Case ID: f-appx_444/html/0183-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Cynthia JETER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Deborah L. PATRICK, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 07-55914.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 11, 2011.
    
    Filed July 20, 2011.
    John Owen Lanahan, Esq., Law Offices of John O. Lanahan, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Alan D. Tate, Esq., Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: FERNANDEZ, RYMER, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Cynthia Jeter appeals the district court’s denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.

In order to prevail, Jeter must meet the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which, in effect, direct us to be highly deferential and to give state court decisions the benefit of the doubt. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 360, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2002) (per cu-riam). Where, as here, the claim is that the state courts unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law, a petitioner must show that “ ‘there was no reasonable basis’ ” for the state courts’ decision; Jeter “has failed to meet that high threshold.”

(1) Jeter first asserts that her constitutional rights under Batson were violated because the state courts unreasonably rejected her claim that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges based on race or gender. We disagree. We have reviewed the record and made the required comparative analysis and we are unable to say that the state court unreasonably determined that the prosecutor’s explanation for the exercise of perempto-ries was not purposefully discriminatory.

(2) Jeter next argues that her due process rights were violated because the trial court erroneously included “intent” in its instructions to the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter. Again, we disagree. The California Court of Appeal could reasonably determine that on the record in this case the error was not prejudicial — we cannot say that the error so infected the trial that due process was violated.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. Rule 36-3.
     
      
      
        .See Harrington v. Richter,-U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 770, 785-86, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).
     
      
      . Cullen v. Pinholster, U.S. - — —,-, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1402, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003); Sessoms v. Runnels, No. 08-17790, slip op. 7337, 7349-50, 2011 WL 2163970, 650 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. June 3, 2011).
     
      
      . Pinholster, - U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 1403.
     
      
      . Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-99, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
     
      
      . See Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir.2010); Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 360 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc). We note that the state courts did not conduct a comparative analysis, but that does not affect the standard of review. See Cook, 593 F.3d at 816 n. 2; see also Harrington, - U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 784.
     
      
      . See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct. 969, 974, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006); Cook, 593 F.3d at 816, 826. We note that even before the enactment of the stringent standards in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we were required to give “great deference" to state court determinations in this area. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21.
     
      
      . See People v. Lasko, 23 Cal.4th 101, 109, 999 P.2d 666, 671, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 447 (Cal.2000).
     
      
      . The facts show, among other things, that Jeter stabbed her husband and then stood by for over twelve hours while he bled to death.
     
      
      . See, e.g., Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437-38, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 1832-33, 158 L.Ed.2d 701 (2004); McNeil v. Middleton, 402 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir.2005); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991).