Case ID: f-appx_418/html/0040-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JIAN MING WENG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-279-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 18, 2011.
    Feng Li, Moslemi and Associates, Inc., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer L. Lightbody, Assistant Director; Todd J. Cochran, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: B.D. PARKER, REENA RAGGI, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Jian Ming Weng, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a January 7, 2010, order of the BIA, affirming the August 6, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Thomas Mulligan, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jian Ming Weng, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 7, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 6, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision, i.e., minus the arguments for denying relief that were rejected by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir.2007); Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008). For applications governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007). Analyzed under the REAL ID Act, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence.

In finding Weng’s testimony not credible, the IJ relied in part on his demeanor, noting that his affect changed when questioned on cross-examination and that he exhibited indicia of anxiety. Because the IJ was in the best position to observe Weng’s manner while testifying, we afford his demeanor finding particular deference. See Shu Wen Sun, 510 F.3d at 380-81; Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir.2005), Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73-74 (2d Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2d Cir.2007).

In finding Weng not credible, the agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies in his testimony. See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008). First, the IJ noted that Weng’s testimony was not consistent with his documentary evidence with respect to his claim that police monitored his house while he was in China. When asked why his written submissions omitted his claim that the police monitored him at home, he answered that he “forgot to write it,” and that his mother “probably thought that it was not important” to include in her letter. However, the agency was entitled to disregard these explanations as they would not necessarily be compelling to a reasonable factfinder. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005).

The agency also found that Weng’s testimony that the police had visited his parents after he fled China and threatened that he would be arrested upon his return was inconsistent with his documentary submissions. With regard to this finding, the IJ erroneously stated “there is absolutely nothing in [Weng’s] statement indicating that the police contacted his parents after he left the residence.” In fact, Weng’s statement does convey that the police contacted his parents after he fled China, saying “[n]ow they found that I did not report so they already threatened my parents that they would arrest and sentence me.” The BIA, however, rephrased this finding, noting that Weng testified that the police had contacted his parents “[m]any times,” a detail that was omitted from Weng’s documentary evidence. Using its modified finding, the BIA did not err in relying, in part, on the omission to find Weng not credible. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n. 3 (noting that an “omission in a document submitted to corroborate the applicant’s testimony, like a direct inconsistency ... can serve as a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination”). Moreover, the BIA’s decision illustrates that remand for it to address the IJ’s error would be futile, as it upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination without relying on the erroneous aspect of his finding. See Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391 (2d Cir.2005). Finally, the agency reasonably discounted Weng’s explanation that his mother’s letter did not mention that the police came looking for him on multiple occasions because she was not highly educated. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81.

In light of the agency’s demeanor and adverse credibility findings, the agency did not err in denying Weng’s application for relief. See Shu Wen Sun, 510 F.3d at 380-81; Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Thus, the agency’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief was not in error as all three claims shared the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (withholding of removal); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005) (CAT).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).