Case ID: misc_14/html/0415-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Gie&ebich, j.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Margaret Shea, Plaintiff, v. The Sun Printing & Publishing Association, Defendant.
    (New York Common Pleas
    Special Term,
    November, 1895.)
    ' To write of a married woman that she is living with a man not her husband is actionable libel. '
    In determining whether words having several meanings are libelous, the inquiry is not whether they could have been understood in any other way than as imputing'a disgraceful charge, but whether that-is the.coñ- ’ structioh. which common people naturally put upon them.
    Issues of law upon demurrer to a complaint in an action ■ for libel, on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient .to constitute a cause of action.
    The material fa'cts are stated in .the opinion, . ; . ' ;.
    
      
      Duncan'Edwards, for plaintiff, opposed. .
    
      ■Er.anMim'Bartlett, for defendant and demurrer..
   Gie&ebich, j.

The article complained of as containing a libel, so far as it is material, is -as follows (the italicised portions being headlines in the article as published): “ Persecuted by Dr. BdU. Edward J. Shea is said to be the victim of the man, who lives, with 1 his wife. Edward J. Shea, who was-committed to Ludlow Street. Jail on October 30th for defaulting in alimony,- was brought before Judge Ak-dbews to-day in , Supreme Court Chambers on- a writ of habeas corpus obtained by his counsel, Frederick Keller, on Friday. Mr. Keller has secured two affidavits, from Mrs. Annie Pierce and Mrs. Mary McNally, tending to show that' Shea has been ■ persecuted - through Dr. Bell, of 1.60 West Eighty-third street, with whom . Mrs-. Margaret Shea, the plaintiffls wife in this action,. isnOw living.” A libel is defined to be “ a malicious publication'by . writing, printing, picture,- effigy, sign or otherwise than, by mere speech which exposes any living, person, or the memory of any person deceased, to hatred,, contempt, ridicule or obloquy, or which causes, -or tends, to cause, any person to be shunned or avoided, -or which has a tendency to injure any person, corporation or association of persons, in his or their business or occupation.” ' Penal Code, § 242; Turton v. New York Recorder, 3 Misc. Rep. 314, 317. Judge Peyob, in speaking for this■ court' in Witcher v. Jones, N. Y. Supp. 493; 43 N. Y. St. Repr. 153, says: “By all authorities, " any unprivileged publication of which the necessary tendency, is to expose a man to hatred, Contempt or ridicule is a libel.” Language is libelous ' which tends to degrade a person in society. 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 295. Is it libelous . to write of a married woman that she is living with' a man not ' her husband? The demurrant contends that this statement / in the above article has- a perfectly harmless meaning.. It is possible to- ring the changes upon the many meanings of the word “ live:” The inquiry, however, is not whether the words could have been understood in any other way than -as imputing a disgraceful charge to the plaintiff, but whether that is the construction which common people naturally put upon them (Ryckman v. Delavan, 25 Wend. 186, 201; Byrnes v. Mathews, 12 N. Y. St. Repr. 74, 79, 80), and this question is for the jury. If the application or meaning of the words is ambiguous, or the sense in which they were Used is uncertain, and they are capable of a construction which would make them actionable,, although at the same time an innocent sense can be attributed to them, it is for the jury to determine, upon all the circumstances, whether they were applied to. the plaintiff, and in what sense they were used.” Per Andrews, J., in Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. 401. The "cases of Ryckman v. Delavan, supra, Patch v. Tribune Assn., 38 Hun, 368, 369, and Woodruff v. Bradstreet Co., 116 N. Y. 217, 220, are to the same effect. The innuendo, if ■ any is' neces^ sary, is in my opinion sufficient. For thesfe reasons the demurrer, should be overruled, and there should be judgment for the plaintiff overruling the demurrer,, with costs, with leave to the defendant to answer within twenty days upon payment of costs.

Demurrer overruled, with leave-to answer.