Case ID: sc-eq_31/html/0341-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Dunkin, Ch.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

J. C. Blackwell, Adm’r. Mary Ridgill, vs. R. M. Ridgill Adm’r. J. Ridgill.
    
      Limitation of Estates — Wills and Testaments.
    
    The testator, by his will, which was in one paragraph, without dot, division or mark of punctuation, first devised and bequeathed to his brother, J. R., who .resided with him, some real and personal estate, and then declared as follows: “I give and bequeath to my wife M. all the lands where I now reside on J also give to my wife M all of my personal property and I also give to my wife all of my household and kitchen furniture 1 also give to my wife alf of my stock horses cattle hogs and poultry and I also give to my wife ¡all that plantation or tract of land known by the name of the Murphy tract the above to be and remain my wifes and at her disposal her life time and after her death to be J. Rs.” The will then contained some further devises and bequests, and amongst them an absolute bequest to testator’s wife, of his notes, accounts and cash afterpayment of his debts that “the above” referred to all the preceding devises and bequests to the testator’s wife M., and was not confined to the devise of the Murphy tract; and consequently that the limitation to J. R. extended to all the property mentioned in the previous devises and bequests to the wife. , *
    
    BEFORE DUNKIN', OH., AT SUMTER,
    JUNE, 1858.
    Dunkin, Ch. This bill was filed 34th November, 1857 stating the death of plaintiff’s intestate on the second day of the preceding month, and that the defendant had taken possession of all her effects in his capacity as administrator of James Ridgill, deceased, and that under an .order from the Ordinary, he had advertised them for sale on the 36th November. Application was made at Chambers at Columbia, on 35th November, to stay the sale until the rights of the parties could be adjudicated. No argument was offered, and the exigency seemed to allow but little time for consideration; a provisional, or temporary injunction was ordered. The determination of the cause depends on the construction of Robert Ridgill’s will, a strictly correct transcript of which accompanies this decree. At the date of the will (1834) and also at the period of testator’s death, (1849) his brother James Ridgill who lived and died a bachelor, resided in the same home with the testator and his wife, who were without children. James Ridgill continued to reside there until his own decease, some years afterwards, leaving Mary Ridgill, his brother’s widow, still surviving until October last. These facts aiford very slender assistance in giving construction to the will. It is, however, very clear that the same interpretation must be adopted as if James Rigill, instead of the widow, had been the survivor. The Court has never been called on to determine the meaning of a written instrument in which the field of argument was more limited, or the correct solution less certain or satisfactory. In some wills the punctuation may aid conjecture, or the division into sections indicate the intention. This will is a single paragraph, without dot, division or mark of punctuation from beginning to end. The sole inquiry is whether the “the above” refers to all that is previously given to his wife, or only to the tract of land known as the Murphy tract, the devise of which immediately precedes those terms. It is manifest that the testator contemplated the survivorship of James Ridgill. He was a member of his household. The testator had other brothers, but he remem-, bered them only by a nominal legacy. To James, he devises two tracts of land and some other articles. But his widow he places in his own situation, giving her the homestead and all his personal property. In addition, he devises to her the Murphy tract of land and then follow the words “the above to be and remain my wife’s, and at her disposal her life time and after her death to be James Ridgill’s.” James had always lived with them.
    The testator probably contemplated that he would not change his home, and he certainly supposed he would outlive his widow. Giving to his wife all about them and particu-larising with superfluous minuteness, as if he took pleasure in giving to her, or was apprehensive that something might be omitted, he then expresses the amplitude of the enjoyment by declaring the “ above to be and remain my wife’s and at her disposal.” But she had no children, and on her decease, his brother James would have no home. He therefore provides in familiar but expressive terms “ to remain my wife’s and at her disposal her life time, and after her death, to be James Ridgill’s.” His widow and his brother were the prominent objects of his affection, of his solicitude and bounty. If James Ridgill had survived the widow, it is difficult to suppose that the testator intended that he should quit the homestead and give place to .strangers in blood. Rather on such considerations than from any fixed conviction as derived from the language of the instrument alone, the Court has adopted the conclusion that the bill must be dismissed — see Lowe vs. Lord Huntington, 4 Russ 532 ; Wigram on Wills, 36 — and it is so ordered and decreed, but without costs.
    COPY WILL.
    In the name of God Amen
    I Robert Ridgill of the State of South Carolina in the District of Sumter clarendon county Being of Perfect mind and memory make this my Last Will and Testament first I Desire to be Decently Buried my Estate and Effects I Bequeath and Dispose of in manner and as follows I Give and Bequeath to my Brother James Ridgill the Lands on ox Swamp which were formerly owned by william Ridgill De’d I Also give and Bequeath to James Ridgill one Tract of land on ox Swamp which I Purchased from Harmon Platt I Also give and Bequeath to James Ridgill my carpenter and plantation Tools I give and Bequeath to my wife Mary Ridgill All the Lands where I now Reside on I also Give to my wife Mary Ridgill All of my personal property and I Also Give to my wife All of my household & Kitchen furniture I also Give to my wife All of my Stock horses cattle hogs and poultry and I Also Give to my Wife All that plantation or Tract of land known by the name of the Murphy Tract the Above to be and Remain my Wifes and at her Disposal her lifetime and After her Death to be James Ridgills I Also Give Give to my Nephew Robert Ridgill Gamble All of my part of land that carne from the Estate of David Nelsop I Also Give All of my Notes accounts & cash to my Wife after paying my Debts if there should any Be left I also give to my Brother Richard Ridgill five dollars and I Also Give to the heirs of William Ridgill De’d five dollars I do hereby constitute and appoint my Wife Mary Ridgill and my Brother James Ridgill to be the whole and Soal executors of this my last will and Testament this 19th February 1834
    ROBERT RIDGILL
    Test
    Robt. V. White,
    Peter Javroe, '
    Johh F. Gamble.
    The plaintiff appealed and moved this Court to reverse tlye decree, on the ground:
    Because the limitation, after the death of testator’s widow, to James Ridgill, is confined to the Murphy tract of land, and does not extend to the plantation on which the testator resided, or to the personal estate bequeathed to his widow; the said plantation and personal estate being given to her absolutely.
    
      Galluchat, Spain, Richardson, for appellants,
    cited Blewer vs. Brightman, 4 McC. 60; Moon vs. Moon, 2 Strob. Eq. 327; Ellam vs. Westly, 4 B. and C. 667 ; 10 Eng. Com. L. R. 749. '
    
      Moses, Blanding, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Dunkin, Ch.

It is proposed to add little to what is said in the Circuit decree. It was urged that Moon vs. Moon, 2 Strob. 'Eq. 327, was authority for a different view. That was also a will upon the construction of which diversity of opinion might well be entertained, and it was determined by a divided Court; But in that case land was given and slaves (by name.) The slaves (by name) were given over after the life estate, to be sold by the executors and the proceeds divided. No further disposition was made of the land. We think it very material to shew,” (said the Court) “ that these subjects were dis-joined, and given with a separate intention as to each; that, while the negroes are limited in remainder,-the testator makes no further mention of the land.” But in Robert Ridgill’s will no such disjunction is marked. There is no repetition of a part of the property before given, and a bequest over of that part. On the contrary, no intention is manifested to separate what is before given. “ The above to be and remain my wife’s and at her disposal her lifetime, and after her death to be James Ridgill’s.” Both real and personal property were included in the preceding gift to his wife. And, in a subsequent clause, he bequeaths to her, without qualification, all his notes, accounts and cash.”

Looking, as the Court is authorized to do, upon the cases cited, to the condition of the testator’s family, they are not prepared to say that any different construction would be more likely to effectuate the intention of the testator than that adopted by the Circuit Court. ' *

The appeal is dismissed.

Johnson and Wardlaw, CC., concurred,

Jippeal dismissed.