Case ID: f-appx_386/html/0154-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael Alan CROOKER, Appellant v. WARDEN, FCI LORETTO.
    No. 10-1720.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 June 10, 2010.
    Filed: July 9, 2010.
    
      Michael Alan Crooker, Loretto, PA, pro se.
    Robert L. Eberhardt, Esq., Laura S. Irwin, Esq., Office of the United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.
    Before: BARRY, FISHER and GREENAWAY, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Because the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6.

In February 2010, Crooker filed a petition under § 2241 alleging that, as a prisoner at FCI Loretto, he had been improperly sanctioned for violating BOP disciplinary rules, but was exonerated after an administrative appeal. Crooker claimed that he intended to file a suit for damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1495 — the unjust conviction statute — and sought from the District Court a “certificate of innocence,” as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2513. The District Court denied the request over Crooker’s objections, reasoning that Crooker’s suit would be frivolous because a reversed disciplinary sanction does not amount to a reversed conviction that would provide the basis for a suit under § 1495, and that the District Court lacked authority to issue a “certificate of innocence.”

A person who intends to file a suit under § 1495 must demonstrate that his conviction was reversed, and “[pjroof of the requisite facts shall be by a certificate of the court or pardon wherein such facts are alleged to appear_” § 2513(b) (emphasis added). In denying the petition, the District Court reasoned that because Crooker’s disciplinary sanction was set aside by an administrative appeals board, the plain language of § 2513 permitted only that board to issue a certificate of innocence. We agree.

In his objections, Crooker argued that the District Court had the authority to issue a certificate of innocence, and cited Roberson v. United States, 124 F.Supp. 857, 861 (Ct.Cl.1954). In Roberson, the Court of Claims reasoned — but did not expressly hold — that a District Court had the authority to issue Roberson a certificate of innocence because that court set aside his conviction on a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 861-63. It did not suggest, however, that a District Court may issue a certificate of innocence merely because it entertains a habeas petition. Thus, Roberson has no bearing on Crook-er’s case, as the District Court did not set aside his disciplinary sanction.

Because we agree that the District Court could not issue Crooker a certificate of innocence, we need not consider its other reasons for denying his petition. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. 
      
      . We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. In determining whether a district court properly denied a petition for habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, we exercise plenary review over the district court's legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.2002).