Case ID: f-appx_558/html/0036-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jacqueline Suzanne GROSSO, Plaintiff-Appellant, Ralph Grosso, Plaintiff, v. Mario BIAGGI, Jr., dba Biaggi & Biaggi, Defendant-Appellee.
    
    No. 13-3106-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 7, 2014.
    Jacqueline Grosso, pro se, Carversville, PA, for Appellant.
    A. Michael Furman (Eric Daniel Mercu-rio, on the brief), Furman Kornfeld & Brennan LLP, New York, NY, for Appel-lee.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges, and MAE A. D’AGOSTINO, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Mae A. D’Agostino, of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Jacqueline Grosso, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dismissal of her legal malpractice complaint against defendant Mario Biaggi, Jr. for failure to state a claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the ease, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), see Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002), reading pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that [they] suggest[ ],” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals no error in the district court’s order granting defendant’s motion to dismiss, as, for the reasons stated in the court’s order, Grosso failed to state a claim for relief that was plausible on its face. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on July 17, 2013.

We have considered Grosso’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly* we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.