Case ID: sc-eq_12/html/0064-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Chancellor J. Johnston", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Dungan vs. Tobin.
    Heard before Chancellor D. Johnson, Barnwell, January Term, 1837. ‘
    This bill was preferred to obtain the instructions of the court’ upon certain matters in controversy between the defendants, arid which arose out of the will of the complainant’s testator'. In the solution of them, it will be necessary to have recourse to the general as well as the particular provisions of the will. For the pujv pose of more convenient reference, I have numbered the clauses in the margin, corresponding with the numbers in the orginal will, a copy of which will he directed to he filed with this decree,
    1st. The first clause contains the usual direction, that the testa® tor’s just debts should be paid.
    ■2d. 1 he second is in these words ; “ If my executors shall find it judicious and proper, 1 would prefer that my estate be iiept to», gether and conducted as in rri) life time, until January, 1838, or if they prefer it, that the negroes he iiired out, the perishable property Sold,” &c.
    3d. ‘ From the net annual incon e of my estate, I desire that $400, if so much be necessary, be applied yearly and every year, for the support and education oí tuy natural son Cornelius Tobin concluding with a solemn request to his executors to bestow every care and attention to his education both academical and colic» giate.
    4>h. In the fourth clause he gives to Orsatnond D. Allen, in trust for flu; sole and separate Use of Elizabeth Nelson, the mother of his natural son, the sum of $140 annually, to he paid out of the net annual income ot his estate until the year 1838, and if she should then he alive, he directs that a sum sufficient to produce that amount annually, should be set apart out of the proceeds of the sale ot his esta.e, at.d invested in public or private securities, to pay the said annuity. On her death the fund to go over to certain re» lations in Ireland.
    5th. “ from the net annual income of my estate, I further give and bequeath the sum of $1000, to be paid as soon as possible, on account of bet advanced age, to my aunt Mary Dwyer, of Kil-kenny, Ireland.” In the event of her being dead, he directs this legaet to be paid to her children or grand children, as the case might he, in 1838.
    6th. “ The balance' of the net annual income of my estate, (if any,) l give and devise to my sister Mary, my half brother Michael, and my half sister Caty, to be divided between them or their children”.
    7th. The questions raised turn principally on the seventh clause of the will, which is in the following words, “ Although I have ex. pressed a wish that my real and personal estate be kept together until 1838, it is not my intention ibat such v>ish be imptrative on my executors ; leaving it to their discretion to sell the whole sooner, if they think it most advantageous, on a long credit, the payment secured as 1 shall presently direct. If not sold sooner, I direct that my whole estate, real and personal, be sold in the month of January, 1838, on a credit payable in instalments of at least one, two and throe years, the purchase money to be secured by bond, mort. gage,” &c
    8th. In the eighth clause, the testator disposes of the proceeds of the sales and the residue of the estate; giviegto his legiiima'e sons Daniel and John, each one fourth part, one other fourth part to be invested in negroes, or public or private securities, for the use of bis natural son, Cornelius, for life, remainder over and the remata-jng fourth part be equally divided between bis sister Mary, his half-sister,Caty, and his half brother Michael, all of Irelund, and if they be dead, to their children.
    0th. In the ninth and last clause, he gives as a reason for his. providing for his relations in Ireland, instead of giving this portion to his legitimate sons, that he had some time before divided his estate equally between them and himself, and appoints executors* of whom the complainant alone has qualified.
    In a codicil the testator recites the death of Elizabeth Nelson9. and in consequence thereof, gives one thousand dollars to his sister .Mary, and to his half sister Caty, and half brother Michael, each-the sum of $500, “ to be paid them severally at the time of th© sale or division of my estate, as in my will directed,” i&c.
    The testator died in October, 1830, leaving an estate consisting-principally of lands, negroes and live stock, and early in 1831, the Complainant sold all the perishable estate except the negroes, and such else as was necessary, to carry on the business of planting,, as the testator did in his life time, and made a crop on the plantation that year ; but finding that comparatively unproductive, and upon a consultation with the legatees resident here, and with judicious planters who were acquainted with the estate, and all concurring that, it was the best and most judicious course, he sold th© whole residue of the estate, real' and personal. The whole estate?, ascertained by the sale, amounted to $40,000, or upwards-
    The defendant, Darling Peeples, claims the legacy to John To-bin, under an assignment from him ; and the defendant, Thomas-Cormick. claims the legacies to the testator’s sister Mary, his half sister Caty, and his half brother Michael, under assignment frona them, and their legal representatives.
    The deféodant, Thomas Cormick, insists that under the- correct construction of the will, the net proceeds of the sales and residue-of the e-tate, are not distributable until January, 1838, and that after deducting (he annual legacy of $400, for the support and education of (be testator’s natural son Cornelius, out of the income, h© is entitled to the interest of the fund of the estate, up to that time, under the bequ -st of “the balance of the net annual income of my estate, if any,” to the testator’s sister Mary, &c. contained in the sixth clause of the will. The other parties interested in th© estate, insist that its distribution must have relation to the sale by by the executor, in 183’J, and consequently,, that defendant Cor-roi'-k. is only entitled to a portion of the accruing interest corresponding with the interest which he takes.in the corpus of the estate. On this question aloue, the complainant asks the advice arid direction of' the court.
    The question then is, when, under the circumstances which have-occurred, did the testator intend that the residuum of the estate, should be distributed 1 Lf not, until January, 1838, then of course the position taken by defendant Cormick must prevail — if upon th©-sale by the executors, then it necessarily fails, and the estate must be distributed as contended for by the other defendants.
    Ah the particular rules laid down for the interpretation.of will® save mere instruments, by which to ascertain the true intent, which, ¡according to the uaiversal rule, and from which there is no exeep. lion, must always prevail — particular rules can, therefore, never apply where the intention is manifest. We must, therefore, look into this will, tor the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the testator, as to the time it was his will the residuum of his estate should he divided, and enquire before we resort to particular rules, whether there is reason to doubt about his intention.
    The direct instructions on this subject will be found in the second and seventh clauses of the will ; which when placed in juxtaposition, and read together, will be found to contain instructions to the following import, viz . “ It is my desire that my estate be kept together, and conducted as in my life time, until January, 1839 ; but if my execütors prefer it, my negroes may be hired out, and my perishable property sold. This wish, however, is not to be regarded as imperative, and if my executors sh ill think it more advantageous, and that the leading purposes of my will, will be pr mated by it, then they are authorized to sell (he whole at any time. if not sold before, they must sell in January, 1838.” Now if the intention depended alone on the proper construction of these two clauses, there could be no question. The terms, thus rendered, are too plain and unequivocal to admit of any doubt, that the residuum was dis? tributable whenever the estate was sold. Whether the sale wa# made uuder the discretion vested in the executors, or the time appointed by the will, there would be no motives for tha executors re-Earning it longer.
    But it is insisted, that this conclusion is opposed by the third clause of the will, which sets apart ©400 of the annual income of the estate, for the support and education of the testator’s natural son Cornelius; by the appropriation in the fourth clause, of y 140 annually out of the income, as an annuity tor Elizabeth Nelson ; by the legacy of ©1,000, to Mary 'Dwyer, out of the same fund provided for in the fifth clause ; andTastly by the bequest of tha net balance of this fund, the annual i ib une, to the testator’s sister Mary, hts half sister Cúty, and his half brother Michael: all of which, it is contended, evidently point to January, 18?8, as the tima for tie distribution of the estate.
    Now that the intention of the testator shall be collected front the whole will, is a rule as universal, as that the intention when as. certatned, shall prevail. It is equally certain, that it is the duty of the court, to construe a will, so as to give effect, if practicable, to every word, sentence and cla'use. But if there be an obvious general intent, which is opposed by a particular provision, so directly, that they cannot be reconciled, the latter will control the former. This last rule proceeds on the plain principle, that every one has the right to put his own interpretation on the language which he uses. Thus, if one possessed of estates in land, whereof he holds one part in fee, and another part by a different tenure, devise all his real estate to A, and adds, “ whereby I intend the lands whereof f am possessed, in fee,” this specification necessarily controls the .general expression, as it indicates the true intent, According to this principle, if any of the dispositions, of this will, renders it necessary that the executor should retain the funds in his hands, after the sale by him, until January, 1838, the estate should not be distributed until theu.
    Will an earlier distribution defeat the appropriation of $400, for the support and education of Cornelius, and the annuity of $140, for Nelson, who appear to have been the peculiar objects of the testator’s bounty ? Clearly not. Cornelius’ portion of the estate, which may be sec down in round numbers at $10,000, invested in any of the modes presented in the will, might be reasonably supposed to produce an anoual income greater than the sum of $400, appropriated tó his support and education ; and the direction that a sum uufficient to produce an annual income of $140, should be invested to pay the annuity for Nelson, renders it indifferent whether the fund remains in the hands of the executors, or a part of it is. thus invested. It is not necessary, therefore, that the funds should remain in the hands of the executors, for either of those purposes.
    Whether, if the income had failed, Mary Dwyer would have been entitled to be paid the legacy of $1000 out of the corpus of' the estate, would be a question not free from difficulty. The income is, unquestionably, the fund primarily chargeable with the, payment, but ihe court in all doubtful cases incline to that construe-, tion, which renders legacies general, i t.sfead of specific. In the case of Cogdell vs. Cogdell, 3 E’y. Rep. a legacy out of a particular fund was held to be a charge u.pon the estate generally. But the question lias not been raised here ; not by Cormick, because she would bo eniitled in prefeience to him, on the same principle on which he claims the residue of the accruing interest. Her claim is concurred in by all the other parties, Ii is not my purpose, therefore, to express any opinion on it. The object of referring to it, is, to aid in the construction of the other provisions of the will.
    That the testator intended that this legacy should be paid in any event, is, I think, fairly inferable from the reasons on which the testator founds it, the advanced age of the legatee, and the instructions that it should he paid as soon as possible. If it be conceded, that the executor was bound to retain the estate until that sum should be raised from the income, that object being attained, for what purpose should he retain it longer? Can it be, that the surplus should accumulate for the benefit of his sister Mary, for his half sister Caty, aud his half brother Michael ? I think not. Tho will contains no specific directions to that effect. The bequest of the bul mice of the net annual income, in the sixth clause, is, in its terms general. Its generality is extended by the qualification, “ if any” — manifesting a secondary intent, and rendering this bequest subordinate to the other dispositions of the will. So that, whether Mary Dwyer is paid her legacy out of the income, or the corpus of the estate, all the purposes of keeping it together are attained, and the estate must be distributed.
    A general view of the dispositions of this will lead irresistibly to the same conclusion. The testator owned an estate consisting of lands, negroes, <fcc. which he had employed in planting. In the second clause of his will he expresses a desire that it should bo kept together and employed as in his life time, or, if his executors prefer, that the negroes should be hired until 1838, and the rest of his perishable property sold. In the 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th, he disposes of tiie whole annual income, necessarily, with reference to the state of things contemplated by the second clause, (his estate kept together, and employed in planting, or his negroes hired out, and his other perishable property sold,) for as yet ho had not provided for any other disposition of it. In framing the seventh clause, it is apparent, as remarked by the counsel, that the testator went back and reviewed what he had done, and he might well have reasoned, and probably did, that the income from planting or hiring of negroes was uncertain, that a strict adherence to the instructions Contained m the second clause, might defeat the leadi ¡g purposes of his will.; circumstance^ might occur, which could not then be anticipated, wluch might re luce the income within the amount nharged upon it. It was fit, therefore, that the executors should be clothed with discretionary powers, ample enough to meet any contingencies that might arise. This confidence might be the more safely con. fided in them, because by no possibility could it work any prejudice to his legitimate or illegitimate sons, nor to his brothers and sisters in Ireland ; for the corpus of the estate was directed to bo divided amongst thorn. It could work no change in their relativo lights, except as to the residue of the annual income, which has already been shown to be secondary to the other dispositions of the will. If the legacy of @1,000 to his aunt be regarded as general,, that would be paid out of the corpus of the estate. If chargeable on the income only, it would only be necessary to retain the estate until that amount be raised from the income, and, in that case, it would be the interest of those entitled to the corpus to pay that legacy and assume the management of their own funds. It would be safe, therefore, to clothe the executors with discretionary powers, to sell whenever they shall see fit, and distribute the corpus of the estate as directed.
    That the executors were clothed with discretionary power to sell the estate when they should deem it advantageous, and that t.ho sale made in 1833, was well authorized under this power, has not been called in question. It follows, that the estate was then divisible. The disposition of the income was evidently predicated on, ¡and had, reference to the income to bo derived from planting, and, if the executors exercised the discretion in good faith, a fact not questionéd, and this source was thus cut off, and the legacies payable out of .it wholly defeated, still it would hold good, not as the act of the executor, but as the will of the testator operating through, ■the agency of the discretion of the executor.
    There.is another .circumstance which ought not to be overlooked. From every thing that appears on the wilt, it was the intention of the testator to distribute the bulk of his estate into four equal parts, .beuveeu his two legitimate .sons, his illegitmate son, and the bulk of his relations in Ireland, as a class. There is certainly nothing which indicates that this class were the dearest objects of his bounty But if the construction they contend for should prevail, they will take not only a share of the corpus of the estate, equal to the whole interest of the other legatees, who were intended to be put on a footing at least of equality with them, but the interest of the whole capital of the estate, deducting the annuities charged upon it from 1832, to 1838, whicn assuming the estate to be worth $40,000, would amount lo $ i 6,800, and deducing therefrom $400 a year for Cornelius, and $140 for Nelson, would leave a net balance of $13,600, of the interest in favor of the Irish relations, and exceeding thus much the other legacies ; whereas ir is obvious, whether we look, to the will, or the relation in which the parties stood, equality at least was intended. The court would never lean in favor of such a construction.
    The complainant is, therefore, advised and instructed, and it is ■hereby decreed, that in the payment of the legacies under this will, he should apportion the funds of the estate on the principles'of this decree, having regard to the time of the sale of the osiaí© made by him in 1832, as the time at which the interest of the defendants were fixed and determined.
    Costs to be paid out of the funds of the estate.
    DAVID JOHNSON.
    
      Grounds of Appeal.
    
    1. That the discretion vested in the executors, as to the time of Sale, cannot affect the interests of the legatees under the will.
    2. That it is not to be supposed, that the testator meant, that the-rights of the legatees should be dependant on the will of the executors, unless elearly so expressed.
    3. That the meaning of the testator, upon critical examination of his language, is, that the income of his estate, ’till 1838, shall be distributed in the same way, whether the estate be, or be not sold.
    T. W. GLOVER, for Appellant.
    
   Chancellor J. Johnston

delivered the opinion of the court.

There is no doubt that the intention, to be gathered from the whole face of the will, must govern. And that the leading purposes of the testator should be consulted, rather than those which appear to have been secondary. The difficulty is not about the principles of construction, but the application, of them.

A good index of a testator’s general intention, will be found by' considering a case in which every part of his will would have had full operation ; in which his every wish would have been completely-gratified, and none disappointed. The will (if we view it in reference to such a contingency,) grojipes the legatees together, as ilioy stood in the mind of the testator, and informs us of the rela« ti?e degrees of affection with which he regarded them.

I presume we shall learn this testator’s leading purposes, by looking at what he directed, had all things gone so that his favorite scheme of keeping up the planting till 1836, had taken effectj in which case, according to the concessions ©f all parties, every clause and part of his will would have had an unrestricted operation.

If we view this will in this light, the testator’s intention is plain* The estimation in which he held his Kilkenny relations, (a phrase, which, for brevity’s sake, l substitute for his sisters and brother,, Mary, Caty and Michael,) was such, that he was willing to give them nearly the whole income of his estate, until 1838, and to add to this, in 1838, one fourth of the corpus, with two thousand dollars besides; while to his natural son, he gave barely one fourth-of the corpus, in 1888, with a small annuity, until that time, for hies--education ; and to his sons, each, only a fourth, of the corpus, in 1838.

Judging by these bounties, who can hesitate to say, that the sons were less objects of his bounty, than the Kilkenny relations 1 Or' that his leading intention was to give more to the latter, than to the former Í

So much for the general intention. And so much on the construction to be gathered from the whole face of the will*

Now, if there is any thing on the will to shew, that, in any con. tingency which has happe.-ed, the testator would have increased the piovisiou for his sons, or diminished that of his Kilkenny friends, —he must be obeyed. But is there any thing to shew this ?

That part of the will by which he authorises his executors to-break up and sell the plauting establishment, is relied on.

What effect is to follow the execution of a power, may be learned by considering the purpose for u hich the power was conferred. The effect to be allowed must conform to. this purpose ; for here, as in every other part of a will, the testator’s intention must pre. Vail.

Now, if the testator gave this power, with a view to enable the executors to increase the legacies of the sons, and to diminish those of the Kilkenny relations, he has not said so. If the conversion of the property into bonds, at interest, was a circumstance going to abate his affection for the Kilkenny friends, or strengthen that, for the sons, he has not told us so ; nor is there any thing in tb© sature of the thing itself, from which we can reasonably infer, that in eonaequenco of it, his affections would have undergone this change.

The testator empowers the executors to sell before 1838, if they deem it advantageous. If his intention was to enable the executors to sell for the purpose of transferring the bulk of income to bis sons — if this was the sense in which he used the word, “ advantageous,” there was no need for anif ” in the case.' He might have saved hims'elf the trouble of conferring the discretion, ary power, and exorcised it himself, by ordering a sale presently, for, without doubt, such a transfer would be advantageous to the sons.

Why did he not order present distribution ? Plainly, because he wished to accumulate income for those to whom he gave it. tic thought that a planting estate, when he made his will, would produce as much income as its value, at interest But he was uucer-' tain whether this would continue to bn the case. Executors tiiight not be able to manage as well as an owner; produce might fail, or seasons ch mge, or lands fail. All this vs ould reduce the income, to the injury of those entitled to it. In such a enuju icture, it would be advantageous t > them to have the capital changed, and put at interest. But it might happen, that at such time, property was laboring under an unusual, though temporary; depression in price. To sell, would injure those entitled to the corpus. To meet all contingencies, the executors were clothed with a discretion. But their povver was a trust. They were trustees for all the legatees ; not for any one in particular; much less for one against another; They must act for the advantage of all, or so as to inflict the least possible injury on any.

The executors have executed this power; and it is not doubted they have executed it in good faith. Bui if it would have been bad faith in them to sell for the avowed purpose of transferring the income — or for the express purpose of revoking the legacies ito the Kilkenny relations ; if the doing these things was not the pur¡pose for which the power was conferred on them ; — is that a sound (construction which would give their act that effect! Can that be a true interpretation, which says that a trust for relieving against a tc >o scanty income, shall, if executed, have the effect of extinguish-in g the income ?

It is said the income intended for the Kilkenny relations, was in come from planting. The testator is supposed to have- given th phi income — so long as it arose from planting, but no longer. N ow, if lie had said so, from the most whimsical motives, or trom at j motive at all — if he bud said so plainly, his discretion must have governed. But he has said no such thing. What he has said¿ is, that he gives the income of his estate. He makes no qualification. His words will take in profits from all sources, without regard to the quality of the capital. If an estate, when sold, ceases to produce-income, the argument is good. If this estate, now, has no income, there is no right in the Kilkenny relations to have any-But if there is, their claim is good.

I would not do injustice to the point made. The zeal with ‘which the argument was urged, evinced that it was grounded on a convic» tion of its correctness. I have, therefore, cast about in every direction for any thing to support it: but in vain.

The argument proceeds upon this : — that the testator having, by the second clause, provided for keeping his estate together for planting, has exclusive reference to this state of things, in all the legacies of income which he creates in the four succeeding clauses. That, therefore, the income intended to give, was income from planting. That the power given to the executors, in the se¿* venth clause, to sell the planting establishment, was a power to de-¡ stroy the income given, by destroying that from which alone it could, accrue.

The testator no where says that he gave the income, on the supposition that it was to come exclusively from planting. If this was his meaning, we can come at it only by implication. But it would be against rule to resort to implication, when it would have the effect of revoking, or restricting the import of, an express bequest; to do so, would amount to nothing less than preferring a conjectural intent to bis express declaration.

But if we may resort to implication, let it he borne in mind, that it is still the testator’s real intention we are to inquire after. The argument undertakes to prove that the testator did not intend that the words, “ income of my estate,” should have their natural meaning — and that it was his intention that the legatees should not have“ income of his estate,” unless it arose in a particular way.

The suggestion of the possible existence of a capricious or unreasonable motive, is no ground for implication. Then can any one assign a sensible reason, (and shall we, without reason, imply an intention contrary to the testator’s expression,) why the testator Should have been willing that his Irish friends should have the in. come of his estate, if the estate was planted, but unwilling they should have it. if the same property, without diminution of value, or injury to any one, was changed to another form : a change nod disagreeable to him, since he expressly authorized it ?

it is conceded, that if the estate had been planted until 1838, ae-©ordiugto his favorite scheme, he intended, the legatees to have the income,. It is also conceded, that in that case, he intended his sons should have no more than a fourth of the corpus, in 1838.

Now, what is there in the will to shew an intention to give his sons more ?

What is there in the will from which to imply, (for, I repeat, there is no express declaration,) that a mere alteration of his estate changed his intention towards his legatees'! That it worked a cha ige in the relative degrees of affection he bore them before 1 That in giving his bounties, he had regard, not to the qualities of his legatees, or the benéíits the bounties would confer on them, but to the qualities of the estate ? Or that he loved first one and then another, by turns, just as Ins estate happened to be in this or thalr posture'!

On the whole, I can make nothing of this argument, but that it asks the ci.urt to strive alter an implication to defeat the plain, import ot the testator’s words ; and to conclude that an intent existed contrary to those words, upon the unauthorized supposition, that he was governed by motives so capricious as to be almost incompatible with a disposing capacity.

1 am persuaded there is nothing in the mere selling of the property to render it inconsistent with the testator’s intention, that the legatees of income should continue to take the profits of the estate after the sale.

The expression, “ if any,” in the sixth clause, has been relied on to shew that the testator contemplated the cessation of income before ici38. But it is obvious be did not employ these words to express a doubt, whether the income would continue, but whether, after paying the bequosis ehaiged on it, there would be any balance. That balance, ■“ if any,” he bequeathed by the sixth clause.

There is another provision, however, which has been supposed to be fuconsiotent with a right to income after a side.

The testator gave the executors power to sell before 1838, and directed them to divide “ the proceeds”' into four equal parts. It is argued, that, upon the sale, the vyiil vested distributary rights in the proceeds,” as a specific body of property; and that a right sprang up to have instant distribution ; which would defeat any claim to have it retained to raise income for the legatees of in. come.

It may be conceded, that distributary rights vested in the prov coeds,” so soon as they came into existence. The mistake seems ■to oe in concludi g that this fixes a time for distribution. If there is nothing declaring that distribution shall take place instantly, the mere existence ot a distiibutary right is by no means inconsistent with a right to have the property retained, that its profits may, in the mean time, be paid to others. Nothing is more common than the creating vested, and transmissable, distributary, interests in property, and at the same delaying the distribution for the purpose of giving the intermediate profits to others. If this could be doubted, the case of a transfer of stock to A, in trust, to pay the dividends' for a term to B, with remainder over to C and D, discharged of all trusts, might be given as an example. That is this very case.

It was competent for this testator to have directed, if he so intended, that the distribution should take place on the sale. But he has not done so. Nor has he given the executors any power to fix a time for distribution. Their power was to select a time for sale, only. We are not to infer that the testator intended the distribution to attend the sale, when such construction is not only unnecessary, but would, in the contingencies which have happened, revoke legacies plai >ly given, and swell others beyond the obvious general intent of the testator. This construction would allow his executors to make his will this or that, not according to his inten. .tiou, but their pleasure.

An expression in the codicil, whereby the testator requires the two thousand dollars, which by the will was to be vested tor the support of Nelson, to be paid to his Kilkenny friends, “ at the time of the sale, or division of his estate, as in his will directed,” has been relied on, as evidence, that he intended the sale and distribution to be cotemporaneous. And, no doubt the sale he here speaks of, was expected by him, to be cotemporaneous with the distribution The sale he speaks of was the one he directed in his will. There, is no direction, though there is a permission, for any sale before 1838. The legacy in the codicil is a substitute for the investment which the will ordered to be made for Nelson; which investment was to be made in 1838, and not before, and was to depend on her being “then” alive. Is not this evidence that he intended this legacy to be paid in 1838.

The only remaining objection to the construction I have given this will, on which 1 shall remark, is, that it contravenes that equality at which the testator aimed. But how does it appear that he did aim at equality ? If equality was his object, he would have divided the corpus equally, or left the profits to pursue-the capital, He has done neither. He divides the capital unequally ; to some he gives capital, but no income ; to others, income without capital and to nearly all unequal portions of income.

Petigru and Glover, for motion.

Bellinger, contra.

Filed 14th March, 1837.

The motion is granted : and it is decreed, that distribution of the capital of the estate be made in 1838, and not before; and that, in the mean time, the profits go to the legatees of income.

J. JOHNSTON,

We concur,

WM. HARPER,

H. W. DESAUSSURE,