Case ID: f-appx_474/html/0825-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

XIUHUI YANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    
    No. 11-2452-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 11, 2012.
    Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; James E. Grimes, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sarah Maloney, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROBERT A. KATZMANN and RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption to read as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Xiuhui Yang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a June 8, 2011 decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Xiuhui Yang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 8, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of Yang’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where, as here, the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating the motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Yang’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than two years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A change in personal circumstances in the United States does not constitute a change in country conditions. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005).

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Yang failed to establish such circumstances based on her newly-commenced practice of Christianity in the United States. Moreover, and contrary to Yang’s argument, the BIA did not find that her motion to reopen was based solely on her changed personal circumstances because it also considered whether she had demonstrated a material change in conditions in China since the time of her 2008 merits hearing and reasonably concluded that she had not. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Indeed, the BIA — referencing, among other documents, various State Department reports — reasonably found that Yang’s evidence did not show an intensification in the persecution of Christians in China since Yang’s 2008 proceedings, but rather reflected a continuation of the policy of the Chinese government of suppression of unsanctioned religious activity. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A.2007). Although a 2009 ChinaAid.org Report and several newspaper articles indicated an increase in the persecution of Christians in some areas of China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in giving more weight to the State Department reports, as there was no evidence to demonstrate the reliability of the other evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341-42 (2d Cir.2006).

Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Yang failed to establish a material change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(h).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).