Case ID: f-appx_628/html/0541-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Alexiz HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant, v. R. GROUNDS, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 14-16283.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 7, 2016.
    
    Filed Jan. 11, 2016.
    Amitai Schwartz, Law Offices of Amitai Schwartz, Emeryville, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Peggy S. Ruffra, Esquire, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: WALLACE and KOZINSKI, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

No clearly established law addresses whether Hernandez’s counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance by failing to properly advise him about his good-time credits before he pled guilty. The Supreme Court has not determined whether good-time credits are a direct or collateral consequence of a plea, although the California Supreme Court considers them to be collateral. See People v. Barella, 20 Cal.4th 261, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37, 41 (1999). Nor has the Court addressed whether “there may be circumstances under which advice about a matter deemed collateral violates the Sixth Amendment.” Chaidez v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1103, 1108, 185 L.Ed.2d 149 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010) (holding that the failure to advise a client of deportation consequences of a plea may amount to deficient performance, without deciding whether deportation is a direct or collateral consequence); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 60, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (declining to decide whether counsel’s incorrect advice about parole eligibility amounted to ineffective assistance).

Without Supreme Court authority on point, the state court’s determination that Hernandez’s counsel didn’t render ineffective assistance can’t be contrary to or an “unreasonable” application of clearly established law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). Accordingly, Hernandez isn’t entitled to ha-beas relief.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.