Case ID: mich_184/html/0472-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Moore, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HAGER v. SCHLIESS.
    Partnership — Assumed or Fictitious Name — Statutes—Plea to Bill op Complaint.
    The verified plea to complainant’s bill to foreclose a mechanic’s lien setting up as an alleged defense that complainant was engaged in conducting his business under an assumed or fictitious name in violation of Act No. 101, Pub. Acts 1907 (2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 2626 et seq.), as the Hager Lumber & Coal Company, was properly overruled by the trial court upon the ground that it was insufficient in law, plaintiff’s name being the same as that adopted in the title of the company and no fictitious or misleading name appearing in the title.
    Appeal from Eaton; Smith, J.
    Submitted January 19, 1915.
    (Docket No. 135.)
    Decided March 17, 1915.
    Bill by Alton J.- Hager against Frank C. Schliess and others to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. Defendants filed a plea to the bill. Plaintiff entered a replication, which the court struck from the files after hearing the testimony in support of the plea which the trial court held was insufficient in law. Defendants elected to abide by their plea and appeal.
    Affirmed.
    
      Clapperton, Owen & Hatten (Elmer N. Peters, of counsel), for complainant.
    
      Russell R. MePeeh, for defendants.
   Moore, J.

Some phases of this litigation were recently before this court. A reading of the opinion, found in 183 Mich. 610 (149 N. W. 1058), will make a long statement unnecessary here.

The case was argued at the January term of £he court. Counsel for appellants says — we quote from the brief:

“As we view this case there is only one question involved, viz., whether the established rules and precedents of this court relating to the practice upon and disposition of pleas in chancery are to be sustained or are to be reversed, and we shall accordingly begin our argument with a discussion of this topic.”

We cannot agree with the counsel that this is the question involved. His appeal was reinstated because he contended and the record showed that defendants had abandoned their right to answer in said cause, and had elected to abide by their, plea. The trial court found that the truth of the plea was established, but he was of the opinion that, though established, it is not sufficient in law to constitute a defense. We take it the question is, Vfas he right in so finding? This court has recently had occasion to construe Act No. 101, Pub. Acts 1907, entitled “An act to regulate the carrying on of business under an assumed or fictitious name.” The cases are Cashin v. Pliter, 168 Mich. 386 (134 N. W. 482, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1913C, 697); Sauer v. Construction Co., 179 Mich. 618 (146 N. W. 422); Axe v. Tolbert, 179 Mich. 556 (146 N. W. 418); Zemon v. Trim, 181 Mich. 130 (147 N. W. 540); and Cross v. Leonard, 181 Mich. 24 (147 N. W. 540). These cases are so recent and so accessible that we shall content ourselves with saying that they justify the conclusion that defendant’s plea, though true, was not a defense.

The decree is affirmed.

Brooke, C. J., and McAlvay, Kuhn, Stone, Ostrander, Bird, and Steere,. JJ., concurred.