Case ID: binn_6/html/0213-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Tilghman C. J. Yeates J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The Commonwealth ex rel. negro Lewis against Holloway.
    
      Philadelphia, Tuesday, January 4.
    The domestic slave ofa member of congress from South Carolina, who during the fouth Garohna> recess of congress attends the family of his master in temporary residence, does not acquire freedom hftbestl'^onger than six months.
    THIS was a habeas corpus to the jailer of Philadelphia / . •> . J county, to bring up the body ox negro Lewis. 1 ne re- - - - - - - 1 turn to the writ stated, that he was held by virtue of a commitment by an alderman dated the 29th of December J 1813, which commitment was founded upon an oath, that Lewis was the slave of Langdon Cheves esquire of South Carolina, and had absconded from the service of his master, 3
    Upon the hearing it was agreed, “’ that Langdon Cheves “ was a native citizen and resident of South Carolina, and “ had never resided any where else but as a sojourner; that “ he was a member of congress from that state, and had “ sojourned in Pennsylvania for the purpose of more con- “ veniently discharging his duties as a member of congress, “ but without any intention to become domiciled there; that “ negro Letvis, who was a domestic servant, had always “ been his slave while residing in Pennsylvania, and ab- “ sconded from his service in Germantown about the 1st of “ December 1813; that sometime in March 1813, after con- “ gress rose, Mr. Cheves came to Pennsylvania bringing “ Lewis with him; that he rented a house in Germantown, “ and lived there with his family till some time in Decem- “ ber 1813, when he went to Washington with his family; “ and that Lewis lived with him more than six months in “ Pennsylvania, but absconded before Mr. Cheves left the “ state for Washington.” Upon these facts,
    ' Rcavle and Lewis for the negro,
    contended that he was free, by virtue of the tenth section of the act of 1st March 1780, which enacts that “ no man or woman of any nation “ or colour, except the negroes and mulattoes who shall be “ registered as aforesaid, shall at any time hereafter be. “ deemed, adjudged or holden within the territories of this “ Commonwealth, as slaves or servants for life, but as free “ men and free women.” 1 Smith's Laws 495. The exception contained in that section, namely, of “ the domestic “ slaves attending upon delegates in congress from the other “ American states, foreign ministers and consuls, and per- “ sons passing through or sojourning in this state &c.” they argued did not embrace the present case, because it was taken out of the exception, by the proviso, that “ such do- “ mestic slaves be not (except in the case of members of “ congress, foreign ministers and consuls) retained in this “ state longer than six months.” Negro Lezuis they said was to be considered as the slave of a sojourner for more than six months.
    1. The basis of the act of 1780, is the right of every person to freedom, therefore the exception must be construed strictly. Under the old confederation, members of congress had a diplomatic character. They were in the nature of foreign ministers, with whom they are coupled in the act. The intent of the act was to give to the members of that congress while sitting, and representing their respective states, the privilege of keeping their own servants, and of bringing with them the rights which were derived from their own law. But when the present federal constitution was adopted, the old one was done away, and there ceased to be any delegates in congress. The act of assembly is therefore not applicable to the present constitution.
    2. The privilege given by the law is in consideration of, and is to be limited by, the public functions of the members of congress. It is confined to an actual attendance in congress, with an allowance of reasonable time eundo, morando, ct redeundo; and does not extend' to a residence during the recess of congress. The words are not members of, but delegates in congress, and the narrowest construction should be made.
    3. Still less can it be understood to extend to, and to except the case of a family residing here during the recess, for their personal convenience, when the congress meet in another state. The spirit of the law is as averse to such a construction as the letter. Pennsylvania voluntarily imparted the privilege to members of congress, because congress was then held in Pennsylvania, and it was necessary of course that the delegates should reside there. The act contemplates the case of a congress in Pennsylvania only; it speaks of slaves attending upon delegates in congress. To enlarge the exception, is to violate the intention of the legislature. Residence in this state not being necessary, while congress sits at Washington, the reason of the exception fails, and the exception itself must therefore fail.
    
      Sergeant contra.
    The intent and the true policy of this state in the act of 1780, was to pay respect to the other members of the confederation in the person of their representatives. It was a policy essentially necessary to the peaceful intercourse of the states, and almost to their equality. There is therefore no propriety in giving a narrow construction to what so evidently flowed from a liberal spirit.
    >1. The change of the confederation for the present constitution, makes no change in the law., So far as the object and intention of the law are concerned, a member of the old congress and of the present congress are the same. It is still a confederated government. The same respect is due by this state, to the southern states and their representatives. The exception was not made in consequence of any temporary interest which this state had in the confederation, or of any particular virtue in the delegates to that body; but in consequence of its general interest in the success of the union, and of the general necessity of granting this accommodation to representatives in the common legislature. This state itself has declared that the law extends to the present congress. The constitution of the United States was adopted by Pennsylvania on the 12th of December 1787. On the 29th of Mareh 1788, a law was passed, expressly recognizing the last exception to the tenth section of the act of 1780, as being then in force. 2 Smith's Laws 443.
    2. The privilege of the member of congress is not limited to his attendance upon that body, or to his going and returning. The language is general, “ slaves attending upon “ delegates in congress.” The verbal criticism upon this phrase, has no weight. In the last exception it is exchanged for “ members of congress,” and both are thus treated as convertible expressions. It is of great moment at times, for the dispatch of business in the vacation, for the more convenient discharge of other business, and in consequence of the state of the country, that members of congress should not return home after a session. The law may reasonably be considered as embracing such a case. In the present instance, there'was a special session in May 1813. The war-prevented the return to Charleston by water. A residence in some of the middle states was therefore almost essential to Mr. Cheves, for he could not go in any manner before May, and two journeys by land after May and before the ensuing session, might have been impracticable. If the act had intended to restrict the privilege in the manner contended for, it would have used the language of the constitution in regard to arrests of members of congress. They are priviledged from arrest, “ during their attendance at the session “ of their respective houses, and in going to, and in return- “ ingfrom the same.”
    
    
      3. The law is not confined to the case of a congress in Pennsylvania. The words do not say so. The spirit of the law is certainly not so. And it is a complete answer to the suggestion, that when the act of 1788 recognized the last exception in the act of 1780, congress were actually sitting-in New York.
    
   Tilghman C. J.

Negro Lewis, -who is brought before us on this habeas corpus, was committed by Aldei'man Keppele as the slave of Langdon Cheves esquire, having absconded from his master’s service. Mr. Cheves is a member of the house of representatives of the United States, from the state of South Carolina, and has never resided in this state, except as a sojourner. During the recess of congress he remained with his family, in a house which he rented in Germantotvn, in this state. Lewis was his slave, and employed as a domestic servant in his family during his stay at Germantown for more than six months, between March and December last. It is contended that in consequence of this residence, Lexvis acquired his freedom by virtue of the act “for the gradual abolition of slavery,” (passed 1st March 1780). The question depends on the 10th section of the act, by which it was ■ enacted, that “ no man or woman of any “ nation or colour, except the negroes or mulattoes which “ shall be registered as aforesaid, shall at any time hereafter “ be deemed, adjudged or holden within the territories of " “this Commonwealth as slaves or servants for life, but as “ free men or free women, except the domestic slaves attend- “ ing upon delegates in congress from the other American states, foreign ministers and consuls, and persons passing ' through or .sojourning in this state, and not becoming resi- “ dent therein, and seamen employed in ships not belonging “ to any inhabitant of this state, nor employed in any ship “ owned by any such inhabitant, provided such domestic “slaves be not alienated or sold to any inhabitant, nor “ (except in the case of members of congress, foreign ministers and consuls) retained in this state longer than six “ months.” The plain meaning of this section appears to be, that the domestic slaves attending upon members of congress, (other than members from Pennsylvania) are excepted from the general provision which confers freedom. But several ingenious arguments have been urged to prove that this act has a more refined and less obvious meaning. First, of all, it is said, that having been passed before the adoption of the present federal constitution, it can have no application to the congi-ess under the present constitution. I cannot .perceive the force of this objection. To be sure, the congress of the United States under the old confederation, is in many respects different from the present congress. But the object and foundation of both is the sáme; they are both founded on a federative union, and the object of both is the general defence and welfare; both require that the members representing the several states should meet at some one place, and it is as necessary that the members from the southern states in the present congress should be attended by their domestics, as it was for the members of the old congress. In fact I do not recollect'to -have heard of this distinction before, and considering that congress sat ten years in this city under the present constitution, during all which time the members from the .southern states were attended by their slaves without molestation, there is strong-reason for supposing that the construction now contended for is contrary to that which has been generally received. And that it is contrary to the construction of our own legislature, appears from the third section of the act “ to ex- “ plain and amend the act for the gradual abolition of “slavery,” passed 29th March 1788, a fe,w months after the present federal constitution had been ratified by this state. In this section it is enacted, “ that no negro or mu- “ latto slave, (except as in the last exception of the tenth “ section of the original act is excepted) shall be removed “ out of the state.” Now the last exception in the tenth section, relates to members of congress, foreign ministers and consuls; so that the proviso in their favour was considered as still in force. The next position of the counsel for ]ia¡¡eas corpus is, that our act is confined to members of congress, during the time of its session, allowing a reasonable time for going and returning. The expression of the act is, delegates in congress; but I take this to be the same as delegates to congress, or in other words members of congress, and that this is the meaning of .the law is certain, because, in the proviso in the last part of the same section, members of congress are the words used. It is next contended, that whatever may be the literal meaning of the words, the real object of the law was to give to members of congress the benefit of their slaves during the time of their attendance on their public duty only. I agree that it is fair to construe the law according to its meaning, provided that meaning is deduced not from conjecture, but from the words of the law; at the same time I am not for adhering to word's, so far as to produce consequences too absurd or inconvenient, to be supposed to have been intended by the legislature. But I see no absurdity or inconvenience in giving to these words their obvious meaning, which will only confer on members of congress the privilege of being served by their domestics during the time that they remain members, whether congress shall be sitting in this or any other state. On the contrary, I see great inconvenience in reducing the southern members to the necessity of giving up their residence in this state during the recess of congress, or losing the service of their domestics. In the case of Mr. Cheves, this inconvenience would be very great indeed, because there was a 'session of congress between March and December, his return to Charleston by -water was cut' off, and it was impossible to say whether the events of the war might not have induced the president of the United States to convene the congress before the month of December. We all know that our southern brethren are very jealous of their rights on the subject of slavery, and that their unión with the other states could never have been cemented, without yielding to their demands on this point. Nor is it conceivable that the legislature of Pennsylvania could have intended to make a law, the probable consequence of which would have been the banishment of the congress from the state. I am therefore of opinion that the true construction of the law’, is that which is impressed on the mind by its first readirfg, that is to say, that the domestic slaves of members of ■ congress who are attending on the family of their masters even during its recess, gain no title to freedom, although they remain in the state more than six months, whether the seat of congress be in Pennsylvania or elsewhere. According to this construction the prisoner is tó be remanded to the. custody of the gaoler.

Yeates J.

The present case appears to me, to be clearly within the words and spirit of the exception contained in the tenth section of the act of 1st March 1780. Mr. Cheves is a member of congress, and within the principle for which the privilege was introduced; and a different construction from that contended for on his behalf, would place him upon the footing of a mere sojourner, which is repugnant to the plain terms of the law.

,1 concur, that Lezois be remanded to the jailer.

Br.ackenr.idge J. concurred.

Prisoner remanded.