Case ID: f-appx_713/html/0711-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Perla A. HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-15901
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 27, 2018
    Perla A. Hernandez, Pro Se
    Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Karl O. Riley, Esquire, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Jeffrey L. Willis, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
    
      Kelly Harrison Dove, Esquire, Attorney, Snell & Wilmer, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Appellee America’s Servicing Company
    Richard J. Reynolds, Esquire, Attorney, Burke Williams & Sorensen LLP, Santa Ana, CA, for Defendant-Appellee MTC Financial, Inc.
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Perla A. Hernandez appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s FDCPA claim against MTC Financial Inc. because the alleged communication was not an attempt to collect a debt as defined by the FDCPA. See Ho v. ReconTrust Co., N.A., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[AJctions taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure ... are not attempts, to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so only through Section 1692f(6),” and that “[a]s for the remaining FDCPA provisions, ‘debt collection’ refers only to the collection of a money debt”).

The district court properly dismissed Hernandez’s. FDCPA claim against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (‘Wells Fargo”) because Hernandez failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Wells Fargo was a debt collector under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (excluding from the definition of debt collector “any person collecting ... a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person”).

We do not consider matters not properly raised before the district court, or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.