Case ID: so2d_223/html/0746-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PEARSON, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Charles Frank EDWARDS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    
      No. 68-1109.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida. Third District.
    June 17, 1969.
    Robert L. Koeppel, Public Defender, and Michael G. Martin, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and Jesse J. McCrary, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., and PEARSON and BARKDULL, JJ.
   PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant was found guilty of and sentenced for the crime of “Attempting to Utter a Forged Instrument”. He contends that there is no such crime in this state and that because he was specifically found not guilty of the crime of uttering a forged instrument he must be discharged. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Appellant was charged by an information in two counts with (1) forgery of a check; (2) uttering of a forged check. At the conclusion of the trial before the court, the appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court found appellant not guilty on count one but adjudicated him guilty of “attempted uttering a forged instrument, as to Count Two, based upon the testimony.” Subsequently when the judgment was entered, it read that the conviction was for “attempting to utter a forged instrument.”

There is no distinction at law between uttering a forged instrument and attempting to utter a forged instrument. This is true because an uttering is proved as fully by an attempt to negotiate a forged instrument as it is proved by a completed negotiation. Harrell v. State, 79 Fla. 220, 83 So. 922 (1920); Hazen v. Mayo, Fla. 1956, 90 So.2d 123.

Section 919.16, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., provides that upon an information charging a defendant with an offense, the defendant may be convicted of an attempt to commit such offense “if such attempt is an offense.” The question thus becomes: If an attempt to utter a forged instrument is not a crime separate from uttering a forged instrument, is it “an offense” within the meaning of § 919.16? We hold that the fact that an attempt to utter a forged instrument is also the uttering of a forged instrument does not mean that an attempt to utter a forged instrument is not an offense. It would seem illogical to hold that because an attempt is as large as the crime, it is not a crime. It is true that the attempt is not a separate crime; but it is an offense. We presume that the trial judge was fully aware of the law that an attempt to utter a forged instrument may be punished as the uttering of a forged instrument. It follows that he inserted the word “attempt” to show that the uttering was not complete and as a predicate for the less than maximum sentence.

No harmful error has been shown. The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHARLES CARROLL, C. J., dissents.