Case ID: f-appx_98/html/0178-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McKEE, Circuit Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert W. GRINE, II; Joanne D. Grine; Estate of Margaret M. Grine, Appellants, v. Ronald W. COOMBS, Executor of the Estate of William R. Coombs, Deceased; Billie M. Yost; Jack W. Shrum; Rotocast Plastic Products; Essex Environmental Industries, Inc; Tionesta Borough Council, of Forrest County; Ronald Hall, President of Borough Council, in an individual and official capacity; Scott Daum, Borough Manager of Tionesta, in an individual and official capacity; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”); Gary Wozniak, in an individual and official capacity as an agent of the DEP; Daniel Holler, Emergency Response Coordinator, Northwest Region, in an individual and official capacity, as an agent of the DEP; Michael McCabe, Regional Administrator, Region III, U.S. E.P.A.; Colleen Call, in her Official Capacity Only as Administrator of Tionesta Borough; United States of America Environmental Protection Agency.
    No. 03-3028.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 13, 2004.
    Decided May 28, 2004.
    Janice S. Haagensen, Enon Valley, PA, for Appellants.
    Robert J. Grimm, Israel, Wood, Puntil & Grimm, Bonnie R. Schlueter, Office of United States Attorney, Pittsburgh, PA, Matthew J. Sanders, United States Department of Justice Environment & Natural Resources, Washington, DC, for Appellees.
    Before NYGAARD, McKEE and CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs claimed that their up-gradient neighbor and others engaged in unlawful disposal practices that resulted in the contamination of their Tionesta Borough, Pennsylvania property. They sued alleging causes of action under the citizen suit provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq., the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, as well as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. The complaint also asserted state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, nuisance, strict liability, as well as an alleged violation of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act, 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6020.101 et seq.

Inasmuch as the district court has already set forth the factual and tortured procedural history of this case, we find it unnecessary to repeat that history here. We only note that on October 23, 2001, the district court entered a final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) in favor of the United States Environmental Protection Agency and Donald S. Welsh, Regional Administrator, Region III of the EPA. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a number of improper interlocutory appeals from various orders entered by the district court granting partial summary judgment to certain defendants, granting partial motions to dismiss to certain defendants, and denying plaintiffs’ motion to hold the EPA in contempt. Finally, on May 5, 2003, the district court sua sponte dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against all of the remaining defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) because of the plaintiffs’ failure to prosecute by, inter alia, engaging in dilatory conduct and refusing to comply with case management orders. Grine v. Coombs, 214 F.R.D. 312 (W.D.Pa. 2003).

In its Memorandum Opinion, the district court exhaustively explained its reasons for granting Rule 54(b) judgment to the Federal defendants, its reasons for entering the other orders noted above, and its reasons for dismissing all remaining claims against the remaining defendants under Rule 41(b). We are in full agreement with the district court’s thoughtful and searching analysis. Consequently, we need not engage in a redundant analysis simply to reach the same results.

Accordingly, we will affirm the district court substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court’s Memorandum Opinion without further elaboration. 
      
      . Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides a remedy of damages for a party who is required to defend a legitimate judgment from a frivolous appeal. We will leave it to the Appellees to determine whether they wish to petition for such an award.