Case ID: tex-crim_172/html/0024-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McDonald, judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Marvin Bell v. State
    No. 34,134.
    February 7, 1962
    
      
      Florence, Garrison & Holt, Gilmer, for appellant.
    
      Leon Douglas, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.
   McDonald, judge.

The offense is possession of whiskey in a dry area for the purpose of sale; the punishment, a fine of $1,000.00 and confinement in jail for six months.

The disposition hereof makes a statement of the facts unnecessary.

Appellant objected to the failure of the trial court to define the term “prima facie evidence” in the charge to the jury.

Where the state relies upon the prima facie evidence statute to show that intoxicants were possessed for the purpose of sale, as it did herein, the definition of “prima facie evidence” should be given in the charge. Whitaker v. State, 164 Texas Cr. Rep. 264, 298 S.W. 2d 600; Seay v. State, 184 Texas Cr. Rep. 256, 115 S.W. 2d 418; and Floeck v. State, 34 Texas Cr. Rep. 314, 30 S.W. 794.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.