Case ID: f-appx_606/html/0376-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Paula RAMSUM, an unmarried person, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Walter FRENZEL; Jane Doe Frenzel; JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, successor to Washington Mutual Bank, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-35371.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 1, 2015.
    Filed June 16, 2015.
    Catherine C. Clark, Law Office of Catherine C. Clark, Seattle, WA, Tim Glenn Krell, Timothy G. Krell Real Estate Law, PLLC, Bellingham, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Hugh Robert McCullough, Frederick B. Burnside, Esquire, Rebecca J. Francis, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TASHIMA, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Paula Ramsum appeals the district court decision dismissing her action fpr judicial foreclosure against property in Whatcom County, Washington, that was formerly owned by her ex-husband.

We review de novo dismissals under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2012). In light of the Washington statutes at issue in this case, we affirm. See Wash. Rev.Code §§ 4.64.030, 65.04.045, 65.04.047, 26.18.020, 26.18.055, 26.21.480, 26.21.490. Because Ramsum did not identify or describe her ex-husband’s former property in the documents she filed with the Whatcom County Auditor’s Office, she did not substantially comply with the requirements for recording liens against real property. See Kim v. Lee, 102 Wash.App.586, 9 P.3d 245, 249 (2000), rev’d on other grounds, 145 Wash.2d 79, 31 P.3d 665 (2001) (en banc) (“Washington courts have long upheld actions taken in substantial compliance with statutory requirements, albeit with procedural imperfections. Substantial compliance requires ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [the] statute.’ ” (quoting City of Seattle v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 116 Wash.2d 923, 809 P.2d 1377, 1380 (1991) (en banc))).

• The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ramsum’s motion to vacate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Maraziti v. Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 253 (9th Cir.1995) (“This Court reviews a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.”). Ramsum could have made the legal argument set forth in her motion to vacate in response to JP Morgan Chase’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Llewellyn, 139 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that “[n]either ignorance nor carelessness on the part of the litigant or his attorney provide grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1).” (internal citation omitted)). Regardless, the statute Ramsum relied on in her Rule 60(b) motion — Wash. Rev.Code § 65.04.047 — does not alter the outcome.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and. is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.