Case ID: mich_22/html/0001-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Graves, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The People v. Peter Navarre.
    
      The People as a suitor in, the courts: Who may appear. Tlie State can be recognized by tbe courts as a suitor in legal proceedings only through tlie agents or legal representatives appointed by law, $md the appearance of the proper representative can only be attested by the record. In a case before a Justice of the Peace under § 5122 of the Compiled Laws, the intervention of the Supervisor of the township is necessary, or that of the Prosecuting Attorney of the county. The State can only bo made plaintiff in error in this Court by the Attorney General.
    
      Heard October 12.
    
    
      Decided October 25.
    
    Error to Wayne Circuit.
    This was an action of debt commenced in the name of the People of the State of Michigan before Peter B. Austin, a Justice of the Peace for the County of Wayne, 'against Peter Navarre. The defendant appeared on the return day and moved to dismiss the cause for the following reasons:
    1st. That, it being admitted that the defendant was a resident of the township of Brownstown, in said county, and that said township did not adjoin the city of Detroit, where the said Justice resided, and that, therefore, ho had no jurisdiction to try the said cause.
    2d. The Supervisor of Brownstown being present, and informing the Court that he did not commence, nor authorize the commencement of said suit, and did not wish to prosecute the same, and asking that the same should be discontinued and dismissed, that, therefore, the same should be dismissed.
    The declaration was in writing and was signed “Fred. A. Baker, Attorney for plaintiffs.” The defendant demurred to the declaration. The demurrer was overruled; he then pleaded the general issue, and on the trial judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. This judgment the defendant brought into the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne by appeal, where the suit was discontinued by consent; and, on motion, costs were granted to the defendant, taxed at $77.25; for which, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs and Joseph Loranger, who had been surety for costs on the commencement of the action before the Justice.
    A writ of error was sued out upon this judgment, from this Court, — F. A. Baker appearing for the people.
    
      F. A. Baker, for plaintiff-in error.
    
      Ward é Palmer, for defendant in error.
   Graves, J.

From an inspection of the record in this case, it would seem that defendant in error was prosecuted before a Justice of the .Peace in the name of plaintiffs in error, to recover certain penalties claimed to have been incurred by Navarre under the statute against obstructing highways (§ 1, Ch. 28, Comp. L.), and the statute to protect bridges from injury (§ 5, Ch. 24, Comp. L.); and that the Justice rendered judgment against him for twelve dollars damages, and ten dollars costs of suit: That an appeal was taken to the Court below, when the cause was discontinued by oral consent in open court, and judgment awarded and costs taxed as follows:

“The People of the State or Michigan, v. “Peter Nayarre.
This cause having been heretofore discontinued in open court, and the question of costs having been reserved, and a motion for costs against the plaintiff and Joseph Loranger, their surety, having heretofore been argued by counsel, for the respective parties, and due deliberation being had thereon, therefore, it is ordered and adjudged by the Court now here that the said defendant do recover from and against the said' plaintiffs and Joseph Loranger, their surety, for his costs and charges about his defense in this behalf expended to be taxed, and that he have execution against Joseph Loranger therefor. Be it remembered that afterwards, to wit, on the 10th day of June, 1869, the defendant’s costs were duly taxed at the sum of seventy-seven dollars and twenty-five cents.”

The only evidence of Loranger’s connection with the proceedings is found in this award of judgment.

The writ of error appears to have" been sued out in the name of the people only, and the assignments of error purport to be by them alone. It is therefore apparent that Loranger is not a party in this Court.

In suing out the writ of error, and in assigning errors in this Court, neither the Prosecuting Attorney nor the Attorney General is named as attorney for the People, and these proceedings appear to have been conducted exclusively by other counsel.

It is seen, therefore, that the People are made to appear in this record as plaintiffs in error, without the intervention of any official representative, but through the procurement and intervention of an unofficial person. But the plaintiff in error can only appear in this class of cases by some public officer designated by law. They óannot be placed in the attitude of litigants in the courts at the will and by the action of private parties or attorneys.

The State can only be recognized by the courts as a suitor in legal proceedings through the agents or representatives appointed by law to speak and act in- its name in the matter in hand; and, unless in the given case the proper agent or representative is present, in legal contemplation the State is not present; and this presence of such agent or representative can be made known and attested only by the record. The State could only be made prosecutor upon the record in the case before the Justice by the intervention of the supervisor of the township in which the penal acts were done (§ 5122, Going. L.), or by that of the Prosecuting Attorney of the county (§ 898, Going. L.); while the latter was the official designated by law to represent the public in the Court below (section last cited)', and the State could not be made plaintiff in error in this Court except by the Attorney General (§ 180, Comp. Li).

While, therefore, the People are designated as plaintiffs in error in the papers before us, they are not present, indeed are not, according to legal apprehension, j)arties at all. We cannot, therefore, assume to pass upon the questions suggested upon these papers. We must consider the writ of error as improvidently issued, and dismiss it.

Campbell, Ch. J. and Cooley, J. concurred.

Christiancy, J. did not sit in this case.