Case ID: scl_26/html/0136-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Earle, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Galliott and Lefevre ads. Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank.
    One partner, after the dissolution of the copartnership, cannot hind the other, by signing the partnership name, without express authority ; and notice through the public papers, to the plaintiffs, of such dissolution, is sufficient.
    Each renewal of a note in hank is a new contract.
    Before Richardson, J., at Charleston, January Term, 1841.
    This was an action of assumpsit, on a note drawn by Sebastian Aimar, dated 31st December, 1831, for three hundred and thirty-seven dollars, with the names of defendants endorsed. It was in evidence that a co-partnership had existed between the defendants, which was dissolved on the 14th November of the same year, before the *date of the note ; and notice of the dissolution, through the public papers, reached the plaintiffs. The endorsement was not in the handwriting of either of the defendant?, but was written by the wife of Lefevre, he himself being-unable to write. There was no evidence of any express authority delegated to her to endorse for the firm, even while it was in existence. The witness on this point said he had seen her sign notes for the firm once or twice, and had mentioned it to Galliott. Mr. Morris, a clerk in the bank, stated that this note had been discounted in the bank, and protested regularly for non-payment. He believed the note to have been a renewal of another note of the same drawer, and endorsed by Galliott & Lefevre, as he found an entry of such a note on the books of the bank, kept by bis predecessor in office. Sebastian Aimar had become insolvent between the date of the first note and the date of the one sued on, and he therefore presumed the bank had discounted this note on the faith of Galliott’s solvency.
    See Post, 298 ; 6 Rich. 219 ; Meggitt vs. Finney w Jones, 4 Strob. 220. An.
    
    I left the facts to the jury, charging them, that unless Mrs. Lefevre had been authorized to endorse the present note, as well as those made during the partnership, the defendants were not bound by her endorsement.
    The jury found for the plaintiff, and the defendants’ counsel served me with the annexed notice of appeal.
    GROUNDS OP APPEAL.
    1. The plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, because the co-partnership was dissolved before the date of the note ; Galliot never assented to, or authorized, the endorsement; and that plaintiffs had no notice of the dissolution.
    2. The statements of Mr. Morris concerning a previous note were not evidence, because, even admitting that to be a fact, each renewal discharges the prior note. IT is evidence was not competent, because his knowledge on this subject was derived from memoranda kept by his predecessor, and not lumself, and which memoranda were not produced in evidence.
    3. The verdict was against justice, law, and evidence.
    
      Cooper, for the motion,
    cited and relied upon 1 McCord, 388, as to the power of partners ; 3 McCord, 52G, was cited by him in order to show that every renewal of a note formed a *new contract, and that this note being a renewal of another, it might be considered as payment. He contended that the mem-oranda of the witness who testified was not competent evidence.
    
      Memminger, contra,
    contended that the wife of Lefevre had been allowed to write for them. Galliott had assented to it, and, therefore, he was bound by her act. This was a renewal. There were other counts in the declaration, and plaintiffs might recover on them.
   Curia, per

Earle, J.

The co-partnership of the defendants having been dissolved before the making of the note in question, and notice having- reached the plaintiff, neither of them could bind the other by signing the partnership name, without express authority. It does not vary the case at all, that the note sued on was a renewal of one endorsed and discounted before the dissolution. It is well settled that each renewal is a new contract. If Lefevre himself could not bind Galliott, by signing the partnership name, it would be very strange if a third person, although the wife of one of them, could do it without authority from either. The revocation of all that she had previously done, was complete by the act of dissolution, and there is no proof of any given to her after-wards, either by Galliott or Lefevre. The plaintiff, therefore cannot recover on the note. It is equally clear that he cannot recover on the money counts. To say that a note discounted by the maker, is evidence of money lent to the endorser, is a novelty. Such a proposition is opposed to the common usage and general experience of men, and the defendants could only be charged upon clear and explicit proof, that in fact, the note was discounted for their benefit, and that they received the money. Motion granted.

The whole Court concurred.