Case ID: wis_147/html/0454-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MaRshall, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Silverman, Respondent, vs. Kaukauna Gas, Electric Light & Power Company, Appellant.
    
      November 15
    
    December 5, 1911.
    
    
      Corporations: Authority of agent to procure insurance: Acceptance of policy: Cancellation: Broker’s right to recover amount paid as earned premium.
    
    Where the manager of a corporation had authority to obtain insurance for it, subject, at most, to the right of the corporation to elect not to keep the policies if the president passed unfavorably upon them, that reservation did not give the corporation a right to keep a policy and enjoy the insurance under it for a considerable period and then return it as never having been accepted for any purpose; and upon a policy being returned for cancellation under such circumstances, a broker ■who had procured it at the request of the manager was entitled to recover from the corporation the amount which he was obliged to pay as earned premium on the policy.
    . Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: Oeeeit T. Williams, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to recover on contract.
    The claim of the plaintiff was that, at defendant’s request, he obtained for it $5,000 personal injury liability insurance, •and delivered the policy, which, after keeping some time, it returned for cancellation; that the cancellation was effected accordingly; plaintiff paying the casualty company as earned premium $150, whereby defendant became indebted to him in such sum, which it refused to pay.
    The claim of the defendant was that, having casualty insurance in the Casualty Company of America which was about to expire, and supposing the plaintiff to be the company’s agent, it notified him to renew the policy; that without authority he placed the insurance in another company, ■obtaining a policy accordingly, which it refused to accept.
    The evidence tended to show this: Plaintiff, as an insurance broker, had for some three years before the time in question obtained defendant’s insurance in the Casualty Company of America. Some little time before the policy was to ■expire Mr. Trottman, the general manager of defendant, re•quested plaintiff to secure a renewal. Mr. Seifert had a business connection with defendant as accountant. Trott-man had been accustomed to negotiate for insurance for defendant. He, as its manager, authorized plaintiff to renew the insurance existing in the Casualty Company of America. That was done subject to the insurance company’s approval. It refused to carry the risk at the old rate, whereupon, plaintiff acquainted Trottman thereof and advised him that as good insurance and favorable terms could be obtained by placing tbe risk in some other company. Trottman thereupon said that such course would be satisfactory. Following that, plaintiff placed the risk in the American Fidelity Company, obtaining two policies. They were submitted to-Trottman and met with his approval, except as to one matter, which was corrected. The policies were then delivered to-Mr. Seifert, who accepted them so far as he had authority to-do so. Alter keeping the policies some time he sent them, to Mr. Pereles, president of defendant, who promptly rejected them, sending them to plaintiff with notice to have-them canceled. Plaintiff was told that Mr. Pereles would, finally have to accept the policies; that they were, however, satisfactory to Mr. Trottman and Mr. Seifert who were authorized to negotiate for insurance. When the policies were-delivered to Seifert he assured plaintiff the pay would be-sent on in a few days. Nothing was said about Mr. Pereles-having to pass on the policies till after they had been procured by Mr. Trottman’s orders. He or Seifert kept the-policies for some time. They were finally returned to plaintiff for cancellation and were, in due course, canceled, plaintiff paying about November 25, 1908, for the time the insurance was in force at the rates charged by the company in such cases, $150.
    The case was submitted to the jury to say whether plaintiff obtained the policies upon the order of defendant through its duly authorized agent, and in case of a finding in the affirmative to render a verdict for plaintiff for the amount claimed, otherwise to render a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff prevailed and judgment was rendered accordingly.
    For the appellant there were briefs by Nath. Pereles &- Sons, and oral argument by Charles N. Canwright.
    
    
      ¡iCharles E. PLwmmersley, for the respondent.
   MaRshall, J.

It is considered that the court would not be justified in discussing the matters submitted, in view of tbe record. It was a very simple case. Tbe court rightly ruled that, if respondent dealt witb an authorized agent of appellant in obtaining tbe insurance, it was liable to him for tbe expense be incurred in respect to tbe matter up to tbe time tbe policies were canceled by its order. That certainly was tbe only jury question in tbe case, if there were any. Tbe appellant bad tbe benefit of tbe insurance for quite a period of time. It was required to pay only tbe cost to respondent of such benefit.

As we read tbe record, there is no room for fair controversy but that Trottman bad authority to place tbe insurance, subject, at tbe best for appellant, to tbe right to elect not to keep tbe policies, upon tbe president of tbe company passing unfavorably upon tbe matter. That reservation did not give appellant tbe right to keep tbe policies and enjoy tbe insurance for a considerable period of time and then return them as never having been accepted for any purpose. Tbe most appellant could well claim, under tbe circumstances, was tbe right to have tbe policies canceled as to any liability for insurance under them after tbe notification to cancel. That right was conceded by respondent and recognized by tbe judgment appealed from. We are unable to see any reason why it should be disturbed. Tbe trial court seems to have taken as favorable a view of tbe case as could reasonably have been done in bolding that it was involved in sufficient uncertainty to require jury interference to arrive at tbe right of tbe matter.

By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.