Case ID: wis_100/html/0400-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Winslow, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Raasch and wife, Appellants, vs. Raasch, imp., Respondent.
    
      August 31
    
    
      September 20, 1898.
    
    
      Equity: Lien on land: Unconscionable conduct: Denial of relief.
    
    In an action to enforce a lien on land for unpaid purchase money, it appeared that plaintiffs had conveyed the land to their son in consideration of natural love and affection and certain payments to be made annually during their lives; that the son occupied it with his wife as a homestead; that thereafter the plaintiffs, conspiring with their son to obtain a reconveyance, induced him to abandon his wife, who thereupon obtained a divorce and was assigned the land and the personal property thereon as her share of her husband’s property; that he then, in order to defeat her rights, fraudulently transferred said personal property to the plaintiffs to an amount exceeding the lien claimed by them on the land, and they assisted in the scheme by taking the property and using it for their joint benefit. Held, that plaintiffs had no standing in equity to enforce their alleged lien.
    .Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of Milwaukee county: R. N. AustiN, Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    This is an action in equity originally commenced for the purpose of canceling a deed of real estate executed by the plaintiffs to William Raasch, their son; but, by amended complaint, the action was afterwards changed into an action to enforce a lien for unpaid purchase money upon the land in question. The land covered by the deed consists of forty acres of land in the county of Milwaukee. On the 14th day of February, 1891, the plaintiffs, who were somewhat advanced in years, conveyed the same by warranty deed to their son, William Eaasch, in consideration of the sum of one dollar and parental love and affection. The deed also contained this further provision as to the consideration : “ And, for a further consideration, said party of the second part agrees, his heirs and assigns, to pay, on demand, to said parties of the first part, the sum of one hundred dollars, or to the survivor of them. Said party of the second part, his heirs and assigns, further agrees to pay to said parties of the first part the sum of one hundred dollars annually during their lifetime, and fifty dollars to the survivor of them.”
    The complaint alleges the due execution of the deed, and that William had neglected to make any of the payments except the sum of $50 to apply upon the first payment, and that there was due $350; also, that the defendant Fredericks claimed to have some interest in the premises subject to the plaintiffs’lien; and they asked for judgment declaring the said sums to be liens on the premises, and that they have personal judgment against William Eaasch therefor, and that the premises be sold to pay such liens unless redeemed.
    The defendant William Eaasch made no answer, but the defendant Fredericks answered, alleging that she was the wife of William Eaasch at the time of the execution of the deed, and that thereupon she and her husband moved upon the land in question, and occupied the same as their homestead, and that she, with her children, was so occupying the same at the time of the commencement of this action; on information and belief, that the plaintiffs conspired with her said Jmsband, William, to have said land reconveyed to them, and, upon her refusal so to do, induced her said husband, without cause, to abandon her and said family, and that thereupon she commenced an action of divorce against him, and obtained a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony on the 31st day of May, 1893, by which judgment said lands were assigned to her, together with all the personal property of William then upon said lands; that there was then upon the farm a large quantity of oats, corn, potatoes, and hay, together with horses, cows, and farming implements, all of the value of over $1,000, which under the decree of divorce became her property; that the plaintiff Friederioh, after her husband had abandoned her, and after said property had been assigned to her, gathered and carried away all of the crops aforesaid, as well as the stock, farming implements, and other personal property upon the farm, and converted the same to his own use; and that such property was thereafter taken and used by both the plaintiffs for their mutual benefit, advantage, and support.
    The action was tried by the court, and the following findings of fact were made: “ That all the allegations in the answer of the defendant Frederiolte Raasoh to the last amended complaint are true as therein stated, except that the court finds that the property alleged in the ninth paragraph of said answer to have been taken by Friederioh Raasoh was, as a matter of fact, wrongfully and unlawfully taken and appropriated by both of the plaintiffs for their joint benefit; and the said articles so taken were of a value exceeding $500. Second. The court further finds that the transfer of the title to said articles, claimed upon the trial to have been made by William Raasch to the plaintiff Friederioh Raasoh, was and is fraudulent and void as to the rights of the defendant Frederiolte Raasoh, and was made to cover up the property of said William Raasch, and to wrongfully prevent the defendant Frederiolte Raasoh from having and asserting her just rights therein and thereto. Third. The court finds that at the commencement of the action there was due to the plaintiffs, under and by the terms of the deed described in the complaint, the sum of- $150, which has been more than paid to the plaintiffs by the property taken by tbe plaintiffs, as alleged in tbe answer of tbe defendant Frederioke Baasoh, wbiob property was and is tbe property of said defendant Frederioke Baasoh, and wbicb, in justice and equity, ought to be applied pro tanto upon tbe amount due under said deed, and wbicb tbe court now does appropriate and apply upon said amount so due to tbe extent of liquidating and discharging tbe plaintiffs’ claim set up in tbe complaint, but which application does not exhaust all of said property, but final adjustment will hereafter be made between tbe parties. Fourth. Tbe court further finds that tbe plaintiffs do not come into a court of equity with clean bands, and that, in justice and equity, there is nothing due to the plaintiffs under and by virtue of tbe agreements contained in said deed, but that tbe plaintiffs have been more than paid what is due to them. Fifth. And tbe court finds that at tbe time tbe last amended complaint was made, to wit, June 25,1894, there was not then due and owing to tbe plaintiffs, under tbe agreements contained in said deed, the sum of $350, with interest, as alleged in folio 8 of said last amended complaint; but, in truth and in fact, there was then nothing due and owing to tbe plaintiffs under said agreement by reason of tbe facts above found; but, in justice and equity,, tbe plaintiffs were owing and indebted to the defendant Frederioke Baasoh. Sixth. Tbe court further finds that the plaintiffs have no standing in tbe court of equity, and no-equitable rights wbicb ought to be enforced by a court of equity.”
    Upon these findings tbe complaint was dismissed, and the plaintiffs appeal.
    For the appellants there was a brief by Nath. Pereles & Sons, and oral argument by C. F. Hunter.
    
    For the respondent there was a brief by Rogers & Mann, attorneys, and Orren T. Williams, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Williams.
    
   Winslow, J.

The evidence in this case was confused and conflicting, but we are unable to say that it does not support the findings; hence the question is whether the findings sustain the judgment. The facts found are, in brief, as follows : The plaintiffs conveyed the land in question to their son, William Raasoh, in February, 1891, in consideration of natural love and affection and certain annual payments to be made them by William during their lives. The defendant Fredericks was the wife of William, and they occujhed the land as their homestead, and cultivated it thereafter, and William made one payment thereon of $50. Difficulties then arose between the parties, and the plaintiffs conspired with William to obtain a reconveyance of the land, and, in pursuance of such object, induced William to abandon his wife; and she thereupon obtained a divorce, and was assigned the land, with the personal property thereon, as her share of William’s property. Thereupon William, in order to defeat the rights of Fredericke under her decree of divorce, made a fraudulent transfer of the personal property on the farm to an amount exceeding $500; and the plaintiffs assisted in such scheme by taking the property and using it for their joint benefit. Under these circumstances, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had no standing in a court of equity to enforce their alleged lien upon the real estate, and in this conclusion we agree.

The facts found by the court are practically to the effect that William and his parents colluded together to get the title of the land back into the plaintiffs, and deprive Fredericke of all her rights therein, and even of her ability to make the annual payments thereon. This action seems to be but the final step necessary to carry out the scheme. A court of equity will not assist in the consummation of any such purpose. The action seems, under the facts found, to be an unconscionable one. We do not say that the mere conversion of tbe personal property on tbe farm constitutes a legal defense to tbe claim for a lien. That seems more than doubtful. But we simply bold that tbe facts present a case of sucb unconscionable conduct on tbe part of tbe plaintiffs towards tbe defendant Fredericke that a court of equity will deny its assistance to them. They have not done equity in tbis very matter, and are in no position to demand tbe assistance of a court of equity.

By the Court.— Judgment affirmed.