Case ID: so2d_596/html/0822-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. LEMMON, Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re the INTERDICTION OF James M. ARMSTRONG.
    No. 92-C-0139.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    April 3, 1992.
   PER CURIAM.

Granted. The record reflects that on July 22, 1986, the curator moved the trial court to appoint Ronald Armstrong as un-dercurator because “Veronica Noble Cas-cante has resigned her position as undercu-ratrix and it is necessary this court appoint an undercurator herein.” The trial court on the same day appointed Ronald Armstrong as undercurator of the interdict. Although the order did not state expressly that Veronica Noble was removed or that Ronald Armstrong was appointed in her place, we think the order was intended and therefore implicitly had this effect because this was the only reason given for moving the court for its order. Because the majority of the defalcations occurred after the petitioner was removed, the law and evidence do not support the judgment below. La.C.C.P. art. 1972. As such, the trial court erred in not granting petitioner’s motion for a new trial. The judgment of the court of appeal, 592 So.2d 13, is vacated; petitioner’s motion for new trial is granted, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.

LEMMON, J., concurs with reasons.

LEMMON, Justice,

concurring.

Counsel for plaintiff admitted agreeing to meet with relator and her attorney to discuss the resolution of the claim against relator. Thereafter, when she did not hear anything further from relator’s attorney, counsel for plaintiff obtained a default judgment without notifying relator’s attorney of her intention to do so. While relator and her attorney may have unreasonably delayed scheduling the meeting, counsel for plaintiff knew that relator was represented by counsel and intended to present a defense. Under these circumstances it was either (1) an ill practice for plaintiff to obtain a default judgment without notifying relator or her attorney that no further delay in filing defensive pleadings would be allowed, or (2) an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny the motion for new trial. An attorney should not grant opposing counsel an unspecified extension of time after service of a petition and then obtain a default judgment without notice simply because opposing counsel unreasonably delayed either settlement discussion or responsive pleadings.