Case ID: tex-crim_33/html/0382-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SIMELINS, Jhdg-e. —", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John Pyland v. The State.
    
      No. 463.
    
    
      Decided May 19.
    
    1. Indictment — Burglary of Railroad Car — Ownership.—An indictment for burglary of a railroad car, alleging that tbe same was occupied by oue'K., and that tbe burglarious entry was with intent t'o steal tbe property of said K. and one H.: Held, tbe indictment was not defective in failing to allege tbe ownership of tbe car in K., or tbe right by which K. was holding or occupying the same.
    2. Same — Statutory law. — In charging burglary from a bouse, it is sufficient for tbe indictment to allege that tbe entry was burglarious and without tbe consent of tbe occupant; and the same rule is made applicable by statute to a railroad car. Penal Code, art. 720.
    3. Same — Evidence—Want of Consent.. — On a trial for burglary of a railroad car with intent to steal tbe property of a certain person, it is permissible to prove by such person bis want of consent, tbe character of bis ownership of tbe property, and tbe fact that be was in control of tbe car at tbe time of tbe burglary.
    4. Defendant as a Witness — Compelling Accused to Testify Against Himself. — Whilst it is true that section 10 of tbe Bill of Eights expressly declares that tbe accused, in a criminal prosecution, shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, Held, that this right is waived when a defendant is sworn as a witness in bis own behalf.
    Appeal from tbe District Court of Denton. Tried below before Hon. D. E. Barrett. ■ '
    This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for burglary of a railroad car or “caboose,” tbe punishment assessed being a term of two years in tbe bouse of correction and reformatory, tbe jury by tbeir verdict having found appellant to be under tbe age of 16 years.
    A motion to quash tbe indictment was overruled. Tbe grounds of ' this motion are fully stated in tbe opinion.
    Appellant was a witness in bis own behalf on tbe trial of tbe case. He testified, that be was born in Ohio; that be was 14 years of age; that for tbe past four years be bad been tramping it in tbe States of Arkansas and Texas; that be bad ridden in tbe cars all over Texas, oftentimes beating' bis way and sometimes paying bis fare; that on tbe day of tbe alleged burglary be entered tbe cupola of tbe caboose through a window, and that after getting in be stole tbe articles testified to by tbe other witnesses, viz., a razor, bat, and pair of shoes, which be found in said caboose of tbe cars.
    No briefs with the record.
    
      JR. L. Henry, Assistant Attorney-General, for tbe State.
   SIMELINS, Jhdg-e. —

1. Tbe indictment alleges that appellant, in tbe day-time, by force, etc., did break and enter a certain caboose there situate, tbe same being a railroad car attached to a train of freight cars, tbe same being then and there aecupied by David Knebbles, with intent, etc.; alleging an intent to steal the personal property of said Knebbles and one Hunter. Appellant moved to quash, because the ownership of the caboose, or the right in which the said Knebbles was holding and occupying the same, was not alleged. It is settled that, in charging burglary in a house, it is sufficient to allege that it was done burglariously, and without the consent of the occupant (Mace’s case, 9 Texas Criminal Appeals, 111; Penal Code, article 706); and-by article 720, Penal Code, the same rule is applicable to'a railroad car. The court did not err in overruling the motion to quash.-

2. The court did not err in permitting the State to prove want of consent on the part of said Knebbles, nor in permitting him to testify that he was in control of the car at- the time the burglary was committed; nor did he err in permitting proof of the character and ownership of the stolen property. The charge was, that defendant burglarized the caboose with intent to steal the property of certain persons.

3. Appellant complains that the court erred in compelling him to testify against himself, in violation of section 10 of the Bill of Bights. The court did not err. The appellant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and thereby waived his right of not being compelled to testify against himself. King’s case, just decided.

4. - The evidence amply sustains the charge. Appellant testified fully as to his guilt. He admits he went in through a window of the cupola of the caboose, which was clearly proven to be an unusual mode of entering the same, and he admits -stealing the goods of the parties charged. *

The judgment is affirmed.

Affirmed,.

Judges all present and concurring.