Case ID: f-appx_508/html/0685-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Kelly Gene PARANTEAU, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Leroy KIRKEGARD and Attorney General of the State of Montana, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 10-35609.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 6, 2013.
    
    Filed Feb. 14, 2013.
    Kelly Gene Paranteau, Billings, MT, pro se.
    Before: FISHER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Montana state prisoner Kelly Gene Par-anteau appeals the district court’s summary denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

1. The Montana Supreme Court’s decision that Paranteau did not suffer a violation of his speedy trial right was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor was the Montana Supreme Court’s decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence showing that Paranteau’s counsel took actions inconsistent with Par-anteau’s desire for a speedy trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

2. The state court’s admission of Par-anteau’s statements to law enforcement was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (considering the totality of the circumstances to determine the voluntariness of a confession). The state court found that the offers of leniency were contingent, not guarantees, and that Paranteau was not so overcome by the effects of methamphetamine that he was unable to comprehend his circumstances or understand the Miranda warnings. Paranteau did not challenge these factual findings in his ha-beas petition, and they are presumptively correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).

3. The Montana Supreme Court’s decision not to remand for retroactive application of State v. Goetz, 345 Mont. 421, 191 P.3d 489 (2008), was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Teague does not concern retroactivity of newly decided state court cases or newly recognized state constitutional rights. Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court’s decision rests on Montana law and therefore does not present a cognizable federal claim. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (noting that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)).

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Paran-teau’s habeas petition pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases. See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir.1990).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.