Case ID: ala_166/html/0059-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SIMPSON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DeBardelaben v. Dickson.
    
      Ejectment.
    
    (Decided Jan. 20, 1910.
    Rehearing denied Feb. 26, 1910.
    51 South. 986.)
    1. Wills; Construction; Use of Technical Terms. — Unless the contents shows the clear intent to use them otherwise than in their technical sense, technical phrases used in a will will be construed to have been used in their technical sense.
    2. Same; Persons Entitled; Heirs; Children. — Where the will provided that the remainder of the testator’s property should go to the testator’s wife for life, and after her death should be equally divided between her heirs, and the will was prepared by a notary public, the word, “heirs” cannot be construed to mean children unless it clearly appears from the context that it was so intended, which does not appear in this case, there being nothing to show that it was so intended, or used in that sense, and hence, under the will, the remainder descended to the heirs of the wife, or widow living at her death.
    Appeal from Lowndes Circuit Court.
    Heard before Hon. J. C. Richardson.
    Ejectment by P. H. Bardelaben against J. C. Dickson and others. Judgment for defendant and plaintiff appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Riddle, Ellis & Kelly, for appelant.
    The provisions of the will in this case bring it squarely within the rule of Shelley’s Case. — 11 Am. St. Rep. 100; Wilson v. Alston, 122 Ala. 630. This rule having been abolished by the statute Sophie E. DeBardelaben did not take a fee simple title to the land. — Mason v. Pate, 34 Ala. 379, and authorities supra. The word, “heirs” has a technical meaning, and does not mean children unless it clearly appears from the context to have been used interchangeably or alternately with the word “children.” - — Mason v. Pate, supra; Machín v. Machín, 15 Ala. 373; May v. Richie, 65 Ala. 602. The plaintiffs being the only heirs of Sophie DeBardelaben, the life tenant under the will, at the time of her death, took an estate tail in remainder under the will.- — Wilson v. Alston, supra. The statute of limitations did not begin to run until after the death of the life tenant. — 3 Mayf. 400. A life tenant in possession cannot hold adversely to the remaindermen, and hence, section 3846, Code 1907, has no application to the case at bar.- — Pickett v. Pope, 74 Ala. 129. For a general discussion of the questions here involved see Kumpe v. Goons, 63 Ala. 48; Gindrat v. Western By., 96 Ala. 162; Smaw v. Young, 109 Ala. 528; Aeree v. Dabney, 133 Ala. 437.
    Pettus, Jeffries, Pettus & Fuller, and D. G. Ewing, for appellee.
    The pole star in a construction of a will is the intention of the testator. — Ballantyne v. Foster, 128 Ala. 643; Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 65 Ala. 321; Tayloe v. Harwell, 65 Ala. 1; Griffin v. Pringle, 56 Ala. 486. Applying these familiar rules of construction to the facts surrounding the testator the word “heirs” must he construed to mean children.— Thorpe v. Yarbrough, 12 Am. St. Rep. 440; Finley v. Hill, 133 Ala. 232; Ihrie 'Estate, 29 Atl. 750; Record v. Fields, 55 S. W. 1021; Stoutenburg v. Moore, 37 N. 3. E. 69; Feltman v. Butts, 71 Ky. 115; Eldridge v. Eldridge, 3 Atl. 61; Boioers v. Porter, 4 Pick. 198. The following cases shed light on the matter under discussion and will aid this court in arriving at a correct con elusion: Campbell v. Noble, 110 Ala. 382; Sullivan v. McLaughlin, 99 Ala. 60; May v. Richie, 56 Ala. 602; Findley v. Hill, 133 Ala. 229; Dunn v. Davis, 12 Ala. 140; Wettock v. Horn, 50 Ala. 1002; Hughes v. Clark, 26 S. W. 187; Lockwood’s Appeal, 10 Atl. 517.
   SIMPSON, J.

This is an action of ejectment by the appellant against the appellees. The property in question was originally owned by P. H. De Bardelaben, Sr., who left a will in wbicb occurred these words: “All of the balance of my property, real, personal and mixed, I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife, Sophie E. De Bardelaben, during her natural life, and after her death to be divided equally between her heirs.” At the time of the execution of the will, and of the death of P. H. De Bardelaben, Sr., there were living his said wife and two sons, B. W. De Bardelaben and L. H. De Dardelaben, both of whom were married, but had no children. After the death of said P. H. De Bardelaben, his said wife and his' said two sons executed a deed conveying the land in question to W. H. Merritt, and hy successive convenyances the same came to the defendants. Subsequently both of said sons died; said L. H. leaving no children, and said B. W. leaving two children, who are the plaintiff’s in this case and the only heirs of said P. H. De Bardelaben, Sr., and of said Sophie E. De Bardelaben, who did not remarry and died November 22, 1908. It will be seen that, under the wording of the will, as provided by section 2183 of the Code of 1876 (section 3403, Code 1907), Sophie E. De Bardelaben took a life estate, and plaintiffs, who were her only heirs living at the time of her death, took the remainder as purchasers.

The contention of the appellee is that the word “heirs” should be read “children,” intending to refer to her children and his then living, and thus creating in them a vested remainder, so that the conveyance by said widow and her two said children carried the entire title to the property. The general rule is that, where the testator uses technical words, he is presumed to employ them in a technical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another is apparent from the context.—30 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 671. It is true that the technical meaning of the word “heirs” must yield to the evident intent of the maker, where it is apparent that he intended to say children. But “this meaning cannot be assigned to the word, unless it clearly appears that it was employed in that sense.”—21 Cyc. 428. The court cannot infer, from any impression of its own, as to what would be natural to do; but there must be something in the context of the will to show that the testator did not understand the meaning of the word, or used it in a sense different from its correct meaning.—Shimer v. Maun, 99 Ind. 190, 50 Am. Rep. 82, 84, et seq.; Machen v. Machen, 15 Ala. 373, 375-6; Ewing v. Standifer, 18 Ala. 400; Mason v. Pate, 34 Ala. 379; Loyd v. Rambo, 35 Ala. 709, 712; Parish v. Parish, 37 Ala. 591, 594; Wilson v. Alston, 122 Ala. 630, 635, 25 South. 225. In the cases of May v. Ritchie, 65 Ala. 602, and Campbell v. Noble, 110 Ala. 382, 19 South. 28, it is said that the deed and the will showed on the face that it was written by an ignorant person, or one not acquainted with the use of technical words; and the case of Findley v. Hill, 133 Ala. 229, 32 South. 497, is based upon the fact that the incongruous provisions of the deed show “that the deed was written by a person unskilled in the use of technical words, and that the grantor must have used 'heir or heirs’ in the first limitation in the narrower sense of children, issue, or descendants.”

In the will now under consideration there is nothing to indicate that the notary public who wrote the will did not understand the meaning of the word “heirs.” There are no incongruous provisions, nor is there anything which would justify the court in supposing that the testator did not intend to devise the property as he did. It is just as natural to suppose that, as her heirs,, if her sons and their issue lived, would also be his heirs, his wish was, on failure of their issue, that the property should go to her heirs. It would be a violent presumption to suppose that the scrivener was so ignorant as as to not know the meaning of the word “heirs,” and yet was so skilled in philology as to- draw ■ the nice distinction between “between” and “among.” We hold that under the will in question a life estate was conveyed to Sophie E. De Bardelaben, with remainder to her heirs living at the time of her death.

It results that the court erred in giving the general affirmative charge in favor of the defendants, and in refusing to give said charge on the written request of the plaintiff. The -judgment of the court is reversed, and the cause remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

Dowdell, C. J., and McClellan and Mayfield, JJ., concur.