Case ID: so2d_673/html/0456-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MONROE, Judge. THIGPEN, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Terry James LANGDALE v. Mary Yvonne Langdale BATY.
    2941088.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Jan. 5, 1996.
    Walden M. Buttram of Buttram & Davis, L.L.C., Gadsden, for appellant.
    John D. McCord of McCord & Martin, Gadsden, for appellee.
   MONROE, Judge.

This case involves the award of postminority child support.

Terry James Langdale, the father, and Mary Yvonne Langdale Baty, the mother, were divorced in 1976. The mother was granted custody of their son, Lance, and the father was ordered to pay child support. In April 1994, 16 days before Lance’s 19th birthday, his mother filed a petition for modification, seeking postminority support for Lance to attend preparatory school and then college. The trial court denied postminority support for Lance to attend preparatory school, saying that there was no precedent for requiring a parent to pay support for preparatory school. However, the trial court specifically reserved the issue of future post-minority support for college expenses, adding that it would entertain another petition on the issue should Lance enter college after preparatory school.

In April 1995, the mother filed another petition for postminority support. According to the record, Lance was scheduled to graduate from preparatory school in May 1995. He had maintained a good average and had been accepted to Samford University for the fall 1995 term. He also had been awarded a football scholarship at Samford. The trial judge held a hearing, after which he ordered the father to pay $100 a week in postminority support. The father appeals.

The father contends that the trial court erred in granting the petition for post-minority support that was filed after his son had reached age 19. He relies on Ex Parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala.1989), in which the Alabama Supreme Court required that an application for postminority support be made before the child reaches the age of majority.

In this case, however, the mother’s first petition for postminority support was filed before Lance reached age 19. In its order denying support at that time, the trial court specifically reserved the issue of postminority support for college expenses until Lance finished preparatory school and entered college. When the trial court reserves jurisdiction for reconsideration of postminority support, the issue of postminority support for college expenses can be considered after the child’s 19th birthday. See Stein v. Stein, 623 So.2d 318 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); Newman v. Newman, 667 So.2d 1362 (Ala.Civ.App.1994).

The trial court reserved jurisdiction to reconsider the question of postminority support for Lance’s college expenses. Therefore, its award of postminority support for college expenses is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

ROBERTSON, P.J., and YATES, J., concur.

THIGPEN and CRAWLEY, JJ., concur in the result only.

THIGPEN, Judge,

concurring in the result only.

While I concur that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, I note that this issue has not been previously addressed by any Alabama appellate court. I know of no authority permitting a trial court to consider a new petition for post-minority support after a child’s nineteenth birthday; however, I suggested “by way of dicta,” that when denying a timely petition, it is within a trial court’s discretion “to expressly reserve jurisdiction on the matter of post-minority support for college expenses.” Stein v. Stein, 623 So.2d 318, 320 (Ala.Civ.App.1993). I again suggested that in Newman v. Newman, 667 So.2d 1362 (Ala.Civ.App.1994), writ quashed [Ms. 1931532, August 25,1995].

While allowing the trial court to expressly reserve jurisdiction seems, in my opinion, to be the better practice, certain problems may arise because of the current vagueness in this area of law. When the issue is reconsidered following a denial with a specific jurisdiction reservation, such as in the case sub judice, it appears to me that the petitioner is requesting a modification, and changed circumstances must be shown. See Newman, supra. In other words, the subsequent petition, is not, as the father complains, a new petition filed after the child’s nineteenth birthday. At the hearing in the instant case, the trial court clearly articulated its position in considering this petition by stating: “I do not consider this a new petition as such, but a continuation of the same issue.” Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment by following a rationale which positions the subsequent petition similar to a subsequent petition for periodic alimony when that issue was merely reserved upon initial consideration.

CRAWLEY, J., concurs.