Case ID: mich-app_7/html/0608-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "J. H. Gillis, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SWAGMAN v. SWIFT AND COMPANY.
    1. Libel and Slander — Special Damages — Slander Per Se — Pleading.
    Special damages need not be alleged or proved where words constitute slander per se.
    
    2. Same — Slander Per Se.
    The words “crook” or “crooked” alone are not slanderous per se.
    
    3. Same — Profession and Employment — Pleading—Special Damages.
    Slanderous words spoken of and concerning one’s profession and employment are actionable in themselves and it is not necessary to aver special damages.
    4. Same — Pleading—Profession and Employment.
    A complaint which expressly avers that slanderous words were spoken of and concerning one’s profession and employment states a cause of action for jury determination.
    o. Same — Profession and Employment — General Damages.
    A complaint which fails to allege that words were spoken of and concerning one’s profession or employment fails to state a cause of action for which general damages may be recovered.
    6. Same — Profession or Occupation — Damages.
    All charges of disreputable or criminal conduct tend to injure every man in his profession, trade, or occupation, but the law does not permit recovery therefor unless the words be spoken of him in regard to such profession, trade, or occupation, and loss is alleged and proved.
    7. Same — Business or Profession — Pleading—Special Damages.
    All slanderous charges relating to one’s business or profession entitle a plaintiff to recover general damages for injury to feelings and reputation, but no additional recovery may be had unless plaintiff alleges and proves special damages.
    
      References for Points in Headnotes
    [1, 3,5-8] 33 Am Jur, Libel and Slander §§ 199-203, 243.
    [2] 33 Am Jur, Libel and Slander §§ 17, 31.
    Libel and slander: charge of being a “crook.” 1 ALR3d 844.
    [4.10] 33 Am Jut, Libel and Slander § 73 et seq.
    
    [9.11] 41 Am Jur, Pleading § 340 et seq.
    
    
      8. Same — Pleading.
    A complaint based upon alleged slander is fatally defective where it fails to allege that such slander was eonneeted with plaintiff’s profession or employment and also fails to plead special damages.
    9. Same — Summary Judgment.
    Summary judgment for defendant in action for slander, brought by plaintiff against his former employer, held, proper, where the claimed slander in the statements “has Swagman pulled any shady deals here too ?” and “was he a little on the crooked side here too?” were not aeeompanied by an allegation that the statements were made concerning plaintiff’s occupation or by an allegation of special damages, sinee general damages may be recovered only where the statements constitute slander per se, and there was no allegation of slander per se absent an allegation that the statements were made in connection with plaintiff’s profession or employment.
    10. Pleading — Mental Suffering.
    Written statements by an employer indieating that plaintiff improperly performed his job and failed to follow instructions held, as a matter of law, inadequate to support a elaim for mental suffering.
    11. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Mental Suffering.
    Summary judgment with respect to that portion of plaintiff’s complaint seeking damages for mental suffering held, proper, where based solely upon allegations that defendant employer made certain written statements indicating that plaintiff improperly performed his job and failed to follow instructions where such statements, as a matter of law, were inadequate to support a claim for mental suffering.
    Appeal from Ingham; Coash (Louis E.), J.
    Submitted Division 2 February 9, 1967, at Lansing.
    (Docket No. 2,080.)
    Decided September 19, 1967.
    Leave to appeal granted December 12, 1967, and case remanded with directions. 379 Mich 791.
    Complaint by Benjamin E. Swagman against Swift and Company, an Illinois corporation, doing business in Michigan as Swift and Company Ice Cream Division, for damages as the result of alleged slander and for mental suffering. Summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
    Affirmed.
    
      Lee G. Sheffer (Larry D. Fowler, of counsel), for plaintiff.
    
      Paul C. Younger, for defendant.
   J. H. Gillis, J.

Plaintiff, Benjamin E. Swagman, appeals from a summary judgment granted to defendant, Swift and Company, on June 13, 1966, in the Ingham county circuit court. Plaintiff’s appeal centers upon counts 4, 5 and 7 of his third amended complaint dated March 30, 1964, which plaintiff contends raised factual issues that were improperly disposed of by summary judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.

Counts 4 and 5 of the amended complaint present substantially similar questions and will therefore be considered together. Count 4 states that on June 12, 1963, in the presence of Robert W. Love, Mr. W. L. Gooch, acting in the capacity of management for the defendant, uttered the following defamatory words: “Has Swagman pulled any shady deals here too ?” Count 5 concerns a statement also allegedly made on June 12, 1963, by Mr. O. J. Salisbury, acting in the capacity of management for the defendant, in the presence of one Paul Thomas. The alleged defamatory words in this instance were: “Was he a little on the crooked side here too?” The only allegation of damage pleaded in count 4 was that the statements caused irreparable injury to plaintiff’s character and reputation in the community. Count 5 was -even more limited in its allegation of damage, i.e., “causing irreparable injury to plaintiff’s reputation.”

It is well established that where words constitute slander per se, special damages need not be alleged or proved. See Newman v. Stein (1889), 75 Mich 402. On appeal, plaintiff agrees that the words “crook” or “crooked” alone are not slanderous per se but that “the words must be examined in the light of the total attendant circumstances; [and] that these circumstances are facts to be decided by a jury who hears the evidence and observes the witnesses.”

Plaintiff’s complaint recites that he was employed by defendant as a salesman. If the alleged slanderous words “were spoken of and concerning his profession and employment * * * then the words are actionable in themselves and it was unnecessary to aver special damages.” Mains v. Whiting (1891), 87 Mich 172, 181. However, the Mains Case also states at p 181:

“In this case the plaintiff * * * expressly avers that they [the words] were spoken of and concerning his profession and employment * * * . Where such averments are made * * * it beT comes a question of fact to be determined by ' a jury.”

The instant case is distinguishable from Mains in that the complaint and amended complaint fail to allege that the words were spoken of and concerning his employment. The complaint must allege a connection between the alleged slander and plaintiff’s profession and absent this connection, the complaint is fatally defective. ■ ,. .

The case of Smedley v. Soule (1900), 125 Mich 192, 197, 198, is directly in point with-the instant case and is therefore quoted extensively:

“It is common in all actions for libel and slander for tbe plaintiff to allege not only his good name, et cetera, as a citizen, bnt also to allege bis business or profession; and the mere fact that sucb occupation or business is stated in tbe declaration is not sufficient to justify tbe inference that tbe libelous or slanderous article was uttered with reference to bis particular business or profession, especially in tbe absence of any allegation that be has suffered pecuniary loss in bis profession or business, but has only suffered loss in bis good name, fame, and credit. What is there in sucb a declaration to notify a defendant that plaintiff claims injury to bis profession or business, or that be would show pecuniary loss without alleging any, or that a jury should be turned loose in a realm of speculation to guess what loss in that direction plaintiff has sustained? # #
“All charges of disreputable or criminal conduct tend to injure every man in bis profession, trade, or occupation; but tbe law does not permit recovery therefor unless tbe words be spoken of him in regard to sucb profession, trade, or occupation, and loss is alleged and proved. Every sucb plaintiff can recover for injury to feelings and damage to bis reputation. If be desires to go beyond this, it is a wholesome rule to require him to connect tbe libelous charge by tbe proper colloquium with such profession, trade, or occupation, and to allege special damages.”

Counts 4 and 5 contain no allegation that tbe words complained of were spoken of plaintiff in relation to bis occupation. Therefore, they do not constitute slander per se and are not actionable without a showing of special damages. Since tbe plaintiff has not alleged any special damage, bis complaint in respect to counts 4 and 5 must fail. Tbe trial eourt correctly granted summary judgment as to these counts.

Plaintiff also contends that count 7 sets forth written statements made by defendant which are sufficient to support a cause of action for “psychological injury.” In essence, these statements allege that plaintiff improperly performed his job and failed to follow instructions. As a matter of law, such statements are inadequate to support a claim for mental suffering and the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Costs to appellee.

Holbrook, P. J., and Fitzgerald, J., concurred.