Case ID: dc_8/html/0023-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

LANGDON vs. PURDY.
    At Law.
    No. 9041.
    1L Xi. made an agreement with P., by which the former was to take charge as foreman of glass-works belonging to P., and the latter was to pay him fifteen dollars per week, and at the end of eight months to transfer to L. an interest of $600 in the works, or, if he should prefer, in money. After L. commenced work the factory was burned, and he took charge of rebuilding it, and continued for nearly a year to manufacture glass after the factory was rebuilt. The written contract was made after such rebuilding, and when the eight months expired L. elected to take the money.
    SI. Held, that there was a substantial performance of the contract, and that L. was entitled to recover the $600 in money.
    STATEMENT OP THE CASE.
    This action is brought upon an agreement, by the terms of which Langdon was to take charge of and conduct, as foreman, the glass-works belonging to the defendant in the city of Washington, and he agreed to pay him fifteen dollars per week, and at the expiration of eight months from the 14th day of February, 1870, the defendant further agreed to assign to the plaintiff an interest in said property equal in amount to $600 ,• or, if plaintiff should prefer, he would pay him the said sum in money.
    The agreement was dated June 13,1870, and the plaintiff had commenced working for the defendant in the early part of the preceding February. It was also shown upon the trial that about the middle of April, 1870, the glass-works were destroyed by fire, and that plaintiff, at the request of defendant, superintended the rebuilding of the same for nearly two months, when he again commenced the manufacture of glass, and continued so to do until February 11,1871. It was while plaintiff was superintending the rebuilding of the works that the original agreement was reduced to writing, and at the expiration of the eight months therein mentioned, he elected to have the sum of $600 in money instead of an interest to that amount in the glass-works, which the defendant refused to pay. Upon this state of the proof the defendant’s counsel prayed the court to instruct the jury as follows :
    “ If the jury find from the evidence that, during several months of the period referred to in this special agreement offered in evidence, the glass-factory of the defendant was not in operation, having been destroyed by fire, then the plaintiff is nob entitled to recover the $600 provide'd for in said special agreement, but only so much as the services actually rendered by the plaintiff were reasonably worth, over- and above what has been paid to him.”
    Which said instructions the court refused, and the case is-here upon exceptions to this ruling.
    
      Brown & Hawes for plaintiff.
    
      Cox & Webb for defendant.
   By the Court :

We think the proof shows a substantial compliance on the-part of the plaintiff with the agreement. It is contended that he could not perform his duties as foreman of the glass-works, from the time they were destroyed by fire until they were rebuilt ; but we think that this proposition is not applicable to the facts of the case. The contract was made and executed about two months after the fire, and the defendant having-signed it with knowledge of that fact, he is now estopped from denying that the plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit., of its provisions. It is clear to 11s that, by executing the agreement at that time, the defendant recognized the services, rendered by the plaintiff as having been rendered in performance of its conditions. It was reduced to writing after the-destruction of the works, and while the plaintiff was superintending their reconstruction. By the terms of the contract, plaintiff is to take charge of the works, and by the proof he was then engaged, with the knowledge and approbation of the defendant, in the work of superintending them. We think there is no substantial variance between the proof and the allegation. The instruction asked for was properly refused, and the judgment must be affirmed.