Case ID: nys_89/html/0978-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SPRING, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re HARDIN’S ESTATE.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
    October 11, 1904.)
    1. Distribution—Personalty—Statute—Rights oe Widow.
    Laws 1888, p. 941, c. 319, adopted in lieu of Code Civ. Proc. § 2732, subd. 12, and providing that representation shall be admitted among col-laterals in the same manner as allowed by law in reference to real estate, does not affect subdivision 3 of section 2732, under the express provisions of which the widow is entitled to the whole of a decedent’s personal estate when he leaves no descendant, parent, brother, sister, nephew, or niece.
    Appeal from Surrogate’s Court, Herkimer County.
    In the matter of the estate of George A. Hardin, deceased. From a decree dismissing the petition of Jane M. Cook as next of kin of deceased, petitioner appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, PIISCOCK, and STOVER, JJ.
    
      C. D. Adams, for appellant.
    Charles A. Miller, for respondent.
   SPRING, J.

The decedent died intestate April 16, 1901, leaving, him surviving, a widow, and no descendant, parent, brother, sister, nephew, or niece. See subdivision 3, § 2732, Code Civ. Proc. The petitioner, his aunt, filed a petition in the surrogate’s court, and a citation was issued pursuant thereto, requiring the administratrix, to whom letters of administration had been issued in May, 1901, to show cause why a judicial settlement of her account should not be rendered. Upon the return of the citation, and at the instance of the administratrix, the proceeding was dismissed, on the ground that said petitioner was not entitled to share in the personal estate of said intestate.

If section 2732, subd. 3, is operative, the entire personal estate to be distributed belongs to the widow. That has been the statute of this state uninterruptedly since the Revised Statutes became operative, and it was embodied in the section mentioned, where the rules governing in the distribution of the estate of an intestate are grouped. Prior to 1898, subdivision 12 of that section read: “No representation shall be admitted among collaterals after brothers’ and sisters’ children.” By the Laws of 1898 (chapter 319, p. 911) the following was substituted for the provision theretofore existing: “Representation shall be admitted among collaterals in the same manner as allowed by law in reference to real estate.” The purpose of this substitution apparently was to put on a like basis the representation among collateral next of kin and heirs at law, as there had been lack of uniformity in the, statute of distribution and that applying in the descent of real estate. Subdivision 12 is to be construed in connection with subdivisions 5 and 10 of the same section, and the rule of representation under subdivision 12 is not effective where the degree of relationship of the next of kin is of equal degree. Matter of Davenport, 172 N. Y. 454-458, 65 N. E. 275. That subdivision certainly did not contemplate any change of the provisions which define the widow’s share in the personal estate. Subdivision 3 is explicit in prescribing the extent of her interest where there is no descendant, “brother or sister, nephew or niece.” Subdivision 12 does not purport to lessen or alter her share. That subdivision and those immediately preceding pertain to the distribution among next of kin who are collaterals, and who are related by consanguinity to the person from whom they take. The widow takes by virtue of her widowhood, and the extent of her interest, in whatever aspect the estate of her husband may be presented as to his next of kin, is prescribed. by various clauses of section 2732. The Legislature did not intend to modify these provisions so long in vogue by changing the subdivisions relating exclusively to representation among collaterals. In order to obtain that result, we must read into the definite language of subdivision 3 a later subdivision, and one which in no way, by its express language, lessens the share of the widow. If so great a change had been designed, subdivision 3 would have been amended and remodeled. Again, the uniformity which was designed to be effected by the amendment to subdivision 12 only pertains to collaterals, and is only applied where the right to take existed. It did not create a next of kin, to the exclusion or diminution of what the widow was entitled. Whatever changes are made by the amended subdivision are among collaterals, not affecting distribution as between a collateral and a distributee in the direct line, or who does not come within the definition of a collateral.

A statutory provision long operative, and the explicit language of which remains unchanged, will not be modified by an amendment of another law relating to a different subject-matter, unless the legislative intent to alter is unmistakable; and as to the interest of the widow, pursuant to these subdivisions, such intent can hardly be conceived.

The decree of the surrogate’s court is affirmed, with costs. All concur.