Case ID: scl_18/html/0401-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per curiam.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State, ex rel. P. E. Peareson v. Jeptha Arledge.
    A title to lands cannot be acquired against the State, by possession under the statute of limitations.
    Lands recently purchased by the State from a corporation, to which they had been originally granted by the State, are not “vacant lands,” within the acts for granting lands; and a grant taken out for such lands vests no title in the grantee.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Earle, at Fairfield, Spring Term, 1831.
    This was an information in nature of a quo warranto, on the relation of Philip Edmund Peareson, Esquire, Solicitor of the State for the Middle Circuit, to try the title to a tract of land. The State purchased from the Catawba Company in April, 1816. The defendant took out a grant for the land in September, 1818 ; and had been in possession ever since: To the information he pleaded the general issue, and statute of limitations. The relator joined issue on the first plea, and demurred to the second ; and the defendant joined in demurrer.
    On the demurrer the presiding Judge delivered the following opinion.
    The question is, whether the defendant can hold adversely to the State; or whether the right of the State can be barred by the statute of limitations. I do not know that the principle of “ nullum tempus,'‘ has ever been formally recognized in our Courts: it certainly has not been repudiated. It is, I think, sufficient for the decision of this case to refer to the case of Huvlock, et al. v. Jackson, 1 Treadw. 135, where the Court, per Mott, J. held, that “ the statute of limitations does not run against the State ; that the Slate cannot be disseized ; and that a citizen cannot hold adversely to the State.” This related to lands which had been acquired by escheat; and the point is expressly decided, that a title to such lands cannot be acquired by adverse possession as against the State. In the case at bar, the State holds as purchaser from a corporation, to whom the lands had originally been granted by the State. If in relation to escheats the principle be, that the statute of limitations will not run, because the State cannot be disseized; the same reason and principle must apply to lands held in any other right, or by any other title. Can the State be disseized of any land 1 If all have an equal right to euter, and there be none who has an exclusive right, can there be any ouster of the body politic by an individual l I apprehend not, unless the claim of defendant be strengthened by the grant which he has obtained as for vacant land. It is very clear that the grant vests no title in the defendant. The land is not “ vacant ” within the meaning of the acts on that subject. I think it has been more than once decided, that a grant under those acts, of es-cheated lands, is void. See the opinion of Brevard, J. in Hurlock, et al. v. Jackson, who refers to the case of Bodden v. Speigner, on that point. It was also made a few years ago in a case from Spartanburgh, Combee, et al. v. Ligón : and I have no hesitation in considering the grant in this case in the same light. A title to the land cannot be acquired in this way; and the grant can be of no avail, unless it be relied on as an ouster, or evidence of intention to hold adversely: and for that purpose it is insufficient. It is but the act of the defendant himself; or, at most, of a subordinate officer, on the representation, by the defendant, that the land was vacant. If it be void as a grant, it is also unavailable for the other purpose. Judgment for the relator on demurrer.
    
      vide Allston v, Saunders, 1 Bay, 26. M'CIuve v. Hill, 2 Mill, 420.
    On the general issue, the defendant again relied on his grant as evidence of title; but the presiding Judge held it unavailing: and the jury found a verdict for the relator.
    
      The defendant now moved to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.
    Clarke, for the motion,
    contended, that as the State claimed the land under a purchase from the Catawba Company, against whom the statute of limitations would have run, it could claim no higher privileges than that company. That the maxim nullum tern,pus occurrit regi was a prerogative maxim, and could only apply where the State claimed property in its sovereign capacity, which it did not in the present instance.
    Peareson, Solicitor, contra.
    
   Per curiam.

We concur in the decision of the presiding Judge, for the reasons given.

Motion refused.