Case ID: f-appx_501/html/0628-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Torrey MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-50283.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 7, 2012.
    
    Filed Dec. 18, 2012.
    Curtis A. Kin, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Michael Anthony Brown, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Holly A. Sullivan, Law Office of Holly A. Sullivan, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: IKUTA and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and BURNS, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Larry A. Burns, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Mitchell appeals the district court’s reimposition of supervised release. We affirm.

The district court did not plainly err in considering the need for restitution when reimposing Mitchell’s term of supervised release; rather, the court is required to consider such a need pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c) and 3553(a)(7). The general rule that district courts may not consider “just punishment” when revoking and reimposing supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), does not override the more specific obligation imposed by § 3553(a)(7) to consider the need to provide restitution. See Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 1354, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010).

Nor was the court’s imposition of a term of supervised release substantively unreasonable, in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). In addition to considering the need for restitution, the district court considered Mitchell’s rehabilitative needs and imposed a sentence that farthered Congress’s goal to help Mitchell make “a desirable transition back into the community.” United States v. Hurt, 345 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir.2003). The result was a sentence that was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the relevant statutory purposes. Carty, 520 F.3d at 991 (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.