Case ID: f-appx_671/html/0255-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM: \n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Angel De Jesus SANABIA-SANCHEZ, also known as Angel Sarabia-Sanchez, Defendant-Appellant
    No. 14-41123 Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Date Filed: 12/06/2016
    Anna Elizabeth Kalluri, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Timothy William Crooks, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Michael Lance Herman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
    Angel De Jesus Sanabia-Sanchez, Pro Se
    Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Following his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry, Angel De Jesus Sanabia-Sanchez was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, which sentence included an eight-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C), based on his prior Texas conviction for burglary of a motor vehicle. For the first time on appeal, Sanabia-Sanchez argues that the district court committed reversible plain error when it concluded that his prior burglary of a motor vehicle conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and thus constituted an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), triggering the then-applicable § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C) enhancement and the increased statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). Relying primarily on Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), Sanabia-Sanchez argues that the definition of a crime of violence in § 16(b), as incorporated by reference into the definition of an aggravated felony in § 1101(a)(43)(F), is unconstitutionally vague on its face. He further contends that this court cannot apply § 16(b) in this case without violating due process.

The Government has filed an unopposed motion for summary affirmance, urging that Sanabia-Sanchez’s arguments are foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). The Government is correct that Gonzalez-Lon-goria forecloses both Sanabia-Sanchez’s facial vagueness challenge to § 16(b) and his challenge to our application of § 16(b) on due process grounds. See id. Accordingly, the motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternate motion for an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     
      
      . The recent grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on the issue whether § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light oí Johnson in Lynch v. Dimaya, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 31, 195 L.Ed.2d 902 (2016), does not alter the analysis. This court is bound by its own precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986).