Case ID: mich_279/html/0313-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Fead, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SOVEY v. FORD MOTOR CO.
    1. Workmen's Compensation — Filing op Award — Appeal to Department.
    The statutory emphasis on filing an award, as well as the necessities of orderly procedure, renders it evident that the time for an appeal from an award of the deputy commissioner to the department of labor and industry begins to run on the filing of the deputy’s award with the department (2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8447).
    2. Same — Statutory Period for Appeal is Mandatory.
    Under workmen’s compensation act stating the purpose that the procedure shall be as summary as reasonably may be and prescribing a period of 10 days for appeal from deputy commissioner to the department, such period for appeal is held, mandatory (2 Comp. Laws 1929, §§8442, 8447).
    3. Time — Statutes—Court Rules — Sunday.
    In judicial proceedings, limitations of time set forth by statute, as distinguished from court rules, are imperative and the period is not extended because the last day of the prescribed time falls on Sunday.
    4. Workmen’s Compensation — Period por Appeal — Computation op Time.
    In prescribing the time for appeal in the quasi-judicial proceedings under the workmen’s compensation act, the legislature must be deemed to have done so in the light of repeated decisions of the Supreme Court relative to the computation of statutory limitations of time (2 Comp. Laws 1929, §8447).
    5. Same — Period por Appeal — Statutes—Departmental Rule.
    Department of labor and industry has no jurisdiction to change or enlarge period for appeal from deputy commissioner to the department, fixed by statute by rule providing for performance of certain acts on Monday when last day of the period falls on Sunday (2 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 8442, 8447; Dept, of Labor and Industry, September, 1935, Rule No. 3, § 9).
    
      6. Same — Appeal prom Deputy Commissioner to Department'— Time — Jurisdiction.
    Appeal from award of deputy commissioner to department of labor and industry, filed by telegram on 11th day after filing of deputy’s award and filed formally on the 13th day, held, too late to confer jurisdiction upon department to hear such appeal, even though telegraphic appeal be deemed formally sufficient and notwithstanding 10th day fell on Sunday, where question was brought to the attention of the department before decision (2 Comp. Laws 1929, §§8442, 8447; Dept, of Labor and Industry, September, 1935, Rule No. 3, § 9).
    Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.
    Submitted January 7, 1937.
    (Docket No. 14, Calendar No. 39,162.)
    Decided April 14, 1937.
    Theodore Sovey presented his claim against Ford Motor Company, employer, for compensation for personal injuries suffered in defendant’s employ. Award to plaintiff by deputy commissioner. Defendants appealed to Department of Labor and Industry. Award reversed. Plaintiff appeals in nature of certiorari.
    Reversed.
    
      Derham é Derham, for plaintiff.
    
      Charles D. Symoncls and Ray E. MacAllister, for defendant.
   Fead, C. J.

Plaintiff had an award of compensation, made by a deputy commissioner on February 10, 1936, and filed with the department February 13th. On appeal by defendant the department vacated the award and denied plaintiff compensation.

The principal question is whether the appeal taken by defendant to the department was timely. It claims it appealed by telegram on February 24th. It filed formal appeal February 26th. We assume, but do not decide, that the claimed appeal by telegram was formally sufficient.

Section 8447, 2 Comp. Laws 1929, reads in part:

“The hearings of the committee (deputy commissioner) shall be held at the locality where the injury occurred, and the decision of the committee shall be filed with the industrial accident board. Unless a claim for a review is filed by either party within ten days, the decision shall stand as the decision of the industrial accident board: Provided, That said industrial accident board may, for sufficient cause shown, grant further time in which to claim such review. ’ ’

The statutory emphasis on filing, as well as the necessities of orderly procedure, renders it evident that the time for appeal begins to run on the filing of the award of the deputy commissioner with the department.

The 10-day period from filing the award of the deputy commissioner expired February 23rd, which was Sunday. The issue is whether the appeal taken the next day was in time.

The statute states the purpose that the procedure shall be “as summary as reasonably may be.” 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8442. The statutory period for appeal is mandatory. Brunette v. Quincy Mining Co., 197 Mich. 301 (16 N. C. C. A. 743); Kalucki v. American Car & Foundry Co., 200 Mich. 604; Detroit United Railway v. Department of Labor & Industry, 231 Mich. 539.

Recognizing a conflict of authority thereon, this court consistently has held that statutory limita-

The legislature must be deeméd to have prescribed the time for appeal in these gwasi-judicial proceedings in the light of such rulings. They are controlling.

Defendant, however, contends that its appeal was timely under rule of the department, adopted under authority of 2 Comp. Laws 1929, § 8442, and which provides for the performance of certain acts on Monday when the last day of the period falls on Sunday. Aside from doubt as to the rule governing appeals, the department has no jurisdiction to change a statute or enlarge it by rule. Butler v. Millman, 271 Mich. 113; Brunette v. Quincy Mining Co., supra.

The question was brought to the attention of the department before decision. The appeal was too late and the department had no jurisdiction to hear it. The award of the deputy commissioner is in force.

Reversed.

North, "VViest, Butzel, Bushnell, Sharpe, Potter, and Chandler, JJ., concurred. 
      
       The powers and duties of the industrial accident board have been transferred to the department of labor and industry and the board abolished. See 2 Oomp. Laws 1929, § 8312.-—Reporter.
     
      
       Ses Rules of Practice and Procedure, Department of Labor and Industry, No. 3, § 9, September, 1935.—Reporter.