Case ID: f-appx_564/html/0701-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Junior BLUE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4380.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: March 26, 2014.
    Decided: April 2, 2014.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
    Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
   Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

William Junior Blue pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012), possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012), and was sentenced to a total of 111 months’ imprisonment. Blue appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court procedurally erred in determining that it lacked the authority to grant a downward variance. We affirm.

We review a sentence imposed by a district court under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45-46, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir.2010). Contrary to Blue’s assertion, our review of the record confirms that the district court exercised its discretion in declining to vary downward in sentencing Blue. We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit the procedural error alleged by Blue.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.