Case ID: scl_32/html/0442-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Wardlaw J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

James S. M’Call, v. Brunson L. Lewis.
    In the ordinary case of conveyance for Hie, with remainder—sale by the tenant for life, and contest between the p1 rchuser and remainderman, if neither party be affected by registry, the remainderman must prevail, because bebas the prior and better evi fence of title.
    The Court held, that the registry of a deed of personal property, in the Secretary of States’ Office, was sanctioned by our statutes, so as to be notice to all subsequent purchasers,
    Tried before Mr. Justice Frost, at Darlington, Spring Term, 1847.
    This was an action ot trover for six negroes. The plaintiff claimed under a bill of sale from W. K. Taylor, dated 29th March, 1841. Taylor had been in possession of the negroes about five years before the sale. The defendant derived title under a deed from P. E. Pearson to the said W. K. Taylor, dated the 2d February, 1836; by which Pearson conveyed to Taylor, Martin and Jude, and their daughter Effie, the last named of whom, and her children, are the subject of this action, “in trust and confidence to hold the same lor the benefit of my sister, Martha C. Taylor, wile of said William Taylor; and after the death of my said sister, to such child or children as she «hall have living ai the time ot her death.” This deed was recorded in the R. M. C. Office in Fairfield district, 13th April, 1836; and in the office of the Secretary of State, in Columbia, in August following. Some short time after the execution of the deed, Taylor carried the slaves into Darlington district, where he resided. Martha C. Taylor died about three or four years before the trial, leaving children, of whom the defendant had married one.
    Many questions were made in the case, which, with the evidence connected with them, it is unnecessary to report for the purposes of this appeal.
    On the construction of the deed, it was ruled, that it created no trusts, but transferred to Taylor the legal estate, during the life of his wife; with a legal estate in remainder to her children.
    The plaintiff insisted that he should be protected in the title derived from Taylor, as a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice; but it was held that the plaintiff could not thus maintain his claim, because the record of the deed was notice.
    The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, and moved fora new trial, on the grounds annexed:
    1st. Because his Honor ruled that the instrument, under which the defendant claimed, created no trust either in relation to the tenant for life, or the remainderman.
    2d. Because his Honor ruled, that the 47th section of the Act of 1785, required all trust deeds to be recorded, and that the plaintiff, therefore, had notice of the title of defendant by reason of the recording of the same.
    3d. Because his Honor should have charged the jury that the title of the plaintiff was perfect, having bought the negroes without notice of the claim of the defendant.
    4th. Because the verdict of the jury was against the law and evidence.
    Moses & Haynsworth, for the motion.
   Wardlaw J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

By the deed a legal estate was conveyed to W. Iv. Taylor, his executors and administrators, for and during the life of his wife. Whether his marital rights attached, or whether he held as trustee for the sole and separate use of his wife, it is unimportant, perhaps unsuitable, for this Court to inquire. It is enough that he was legal owner. But the deed, as seems plain, gave the property alter the wife’s death to her children, and it is unimportant to consider what would have been the result here, had the husband been constituted trustee for the separate use of the wife during her life, and for her children after her death, and the possession had been acquired by the children, after the death of the wife and the accomplishment of all the apparent purposes of the trust.

The case is then the ordinary one of conveyance for life, with remainder—sale by the tenant for life, and contest between the purchaser and a remainderman. If neither party be affected by registry, the remainderman must prevail, because he has the prior and better evidence of title.

If other views of the deed be taken, so that the question of registry be material, this Court, although the members of it arrive at the conclusion by various processes, is of opinion that the registry of the deed in the Secretary of State’s office, was sanctioned by our Statutes, so as to be notice to all subsequent purchasers.

The motion is therefore dismissed.