Case ID: tex_7/html/0259-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Wheeler, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Warner v. Bailey.
    The words, “of the county of Jefferson,” annexed to the names of the parties, are a sufficient averment of their residence, under the statute, especially on general demurrer.
    The office of a general demurrer in our practice is similar to that assigned to it in the common-law system of pleading; and the only question which will be entertained under it is, whether the pleading demurred to discloses the existence of any causo of action or ground of defense. The office of exceptions, on the other hand, is similar to that of a special demurrer in the English pleadings, namely, not only to question the existence of any cause of action or ground of defense, but to point out particularly wherein the pleading is defective. (Note 71.)
    Where the petition, in an action for wrongfully suing out an attachment, set out the affidavit on which the attachment issued, and alleged that the writ was sued out “wrongfully, vexatiously, and maliciously,” and “without sufficient cause or justification,” it wa3 held to be sufficient on general demurrer. But quere if there had been a special exception. (Note 72.)
    Where the petition, in an action for wrongfully suing out an attachment, was objected to, on the ground that it did not appear from the petition that the suit by attachment had been determined before the institution of this suit: Meld, That the averment that the attachment had been quashed, “as will more fully appear by reference to the record and proceedings now remaining in the said District Court of Jefferson county, (same court where this suit was brought,) and to which your petitioner prays leave to refer,” was a sufficient answer to the objection, it appearing from a transcript of the record in the case referred to that the District Court had at the same time quashed the attachment and dismissed the suit.
    Appeal from Jefferson. This was an action to recover damages for an alleged trespass committed in wrongfully suing out and levying ail attachment. The petition stated the names of the parties and their residence, as follows: “Tile petition of Isaac B. Bailey, of the county of Jefferson, complaining of Christian Warner, of the county of Jefferson and State of Texas.” It alleged that the plaintiff was the owner of a certain schooner in the county of Jefferson, engaged in trade and running "between Sabine Pass and STibiett’s Bluff, on tide water, and that the defendant, “well knowing the premises, and without sufficient cause or justification, wrongful^, vexatiously, and maliciously sued out an attachment, or process purporting to be an attachment, before one William Myers, a justice of the peace in and for the county of Jefferson and that the defendant, under color of the attachment, forcibly entered upon the said schooner, took possession of her, and forcibly held possession, and took and carried away her anchor, by reason of which loss and damages, particularly and specially stated and described, resulted to the plaintiff. The petition further alleged that, on appeal from the judgment of the justice to the District Court, the attachment, by order of tiie court, was quashed, “as will more fully appear by reference to the record and proceedings now remaining in the said District Court of Jefferson county, and to which your petitioner prays leave to refer.”
    A copy of the affidavit on which the attachment was issued, and of the writ, was made a part of the petition.
    The defendant answered by a general demurrer and a general denial.
    There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff; a motion for a new trial, (made, however, after the lapse of more than two days from that on which the verdict was rendered,) and overruled.
    
      Jones %• Ballinger, for appellant.
    
      IT. JET. 8¡- M. M. Potter, for appellee.
   Wheeler, J.

The ground of error relied on was the judgment of the court, overriding the demurrer to the petition. And it is insisted that the petition is insufficient, in that—

1st. It does not state the residence of the parties, as required by the statute,

2d. It does not negative the statements made in the affidavit on which the attachment issued.

Note71. — Williams®. WarnoII, 28T.,CIO; Moreland®. Atchison,34T.,351; Shirley ®. Byrnes, 84 T., 025; Robinson v. Davenport, 40 T., 333.

Note 72. — City of Marshall v. Bailey, 27 T., 680.

3d. It does not aver that the suit by attachment was determined before the institution of this suit.

Although the petition does not contain an independent averment that the parties, respectively, resided in the comity of Jefferson, yet the phrase, “of the county of Jefferson,” annexed to their names, is a sufficient averment of their residence to answer the object and intention of the statute. Ho good reason is perceived for requiring a more formal averment of the fact; and we think the petition in this respect sufficient, especially on general demurrer.

There may be more reason to hesitate upon tlie question of the sufficiency of the averment of the want of probable cause for suing out the attachment. We are, however, of opinion that, on general demurrer, tlie petition is, in this respect also, sufficient. '

In the case of Frosh v. Swett, (2 Tex. R., 485,) it was held that a general demurrer will not reach a merely informal or defective averment; that if a cause of action he shown, but bo informally or defectively stated, the objection must he taken specially by exceptions, and will not afford a ground for a general demurrer. And this distinction has been recognized and enforced in subsequent decisions. (Wells’s Adm’r v. Fairbanks, 5 Tex. R.)

It may be regarded as settled that the office of a general demurrer, in our practice, is similar to that assigned to it in tlie common-law sj'stem of pleading, and Hint the only question which will be entertained under it is, whether the pleading demurred to discloses the existence of any cause of action or ground of defense; and that the office of exceptions is similar to that of a special demurrer in the English pleadings, namely: not only to question the existence of any cause of action or ground of defense, hub to point out particularly wherein the pleading is defective. Consequently, if sufficient be stated to enable the court to see that (here is a good cause of action or ground of defense, however defectively slated, the defectiveness or insufficiency of tlie averments cannot be taken advantage of by general demurrer, but ¡mist be made the ground of exceptions, pointing out specially wherein tlie defect exists, in order to afford an opportunity to obviate the objection by amendment! Hence, sncli insufficiency in the manner of stating the facts as may be cured by amendment cannot, in general, be objected to on general demurrer.

The petition sets out tlie affidavit on which the attachment issued, and alleges that the writ was sued out “ wrongfully, vcxatiously, and maliciously,” and “ without sufficient cause or justification.” These allegations, tliongh'tliey do not expressly, yet they do impliedly, negative the grounds stated in the affidavit made to obtain the attachment. And any supposed insufficiency in the manner of stating tlie facts could only have been objected to by exceptions, pointing out the particular grounds of objection.

Finally, the petition alleges that the attachment was quashed by order of the District Court at a term previous to tlie institution of this suit; and by a transcript of the judgment of the court in the record, and to which reference is made in tlie petition, it appears that the court, by its judgment rendered before the bringing of this suit, at tlie same time quashed, tlie attachment and dismissed the case. This, it is conceived, is a sufficient answer to the objection that it does not appear from the petition that the suit by attachment was determined before the institution of this suit.

It is scarcely necessary to say that tlie motion for a new trial came too late, under tlie statute, (Hart. Dig., art. 766,) and cannot be sustained.

We are of opinion that tlie objections to the legal sufficiency of the petition arc not well taken, and that tlie judgment be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.