Case ID: scl_43/html/0382-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Glover, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Edward Wilson vs. Samuel Hamilton.
    Where the libel is so ambiguous that from a mere perusal it is impossible to know the person alluded to, the declaration should contain an introductory colloqium averring that the plaintiff was meant, and an innuendo will not supply its place. For want of such averment the plaintiff may be nonsuited at the trial.
    BEFORE GLOYER, J., AT CHESTER, SPRING TERM, 1856.
    This was an action on the case for a libel.
    The declaration is as follows:
    “ Samuel Hamilton the defendant, was attached to answer to Edward Wilson, the plaintiff, of a plea of trespass on the case, and so forth: and, thereupon, the said plaintiff by McAliley and McLure, his attorneys, complains against the said defendant, for that the said defendant, heretofore, to wit: on the first day of September, in the year of our Lord, one thous- and eight hundred and fifty-four, at Chester Court house, in the district of Chester, and State aforesaid, did wickedly, maliciously and falsely compose, write and publish, of and concerning the said plaintiff, a false, wicked and malicious libel, in the words following, to wit: £ To de big faced blacksmith,’ (meaning the, plaintiff,)‘and his stretch-worm overseer, the infant, Peter Dickey, hog killer.’ ‘Now Ed.’, (meaning the said plaintiff,) ‘ when you go to bed, think how mean you have grown.’ ‘You’ (meaning the plaintiff) ‘borrow my tools and keep them as your own.’ (thereby meaning that the said plaintiff was guilty of dishonesty) ‘ My still-yards, augurs and horse phlemes, and other things too tedious to name.’ ‘ If you ’ (meaning the plaintiff) ‘ would think of them you surely would think shame.’ ‘ The wicked borrow but the same do not pay.’ —‘ Whereas, the righteous mercy show and gives his own away.’ -‘Now, if you” (meaning the plaintiff) ‘get any more of my tools, you’ll get them after night.’ ‘ And if you have a title to them I think it will not be right.’ ‘Now run away the stretch worm, your crop is nearly grown.’ ‘Now drive the red animal home and let him go until his own.’ ‘ The neighbors need not laugh, nor yet set up their snouts.’ ‘ You have got done with Billy Blue by feeding on sassifras sprouts, sprouts sprouts, sprouts.’ — ‘ Sassifras sprouts, as Blue. said himself.’ ‘ P. S., for postcript; Two setting chairs out of pocket by the said firm, Ed.’ (meaning the said plaintiff) ‘ and stretch worm.’ Thereby meaning that the said plaintiff had been guilty of stealing and was a dishonest man.”
    [Here followed a second count upon a letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff, also alleged to be a libel. The declai'ation concluded as follows:]
    “ By means of the committing of which said several grievances by said defendant as aforesaid, the said plaintiff hath been, and is greatly injured in his good name, fame and credit, and brought into public scandal, infamy and disgrace, with and amongst all his neighbors, and other’ good and worthy citizens of this State, inasmuch that divers of these good neighbors to whom the integrity and innocence of the said plaintiff in the premises were unknown on occasion of the said grievances by the said defendant as aforesaid, from thence hitherto have suspected and believed, and still do suspect and believe the said plaintiff to have been and to be a person guilty , of dishonesty and fence burning, and hog killing, and of falsehood, and have by reason of the committing of said grievances by the said defendant as aforesaid, from thence hitherto have wholly refused and still do refuse to have any dealings or intercourse or discourse with him, the said plaintiff, as they were before used and accustomed to have and otherwise would have had. And the said plaintiff has been by reason of these premises otherwise greatly injured, to wit: at the place aforesaid, on the day and year, aforesaid. To the damage of the said plaintiff, five thousand dollars, and therefore he brings his suit, and so forth.”
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows :
    “ This was an action on the case to recover damages for the publication .of an alleged libel.
    “ The witnesses for the plaintiff proved that the paper was in the hand-writing of the defendant, and was seen by two persons in the summer of 1854, about 9 or 10 o’clock, A. M., tacked on the plaintiff’s shop, which is on a highway, and that Andrew Wiley took it down. Hugh Brigham saw the defendant write it, who said, that he allowed to have it put on plaintiff’s shop door, but not.by himself. Defendant once handed a paper similar to this to David McWilliams.
    “ It is not necessary to report the remainder of the evidence, which is not pertinent to the questions made by the appeal.
    “The defendant’s counsel moved for a nonsuit on the ground, that there is no averment in the declaration connecting the defamatory paper with the plaintiff, and showing that he comes within the description; and also, admitting that there is a sufficient averment,, there is no proof to sustain it.
    “The nonsuit was ordered. Where the person is so ambiguously alluded to, it appeared to, me that it should be averred distinctly that the libel was published of the plaintiff, and that a suggestion by innuendo, as was contended in argument, was not sufficient.
    “The plaintiff has appealed on the annexed grounds.”
    The plaintiff appealed, and now moved this Court to set aside the nonsuit on the grounds:
    1. Because the declaration was sufficient in law.
    2. Because if the declaration had been insufficient in law, its insufficiency could not be legally a ground of nonsuit.
    
      3. Because the order1 of nonsuit was contrary to law.
    McAliley, for appellant.
    Boylston, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Glover, J.

When the defamatory paper shows clearly what is meant, and of whom it is written, it is unnecessary to allege new matter by way of inducement in the introductory part of the declaration; but where the paper is so ambiguous in its language that, from a perusal of it, the person alluded to cannot be ascertained, or where the libellous purpose is not manifest, a colloquium and averment are necessary to explain the meaning.

If an averment is necessary in pleading to make doubtful expressions clear, no defamatory paper ever required its use more than that declared upon by the plaintiff. Without some reference to extrinsic matter, it is not possible to point out the person alluded to in the alleged libel.' “ De big faced blacksmith,” “Peter Dickey, hog killer,” “Ed,” “Stretch worm,” and “Red animal,”' identify no person, and are altogether incomprehensible, unless we look beyond the meaning conveyed by the words. There is no colloquium averring that these expressions are applicable to the plaintiff, and an innuendo cannot supply its place. As was contended in the argument, this would confound clear distinctions which have been long observed. An innuendo is explanatory of the meaning of a publication by a reference to what has been previously ascertained by averment or otherwise, (1 Stark. 418,) but it cannot extend the sense of words beyond their meaning — as in Barham’s case, 4 Rep. 20, where it was alleged, “ He has burnt mybarn,” (meaning plaintiff’s barn of corn,) the innuendo was held bad, because it did not explain, but extended the meaning of the words used. It is possible that a paper may, by description, so point out the person and connect him with the libel, as to supersede a colloquium or an averment. Shalmer vs. Foster, Cro. Car. 187.

The new matter introduced by an introductory averment, in explanation of words doubtfully or ambiguously expressed, admits of proof; but an innuendo which is only explanatory and connects together facts already known, either from the face of the paper or by reference to extrinsic matter, is never proved nor admits of proof. (Rosewell’s case. 2 State Trials, 105.)

The same question made by the first ground of appeal, was considered and decided in the case of the State vs. Henderson, (1 Rich. 179,) where most of the leading cases are collected; and, as the same certainty in alleging the publication and the libellous matter is required in civil as in criminal cases, (Bagley vs. Johnson, 4 Rich. 22; the State vs. Goodman, 6 Rich. 387,) it is a direct authority upon the point submitted. The cases of the King vs. Horn, (2 Cowper, 672,) and Van Vechten vs. Hopkins, (5 Johns. 211,) confidently relied upon in support of the motion, fully sustain the decision in the case of the State vs. Henderson. The matter set forth in the first count may be libellous and may be intended to apply to the plaintiff, but from a perusal of the paper, its latent meaning cannot be collected, nor is there any new matter alleged by way of inducement, that shows its defamatory character or which connects the plaintiff with it. An innuendo cannot supply this defect apparent on the declaration, and as the necessary allegations are omitted, there was no evidence submitted proper for the consideration of the jury, and the nonsuit was therefore, properly ordered.

Motion dismissed.

O’Neall, Wardlaw, Withers, Whitner and Munro, JJ., concurred.

Motion dismissed.