Case ID: so2d_842/html/0661-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MONROE, Judge CRAWLEY, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael Blois PEARSON v. Lisa Carol Pearson MASTERS.
    2990425.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Sept. 1, 2000.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 27, 2000.
    Marl D. Owsley, Talladega, for appellant.
    Steven D. Adcock, Talladega, for appel-lee.
   MONROE, Judge

AFFIRMED. NO OPINION.

See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(F), Ala. R.App.P.; Ex parte Patranos, 693 So.2d 473 (Ala.1997); Brown v. Brown, 719 So.2d 228, 231 (Ala.Civ.App.1998); and Hall v. Hall, 391 So.2d 122 (Ala.Civ.App.1980).

ROBERTSON, P.J., and YATES and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.

CRAWLEY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

CRAWLEY, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur except as to the affirmance of the visitation provision; I dissent from that affirmance. “[T]he child’s wishes are given consideration in custody [and visitation] situations; however, they are not controlling.” Hermsmeier v. McCoy, 591 So.2d 508, 509 (Ala.Civ.App.1991); Patterson v. Patterson, 345 So.2d 1364 (Ala.Civ.App.1977).

I think there is a critical difference between the 1996 order “giving consideration to the child’s wishes,” in regard to visitation, which is permissible, and the 1998 order awarding visitation “according to the child’s wishes,” which I believe is impermissible. The wording of the 1998 order .permits the father’s visitation rights to hinge on the son’s wishes and, thus, allows the son’s preference to control.