Case ID: ohio-st_67/html/0326-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Shauck, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The Board of Education of Van Buren Township, Darke County v. The Board of Education of Greenville Township, Darke County.
    
      'Township education boards — Joint meeting to establish joint sub-district — Disagreement—Independent meeting of members of joint boards — Majority of quorum effective, when — School law.
    
    Under tbe provisions of chapter 5 of the Revised Statutes, a joint meeting of the members of different township boards of education to consider a petition for the establishment of a joint subdistrict is, an agreement failing, an independent body in which a majority of all the members of the interested boards constitutes a quorum, and tbe favoring vote of a majority of tbe quorum is sufficient for the provisional establishment of such district.
    (Decided December 16, 1902.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Darke county.
    Plaintiff in error filed its petition in the court of common pleas for a decree enjoining the defendant from erecting a schoolhouse in a joint subschool district composed of territory belonging in part to each of said townships, and from taking control of the funds and school matters in said subdistrict, upon the ground that said snbdistrict had not been lawfully established. The allegations of the petition in substance are: The proper petition for the establishment of said district was filed, and due notice was given to the members of the boards of education of a joint meeting to take action thereon. Pursuant to said notice, and at the time designated, there assembled at the joint meeting eleven of the twenty members of the Greenville township board, and seven of tbe nine members of the Van Burén township board. The meeting was organized as an independent body by the election of a president- and clerk. Upon tlie proposition to establish the snbdistrict in accordance with the prayer of the petition, ten who were members of the Greenville board, and two who were members of the Van Burén board, voted in favor of the proposition, thereupon the chairman declared that the proposition carried, and proceedings were undertaken upon the assumption that the action was valid to create the sub-district. The petition also alleges that the school facilities previously provided in the two townships were adequate to meet the wants of the children of school age. In the common pleas a demurrer to the petition was overruled, and a peremptory injunction was granted. On a petition in error the circuit court reversed the judgment, sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the petition, rendering judgment against the plaintiff for costs.
    
      Mr. A. L. Clark and Mr. A. C. Robeson, for plaintiff in error, cited and commented upon the following authorities:
    Sections 3928, 3931 and 3931, Revised Statutes; State v. Wright, 17 Ohio, 32; Section 3971, Revised Statutes; State v. Davies, 5 Circ. Dec., 525; 12 C. C. R., 218; Board of Education v. Saloon, 7 N. P., 289; Coast Co. v. Spring Lake, 58 N. J. Eq., 586.
    
      Mr. W. Y. Stubbs and Messrs. Anderson & Bowman, for defendant in error, cited and commented upon the following authorities:
    Section 2, article 6, constitution; Section 3885, Revised Statutes; Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St., 211; State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St., 275; State v. Best, 35 W. L. B., 360; State v. Treasurer, 22 Ohio St., 144; United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S., 1; At
      
      torney General v. Shepard, 62 N. H., 383; Gas Co. v. Rushville, 121 Ind., 206; Launtz v. People, 113 Ill., 137; Cadmus v. Farr, 47 N. J. L., 208; First Parish v. Stearns, 21 Pick., 148; Lawrence v. Ingersoll, 88 Tenn., 52; Cupp v. Commissioners, 19 Ohio St., 175; State v. Wilkesville Tp., 20 Ohio St., 288; Fox v. Fox, 24 Ohio St., 335; State v. Green, 37 Ohio St., 227; State v. Anderson, 45 Ohio St., 196; Everett v. Smith, 22 Minn., 53; Oldknow v. Wainwright, 2 Bur., 1017; Ohio v. Treasurer, 17 Ohio, 32; Board of Education v. Guy, 64 Ohio St., 434; State v. School District, 29 Ia., 264; State v. Powers, 38 Ohio St., 54; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich., 30; Stockle v. Silsbee, 41 Mich., 621; State v. Fleming, 147 Mo., 1; People v. Oakland, 92 Cal., 611; People v. Peoria, 166 Ill., 517; State v. Topeka, 31 Kan., 452; Haff v. Fuller, 45 Ohio St., 495; Board of Education v. Stuck, 39 Ohio St., 259.
   Shauck, J.

The principal contention of counsel for the plaintiff is, that Section 3928, Revised Statutes, which is a part of the chapter relating to joint subdistricts, contemplates the establishment of such subdistricts by the mutual agreement of the boards concerned, to be expressed at a joint meeting, and that by implication a quorum of each board must be present, and that a majority of each quorum must vote in favor of its establishment.- Whether that is the correct interpretation of the particular section cited, if considered alone, need not be determined in the present case. Chapter 5 is devoted wholly to the establishment, maintenance, alteration and dissolution of joint subdistricts. The proceedings had in this instance were supposed to be, and, we think, clearly were, authorized by this, and the succeeding sections of the chapter. These sections contemplate that an agreement failing, the members of the several boards, interested shall constitute a special body for the consideration of the subject. Since the statute makes, no different requirement, a majority of the body is a quorum, and a majority of the quorum may act. This view of the statute need not be rejected from fear of abuse by the preponderating vote of the membelrs from a larger township. What the legislature has evidently regarded as a safe precaution against such possible abuse is found in a timely remonstrance to be filed with the probate judge. The action of the joint board provisionally established the joint subdistrict, and the statute pointed out a mode of procedure to be pursued by any who are dissatisfied therewith.

It may be that the case would, upon consideration of the question, be found to be within the familiar rule that there can be no resort to equity when legal remedies are adequate, and further that the plaintiff’ is without capacity to maintain the present action, but the point decided justifies the judgment of the circuit court and it will be affirmed.

eJudgment affirmed.

Btjrket, C. J., Spear, Davis, Price and Crew, JJ., concur.