Case ID: sc-eq_7/html/0384-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Colcock. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William Leverett et al. v. John Leverett et al.
    
    The act which requires the slaves on the plantation of a tenant for life who dies after the 1st of March, of any year, to remain thereon to finish the crop, does not ¿rive hire to the remainder-man, but confers their services for the remainder of the year to the estase of the deceased tenant.
    
      Temperance Leverett, by a deed from Ann Floyd, was entitled during her life to certain slaves; and after her death they were given over to the complainants. The tenant for life died on the 25th day of March, 1824. Her executors, the defendants, kept these slaves on the plantation until they finished the crop of that year, under the authority given to them by the act of assembly of 1789 (Pub. Laws, 494,') which is in the following words : “ If any person shall die after the 1st day of March in any year, the slaves of which he or she was possessed, whether held for life or absolutely, and who were employed in making a crop, shall be continued on the lands which were in the occupation of the deceased, *until the crop is finished; and then be delivered to those who have the right to them ; and such crop shall be assets in the executors or administrators hands, subject to the debts, legacies and distributions; the taxes, overseer’s wages, expenses of physic, food and clothing being first paid ; and the emblements of the lands, which shall be severed before the last day of December following, shall in like manner be assets in the hands of the executors or administrators; but all such emblements growing on the lands on that day, or at the time of the testator or intestate’s death if that happens after the said last day of December and before the 1st day of March, shall pass with the lands. And if any person shall rent or hire lands or slaves of a tenant for life, and such tenant for life dies ; the person hiring such land or slaves shall not be dispossesed until the crop of that year is finished, he or she securing the payment of the rent or hire when due.”
    The complainants contended that the defendants, the executors of Temperance Leverett, should pay them for the hire of the negroes from the death of their testatrix, on the 25th of March, 1824, till the 10th day of January, 1825, when the crop was gathered. It was contended by the defendants that the act of 1789 gave the services of the negroes employed in making the crop, if the tenant for life died after the 1st day of March, for the purpose of making the crop. It was to prevent great injury from the loss of a crop planted, and the difficulty of employing hands after that period. For the complainants, it was answered that that was true : but the legislature never intended that the tenant for life, or his representatives, should have the benefit of their labor without consideration. For reasons of policy, the property was to be kept together; but the interest of the parties was to remain the same : and the executors in this case should be compelled to come to a just account for the profits of the slaves.
    *The question came up upon the report of the commissioner.
    June, 1826. DeSaussuru, Chancellor. The first exception depends upon the construction of the statute of 1789, which enacts that on the death of a tenant for life of any estate which may determine at an uncertain time, such death occurring after the first of March, the slaves of the estate are to be continued on the estate to the end of the year, or as the exception expresses it, “ the estate is continued to the end of the year.” The complainants contend, and the commissioner has decided, that though the property be so continued under the statute, it is subject to hire. The statute does not say so, and never to my knowledge has been so construed. I do not think it the sound construction ; for I believe an essential benefit was intended and not an illusory one. The exception must be sustained, and so much of the report overruled and corrected.
    The complainants appealed.
    O’Neall and Johnson, for the appellants.
    The legislature only intended to give the estate of the tenant for life the benefit of the labor of the negroes in finishing the crop; and did not intend to extend the estate of the tenant for life to the end of the year.
    The words of the act are, “ who were employed in making a crop» from which it is to be inferred that the legislature solely intended to secure to the estate the labor of the slaves in making a crop, and did not take away the right of the remainder-men to hire.
    In the latter part of the clause the following words are. made use of, “and if any person shall rent or hire lands or slaves of a tenant for life, and such tenant for life dies, the. person hiring such lands or slaves shall not *be dispossessed until the crop of that year finished; he or she securing the of rent or hire when due.” From which it is apparent that the legislature meant to secure the payment of hire, in that event, to the remainder-man ; and this part of the act explains the previous part, and plainly indicates that the intention of the legislature was not to take from the remainder-man the right to hire.
    The doctrine of emblements has no analogy to this case, except so far as the crop growing on land may be regarded as precisely the same as the labor of the slaves; but it does not follow, from the fact of the emblements going to the tenant for life, in the case of lands, that therefore, when the labor of slaves is secured to the estate of the tenant for life, in completing the crops, the right of the remainder-man to claim hire is taken away. They cited 1 Brev. 335. 3 Dane’s Ab. 125. Tit. Emblements.
    Bauskett and Dunlap, contra.
    The act expressly makes the crop assets, which plainly declares that the benefit of the labor of the slaves shall go to the executor. The case is precisely like the case of emble-ments. The latter clause of the act relates only to persons who hire slaves, and cannot control the force of the previous part of the clause, which specifically relates to tenants for life. It is proper, where persons hire slaves, that the owner shall not lose his hire; and the act expressly provides for it. If it was intended that the representatives of a tenant for life should pay, the act would have provided for that too. Expressio unius exclusio alterius.
    
   Curia, per

Colcock. J.

This court concur with the chancellor in his construction of the act of 1789: and I can safely say, that I never beard a doubt expressed as *to the correctness of such constrion. It is in furtherance of the common law doctrine of em-blements, that he who has a right to sow shall be entitled to reap ; which cannot be done in this country, unless the negroes employed in making the crop, are permitted to remain to the end of the year. It would often be of little advantage to the person taking, to remove the negroes after the crop is planted; whereas, it might operate as a total destruction of the crop. The appropriation of the crop, as assets in the hands of the executors, certainly negatives the idea of allowing compensation by way of hire to the person entitled to the negroes.

Decree affirmed.