Case ID: so2d_624/html/0903-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. LEMMON, Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re Eddie L. STEPHENS.
    No. 93-B-0939.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 1, 1993.
    Stay Denied; Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1993.
    G. Fred Ours, New Orleans, T. Haller Jackson, III, Shreveport, John T. Seale, New Orleans, for applicant.
    Eddie L. Stephens, Baker, for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon review of the hearing committee and disciplinary board findings and recommendations, and considering the transcript, record, briefs, and oral argument, it is the decision of this court that a suspension be ordered.

Eddie Stephens, the respondent attorney, failed to maintain a trust account, placed clients’ funds into his operating account and converted clients’ funds to his own use. Stephens reimbursed $2,000 of the misplaced funds by applying them to his clients’ medical expenses after holding them for fifteen months and going through a disciplinary hearing. Stephens has not yet made full restitution. However, there are mitigating circumstances: (1) An unexplained delay of three years in the disciplinary proceedings; (2) Respondent’s meager experience as a lawyer; and (3) Respondent’s lack of record of misconduct at the time of his violations.

Accordingly, it is ordered that Eddie L. Stephens be suspended from the practice of law in Louisiana for a period of one year from the finality of this decision, with his reinstatement conditioned upon his providing full restitution to all injured parties. All costs of this proceeding are assessed to respondent.

SUSPENSION ORDERED.

LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

KIMBALL, J., dissents for reasons assigned by LEMMON J.

MARCUS, J., not on panel.

LEMMON, Justice,

dissenting.

The record supports imposition of a suspension for one year and one day, as recommended by the Disciplinary Board. Respondent has not shown that the delay in the disciplinary proceeding should be considered a mitigating factor. Mitigation is sometimes attributed to a delay between the misconduct and the hearing because the attorney is called upon to defend the misconduct after a record of satisfactory behavior in the interim. In the present case, the court, upon questioning disciplinary counsel, was informed that numerous other complaints have been filed against respondent in the interim and that several have resulted in formal proceedings now at various stages in the system. While it would be inappropriate for this court to give any weight to these pending proceedings, the fact of their existence dissuades me from considering the delay as a mitigating factor.