Case ID: ohio-st_8/html/0201-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Bartley, C. J. J. R. Swan, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Hollister and Smith v. The Judges of the District Court of Lucas County.
    1. Every court, in the exercise of its supervisory and protecting charge over its records, and the papers belonging to its files, has the power to direct the clerk to correct not only clerical errors,'but such errors as may arise from any fraudulent or improper alteration or mutilation of its files or records.
    2. To make such correction, the court may hear evidence, and act on the proof; and it is not essential to the action of the court, that the judges act on their personal knowledge of the error.
    3. The judges of the court of common pleas are, by the constitution and laws of the state, judges of the district court, and, as such, empowered to exercise its authority.
    4. A writ of mandamus directed to a subordinate judicial tribunal, is properly directed to the judge or judges of such court.
    This is a motion for a peremptory mandamus.
    On the 23d day of February, 1857, an alternative writ of mandamus was issued out of tbe Supreme Court at the instance of Hollister and Smith, directed to the judges of the district court of Lucas county, commanding them to cause an order to he made (or show cause why they refuse so to do) directing the clerk of said district court to correct the record in a certain action which had been tried at the April term, 1855, of said court, in which action said Hollister and Smith were defendants, and John P. Reznor was plaintiff, by restoring to the hill of exceptions signed, sealed and filed in said case as a part of the record thereof, certain material words, which, as was alleged, the judge of the court of common pleas, who presided at said term of the district court, had improperly stricken out of the bill of exceptions, outside of the court room, after the final adjournment of the court, without personal consultation with either of the judges of said court, and without the knowledge or consent of Hollister or Smith, or their attorneys ; and which alteration, as was alleged, was not the act of the district court.
    To the alternative writ the following return was made:
    “ The undersigned, in obedience to the command of the annexed writ of mandamus, hereby certifies and returns, that he was one of the judges composing the district court within and for the county of Lucas, and State of Ohio, at the time the bill of exceptions mentioned in said writ was signed; and that the other two judges composing said court were Messrs. Otis and Starkweather; that the official terms of Otis and Starkweather have since then expired, and that they no longer hold the office of judge. The judges of the common pleas now holding the district court for said county, say they know nothing about the facts set forth in said writ of mandamus, and, as judges, have no power over the clerk in the premises, and can make no order that he is bound to obey. The writ being directed to them as judges of the district court, (when in fact they are only judges of the court of common pleas, and, as such only, authorized to hold a district court,) and not to the district court, they humbly submit whether the district court is called upon to obey the command of the writ. The district court have, therefore, not felt called apon to take any action in the matter, nor, as a court, to make any return to said writ.
    “ The undersigned, however makes this statement in order that the honorable Supreme Court may be advised that no disrespect or disobedience to said writ is intended on the part of the district court, or the judges composing the same.
    “ All which is respectfully submitted,
    “JOHN FITCH,
    “ Judgo of the Court of Common Pleas of the 4th Judicial District of Ohio.”
    
      
      Waite Murray, for relators.
   Bartley, C. J.

The objections made to the correction of the alteration in the bill of exceptions, on behalf of the defendants, appear to be the following:

1st. That two of the judges know nothing about the facts.

2d. That they have no authority over the clerk in the .premises, and can make no order that he is bound to obey.

3d. That they are judges of the court of common pleas, and only as such, authorized to hold a district court.

4th. That the alternative writ was directed to them as judges of the district court, and not to the district court.

Every court of record has a supervisory and protecting charge over its records, and the papers belonging to its files; and may at any time direct the correction of clerical errors, or the substitution of papers in case the originals are purloined or lost; and, in the exercise of the same authority* in case the records or files should be fraudulently or otherwise improperly altered or defaced, may direct their correction and restoration to their original condition. And in making such corrections, the clerk is under the control and authority of the court.

Two of the judges, it is said, have no knowledge of the facts touching the alleged alteration of the bill of exceptions. This is no legal excuse for not doing the act directed, when they have the unquestionable authority to direct the relators and other parties interested, to produce their proofs in relation to the matter. The personal knowledge of the judge is not essential to the correction of a clerical error. He may inquire into the matter and inform himself by competent evidence, and act upon that, as he acts upon proof given in court in the performance of other judicial acts.

It is objected that the defendants are judges of the court of common pleas, and only as such, authorized to hold a district court. It matters uot in what fonn of expression the judicial power is conferred. The defendants are, by the constitution and laws of the state, constituted judges of the district court, and as such, clothed with full authority to hold the district court and exercise its jurisdiction and authority. And their authority to exercise chamber powers in vacation, touching causes pending in the district court, by allowing and dissolving injunctions, and performing other acts as judges of the district court, cannot be controverted. And the fact that they are judges of the common pleas does not, under the constitution and laws of this state, render them incompetent to act as judges of the district court.

There is nothing in the objection, that the writ is directed to them as the judges of the district court instead of the district court. The writ was properly directed. They are the judges of that court, and as such, clothed by the constitution and laws of the state, with power to hold that court and exercise its authority.

A writ of mandamus to a subordinate judicial tribunal is properly directed to the judge or judges of the court, and especially where there may be other judges authorized to hold or participate in holding the court. In case of disobedience to the mandate of the supervisory court, the authority to compel obedience is exercised over the judges personally having the power to exercise the functions of the court.

. Peremptory mandamus awarded.

Brinkerhorr and Scott, JJ., concurred.

J. R. Swan, J.,

dissented: Holding that a motion in the district court to correct its record, if overruled, could, on exception and petition in error, be revised; and consequently a mandamus is not, in such case, the proper remedy.