Case ID: minn_69/html/0426-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CANTY, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HELEN A. McCLUER v. JAMES CROTTY and Another.
    
    October 20, 1897.
    Nos. 10,819 — (253).
    Judgment of Municipal Court — Motion to Vacate.
    Under Sp. Laws 1887, e. 6, § 49, regulating the practice in the municipal court of Stillwater, a judgment entered in that court for default of appearance and answer cannot be set aside, and defendant allowed to answer, unless the motion for that purpose is made within six months after the entry of such judgment.
    Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the municipal court of Still-water, Jack, J., setting aside a judgment by default.
    Reversed.
    
      F. W. Gail, for appellant.
    
      Fayette Marsh, for respondent.
    
      
       Reported in 72 N. W. 701.
    
   CANTY, J.

The statute prescribing the practice in the municipal court of Stillwater provides:

“If the defendant fail to appear at the opening of the court on the day at which the summons is returnable, he shall be defaulted. * * * The court may for good cause in its discretion, and on such terms as it may deem equitable, open any default within six months after the same is made.” Sp. Laws 1887, c. 6, § 49.

This action was brought in that court. The summons, which was duly served, was made returnable March 17,1896. Defendant failed to appear, and was defaulted. Judgment was entered for plaintiff on such default April 26, 1896. On July 22,1897, an order to show cause why said judgment should not be set aside and defendant given leave to answer was procured by defendant, and after a hearing thereon the court made an order setting aside the judgment and allowing defendant to answer. From this order plaintiff appeals.

One of the grounds urged for reversal is that the time for opening the default had expired long before any move was made to open the same. In our opinion the point is well taken. No attempt was made to remove the default until considerably over a year after the entry of judgment thereon, while the statute allows at most but six months after judgment in which to proceed to open such a default,

The order appealed from is reversed.