Case ID: f-appx_632/html/0341-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Nicholas Scott STONE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R. LOPEZ, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 13-17313.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Aug. 11, 2015.
    Filed Jan. 22, 2016.
    Linnea Marie Johnson, Esquire, Central California Appellate Program, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Nicholas Scott Stone, pro se.
    David Alan Rhodes, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: KOZINSKI and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior U.S. District Judge for the for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner-appellant Nicholas Scott Stone appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition challenging his conviction for attempted murder with premeditation in violation of California Penal Code §§ 664 and 187. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

The district court did not err by holding that the state court’s ’ determination that Stone received constitutionally adequate notice of the attempted murder charge was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Stone claims his defense was prejudiced when the prosecution’s theory at trial diverged from the original complaint. But where there is a variance between “the allegations and proof,” the inquiry is “whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the substantial rights’ of the accused.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Under Brecht, relief is proper only if we have “grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)).

Stone has failed to show how the information charging him with the attempted murder of “J.F.” prejudiced his defense. At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the prosecutor clearly argued Stone attempted to murder someone in the group of Norteños, which included J.F. Both the preliminary hearing and the trial testimony focused on the angle of the gun and whether Stone’s intent was to shoot up in the air and scare the group, or whether Stone instead pointed the gun down and intended to kill. Considering the similarities between the proof presented at the preliminary hearing and the proof presented at trial, we cannot say that any error in notice was so great as to “affect the substantial rights” of Stone or have a “substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 632 n. 7, 113 S.Ct. 1710. Because the “issue in appellant’s trial was not-who he intended to kill but whether he intended to kill,” the California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded any error was harmless. People v. Stone, No. F051812, 2009 WL 3358436, at *8 (Cal.Ct.App. Oct. 20, 2009) (unpublished).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.