Case ID: f-appx_615/html/0019-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

LEI LIN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-745.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 8, 2015.
    Michael Brown, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant, Attorney General; Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel; Janette L. Allen, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      
       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. as Respondent.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Lei Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February 14, 2012 decision of the BIA affirming an April 13, 2010 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Douglas B. Schoppert denying Lin’s application asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 17 Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Lei Lin, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Feb. 14, 2012), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 13, 2010). Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005), applying well established standards of review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

For applications like Lin’s that were filed before enactment of the 2005 REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility determination must be based on “specific, cogent reasons” that “bear a legitimate nexus” to the finding, and any discrepancy must be “substantial” when measured against the record as a whole. Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003). Inconsistencies need not be fatal if they are “minor and isolated,” and the testimony is otherwise generally consistent, rational, and believable. See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir.2000).

Lin argues that (1) he adduced new evidence sufficient to rehabilitate his prior incredible testimony pertaining to his family planning claim, and (2) the agency improperly found his testimony relating to Falun Gong not credible on the basis of the prior adverse credibility determination. We are not persuaded.

The agency was entitled to discount Lin’s new evidence because it consisted of unsworn letters from interested parties and unsigned, unauthenticated photocopies of purportedly official documents. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that weight accorded to evidence lies largely within discretion of agency). Moreover, the prior adverse credibility determination was based on a finding that Lin had submitted falsified documents to the IJ. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-47 (2d Cir.2007).

As to Lin’s alleged practice of Fa-lun Gong, the agency was justified in relying on the prior adverse credibility determination to find Lin’s testimony and documentary evidence incredible. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170, 171 (2d Cir.2007) (“[B]ecause the submission of [false ancillary] evidence raises the question of the alien’s overall credibility, even ancillary evidence sometimes supports falsus in uno.”)-, accord Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d at 146 — 47. Accordingly, the agency did not err in discounting Lin’s scant documentary evidence and in disbelieving the evidence that depended upon Lin’s credibility. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d at 146-47; Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d at 170.

Because these findings are dispositive of Lin’s petition, we need not review the agency’s alternative grounds for denying Lin relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).