Case ID: ga_41/html/0045-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BROWN, C. J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*THOMAS OZMORE plaintiff in error, v. PERCEY ANN OZMORE, defendant in error.
    (Atlanta,
    June Term, 1870.)
    APPELLATE PRACTICE—REVIEW—ORDER FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND ALIMONY..—An order for attorneys’ fees and alimony will not be reviewed by the Supreme Court pending the act of divorce. (R.) See end of Report. The declaration in this case sets forth a cause of action, and the demurrer was properly overruled.
    DIVORCE — GROUNDS — CRUEETY — CONDONATION. — Kicking one’s wife, wounding and bruising her eye, head and face, is sufficient cruel treatment to justify a divorce, and a condonation will not prevent it, if that condonation was upon a condition which has been broken by the husband. (R.)
    'Divorce. Alimony. Bill of Exceptions. Before Judge Harrell. Randolph Superior Court. November Term, 1869.
    Mrs. Ozmore’s libel for divorce, stripped of the verbosity usual in such pleadings, averred that they married on the 27th of August, 1857, lived happily, had children, (giving ages, etc.,) but he became “unkind, harsh and cruel in his general deportment to her, sought every opportunity to vex, harrass and render her life as wretched and miserable as he well could do; he has even resorted to acts of personal violence towards her;” “kicked her and knocked her down, wounding and bruising her head, face and right eye.” She submitted to all this, hoping he would do better, but “of late, just before their separation, he has grown more intolerant, insulting and cruel in his general deportment towards her, sought every possible way to harrass, vex and mistreat her, and has accused her, without cause, of the grossest immoralities and crimes;” “heaped upon her reproaches, curses, and the most profane and bitter maledictions;” repeatedly ordered her to take said children, leave his house and go to her people, for that he and she must and should separate, and said that he would no longer labor for the support of her and said children, and by menaces and threats, alarmed her for her personal safety, and thereby forced her to leave his house and home.” Therefore, “on the 7th of September, 1869, at his command, she took her children, separated from him, and went to her people.” She prayed for a divorce a *vinculo matrimonii. He filed a demurrer to said petition. Pending this suit she applied for alimony and counsel fees. His counsel insisted upon his demurrer, and it was overruled. The- Judge heard evidence as to the condition of the parties, and the circumstances of the separation, and granted alimony and attorneys’ fees. His counsel filed a writ of error, and said that he erred in overruling said demurrer, in granting fees and alimony, “because there are no sufficient grounds stated in the libel to authorize a divorce, because the proof failed to show that she could maintain her action for divorce, and because the allowance for fees and alimony was excessive.” Because not before the Court, (though it is hinted at in the opinion,) this evidence is useless here. This. Court, on its own motion, declined to consider the questions of alimony and attorneys’ fees, because the order as to them • was but interlocutory, and could not be brought to this Court till the final decree in the case, and confined his counsel to the demurrer to the libel.
    E. ,L. Douglass, Hood & Kiddoo, for plaintiff in error,
    cited as to Alimony, Code, Secs. 1732, 1735; 38 Ga., 663; 39th, 53. As to Condoning, Code, Sec. 1714; 24th Ga., 238. As to Cruelty, 36th Ga., 286.
    B. S. Worrill, for defendant.
   By the Court—

BROWN, C. J.,

delivering the opinion.

This case was heard in this Court, upon the demurrer to the libel for divorce. The cause assigned is cruel treatment of the wife by the husband. While we are not disposed to encourage the dissolution of the marriage relation, for every indiscreet act, harsh expression, or unkind word, spoken by one of the parties to the other, we feel constrained to hold that the declaration sets forth sufficient cause in this case to sustain the action, under our statute, and to authorize a total or a partial divorce, in the discretion of the jury, if the allegations are sustained on the hearing of the case. It is distinctly alleged that the husband kicked the wife with his *shoe, on the side of the head, knocking her from the chair where she was sitting, upon the floor, wounding and bruising her eye, head and face. This was certainly such cruel treatment as justified her appeal to the Courts.

But it is replied, that the declaration shows a condonation of this act, and that the parties lived together as husband and wife for months after this cruelty was inflicted. This is true, but the declaration also alleges, that this condonation was on condition •that he would never molest or maltreat her again, and that he afterwards not only cursed and abused her, but that he, without cause, accused her of criminal sexual intercourse with other men; and when she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy by him, and was almost ready to be confined, that he ordered her to leave his house and take her children with her, as he would not work for her and them any longer; and that, becoming alarmed for her personal safety and life, she took her children, ■ left his home and went to.her people. If there was a condonation on the condition stated, we hold that those acts were a clear violation of that condition.

The declaration may be subject to special demurrer for informality in the statement of time, place, etc., but it is amendable in this particular. We hold that a good cause of action is substantially set forth. Judgment affirmed.