Case ID: ohio-st_168/html/0249-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per Curiam.\n     Weygandt, C. J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State, ex rel. Peirce, v. Board of Elections of Stark County et al.
    (No. 35796
    Decided October 8, 1958.)
    
      Mr. Clyde H. Wright, for relator.
    
      Mr. Norman J. Putman, prosecuting attorney, for respondent Board of Elections of Stark County.
    
      
      Mr. William Saxbe, attorney general, and Mr. Hugh A. Sherer, for respondent Ted W. Brown, Secretary of State.
    
      Mr. Earle E. Wise, for respondent Anthony Flex.
   Per Curiam.

The petition in this case was not filed until August 23, 1958, eight days after the final date on which candidates could voluntarily withdraw, which was August 15, 1958, i. e., “prior to the eightieth day before the day of such general election” (Section 3513.30, Revised Code) and three days after the time during which vacancies could be filled, which was August 20, or “not later than the seventy-sixth day before the day of such general election” (Section 3513.31, Revised Code).

Under such circumstances, the unexplained dilatoriness on the part of relator, where time was an important factor and required his diligence, deprives him of the relief he now seeks. In the event the election result is favorable to Flex, other remedies will be available to relator.

The demurrers to the petition are sustained, and the writ of prohibition is denied. State, ex rel. Winterfeld, v. Board of Elections of Lucas County, 167 Ohio St., 531, 150 N. E. (2d), 420.

Writ denied.

Weygandt, C. J., Zimmerman, Stewart, Taet, Matthias, Bell and Herbert, JJ., concur.

Weygandt, C. J.,

concurring. Although this case can be concluded on the ground of laches, it seems futile to deny the writ of prohibition and allow the name of the candidate to remain on the ballot when it is conceded that he will not have been admitted to practice as an attorney at law in this state for a period of at least six years immediately, preceding the commencement of the term, as provided by Section 2301.01, Revised Code.

Stewart and Matthias, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring opinion.