Case ID: f-appx_714/html/0772-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Andrea Dee HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 15-35908
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2018  Portland, Oregon
    Filed March 12, 2018
    Max Rae, Max Rae, Attorney, Salem, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    Jeffrey Eric Staples, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, Renata Gowie, DOJ-USAO, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Ap-pellee
    Before: FISHER, N.R. SMITH and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Andrea Holloway appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, see Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2010), and we affirm.

1. The ALJ properly excluded conversion disorder or psychogenic dystonia. No “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques” resulted in a finding or diagnosis of this impairment. See Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

2. The ALJ provided specific, clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Holloway’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Even assuming the ALJ erred by considering Holloway’s criminal history, see SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg. 14166, 14171, any error was harmless,

3. The ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons that were supported by substantial evidence for discrediting Dr. Dieter’s opinion. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant's self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible.”) (citation omitted).

4. The ALJ provided germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of Thomas Miller, Holloway’s boyfriend, because his testimony was inconsistent with the medical record. See Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.

5. The ALJ’s finding that jobs exist in significant numbers that Holloway could perform was supported by substantial evidence. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279. The ALJ was permitted to rely on the job testimony offered by the vocational expert. See Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . In light of our disposition, we need not address Holloway's remaining contentions regarding her 2008 applications.