Case ID: f-appx_112/html/0997-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM: \n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brandon FRANKLIN, also known as Sircrease D. Brooks, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 02-41501.
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Decided Nov. 22, 2004.
    Lisa G. Flournoy, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Lufkin, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Amy R. Blalock, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Wayne R. Dickey, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tyler, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Brandon Franklin conditionally pleaded guilty to possessing with the intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing more than four kilograms of codeine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Franklin was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for following too closely, a violation of Tex. Transp. Code § 545.062(a). He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

Franklin first argues that the initial stop of the vehicle was unlawful. He contends that because the Texas statute lacks a clear standard, the officer’s stop was based on mere opinion or judgment. He argues that the officer’s subjective intent should be closely scrutinized.

The stop of an automobile by police must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, when viewed in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below, see United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (5th Cir.1990), supports the district court’s determination that there was probable cause for the stop of the vehicle. Because the legal justification for the stop was objectively grounded in the observations and knowledge of the officer, the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 288 (5th Cir.1999).

Franklin also argues that his prolonged detention was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, and he challenges the lawfulness of the search of the vehicle. This court recently considered the appeal of Reginald Brigham, the driver of the vehicle in which Franklin was a passenger. See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500 (5th Cir.2004)(en banc). In Brigham we upheld the validity of the detention, questioning, and search at issue here, rejecting the same arguments raised herein by Franklin. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506-12. We are satisfied that the detention and questioning of Franklin was justified under the circumstances and that the search of the vehicle was conducted pursuant to Brigham’s voluntary consent. See id.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.