Case ID: sw_200/html/0523-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

ANSELMO v. STATE.
    (No. 4826.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 23, 1918.)
    1. Criminal Law <&wkey;1090(ll) — Appeal — Scope.
    It is only through bills of exception, as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 744, and the statement of facts when new trial is refused, as provided for by article 844, that the court is apprised of occurrences at the trial, and in view of article 938, stating procedure on appeal in criminal cases, court can consider as ground for reversal only matters presented for review as so required.
    2. Criminal Law <&wkey;687(l) — Evidence—Reception.
    Where accused’s wife described the knife with which he killed deceased, and her description was not controverted, and the evidence then closed, it was not an abuse of discretion to de-' cline to open the evidence the next day for the admission of the knife.
    3. Criminal Law <&wkey;1153(2) — Expert Opinion-Qualifications of Witness — Discretion of Court.
    Generally speaking, the decision of the trial judge as to the qualification of an expert to give testimony is not reviewable.
    4. Criminal Law <&wkey;1169(2) — Appeal — Harmless Error.
    Assuming that undertaker was not qualified to state cause of deceased’s death, admission of such evidence was not harmful, where the circumstances, as to the cause of the death of deceased, were conclusive.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Root. B. Seay, Judge.
    H. Anselmo was convicted of murder, and be appeals.
    Affirmed.
    John White, of Dallas, for appellant.. E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, J.

Appellant appeals from a judgment condemning him to 12 years’ confinement in the penitentiary for the offense of murder.

Appellant and deceased were Mexicans,'’or of Mexican descent. Deceased was stabbed and killed on the streets of Dallas at nighttime. Appellant admitted that he stabbed a man whom the other testimony identifies as deceased named in the indictment, and the evidence shows that the deceased died almost Immediately from the wounds. The state’s theory as developed by the evidence of its witness Baker and some corroborating circumstances was that the appellant slipped up behind the deceased and stabbed him. Appellant’s theory and testimony was that the deceased and others, all of whom were unknown to him, attempted to rob him, and that he stabbed in self-defense, or to prevent the robbery. The state’s witness Baker claimed to have been present, but knowing none of the parties, simply a pedestrian on the streets. Appellant fled from the scene of the homicide, dropping his hat, which was picked up and identified on the trial as belonging to him. Baker went to the deceased and was joined about the time he fell by a police officer, who called an ambulance in which deceased was taken away from the scene.

We are unable to agree with the appellant that the evidence is insufficient.

Several bills of exception were prepared and refused by the court upon the ground substantially that they embodied matters entirely contrary to the record of the trial. As presented, the complaint was not of refusal to allow proper hills, but it is suggested that the bills as in the record and refused by the court should be considered. It is only through bills of exception and statement of facts verified as required by statute (article 744, O. O. P., and article 844) that this court can know judicially what takes place in the conduct of a trial except in instances where bystanders’ bills are presented. It is only matters presented for review in the manner required by law that this court is authorized to consider as ground for reversal of judgment. O. C. P. art. 938.

The appellant’s wife -der.eribed the knife in his possession while testifying as a witness, and on the next morning, after the evidence had closed the evening before, there was an effort made on the part of appellant to introduce the knife in evidence. The wife’s description of the knife was not controverted, nor was there any conflict with her testimony on the subject, and as disclosed by the bill, with its qualification, there was no abuse of the court’s discretion in refusing to reopen the evidence.

The undertaker testified that the wound inflicted upon the deceased caused his death, or that he bled to death therefrom. The witness testified to the facts touching his qualification which, in the opinion of the trial judge, was sufficient, and generally speaking the decision of the trial judge as to the qualification of an expert to give tes-timony is not reviewable. Holder v. State, 194 S. W. 162, and cases there cited. In explanation of the bill, the trial judge directs attention to the fact that the witness gave without objection substantially the same testimony as that objected to. The evidence, if improper, would not have been harmful for the reason that the circumstances were conclusive' as to the cause of the death of the deceased.

The criticism of tile testimony of the witness Baker as to the identity of the appellant goes to its weight and not to its admissibility, and is not really upon a controverted issue when considered in connection with the testimony of the appellant, in substance, that he stabbed the deceased to prevent injury to himself.

Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. 
      <jfc»For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes