Case ID: f-appx_551/html/0302-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Aaron Travis BEAIRD, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-30018.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 17, 2013.
    
    Filed Dec. 30, 2013.
    Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Richard Edward Cohen, James D. Oesterle, Esquire, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Nancy Tenney, FPDWA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Aaron Travis Beaird appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 84-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and mail fraud, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1341. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Beaird contends that the district court violated his due process rights by failing to give him notice of its intent to depart upwards from the Sentencing Guideline range, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h). Because the district court imposed an upward variance, it was not required to give notice under Rule 32(h). See Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 171 L.Ed.2d 28 (2008).

Beaird next contends that the district court erred by finding that Beaird’s conduct fell outside the heartland of fraud cases. The district court properly tailored its sentence to the specific characteristics of Beaird and the offense. See United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1012 (9th Cir.2010).

Finally, Beaird contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of mitigating factors, such as his immediate acceptance of responsibility and commitment to paying restitution. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Beaird’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the length of time Beaird engaged in the fraudulent scheme and his close connection to the victims. See id.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.