Case ID: ny-crim_4/html/0112-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Boardman, J. Hardin, P. J. Follett, J. (dissenting).", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Supreme Court-General Term-Third Department.
    
      November, 1885.
    PEOPLE v. MONDON.
    Confessions, and Statements op Prisoner.
    The statements of a defendant, not shown to be under the influence of fear produced by threats, made by him in relation to the crime with which he is charged, before the coroner under oath while under arrest on suspicion but without warrant, are admissible against him.
    .. And this is the rule although such statement be not in the nature of a confession, and though the coroner has not advised him that he need not answer.
    ' To convict there need not be sufficient evidence in addition to a confession of defendant. The jury have a right to resort to a confession to aid the other evidence in the case and, upon the whole, determine as to the guilt. (Per Boabdman, J.)
    Appeal by the defendant, Frank Mondon, from a judgment of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Herkimer county, Hon. T. 0. Williams presiding, of May 23, 1885, convicting defendant of murder in the first degree.
    The facts in this case appear to be, in brief, that the body of ■ John Wishart was found in a ditch upon the land of Sanford ■ G-etman in the town of Frankfort, by his son Adam, on the 8th day of May, 1884. He was lying in the ditch with his head toward the railroad and his feet toward the river, with his face •in the water and his toes also in the water, his body being upon the flood-wood which was in the ditch.
    Upon the back of the head was a wound sufficient to produce ’ death, and that there was a wound upon the face which would not have produced death. That the deceased was last seen alive about the 18th day of April, 1884, was claimed by the prosecution, although a witness, Louise Mondon, testifies it was in the following week. The accused, Mondon, was taken before the coroner and was examined there and at the commencement • of his examination the club which was produced in court was
    
      taken from a paper in his presence, and he then stated that he did not kill Wishart with the club, that if he had killed him he would have gone to Italy. At the time the club was shown he had been charged with the murder, or at least was under arrest and had been brought from Herkimer jail He was examined partly through an interpreter and partly personally, and finally the coroner came to the conclusion that he did not understand English well enough to be examined •except through an interpreter.
    The following evidence was introduced by the prosecution:
    After being in jail some time defendant told sheriff Brown that he saw Adam Wishart kill the deceased; that Adam was in his boat fishing, and the deceased came down across the railroad track, and Adam motioned to deceased to come down into the bushes, and when he got there, he, Adam, hit him over the head with a club and killed him. At his suggestion the sheriff took him in his wagon to go up to see where the transaction took place, &c. On the way there they passed near the place where the body was found, and when they got near that place the defendant looked pale, his arm and leg trembled; after passing this place they went on up to the Frankfort depot and then the defendant told the sheriff just where he stood when the deceased was killed by Adam, which was near the depot by some trees,- and then took him to where he said Adam killed him, which was where the river comes up to the railroad Upon a careful observation it was found that defendant could not see from where he stood to where he said Adam killed the old man. When defendant learned this, he said he walked down near where the deed was done. While showing the sheriff his face turned white, then red After this the defendant told sheriff Brown and Mr. Baxter another story, which was that he and Adam killed the deceased; that Adam hit him with a stick, and he, defendant, threw him into a ditch; that Adam went across the river in a boat, and he stayed in the bushes until night, and then went home and told the old lady and she cried and he chided her for it, saying she wanted him killed.
    The corpus delicti was established beyond any doubt The real issue in controversy was whether or not the death was-caused by the defendant. It is proved that Adam Wishart was not at the place where defendant said he killed deceased» The defense gave no evidence.
    
      H. Olay Hall, for defendant, appellant.
    
      A. B. Steele, district attorney, for the people, respondent.
   Boardman, J.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, in killing John Wishart. At the-inquest held to ascertain-the cause of his death, the defendant then under arrest, charged with the murder, was brought by the sheriff before the coroner and sworn. While denying his guilt, he made-statements, touching his relations with deceased, and about his own conduct at or about the time of the homicide. These statements were proved upon the trial under the defendant’s objection and exception, but no ground of objection was stated to the court so far as the papers show. Assuming, however, that the objections and exceptions were sufficient in form, we-have to consider whether the defendant’s declarations made before the coroner, under oath, while under arrest on suspicion, but without warrant, charged with this crime, were admissible in evidence. By section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “a confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats,” &e. The remainder of the section has no-relation to the question before us. The evidence offered was not a confession, but, on the contrary, a denial of his guilt of the crime. The statements made will not, however, be treated, I apprehend, by any harsher rule, than if they were confessions in the strictest sense of guilt They were confessions or statements of his conduct and declarations about the time of the murder, and where he was, and what he knew or saw of the deceased, at the same time. I shall hold that such statements are controlled by the section cited, and that it will not be restricted by the courts to admissions of guilt alone. The purpose of the law, I submit, is to allow such evidence to be given to a jury, provided it is not made under the influence of fear produced by threats. The jury, from all the circumstances surrounding the case, is left to give to it such weight and credit as seems proper. The section was, doubtless, intended to make a definite and certain rule, where formerly, if the authorities were not conflicting, they were obscure, refined and difficult to follow or distinguish. The commission of a crime is easy and prompt The punishment of the criminal is often a task of great difficulty, involving a great expense of time and money. It is, therefore, wise in the Legislature to render easy and certain, so far as may safely be done, the rules of evidence to be observed in criminal trials. The competency of such evidence is fully supported, I think, by the case of the People v. McGloin (91 N. Y. 241; 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 154; S. C. at General Term, 1 Id. 105). Judge Brady, at General Term, says: “This section, in phraseology at least, limits the objection to a confession,, to the ground simply that it was made under the influence of fear produced by threats,” and, therefore, whatever may have been the rule heretofore, such confessions, with the exception named and possibly one other, may be admitted in evidence-against the prisoner. In the Court of Appeals, Chief Judge-Huger would have been content to rest the decision of the-court upon Judge Brady’s opinion, were not a human life involved. He, therefore, proceeded to discuss the several grounds-of objection taken in that case:

First. That the confession was made under the influence of fear; second, because it was taken before a magistrate after the-defendant was accused of, and under arrest for, the perpetration of the crime; and third, that it was not voluntarily made, being a sworn deposition.

He finds in the case no evidence of threats, and so dismisses the first ground. A summary statement of the law as well settled prior to the Criminal Code, is his answer to the second objection. He says (91 N. Y. 247):

First. That all confessions material to the issue, voluntarily made by a party, whether oral or written, and however authenticated, were inadmissible as evidence against him on a trial for a criminal offense. People v. Wentz, supra. Second. It was no objection to the admissibility of such confessions, that they had been taken under oath from a person attending before a coroner, in obedience to a subpoena, upon an inquiry conducted pursuant to law, into the cause of a homicide. Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. 23; Teachout v. People, 41 Id. 7. Third. That the confession or declaration sought to be given in evidence was in writing, and purported to be sworn to, was no objection to its admissibility, unless it also appeared that it was7 taken before a magistrate upon a judicial examination against the person accused of the commission of the crime.” The learned judge proceeded to show that the examination before a coroner is extra-judicial, and is not included in the third proposition quoted, and is not embraced in sections 188 to 200 of Criminal Code. In the McGfloin case, the statement purporting to be under oath was made before the coroner. But, if under oath, it was decided that, under the authorities, it was in no respect a compulsory statement, and was, at common law, inadmissible in evidence against the defendant Then, after reciting section 395 of Criminal Code, it is further said: It is thus found that neither at common law, nor by statute, was this evidence open to any of the grounds of objection raised.”

The McGfloin case seems to me to sustain the rulings of the learned justice on the trial The language of the Criminal Code is broad, distinct and positive; it allows the evidence to be put in on the trial and its weight and value to be adjudged by the jury. Why shall we not accept it as it reads and according to its plain intent ? Why shall we again go back to the vague and nebulous hypotheses of possible influences upon the mind of the prisoner, of his fear and anxrety and confusion arising from his situation ? He is now a competent witness in his own behalf, and can explain his declarations and conduct after-abundant time for reflection. The acts and declarations of the prisoner, as sworn to by him, tended to exculpate him from the alleged crime, and were of no consequence except as they were afterwards in some respects proved to be false. He confessed no fact before the coroner tending to convict him of the crime now charged upon him. Why, then, shall it be presumed that lie was acting under the influence of fear instead of cunning, in the absence of evidence ? Why shall it be presumed in the like absence of evidence, that his evidence so given was not voluntarily and willingly given? True, the coroner should have advised him that he need not answer any of the questions put to him or submit to an examination, but in the absence of such advice the law will not presume his answers were compulsory and against his will. A person accused of crime should have the protecting mantle of the law thrown around him. That is done by giving a prisoner every right of exception while the people have none. It is always safe for a court to rule against the people in criminal cases, for there can be no review or reversal on that account So that, step by step, the tendency is to protect the prisoner by all recognized lawful means, and also to give him the benefit of every doubtful ruling on the trial. If the present evidence shall be held incompetent on appeal, the trial courts are again thrown back into the slough of doubt and uncertainty. Presumption will again be invoked to deprive the jury of the prisoner’s declarations, admissions and conduct, when the fact was recent and when honest and innocent men are likely to tell the truth, the Criminal Code will be disregarded by holding it incompetent. A rule of evidence adopted by the Legislature should not be deprived of all its virtue by judicial construction in hostility to its plain intent.

The request to charge at folio 676 was clearly untenable. The jury was told it could not convict upon the defendant’s confession alone. But it is not the law that there must be evidence enough to satisfy of guilt outside of the confessions. The jury has the right to resort to the confessions to aid the other evidence in the case, and upon the whole determine as to the guilt

Upon the merits, the verdict of the jury is sustained by the ■evidence in the case.

An examination of the other exceptions in the case does not show any error to the prejudice of the defendant, nor do any of such exceptions call for special consideration.

The judgment and order should be affirmed.

Hardin, P. J.

Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was held that declarations or confessions of a person were not involuntary because made after his arrest and while in custody. Murphy v. People, 63 N.Y. 591; Willett v. People, 27 Hun, 469.

When section 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was adopted the Legislature declared that confessions of a defendant, “ whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person,” can be given in evidence.

Two exceptions were declared to the rule: (1) H the confessions were made under influence of fear, produced by threats. (2) If made upon stipulation of the district attorney that the person should not be prosecuted therefor. The case before ús does not fall within either of the exceptions. There was nothing in .the evidence before the trial court, at the time the declarations of the defendant made before the' coroner were received, to indicate that the declarations were made under the influence of fear produced by threats.”

The test as to whether the ruling was correct must be made upon the evidence as it stood when the declarations were ruled upon and received. Murphy v. People, supra.

We look into the evidence in vain for any features of it which carry the case within the exceptions in the section of the Code of Criminal Procedure under consideration. Thus we are brought to say that the general rule prescribed by the section allows the declarations of the defendant to be received in evidence. Furthermore, the construction put upon the section by the Court of Appeals, in People v. McGloin (91 N. Y. 245; 1 N. Y. Crim. 154) seems in point, and it is our duty to follow and apply that construction in this cáse. It may be observed that there was not evidence in the case before us that called for a close discrimination upon the question of whether or not there was the “influence of fear produced by threats,” as was found in the McGrloin case.

A subsequent part of the section from which the quotation has been made declares that “ a confession is not sufficient to warrant his conviction without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed”

The learned trial judge applied this statutory rule to the case in hand In reply to a request he said: “ I charge, as I have before, that the confession is not sufficient without additional proof that the crime has been committed.” He also charged that there must be corroboration of the confession tending to connect the defendant with the crime. The language of the trial judge quoted, carried to the jury the rule laid down by.the statute. People v. Williams, 29 Hun, 520; 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 336. .

There was no error in refusing to charge the jury that they “must not consider the evidence of Louis Mondon.” The effect, force and credit to be given to that evidence was properly left for the jury to say. Chapman Ex’rs v. Ins. Co., MSS. opinion, Fourth Department. The jury were instructed “ they might disregard his evidence; it is a question for them whether they would give any weight to it, and what weight.” The charge in that regard was sufficiently favorable to the defendant. Coleman v. People, 58 N. Y. 555.

The case seems to have been carefully tried, and the ques tions of fact very fairly and faithfully submitted to the jury.

-In People v. Murphy, 4 Hun, 102; S. C. affirmed, 63 N. T. 590, it was held that “to authorize a conviction in criminal cases, upon circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the case to the exclusion of every possibility that the crime was committed by a person other than the prisoner. It is sufficient if the evidence satisfy the understanding and conscience of the jury, and exclude from their minds all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.”

In the case in hand, the suggestion that another, or even others, may have been concerned in and in complicity with the defendant in the crime, is not sufficient to warrant a distrust and disturbance of 'the verdict of the jury.

Concurring with brother Boardmajst, who has said “ the verdict of the jury is sustained by the evidence in the case,” and believing that there was no error in the progress of the trial, I must vote for affirmance.

Follett, J. (dissenting).

It is difficult to understand, and unsafe to construe, a statute without having in mind the law upon the subject existing at the time the statute was passed. Since Warickshell’s Case (1 Leach, 263), the sole test of the admissibility of confessions in countries wherein the common law prevails is, were they voluntary ? An analysis of the reported cases would be unprofitable and simply show: (1) That prior toBaichy’s Case (2 Denison Or. Gas. 430), the courts presumed confessions to have been involuntary, and inadmissible from slighter causes, than since that case. (2) That the confusion in the cases has arisen from the courts assuming that the physical facts and inducements, which were sufficient to render a prior confession involuntary, should control the decision of every subsequent case resting upon like or similar facts, without regard to the character or intelligence of the individual; while, on the other hand, courts have applied the rule (which has remained unchanged since the case first cited) to the facts of each case, recognizing the true rule, that whether a particular confession was voluntary was a question of fact rather than of law. It is apparent that circumstances and surroundings which would unsettle and coerce the judgment of one person, rendering his confession involuntary, would produce no such result in the case of another differently constituted and trained.

The following are the leading cases in this State which bear directly upon the question under consideration:

In Hendrickson v. People (10 N. Y. 13), the defendant was examined under oath before a coroner in respect to the death of his wife. When examined he was not under arrest or under suspicion. Subsequently he was convicted of her murder, and it was held competent for the people to prove what he had testified to before the coroner. Four of the judges of the Court of Appeals holding that the evidence was properly received and three dissented.

In People v. McMahon (15 N. Y. 384), the defendant was arrested without a warrant, upon suspicion of having murdered his wife. He was taken before the coroner, who was holding an inquest, and examined under oath He was afterwards indicted and tried for the murder. Upon his trial his testimony given before the coroner was read in evidence against him. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the statements were not voluntary. All of the judges concurred in this judgment, except two who did not hear the argument.

In People v. Wentz (37 N. Y. 303), McMahon’s Case was commented upon and approved, and it was held that the test of admissibility of admissions was whether they were voluntary.

In Teachout v. People (41 N. Y. 7), the defendant, who was not under arrest, but was under suspicion of having murdered his wife, was examined before the coroner as to the circumstances of her death. Before he was examined the coroner informed him that it was rumored that he had caused her death and that he was not obliged to testify. He said he had no objection to telling all he knew. 41 N. Y. 9,10. Subsequently he was convicted of the murder of his wife. Upon the trial his testimony given before the coroner was proved against him by the people. The Court of Appeals held that the statements were voluntary and competent; all of the judges concurring except two.

In discussing Hendrickson v. People and McMahon v. People, it was said: “ In the former case (Hendrickson’s) the declarations were held admissible, in the latter (McMahon’s) they were held .incompetent The precise distinction by which the latter is distinguished is that in the latter case the prisoner stood before the coroner as a party in fact charged with the crime, and was there subjected to an examination on oath touching his own guilt or innocence. The coroner was in such case substantially in the place of an examining magistrate, and the fact that the prisoner was held under an arrest made without warrant could not make his protection against such an inquisition less imperative.”

The general rule applicable to judicial confessions is well stated by Wharton, and is fully sustained by the cases cited in. <• the note to the section quoted: “ But the testimony of • an accused party, taken as such, is not admissible, when such accused party is put on his oath and sworn and, examined., This rule is founded upon the unreliable, as well as the inquisitorial character of such statements; and, therefore, where a man, having been arrested by a constable without warrant, upon suspicion of having committed murder, was examined as a witness at the coroner’s inquest, it was held that the statements thus made by him were not admissible against him on his trial for the murder. The same rule obtains where the defendant is compelled to answer, under oath, questions by the committing magistrate.” Whart. Crim. Ev. 668; see, also, 1 Greenl. Ev. 13th ed. 225; 1 Ph. Ev. 4th Am. ed. 560; 3 Russ. Crim. 5th ed. 475.

The authorities above cited do not directly bear upon the constitutional question about to be discussed, but they show that the rule applied upon the trial of this case, does not prevail in any country governed by the principles of the common law.

Section 395 of the Code'of Criminal Procedure provides: “A confession of a defendant, whether in the course of judicial proceedings or to a private person, can be given in evidence against him, unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that he shall not be prosecuted therefor; but it is not sufficient to warrant his conviction, without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed.”

The word “ confession,” signifies an admission of a guilty par- " ticipation in the commission a crime. People v. Strong, 30 Cal. 151; People v. Parton, 49 Id. 632; Step. Dig. of Ev. art 21. ’This is also the sense in which the word is generally used. Within this meaning of the word the defendant made no con.fession. But assuming that the word “ confession,” as used in the section quoted, embraces admissions and statements made in the course of a denial of guilt, still, the question remains, whether the admissions and statements were voluntarily made. 'Two kinds of confessions are described in the section: (1) Judicial confessions, made in the course of judicial proceedings. (2) Extra-judicial confessions, made to private persons. In this •case we are dealing with judicial confessions and admissions, and the decisions and rules relating to extra-judicial confessions will mot be specially considered.

The constitution provides: “Mo person shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.” Const. art. 1, § 6; Code Crim. Pro. § 10. The question arises, whether the action of the coroner and of the trial court violated this provision ? If the result is prohibited, the fact that it was brought -about by the action of two. courts instead of one, while acting in the same matter, does not make the result less illegal.

The Court of Appeals, in discussing the constitutionality of the law, permitting defendants in criminal cases to testify in their -own behalf, said: “The constitution primarily refers compulsion exercised through the process of the court, or through laws acting directly upon the party, and has no reference to an indirect argumentative pressure such as is claimed is -exerted by the statute of 1869.” People v. Courtney, 94 N. Y. 493; 1 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 573.

In People v. Hackley (24 N. Y. 83), it is said: “ It is, of ■•course, competent for the Legislature to change any doctrine -of the common law, but I think they could not compel a witness to testify on the trial of another person to facts which would prove himself guilty of a crime without indemnifying .him against the consequences, because, I think, as has been ■mentioned, that, by a legal construction, the constitution would "be found to forbid it.” The discussion of this question in the rcase last cited, is full, clear and instructive.

If the constitution prohibits “compulsion to be exercised ■ through the process, or through laws acting directly upon the parties,” and prohibits the Legislature from passing a statute ■ “ compelling a witness to testify on the trial of another person .to facts which would prove himself guilty of a crime without .indemnifying him against the consequences,” it seems to me, •that, admitting in evidence testimony which a prisoner was re- . quested to give in a criminal proceeding against himself, is also prohibited, and the question remains, notwithstanding the section of the Code quoted, was defendant’s testimony before the -coroner voluntary?

The record in this case discloses that the defendant was an» Italian laborer, having an imperfect understanding of the English language. He was under arrest charged with murder, A coroner’s inquest was being-held. The prisoner was taken by the sheriff, in whose custody he was, and whose power he - could not resist, before the coroner’s inquest then engaged in an, investigation against himself. He did not go there voluntarily.. He was sworn by the coroner as a witness, and presumably in the usual form, to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, in the matter under investigation. The prisoner - was without counsel, and without means to employ counsel He was not informed that he could not be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor that he need not give an answer which would tend to criminate himself. He was then questioned.. by the district attorney and also by the coroner. “ The exami- - nation was taken by questions put either by the district attorney or myself ” (coroner’s evidence). He was twice examined, and at the conclusion was re-sworn. The prisoner had recently come from a jurisdiction where persons charged with crime are compelled to answer questions touching their own guilt or inno- • cence when put by magistrates. The prisoner’s attendance - before the coroner was certainly compulsory, and it seems tome the testimony taken was involuntary, and inadmissible-under the constitution. If admissions obtained by the method, under consideration are admissible, it is difficult to see why all persons- charged with crime, in prison and ignorant of their-rights,' may not be taken by sheriffs before commiting magistrates or grand juries and their answers used against them on-, trials. Whether admissions are voluntary or involuntary depends upon the circumstances surrounding each case. Had this. defendant been informed of his rights, had he been attended by-counsel, or had it appeared as a fact, or by fair inference that he-knew his rights, his testimony before the coroner might be regarded as voluntary, but not so under the circumstances disclosed by this case.

But it is answered; there were no threats, nor fear, and.therefore the examination was legal, and the testimony so taken competent against him on the trial of the indictment This.'floes not seem to reach the question. When a constitutional .•statute is so administered by the court as to produce a result "prohibited by the constitution, it is error.

Suppose an examination pending before a magistrate or a • grand jury. The person charged with the offense tinder investi- ; gation is in jail, from which he is taken by the sheriff and carried before the magistrate or grand jury. The prisoner is ignorant ■ of his rights and is not informed of them, he is directed in the kindest manner by the magistrate or foreman to be sworn as a •witness,- he submits and is cross-examined by the district -attorney and the presiding magistrate. His testimony is not given under the influence of fear produced by threats,” because dhere are no threats.

Under the rule declared by my brethren, evidence so acquired would be admissible upon the trial of the indictment, which • seems to me would be a plain violation of the constitutional -guaranty. I am unable to see any difference in principle between the supposed case and the case at bar.

A coroner’s inquest is a tribunal created by our statutes, «charged with the duty of investigating crimes; and this inquest was engaged in an investigation aimed at this defendant. The People v. McGloin (91 N. Y. 241; 1 N. Y. Crim. 154), relied upon by my brethren, does not seem to me to be at all in point. In that case the rule was recognized that confessions must be voluntary to be admissible. McGloin was in confinement and -said he would make a statement; a coroner was sent for, who wrote down the prisoner’s statement, which upon the trial of an ■indictment for the crime, was admitted in evidence against bimr As said by the Court of Appeals: “ The coroner was not acting in any official capacity, but as a mere clerk t© take down and ■prove the confession.” The coroner informed the prisoner that was his right to refuse to make a statement; that he should •consider well before he made one, and no questions were put :by the coroner. People v. McGloin, 28 Hun, 152; 1 N.Y. Crim. Rep. 105. In McGloin’s case the coroner was not acting in a ■judicial capacity, but as a scribe; while in the case at bar, the ■coroner was acting-in. a judicial capacity, and in effect required the defendant to he sworn, and submit to an examination by the prosecuting officer.

In People v. Gibbons (43 Cal. 557), it was held that the testimony of a prisoner taken before a committing magistrate could not be received in evidence upon the trial of an indictment. The decision is placed upon the ground that the magistrate had no authority to take the examination, and it was not admitted as a confession. Afterwards accused persons were authorized to testify before committing magistrates, and it was then held,-. that if a prisoner voluntarily testified the evidence might be admitted upon a trial of the indictment. People v. Kelley, 47 Cal. 125.

Again, section 778 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires ■ the testimony taken at inquests to be reduced to writing and forthwith filed. The defendant’s testimony was not proved by putting in the coroner’s record, but by asking if the defendant swore to particular facts.

In People v. Gelabert (39 Cal. 663), it was held that an extrajudicial confession, partly in English and partly in broken Spanish, made to a person who did not understand all the pris- - oner said in Spanish, could not be proved against the prisoner. How perfectly the coroner understood the defendant in this. case may be inferred from his evidence. The coroner testified: Some of the questions were put directly to the witness, some - were not. Those which were not put directly were put by an interpreter; we used the interpreter after the first few linés ; when we came to a question which we thought he did not understand we put that through an interpreter. I think that. was kept up all through the examination. We finally adopted . the interpreter; I came to the conclusion that he.did not understand English well enough to be examined; I wrote down the ■ substance of the answers- as they were given to me by the interpreter after the questions had been put; when it was read over - to him it was read right along from beginning to end through the interpreter; the interpreter was a son-in-law of the deceased; the interpreter was examined as a witness also. Ho,' I am mistaken in the time. On the taking of the evidence, which is • signed by him, no interpreter was used; the interpreter was - used ou a subsequent day; I read the evidence over to him, line by line, and asked him if he understood it, and if it was the truth which he told me, and he said it was; then I re-swore him to the deposition.”

Permitting the testimony of the defendant given before the coroner to be proved against him was error, for which the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.

Conviction and judgment affirmed. 
      
      The request was that if there was not sufficient evidence without the so-called confessions to satisfy the jury of the defendant’s guilt, they must acquit.