Case ID: scl_9/html/0159-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Nott.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Hood against Huff.
    The penililtjng Lm!,Pwhenssue°(Í the bond or note given for the. purchase-money, good title in the Sí has bienio eviction, is peculiar to the Courts of this f¿Sífp^oy^anS ought notntoipbc extended; nor ¿“°e!y b¿ fm’not"dciS a C0IBpiete chain Jeif^utae'SahSwibettei""™ actually subsist-pnersonsome other
    This was an action of assumpsit on two notes' of hand given for the purchase money of a tract _ _ oí land. The defence set up, was a want of title Jr7 in the plaintiff when he sold the land; in . ¶ quenco or which the consideration of the notes had failed. In support of this defence, several grants were produced, which ran into, and took off, parts of the land in question. In reply, the 'x ^ A A * plaintiff gave evidence of a grant to John Armstrong, dated as early as the year 1753, and */ %! much older than any of the grants produced on the part of the defendant. He then deduced a x # 4 regular chain of title from John Armstrong down to Charlas Richardson. Charles Richardson sold to Francis Ross, but had only given a bond to' make titles, which titles were never executed. Francis Ross, however, went into possession under that bond in the year 1779, and continued in possession until his death. He devised the land to his son Alexander, who sold and conveyed to the plaintiff and he again to the defendant; and possession had accompanied and followed the sale from Francis Ross down to the present time, The defendant being apprehensive that the bond from Charles Richardson to Francis Ross might not be considered a substantial link in his chain of title, after the commencement of this action, procured a deed to be made from Charles 
      
      Richardson to Alexander Ross; also a deed from Ross to himself; and made a second conveyance himself to the defendant!
    Several objections were made to the plaintiff’s chain of title in the progress of the cause.
    1st. That none of the deeds prior to the sale to Francis Ross ought to have been admitted as ancient deeds without proof of their execution, because none of the persons to whom they were made had ever been in possession of the land.
    2d. That the deed to Charles Richardson ought not to have been admitted without proof of its execution, because there was an erasure and alteration apparent on the face of it, in the part describing the land, which is a material part.
    3d. That as the defendant had offered to pay the money before the commencement of the action, if the plaintiff would produce a good title to the land, he was, at least, entitled to an abatement of the interest.
    All these grounds being overruled, the plaintiff obtained a verdict for the full amount of his debt, with interest and costs.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Justice Nott.

This is a motion for a new trial, on the several grounds above stated. It is not necessary in this case to decide the question, whether a deed which is more than thirty years old may be read in evidence as an ancient deed without proof, where it has not been followed by possession. For the possession of Francis Ross, and all who have held under him, although he had only equitable title, was sufficient to satisfy the law in that respect. It is not necessary that the immediate grantee should have been in possession. It is enough that those have been who derive' title under him.

whether an erasure in a deed J®t> ™‘®rl'fom0¿ qSo“votVfact

The objection appearing on the face of the deed to Richardson, appeared at first view to present a greater difficulty. But 1 think it was properly admitted. For whether an erasure be † 1 ^ 4 in a material part or not, may sometimes involve a question of fact as well as law. And although it must be confessed, that this alteration does appear to have been intended to give some effect to the operations of the deed; and such, perhaps, as would in ordinary cases have authorized its rejection; yet in this case its admission could furnish no good ground for a new trial. The land was sufficiently described in other parts of the deed; and the only object of this alteration, was to identify the property. But it was the title only, and not the identity, that was in issue. And whether it even had that effect, was a matter to be determined by evidence, aleiende; and, therefore, was proper for the consideration of the Jury. But 1 consider not only the alteration, but the deed itself, as immaterial in this case. Permitting such a defence in an ae~ tion of this sort, where there has been no eviction, and, only a general warranty of title, is pecaliar to this state. It was originally an usurof power in our Courts, to prevent a circuity and multiplicity of actions. But it has too long prevailed, and the correctness of it been too solemnly adjudged, to be now questioned* The policy of it, however, is not the less questionable; and the principle is not to be extended. I believe the decisions have never gone so far as to allow a person to avail himself of this defence, merely because the plaintiff had not produced a complete chain of title in himself; but the defendant must show a better title actually subsisting in some other person. As soon, therefore, as the plaintiff showed an older grant to John Armstrong than those produced on the part of the defendant, there was an end of the defence; and the possession of Francis Ross, and those under him, with the evidences of title which they possessed, gave the defendant a good and indefeasible title against all the world. If every deed from Armstrong to Ross had been blotted out of the chain of title, the defendant could never have been disturbed in his possession. It is worthy of remark, also, that the objection does not come from a person claiming adversely to the defendant’s title; but it is the party himself raising an objection to his own title, the validity of which no other person has ever contested: and that while he still remains

4 in the quiet undisturbed possession of the property. The motion then cannot be granted, on either of those grounds.

a party cannot stop interest The ¿s‘e™io™or the land is genetotieinSfSr neypurclia3e~mü'

The next question is, whether he was entitled to an abatement of interest? Perhaps the difficulty of ascertaining the extent of such abatement, if any should be allowed, would be a sufficient answer to that question. The defendant purchased several tracts of land from the plaintiff; the relative value of each does not appear to have been taken into consideration at the time of the contract, nor to have been ascertained since; and it is somewhat doubtful, at least, whether there are any data by which, according to the rules and practice of this Court, that fact could be ascertained.' But it is unnecessary now to decide the question. The defendant had i , t n,i . ,. , , never made a tender oí the money; he did, to be sure, say he would pay, if the other would show . , him a good title. But no exhibition of money was made; and there is no evidence that he ever was ready to pay. But besides, he has always been in the peaceable enjoyment of the property; and if it was worth the price contracted for, the use and occupation wqre worth the interest. It was indeed proved that some person had threatened to indict him, unless he desisted from cutting timber on some part of the land; but that was a mere empty menace, which was not to be regarded. It is to be presumed that he was made acquainted with the plaintiff’s title when he purchased, and relied upon his warranty, to-, which he might have had recourse if he had been evicted. On all the grounds, therefore, I of opinion the motion ought to. be rejected.

Bay, Colcock, Gantt, Johnson, and Cheves, J. concurred.