Case ID: h-j_6/html/0418-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Dorsey, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Key’s Ex’r. vs. Parnham.
    Appeal from Saint Mary’s county court. Action of Assumpsit. The' declaration contained four counts — A That Key, the defendant’s testator, (now appellant,) had hired of the plaintiff) (the appellee,) sundry slaves for the use of K. K. Heath, in consideration whereof, Key then and there, in writing, underfoot and faithfully promised the plaintiff to pay him §80 for each and every slave, amounting in the whole to §480. 2. That Key was indebted to the plaintiff' for the hire.,and wages of sundry slaves, &c. 3.' Quantum ‘tp.eruit fe’.the hire of slaves, íce. 4. That R. K. Heath was indebted to the; plaintiffin §480, in consideration of the premises,; and fkat the'plaintiff) at the request of Key, would forbear and, give, time to Heath. for payment until the 1st of January 1818. Key undertook and promised to pay the plaintiff on that day, &c. The defendant pleaded no?i assumpsit iestatoris. At the trial, the plaintiff’ offered in evidence the following written agreement': “I have, this 9th of January 18.17, hired of George Parnham5 Esq. the following.six negro men, fon the use of Richard Key Heath, of Baltimore county, and for and during the presenf year, and agree, on behalf of the said Heath, to give eighty dollars as wages tor each, of the said negroes, and to furnish them with.all necessary clothing and .food, viz. Juba, JJtavy, James, Richard, Michael, and Shadrick. Philip Key.”
    
    
      A written agree* snent catinotbe explained by a subsequent letter of one of the parties;
    Where, upon the face of an ngreentent, one of the contracting parties appears plainly to be acting as the agent of another, the stipulations or the agreement operate solely to bind the principal, unless it manifestly appears that the agent intended to superadd or substitute his own responsibility for that of his principal.
    An agreement, that “I have this 9th January, 1817, hired ot G« P. the following slaves, for the use of R. K* Hy to give 3580 as wages for each of the slaves, and to furnish them with all necessary clothing aftd ioodj, (then acting the names of the slavey) and signed P* /C” — ffeldi not to bind P* K* personally*
    
      Which was admitted to be in the handwriting of tho testator. And proved that the slaves mentioned in said writing were sent to Heath, and hired by him agreeably to the. terms of. the agreement. The plaintiff also produced the. following letter, admitted to be in the bandwriting of the defendant’s testator: “Bear Sir., Mrs, Key is anxious l should hire your sistey’s woman fur Mrs. Heath. If then she will take no less than §25, and the woman can go up with the other hands, you will send her up, and I will be answerable for the. wages, clothing and food. The woman, will have a fender, good mistress; and indeed I know tha,t great care will be taken of the whole of them.
    
      P. Key.
    
    
      Indian Pawn, 1.2 January, 1817.”
    The defendant then produced a witness, whq proved that Key showed to the witness a letter?,from Heath, requesting Key to hire for him a large number of hands. This was in the winter 1817, and before the hiring of the negroes mentioned in the agreement; the price of the hands was imt limited, but Key was requested not to exceed $8Q each.. The defendant also proved, that Heath resided', at the time* of the agreement, in the neighbourhood of Baltimore, and-had* done so long before and did long after; and that Heath was always, up to the year 1819, generally known as aman of character and* of high pecuniary credit. That the intestate, at the time of making- the agreement, communicated to -the plaintiff that the slaves were for the use of Heath, and that he was authorised- by Heath to hire them; and. further, that Heath had been at Chaptico, in Saint Mary’s-. county, the year before the agreement was made, and hired a good-many slaves in the said county. jHie defendant then prayed the opinion of the court to'the'jury, that the letter of Key, the defendant’s testator, wap not evidence, in the cause, and-that said testator was acting as agent in making said agreement, and therefore was not liable in this*, action. But the.court, [Plater A, J.] refused to give this opinion, and. allowed, said letter to be read in evidence to the jury; and further directeddhe jury, that it was the opinion of the court, from the face of the agreement, and the other evidence, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover» The defendant excepted; and. the verdict and judgment being for the. plaintiff,-the defendant appealed to this court..
    The cause was argued before Buchanan, Ch. J. Earle# Martin, Stephen, Archer, and Dorsey, J.
    
      Ashton, the Appellant, ip person,
    relied upon M‘Donough vs. Templeman, 1 Harr. & Johns. 156, and The Mechanics Bank vs. The Bank of Columbia, 1 Wheat. 326.
    
      Stone, for the'Appellee,
    submitted the case to the court without argument.
   Dorsey, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. Afterstatjng the facts, and the opinion of the court below,he proceeded?

To this opinion of the court the defendant excepted;, and, it appears to this court, not without cause. Let it for the moment be admitted, that matter de hors the written instrument itself may be resorted to in explanation of the meaning of the agreement of the 9th of January, yet the letter of the 12th of January cannot be received for that purpose; it is no part of the res gesta intended to be contained in the agreement on which this action has been instituted; it is a proceeding subsequent in point of time, relating entirely to a different subject, and being'irrelevant to the matter in issue in the cause, is wholly, inadmissible as evidence before the jury. •

In refusing the prayer of the defendant as to the agency of the testator, and in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, this court think that the county court also erred Wherever, upon the face of an agreement, a party contracting plainly appears to be acting as , the agent of another, the stipulations of the contract are to be considered as operating solely to bind the principal; unless it manifestly appears by the terms of the instrument that the agent intended to superadd or substitute bis ownt responsibility for that of his principal. In such case, and in such case only, if acting within the scope of his powers, is he personally answerable. No such intentipp is manifested by the present agreement; it states that the negroes were hired for the use of Richard K. Heath, and the stipulation to pay is made, in so many terms on his behalf} thereby repelling any inference that might otherwise be drawn, to in.vólve him personally on this contract. A much stronger case than the present was decided by the court of appeals, of this state at June term, 1804; reported in 1 Harr. & Johns. 156, M‘Donough vs. Templeman. There, although, in the introductory part of the agreement the defendant describes himself as acting on behalf of his principal, yet when' he stipulates for the payment of the hire of the negroes, without any express reference or allusion to his principal, he binds himself in, precisely the same térros that he would have used had it been the intention of iha parties that lie alone, and not those for whom he contracted, was to be bound for the debt. Yet the court of appeals, looking to the intentions of the parties, as deducidle from the relative situation, in which they stood, determined that the engagements of the defendant, although by the expressions used involving himself only, were to be understood as referring to his representative character, and not as inducing any personal liability on him. In the case at bar-, the defendant’s testator, in the very clause of the agreement on which this action is founded, states in express terms, that he agrees on behalf of his principal to pay; thereby evincing the most unequivocal intention not to-pledge his own personal responsibility.

The court dissent from the opinions given by tire court, below, and therefore reverse their judgment.

JUDGMENT REVERSED.