Case ID: f-appx_474/html/0541-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lester Mathews SHARPTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-30353.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 26, 2012.
    
    Filed July 3, 2012.
    Cyndee Peterson, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Missoula, MT, Leif Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Billings, MT, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Jason Trinity Holden, Faure Holden Attorneys at Law, P.C., Great Falls, MT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2). Accordingly, Sharpton’s request for oral argument is denied.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lester Mathews Sharpton appeals from the 144-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for viewing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Sharpton first contends the district court erred when it applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) because his prior conviction for two counts of criminal sexual contact with a minor did not constitute a “pattern of activity.” The district court did not err. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) cmt. n. 1.

Sharpton next contends that the district court erred in denying him an additional one-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3El.l(b). He argues that the government’s refusal to move for the third point was arbitrary in light of the fact that the plea offer that Sharpton rejected would have permitted an appeal challenging the enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(5). This argument is unpersuasive because the government’s position was not arbitrary. See United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 1002-04 (9th Cir.2009).

Sharpton also contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider fully and to explain the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The record belies this contention.

Sharpton finally contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.