Case ID: how-pr_32/html/0359-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Leonard, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

COURT OF APPEALS.
    The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, appellants agt. The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of New York, the Mayor Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York and James Nesbitt, respondents. Same agt. Same, except John H. Hillyer, instead of Nesbitt.
    No relief can be administered in equity, where the remedies at law are adequate for the attainment of justice.
    Where a tax is imposed in this state on the amount of stocks and bonds deposited with the comptroller of this state, by a foreign life insurance company under the laws of 1851, having an agency and doing business in this state, such company cannot sustain an equitable action against, and restrain by injunction, the proper authorities by which such tax was imposed, from the collection thereof. The assessment of such a tax may be reviewed and corrected by certiorari, or be stricken from the roll by mandamus.
    
    
      September Term, 1866.
    These actions were instituted to test the liability of these plaintiffs to be taxed in the sum of $100,000, deposited by them with the comptroller of this state. The plaintiffs are a corporation under the laws of the state of New Jersey, for the business of life insurance. They had an office in the city of New York, and an agent there for the transaction of such business.
    By an act of the legislature of this state passed in 1851 {chap. 95), all companies transacting the business of life insurance within this state, were required to deposit with the comptroller of this state $100,000 in public stocks or bonds. The comptroller was to hold such stocks, bonds and mortgages, as security for policy holders (§§ 1 and 2). Under the provisions of the act, these plaintiffs deposited with the comptroller of the state the sum of $100,000, and this sum has been included in the assessment lists of the city of New York, against these plaintiffs, as so much personal property hable to taxation under the laws of this state.
    In 1856, the board of supervisors of the city and county of New York imposed as a tax thereon, the sum of $1,388, and the defendants, or some of them, were proceeding to collect the same.
    The first above entitled action was commenced in the superior court of the city of Mew York. The complaint set out the foregoing facts, and claimed that the said tax was erroneous and unlawful, and should be remitted or corrected. It also set forth that the board of supervisors had issued their warrant to the defendant, James Mesbitt, to collect said tax, and that he, by virtue thereof, had levied upon the property of the said plaintiffs; that the amount of the tax when coEected, would be the property of the defendants, the mayor, (fee., of the city of Mew York. The complaint prayed that the defendants might be enjoined from coEeeting the tax, or from interfering with the property levied, and that the court would adjudge that the defendants be restrained from collecting or receiving the same, or for such further or other rehef, or both, as might be just.
    The defendants demurred to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
    Judgment was given for the defendants, dismissing the ■ complaint with costs, and this judgment was affirmed at the . general term, and the plaintiffs now appeal to this court.
    The second of the above entitled actions was commenced in the supreme court, and the complaint set out an assessment in the same manner, and an imposition of a tax thereon in the sum of $1,556,44 for the year 1857, and otherwise contained the same facts and the same prayer, as the complaint in the superior court.
    The demurrer thereto aEeged these grounds : First, that the supreme court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the action; second, that said court could not review by complaint and injunction the proceedings of subordinate tribunals, created by and acting under a statute, and clothed with the exercise of pohtical powers; third, that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
    Judgment was given for the defendants, and the same was affirmed at the general term, and the plaintiffs now appeal to this court.
    A. O. Bbadlby, for appellants.
    
    These suits aslc the judgment of the court whether the plaintiff is liable to two taxes imposed upon it—the first in 1856 for $1,383, the second in 1857, for $1,556.44, in New York city upon $100,000, in bonds of Brooklyn, Albany and Troy, incorporated cities of this state, deposited with the comptroller, and which remained in his custody when the taxes were assessed.
    Both actions were commenced in that city—the first in the superior, and the second in the supreme court—by summons and complaint verified. In both the defendants have simply demurred.
    The plaintiff is a life insurance corporation, created by the state of New Jersey; witAan office at Newark therein, where all of its policies of insurance are signed, and where all elections, all meetings of directors and of committees are held, and all business transacted. It has never had any office elsewhere. It has in the state of New York about twenty-five agents, whose business is limited to receiving applications for insurance, transmitting them to the plaintiff at Newark, and when approved by it, delivering the policies, and receiving and remitting premiums to the plaintiff at Newark. It has no money or capital invested in any manner in its business in the state of New York except bonds and mortgages, for monies loaned, which are all kept at Newark, and stocks, being bonds of the cities of Brooklyn, Albany and Troy, which are all lodged with the comptroller of the state of New York, in pursuance of a law of said state, (Laws of 1851, chap: 95, §§ 1, 2 and 3, p. 167), the only law which ever required or even authorized a life insurance company created by another state to deposit securities with the comptroller or other officer of this state, or empowered such comptroller or officer even to receive them. That law however was repealed by laws of 1853, chapter 463, section 22, page 890, &c. Notwithstanding such repeal, and because thestockshadnotbeen surrendered, the board of supervisors assessed the plaintiff for the taxes in question, issued them warrants for the collection thereof—in the one case to the defendant Nesbitt, and hi the other to the defendant Hillyer, by whom respectively, property belonging to the plaintiff, which happened to be found in the city was seized, and notice given that the same would be sold for the payment of the said taxes, penal interest and costs. The taxes, when collected, of course would go into the treasury of the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York, to be used like other moneys, as may be lawful. All this is alleged in the complaint, and of course admitted by the demurrer.
    In both complaints the plaintiff expressly denies its liability on the facts stated to be taxed under any law of the state of New York; and on the merits of the case, that is the sole question. It may perhaps be allowed further to state not as varying, but to show the gravity of the question, that similar taxes have been levied, and similar proceedings instituted in every subsequent year, down to and including 1864, but by arrangement stayed to abide the event of the cases now at the bar. The aggregate of all these taxes is about $15,000, and unless there be a remedy here and in this form, there is no remedy anywhere, or in any form.
    I. And on the merits, the statutes and the decisions of this court, have left nothing to argue. Corporations created by other states, doing life insurance here, must now make them deposits with some officer of the state by which they are created (Laws 1853, ubi supra, § 14). This, however, only applies to states in our 
      
      union, and not to corporations doing life insurance, created by foreign governments. These must make deposits with the comptroller, exactly as if they were created by this state. (Laws of 1853, p. 893, § 15, also §§ 6 and 17; International Life Ass. Com. agt. Com. Taxes, 28 Barb. 318; British Commercial Life Ins. Co. agt. Same, 28 How. P. R. 41.)
    The distinction between such companies created by other states, and those created by foreign governments not being states, of this union, is sharply drawn in the statute of 1849, page 441, section 7, is obliterated by the act of 1852, and restored by that of 1853, sections 14 and 15. And in The People agt. The New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. (26 N. Y. 303), this court held that the defendant, a corporation created by the state of Massachusetts, and having its office in Boston, but agencies like ours here, and having deposited a hundred thousand dollars with the comptroller at Albany, which deposit had not been withdrawn on repeal of the law requiring it, was not liable to taxation.
    That distinction harmonizes the decisions, and the only question is, whether New Jersey is a state in the union ?
    It is true that the Massachusetts suit came into court on a “ case agreed ” (Code, § 372). Bnt such a proceeding is allowable only where the “ question in difference might be the subject of a civil action,” and it is to be submitted to some court, “ which would have had jurisdiction if an action had been brought, ” and which is to “ render judgment thereon as if an action-were depending.” But the case is not required to contain anything but “ the/acts on which the controversy depends that is, the bare facts constituting a cause of action, which the complaint would have had to state, if instead of a case agreed, there had been an action; just what in these cases at bar, the complaints do state and the demurrers do admit. Muíalo nomine, therefore, that Massachusetts case is each of these, except that here the wrong has proceeded further, and been oftener repeated; for that case shows nothing after the illegal assessments; a distinction that can be made adverse to the plaintiff here only on somb such ground as the greater the wrong the less the right to redress, or that eight years, or if it be not allowable to look beyond the two actual cases at bar, then two years of repetition makes wrong right as a custom.
    Tn that case, it is true that the people were parties—whether the only parties maintaining the-validity of the tax, the report fails to show—and it is equally true that they may be proper or even necessary parties defendant here. There •can, however, be no pretense that they should have been the only parties, and no objection of non-joinder is taken (§§ 144 and 148).
    All that is or may be suggested about other remedies by special proceedings instead of by action in these cases, was equally or more applicable to that.
    A certiorari would have brought up the assessment roll. But, if in that case as in these, the roll had located the party assessed, both it and its property in the first ward of the city, the return would have shown full jurisdiction, provided, always, tribunals, whether judicial, administrative or political, can acquire jurisdiction simply by acting just as if they had it. In that case, however, as in these, the facts showing want of jurisdiction lay outside of the assessment roll, and therefore would not have appeared from the return.
    
      Mandamus, however, if it had been necessary to resort to it, could have done full justice in that case by merely correcting the assessment roll, whereby any warrant endangering the company’s property would have become impossible. ■ Here, however, the warrant is out and levied, and forever beyond that remedy. But in that case it was not necessary, and the objection becomes valid in these 
      only on some such ground as that a party wronged is deprived of redress by not having previously resorted to some unnecessary remedy.
    
      Prohibition, too, if it was an appropriate proceeding for such cases (as notwithstanding The People agt. Works, 7 Wend. 486; see People agt. Tompkins, G. S. 19 Wend. 154; Ex parte Braudlacht, 2 Hill, 367; People agt. Seward, 7 Wend. 518; Ex parte Gordon, 2 Hill, 363 : People agt. Supervisors, 1 Hill, 195, it clearly is not), might have accomplished something for the New England Company in arresting the eourf—the board of supervisors—from further proceeding. But here that court, if it be a court, had got through and stopped already. Prohibition never stays proceedings on mere process issued.
    The true answer, however, is, that those special proceedings are none of them to be resorted to except when there is no other remedy. But such a remedy always exists whenever thé facts constitute a cause of action, for then full justice can be done in determining not only the direct rights of the plaintiffs against defendants, and of defendants against plaintiffs, but also the ultimate as well as direct rights of the defendants, all around among themselves (§ 274, subd. 1). In special proceedings the justice, such as it is, is partial, but in actions complete, being co-evtensive with all the rights and wrongs involved, and with all the parties concerned in either. That cause of action appearing in the New England Company case, it finally, and after adverse decision by one of the same courts, succeeded. The like or a larger, not stronger (for all causes of action are of equal strength) cause of action appearing in ours, we must succeed too, or fail on other grounds.
    But it is said that the assessors and the supervisors are now, or will hereafter become personally liable for all damages. Perhaps so ; but it is no objection on demurrer only to jurisdiction, and for want of any cause of action in the complaint, that somebody else is or will be liable for the wrong complained of, unless it also appear that the defendants are not.
    
    II. Here these cases might be rested, wefe it not that the respondents raise questions even upon the concession that the assessments and levies were illegal, and that all the facts and all necessary parties are in court. The ground is not indeed quite that municipal corporations have only to make illegal assessments, in order to put themselves beyond the restraint of courts in the collection. That would be quite broad. The ground taken is narrower, and is best stated in the words of the points themselves:
    
      “First. An injunction will not be granted to sustain the collection of a tax illegally imposed upon the personal property of the plaintiff.”
    ‘1 Second. There is no allegation in the complaint which brings these cases within either of the three exceptions to the general rule that a court of equity will not entertain an action by a party aggrieved, for relief against an erroneous or illegal taxor assessment.”
    That is going far towards the old red sandstone of jurisprudence. For it refers to a time when the distinction between legal and equitable remedies yet continued, and when an uniform mode of proceeding in all cases, had not been established; when the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity had not been abolished; when every right and every wrong had stiU its special name, form and pigeon hole, and when every mistake of pigeon hole form or name, was still as fatal as to have had no right or wrong ; when all actions for the enforcement or protection of private rights, or the redress of private wrongs, had not been reduced to a single form, and when all other forms of pleadings had not been swept away; when it was not enough in any and every case that the plaintiff should state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action whatever, in his favor, against the defendants; when there could not be joined in the Same complaint several and all causes of action, whether such as had used to be denominated legal or equitable, or both, where they arose out of the same transaction, or different transactions connected with the same subject matter (and if no objection specially therefor were taken by demurrer); all other causes of every kind, also—when there prevailed other rules than now prevail, as to parties plaintiff and parties defendant, and when the courts could not grant every relief whatsoever, consistent with the case made by the complaint and within the issue, not only in giving judgment for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, or for or against one or more of several defendants, giving even defendants affirmative relief against plaintiffs, and then after all this, determining the ultimate rights on each side as between themselves ; and when, finally, it was not enough in every case of a judgment requiring the performance of any act other than the payment of money, or the delivery of real or personal property, to serve a certified copy of the judgment, in order to make disobedience a contempt.
    The respondent’s points, therefore, refer to a state of things long passed away, and all the authorities giving them any sanction, except the two cases at bar, which, by a strange circuity of reasoning, are cited as authorities in point for themselves, were decided either before the flood, or when dryland was just beginning to appear.
    It is no longer allowable to infer from the non-existence of a known remedy the non-existence of any right protected or enforced, or of any wrong; but now the right or wrong being shown, all remedies whatsoever, appropriate to the protection or enforcement of the one, or the redress of the other, are as much within the jurisdiction as the parties or cause of action ; nay, remedies are all that there ever is or can he of jurisdiction, for courts do not create rights or wrongs, and have no concern with parties or causes of action, except to find or make the remedies just commensurate with each case as it is.
    Of the old remedies, many are quite gone, and of those that remain not one is unchanged; while in disposing at once of all causes of action arising out of all transactions connected with the same subject matter, doing full justice to all parties all around, it becomes often wise and just to employ such new remedies that would have made Lords Kenyon and Eldon, sitting each in his form-bound tribunal, stare and gasp.
    It proves nothing then, to show that courts of equity would not have taken cognizance of a given case, or that injunction is an inappropriate remedy; for the first objection is true in nine of every ten cases, and the second in ninety-nine of every hundred; or if the new mode of bringing into contempt, by bare service of the judgment has taken its place, then the objection is good in every case. There will, nevertheless, if private rights exist to be enforced or protected—or private wrongs to be redressed—be abundant remedies. ,
    Now the complaints in the cases at bar, state facts showing, not assessments erroneous within jurisdiction, but utterly void, as transcending all jurisdiction, warrants issued, property of the plaintiff seized, with notice to redeem or salo; all this by one of the defendants for the benefit of another of the defendants, by the instrumentality of the third defendant. Here are rights of property invaded, other rights endangered, and a right of return and of damages, and of future immunity, to be enforced—no suggestion of misjoinder or non-joinder—no mention in the complaint, either of courts of equity or of injunctions. The defendants have not suffered default, but made an issue of law, whether the complaints state facts sufficient not for an injunction, or to show jurisdiction in a court of equity, but to constitute a cause that is any cause of action.
    
      The actual damage, however, thus far inflicted is small, the bulk of the wrong being still impending, and the main redress will be something directly or indirectly restraining the defendants. This may be first by judgment of damages for the seizure and detention, and of return; or second, by judgment for the whole value, as upon a conversion; or third, by a simple judgment without damages that the taxes are void, and directing a relinquishment of the levy; or fourth, by final injunction, if such a writ still survive.
    In the first two cases, attempts to collect the same taxes by new proceedings, would be met by the doctrine of res adjudicata, and in the last two by proceedings as for a contempt. In the first two the restraint upon the defendants would be indirect, in the last two direct; but in all there would be restraint. Any one of them would be sufficient for the plaintiff; none of them would wrong the defendants ; for it can never be a wrong either to be obliged to make compensation for wrong done, or to desist from continuance in doing it. Bach of these is consistent with the case made by the complaint, and within the issue, whether that'case contains a cause of action. And what a court of equity would or would not have done with such a case before the Code, is just as immaterial as what the Boman Prretor would or would net have done before or after Justinian.
    The demand of relief is equally broad or broader; for besides restraint, without specifying the kind, it asks further and other relief, or both. But whether it be held to be so general as to amount to no demand at all, .or so narrow, by asking only such relief as courts of equity give in a case where they give none, as to amount to just the same thing, still the plaintiff’s supposition of the relief to which he is entiled, is of no importance except in the event of a failure to answer (Code, §§ 129,142, subd. 3, § 246, subd. 2, §§ 278, 275; also Yoorhies’ Code, notes to same sections), an event which a demurrer prevents by raising an issue of law demanding a trial (§§ 248 and 252). But defect or. inappropriateness of relief is not a ground of demurrer (§§ 144 and 149), and therefore cannot be brought within any issue. On failure to anspier, the relief granted is only such as shall be consistent with the case made by the complaint, and within the relief demanded ; while in every other case, that is, whenever there be an issue (which in the cases at bar is whether there be facts constituting a cause of action), it is any relief consistent with the case made, and within the issue. "Wherefore, although on judg ment for plaintiff on demurrer he is to proceed in the manner (§§ 269, 246), he is not limited to the relief in cases of failure to answer, but takes any relief whatever, commensurate with his rights and wrongs, as shown by the facts stated in his complaint. (Cowenhoven agt. City of Brooklyn, 38 Barb. 9; N.Y. Ice Co. agt. W. Western Ins. Co. 23 N. Y. 257; Wright agt, Hooker, 10 Id. 51; Byxbie agt. Wood, 24 Id. 607; Barlow agt. Scott, Id. 40; Redmond agt. Dana, 3 Bosw. 616.)
    in. The defendants all belonging in Hew York, and served there—the cause of action having arisen there, and the subject of the action situated there—the superior court (§ 33) as well as the supreme court, had jurisdiction of the person of the defendants, and of the cause of action.
    IV. The second ground of demurrer assigned in the second of the cases at bar, if it raise questions either of jurisdiction or the sufficiency of the facts, is already disposed of with those questions. If it raise any different question, it states no ground allowable by section 144, and so is no demurrer. Even if it were otherwise, the assumed ground of it does not exist in either of these cases. They do not seek to review by complaint or injunction, or to review at all the proceedings .complained of. Errors committed within jurisdiction, have no doubt this tenderness shown them, that they shall be corrected only by special proceedings, in prescribed modes of review. But wrongs without jurisdiction, are every where aim-ply void. Judgments—one in the superior court, and the other in the supreme court of the first district, rendered against these plaintiffs, without jurisdiction of the person or cause of action, or on complaint showing no cause of action, would have been just as void as these taxes, and no more entitled to review—and if executions had been issued and levied—actions brought to arrest the wrong, even in the courts where the void judgments had been entered, would have been just as hable to the objection that appeals could not be brought by eomplaint and injunction, as these actions are liable to the objection now made. 27iai would be no appeal, just as this is no review.
    In Hayward agt. City of Buffalo (14 N. Y. 534), Judge Denio was clear that the action would have been maintained if a warrant had been levied on plaintiff’s property: for want of this the action was a mere quia timet, and there was nothing to be afraid of—the assessment being so clearly void as to be even no cloud on a title, and the defendant had no personalty which a warrant could have reached—simply, there was no cause of action. Similarly in all cases. Whenever one has been injured by the wrong of another, he may have redress and immunity, not because the injury was done under color of an illegal tax, assessment or judgment, but because of the injury. He might sue for the injury, omitting ah mention of the matters under color of which it was done—and this would be best, were it not that the embarrassment arising from possible defenses set up by defendants, render it more eonvenient to tell the whole story at the outset. Still the gravamen lies in the bare injury, doing and being threatened. On the other hand, however, a man not yet hurt, but only afraid of some void tax that may never hurt him, is in a different position. There in many cases, the courts refuse to interfere, not because they are courts of equity any more than courts of law, but simply because damnum absque injuria constitutes no cause of action any where.
    These cases at bar, therefore, are not cases to review errors within jurisdiction —nor yet suits merely quia timet; and if they were the latter, the New England case so often referred to, is in point to show that there is a real danger against which it is just that courts of justice should interfere.
    V. The judgments below should be reversed, with costs.
    A sudden illness of Mr. Bradley having prevented the points for appellants from being furnished within the time required by the rules, and the corporation counsol having by stipulation, now on file with the clerk, consented to an extension of twenty days from the 22d October last, his honor the chief judge, directed the time to be extended accordingly, and a note to that effect to be submitted with the points.
    New York, Nov. 7th, 1866.
    A. R. Lawbence, Jb., for respondents.
    
    Riohabd O’Gobman, counsel to the corporation.
    
    These actions are brought by the appellants to restrain the collection of taxes alleged to have been illegally imposed upon the appehants during the years 1856 and 1857, respectively.
    The respondents demurred to the complaint (Complaint, pp. 7, 8).
    The first case comes up on appeal from the judgment in favor of respondents, in the superior court of the city of New York, and the second on appeal from a like judgment in the supreme court in the first district.
    The decision below in the superior court is reported in 8 Bosworth, 683, and that of the supreme court in 33 Barbour, 322.
    I. An injunction will not be granted to restrain the collection of a tax illegally imposed upon the personal property of the plaintiff. (New York Life Ins. Co. agt Supervisors of New York, 4 Duer, 192; Heywood agt. City of Buffalo. 14 N. Y. 534; Wilson agt. The Mayor, &c. of N. Y. 1 Abb. 4; Chemical Bank agt. The Mayor, &c. of N. Y Id. 79; Moers agt. Smedley, 6 J. C. R. 28; Mayor agt. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132; Wiggin agt. Mayor, 9 Paige, 16, 24; Van Doren agt. Mayor, Id. 388; Livingston agt Hallenbeck, 4 Barb. 9,16; Van Rensselaer agt. Kidd, Id. 17; Bouton agt. Brooklyn, 7 Bow. 205; Bouglas agt. Mayor, 2 Duer, 110; Mutual Benefit, &o. Ins. Co. agt. Supervisors of N. Y. 33 Barb. 322; Same agt. Same, 8 Bosw. 683.)
    II. There is no allegation in the complaiut, which brings these cases within either of the three exceptions to the general rule, that a court of equity will not entertain an action by a party aggrieved, for relief against an erroneous or illegal tax or assessment. (Heywood agt. City of Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 534 and 541; Complaint, 3-14.)
    HI. The appellants had several remedies at law for any injury which they might sustain by reason of the imposition and collection of the taxes mentioned in the complaint.
    1. They could review the proceedings of the assessors and the supervisors by certiorari. (Heywood agt. Cily of Buffalo, supra ; Storm agt. Odell, 2 Wend. 287; Caledonian Co. agt. Trustees, &c. 7 Wend. 508; People agt. Brooklyn, 9 Barb. 535.)
    2. They had a remedy by prohibition against the supervisors and the receiver and constable (People agt. Works, 7 Wend. 486).
    3. Also by mandamus to compel the supervisors to strike the name and tax from the roll. (People agt. Albany, 12 J. R. 414; Ex. parte Nelson, 1 Cow. 417; Hull agt. Oneida, 19 J. R. 260; Bright agt. Chenango, 18 Id. 242; People agt. New York, 10 Wend. 393; Bank of Utica agt. Oity of Utica, 4 Paige, 400 ; People agt. New York, 18 Wend. 605; People agt. Watertown, 1 Bill, 616; People agt. Niagara, 4 Id. 20 ; Adriance agt. Supervisors of New York, 12 Bow. Pr. R. 224.)
    4. By an action against the assessors and sepervisors committing the wrong, for the recovery of the damages sustained therefrom, (Mygatt agt. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316 ; Saunders agt. Springsteen, 4 Wend. 429 ; Ontario Bank agt. Bunnell, 10 Id. 186; Weaver agt. Devendorf, 3 Benio, 117; Prosser agt. Secor, 5 Barb. 607; The People agt. Supervisors of Chenango, 1 Kern. 563.)
    IT. The bonds deposited by the appellants with the comptroller of this state, were liable to taxation under the provisions of the act of February 27, 1855. (Laws of 1855, p. 44; International life Ass. Com. agt. Com. Taxes, 28 Barb 318 ; British Commercial Life Ins. Co. agt. Com Taxes, 28 How. Pr. R. 41; Laws of 1853, pp 892 and 893, §§ 14 and 15; Complaints, fols. 6 and 7.)
    T. The judgments below should be affirmed, with costs.
    
      Brief of respondents in reply to appettanis’ argument :
    
    I. The counsel for the appellants, in the statement of the case which precedes his points, alleges that “ these suits ask the judgment of the court whether the plaintiff is liable to two taxes imposed upon it,” while the complaint in each action demands judgment “ that the defendants, and all of them, may be enjoined and restrained from collecting, receiving and paying over the said tax, and interfering with, removing, selling or disposing of any personal property belonging to the said plaintiffs, for the purpose of collecting said tax; and that this honorable court will adjudge that the said defendants, and each and all of them, be forever restrained and enjoined from collecting or receiving the same; and for such other or further relief, or both, as may be just.” The whole scope and object of the complaint in each case, is the obtaining of an injunction; and most of the allegations in each would he inappropriate, if any different relief was sought. The learned counsel for the appellants, has, therefore, improperly stated the object of the actions as being “ to ask the judgment of the court as to whether the plaintiff is liable to two taxes imposed on it.” His complaints are framed to present a case entitling him, as he supposed, to the equitable interposition of the court by way of injunction, and not for the purpose of deciding the abstract question as to whether the appellants were liable to taxation; which decision, if no relief was adjudged under it, could practically be of no benefit or advantage to the plaintiffs.
    II. That a court of equity has no jurisdiction to decree an injunction in a case where a tax is alleged to have been illegally imposed, is too well settled by the authorities which have been cited in the respondents’ points, to admit of any question ; and there is no case suggested in the points which have been presented on behalf of the appellants, and no principle invoked, which in any way establishes or countenances a different doctrine. The argument of the counsel, if well founded, might be applicable were this a certiorari to the assessorsto review their assessment, or a mandamus to the supervisors to compel them to remit a tax, or any other statutory or common law writ, the office of which is to correct any error in the assessment of a tax, or to afford a remedy in case the same had been illegally imposed; but the argument is of no force in a case where the equitable jurisdiction of the court by way of injunction is invoked. It does not make out, nor do the complaints state, any case falling under any acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction (Heywood agt. The City of Buffalo, 14 N Y. 538).' The uniform'current of decisions in this state has always been to the effect that a court of equity had no jurisdiction in cases such as these; and in Hey wood agt. (My of Buffalo, above cited, the point which the respondents urge is fully sustained by this court. In the opinion of Johnson J. (p. 540), it is said: “If the plaintiff failed to make out a case of equitable cognizance in his complaint, he was entitled to no judgment. Because the same court had power to set aside the assessment had all the proceedings been removed to it by the appropriate writ. from the inferior tribunal, it does not follow that a party may have the same relief in any other form of proceeding,” &c. And again: “Whatever distinctions may have been abolished by the Code of Procedure, this certainly has not.”
    III. The points made by the appellants, do not in any manner answer the first and second points made on the brief filed by the respondents on submitting their cases; and the court will look in vain through the brief of the appellants to discover any decision which at all detracts from the controlling force and authority of the eases cited by the respondents. The whole argument of the appellants upon the two propositions:
    ■ 1. That “ an injunction will not he granted to restrain the collection of a tax illegally imposed upon the personal property of the plaintiffand
    2. That “there is no allegation in the complaint which brings these cases within either of the three exceptions to the general rule, that a court of equity will not entertain an action by a party aggrieved fot relief against an erroneous or illegal tax or assessment” consists in merely characterizing them as “going far towards the old red sandstone of jurisprudence,” and as decided either before the flood or when dry land was first beginning to appear.” Such criticisms, unsupported by authority, are not arguments, and lose any force or effect, when it is recollected that the whole doctrine contended for by the appellant was in the case of Heywood agt. The Oily of Buffalo—certainly not an antediluvian adjudication—expressly repudiated, this court deciding therein that a court of equity would not interfere or exercise jurisdiction in relation to a tax or assessment, except in three certain, well defined classes of cases, within none of which exceptions does the case made by the appellants fall..
    IV. Again, referring to the other points made by the counsel for the respondents in the brief heretofore filed, it is respectfully submitted that the judgments appealed from should in all respects be affirmed, with costs.
   Leonard, J.

The question presented in this case has been passed upon by this court adversely to the plaintiffs (14 N. Y. 534). Assuming, as the complainant alleges, that the assessment is illegal, the plaintiffs have, or had, at least two complete remedies at law. The assessment might have been reviewed and corrected by certiorari, or have been stricken from the roll by mandamus. These remedies are adequate for the plaintiffs, as there is abundant authority to show, cited by the learned counsel for the respondents; where there are such remedies fully adequate, the aid of a court of equity cannot be evoked. The case principally relied on by the counsel for the appellants to maintain these actions, was determined in 1863, since the judgments were entered in the courts below, and is reported in The People agt. The New England Mutual Life Insurance Company (26 N. Y. R. 303). That case was submitted on a statement of the facts agreed on by the respective parties, under section 372 of the Code. In the court below the tax was held to be legal, and judgment was rendered against the company for the recovery of the amount; upon an appeal to this court that judgment was reversed, and the assessment held to be illegal. No objection was raised to the determination of the question. On the contrary, both parties asked the determination of the legality of the tax.

In the case at bar, the objection is specifically raised, based upon the decisions of this court, that a court of equity will not take cognizance or grant equitable relief by injunction, where full relief can be obtained at law. The appellants cannot be aided by the decision in 26 N Y. B., without overturning prior authority in this court, in no respect inconsistent with that .decision. It has been held by this court that the act of 1853 (Sess. Laws, chap. 463), for the incorporation of life insurance companies, and in relation to the agencies of foreign companies, repeals so much of chapter 51, of laws of 1851, as required the deposit by foreign companies of $100,000 with the comptroller; but it is unnecessary to go into the merits of this question, inasmuch as it appears from the decisions that no relief can be administered in equity, where the remedies at law are adequate for the attainment of justice.

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.