Case ID: sc-eq_31/html/0226-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Wardlaw, Ch.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Stephen Jones vs. Margaret Godwin.
    
      Notice — •Marriage Settlement — Husband and Wife — Trusts and Trustees — Limitations, Statute of
    
    Actual notice of an unrecorded marriage settlement inferred from circumstances, the principal fact being that the purchaser took a bill of sale from the trustee and the husband.
    Where the husband and trustee sold a negro held in trust for the wife for life,with remainder to the children, and the purchaser remained in possession eight years, when the husband died: Held, that the purchaser’s possession did not give him title under the statute of limitations — the wife having had no notice of the sale until the husband’s death.
    BEFORE DUNKIN', CH.} AT WILLIAMSBURGH,
    FEBRUARY, 1858.
    Dunkin, Ch. The pleadings and the evidence present the following state of facts: In March, 1833, Hardy B. Godwin was about to be married to the defendant, then Margaret McCutchen — Godwin had no other property than his horse. The defendant was possessed of negroes and other property. In contemplation of the marriage, an instrument was executed on 26th March, 1833, a copy of which is filed with the pleadings. The language of the paper is neither exact nor technically accurate. But all instruments of this character receive a liberal construction in order to effect the manifest object of the parties, especially when the. purpose is to secure only the property of the intended wife. The effect of the transaction was to vest the legal estate of the slaves in the trustee, Willis J. Godwin, to be held for the separate use of the wife, during her natural life, and on her decease, for her lawful issue absolutely. It is also to be inferred from the provisions of the instrument, that the husband was entitled to the possession of the property, but that he “ was to manage and employ the same for the use and benefit of the wife and her lawful issue.”
    The- marriage accordingly took place. The deed was duly proved, and was recorded in the Secretary of State’s office, 25th May, 1S33, and on the 4th July, 1833, in the office of the Register of Mesne Conveyance for Williamsburg District. In process of time, Hardy B. Godwin became embarrassed in his affairs ; and, in March, 1848, he and the plaintiff entered into a bargain for the sale and purchase of the slave John, the son of a woman included in the settlement. The plaintiff lived in the neighborhood, and the evidence of his cousin, John Frierson, as well as that of Willis J. Godwin, apart from the public notoriety of the record, leave no reasonable doubt that the plaintiff was fully aware of the infirmity of the title for which he was treating. Else why apply to the trustee “ to sign the bill of sale ?” He took a bill of sale from Hardy B. God-win and Willis J. Godwin, as joint owners, with the usual warranty, dated 7th March, 1848, but which has never yet . been placed upon record.
    The plaintiff remained in possession of John from this time until the death of Hardy B. Godwin. He died the latter part of 1855, or beginning of 1856, leaving the defendant, his widow, and seven children. Soon afterward, John was taken by the .defendant, claiming the possession of him under the provisions of the settlement of March, 1833. The plaintiff filed his bill for specific delivery, &c., on 30th September, 1S5'6.
    The character of the plaintiff’s title under his arrangement with, the husband of the defendant and her trustee, Willis J. Godwin, is discussed by Mr. Justice Story, in the § 395 of his Equity Jurisprudence: “A person who purchases with full notice of the legal or equitable title of other persons, will not be permitted to protect himself against such claims.” “It would be gross injustice, to allow him to defeat the just rights of others by his own iniquitous bargain. He becomes by such conductparticeps criminis with the fraudulent grantor.” “And in all such cases of purchases with notice, courts of equity will hold the purchaser a trustee for the benefit of the persons whose rights he has thus sought to defraud or defeat.”
    The principle is illustrated in the text, by reference to the case of Saunders vs. Dehaw, 2 Fern. 271, in which a mortgagee with notice of a trust, in order to protect his mortgage, procured a conveyance from the trustee. He was held not to be entitled to any benefit from it; but he.was declared to be subject to the original trust in the same manner as the trustee. Although a purchaser may buy an incumbrance, or, as it is said, lay hold on any plank to protect himself, he must not protect himself by taking a conveyance from a trustee with notice of a trust, for he thereby becomes a trustee; and, to get a plank to save himself, he must not be guilty of a breach of trust. But the plaintiff had not the plea of necessity. It was not the case of tabula in naufragio. He dealt with his eyes open, and with his free will. His knowledge of the trust was far more clearly established than that of the purchaser in the case of Gibbes vs. Cobb, 7 Rich. Eq. 60. Yet with all this information, the plaintiff proceeds to bargain with the husband for the purchase of the slave, but cautiously refrained from completing the contract until he had procured the assent of the trustee to violate his trust by joining in the bill of sale. His reply to his kinsman, John Frierson, who, after defendant was in possession of the slave, rather reproached the plaintiff for not running the negro as soon as Godwin was dead, shews that he always understood his position.
    But it is said that the original infirmity of the plaintiff’s title was cured by the laches of the defendant in prosecuting her rights; that the fraud of the plaintiff in his arrangement to defeat the xrusts of the settlement was only constructive, and that he is entitled to the protection of the statute of limitations. This is the only part of the case in which the Court has experienced any embarrassment. As has been already intimated, it is not only a fair construction of the terms of this instrument, but the natural and common interpretation and understanding of all such contracts, that the husband was to be entitled “ to manage and employ the slaves.” He might keep them in his own possession, if necessary, for the comfort and support of his family, or he might hire them out to other persons for the same purpose, if that should be a more advantageous mode of employment. As he had the charge of his own family, it would be very difficult to prescribe at what time the trustee or cestui que trust was bound, or had the right to interfere with his management. He might hire one of the slaves to his neighbor for a month or a year, or a term of years, even without consulting the trustee, much more with his privity and approbation. The answer of the defendant is upon oath; she avers that until after the decease of her husband, she never knew that the plaintiff had purchased the slave; that, on the contrary, she was informed, and always believed, “that by some arrangement between the plaintiff and her deceased husband, the plaintiff was to hold the slave during the lifetime of her husband; and that she did not know until after the slave was again in her possession, that the plaintiff had any title to him. She had been informed and believed, that the plaintiff had a right to the use of the slave during the life of her husband, and that he would be restored to her upon his death.” There is nothing in the evidence to contradict or impeach this averment. On the contrary the instrument, under which the plaintiff claimed the absolute estate, although very formal was never placed on record, and had' all the appearance, when produced, of never having left the plaintiff’s escritoire. It was not the bargaining for the use of the slave of which the husband had the right of management, which necessarily constituted any fraud; but it was the sale of the absolute property in the slave. The defendant is in no worse situation than if she had filed a bill against the plaintiff and the trustee, charging the fraud, which she has proved, and averring that this fraud had only come to her knowledge since the decease of her husband. The distinction between a court of law and a court of equity, in this respect, is stated in Prescott vs. Hubbett, 1 Hill Ch. 213, and is familiarly recognized. In equity the relief against a fraud done to the rights of a party, is barred in four years, (not from the commission of the act as at law,) but from the discovery of the fraud — and it is prima facie sufficient if the party (aver that the discovery was within four years. The plaintiff, selecting the jurisdiction of a court of equity, submits to the rules of administering justice which prevail in that tribunal'. The court is of opinion that the equitable rights of the defendant are satisfactorily established, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to the aid of this court, in disturbing her possession.
    It is ordered that the bill be dismissed.
    The complainant appealed, and moved this court to reverse the decree on the grounds:
    1. Because the purchase, by complainant, for a full price, vested in him a valid, legal and equitable title to the slave John, and the pretended settlement set up by defendant cannot defeat said title.
    2. Because the paper set up as a marriage settlement was not recorded within the time required by law in the office of the Register of Mesne Conveyances for Williamsburg District; and if held a valid settlement is void as to complainant as purchaser.
    3. Because the possession of complainant, for eight years, gave him a good title against the trustee and cestui que trusts under said deed; and defendant’s answer as to what she considered the character of such possession was not evidence to rebut the presumption that the said possession was an adverse one.
    
      Harllee and Pressley, for appellant.
    
      Dargan, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Wardlaw, Ch.

Two questions are raised by this appeal; first of fact whether the plaintiff at the time of his purchase had notice of defendant’s equitable title, and secondly whether the statute of limitations is a bar to that title under the circumstances of the case. It is difficult to add to the Chancellor’s reasoning on either question.

On the first we should adopt here the Chancellor’s conclusion, unless error was clearly demonstrated. But we have considered the evidence, and we fully concur in that conclusion. The recording of the marriage settlement, although it was effected a few days after the prescribed time, and for that reason not raising the implication of notice to all persons, goes far to shew actual notice to a near neighbor of a fact so notorious as the settlement. The conviction of Willis Godwin that plaintiff well understood the condition of the property— the omission of the plaintiff, while alleging in his bill that plaintiff set up a claim on the slave, and while conversing with his cousin concerning the slave, to deny notice of the character of defendant’s claim — are slight-circumstances but tending to show notice. Then there is the fact inexplicable on any other hypothesis of his procuring the trustee to join in the bill of sale. In his conversation with his cousin, he founded his trust of exemption from loss exclusively on the warranty of the trustee, and we are glad to be informed that such is the condition of the trustee’s affairs, that the plaintiff is not without redress in the proper forum.

As to the statute of limitations we concur in the view presented in the circuit decree, so sufficiently as to need no amplification. Where a decree is adequately vindicated by a single course of reasoning, it is superfluous and frequently indiscreet to add other lines of argument It is at least doubtful whether the rights of the defendant were at all invaded, so as to impose necessity of suit, before the death of her husband Walker vs. Frazier. 2 Rich. Eq. 99. But we forbear further discussion.

It is ordered and decreed that the decree be affirmed and the appeal be dismissed.

Dunkin and Dargan, CC., concurred.