Case ID: f-appx_641/html/0088-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael Anthony CLARKE, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-2651.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 11, 2016.
    Corrected March 14, 2016.
    Sergei Orel, (S. Michael Musa-Obregon, on the brief), Maspeth, NY, for Petitioner.
    Joseph A. O’Connell, Attorney (Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, on the brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, ROBERT D. SACK, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR„ Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Michael Anthony Clarke, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of a June 25, 2014, decision of the BIA affirming the June 17, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering that Clarke be removed to Jamaica. In re Michael Anthony Clarke, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 25, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Buffalo June 17, 2013). In his petition for review, Clarke argues that the IJ erred in denying Clarke’s motion to change venue or, in the alternative, to continue the removal proceedings. Clarke also asks this Court to remand to allow the BIA to hear new evidence related to Clarke’s marriage to a United States citizen during the pendency of this petition. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the denial of a request for a change of venue or a continuance for abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir.2006); Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 558 (2d Cir.2005). To secure a remand, a petitioner challenging such a denial must demonstrate not only that the IJ abused its discretion, but also that the denial prejudiced the petitioner. See Lovell v. INS, 52 F.3d 458, 460-61 (2d Cir.1995).

Even assuming, arguendo, that the IJ abused its discretion in denying Clarke’s motion, we agree with the BIA that Clarke has failed to show any prejudice. Clarke sought a venue change to facilitate the presentation of evidence. However, because Clarke admitted that he was removable, there was no need for the Immigration Court to hear any evidence unless and until an 1-360 visa petition that Clarke had filed was granted, a necessary step in Clarke’s effort to be reclassified as a lawful permanent resident. Clarke’s petition, which was decided by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, not the Immigration Court, was ultimately denied. Thus, the Immigration Court’s refusal to grant a venue change could not have prejudiced Clarke. Similarly, Clarke sought a continuance to allow him to await a final decision on his 1-360 visa petition. Here, too, the denial of the petition precludes any finding of prejudice.

We also reject Clarke’s request that we remand these proceedings to allow the BIA to take additional evidence related to Clarke’s recent marriage to a United States citizen. We lack any statutory authority to order the taking of additional evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Furthermore, to the extent that we retain any

inherent power to remand for additional fact-finding in agency cases that present extraordinary and compelling cireum-stances[,] ... the exercise of such an inherent power is not warranted if : [i] the basis for the remand is an instruction to consider documentary evidence that was not in the record before the BIA; and [ii] the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen a case before the BIA for the taking of additional evidence.

Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir.2007). Here, to start, there is nothing extraordinary or compelling about Clarke’s case, which was commenced in September 2010 and is only still pending as a result of numerous postponements ordered for Clarke’s benefit. Additionally, the evidence of Clarke’s marriage was not before the BIA, and agency regulations provide an avenue for Clarke to seek to reopen the proceedings below. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii); see also Xiao Xing Ni, 494 F.3d at 271 (“The ability of a particular petitioner to successfully reopen proceedings in the agency does not bear on the question.” (emphasis in original)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. 
      
       Having rejected Clarke’s request for a remand, we dismiss the government’s motion to strike the extra-record evidence Clarke has submitted with his brief as moot.