Case ID: us-ct-cl_60/html/0326-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

MINNIE MOORE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS W. MOORE, DECEASED, AND LILLIE C. STONE v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. B-246.
    Decided February 9, 1925]
    
      On the Proofs
    
    
      Eminent domain; just compensation. — The plaintiffs declined to accept the compensation for property taken by the United States for public use under the act of March 16, 1918, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, but accepted 75 per cent thereof as authorized by statute. They are entitled to judgment for the difference between the amount paid and the amount of just compensation as determined by the Secretary with interest.to date of such payment under the rule in the Seaboard Air Lime ease, 261 U. S. 299.
    
      The RefortePs statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Thomas F. Gullen for the plaintiffs.
    
      Mr. Edwin S. McOrary, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Robert H. Lovett, for the defendant.
    The following are the facts as found by the court:
    I. The plaintiff, Lillie C. Stone, is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Maryland. Louis W. Moore, named a plaintiff in the original suit, was a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Virginia. He died, pending the determination of this cause, intestate, and was survived by a widow, Minnie Moore. His death was suggested and the cause was allowed to proceed in the name of the administrator of his estate. On the 8th day of January, 1923, the said Minnie E. Moore was duly appointed administratrix of the estate of the said Louis W. Moore and has filed an authenticated copy of the record of her appointment as such administratrix.
    II. On and before September 24, 1918, the said Lillie 0. Stone and Louis W. Moore were the owners of that certain real estate in the District of Columbia known and described as lots Nos. 29 and 36 of James Adams and Robert Coltman executors’ and trustees’ subdivision of lots in square numbered eighty-eight as per plat recorded in the office of the surveyor for the District of Columbia. Said property was requisitioned and taken by the United States on or about October 10, 1918, for public use.
    Said lot number 29 contained 3,567 square feet and lot number 36 contained 4,581 square feet. The reasonable value of said property at the time it was taken and just compensation for the owners thereof for the same was $3,844.
    III. Said property was taken by virtue of the act approved May 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 550, and the proclamation of the President dated June 18, 1918, mentioned in the petition in this cause. Upon the taking of the property as aforesaid the Secretary of Labor,- as the authorized agency of the President, determined that the just compensation to the owners for said property was $3,844. The plaintiffs, declining to accept that sum as the just compensation, accepted, as authorized by the statute, 75 per cent of the same and were accordingly paid $2,883, and the same was paid to the plaintiffs on the 30th day of April, 1919. The property was taken possession of by the defendant on the 24th day of September, 1918, and no payment therefor was made until 75 per cent of the ascertained value was paid on the 30th day of April, 1919. Interest on the whole sum of $3,844 from the time the property was taken possession of by the defendant until the date of payment of 75 per cent of the value amounts to $134.54.
    The court decided that plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
   MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT

The plaintiffs were entitled to just compensation for the property at the time it was taken. Nothing was paid until seven months thereafter. Under the rule stated in the Seaboard Air Line case, 261 U. S. 299, they were entitled to interest in order to give them the just compensation to which they were entitled when payment was made. We have accordingly computed interest up to the date of that payment, credited the amount paid, and given the plaintiffs judgment for the difference.