Case ID: f-appx_699/html/0692-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ivan SPEED, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-10056
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 19, 2017  San Francisco, California
    Filed October 24, 2017
    Jonas Lerman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-USAO, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    
      David Annicchiarico, Law Office of David L. Annicchiarico, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: W. FLETCHER and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and HOYT, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      
         The Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Ivan Speed was convicted of selling cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school and now appeals several conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. When a defendant does not object to conditions of supervised release in the district court, we review the imposition of conditions for plain error. United States v. Jeremiah, 493 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2007). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.

On appeal, Speed challenges the payment provision of his treatment requirements, a prohibition on alcohol consumption, and a ban on frequenting gambling establishments. We hold that the district court did not commit plain error by requiring Speed to contribute to the cost of treatment, subject to the discretion of his probation officer. See United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, based on Speed’s history of drug use and drug-related offenses, the district court’s imposition of alcohol-related conditions was not plain error. United States v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Vega, 545 F.3d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]t is hardly a secret that there is a tie between drug abuse and alcohol abuse.”). Lastly, the condition relating to frequenting gambling establishments is not vague or over-broad, and directly relates to Speed’s rehabilitation. United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754, 767-68 (9th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.