Case ID: so2d_442/html/1062-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Iris GAUSE, Appellant, v. FIRST BANK OF MARIANNA, Appellee.
    No. AT-199.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Dec. 16, 1983.
    F. Philip Blank, Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Charles M. Wynn, Marianna, and Thayer M. Marts, Tallahassee, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant, counterplaintiff below, appeals a “judgment” granting appel-lee/counterdefendant’s motion for summary judgment as to a three-count counterclaim. The decretal portion of the trial court’s “judgment” reads:

ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that Counter-defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

This order is merely authorization for entry of a final judgment; it does not, in and of itself, constitute an appealable final judgment. Shupack v. Allstate Insurance Co., 356 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Additionally, it appears from a review of the record that appellee’s motion for summary judgment applies only to Count I of appellant’s three-count counterclaim. Because all three of the counts in the counterclaim are interrelated and arise out of the same transaction, a final judgment as to only one count is a nonappeala-ble interlocutory order. Mendez v. West Flagler Family Association, Inc., 303 So.2d 1 (Fla.1974); McClain Construction Corp. v. C.S. Roberts, 351 So.2d 399 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

ERVIN, C.J., and BOOTH and ZEH-MER, JJ., concur.