Case ID: mich-app_31/html/0177-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

PEOPLE v. BREWER
    1. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Waiver of Rights — Right Against Self-Incrimination — Court’s Duty.
    Failure to inform a defendant that he waives his right against self-incrimination by entering a plea of guilty is not reversible error because there is no requirement competing the eourt to inform the defendant that he is waiving certain constitutional rights; the only requirement prescribed by statute, court rule, or case law is that the guilty plea be voluntarily and intelligently made.
    2. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Sufficient Pacts.
    Sufficient facts were elicited from the guilty-pleading defendant to establish his commission of an attempted breaking and entering where defendant, while represented by counsel, admitted breaking into the building, denied his plea of guilty was coerced, asserted that his plea was voluntary, and was advised of the consequences of his plea.
    References for Points in Headnotes
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 359.
    
       21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 484-496.
    Appeal from Oakland, Robert L. Templin, J.
    Submitted Division 1 January 8, 1971, at Detroit.
    (Docket No. 9517.)
    Decided February 25, 1971.
    Paul David Brewer was convicted, on Ms plea of guilty, of attempted breaking and entering. Defendant appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Thomas G. Plunkett, 
      Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank R. Knox, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for tbe people.
    
      John H. Waldeck, for defendant on appeal.
    Before: R. B. Burns, P. J., and J. H. Gtllis and Danhoe, JJ.
   Per Curiam.

Defendant appeals from tbe trial court’s acceptance of bis guilty plea to attempted breaking and entering. MCLA § 750.92 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.287).

Tbe defendant gives two reasons wby his guilty plea was erroneously accepted. First, be alleges that tbe trial court failed to inform bim that be was waiving bis constitutional right against self-incrimination. Secondly, be contends that the court failed to elicit sufficient facts from bim to establish that tbe specific criminal acts charged bad been committed by tbe defendant.

Defendant’s reasons are not meritorious. There is no requirement compelling tbe trial judge to inform defendant that be is waiving certain constitutional rights. People v. Jaworski (1970), 25 Mich App 540. Basically, the only requirement prescribed by statute (MCLA § 768.35 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev §28.1058]), court rule (GCR 1963, 785.3), and by long-established case authority (Kercheval v. United States [1927], 274 US 220 [47 S Ct 582, 71 L Ed 1009]; Chambers v. Florida [1940], 309 US 227 [60 S Ct 472, 84 L Ed 716]) is that the guilty plea be voluntarily and intelligently made by tbe defendant. Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 US 238 (89 S Ct 1709, 23 L Ed 2d 274). See also Brady v. United States (1970), 397 US 742 (90 S Ct 1463, 25 L Ed 2d 747).

Upon examination of the record we discover the following. Defendant had benefit of competent counsel, admitted breaking into the building, denied that the plea was coerced in any way, was apprised of the consequences of his plea, and asserted that his plea was voluntarily made. The court did not err in accepting the unfettered choice of the defendant to plead guilty.

Affirmed.