Case ID: tenn_21/html/0224-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Reese, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Keaton’s distributees vs. Campbell, et als.
    
    John Keaton died in Missouri, having some personal property in that State, and some in the possession of his family in the State of Tennessee; W. Keaton administered on his estate in Tennessee, and gave sureties for the performance of this trust in Tennessee; he then went to Missouri, obtained letters of administration upon the estate of decedent in that State, and gave sureties for the performance of that trust: Held, that these trusts were distinct and independent of each other, and t'he sureties in one State not responsible to the distributees for the effects received into possession in the other; and this is so, though the administrator may have brought the property obtained in Missouri to Tennessee, converted it into cash, and made a return of the proceeds to the appropriate tribunal in Tennessee as assets. , ■ ’
    
    This bill was filed in the chancery court at Winchester, by Lackey and wife, Bennett and wife, and Gibson and wife, distributees of the estate of John Keaton, deceased, against James Campbell, J. H. Bradford and Elizabeth Keaton, securities of William Keaton, administrator of said John Keaton’s estate. It was filed on the 19th day of February, 1839, and prayed for an account and distribution of the estate, amongst those entitled, according to law.
    
      The facts of the case are substantially as follows:
    John Keaton, after having resided in Franklin county, Tennessee, between 25 and 27 years, about the spring of 1825, went to Missouri, leaving behind him his family and “some property, consisting of household furniture and necessaries,” and taking with him ■about 20 negroes, horses, wagons, stock, &c. He lived in Missouri, ■treating" that State as his domicil, till his death, on the 2d of September, 1828, when his property consisted of about the same ■things which he had taken with him. Whether he had finally abandoned the county of Franklin, as a place of residence, does not certainly appear.
    The probate court of Jefferson county, Missouri, on the 4th day of September, 1826, granted administration ad colligendum, to one Michael Taney, who had been Keaton’s partner in that State, and he executed a bond with surety, in the penalty of five thousand dollars, conditioned to collect all the estate, personal and real, of the deceased, make an inventory thereof, and safely keep and deliver it to the administrator to be afterwards appointed. On the 18th September, 1826, administration of the estate was granted by the same court to the same Taney, conditioned as usual for the administration of the estate. On the 5th and 6th, 1826, a list of his properly was made by appraisers, and it consisted of 18 negroes, horse, saddle, saddle-bags, wagon, &c. &c. The appraisers valued the whole ■at $5189, and their proceedings were returned to the probate court <on the 18th September, 1826, on which day the administrator also filed a list of notes amounting to '$139 87-J. On the 2d of October, an additional appraised inventory was filed, consisting of two slaves. On the 3d of October, there was a sale of certain of the personal property. Thus far things had gone on in Missouri, when, on the 8i/i of October, Elizabeth Keaton, the widow of the deceased, still residing in Franklin county, Tennessee, by power of attorney under seal, reciting that she had heard of her husband’s death by letter, appointed William Keaton her agent “to transact all her business in Missouri, occasioned by the death of her husband,” áte. On the 23d of October, William Keaton applied to the probate court of Jefferson, Missouri, for administration of John Keaton’s estate, “in virtue of his being of kin to said deceased, and also because he was a creditor of the estate of the deceased,” which application was made of record on the 28th of October. On the 6th of November he renewed this application, and both of them seem to have been filed in writing on the 11th of November.
    Whilst this application or suit for the administration was thus pending before the probate court of Jefferson county, Missouri, the county court of Franklin county, Tennessee, on the 27th of November, granted administration of said John Keaton’s estate to William Keaton, and he gave the usual administration bond, with the defendants as his sureties.
    William Keaton now returned to Missouri, and resuming his suit for the administration there, moved the probate court on the 12th of December, to defer the consideration of his application till the 15th, on which day it was again continued, and Taney was ordered to hire the negroes, and a dedimus was given to Keaton to take depositions, to be read on the trial of his application. On the 6th of January, 1827, Taney made a further sale, which was filed on the 14th of March, and on the 15th Keaton having made proof to the court that he was of kin to the deceased and a creditor, the letters granted to Taney were revoked, and administration de bonis non granted to Keaton, on his giving bond, which he did, and was .qualified; whereupon, Taney filed an inventory of notes, &c., and produced his accounts and vouchers for settlement, on which the estate was found in his debt $156 73f.
    The estate in Missouri was now in William Keaton’s hands, and about the month of April he brought the negroes, who had been in Taney’s possession, to Tennessee, Franklin county. On the 11th of September, 1827, Keaton made a settlement with the court of probate in Missouri, and was found in debt to the estate $288 67£, on which he was required to pay interest by an order made, June 10th, 1828. On the 3d of November, 1830, he made a final settlement in Missouri, and was found in debt to the estate $57 62.
    After the removal of the negroes to Tennessee, they were hired out till the 18th of March, 1830, and on the 5th of that month, they were sold, and William Keaton became the purchaser of most of them. He returned inventories and accounts from time to time, showing sales of the personal property, hire of negroes, and rent of land. At November term, 1830, the county court of Franklin, appointed commissioners to settle with him, which appointment was renewed at February term, 1831, and on the 10th of March, 1831, a settlement was returned. In it he is charged withjhe sales of the ne-groes $6,689 99, for insolvent debts 1,893 40, See,, in all amounting to $11,510 93f, and the amount of insolvent debts, repayments, áre,, being deducted, in all $6,508 87f, leaves a balance in his hands of $5,002 35J. On the 22d of March the same commissioners, under an order of February session, 1833, made an additional settlement, giving the administrator a further credit of $923 28f.
    Mrs. Keaton was appointed guardian of her daughters at February session, 1831, and at November session, 1832, she made her first return, in which she charges herself with $586 07| received by her as the distributive shares of her daughters, and as paid by the admistrator of the estate.
    At the August term, 1840, the case came on for final hearing on the bill, answer of the defendants, replication, exhibits and proof, when the counsel for the defendants suggested the death of defendant Elizabeth Keaton. The said Elizabeth Keaton died subsequent to the previous term of the court. It was then insisted by the defendants’ counsel that the suit should be continued and renewed against the representatives of the decased, but the court being of the opinion that the complainants had the right to elect, whether they would renew against the representatives or proceed against the survivors, overruled this motion, and on the motion of complainants, ordered that the suit be abated. To this opinion the defendants excepted. The case was then heard. The chancellor being of the opinion that the securities on the administrator bond executed in Tennessee were liable for the respective distributive shares of said estate, which came to the hands of the administrator, either by virtue of his original letters of administration obtained in Tennessee, or the auxiliary letters obtained in Missouri, ordered the clerk and master to take an account of the entire estate of the intestate, which came to the hands of the administrator in each State, and that the settlements which had been made in each of the States by the authority of the courts, respectively, with each administrator, be taken as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein in taking such account. The chancellor being further of the opinion that the purchase of the slaves by the administrator was void, directed the clerk to ascertain the value of the slaves at the time of the sale and purchase by the administrator, and charge him with such value, the previous hire and interest upon the value, áre.
    From this decree the defendants appealed to the supreme court.
    
      
      Taul, for the complainants,
    cited, and relied upon Story’s coil-' flict of laws, p. 242,513, and Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason’s Reports, 381.
    The reporter regrets that it is out of his power to give a' full statement of the argument of Mr. Taul oil the important question involved in this case.
    
      Meigs, for the defendants.
    In England — Probate in one province is void as to goods in the other. Williams,-124, sec. 2, note b: 1 Saund. 275, note c. Probate is the only evidence of right to personal property of intestate. 4 T. R. 258; 15 Eng.- Com. Law Rep. 230, cited, Wentworth, 112. Probate jurisdiction depends upon-the situation of the goods. 2 Ld. Raym. 855: 1 Petersdorff’s Ab. 231, marginal, pi. 6: Ibid. 261, pi. 2, Kegg vs. Horton. In this country — The same principles prevail; and it has been decided, that the goods of the intestate being situate within a State, is what gives the probate courts of such State jurisdiction. Evibraxj vs. Millar, 1 Alex. Marshall, 303. That where the property of a decedent is wholly in a foreign country, and some of it is brought to this after his death, no administration can be granted here, but the administrator appointed in the foreign country may act here, Ibid. 304: 4 Littell, 277: 5 Monroe, 47: Williams . 174: Story’s Confl. sec. 522, i. e. may maintain a personal action, the administration in the State where the goods are situated,- making, him owner in propria “persona; Story’s Confl. sec. 516, 517,518, And when the administrator brings the property to another jurisdiction, he holds it in his own right, but as trustee. The remedy against a foreign administrator, who brings his assets here, must be pursued in the jurisdiction which granted his letters. Story’s Confl. sec. 515, and authorities cited: Logan vs. Fairlie, 1 Cond. Eng. Chan. Rep. 459: Davis vs. Davis, 8 Pick. 475. The sureties only guaranty the administration of the effects lying within the State. 2 Mass. Rep. 394; 3 Missouri Rep. 490: 6 Pick. Rep, 481.
    
      W. A. Cook, on the same side.
    1. We contend that the sureties- in the administration bond in the State of Tennessee, are not liable for the assets of intestate,, received by the administrator in the State of Missouri, by virtue of his letters of administration in that State.
    2. They are not responsible to the distributees for the- assets re» eeived in Tennessee, but they are discharged, as all those assets came to the hands of the administrator under the laws of Missouri, the administration in this State being auxiliary to the administration in Missouri, the domicil of the intestate, and all the assets received in this State, having come to his hands, he shall be presumed to hold them as administrator according to the laws of the do-micil.
    By the laws of Tennessee, at the death of the intestate, where the intestate died in this State, letters of administration could alone be granted in the county of the intestate’s residence: in any other county they would be void. Nelson’s lessee vs. Griffin', et al, 2d Yerg. 624, Where intestate resided out of the State, the courts generally had no power to grant letters of administration, but the courts of the different counties, where any of the effects of the testator or intestate was situated, might grant letters, and these letters would extend to the bounds of the State, and prohibit other courts from granting them, though there should be property within ■their jurisdiction. Act of 1831, ch. 24, sec. 1,2: Brown vs. Wright, 4 Yerg. Rep. 57.
    Before the passage of the act of 1831, the county court, within whose jurisdiction any of the personal estate was situated, had power to grant letters testamentary or of administration on those assets. 4 Yerg. Rep. 57. Then what is the effect of the letters of administration in this State on the effects of a non-resident? By the act of 1831, they are made to cover all the effects within the bounds of the State. But how does the administrator represent the intestate? He certainly represents him fully, so far as his estate may be situated in the State at his death. But does it represent his person fully, or in other words, is he generally speaking the personal representative of the intestate? We contend his administration is special, and confined to the goods of the intestate within the State, and that farther than they extend, he is not his personal representative. If so, then, so far as his sureties are concerned, no account can be had, except for a due administration of those assets. This question may be tested, first, by principle.
    Suppose A. dies in Missouri, and has effects in all the different States in the Union, and also in England, France and Holland, and administrations are taken out in each of these governments, and bond and security are given in each for their due administration. Which of these administrators is the general personal represen■tative of the deceased? By the universal consent of nations, for the security of their citizens, and to prevent the greatest inconveniences, -the personal effects of the intestate are to be distributed according to the laws of his domicil. He is supposed to be acquainted with the laws of his own State, and when he dies intestate, he is supposed toadopt those laws as his will, as to the disposition of his property. Amb. 25: Amb. 415: Thorne vs. Watkins, 2 Ves. 35: .Bruce vs. Bruce, 2Bos. & Pul. 229, note: 6 Bro. P. G. 566: Balfour vs. Scott, 6 Bro. P. 0.550: 3 Ves. Jun. 198: 1 Hen. Bl. '690: 6 Bro. P. 0. 577: Drummond vs. Drummond, 6 Bro. P. 0. 601: Phillips vs. Hunter, 2 Hen. Bl. 402: Hunter vs. Potts, 4T. R. 182: Somerville vs. Somerville, 5 Ves. Rep. 750: Dixon’s 1ex’rs vs. Ramsay’s ex’rs, 3 Cranch, 319: Goodwin vs. Jones, 3 Mass. 514: Richards vs. Dutch, 8 Mass. Rep. 506: Dawes vs. Boylston, 9 Mass. Rep. 337: 5 East. 124: Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason’s Rep. 381: Dawes vs. Head, 3 Pick. Rep. 128: Hooker Vs. Olmstead, 6 Pick. 481: Story’s Confl. of Laws, 403 : si Paige’s C. R. 182: 2 Hen. & John. Rep. 192, 224, 228: Holmes vs-. Ram-sen, 4 John. C. Rep. 460: 2 John. Rep. 229:. 3 John. G. Rep. 190: Vattel, book 2, 85, 103, 110, 111. But, still, is there any general administrator, and if so, are the others independent or auxiliary ? Upon this subject there is much contrariety of opinion in the books, and not a little confusion. Many judges and eminent writers maintain and hold, that the administration of the domicil is the principal or leading administration, and all others are subservient ■or auxiliary to it. So far as creditors are concerned, whatever may be the conflict of opinion in foreign countries, it is definitively settled in the United States, that each administration is independent. Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason, 381: Dawes vs. Boylston, 9 Mass. Rep. 337: Selectmen of Boston vs. Boylston, 4 Mass. Rep. 318,384: 8 Mass. Rep. 506: Dawes vs. Head, 3 Pick. Rep. 128: Hooker vs. Olmstead, 6 Pick. Rep. 481: 8 Pick. 475: 10 Pick. 77: Stephens vs. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 256. Case of Miller’s estate, 3 Rawle, 312; Story’s Confl. 423. As between the administrators themselves, they must be considered as independent, for their letters have no ex-territorial effect, but are confined to the jurisdiction or State granting them, so that even the executor or administrator of the domicil cannot call any other administrator to account. Lee vs. Moore, Palm. R. 163: 3 P. Wms. 369: 2 Ves. 32: Attorney General vs. Cockrell, 1 Price’s R. 179: 2 Madd.R. 101: 1 Hag. Eel. it. 93, 239 : Mitf. P. 177: 1 Cranch,-259: Dixon's ex'rs vs. Ram-Say's ex'rs, 3 Crunch, 319: 9 Wheat. 565: 12 Wheat. 169: & Rand. 158: 2 Gill. & John. 193: 3 Mass. 514; 5 Mass. 67: 11 Mass. 256, 313 : 4 Mason’s Rep. 16, 32: 5 Pick. 65 t Holmes vs. Ramsen, 20 John. Rep. 229, 265 : 5 Peters, 518: 7 Cowen, 64;-2 Sim. & Stewart. 284: 1 Dow. & Ry. Rep. 35: Story’s Confl.-of Laws, 422, 513: Selectmen of Boston vs. Boylston,• 2 Mass.Rep. 384.
    But suppose one administrator should voluntarily pay over the-assets in his hands, after payment of debts, to the administrator of the domicil, would that be a good payment, and operate as a discharge of him and his securities? If the administration in the foreign State is to be regarded strictly as auxiliary to the administration of the domicil, then the payment by the auxiliary to the administrator of the domicil, according to the weight of authority, would be a discharge of the auxiliary administrator, and of course-of his securities. Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason’s Rep. 381: 5 Mason’s Rep. 95: 1 Vern. Rep. 377: 11 Mass. Rep. 256. Case of Miller's estate, 3 Rawl. 312; Dawes vs. Head, 3 Pick. 128: Hooker vs. Olmstead, 6 Pick. 481:- 8 Pick. 475:- 10 Pick. 71: Story’s Confl. of Law, 422, 423, 313.
    But in- considering this question, one important consideration ought to be taken into view, which does not seem to have-been adverted to in any of the cases; that is, by the policy of the United States, on which their legislation is founded, the administrator has to give bond and security to the court of probate for the faithful discharge of the duties of his office. Will all payments to the administrator of the domicil charge the sureties in the bond of the domicil administrator? It would certainly be unjust and oppressive, if the sureties in the administration of the domicil should • be held liable for all sums of money that might be paid over to him by the various administrators in foreign governments and States. The sureties could by no possibility know,- any thing of the amount of the assets in foreign governments; they might be acquainted with the effects in their own State, and be willing to stand as security for the administration of these funds, but would not do so if they were bound for assets in all the States of the Union, to an unknown amount.
    It is made the duty of the court to take bond and good securities,, and in a penalty of sufficient amount to cover the effects of the deceased. The court is presumed to know something of the situation of the property of its own citizens, and if not so acquainted, they can easily inform themselves thereof, by calling witnesses before them, and by qualifying the administrator; but as to effects in other governments, it would and could know nothing. What sureties are they then to require ? A man of one substance would be sufficient to answer for all the effects in the local jurisdiction, and wholly insufficient to answer for all the assets in all the other States. To require unreasonable sureties or responsibilities, would be unjust and inconvenient, and would leave many estates unrepresented. In what penalty shall the bond be taken? Double the amount of the effects is usual, and is ample in amount. But double the amount of what assets? All the assets in the civilized world, or double the amount within the local jurisdiction?
    How would it operate in practice? A man dies in Davidson county, administration is taken on his estate, with two sureties in the penalty of two thousand dollars, double the amount of the assets in Tennessee. It turns out that the intestate had assets to a large amount in several sister States, and also in England. Shall the sureties be held liable for these assets ? But suppose administrations with securities are taken in the other States and governments, and all these administrators pay over the amounts in their hands to the administrator in Davidson; will these payments discharge such administrators and their sureties? If so, then, the whole estate will be in great jeopardy; for the sureties in Davidson are only bound for two thousand dollars, and all the other sureties are discharged. Again: would it not be contrary to all rule and all principle to make the sureties thus liable, their safety or their ruin to depend on the will of the foreign administrators? They cannot be compelled to pay over the amount in their hands to the administrator of the domicil. They may and are bound to pay over to the next of kin. Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason, and authorities referred to in that case. Shall they be permitted thus to hold in their hands the destinies of others ? All society would reprobate such a decision.
    But if that is so, would the converse of the proposition be true ? Suppose the administrator of the domicil pays over to the auxiliary administrator or administrators in other States, will that discharge him and his sureties, and throw the burthen of the whole property, as well in the government of the domicil as in the government of the auxiliary administration upon the sureties of the latter! Has any case ever been so decided ? Has any jurist or legal writer ever laid down such a proposition? There ceitainly is no reason or propriety in the principal administrators paying over his assets to an auxiliary administrator. But suppose there are ten different foreign administrators. To which is he to make payment? or, can he páy to any he pleases and select which sureties he will sacrifice? The bonds of these auxiliary administrators, if they can be so called, ■are usually very small; as for instance, a debt may be due in a ¡State of one or two hundred dollars, an administration is taken •out, and a bond given in the penalty of two or four hundred dollars. Can the principal administrator, or administrator of the do-micil, and all the other administrators discharge their sureties and themselves by paying over to this administrator? The consequence would be most disastrous. The whole policy of the law, requiring security, would be defeated, and no prudent man would be willing to become security, for he might be rendered liable in many instances to the penalty of his bond, when the whole assets in his State had been properly administered.
    In England, no security is required of the administrator, but that he will return a correct inventory to the Ordinary.- In the case before the court, the administrator under the laws of Missouri, the intestate’s domicil, gave bond and security for his administration; he received there and inventoried all the negroes of said estate, who were in said State at the death of intestate, and the date of his administration there. He applied there on the ground that he was a creditor and of kin, and was appointed. He subsequently removed to this State, pretended to sell the negroes, bought most of them himself, and then returned to Missouri. Is there any pre-tence for charging the sureties here with the funds in his hands, received under the laws of Missouri? His inventorying them here a second time, surely can make no difference. They were still in his hands as administrator, as he first received them, and he cannot be considered in any other light than the domicil administrator with the effects in his hands as he originally received them. He cannot have .it in his power to discharge one set of securities and charge the others by his mere will.
    Suppose the administrator of the domicil receives assets in his nation, carries them to a foreign nation and pays them over to some administrator there, who immediately inventories them and returns them to the original administrator. Are the first or domicil administrator and his sureties discharged, and the sureties of the foreign administrator fixed with all these assets?
    The conclusion to which I arrive is, that the sureties for administrations in States other than the State of the domicil, are certainly' only bound for a faithful administration of the assets within the-local jurisdiction of his State, and which have not been reduced to* possession by some .one administrator, either domicil or other.He is not even bound for all the debts due in his State at the time1 of his administration, for these debts being of a transitory nature,- and binding the person of the debtor wherever he may be, the debtor-may pay to any legal administrator, out of his place, and the pay-ment will be valid. For if he goes into another State, he may be! sued and the debt recovered, and he cannot plead that he lives in-another State. 6 John. Rep. 357: Doolittle vs. Lewis, 7 John. C. Rep. 47: Campbell vs. Lowrey, 7 Cowen, 67. So if the debtor comes into the State, the administrator is bound to sue him and collect the debt, or he will be liable for it. 3 Paige’s C. Rep. 183.
    That the administrator in one government, not the domicil, is-not bound as such to account to the Ordinary where his administration is granted upon his bond given to that Ordinary for assets received as administrator in the State of the domicil, is decided in-the following cases: Selectmen of Boston vs. Boylston, 2 Mass„Rep. 385 : Hooker vs. Olmstead, 6 Pick. 481: Stevens vs. Gaylord, 11 Mass. Rep. 256, 262: 1 Dow. & Ry. Rep. 35: 3 Paige’s C.Rep. 465: Alsup vs. Alsup, 10 Yer. Rep. 283.
    The question, whether the administrator of another State is no# liable to legatees and distributees in this State as a trustee, is altogether another question. That he is responsible as trustee, is-established by the case of Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason’s Repi-381: Alsup vs. Alsup, 10 Yerg. Rep. 283 : 7 Paige’s C. Rep.: 7 Cowen’s Rep. 642. In this latter case he is not liable upon his administration bonds as administrator but as trustee. ■ If liable upon» his bonds then, upon what bond? - Upon the bond in the State where the bill is filed alone, holding the sureties liable for his maladministration or for assets received and not accounted for under' all his administrations in other States, under other letters of administration, where other bonds were given with other securities? By no means. It is possible, if all the sureties upon all the bonds were before the court, they might be each held responsible for the assets-received in the different States, each set being liable for those received in his own State without the bill being multifarious. But «pon no principle or authority can one set of securities be made responsible for the assets received, and covered by bonds in other ■States.
    Suppose the administrator receives assets in one State, not of the domicil, then takes out administration in another State, out of the domicil, and returns inventories of those assets again in the other State, will that render the sureties under the last bond liable ? ■Suppose he inventories all the assets received under different administrations in Europe and different States in the Union, in all the 'different countries, will that render all the sureties in all the States liable for all the assets received as administrator in foreign governments, and all the States in the Union ? The doctrine is intolerable, absurd, and leads to the most ruinous consequences.
    The case of Pratt vs. Northam, 5 Mason’s Rep. is no authority to support the position. In that case, the administrator of the domicil appointed an agent to collect debts and effects of his intestate in England, and in order to effect that object, took out special auxiliary letters of administration in England, to collect those assets, and as such received them and paid them over to his principal, ■the original domicil administrator. In that case, judge Story was of opinion the sureties to the domicil administration were liable for tjibse assets, but they were not subjected, the case going off on another point, the Statute of limitations. The case can, therefore, hardly be considered as an authority upon that state of facts, to wit, an agency and express auxiliary administration in a government other than the domicil. But no authority or dictum is to be found in the books, holding that sureties, situated as the defendants here are, are liable for assets received in the country of the domicil, under letters there issued, and it is believed that Pratt vs. Northam, cannot be supported by any authority.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

John Keaton resided for many years in the county of Franklin, in this State. In the spring of 1825, he went to the State of Missouri, taking with him eighteen or twenty slaves. They constituted .nearly the whole of his personal estate. He left behind him, however, his family and his household effects. He seems to have employed his slaves, and to have occupied himself, in the State to which he had went, in the mining business, and had there a partner in conducting his operations. He paid a visit or two to his family after he left; but what were his intentions as to their future residence, does not appear. He died in the State of Missouri, in the fall of 1826. A few days after his death, the court of probate of the county of Jefferson, in that State, granted administration ad colligendum to one Michael Taney, who was a partner, who entered into bond in that character. A few days after this, administration on the estate was granted by the same court of probate to Taney, who gave the usual administrator’s bond, and was duly qualified. A list of the property was made by appraisers, including IS' slaves, and duly returned to the court of probate. On the 2d October, 1826, an additional appraised inventory was returned, consisting of two more negroes. And on the 3d October there was a sale of a portion of the personal property. Afterwards, on the 8th October, the widow of the deceased, residing in Franklin county, Tennessee, gave to William Keaton, a power of attorney, under seal, to attend to her interests in Missouri; and on the 23d of that month, he applied to the probate court of Jefferson county, in that State, for administration of John Keaton’s estate, “in virtue of his being of kin to said deceased, and, also, because- he was accreditor of the estate of the deceased,” and before its determination, the county court of Franklin county, in the State of Tennessee, on the 27th November, 1826, granted administration on the estate of John Keaton, to the same William Keaton, who entered into bond, with the defendants as his security. And such proceedings were had in the case before the probate court in Missouri, that on the 15th of March, 1827, the letters of administration to Taney were revoked, and letters of administration de bonis non, were granted to Keaton, on his giving surety, which he did, and was qualified. Keaton af-terwards brought the slaves to Tennessee, hired them out for a year or two, made return of their hire to the county court of Franklin ; sold them all at length, or pretended to do so, became the purchaser of most of them himself, returned the amount in the account of the sales to the county court, and finally, with the negroes, removed to the State of Missouri.

The distributees of John Keaton, file this bill against Campbell and Bradford, the sureties in the Tennessee bond, for the value of these negroes. And whether, under the circumstances stated, they are liable, is the question before the court. This question has been argued, on both sides, with much learning and ability. It is one of the first impression among us; and feeling, sensibly, its magnitude and importance, we have bestowed upon it, an attentive and anxious consideration. The people of the United States, constituting one integral government for some purposes, are yet, for other purposes, a community of nations, so to speak, essentially distinct, and even foreign from each other. In this latter relation, they exist as to the comprehensive and highly important interests, founded upon the distribution of personal • estate; while, at the same time, the internal commerce, social intercourse, frequent changes, and mub implications of domicil, and all the varied and widely ramifiéd relations and connexions of a prosperous, enterprising and homogeneous people, create rights and interests, as to personal property, seldom to be limited, in the case of any individual of ordinary wealth, to the single State in which he may at the time reside. This state of things, while it calls upon the judicial tribunals of all the States for the reciprocal exercise of a liberal comity, admonishes us, to approach with caution, and touch with delicacy, such a question as that, which the record presents. The case before us, in allegation and proof, was obviously prepared, upon both sides, upon the sup- j position, that the decree to be given would turn upon the question ( of domicil, and as a consequence of that, upon the question, as to) which administration was principal, and which ancillary, and the I argument has proceeded, but in a much slighter degree, upon the same ground. For the Missouri administration, it has been said, there lived, and, for nearly two years had lived the intestate; there he died, there were his slaves, constituting by far the greater portion of his property; and there too, was the first administration in point of time! As to the Tennessee administration, it has been said, here had long been his home, here remained his family, and' his household furniture and effects. The pretensions- of each are-plausible, and not unequally balanced. The domicil, in the absence of any proof as to the animus of the intestate, and as presented in the record, was probably in Franklin county in this State. But, under all the circumstances shown in this case, it may be said, that j if ever there were two administrations, in different jurisdictions, | entirely distinct and independent of each other, they are the administrations stated upon this record.

Upon the subject of principal and ancillary administrations, Justice Story, in his very able and elaborate judgment in the case of Harvey vs. Richards, 1 Mason’s Rep. 415, says, “I have no objection to the use of the terms principal and ancillary, as indicating a distinction in fact as to the object of the different administrations; but we should guard ourselves against the conclusion, that, therefore, there is a distinction in law as to the right of parties. There is no magic in words. Each of these administrations may be properly considered as a principal one, with reference to the limits of its exclusive authority, and each might, under circumstances, justly be deemed an ancillary administration. If the bulk of the property, and all the heirs and legatees and creditors were here, and the foreign administration were to receive a few inconsiderable claims, that would most correctly be denominated a mere ancillary administration for the beneficial use of the , parties here, although the domicil of the testator .were abroad. The converse case, would, of course, produce an opposite result. But I am yet to learn what possible difference it can make in the rights of the parties before the court, whether the administration be a principal or an ancillary administration. They must stand upon the authority of the law to administer ordinary relief, under all the circumstances of their case, and not upon a mere technical distinction of very recent origin.”

This is said, in a case, too, where the American administration was, in point of form, as well as in qbject, ancillary; for the do-micil was at Calcutta,and a will and executors there existed, and the administration with the will annexed was taken at their instance; but certain of the distributees residing in this country, the administrator was ordered to account and distribute here, not to transmit the surplus to the executors at the domicil. It is said 'elsewhere, by Justice Story, that whatever may be the form of administration in different countries upon the same estate, they are distinct and independent, because of the distinct and independent source from which they are derived, the power and jurisdiction which grants them, and to which they are accountable. In the case before us, however, the administrators were distinct and independent of each other in point of form, as well as in point of fact, and of legal liability. The administrator in each State, although not at first identical, became so, indeed, in the course of events. But we apprehend, that circumstance can operate nothing as to the liability of defendants, Campbell and Bradford, the Tennessee sureties in the administration bond. Their liability under the operation of that circumstance is the same, not greater than if Taney had continued administrator in Missouri, and these specific chattels, the slaves, subject to the Missouri [administration, and upon which that had attached,, had subsequently been brought by William Keaton into Tennessee, and treated as assets by virtue of his Tennessee administration. In what situation would they have been in that case ? That question is answered by the case of Currie, adm’r, vs. Bircham, 1 Dow. & Ry. 32: where Bircham had money in his hands in England, the proceeds of effects, which had been in the hands of the administratrix in India, was sued by the English administrator on the same estate: It was held,' that the action would not lie; but that the foreign administrator, although of course, not in general entitled to sue in that character, could sue upon her own legal title. The same principle is recognised " in the case of Embray vs. Millar, 1 Alex. Mar. Rep. 304: 4 Littel, 277: 5 Monroe, 47: Story’s Confl. of Laws, 516-17-18-22. If then, in the case supposed, of Taney continuing administrator in Missouri, Keatpn the Tennessee administrator, had brought the negroes within this jurisdiction, the Missouri administrator could not in that character, indeed, but in his own legal title as trustee, have maintained here the action of detinue, or according to the course of our court of chancery with regard to property of that description, a detinue bill, as it has been called, and have recovered the possession of the negroes, and removed them to Missouri. But Keaton brought them here, they being assets in Missouri, and the administration granted by that jurisdiction having attached to, and appropriated them to be accounted for, in a course of administration there; he brought them here, and they were in his hands here, not indeed, in his character of Missouri administrator, but in his own legal right, and as trustee; under such circumstances, will the court here, permit him, in violation of his duty of administrator in Missouri, to convert these slave's into assets in Tennessee, so as to fix the sureties here with responsibility 1 This ought not to be done. 1st. In comity to the' State of Missouri. 2nd. In justice to the sureties here; for an account of the faithful administration of these very slaves in Missouri were the several bonds with sureties mainly given in that State; and when in Tennessee or elsewhere, Keaton sold, or pretended to sell to himself the slaves in question, he violated his Missouri bond, and would, and could, and ought, there to be held responsible. The case to which we have already referred, in I Mason, establishes, that he could there be held to account, either to distributees or creditors, even if that had been in fact, in object, and in form, as it was not, an ancillary administration. But as it was distinct and independent, there was no more ground, or reason, for their throwing upon the Tennessee sureties the Missouri assets, than for throwing upon the Missouri sureties the Tennessee assets; and if that can be done, in either case, then, if there were twenty-six distinct and independent administrations in this confederacy by one, or many administrators, upon the same estate, it would be within the legal competency of the several principals and their sureties, by concentrating the assets upon one point, to throw the entire responsibilities upon one set of sureties; and this too, without furnishing the sufferers, ultimately, any chance for contribution, seeing that the transactions are distinct .and independent.

But it is said, that the defendants, the sureties, should be held liable in this case, because it is an acknowledged principle that the voluntary payment of a debt to a foreign administration, will discharge the debtor. And because goods employed in commerce, and in transitu, a ship, &c,, to the domicil, at the time of the death, although in a foreign port at the moment of that event, may properly be disposed of under the domestic administration. These cases stand upon their own grounds, and are very distinct from the present. The latter case of the transit of goods is placed by Mi’. Justice Story in his Conflict of Laws, upon grounds of strong public convenience, and indeed of unavoidable necessity, founded upon the nature of commerce, the ignorance of the death, &c., and the temporary interest of others in freight, &c.

Again: It has been said, that it has been not unusual for a foreign administration to be granted, where specific chattels have existed, but that the domestic administration often, in such cases, brings them home, and disposes of them in the course of the domestic administration. We have not that case before us, and, therefore, do not feel called on to say, that the sureties of the administrator would not be bound. We decide the case, before us, and that only: that where a distinct and independent administration has been granted in the jurisdiction of the situs of the chattels or effects, and such jurisdiction has attached to them, they cannot then be brought into the administration here, so as to subject the surety. Again: It is said that the surplus is transmissible from the foreign administration. Yes; unquestionably, it is so ruled in many cases. But this means, where a suit in chancery has been brought at the instance of the proper persons, the condition of the estate at home and abroad enquired into and ascertained, creditors and distributees and others having been duly notified, and their claims satisfied, or waived, the court may transmit, by its act and order, such surplus, and all persons within their jurisdiction would, of course, be indemnified. Whether they would order it to be transmitted to the administrator himself, or to some judicial forum, where the parties in interest were accounting, and if to the former, whether it would subject his sureties, we care not to speculate.

The case in 5th Mason, relied on, as fixing the liability of the sureties, was a case, where the foreign administration was in its very terms and on the face of it, subordinate, and for the use and benefit of the American executor. But in that case, on other grounds, the sureties were held not to be liable, so that, in fact, there was no decree against him. But see the case of Hooker vs. Olmstead, 6 Pickering, 481.

Upon the whole, we are of opinion, that the complainants must seek their remedy against the administrators in the Missouri jurisdiction, where it happened, both he and the property in question, were at the institution of this suit, and that the sureties for the administration here, are not, under the circumstances of this case, liable.