Case ID: mass_28/html/0417-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      \n      Putnam J. Wilde J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jane Greene versus Stephen C. Greene.
    On a libel for a divorce a mens&, by the wife, it appeared that the husband’s domicile of origin was in Uxbridge, in the county of Worcester; that he intermarried with the libellant in 1810, and removed with her to Savannah, in Georgia, where he was engaged in business, and continued to reside there with his wife and family until 1821, except in the summer seasons, svhich he usually spent in the northern states; that in 1821 he broke up his household establishment at Savannah and returned to his father’s at Uxbridge; that after a few months’ residence there he established his family at Providence, in Rhode Island, where they remained till 1825, he passing the summer months in each year with them, but still continuing to carry on his business at Savannah; that in 1825 he broke up housekeeping at Providence, and separated from his wife, and from that time to the present had kept up a household establishment at Uxbridge, on the farm which was his father’s and which was mortgaged to him before the death of his father in 1825; that he resided there during the summer months, employing housekeepers and domestics and superintending the management of the farm, but continuing to carry on business the rest of the year at Savannah; and that the wife came from Providence into the county of AVorcester to reside, in September 1830, and soon after filed her libel. It was held, that the husband was domiciled in Savannah from 1810 to 1821, in Providence from 1821 to 1825, and in Uxbridge ever since; that the domicile of the wife followed that of her husband ; and that this Court, sitting for the county of Worcester, had jurisdiction of the libel.
    
      This was a libel by a wife against her husband, for a divorce a mensa, et thoro, for neglect to make suitable provision for the maintenance of the libellant, and for extreme cruelty alleged to have been used towards her in August 1830, at Uxbridge, in the county of Worcester. The libel was filed on September 6, 1830.
    At the last April term, before Putnam J., the libellee contended that neither of the parties had any such domicile in this commonwealth, as would give this Court jurisdiction in the case.
    It was proved that the libellee was born and brought up in Uxbridge ; that he intermarried with the libellant in 1810, at Providence, in the state of Rhode Island, and that he was at that time engaged in business at Savannah, in the state of Georgia, where he has ever since had a mercantile establishment ; that from 1810 to 1821, he with his wife and family resided and kept house at Savannah, except in the summer seasons, when he and his family usually returned to the northern states.
    In 1821 the libellee broke up his household establishment at Savannah, and returned with his wife and. children to his father’s at Uxbridge, where he resided about five months.
    From 1821 to 1825 he kept house at Providence, and his wife and family remained there during his absence at Savannah ; he living with his family about four months in the warm season of each year.
    In 1825, he broke up housekeeping at Providence, took his children away from the libellant, and separated from her. He •placed the two eldest children at school, and the youngest one with his sisters, who resided on the farm in Uxbridge, owned by the libellee’s father at the time of his decease, which occurred in 1825.
    At the time of the decease of his father in 1825, the libellee held a mortgage of the farm for several thousand dollars, and his father’s estate was insolvent. The libellee and the other heirs of his father joined in a conveyance of the farm to one Chapin, the agent of the libellee at Providence, who thereupon made a bond to the libellee, conditioned that he would reconvey the farm to the libellee, his heirs or assigns, whenever he should pay the sum which Chapin had advanced or should thereafter advance on account of the libellee. The consideration mentioned in the deed was $ 6,500, and the deed was dated October 4, 1825, which was after the separation, There was no evidence that the mortgage had been paid or discharged.
    The libellee, after the death of his father, occupied the farm, hired laborers, stocked the farm, provided all the necessaries for the family, and sold all the produce of the farm. His sisters kept the house and managed the domestic concerns at the farm for two years after the death of their father, and afterwards the libellee procured other housekeepers and female domestics. The libellee spent three or four months in the warm season of each year at the farm in Uxbridge, superintending the management of it and occasionally laboring upon it himself. On his return from the south, he always sent for all his children, who usually remained with-him on the farm until he went to Savannah in the autumn. The youngest child remained at the farm with the sisters of the libellee about two years, till it had arrived at a proper age to be sent to school. The other two children were abroad at school every year, during the absence of their father at Savannah. This state of things continued from 1825 to the time of the hearing.
    The libellee called the farm his property and used it as such ; he gave portions of the land for the purpose of making a road and a canal through the farm, and sold off large quantities of wood standing upon the farm ; and offered to sell a considerable portion of the land. Of some of these transactions Chapin was informed by the libellee either before or after they took place, and of others he had no notice.
    The libellee, in the deed to Chapin, and in a contract in his own handwriting, in 1828, respecting the sale of certain trees standing on the farm, styled himself “ of Uxbridge.”
    In 1830 the libellee made extensive improvements on the farm, and fitted up the buildings at considerable expense, and in a style suited to his standing and means.
    It was also proved, that the libellant had resided principally at Providence from the time of her separation from the libellee, to the first of September 1830, when she came to Worcester, in this county ; where she has since resided.
    
      Oct. 8th.
    
    
      Merrick and W. S. Hastings, for the libellant,
    cited in regard to the jurisdiction of this Court in cases of divorce, St. 1785, c. 69, § 7 ; Prov. St. 4 W. & M. c. 10 (Anc. Chart. 243) ; Moore v. Moore, 2 Mass. R. 117 ; Richardson v. Richardson, ibid. 153 ; Lane v. Lane, ibid. 167 ; Squire v. Squire, 3 Mass. R. 184 ; Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. R. 260 ; 2 Kent’s Comm. 93 to 98. They contended, that at the time of filing the libel, the husband’s domicile was in Uxbridge, and that by construction of law, the wife’s domicile followed that of the husband. Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 787 ; Hanover v. Turner, 14 Mass. R. 231 ; Knox v. Waldoborough, 3 Greenl. 455 ; Williams v. Whiting, 11 Mass. R. 424 ; Cambridge v. Charlestown, 13 Mass R. 501.
    
      B. Mams, J. Davis and C. Mllen,
    
    on the other side. The libellee has been domiciled in Savannah from 1810 to the present time. That was his place of business, and there lie exercised municipal rights, and his removals to the north were temporary, like those of other citizens during the warm season. Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves. 755. Admitting however that he acquired a domicile in Providence, the facts do not show that he subsequently acquired one in Uxbridge. 11 does not appear that, since he left Providence, he has exercised any political rights of a citizen in this county, or that.he has been taxed here for his poll or personal property, and he has resided at Savannah during the greater part of every year, engaged in the transaction of mercantile business. 5 Ves. 750. It is said that the wife has a domicile in Uxbridge, her domicile, by construction of law, following that of her husband. But for the purpose of procuring a divorce she may have a separate domicile, which in such case means residence merely. Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. R. 264. She did not reside in this county at the time of the alleged cruelty, but came into this state afterwards, only for the purpose of procuring a divorce. She came on the 1st of September 1830, and the libel was filed on the 6th. By the St. 1785, c. 69, § 7, the libel is to be heard in the county where the parties live ; that is, if both live in the same county, otherwise in the county where they have lived together. These parties have never lived together in this county nor in this state. Lane v. Lane, 2 Mass. R. 167 ; Squire v. Squire, 3 Mass. R. 184 ; Richardson v. Richardson, 2 Mass. R. 153.
   Putnam J.

was of opinion, that the libellee had such a domicile as would give this Court jurisdiction in the case, but reserved the question for the determination of the whole Court.

Oct. 10th

Wilde J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. Upon the facts appearing by the report of the evidence, we are of opinion that the domicile of the defendant was, at the time of the abuse complained of, within this county. By law the libellant’s domicile followed that of her husband ; so that the parties were living within this county, according to the true meaning of the statute giving jurisdiction to this Court in cases of divorce. The libellee’s domicile of origin was in the town of Uxbridge, where he was born and brought up. In 1810 he intermarried with the libellant and removed with her to Savannah, in the state of Georgia, where he was at the time engaged in business, and there he continued to reside with his wife and family until 1821, except in the summer seasons, when he usually returned to the northern states. In 1821 he broke up his household establishment at Savannah, and returned to his father’s in Uxbridge, and after a short residence there, he established his family at Providence, where they remained until 1825, he spending about four months in each year with them ; still, however, continuing to carry on his business at Savannah. In 1825 he broke up housekeeping in Providence, separated from his wife, and from that time to the present he has kept up an establishment at Uxbridge, on the farm which was his father’s, and which was mortgaged to him before the death of his father in 1825. Here he resided during the summer months, his sisters, continuing to manage his domestic concerns for some years, and afterwards he procured other housekeepers and domestics, and continued to superintend the management of the farm, occasionally laboring on it himself.

The conclusions to be drawn from these facts seem to us sufficiently plain. The domicile of the libellee from 1810 to 1821 was, we think, at Savannah ; and from 1821 to 1825 a) Providence ; but when he broke up housekeeping at the lattei place in 1825, and formed a household establishment at Uxbridge, he must be considered as intending to resume, and as having actually resumed his original domicile. His residence at Savannah negotiorum ratione, for the purposes of business and the acquisition of property, is a circumstance oi little weight, and by no means sufficient to constitute a domicile. He resided there, it is true, during the larger portion of each year; but when there is a divided residence the length of residence in the one place, or the^other, will not settle the question of domicile ; but it must be determined by other circumstances.

When the defendant broke up his domestic establishment at Savannah, and withdrew his family, the presumption is strong that he intended to abandon his domicile there, and that he returned, leaving his family behind, merely for the purposes of business ; and there is no evidence that he ever after considered that place as the place of his fixed residence or habita tion. On the contrary, the presumption of his attachment to his native place and connexions, his keeping up an establishment for his family at Providence, and afterwards at Uxbridge, and his improvement of his paternal estate, are all opposed to such a supposition.

If the libellee’s residence, and the attending circumstances, had been the same for the whole period since 1810 as they appear to have been since 1825, we think it hardly would be doubted that his original domicile would have remained unchanged ; and if so, we cannot well doubt the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that during the latter period of time he did in fact resume his original domicile. The separation of the parties in 1825, has no bearing on the question of domicile since that time. The wife could not acquire a domicile sepa rate from her husband’s, and although they lived apart, she still followed his domicile.

Another view might be taken of this case, if necessary. Speaking individually, I should have no hesitation in saying that a man may have two domiciles in different states, or within separate jurisdictions, so as to be amenable to a process of this description in either. That a man may have two domiciles for some purposes, although he can have but one for succession to personal property, is well settled in England and in other countries. Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 750.

It seems also to be clear, that the parties are sufficiently domiciled here to authorize the Court to sustain jurisdiction of the cause; and according to the Scotch decisions cited by Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries (2 Kent’s Com. 97), we should be authorized to dissolve the marriage, if this were a libel for a divorce a vinculo. The Court of Sessions, in several cases there hold, that the relation of husband and wife, wherever originally constituted, was entitled to the same protection and redress as to wrongs committed in Scotland, that belong of right to that relation by the law of Scotland ; that matrimonial obligations are juris gentium, and admit of no modification by the will of the parties ; and that foreign courts are not bound to inquire after that will, or after the municipal law to which it may correspond; that they are bound to look to their own law, especially in the administration of that department of internal jurisprudence which operates directly on public morals and domestic manners; that though marriage, contracted according to the lex loci, be valid all over the world, yet many of its rights and duties are regulated and enforced by public law, which is imperative on all who are domiciled within its jurisdiction. The same question however was brought up on appeal from Scotland to the House of Lords in England, and the decision of the twelve judges does not sustain the Scotch decisions as to divorces a vinculo. They seem to deny the competency of any foreign court to pronounce a decree of divorce a vinculo of English marriages, or to pronounce any other decree in the case than such as would be warranted by the lex loci contractus. But it might be easdy shown that divorces a mensa et thoro stand on a very different footing from divorces a vinculo, and that if the lex loci were to govern, it would not affect our decision in this case. We are not called upon, however, to discuss these grave and important questions, as we are all of opinion that the domicile of the parties is satisfactorily proved to be within this county, notwithstanding the libellee’s residence at Savannah.

Divorce a mensa, et ihoro decreed. 
      
       It seems, that the maxim, that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, will not be applied to oust the Court of its jurisdiction in case of a libel by a wife for a divorce. Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181.