Case ID: miss_84/html/0194-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Truly, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Bee W. Jones v. State of Mississippi.
    1. Criminal Law. Mwrder. Self defense. Instruction. Abandonment of intent to Mil.
    
    In a murder case it is error to give an instruction for the state denying defendant the right of self-defense if he armed himself with a deadly weapon and provoked the difficulty with intent to kill deceased, there being testimony tending to show that defendant abandoned the intent to kill before slaying the deceased and that the killing was in self-defense.
    2. Same. Satisfaction of jurors’ minds and consciences. Reasonable doubt.
    
    An instruction authorizing the conviction of a defendant if the minds and consciences of the jury are fully satisfied of his guilt is erroneous; the jury should not convict unless satisfied of a defendant’s guilt beyond every reasonable doubt arising from the evidence.
    From: the circuit court of Leflore county.
    Hon. A. McC. Kimbrough, Judge.
    Jones, appellant, having been indicted, tried, and convicted of the murder of one Robert Riley and sentenced to the penitentiary for life, appealed to the supreme court.
    On the night of January Y, 1904, at a meeting of the colored Knights of Pythias, appellant shot and killed Riley. Before the meeting was called to order, some question came up as to the correctness of the books of tbe organization, of which Jones had control, and Riley said: “Open np tbe lodge, and let Bee W. alone.” Whereupon angry words passed between Jones and Riley, and Jones advanced toward Riley with bis bands in bis pistol pocket, making insulting remarks. Tbe chancellor commander of tbe lodge went to Jones, caught him by tbe coat, and ordered him to take bis seat. Thereafter Riley attempted to get a stick, and, failing in that, got a hatchet and advanced upon Jones, who moved away, drawing bis pistol, and backed fifteen or twenty feet from where tbe trouble first commenced, followed by Riley, when Jones shot Riley, killing him. Tbe third instruction given for tbe state, referred to in tbe opinion of tbe court, is as follows: “No. 3 — Tbe court instructs tbe jury that if tbe minds and consciences of tbe jury are fully satisfied by all tbe evidence in tbe case that tbe defendant provoked tbe difficulty with tbe deceased, armed at tbe time with a deadly weapon, provided for tbe purpose of killing or doing deceased some great bodily barm, and that be shot and killed tbe deceased in tbe difficulty so provoked, then tbe court instructs tbe jury that the defendant is guilty, even though tbe jury may believe that tbe defendant, at tbe time be killed tbe deceased, killed him in self-defense.”
    
      S. B. Ooleman, for appellant.
    Tbe long line of decisions condemning tbe omission of “belief beyond -reasonable doubt” has been violated, and tbe court is referred to Helm’s case as authority for tbe language used. But tbe graver and greater error in tbe third instruction is in leaving out entirely and taking from tbe consideration of tbe jury whether or not Jones bad abandoned tbe difficulty, even if be provoked it, and whether Riley was or was not tbe aggressor at tbe time of tbe shooting.'
    
      William, Williams, attorney-general, and McGlurg, Gardner & Whittington, for appellee.
    
      The testimony is undisputed that Jones made threats to kill Eiley on Thursday morning; that he was the aggressor and provoker of the difficulty; that he entered it armed with a deadly weapon, intending to use it when he provoked or brought on the encounter; that he did originate the difficulty; that he did not at any time abandon the difficulty, and did use the weapon and kill Eiley in the difficulty so provoked, pursuant to such intent, and provoked for the purpose of decoying his victim into demonstrations which would apparently justify the contemplated killing. There was no error by the court below in granting instruction No. 3 for the state. Helm, v. Slate, 67 Miss., 562; Aldridge v. State, 59 Miss., 250.
    Under the facts proved in this case this instruction is in complete harmony with the law as announced in Gannon v. State, 57 Miss., 147; Allen v. State, 66 Miss., 385; Hunt v. State, 72 Miss., 413; Prine v. State, 73 Miss., 838; King v. State, 74 Miss., 576; Pore v. State, 75 Miss., 727; Long v. State, 52 Miss., 36; Smith v. State, 75 Miss., 542.
   Truly, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The third instruction for the state is fatally erroneous. It states that “if the minds and consciences of the jury are fully satisfied by the evidence in the case” of the existence of certain facts therein stated, the jury should convict, even though they should believe “that the defendant at the time he killed the deceased killed him in self-defense.” “Full satisfaction” of the minds and consciences of the jury of the guilt of a defendánt is no compliance with the rule which requires the jury to be convinced of guilt “beyond all reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 73 Miss., 823; 19 South., 826; Powers v. State, 74 Miss., 777; 21 South., 657; Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss., 576; 23 South., 210, 230. The instruction is further inaccurate in that it deprives the defendant of the right of self-defense, even though, after provoking the difficulty, he may have, in good faith, withdrawn therefrom. It is well settled that one may wrongfully provoke a difficulty, and yet if afterwards, at any moment during its progress, he in good faith abandons the conflict, and is subsequently murderously assaulted by the deceased, and is forced to slay in self-defense, he is not estopped from pleading such self-defense in justification of his acts. Smith v. State, 75 Miss., 553; 23 South., 260; Patterson v. State, 75 Miss., 675; 23 South., 647. We approve the language employed in Lofton v. State, 79 Miss., 734; 31 South., 425, where, speaking of an instruction similar to the one here under review, the court said: “This form of charge, declaring a defendant estopped to plead self-defense, is an exceedingly unwise one to be given. We have repeatedly condemned it. . . . It can never be proper, save in a few very rare cases where the case is such, on its facts, that a charge can be given embracing all the elements — not part of them, nor nearly all of them — essential to the estoppel. The old paths are the safe paths.”

Reversed and remanded.