Case ID: ny-st-rep_16/html/0701-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John N. Stearns, Resp’t, v. Louis Hemmens et al., App’lts.
    
      (New York Court of Common Pleas, General Term,
    
    
      Filed May 7, 1888.)
    
    1. Summary proceedings — Code Civil Pro., § 2231, sued. 4 — Case WITHIN.
    The defendant was removed from the possession of certain premises, by summary proceedings, at the instance of the plaintiff his landlord in pursuance of Code Civil Pro., § 2231, subdivision 4, which provides for such removal of a tenant, when any part of the demised premises are used for any illegal business. The illegal business was conducted by a sub-tenant and was discontinued before this trial not voluntarily, but through fear of a criminal prosecution. Held, that such discontinuance of the business did not remove the case from the operation of the statute, and that the case was distinguished from one where the business was conducted by a sub-tenant, who was voluntarily ejected by the principal upon his discovery that such business was carried on.
    2. Same—Evidence—Competency op.
    
      Held, that the record of a conviction of the sub-tenant for carrying on an illegal business was properly admitted as corroborative testimony in behalf of the plaintiff.
    3 Justice’s court — Judgment op—Appeal prom —Appellate court MUST DISREGARD TECHNICAL ERRORS—CODE ClVTL PRO., § 3063.
    
      Held, that on an appeal from a justice’s judgment an appellate court must render judgment according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors or defects not affecting the merits. Code Civil Pro., § 3063.
    
      Stearns & Curtis, for resp’t; H. Joseph, for app’lts.
   Per Curiam

Th only question reviewable upon this appeal is whether or not the judgment of the trial court was properly rendered and upon sufficient evidence. The alleged issues of fraud and collusion or conspiracy find no place in this determination, and relief therefore must be sought in another tribunal.

The appellant (a tenant) was removed from the possession of the premises, No. 50 Broadway, at the instance of the respondent (the landlord), in pursuance of the following provision of the Code of Civil Procedure.

“Sec. 2231. In either of the following cases a tenant or lessee at will or at sufferance, or for part of a year, or for one or more years, of real property, including a specific or undivided portion of a house or other dwelling, and his assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives, may be removed therefrom as prescribed in this title. Subdivision 4, where the demised premises or any part thereof are used or occupied as a bawdy house, or house of assignation for lewd persons,- or for any illegal trade or manufacture, or other illegal business.”

In this connection reference must be had to the act of May 22, 1873 (Laws 1873, chapter 583), which provides :

Section 1. “Whenever the lessee or occupant, other than the owner, of any building or premises, shall use or occupy the same or any part thereof for any illegal trade, manufacture or other business, the lease or agreement for the letting or occupancy of such building or premises shall thereupon become void, and the landlord of such lessee or occupant may enter upon the premises so let or occupied, and shall have the same remedies to recover possession thereof as are given by law in the case of a tenant holding over after the expiration of his lease.”

It was urged upon the argument that the respondent having discontinued the business before the trial, is not within the purview of the statute, which is penal in its character and application. The case of Shaw v. McCarty (2 Civ. Pro., 49, 54), cited as authority upon this proposition. We think, however, that that case is distinguishable from the case at bar. There the illegal business was carried on by a sub-tenant of the primary lessee, who, when he made the discovery, terminated the lease and ejected the tenant. Subsequently, proceedings were taken by him to terminate the superior lease, which were not upheld. The distinction between the two cases lies in the fact that in the Shaw case, the principal tenant was not, in any way, implicated in the illegal business; he being only a subordinate lessor, his act was voluntary, and he had the legal right to eject the wrong doer when he obtained knowledge of his conduct.

In the present case there was no voluntary termination of the business; it was conducted by a sub-tenant, and abandoned under apprehension of a prosecution under the criminal law; he was constructively in possession of the premises until the final judgment rendered herein.

As appears by the return, the testimony upon the main fact in dispute (the violation of the statute), was conflicting, and in all such cases we have repeatedly declined to interfere with the conclusions reached by the trial court.

The exception at page 72 was not well taken. The record of conviction was for an offense identical with the provisions of the statute above mentioned, and was properly admitted as corroborative testimony in behalf of the plaintiff. Wottrich v. Freeman, 71 N. Y., 601; Eighmg v. The People, 79 N. Y., 546.

The other exceptions to the rulings upon the trial, in our judgment were immaterial to the issue presented, and should be overruled.

The appellate court- must render judgment according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the merits. Section 3063 Code Civil Procedure.

The judgment appealed from should be affirmed with costs.