Case ID: so2d_435/html/0796-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. BOYD, Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Wayne A. DRIZIN, Respondent.
    No. 61647.
    Supreme Court of Florida.
    July 14, 1983.
    John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director and Stanley A. Spring, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Michael D. Powell, Bar Counsel, Fort Lauderdale, for complainant.
    No appearance for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary proceeding is before the Court on complaint of The Florida Bar and report of the referee. No petition for review has been filed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 15, Florida Constitution.

The referee found respondent guilty of both counts of The Bar’s complaint. Specifically, the referee found respondent guilty of violating Florida Bar Integration Rule, article XI, Rule 11.02(3)(a) and Disciplinary Rules 1 — 102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), 5-104(A), 9-102(A)(2) and 9-102(B)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The referee recommended that respondent be disbarred for a period of five years, such disbarment to run concurrently with respondent’s disbarment imposed by this Court in The Florida Bar v. Drizin, 420 So.2d 878 (Fla.1982). The referee also recommended that respondent be taxed costs in the amount of $758.85.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the referee and adopt them as the opinion of this Court. Respondent is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in Florida, and he cannot reapply for admission to the Bar within five years from the date of this opinion. Costs in the amount of $758.85 are also taxed against respondent.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which ADKINS and SHAW, JJ., concur.

BOYD, Justice,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority opinion approving the referee’s recommendation that respondent should be disbarred. My only disagreement is with that portion of the order which precludes an application for readmission for a minimum of five years.

Respondent has not filed a petition for review of the report of the referee. Article XI, Rule 11.09(3)(f) of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar provides in pertinent part:

If no review is sought of a report of a referee entered under the rules and filed in the Court, the findings of fact shall be deemed conclusive and the disciplinary measure recommended by the referee shall be the disciplinary measure imposed by the Court, unless the court directs the parties to submit briefs or oral argument directed to the suitability of the disciplinary measure recommended by the referee.

Therefore the recommended discipline of a minimum of five years’ disbarment is to be imposed unless we direct the filing of briefs directed to the suitability of the recommended discipline.

Article XI, Rule 11.10(5) of the Integration Rule provides that in general, “no application for admission may be tendered within three years after the date of disbarment or such longer period as the Court might determine in the disbarment order.” Thus our power to impose a period of ineligibility for readmission longer than three years is recognized by the Integration Rule. It has traditionally been our practice, however, to follow the general three-year guideline in most cases. If we are to impose a longer waiting period on some offending lawyers, such action should be based on reasoned judgment and grounded in the nature of their misconduct. It is necessary that we take steps to avoid allowing such differential treatment to arise from purely arbitrary factors. Therefore I would direct the filing of briefs addressed to the suitability of the five-year period of ineligibility for readmission ordered in this case.

Again, I fully agree that disbarment is appropriate to this case and dissent to the specific nature of the order of discipline only out of concern for principles of due process and equal protection.

ADKINS and SHAW, JJ., concur.