Case ID: ny-2d_90/html/0742-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Smith, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

[688 NE2d 479, 665 NYS2d 605]
    In the Matter of Lawrence Merson et al., Respondents, v Donald F. McNally et al., Respondents; Philipstown Industrial Park, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant. In the Matter of Philipstown Industrial Park, Inc., Appellant, v Town Board of Town of Philipstown et al., Respondents.
    Argued September 10, 1997;
    decided October 30, 1997
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      LeBoeuf Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L. L. P., Albany (Robert J. Alessi and Michele L. Anderson of counsel), Van DeWater & 
      
      Van DeWater, Poughkeepsie (Ronald C. Blass, Jr., of counsel), and Robinson Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman, L. L. P., New York City (J. Kevin Healy and Philip E. Karmel of counsel), for intervenor-appellant in the first above-entitled proceeding.
    I. The Planning Board rationally issued a negative declaration for the mining project. (Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674; Matter of Schodack Concerned Citizens v Town Bd., 148 AD2d 130, 75 NY2d 701; Sun Co. [R & M] v City of Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 209 AD2d 34, 86 NY2d 776; Matter of Cohalan v Carey, 88 AD2d 77, 57 NY2d 672; Matter of Currier v Planning Bd., 74 AD2d 872, 52 NY2d 722; Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd., 79 NY2d 373; Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355; Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd., 157 AD2d 273.) II. The Planning Board did not issue a de facto conditioned negative declaration. (Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd., 157 AD2d 273; Matter of Cathedral Church v Dormitory Auth., 224 AD2d 95, 89 NY2d 802; Matter of Miller v City of Lockport, 210 AD2d 955, 85 NY2d 807; Matter of Ferrari v Town of Penfield Planning Bd., 181 AD2d 149; Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd., 79 NY2d 373.) III. The de facto conditioned negative declaration is an unnecessary, unworkable concept which is contrary to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) framework. (Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524; Matter of Hingston v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 202 AD2d 877, 84 NY2d 809.)
    
      John A. Porco, P. C., Carmel (Robert C. Lusardi of counsel), for Lawrence Merson and others, respondents in the first above-entitled proceeding.
    I. Respondent, Planning Board, did not take a "hard look” at the environmental issues and did not comply with the procedural requirements of SEQRA. (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561; Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400; Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd., 157 AD2d 273; Matter of Holmes v Brookhaven Town Planning Bd., 137 AD2d 601; Matter of Rye Town/ King Civic Assn. v Town of Rye, 82 AD2d 474, 55 NY2d 747, 56 NY2d 985, 57 NY2d 775; Matter of Group For S. Fork v Wines, 190 AD2d 794; Matter of Schenectady Chems. v Flacke, 83 AD2d 460; Inland Vail Farm Co. v Stergianopoulos, 104 AD2d 395, 65 NY2d 718; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v Planning Bd., 96 AD2d 986, 61 NY2d 668.) II. The negative declaration issued by the Planning Board was a conditioned negative declaration or a "de facto” conditioned illegal negative declaration. (Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd., 157 AD2d 273; Matter of Group For S. Fork v Wines, 190 AD2d 794.)
    
      Rivkin, Radler & Kremer, Uniondale (Evan H. Krinick, Perry Balagur and Merril Schapiro Biscone of counsel), for New York State Builders Association, Inc., amicus curiae in the first above-entitled proceeding.
    The Court of Appeals should reject the Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd. (157 AD2d 273) doctrine. (Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784; Matter of Howard v Wyman, 28 NY2d 434; Matter of Har Enters. v Town of Brookhaven, 74 NY2d 524; Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd., 79 NY2d 373.)
    
      LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L. L. P., Albany (Robert J. Alessi and Michele L. Anderson of counsel), Van DeWater & Van DeWater, Poughkeepsie (Ronald C. Blass, Jr., of counsel), and Robinson, Silverman Pearce Aronsohn & Berman, L. L. P., New York City (J. Kevin Healy and Philip E. Karmel of counsel), for appellant in the second above-entitled proceeding.
    I. The Court below erred in relying upon SEQRA to overturn the lower court’s annulment of the Town Board’s action because the lower court based its decision on grounds that are independent of SEQRA and that provide independent grounds to annul the Town Board’s action. II. The Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL) preempts the Philipstown Mining Law. (Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v Town of Carroll, 71 NY2d 126; Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668; Matter of Northeast Mines v State of New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 113 AD2d 62; Seaboard Contr. & Material v Town of Smithtown, 147 AD2d 4; Town of Cortlandt v Santucci, 163 Misc 2d 483; Matter of North Shore Steak House v Board of Appeals, 30 NY2d 238.) III. The Town’s August 3, 1995 mining amendments are without significance. (Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753; Matter of Alscot Investing Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Centre, 64 NY2d 921; Matter of Hatcher v Planning Bd., 111 AD2d 812; Matter of Pokoik v Department of Health Servs., 220 AD2d 13; Matter of Temkin v Karagheuzoff, 34 NY2d 324; Cymbidium Dev. Corp. v Smith, 133 AD2d 605; Matter of Lawrence School Corp. v Morris, 167 AD2d 467.) IV. Once the Town Board has delegated authority to a Planning Board to issue a special use permit, the Town Board may not retain jurisdiction to nullify the Planning Board’s issuance of such a permit. (Matter of Kamhi v Planning Bd., 59 NY2d 385; 
      Matter of Spinosa v Ackerman, 98 Misc 2d 1073, 72 AD2d 976; Matter of Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val., 61 NY2d 892; Matter of Allen v Adami, 39 NY2d 275; Incorporated Vil. of Old Field v Hickey, 225 AD2d 666; Matter of 440 E. 102nd St. Corp. v Murdock, 285 NY 298; Matter of Pittsford Plaza Assocs. v Spiegel, 66 NY2d 717; Matter of Ogden Citizens for Responsible Land Use v Planning Bd., 224 AD2d 921.) V. The Town Board’s action was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. (Matter of Lee Realty Co. v Village of Spring Val., 61 NY2d 892; Matter of Sullivan v Town Bd., 102 AD2d 113; Matter of McDonald v City of Ogdensburg Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 101 AD2d 900; Matter of Knight v Bodkin, 41 AD2d 413; Matter of Peter Pan Games v Board of Estimate, 67 AD2d 925; Matter of Leisure Time Billiards v Rose, 201 AD2d 340; Matter of Samek v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 162 AD2d 926; Matter of Old Country Burgers Co. v Town Bd., 160 AD2d 805.)
    
      Richard I. Goldsand, Brewster, for respondents in the second above-entitled proceeding.
    I. The MLRL does not preempt section 175-42 of the Town of Philipstown Zoning Code. (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668; Village of Savona v Knight Settlement Sand & Gravel, 88 NY2d 897; Matter of Cathedral of Incarnation v Glimm, 97 AD2d 409, 61 NY2d 826; Matter of Tandem Holding Corp. v Board of Zoning Appeals, 43 NY2d 801; Matter of Hunt Bros. v Glennon, 81 NY2d 906; Morrell v C.I.D. Landfill, 125 AD2d 998, 69 NY2d 612; Matter of Northeast Mines v State of New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 113 AD2d 62; Matter of Voorheesville Sand & Stone v Town of New Scotland, 136 AD2d 849; Seaboard Contr. & Material v Town of Smithtown, 147 AD2d 4; Matter of Hoffay v Tifft, 164 AD2d 94.) II. Appellant duly amended its zoning law on August 3, 1995 and pending the determination of this appeal. (Matter of Alscot Investing Corp. v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Centre, 64 NY2d 921; Matter of Hatcher v Planning Bd., 111 AD2d 812; Lander v Wilson, 100 AD2d 896.) III. The Town Board’s resolution withholding final approval and disapproving and denying respondent’s application for a temporary special use permit was not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. (Matter of Wegmans Enters. v Lansing, 72 NY2d 1000; Matter of Ngen Ock Lee v Riverhead Town Bd., 120 AD2d 530; Matter of Major v Cohen, 126 AD2d 205; Matter of Shell Oil Co. v Farrington, 19 AD2d 555; Hausman v Common Council, 60 AD2d 770; Matter of 4M Club v Andrews, 11 AD2d 720; Matter of Turner v Cook, 9 Misc 2d 850; Matter of Vic’s Auto Body & Repair v Granito, 43 AD2d 982; Matter of 
      
      Bebis v Board of Stds. & Appeals, 28 Misc 2d 304; Matter of McCormick v Lawrence, 54 AD2d 123.) IV. Section 274-b of the Town Law does not prohibit the Town Board from reserving unto itself final approval of the subject temporary special use permit. (Matter of Boxer v Town Bd., 60 AD2d 913; Matter of Spinosa v Ackerman, 98 Misc 2d 1073.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

We hold that, under certain circumstances, a negative declaration may be issued under the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) even where the project — a Type I action — has been modified during the initial review process to accommodate environmental concerns of the lead agency and other interested parties.

In the first case, Matter of Merson v McNally, we conclude that the modifications made to the project in response to environmental concerns raised during the Planning Board’s review, were a legitimate product of the process and did not implicitly convert the ultimate determination of nonsignificance into an improperly conditioned negative declaration. Thus, the order of the Appellate Division annulling the negative declaration should be reversed. Since that decision was relied upon by the Appellate Division to dismiss the project developer’s petition in the second action, Matter of Philipstown Indus. Park v Town Bd., a reversal is also appropriate in that case. Each case must be remitted to the Appellate Division for a determination of issues raised but not decided on the appeal to that Court.

I

The cases before us represent two parts of one long story for which the relevant facts will be summarized herein. Philips-town Industrial Park, Inc. (PIP) is the owner of over 80 acres of real property located within an industrial zoning district in the Town of Philipstown, Putnam County, New York. PIP’s development plans for the land included soil mining and reclamation on the southern portion of the parcel.

Prior to PIP’s purchase of the land in 1987, the property had been extensively mined but had not been relandscaped. Under its proposal, about 9.8 acres would again be subject to surface mining which would consist of "sizing” gravel by sifting the material through a portable screen. Another area of about 7.5 acres would not be mined but would be regraded and reclaimed and a third area would be subject to various activities necessary to the operation of the mine. The mining project would result in an expansion of the pond located on the parcel which PIP claims would "yield environmental benefits and recreational opportunities.”

PIP applied to the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for a "mined land reclamation permit” pursuant to New York’s Mined Land Reclamation Law (MLRL; ECL 23-2701 — 23-2727). PIP also applied to the Planning Board for a temporary Town Special Use Mining Permit pursuant to the Town Mining Law. The chapter sets forth certain "standards and conditions” pursuant to which each mining project proposal is to be considered (see, art X, § 175-46) and the question' arose whether the local mining law was preempted by the MLRL. Finding no preemption, the Planning Board reviewed the permit application and declared itself the lead agency for purposes of review under SEQRA. The DEC and the Department of Transportation were among the other agencies involved in the review process.

The Planning Board first determined that the mining project qualified as a Type I action under SEQRA because it "involve[d] the physical alteration of 10 acres” (6 NYCRR 617.12 [b] [6] [i]). PIP then submitted a draft of a full Environmental Assessment Form (EAF) pursuant to the SEQRA regulations. During the review process, the Planning Board identified several "potentially large” environmental impacts from the proposed project. In response to concerns raised by the interested agencies, the Planning Board and community members during public meetings and hearings, PIP continually revised portions of its project plans. All of the modifications were discussed and considered by the Planning Board during these open meetings. The entire project proposal was reduced to a single bound volume (which included a completed EAF) and was finally submitted on May 4, 1993.

On May 18, 1993, the Planning Board received an opinion from the DEC that a determination of nonsignificance in the form of a negative declaration would be appropriate for the mining project. Two days later, on May 20, 1993, the Planning Board issued a negative declaration by unanimous vote. The Planning Board also granted the temporary special use permit (subject to the final approval of the Town Board) upon its finding that "the applicant has met or exceeded the performance standards outlined” in the Town Zoning Law. Soon afterward, a group of community residents filed a CPLR article 78 petition in Supreme Court seeking to annul the negative declaration of the Planning Board and PIP intervened.

Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding and concluded that the determination of the Planning Board was not improperly issued. In so holding, the court found that "the environmental assessment form adequately identified areas of environmental impact.” The court stated that it would "defer to the planning board’s discretion as to the * * * issuance of a negative declaration under SEQRA.”

The Appellate Division reversed and annulled the negative declaration. The Court held (227 AD2d 487, 490):

"Inherent in the Planning Board’s determination was a recognition of significant environmental impacts posed by the intervenor’s project * * *. It is evident that the numerous measures proposed by the intervenor in mitigation of these impacts were conditional prerequisites for the issuance of the negative declaration * * *. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Planning Board’s negative declaration was the functional equivalent of a conditioned negative declaration” (citations omitted).

On May 25, 1993, PIP wrote to the Town Board to request final approval of the special use permit pursuant to article X, § 175-42 of the Town Zoning Law. Approval was denied by the Town Board on July 12, 1993 based upon various zoning and environmental concerns. PIP filed an article 78 proceeding on August 4, 1993 which challenged the right of the Town Board to deny a temporary special use permit for PIP’s project. Supreme Court found in PIP’s favor and granted the petition. The Appellate Division concluded that reversal was mandated by its determination in Matter of Merson v McNally, and it reached no other issues raised by the parties.

PIP appeals the ruling of the Appellate Division in Merson pursuant to leave granted by this Court, and we now reverse that determination. PIP also appeals the ruling of the Appellate Division in Philipstown, again pursuant to leave granted by this Court. PIP principally argues that the Town’s mining ordinance was preempted by the New York State Mined Land Reclamation Law (see, Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668; Village of Savona v Knight Settlement Sand & Gravel, 88 NY2d 897). We must, however, consider the case in the posture it comes before us. Thus, because the Appellate Division has not addressed the issues of preemption and the propriety of the Town Board’s withholding its approval of the temporary special use permit, we reverse and remit for consideration of these issues, without expressing any view on them.

II

''SEQRA’s fundamental policy is to inject environmental considerations directly into governmental decision making” (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d 674, 679). This policy is effectuated, in part, through strict compliance with the review procedures outlined in the environmental laws and regulations (see, Matter of King v Saratoga County Bd. of Supervisors, 89 NY2d 341, 347-348). A SEQRA review process conducted through closed bilateral negotiations between an agency and a developer would bypass, if not eliminate, the comprehensive, open weighing of environmentally compatible alternatives both to the proposed action and to any suggested mitigation measures.

However, we disagree with the Appellate Division’s holding to the extent it can be read to bar any significant modification during the review process as a conditioned negative declaration. Instead, we adopt an analysis which allows for consideration of the legitimate maturation of a development project in accordance with the goals of environmental regulation. In exercising our judicial review function concerning the process at issue, we conclude that the determination of nonsignificance made by the lead agency was not improper.

The Regulatory Process Under SEQRA

Under the procedures set forth in the DEC regulations, when a developer first submits a proposal for a particular project, it is determined whether the project qualifies as a Type I, Type II or an unlisted action for purposes of SEQRA review (6 NYCRR 617.5 [a] [4]). For Type I actions, the developer must submit a full EAF which "must be used to determine the significance of such actions” (6 NYCRR 617.5 [b]).

The very purpose of an EAF is to assist an agency "in determining the environmental significance or nonsignificance of actions” (6 NYCRR 617.2 [m]). As the form itself states, "[t]he full EAF is intended to provide a method whereby applicants and agencies can be assured that the determination process has been orderly, comprehensive in nature, yet flexible enough to allow introduction of information to fit a project or action” (6 NYCRR 617.20, appendix A). Part 2 of the EAF allows the lead agency to identify "the range of possible impacts” and "whether an impact can be mitigated or reduced” (6 NYCRR 617.20, appendix A). As stated on the required form, "[identifying that an impact will be potentially large * * * does not mean that it is also necessarily significant. Any large impact must be evaluated in Part 3 to determine significance. Identifying an impact in column 2 simply asks that it be looked at further.” This highlights the functional difference between an EAF and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). While an EAF is used to determine significance or nonsignificance, the purpose of an EIS is to examine the identified potentially significant environmental impacts which may result from a project (Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d, at 680).

To arrive at its determination of significance, the lead agency must identify "the relevant areas of environmental concern” and take a "hard look” at them (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 397; see also, Matter of Kahn v Pasnik, 90 NY2d 569 [decided today]). The agency must set forth a reasoned elaboration for its determination (see, Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd., 79 NY2d 373, 381; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d, at 680). As we have stated, "[w]here an agency fails to take the requisite hard look and make a reasoned elaboration, or its determination is affected by an error of law, or its decision was not rational, or is arbitrary and capricious or not supported by substantial evidence, the agency’s determination may be annulled” (Matter of WEOK Broadcasting Corp. v Planning Bd., 79 NY2d, at 383). However, we have also cautioned that "[wjhile judicial review must be meaningful, the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency for it is not their role to 'weigh the desirability of any action or [to] choose among alternatives’ ” (Akpan v Koch, 75 NY2d 561, 570, quoting Matter of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400, 416).

Although the parties presently contest issues such as whether the lead agency took a "hard look,” the Appellate Division resolved these cases solely on the ground that modifications made to the project were an improper circumvention of the procedural requirements under the environmental regulations. Thus, that is the threshold critical issue that we must address.

The Impact of Modifications on the SEQRA Process

The dilemma is this — how to permit an evolving process for identification of environmental concerns and initiatives to meet those concerns yet, on the other hand, to guard against an avoidance of the EIS process through private bilateral negotiations between a developer and a lead agency when a project may have potentially significant environmental impacts which need full and open consideration.

To deal with this dilemma, we start with the definition of a conditioned negative declaration, permitted only in unlisted actions: "a negative declaration issued by a lead agency for an unlisted action, involving an applicant, in which the action as initially proposed may result in one or more significant adverse environmental effects', however, mitigation measures identified and required by the lead agency * * * will modify the proposed action so that no significant environmental impacts will result” (6 NYCRR 617.2 [h] [emphasis supplied]).

Applying this definition in the context of a Type I action, we prescribe a twofold inquiry to examine whether a negative declaration has been impermissibly conditioned: (1) whether the project, as initially proposed, might result in the identification of one or more "significant adverse environmental effects”; and (2) whether the proposed mitigating measures incorporated into part 3 of the EAF were "identified and required by the lead agency” as a condition precedent to the issuance of the negative declaration.

On the first point, if all areas of concern involve a minimal risk to the environment, no further inquiry is necessary and modifications in these areas would not impermissibly condition or invalidate an otherwise proper negative declaration. However, where the lead agency has identified potentially significant impacts (see, Chinese Staff & Workers Assn. v City of New York, 68 NY2d 359, 364-365), or where the record supports an inference that the identified impacts would have to be considered potentially significant (see, Inland Vale Farm Co. v Stergianopoulos, 104 AD2d 395, 397, affd 65 NY2d 718), or where the identified impacts fall within typically environmentally sensitive areas or locations, the second prong of the test must be examined.

At the second phase of analysis, a court must examine whether the proposed mitigating measures, incorporated as part of an open and deliberative process, negated the project’s potential adverse effects. Under such circumstances, the proposal, as revised, could still result in a determination of non-significance and the issuance of a valid negative declaration. In this regard, mitigating measures could be viewed as part of the "give and take” of the application process, and would be less of a concern than those revisions or mitigation measures made after final submission of the EAF.

However, a lead agency clearly may not issue a negative declaration on the basis of conditions contained in the declaration itself. Nor could the lead agency achieve the same end by other means, such as supporting the negative declaration with a statement that conditions would be imposed only on an underlying special use permit to reduce environmental impacts; extracting concessions from the developer as necessary prerequisites to the issuance of the negative declaration (Matter of Shawangunk Mtn. Envtl. Assn. v Planning Bd., 157 AD2d 273, 277); or requiring specific mitigation measures, and then approving a proposal that has been revised in compliance with the mandate of the lead agency.

The environmental review process was not meant to be a bilateral negotiation between a developer and lead agency but, rather, an open process that also involves other interested agencies and the public. Thus, there would ordinarily be no inherent problem in revising or modifying project plans to address concerns raised during the environmental review, particularly concerns raised by other agencies.

However, mitigating measures will not obviate the need for an EIS unless they clearly negate the continued potentiality of the adverse effects of the proposed action. Otherwise, the EIS process would be necessary to review the adequacy of the mitigating measures, and any environmentally compatible alternatives to the suggested mitigations. The lead agency’s determination of the sufficiency of the proposed mitigation measures would of course be subject to a judicial examination of whether the lead agency took the requisite hard look (see, e.g., Matter of Kahn v Pasnik, 90 NY2d 569, supra [decided today]); the more numerous and significant the environmental impacts identified at the outset, the greater possibility that mitigation measures would not suffice, and an EIS would be required.

Here, the Planning Board, in reviewing part 2 of the EAF identified a number of impacts as "potentially large.” For example, the Town’s planning consultant articulated his concern with "ambient noise level and access to a mining operation through a subdivision.” Indeed, the consultant specifically stated that "the Board must consider the noise issue more in depth as it has been shown to be one of the most complex and important matters in connection with the application” bearing on SEQRA review.

Nevertheless, the agency’s general concerns relating to noise levels were alleviated through the review process by the actions of, and open discussions with, the developer. In response to such concerns, PIP explained that it had taken several surveys and readings of the ambient noise in the area of the mining operation and, as a result of its analysis, PIP concluded that "an ambient noise level within the guidelines of the [local] zoning law will be maintainable by the mining operation.” Additionally, in this regard, the agency suggested that Saturday hours and operations be limited only to the sale of materials and the developer agreed.

A similar open and deliberative process surrounded the concerns raised by the increased traffic stemming from the project. The Board suggested that the developer "consider” a separate access road and the mining plan was amended in response to such comments. PIP pursued a temporary access route onto Route 9 and other measures to lessen the traffic on residential streets.

Another example of legitimate modifications being made surrounds the concerns raised about groundwater and possible contamination around the aquifer, typically an environmentally sensitive area. In a Townwide Aquifer Study published after PIP initially submitted its permit application, a minimum of eight feet of overburden was recommended for placement above seasonal high groundwater elevation to alleviate concerns associated with the subsurface sewage disposal system. Although PIP’s original plans called for six feet of overburden, PIP modified its plans to incorporate two additional feet of overburden when it reviewed the report. This modification negated the potential adverse effects.

Thus, the modifications here were not conditions unilaterally imposed by the lead agency, but essentially were adjustments incorporated by the project sponsor to mitigate the concerns identified by the public and the reviewing agencies, with only minor variations requested by the lead agency during the review process. Of distinguishing dispositive import here is that the modifications were examined openly and with input from all parties involved. This process comports with the overriding purposes of SEQRA.

The revisions thus came about as part of the review process and were submitted and publicly evaluated prior to the issuance of the negative declaration. Moreover, the lead agency properly sought the views of other interested agencies before making a final determination regarding significance. In fact, the DEC issued its recommendation of nonsignificance based upon the final revised project plans in accordance with the regulations (see, 6 NYCRR 617.3 [e]). These considerations combine to support the conclusion that the negative declaration in this case was not improperly conditioned.

This case illustrates the practical reality that a project, especially a large undertaking such as a Type I action, usually undergoes modifications from its initial specifications. Modifications made to a project during the review process should not necessarily be characterized as impermissible "conditions.” Indeed, the SEQRA regulations themselves help to show that the purpose of identifying "potentially large” environmental impacts in the midst of the EAF process is to allow a developer the opportunity to address those potential impacts in the project proposal.

In sum, the mere circumstance that modifications may have been made to a proposal is an insufficient basis to nullify a negative declaration otherwise properly issued. What is dispositive is the character and source of the identified modifications. The SEQRA process here was conducted openly and deliberatively. Moreover, the agency’s elaboration of the basis for its determination of nonsignificance is reasonable.

Accordingly, in each case, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Appellate Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Titone, Bellacosa, Levine, Ciparick and Wesley concur.

In each case: Order reversed, etc. 
      
      . On November 5, 1993, the DEC issued a State Mining Permit and, in a letter addressed to "Town Supervisor & Concerned Citizens,” the DEC explained why the environmental concerns raised in the Town Board’s denial of a special use permit were without merit.
     
      
      . The agency may waive the requirement of an EAF if a draft EIS is submitted instead (6 NYCRR 617.6 [a] [4]).
     
      
      . As stated in the current regulations, "[a]n EIS provides a means for agencies, project sponsors and the public to systematically consider significant adverse environmental impacts, alternatives and mitigation” (6 NYCRR 617.2 [n]). If the lead agency determines "that the action may include the potential for at least one significant environmental effect” (6 NYCRR 617.6 [g] [1] [i]), the agency must issue a positive declaration (6 NYCRR 617.2 [cc]; Matter of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v Board of Estimate, 72 NY2d, at 680). However, when the agency determines that "the implementation of the action as proposed will not result in any significant environmental effects,” the agency may issue an unqualified negative declaration (see, 6 NYCRR 617.2 [y]).