Case ID: wis_100/html/0266-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Winsnow, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rens, Appellant, vs. Northwestern Mutual Relief Association, Respondent.
    
      May 26
    
    
      June 23, 1898.
    
    
      L/ife insurance: Suicide: Court and jury: Evidence: Declarations showing intention.
    
    1. In an action on a policy of life insurance which did not cover death by suicide, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, there was evidence, among other things, that the deceased frequently became intoxicated, quarreled with his wife, and then threatened to HU himself; that on one such occasion he attempted to cut his throat, and on the same evening said to his mother “ Good-by for the last time;” that the next day he attempted to borrow a rifle and a revolver to shoot rats, but finally purchased a revolver and ammunition and took them to his room, saying to another occupant of the building that he “ had a weapon and would never see another sunrise; ” that he resisted an attempt to take the revolver away, and went into the dining room alone; that shortly after-wards a shot was heard, and the deceased was found lying on the floor, with a bullet hole through his head, entering above the right ear and coming out back of the left ear; and that there were no marks of burnt powder, and the flesh around the hole was not burned or broken. Meld, that a verdict for defendant was properly directed, the only reasonable inference which could be drawn being that the deceased took his own life.
    
      2. In such a case evidence of the declarations of the deceased within the twenty-four hours preceding his death, tending to show an intention to commit suicide, was properly admitted.
    Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Marathon ■county: Ohas. Y. Bardeen, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    This is an action by the plaintiff, as payee of a life insurance policy upon the life of her husband, who died April 2, 1896, from the effects of a pistol shot. The defense was suicide. The policy contained a provision to the effect that suicide, whether voluntary or involuntary, sane or insane, was not a risk assumed by the defendant.
    The evidence showed that the deceased had been married to the plaintiff four or five years, and frequently became intoxicated, and, when in such condition, would have trouble with the plaintiff and threaten to kill himself; that he was intoxicated during the day prior to his death, and that the night before his death he attempted to cut his throat; that on the same evening he said to his mother, “ Good-by for the last time; ” that upon the following day, being the day of his death, he tried to borrow a rifle, but failed, and in the afternoon attempted to borrow a revolver for the purpose of shooting rats. Later he purchased a self-cocking revolver with ammunition, and took it to the rooms where he lived, saying to another occupant of the building that he “ had a weapon and would never see another sunrise.” His father was then sent for, and several other neighbors came, and the deceased had the revolver in one hand, flourishing it in the air, and swinging his arms. He resisted an attempt to take the revolver away from him, and went into the dining room alone; and shortly afterwards a shot was heard, and, upon going into the room, the deceased was found lying upon the floor, the revolver close to him, and cartridges scattered over the floor. There was a bullet hole through the head, entering over the right ear and coining out back of the left ear. There were no marks of burnt powder, nor was the flesh burned or broken around the bullet hole. The plaintiff objected to the evidence showing threats of the deceased to commit suicide, and also his other statements during the twenty-four hours prior to his death, but the evidence was received.
    Upon this testimony the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, and from judgment upon such verdict the plaintiff appeals.
    For the appellant there was a brief by Mylrea, Marchetti & Bird, and oral argument by C. B. Bird.
    
    To the point that the question whether the deceased committed suicide was for the jury, they cited Ilome Benefit Asso. v. Sargent, 
      142 U. S. 691; Keels v. Mut. R. F. L. Asso. 29 Fed. Rep. 198; Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McWhirter, 73 id. 444; Whitlatch v. Fidelity <& C. Co. 149 NT. Y. 45, 51; Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256; Baclvmeyer v. M%ot. B. F. L. Asso. 82 Wis. 255; S. C. 87 id. 325; Cronkhite v. Trmelers’’ Ins. Co. 75 id. 116; Mallory v. Trmelerd Ins. Co. 47 N. Y. 52; Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. A7cens, 150 U. S. 468.
    
      Frank F. Parkinson, for tie respondent,
    argued, among other things, that the declarations of the deceased were admissible. Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397; Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S. 465; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. McWhirter, 73 Fed. Rep. 444; Globe Acc. Ins. Co. v. Cerisch, 61 Ill. App. 140; Hale v. Life 1. de I. Co. 65 Minn. 548; Comm. v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180; 1 Greenl. Ev. §§ 108, 109, 111, 114; Taylor, Ev. 375-380; 1 Phillips, Ev. 194; Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U. S. 285; Smith v. Hat. Ben. Soc. 123 NT. Y. 85; Woodward v. Sullwan, 152 Mass. 470; Friend v. Burleigh, 74 N. W. Rep. 50; Bliss, Ins. 592, 593; French v. State, 93 Wis. 325; Jwrvpertz v. People, 21 Ill. 375; Worth v. C., M. & St. P. B. Co. 51 Fed. Rep. 171; Wharton, Grim. Ev. (8th ed.), § 756.
   Winsnow, J.

We think the verdict was rightly directed. From the evidence given on the trial but one reasonable inference could be drawn, and that was that the deceased took his own life. Any other conclusion from the facts in evidence would amount to a pitiable stultification of the reasoning powers.

The evidence of the declarations of the deceased within the twenty-four hours preceding his death, tending to show an intention to commit suicide, was properly admitted. The question was as to the intention of Rens in firing the shot, and, when such is the question, declarations of the party which are so close in point of time to the act as to justify a reasonable probability that he carried his declared intention into execution are admissible as original evidence, provided they are made under circumstances precluding the idea of misrepresentation or bad faith. Hale v. Life I & I. Co. 65 Minn. 548. The evidence seemed clearly to show that the deceased commenced to prepare for suicide on the day before his death, and all his remarks and acts are so closely connected with the final tragedy as to form really parts of the same transaction.

By the Cowrt.— Judgment affirmed.

Bardeen, J., took no part.