Case ID: sw_217/html/0163-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DAVIDSON, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

(86 Tex. Cr. R. 365)
    COTTON v. STATE.
    (No. 5522.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 10, 1919.)
    Appeal from District Court, Hunt County; Wm. Pierson, Judgee.
    Ira Cotton was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Neyland & Neyland and Crosby & Harrell, all of Greenville, and B. B. Sturgeon, of Paris, for appellant.
    C. M. Cureton, Atty. Gen., W. J. Townsend, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Clark & Sweeton, of Greenville, for the State.
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of manslaughter and allotted five years in the penitentiary. i

This is a companion case to that of Hubert Cotton v. State, 217 S. W. 158, this day reversed and remanded. The questions presented in the two cases are, in the main, the same, and in regard to those' questions, discussed by Judge Lattimore in the .Hubert Cotton Case, reference is here made.

There is this difference with reference to the charges: In the Hubert Cotton Case, the court limited the jury, in his charge on manslaughter, to the consideration of the acts and conduct of the deceased, omitting the acts and conduct of the brother of deceased, and a special charge was asked by the defendant, curing that mistake in the charge, which was'refused. This has been discussed in the opinion by Judge Lattimore, and the court’s charge there was held erroneous, and the charge requested by appellant should have been given. The charge in this ease does submit, as a part of the adequate cause, the acts and conduct of the brother,, as well as the deceased. It is not the intention here to discuss that phase •of the case at any length, or the difference between the charges in the two cases. We are of opinion that the Hubert Cotton Case decides the question correctly, and should be followed by the trial court in- his charge on manslaughter in this case upon another trial.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded