Case ID: scl_2/html/0481-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "The presiding Judge, (Bay,)", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Administrators of John Compty, deceased, against Martyn Alken.
    Columbia,
    1802.
    Where a bond assigned to defendant, ■was offered in discount against one given by him. to the plain*» tiffs’ intestate, a receipt is good evidence to shew that the assigned bond had been paid off. A receipt or acquittance of any kind, is not barred by the statute of limitations, as it is an extin-guishment of the debt pro tanto, and ought not to be assimilated to open account*
    DEBT on bond, 1,000/. Verdict for plaintiffs. Motion for new trial.
    This action was brought upon a bond given by defendant to plaintiffs’ intestate. Defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice that he meant to offer in discount, a bond assigned him by William Cunnington, for a sum equal in amount to the amount of the bond sued for, viz. 1,000/. given by the intestate in his life-time to the said- William Cunnington.
    
    Upon the trial, this bond from Compty to Cunnington was produced, with a regular assignment to Aiken, the defendant in this case.
    To this bond, however, the plaintiffs objected, alleging that it had been paid off; and for that purpose, offered a receipt to the full amount of the bond offered in discount, to the following effect: “Received May the 20th, If 94, of “ John Compty, sundry goods by Richard Bolán, to the “ amount of 200/. also some time before, a note of Cornelius “ Vanderhorne, for 600/. ■ also an order on John Rutledge, “ for. 200/. which I shall be accountable for.
    (Signed,)
    “ William Cunnington.”
    Mr. Falconer, for defendant,
    contended, that this receipt not being on the bond, nor specifying on what account these goods and the note and order were delivered to Cun-nington, they could not be considered in any other light than as an open account against Cunnington, and as such, the whole was barred by the statute of limitations. For that purpose he quoted Espinasse’s N. P. 239. where it is laid down, that a debt barred by the statute of limitations, eould not be admitted in discount, and the plaintiff might object to it on the general issue. That although Aiken was not plaintiff in this action, yet as this receipt went to destroy his discount, he ought to be considered as standing in the shoes of a plaintiff, in rebutting any discount set up against the bond he offered in evidence against the present plaintiffs’ claim.
    He next contended, that a discount could not be set off against a discount. That the act never contemplated any such kind of transactions, only mutual demands between the parties litigant.
    In reply to this, it was urged on the part of the plaintiffs, that this receipt was evidence of payments made to the amount of the bond offered in discount, and was to be considered as made for the express purpose of satisfying this bond, as no transaction whatever appeared between the deceased in his life-time, and Cunnington, who assigned this bond, excepting the one under consideration. It was admitted that the statute of limitations would bar open accounts, but that the statute never could run against payments, or discharges given by a man xvho has a demand against another.
    
   The presiding Judge, (Bay,)

in his charge to the jury, told them, that there was a great difference between open accounts and discharges or acquittances. The former as well as notes of hand, might, be barred by the statute of limitations, but that act could never operate against a release or acquittance, because so much as was mentioned in. a release or a discharge was an extinguishment of the debt. or demand pro tanto. That every receipt was a release in law, and extinguished a debt or demand as effectually as a release under hand and seal. That in the present case, the receipt was for the whole amount of the bond, and as it did not appear, that there were any other transactions between the parties, it was fair to presume that the sums mentioned in the receipt produced, were paid in discharge of the bond offered in discount. And that if the jury should be of his opinion, and there was nothing to justify a contrary one, it would be their duty to reject the bond offered in discount, as having been paid off and discharged.

That this could not be considered as a discount against a discount, which would be an absurdity, but evidence of payment of a debt offered in discount, for it had been frequently determined that a bona fide debt transferred to a defendant, might be set off against a plaintiff’s demand. That it was, therefore, surely consistent with every principle of law and justice, for the plaintiff, if he could shew that the debt assigned was paid off by him, to give evidence to rebut the defendant’s discount offered against him.

The Jury, agreeably to the Judge’s charge, found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and rejected in toto the defendant’s discount.

This was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection, and the verdict being against law.

When, after argument, the Judges refused the motion and ordered the rule to be discharged, holding, that a receipt or acquittance of any kind, was not within the intent or meaning of the statute of limitations, and that the construction given by the presiding Judge in his charge to the jury, was perfectly consistent with the rules of law.

Present, Grimke, Waties, Bay, Johnson, and Trf. ZEVANT.

BREVARD absent at the time of the argument,.