Case ID: ne2d_779/html/1154-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DICKSON, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In the Matter of Lynn Morrow MALKOWSKI.
    No. 45S00-0107-DI-320.
    Supreme Court of Indiana.
    Dec. 16, 2002.
   ORDER APPROVING STATEMENT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AND CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT FOR DISCIPLINE

Pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Section 11, the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission and the respondent have submitted for approval a Statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline stipulating a proposed discipline and agreed facts as summarized below:

Facts: The parties agree that, without the knowledge of the opposing party or counsel, the respondent added a "nune pro tune" retroactive effective date to a stipulation concerning modification of child support before submitting the stipulation to the court for signature. The trial court judge signed the order on April 17, 2000. The respondent's addition backdated the effective date of the modification to July

28, 1999. After the opposing party objected to the signed order, the trial court struck the added language and ordered the respondent to pay opposing counsel's fees.

Violations: The respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(1), which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact to a tribunal, and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Discipline: Thirty-day suspension from the practice of law, effective January 25, 2003, with automatic reinstatement thereafter.

The Court, having considered the submission of the parties, now APPROVES and ORDERS the agreed discipline, noting, however, that it does so largely because it is an agreed resolution. Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent. The Clerk is directed to provide notice of this order to the hearing officer and all parties and entities as directed by Admis.Disc.R. 23(8)(d).

SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.

DICKSON, J.,

dissents, believing that a mere 30-day suspension is grossly inadequate for a lawyer who deliberately altered an agreed stipulation, inserting language favoring the lawyer's client to which the opposing party had not agreed, and who then deceptively submitted the stipulation to the court for approval without disclosing the alteration.