Case ID: ga_48/html/0437-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Warner, Chief Justice.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Simon Cogan, plaintiff in error, vs. Nathan G. Christie et al., defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. Notice — Possession—Constructive.—If C was in possession of land at the time S purchased it, that fact was at least constructive notice to the purchaser, and was sufficient to have put him upon inquiry as to the character and extent of'C’s claim. (R.)
    2. New Trial — Discretion of Judge. — Where the evidence leaves it in some doubt whether a fact necessary to sustain the verdict was established, the Supreme Court will not control the discretion of the Superior Court in awarding a new trial. (R.)
    Possession. Notice. New trial. Before ■ Judge Harrele. Terrell Superior Court. May Term, 1872.
    Simon Cogan filed his bill against Nathan G. Christie, Sea-born A. Smith, and William Pemberton and Richard R. Brown, as executors of William B. Jones, for the purpose of canceling two deeds to the “Cogan Mill Place,” one from Christie to Smith, dated November 1st, 1859, and one from Smith to Jones, dated August 4th, 1863. (The record also fixes this year as 1867.) The bill further prayed that Christie might be required to specifically perform his contract contained in a bond for titles, in which he obligated himself to convey said property to complainant.
    For the remaining facts, see the decision.
    
      C. B. Wooten ; R. F. Simmons, for plaintiff in error.
    *F. M. Harper, by Cearic & Goss; Arthur Hood, for defendants.
    
      
      Notice— Possession — Constructive.—“The actual possession of land is notice to all the world of whatever rights the occupant really has in the premises.” Burr v. Toomer, 103 Ga. 161, 29 S. E. Rep. 692, citing with approval the principal case.
      Same — Same.—-“It is incumbent upon one who purchases, or contracts for a lien on land, to inquire into the right of any person in possession thereof; and such possession charges the former with notice of whatever title or right the occupant really has in the premises.” Neal v. Jones, 100 Ga. 769, 28 S. E. 427, citing with approval the principal case.
      Same — Same.—“The rule that a purchaser of land is bound to inquire into the right of one in possession thereof, and that such possession charges the purchaser with implied notice of that claim of right, is too firmly established to be now denied.” Franklin v. Newsom, 53 Ga. 581, citing with approval the principal case.
      Same — Same.—“Possession of land is notice to the world of whatever right or title the occupant has.” Broome v. Davis, 87 Ga. 587, 13 S. E. Rep. 749, citing -with approval the principal case.
      Same — Same.—-Finch v. Beal, 68 Ga. 597, cites with approval the principal case.
      Same — Same.—Principal case cited with approval in Dougherty v. Western & Atlantic R. Co. 53 Ga. 313.
    
   Warner, Chief Justice.

The error complained of in this case is the granting of a new trial by the Court below. The main facts of the case are as follows : Cogan and Jordan purchased a tract of land with a mill thereon from Christie, who executed to them his bond to make a title thereto when the purchase money therefor should be paid. Cogan went into possession of the land and alleges he has paid all the purchase money, that Jordan relinquished all his interest in the land to him. The evidence in the record upon this part of the case is somewhat conflicting. It appears, however, that Christie, after he had sold the land to Cogan and Jordan, sold it to Smith, and made him a deed, dated 1st November, 1859. Smith sold the land to Jones, and made him a deed, dated 4th August, 1863. On the trial of the case the Court charged the jury that Cogan acquired no title to the land under his bond for title unless all the purchase money was paid, and even if it was all paid, Christie having made a deed to Smith, conveying the land in dispute, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover unless the proof showed that Smith had notice of that fact at the time of his purchase, and the mere fact of Cogan being in possession of the land was not sufficient notice to Smith. The jury found a verdict in favor of Cogan. Whether the Court granted the new trial because the jury found contrary to the charge of the .Court, or because the verdict was contrary to the evidence, does not appear in the record. If Cogan was in possession .df the land at the time Smith purchased it from Christie, that fact was constructive notice to Smith, at least, and sufficient to have put him upon inquiry as to the character and extent of Cogan’s claim of title to an interest in the land, and the charge of the Court was error in regard to that point in the case.

In view of the evidence contained in the record, and as *there is some doubt under that evidence whether Cogan was in possession of the land at the time of the date of Smith’s deed, we will not interfere with the judgment of the Court below in granting the new trial.

Judgment affirmed.