Case ID: nc_4-2/html/0177-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Ruffin, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FENTRISS against ROBINS.
    ¶⅞«>⅞'« IYsfcnd/irit iaw m¡ght ll,ave llad a" dequate relief, a Court t/iü notsusv la,n an , junction file® him, on attempt to prove a fpaterial ’fact, in consequence of the advice of his counsel that it vvas' necesWy.
    THIS was a motion to dismiss a bill in equity, upon • • the ground, that the Complainant might have made de-fence in the trial at law. The material allegations in the » ° bill were, that the Complainant purchased from Anderson a tract of land, for which he paid him promptly 120, and ágreed to pay him jCl20 more in a twelvemonth. The " .• . Complainant gave a penal bond, to secure the last inent, which he had reduced to fí 10. The ánt became surety for Anderson to one Hilsly, in bonds amounting, together, to £90, and It was agreed,? that, upon his taking up those bonds, the amount should discharge pro tanto of his penal bond to the Defendant. The Complainant did take up those bonds ; and at' the request of Anderson,’ paid to one Archer the fur** Aer sum of ^10.
    
      Anderson afterWards joined the enemy, during tlft Revolutionary War, but knowing that the balance due nim was only ^10, desirous to guard the Complainant against the payment of a greater sum, asno credits were indorsed on the bond, ancl anxious to secure what was due if he survived the perils which , surrounded him', or that his wife áhd children might receive it if he fell, brought the bond to the Complainant and delivered it to him!. Anderson ■was afterwards Killed, and the Complainant paid the ba-Itifite to his widow, who was in great distress.
    In 178⅜, administration of Aridefson,sreffecta was granted to Robins the elder, who had married his sister, and Who knew all the circumstances relative to the bond and ⅜⅛ payment, and who, although he lived many years, commenced no suit against the Complainant. Upon his death, administration de bonis non was granted to the féndant, who, upon some imperfect information, instituted the. present action, Which was decided in the County Court in favour-of the Complainant; but the Defendant Appealed to the Superior Court. While the suit was depending there, the Defendant admitted to the agent of the Complainant the payment of the money to Hilsly, but alleged, tha# it was in part of the first payment fo.r {he land. This • the Complainant was able to disprove, But was advised;; that it was unnecessary to produce the Jjonds given to Hilsly, or to prove, that they were taken tip ; in consequence of which he did not produce them, ¿aviní no witness to prove them or that they,were taken tip. Upon the trial of the suit, the Complainant proved, that tHe m&ney paid to Hilsly was riot'in part of the first'payment for the land. He also proved the payrhent to Archer. Nevertheless, a judgment and verdict were rendered against him ; the former for the penálty of his fcond, which the Defendant threatens to enforce. The Complainant moved for a new trial; which was denied. He is now ready to prodiice the receipt given for the first payment, and the bonds to Hilsly. Upon the answer coding in, the injunction was dissolved J when a replication was entered and the bill continued as an original one.
    Norwood, for the Complainant.
    Though this Court will reluctantly interpose, after a verdict at law, where the Defendant might have defended himself, yet, when the recovery is untonscientious, and that knoWn to the Plaintiff, Equity will relieve; as where ... a receipt from the Plaintiff at law is found after the ver-diet.
    
    
      
       2 P. Wms 426.
      2 Vern. 146.
      2 Wash. 36.
    
   Ruffin, J.

ft is admitted by the Complainant, that his cáse is one which might have been relieved at law ; and the reason given why it was not, is, that he did not attempt, in a proper manner, to prove a material fact in the trial at law ^ having been advised by his counsel, that such proof was unnecessary. He now insists that it is in his power to make the necessary proofs, and prays to have an opportunity to do so here. In this point of view* the bill is an appeal to this Court for a new trial in Equity. If a new trial had been proper, the Court of Law was entirely competent to grant it. It is a subject of the ordinary jurisdiction of those Courts. But the Complainant further says, that he did move for a new trial, and was refused; and this refusal is made another ground for' Coming into this Court. In this respect, the bill is fot relief against the errors of the judgment at law.

If these facts laid any foundation for a suit in Equityy there would soon be an end to all proceedings at Laws Upon one or other of these points, either to hear errorsr °f the CoUrc or re-try the facts falsely found by the jury,; all causes would end in Chancery, and the Courts of Comma» Law be abolished.

It is Unnecessary to sáy, whether the bpinion of the Superior Court rías right or not; though it may well be doubted whether the mistake 6f counsel upon t^point of law, as stated in the bill, forms á ground for a new trial: Zachary v. Lester, in this Court. Whether right or wrong, a Court of Equity is not to hear errors or reverse judgments at law. The case of Ambler v. Wild, has been cited bji the Defendant; and it must be admitted, that it goes the full length of the present case. But that decision is a solitary one, and I cannot allow to it the authority of overturning a long train of contrary decisions and the oldest and best established maxims of our law.

Courts of Law and Courts of Equity are both eminently useful, and, perhaps, alike indispensable. But they are very differently constituted, proceed by different modes, take cognizance of different subjects, and are intended tot different purposes, fin their original organization, their jurisdictions are separate, and it appears to me that their utility can only be preserved by keeping them unblended.

I am, therefore, of opinion, that Equity ought not, in any instance, to interfere, where a competent relief migltfi have been had at Law ; and, consequently, that

The bill must be dismissed.

The fest of the Court concurred. 
      
       2 Wash. Rep. 36.