Case ID: so2d_359/html/0985-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SUMMERS, Justice. CALOGERO, Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Louisiana v. Harry J. TYLER.
    No. 61402.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 19, 1978.
    Clifford Cardone, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
    William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
   SUMMERS, Justice.

Defendant Harry J. Tyler was charged by bill of information with one count of armed robbery and two counts of second-degree murder. He waived trial by jury. Evidence was heard on March 8 and 9, 1977. When the State and the defense rested, the trial judge took the case under advisement. On June 13, 1977 the trial judge rendered his judgment, finding defendant guilty as charged on the armed robbery count, not guilty of the first second-degree murder count, and guilty as charged of the second attempted second-degree murder count. Thereafter defendant was sentenced to serve twenty years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

On this appeal the defendant asserts his right for appellate review of the record for “an error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence.” La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 920. Although we find no errors warranting reversal of this conviction and sentence, the Court is concerned about the three-month delay between the taking of evidence and the announcement of the judgment. La.Code of Crim.Pro. art. 765. The judgment is a part of the “trial” in a bench trial just as the verdict is part of the “trial” in a jury trial. It appears doubtful that a criminal trial can properly be protracted over such a time span with a three-month interval between essential steps in the normal order of trial. Id. art. 765(8). Nevertheless, the law presumes the regularity of judicial proceedings. La.Rev.Stat. 15:432. Therefore, in the absence of an objection or a showing of prejudice, there is no ground for reversal of this conviction.

For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.

CALOGERO, J., concurs and assigns reasons.

CALOGERO, Justice,

concurring.

I subscribe to the majority opinion in this case because it is correct as a matter of law and in keeping with the procedure and customs of this Court under which a very restrictive appellate review is made when a defendant simply asks this Court to review the record for errors discoverable by a mere inspection of pleadings and proceedings and without inspection of the evidence. C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975). The fact that the majority has reviewed only the third assignment of error is in keeping with our practice of reviewing in non-capital cases only those assignments which are argued by counsel in brief or oral argument because defense counsel in this case did not argue the first two errors he had formally assigned.

Nevertheless, I believe that defense counsel in this case made a grave error in failing to argue his first assignment which concerned the failure of the trial judge to grant his motion to quash the information because of improper joinder of offenses. Perhaps the merits of that assignment could still be reviewed in an application for writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a denial of due process rights through his being forced to face these unrelated charges in one trial, or on the basis of incompetent counsel. In any case, it should be apparent to defense attorneys that the abandonment of meritorious assignments may in future stages of given litigation constitute the basis of a finding of incompetence.