Case ID: f-appx_710/html/0144-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Michael CORBIN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 17-4493
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: January 30, 2018
    Decided: February 1, 2018
    James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. William
    Camden Lewis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Richard Michael Corbin pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment. Counsel has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) brief, finding no meritorious issues, but questioning whether the court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and whether the sentence is reasonable. Corbin was informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so. The Government declined to file a brief. Finding no error, we affirm.

Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court also must ensure that the defendant’s plea is voluntary, supported by a sufficient factual basis, and not the result of force, threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20.

Because Corbin did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in the district court or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, we review the plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). “To prevail on a claim of plain error, [Corbin] must demonstrate not only that the district court plainly erred, but also that this error affected his substantial rights.” Id. at 816. In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes that an error affected his substantial rights if he demonstrates a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty but for the error. Id. The record reveals that the district court conducted a sufficient plea colloquy with Cor-bin. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in accepting Corbin’s guilty plea.

This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We first review for significant procedural errors, including whether the district court failed to calculate or improperly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failed to adequately explain its chosen sentence. Id. If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we then examine substantive reasonableness, considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. We presume that a sentence within or below the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). “Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

We discern no error in the court’s rulings or its determination of the Guidelines range. We also conclude that Corbin fails to rebut the presumption that his below-Guidelines-range, albeit statutory maximum, sentence is substantively reasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. The district court responded to defense counsel’s arguments for a downward variance sentence meaningfully, and explained its chosen sentence. We conclude that Cor-bin’s sentence is reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Corbin’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Corbin, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Corbin requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Corbin.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED