Case ID: scl_46/html/0254-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Glover, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

J. H. Mayson vs. J. Sheppard.
    
      Slander — Verdict in Figures — Damages.
    B. said of A. that lie stole a watch, and added “ he went to Gray’s shop for a watch ; demanded a gold watch ; Gray told him to take it; he did so — the owner came for the watch — Gray sent word to him to send it back, which he did. If that be not stealing, what do you call it —Held, that the words were'actionable.
    A verdict in figures with the symbolical prefix ($) denoting dollars, held good, in an action of slander.
    A verdict for three thousand dollars in an action of slander held, not excessive.
    BEFORE O’NEALL, J., AT EDGEFIELD. SPRING TERM, 1859.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
    “ This was an action of. slander for words spoken. It was alleged that the words spoken had caused the marriage about to be had and solemnized between the plaintiff and Mrs. Josephine Watson, to be broken off. Although it was clear that they had some effect, yet they were not the sole cause. I therefore thought, and’so instructed the jury, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in that behalf.
    “ The words were uttered in the presence of Mrs. Susan Powell, and were proved by her. On the last of August, ’57, at the house of his overseer, James Kemp, the defendant said 1 he wondered if Jim ever told the widow of the gold watch which he stole from Gray, or purloined.’ He went on to say that1 the plaintiff went to Gray’s shop for a watch; demanded a gold watch; Gray told him to take it; he did so; the owner came for his watch; Gray sent word to the plaintiff to send it back, which he did; if that be not stealing, what do you call it?’ I thought, and so instructed the jury, that these ■words were actionable.
    “ The words were not proved to have been published but once. It was very clear that there was not the slightest foundation for the charge against the plaintiff. Although it was shown that the report was widely circulated, and that the defendant had heard it.
    “ The case was very fairly submitted to the jury, who went out about four P. M., and agreed upon their verdict at four A. M. At the opening of the court, at nine A. M., the verdict was read, and, I presume, recorded, for three thousand dollars. They were then allowed to disperse. After an hour, on their reassembling, it was brought to the attention of the Court that the verdict was in figures. The plaintiff moved that the verdict should be so amended as to be in writing— the defendant objected to any amendment. I thought after the jury had dispersed, I had no power over the matter. I did not think, however, that the verdict would be affected by being in figures.”
    The defendant appealed, and now moved this Court for a new trial, on the grounds:
    1.Because his Honor the presiding Judge, erred, it is respectfully submitted, in charging the jury that the words proved to have been uttered and published by the defendant, were slanderous in themselves, and that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict of damages.
    2. Because the verdict rendered in this case is not in legal form, the same not being in writing, but in figures.
    3. Because the jury found 'for the plaintiff excessive damages, altogether unwarranted‘by the proof.
    
      The plaintiff also appealed from the decision or order of the presiding Judge refusing the motion or order proposed on behalf of the plaintiff, that the verdict be amended by permitting the jury to express in letters or -written words, instead of figures, the amount of damages found for the plaintiff in and by the verdict, upon the grounds:
    1. The counsel for the plaintiff was not present at the reading of the verdict, which occurred immediately after the opening of the Court on Wednesday morning, but entered the court-room immediately after the reading of the verdict, and was constrained forthwith to proceed with the trial of another cause, begun the day before, and then in progress, and during the argument in the said cause, the said defect in the verdict was for the first time discovered. Immediately after the Judge’s charge to the jury in the case referred to, and before any other matter was brought to his attention, the motion or order aforesaid relating to the correction or amendment of the said verdict was proposed; and, under such circumstances, it is respectfully submitted, that the presiding Judge erred in refusing the same. »
    2. That, according to the course and practice of this Court, the motion or order for the correction or amendment of the verdict in this case, ought to have been granted, under the circumstances attending the proposing of such motion or order.
    Adams, Moragne, for defendant.
    Carroll, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Glover, J.

The words proved are actionable, as they clearly impute larceny, unless' they are so qualified by other expressions used by the defendant in his conversation with the witness, as to show that no criminal act was directly charged. After the defendant said that the plaintiff stole a watch, he added: “the plaintiff went to Gray’s shop for a watch ; demanded a gold watch; Gray told him to take it; he did so ; the owner came for his watch; Gray sent word to the plaintiff to send it back, which he did. If that be not stealing, what do you call it ?” If the intention was to get possession of another’s watch unlawfully, and to convert it to his own use, the conversion was felonious, and the words actionable per se. (State vs. Lindenthall, 5 Rich. 237.) But the pleadings are not before us, nor do the grounds of appeal make it necessary that they should be. If the words were not actionable per se, we must presume that all proper averments were employed and proved.

2. The defendant contends, and the plaintiff indirectly admits, that the verdict is not in legal form, because the amount of the damages found by the jury is not expressed in letters. The Act of 1795 (5 Stat. 262), referred to in support of this ground, has no application. The second section is limited to verdicts on contracts, and the direction is not that such verdicts shall be expressed in letters, but “in dollars or units, dimes or tenths,” &c. The purpose was, as far as legislation could accomplish it, to substitute the federal in the place of the English denominations of coins. The Act is only directory, and, by its terms, does not embrace verdicts in actions of tort. But the verdict in this case exactly conforms to the Act by the use of the federal designation of a coin, with a symbolical prefix expressing the denomination. The symbol ($>) denoting dollars, one or more, and figures indicating the number, is quite as certain as letters can express the denomination and amount intended. Entries made by public and bank officers, and merchants, are generally in figures, with the significant prefix to denote dollars.

If the attention of the Circuit Judge had been called to this verdict before it was recorded, the amendment proposed by the plaintiff’s attorney would have been ordered, not because such a verdict is illegal, but to guard against any fraudulent alteration which could be more easily made when figures are used. -The Act of 1839 (11 Stat. 71) directs the clerks of the courts to record in the Common Pleas Journal, an exact copy of the verdict, which is an an additional check against unfair practices; and if they would add to such exact copy, when in figures with the dollar symbol, the amount and denomination in letters, the check would be complete.

In actions of tort where the circumstances often justify exemplary and punitive damages, we have no standard by which to measure the exact quantum; and unless the amount is so flagrant as to excite the suspicion of unfair dealing, we will not grant a new trial because the jury may have differed with the Court, or, perhaps, may differ with .another jury, in the amount of their verdict.

Motion dismissed.

O’Neall, Wardlaw, and Munro, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed.