Case ID: ny-2d_80/html/0553-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Bellacosa, J. Hancock, Jr., J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rachel Anglin, Respondent, v Harold Anglin, Appellant.
    Argued November 17,1992;
    decided December 21, 1992
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Zubres, D’Agostino, Hoblock & Greisler, P. C., Albany (David M. Siegal of counsel), for appellant.
    The commencement of an action for a separation is the commencement of a matrimonial action within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c). (Lennon v Lennon, 124 AD2d 788; Butti v Butti, 151 AD2d 633.)
    
      Bohl, Clayton, Komar & Della Rocca, P. G, Albany (George H. Barber of counsel), for respondent.
    Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2), the evaluation date of property subject to equitable distribution is the date the matrimonial action stated in subdivision (5) is commenced and subdivision (5) does not include a separation action. (Lennon v Lennon, 124 AD2d 788; Jolis v Jolis, 98 AD2d 692; Petre v Petre, 122 AD2d 559.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Bellacosa, J.

The appellant former husband presents a single statutory interpretation question for this Court to settle — whether a separation action ends the period for the accrual of marital property as prescribed by Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c). The Appellate Division, agreeing with Supreme Court, held that the start of the separation action did not effect that end. We, too, conclude that a separation action does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership and, therefore, does not preclude the subsequent accrual of marital property.

FACTS

The parties to this action were married in 1954 and have three children. In 1982, the wife brought a separation action against her husband, which was contested and did not go to trial until January 1988. In 1983, the wife was granted exclusive use and possession of the marital residence, temporary maintenance, and temporary child support. At times, after the separation action was commenced, the parties continued to live in the marital residence together and filed joint tax returns. Two years after the separation action was commenced, they also travelled to Tennessee together. Following trial of the separation action, at which the amount and duration of maintenance were the only contested issues, the wife was granted maintenance and a judgment of separation was entered on October 20,1988.

In 1989, the wife commenced an action for divorce, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170 (5). The husband sought an order declaring that assets acquired after the commencement of the 1982 separation action were not marital property. The wife cross-moved to set the much later date of the commencement of the divorce action as the cutoff, after which property acquired would not be considered marital property.

Supreme Court, Albany County, noting the divided views of the various Appellate Divisions on this narrow but critically important point of law, fixed the commencement date of the divorce action as the marital asset accrual cutoff date. The Appellate Division, Third Department, agreeing with Supreme Court and the views of the First and Fourth Departments on this issue, affirmed by a vote of 3 to 2. The Appellate Division then granted permission to the husband to appeal to this Court on a certified question.

DISCUSSION

The Domestic Relations Law and its equitable distribution regime are complex, interlocking statutory frameworks. As this Court recently observed in Matter of Aaron J. (80 NY2d 402, 407), we are obliged in interpreting such statutes to "harmonize the various provisions * * * and to construe them in a way that renders them internally compatible”. In a subdivision captioned "Definitions”, Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c) states that "[t]he term 'marital property’ shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action” (emphasis added). Nowhere in the subdivision captioned "Definitions” is the term "matrimonial action” defined.

Appellant urges a plain meaning approach to the understanding and application of Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c). He maintains that by the "clear definitional language”, a matrimonial action must include a separation action and he points to the reasoning of the Second Department in Lennon v Lennon (124 AD2d 788), which stands alone against the contrary views of the other three Appellate Division Depart-merits. The Second Department relied on a discrete subdivision of the same statute, Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2), captioned "Matrimonial actions”, which lists 11 types of matrimonial actions, and used that enumeration as an aid to defining "matrimonial action” for purposes of the marital property definition provision, Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c). Because an action for separation is included in the Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) list, appellant, the Lennon Court and the dissent base their further analysis on the predicate that the mere delineation in section 236 (B) (1) (c) is self-defining and self-executing.

Their plain meaning approach, however, fails to give sufficient consideration to the fact that also included in the Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) list of "[m]atrimonial actions” are actions that could not possibly serve as the cutoff point for the accrual of marital property. For example, the list includes actions "for a declaration of the * * * nullity of a foreign judgment of divorce [and] for a declaration of the validity * * * of a marriage” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [2]). The objective of these actions, as Justice Levine convincingly observed in his majority opinion below, is "a judicial declaration of the continued existence of the marital relationship” (Anglin v Anglin, 173 AD2d 133, 135 [emphasis in original]). If one of these actions, by the so-called plain meaning "matrimonial actions” litany, were held to demarcate the end of the marital property accrual period, an inexplicable contradiction would be plainly evident.

Thus, "matrimonial action” for the purpose of defining the termination point for the further accrual of marital property cannot be governed by an overly inclusive and generalized list but must instead acquire its meaning in relation to the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and within the particular application of the equitable distribution regime. We should not accept or view Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2) as a definitional list for all purposes.

We are aided in the view we adopt by the express terms of section 236 (B) (1) (c), which draws a parallel between a "separation agreement” and "the commencement of a matrimonial action” (emphasis added). Either category serves to demarcate the closing date of the marital property accrual period. The appellant former husband would construe the categories so that either a separation agreement or the commencement of a separation action "objectively signifies the end of the marital partnership” and "clearly signals the end of the economic partnership of the marriage”. That conclusion may not be so facilely accepted. The economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks "divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage”, i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available (see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5]). That provides internal consistency and compatibility and objective verification, as opposed to uneven, ephemeral, personal interpretations as to when economic marital partnerships end. This Court has said that the "winding up of the parties’ economic affairs and a severance of their economic ties by an equitable distribution of the marital assets” — a winding up consistent with the termination of a partnership — is to be carried out "upon dissolution of the marriage” (O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 585 [emphasis added]). All separation actions do not actually or realistically constitute the functional or cognizable equivalent of the dissolution of a marital economic partnership or of a marriage itself. Indeed, a separation decree, using somewhat Victorian terms, serves only to "separate] the parties from bed and board, forever, or for a limited time” (Domestic Relations Law § 200 [emphasis added]). Moreover, while a separation judgment may be used as a predicate for divorce (see, Domestic Relations Law § 170 [5]), the law requires another definitive act by a party — a discrete action at law — to legally effectuate the divorce objective and terminate a marriage.

It is pertinent that the Legislature has expressly allowed a separation agreement to fix the cutoff date for accrual and control the distribution of the economic fruits of the marital economic partnership. In effect, the Legislature has allowed parties to "contract out of th[e] system of marital property and maintenance” (see, Member of Assembly Mem, 1980 NY Legis Ann, at 130). Because a separation agreement constitutes a voluntary bilateral mechanism allowing parties to opt out of the statutory equitable distribution regime, the statute places the agreement on a par of materiality and legal effect with the commencement of a qualifying matrimonial action that would legally terminate the marital economic partnership. As Justice Levine aptly noted, "because the spouses have the power to provide for the entire disposition of marital assets in a separation agreement, and commonly do so, it was appropriate and consistent to designate the execution of a separation agreement as an alternative terminating event in defining marital property for equitable distribution purposes in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c)” (Anglin v Anglin, 173 AD2d 133,136, supra [emphasis added]).

Appellant offers counterarguments that the courts should carefully differentiate between the distribution of marital property under section 236 (B) (5) and the demarcation of its accrual specified in section 236 (B) (1) (c) (see also, Florescue, The Cutoff to Accrual, NYU, Aug. 10, 1992, at 3, col 1). We acknowledge the distinction, but emphasize, too, that this variation does not alone resolve the precise question before us, which is whether the Legislature has chosen a separation action as the cutoff for the accrual of marital property, as prescribed in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c). Judicial policy preferences are irrelevant and not controlling in answering that question. In the interpretative context, courts are obliged to "harmonize the various provisions” of the statute (Matter of Aaron J., 80 NY2d 402, 407, supra) and, thus, must read the entire law and accord respect to the interlocking and interrelated features of all its parts. Although subdivision (5) of section 236 (B) purports only to govern the equitable distribution of marital property, it nevertheless also provides valuable guidance in the search for what the integrated statute was intended to mean and informs the judicial ascertainment of a solution that gives all parts of the statute consistent and effective meaning (see, Matter of Aaron J., supra; Matter of Society of N. Y. Hosp. v Del Vecchio, 70 NY2d 634, 636; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 97, 98). The specific equitable distribution words and provisions of the Legislature must be accorded appropriate weight in this context and, in our view, they should enjoy precedence over a generalized enumeration provision. By this method and assessment, a real harmonization and effectuation of the purpose intended by the Legislature is accomplished.

Notably, the Legislature has given the courts significant flexibility in fashioning the appropriate remedy of equitable distribution of marital property. The commencement of a separation action may be considered as a factor by courts, among other relevant factors, as they attempt to calibrate the ultimate equitable distribution of marital economic partnership property acquired after the start of such an action by either spouse (see, Anglin v Anglin, 173 AD2d 133, 137, supra). The Legislature has wisely refrained from excluding, arbitrarily and per se, assets acquired subsequent to the commencement of a separation action from the potential pool of accruing marital property. We have correspondingly noted that the Legislature deliberately defined marital property "broadly”, and we have upheld that "broad construction” (see, Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15; Majauskas v Majauskas, 61 NY2d 481, 489). The rigid formula advocated by the appellant and espoused by the dissent in this purely statutory interpretation case, would incongruously retreat from the flexibility properly reposed in the courts in this sensitive and difficult area. The net result in this case would also be demonstrably unfair.

We have considered all the other arguments presented and conclude they are without merit.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the negative.

Hancock, Jr., J.

(dissenting). However it may be characterized, the majority holds that under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (c) neither a separation action nor a separation judgment dissolves the marital economic partnership so as to terminate the accrual of marital assets for equitable distribution (see, majority opn, at 556-557). Thus, even though the marriage relationship has deteriorated to the point where one party has sued for and even obtained "a judgment separating the parties from bed and board, forever, or for a limited time” (Domestic Relations Law § 200), the individual assets of the husband and wife continue to be lumped together for eventual distribution as marital property when the marriage is finally dissolved. The majority’s holding that the "economic partnership” survives the discord of a separation action is incompatible with the well-defined concept of the "economic partnership” relationship as the centerpiece of the Equitable Distribution Law (see, Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14; O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 585; Majauskas v Majauskas, 61 NY2d 481, 489).

"Economic partnership” is not some abstract state which is deemed to exist by virtue of the marriage contract. On the contrary, "economic partnership” is a specific conception of the marriage relationship which the Legislature has adopted as a fair and realistic basis for the division of property when the marriage terminates. It is a practical concept reflecting the trust, the interdependence and the voluntary sharing of the obligations of supporting, maintaining and nurturing the family which exist when the parties function together as an economic unit. The idea reflects what married people living together actually do and how they function when operating as an economic unit, not some theoretical notion of how married but separated people might function if they were not separated. Because the majority opinion is predicated on a novel theory of ’’economic partnership” which is contrary to established precedent, antithetical to the essential basis of equitable distribution and inconsistent with the plain language and practical sense of the statute, I dissent.

I.

In O’Brien v O’Brien (supra, at 584-585), we explained that in enacting part (B) of Domestic Relations Law §236 the Legislature replaced the traditional common-law title theory of property with an entirely new theory — equitable distribution. Citing the Governor’s Memorandum of Approval, we emphasized that ”[e]quitable distribution was based on the premise that a marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker” (id., at 585 [emphasis added]). In O’Brien, the husband’s professional medical license was held to be marital property because the wife helped support him financially and emotionally while he studied for the license (id., at 585-586). The economic partnership idea as the basis of equitable distribution was further refined in Price v Price (69 NY2d 8, supra), where we noted that the concept ’’reflects an awareness that the economic success of the partnership depends ’not only upon the respective financial contributions of the partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home’ ” (id., at 14 [quoting Brennan v Brennan, 103 AD2d 48, 52]). In Price we held that where a separately owned company had appreciated during the marriage ’’due in part” to the contributions of the nontitled spouse in homemaking and attending business conventions with her husband, the appreciation constituted marital property (id., at 17; see also, Majauskas v Majauskas, supra, at 488-490 [vested pension rights held to be marital property on economic partnership theory]).

The majority finds a sufficient ground for the economic partnership and the continued accrual of marital property in the legal existence of the marriage irrespective of the actual relationship of the parties. In this holding, the majority ignores the teachings of Price, O’Brien and Majauskas and creates a troubling precedent which cuts against the very purpose of equitable distribution — i.e., a fair distribution of only that property which the parties accumulated during the marriage as a result of their joint, cooperative endeavors. Thus, under today’s decision, a married couple (such as the parties here) may live separate and apart for years after commencement of a separation action and the grant of a decree; their affection for each other and the mutual trust and respect necessary for the sharing of marital obligations may have long since vanished; yet, the economic partnership will be deemed to have continued and their individual assets will be pooled for eventual distribution as marital property.

The sole aim of replacing the rigid and sometimes unjust common-law property doctrines used in the division of marital property with a new system of equitable distribution was greater fairness to the parties on dissolution of the marriage. Clearly, that aim is achieved by the lumping together for distribution what is accumulated while the parties actually function as and contribute to an economic unit. For then it is appropriate and fair that individual property interests should give way and that in making the equitable distribution, the Court should recognize "the value of 'non-remunerated services’ such as homemaking” and "consider any 'contributions and services as a spouse, parent * * * and homemaker’ ” (Price v Price, supra, at 14-15 [quoting Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) (6)]). It is difficult at best to understand, nor does the majority explain, how the aim of fairness is furthered —or any legitimate purpose, for that matter — by ignoring the realities of the marital relationship and ordering the continued merging of the marital assets after the parties have legally separated and after any basis for an actual economic partnership has ceased to exist (see, Florescue, The Cutoff to Accrual, NYU, Aug. 10, 1992, at 3, cols 1, 2 [“The statutory goal (of the Equitable Distribution Law) is to distribute 'equitably’ the fruits of the marital partnership, Once that partnership has ceased to exist, its fruits should too”]).

II.

That the mixing of the parties’ individual assets as marital property should cease when a separation action is started or a decree obtained is dictated by the plain wording as well as the sense of the statute. Under the Equitable Distribution Law, “marital property” is defined as “all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [1] [c] [emphasis added]). Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (2), entitled “Matrimonial actions”, states that "[e]xcept as provided in [Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5)], the provisions of this part shall be applicable to actions for * * * a separation” (emphasis added). The logic of the statutory scheme is clear: to constitute marital property for equitable distribution upon final dissolution of the marriage, the property of the individual partners must be acquired during the marriage and before steps are taken which signify the breakup of the marital partnership.

It is, of course, a basic rule of construction that “statutory language is generally given its natural and most obvious meaning” (Price v Price, supra, at 15 [citing McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94]). Yet, the majority rejects the directive of the statute from its plain wording: that marital property should not continue to accrue after "the commencement of a matrimonial action” (§236 [B] [1] [c] [emphasis added]) and that by the terms of the statute an action “for a separation” is a matrimonial action (§ 236 [B] [2]).

It is also a basic rule that an interpretation of a statute should be rejected if it produces a result which is unreasonable or unfair (see, Ferres v City of New Rochelle, 68 NY2d 446, 454; McKinney’s Cons Law of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 141, 143, 146). Here, the result of the majority’s construction is both unreasonable and unfair — a party’s individual property will be included in the mix of assets as marital property even after the marriage is a “dead marriage”, after the parties have ceased to function as an economic unit and after the actual marital partnership no longer exists.

Moreover, the majority construction produces an anomaly. Section 236 (B) (1) (c) provides that both the execution of a separation agreement and the commencement of a matrimonial action have the effect of cutting off the accrual of marital property. Yet, under the majority decision, neither the commencement of a separation action nor even the filing of a separation decree stops the accruing of marital property— although a separation, if pursuant to an agreement, concededly has that effect (see, Milbrandt v Green Refractories Co., 79 NY2d 26, 36 [a construction which produces an anomaly should be avoided]). Here, for example, the parties lived apart, after commencement of the separation action, under a temporary order and, later, under the separation decree which contained provisions for maintenance and exclusive possession of the house. Under the majority decision, until the divorce action was commenced whatever additional assets that the parties acquired after separation are treated as marital property. If the parties had separated pursuant to an agreement containing the same terms as in the temporary order and separation decree, their individual assets would not be treated as marital property. In both the actual as well as the assumed case, the fact of separation dispels any possibility of the ongoing cooperation and sharing of the mutual obligations on which the economic partnership is based. No reason is suggested for these conflicting results. To be sure, a separation agreement implies that the separation was voluntary, even amicable, while a separation action bespeaks an involuntary separation, one that may be fraught with bitter marital strife. If anything, such involuntary separation seems even more antagonistic to the concept of the economic partnership than a separation under an agreement.

The majority offers no reason as to how its decision furthers the underlying purpose of the Equitable Distribution Law— i.e., distributing property resulting from the economic partnership. Rather, it stresses the point made by the Appellate Division (173 AD2d 133, 135) that actions to declare the nullity of a foreign divorce and for the validity of a marriage —both assertedly presupposing the "continued existence” of the marriage — are included as "matrimonial actions” in section 236 (B) (2). Thus, it is argued, little significance should be attached to the inclusion of separation actions in that same section. No authority is cited for the majority’s proposition that an action to nullify a foreign divorce or to declare a marriage valid is necessarily one brought for " 'the continued existence of the marital relationship’ ” (majority opn, at 556 [quoting Anglin v Anglin, 173 AD2d 133, 135, supra]). Certainly, the fact that the parties have had to resort to litigation over some disputed issue suggests that whatever marriage might continue will be less than amicable. But, in any event, the argument overlooks the critical point: that it is the existence of the economic partnership, not of the marriage as a legal entity, on which the accrual of marital property and the very concept of equitable distribution are based.

Judges Kaye, Titone and Smith concur with Judge Bellacosa; Judge Hancock, Jr., dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Acting Chief Judge Simons concurs.

Order affirmed, etc. 
      
      . Governor’s Mem of Approval, 1980 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1863; see also, Assembly Mem, 1980 NY Legis Ann, at 129-130.
     
      
      
        , A large body of law has developed around the concept "economic partnership” as the basis for marital property (see, e.g., Finocchio v Finocchio, 162 AD2d 1044; Fish v Fish, 161 AD2d 979; Dzembo v Dzembo, 160 AD2d 1144; Smith v Smith, 154 AD2d 365; Anderson v Anderson, 153 AD2d 823; Mahlab v Mahlab, 143 AD2d 116; Behrens v Behrens, 143 AD2d 617; Rider v Rider, 141 AD2d 1004; Josan v Josan, 134 AD2d 486; Clerk v Clerk, 132 AD2d 456; see also, Scheinkman, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 14, Domestic Relations Law C236B:4-C236B:8, at 191-223).