Case ID: sw_260/html/0573-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J. LATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CROW v. STATE.
    (No. 7438.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 12, 1924.
    Rehearing Denied April 16, 1924.)
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    Licenses <&wkey;42 (4) — Evidence held to sustain conviction for personation of certified public accountant.
    Evidence establishing that defendant, not having a certificate under the statute, represented himself to be a certified public accountant only to a member of a city commission when endeavoring to secure the audit of their books, and that he used the initials C. P. A. after his name in negotiations with that member, 1ield sufficient to sustain a conviction, under Vernon’s Complete Tex. St. (Penal Code) arts. 999rr to 999vv, though he did not so hold himself out to the public.
    <§sso3Tor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from Wichita County Court, at Law; Guy Rogers, Judge.
    D. R. Crow was convicted of holding himself out as a certified public accountant, in-violation of a statute, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Mathis & Caldwell, of Wichita Falls, for appellant.
    Weldon, McDonald & Cummings, of Wichita Falls, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of holding himself out as a certified public accountant contrary to the act of the Legislature of this state as set out in Vernon’s Complete Texas Statutes of 1920 (Penal Code), embraced in the several sections designated as article 999, “rr” to “vv”.

It was shown that the appellant had not been accorded a certificate as a “certified public accountant” under the terms of the statute of this state, but that he was holding himself out as a certified public accountant by reason of having a certificate from the “National Association of Certified Accountants, Incorporated, Washington, D. C.”

There is no material difference between the principles controlling the appellant’s case and those in the case of Henry v. State, No. 7028, 260 S. W. 190, which is this day affirmed. Upon the authority of this case, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

Appellant concedes the correctness of our holding in regard to the constitutionality of the law under which this conviction is had, but now contends that tbe evidence is insufficient to support tbe judgment. By reference to article 999uuu, Vernon’s Complete Texas Statutes, we observe it penalizes any person wbo uses tbe initials “O. P. A.,” or otherwise falsely bolds bimself out as being qualified under tbis act, while practicing public accountancy in tbis state, without having actually received the certify cate provided for in said act. Appellant’s contention seems based on tbe proposition that tbe evidence does not sufficiently show that be'held bimself out to tbe public; it being urged that be is only shown to have so represented bimself to a member of tbe city commission of tbe city of Wichita Ealls, Tex. Tbe statute in question contains several subdivisions, each including acts which would amount to a violation. These may be tabulated as follows: (1) Any person wbo represents himself to the public as having received a certificate as provided for in tbis act. (2) Wbo advertises as a “certified public accountant.” (3) Who uses the initials “C. P. A.” (4) Who otherwise falsely bolds bimself out as being qualified under tbis act. (5) Wbo continues to use.the initials “C. P. A.” after revocation of his certificate. (6) Who refuses to surrender such certificate after revocation thereof, but continues to practice as a public accountant.

It would appear manifestly that' the act of appellant in endeavoring to secure tbe audit of books in the "city of Wichita Ealls for the Texas Audit Corporation, which title appellant used as a trading name, and his use of the initials “C. P. A.” after his name in his negotiations with said member of the city commission, would amount to a violation of one of the subdivisions above enumerated. He practically admitted that this was his business. The language used by us in the last paragraph of the decision of Henry v. State, No. 7028, 260 S. W. 190, opinion March 12, 1924, can in no sense be construed to hold persons not guilty of violating this law, because such language has reference to the first one of the subdivisions above mentioned.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s contention, the motion for rehearing will be overruled.