Case ID: f-appx_690/html/1005-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Daniel MASTERSON; Bijou Masterson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP., formerly known as The Bank of New York as Trustee for CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2007-19, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2007-19; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-55277
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 8, 2017 
    
    Filed May 17, 2017
    Daniel Masterson, Pro Se
    Bijou Masterson, Pro Se
    Jennifer A. Jackson, Esquire, Litigation Counsel, Bryan Cave LLP, Santa Monica, CA, Douglas E. Winter, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
    Jennifer A. Jackson, Esquire, Litigation Counsel, Bryan Cave LLP, Irvine, CA, Monica Kohles, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Santa Monica, CA, Douglas E. Winter, Attorney, Bryan Cave LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
    Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Daniel Masterson and Bijou Masterson appeal pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We have an independent duty to determine whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

Dismissal of the Mastersons’ action was proper because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, as the Master-sons failed to allege an injury in fact to establish Article III standing. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC) Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (the alleged injury must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” to establish Article III standing); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (elements of Article III standing). Because a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice, see Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004), we vacate the judgment in part and remand for the district court to dismiss the Mastersons’ action without prejudice.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.