Case ID: f-appx_582/html/0736-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Lee V. QUILLAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rick HILL, Warden, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-15001.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 25, 2014.
    
    Filed July 7, 2014.
    Lee V. Quillar, Represa, CA, pro se.
    Neah Huynh, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Lee Quillar appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment, on the basis of the mootness doctrine, in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person’s Act (“RLUIPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch, 228 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Quillar failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there remained any case or controversy warranting further relief after defendants expunged the disciplinary reports related to grooming violations that Quillar challenged under RLUIPA, and restored his classification status, loss of credits, and access to privileges as if the reports were never issued. See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir.2012) (“A claim is moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543, 549 (9th Cir.1998) (“The basic question in determining mootness is whether there is a present controversy as to which effective relief can be granted.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Quillar’s contentions that defendant erroneously failed to expunge a June 22, 2005 disciplinary report or restore his classification status from “A2B” to “A1A;” that court-appointed pro bono counsel in his prior appeal and on remand prejudiced his ability to prosecute his claims; and that the district court prevented him from submitting relevant evidence on summary judgment, are unpersuasive.

Defendant’s motion for judicial notice, filed on June 18, 2013, is granted. See Fed.R.Evid. 201.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.