Case ID: mass_25/html/0577-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Thomas J. Maxwell, Petitioner &c., versus Lucy Hardy.
    The mother of a bastard child is a competent witness on a complaint for the maintenance of the child, under the statute of 1785, c. 66, § 2, although, during her pregnancy and previously to her examination before the justice of the peace, she declares that the person whom she subsequently accuses in the time of her travail, is not the father of the child with which she is pregnant ; it is sufficient, if she continues constant in her accusation from the time of her examination before the justice.
    Her previous declaration is an objection to her credit only, not to her competency.
    This was a petition for a certiorari to the Court of Common Pleas, in the case of a complaint against the petitioner under St. 1785, c. 66, for the maintenance of the complainant Hardy’s bastard child, born October 19, 1S2S, of which the complaint alleged Maxwell to be the father. The general i jsue was joined in the Common Pleas, on the trial of which, before Cummins J., the complainant read in evidence her voluntary examination and accusation of Maxwell, taken by a justice of the peace on August 25, 1828. She then proved, that, in the time of her travail, she accused Maxwell of being the father of her child ; and then offered herself as a witness to testify to the same fact before the jury.
    
      Jan. 20th, 1830,
    Maxwell then offered to prove, that the complainant, in July or August, 1828, and before her examination, had expressly declared, that if she was pregnant, Maxwell was not the father of the child ; and he moved the Court, that on receiving this evidence, her testimony should be rejected, on the ground that she had not remained constant in her accusation.
    But the judge overruled the motion, and refused to admit this evidence, on the ground, that the proof, if satisfactory, of the complainant’s declaration at the time alleged, would not render her an incompetent witness in the case ; and he said that Maxwell might offer the evidence to affect her credibility.
    The complainant was received as a witness, and Maxwell was found guilty.
    Maxwell excepted to the opinion and order of the judge, re jetting the evidence offered by him, and admitting the complainant as a witness.
    Hoar, for the petitioner,
    cited St. 1785, c. 66, § 2, which provides for this prosecution and makes the mother of the bastard child a witness, in case she “ shall accuse any man of being the father thereof before any justice of the peace, upon examination on oath, and being put upon the discovery of the truth respecting the same accusation in the time of her travail, shall thereupon accuse the same person of being the father of the child of which she is about to be delivered, and shall continue constant in such accusation,” &c. He contended that the complainant had not continued constant in her accusation, as required by the statute, which means, that she must continue constant during the whole time of her pregnancy, or while she is conscious of her pregnancy, and therefore that she was not a competent witness. This statute, which makes a party a witness, against the common principles of right, has always been construed strictly. Commonwealth v. Cole, 5 Mass. R. 517; Bacon v. Harrington, 5 Pick. 63.
    
      Keyes, contra,
    
    cited Judson v. Blanchard, 4 Connect. R. 557; Davis v. Salisbury, 1 Day, 278; Wormstead's case, 2 Dane’s Abr. 517; R. R. v. J. M. 3 N. Hamp. R. 135.
    
      April term 1830,
   Parker C. J.

afterward drew up the opinion of the Ciurt. We think it exceedingly clear, that the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was right ; whether we refer to the words of the statute on which the prosecution is founded, or the rea- ' son of the thing, in relation to the probable intent of the legislature.

The general object was to give competency to a witness who by the general rule of evidence would be excluded as in terested, in a case in which, without such evidence, the mischief intended to be cured would be irremediable. The danger of such evidence was not overlooked by the legislature, and was intended to be guarded against by placing the witness in such circumstances at the time of her accusation, as would in all probability insure her veracity. In the time of her utmost peril, with the fear of death and judgment before her eyes, it was wisely thought that a false accusation would rarely if ever be made ; upon the same principle, that the declaration of a person in extremis, which may affect the life of a party accused of murder, are admitted, though not under the sanction of an oath. And as a further security for the truth of the accusation, the witness is to continue constant in the charge to the time of her examination on oath before the magistrate. These solemnities are essential to her competency, and if they fail, she is not to be admitted to her oath on the trial. But if it appears, that being put upon the discovery of the truth at the time of her travail, she accused the same person against whom she complains under oath before the magistrate, and that she has continued constant in her accusation, she is to be admitted as a witness, and her credibility left to the jury. The constancy required to make her competent, is evidently intended to be from the time she has made the accusation in either of the above solemn forms. Any previous charge upon another person, or denial of illicit commerce with him who is afterward charged as the putative father, may be properly shown, to affect hei ciedit with jul7’ but does not destroy her competency, because they admit of explanation, and may appear to be the result of terror or shame for her condition, or to have been produced by the threats or blandishments of her seducer.

We find this exposition of the statute to have been given by this Court in the case of Drowne v. Stimpson, 2 Mass. R. 441. The other cases cited by the counsel for the petitioner do not touch the point.

In Connecticut and New Hampshire the courts have given the same construction to their statutes on the same subject. 4 Connect. R. 557 ; 3 N. Hamp. R. 135. Indeed, we think it very clear from the words of the statute and the obvious intent of the legislature.

Petition dismissed. 
      
       See Dennett v. Kneeland, 6 Greenleaf, 460; Tillson v. Bowley, 8 Green-leaf, 163; Stiles v. Eastman, 21 Pick. 132; M'Managil v. Ross, 20 Pick. 99. Revised Stat. c. 49, § 3; Warner v. Willey, 2 Root, 490.