Case ID: f-appx_149/html/0713-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MURPHY, Circuit Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Raul CHAVEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF BOULDER; Christine Highman; Virginia Cree; Boulder County Department of Social Services, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 03-1316.
    United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
    Dec. 15, 2003.
    Raul Chavez, Longmont, CO, Pro Se.
    Andrew Ross MacDonald, Office of the Boulder County Attorney, Boulder, CO, David Hughes, Boulder County Attorney’s Office, Boulder, CO, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
   ORDER AND JUDGMENT

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Raul Chavez appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint. In his complaint, Chavez sought relief from state court orders requiring him to pay foster care fees and from a wage garnishment for the payment of such fees. The state court order to pay foster care fees was made pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 19 — 1—115(4)(d) and 19-2-114, to defray the costs associated with the granting of temporary custody of Chavez’s two minor sons to Boulder County Social Services following delinquency proceedings. The district court dismissed Chavez’s complaint pursuant to Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), noting that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it had no jurisdiction to review the state court orders placed at issue by Chavez’s complaint.

Upon review of the district court’s order, the parties’ briefs and contentions on appeal, and the entire appellate record, this court AFFIRMS for substantially those reasons set out in the district court’s order of dismissal dated June 12, 2003. 
      
       This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.