Case ID: f-appx_190/html/0479-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amanda Jo SCHOENEWEIS, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 06-1651.
    United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
    Submitted May 26, 2006.
    Decided June 2, 2006.
    
      Stephen B. Clark, Office of the United States Attorney, Criminal Division, Fair-view Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Amanda Jo Schoeneweis, Fort Worth, TX, pro se.
    Before Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, and Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER

Amanda Schoeneweis was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). While on supervised release for this offense, Schoeneweis violated several of the terms of that release. Schoeneweis did not contest any of the alleged violations at her revocation hearing. The district court accordingly revoked the release and imposed an additional 24 months of imprisonment and an additional 18 months of supervised release. Schoeneweis now appeals, but her appointed lawyer has moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), because he cannot discern a nonfrivolous issue for appeal. We invited Schoeneweis to respond per Circuit Rule 51(b), but she has not done so. Therefore, we will consider only those potential issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir.1997) (per curiam).

Counsel considers whether Schoeneweis could challenge as unreasonable the district court’s decision to reimprison her for 24 months and impose an additional 18-month term of supervised release. We agree with counsel that this potential issue is frivolous. When imposing a term of reimprisonment for violating supervised release, a district court must consider the applicable policy statements and the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588-89 (7th Cir.2004). The district court did all of this at Schoeneweis’s revocation hearing. It noted the range recommended by the policy statements. The court then explained that it was imposing a longer term of reimprisonment because Schoeneweis’s original sentence had been reduced due to her substantial assistance. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 cmt. n. 4. The district court also took into account Schoeneweis’s history of drug abuse and the fact that she had resumed her “old habits” soon after being released from prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); see also Carter, 408 F.3d at 854 (courts should consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and the “defendant’s history and characteristics”); Salinas, 365 F.3d at 589 (same).

The only other potential issue counsel mentions is the possibility that Schoeneweis received ineffective assistance of counsel at her revocation hearing. If Schoeneweis has such a claim, cf. United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2006), she can raise it in a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see, e.g., United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir.2003).

For the above reasons, we GRANT counsel’s motion and DISMISS the appeal.