Case ID: mass_62/html/0151-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Shaw, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Caleb Emery vs. Charles Lawrence & trustees.
    Where a .workman, in the employment of a manufacturing company, made an assignment of the wages then due, and which should thereafter become due, to him, to a certain date, in consideration of being indebted to the assignee, and an Undertaking on the part of the latter to supply the former with groceries, from time to time, as his family might need them; it was held, that the assignment, in the absence of fraud, was valid, and transferred to the assignee all the assignor’s interest in his wages for the time specified.
    The Merrimack Manufacturing Company having been summoned as trustees of Lawrence, the principal defendant, a workman in their employ, and having been served with a copy of the writ on the 7th, 11th, and 26th of February, 1848; in their answer admitted that they had in their hands, at the time of the service on them, the sum of $33 due the principal defendant for wages, unless the same was .transferred to Cochran & Paige, by an assignment, executed by Lawrence, a copy of which they annexed to their answer, and which was as follows : “ Know all men by these presents, that I, Charles Lawrence, of Lowell, in the county of Middlesex, and commonwealth of Massachusetts, laborer, in consideration of one hundred dollars to me paid by Matthew H. Cochran and Simon B. Paige, both of said Lowell, in said county of Middlesex, traders and copartners under the name and style of Cochran & Paige, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby assign, transfer and make over to the said Cochran & Paige, all that is due me in money from the Merrimack Company, a body corporate in said Lowell, for services rendered, and also whatever may become due me from said company till April the 1st, 1848, and I hereby empower the said Cochran & Paige to receive the money earned by me of the said company for the time aforesaid, and to receipt for the same, in my name and stead on the said company’s books, for the sums earned during the before stated time. Witness my hand and seal this twenty-first day of January, A. D. 1848.”
    Cochran & Paige having appeared, and been admitted as parties to the suit, claimed the wages in question, by virtue of this assignment. On the trial in the court of common pleas before Byington, J., of an issue framed to test the validity and effect of this assignment, it was in evidence that the assignment was left at the counting-room of the company, in the hands of their paymaster, and was accepted by him on the 7th of February, 1848, and always afterwards, except when in the hands of counsel, had remained in the possession of the paymaster; that the claimants had refused to supply the defendant with goods for his family, unless he would give them an order for his wages; that the consideration for the assignment was a promissory note for $15.32, due from the defendant to the claimants, an account, the amount of which was not stated, and an undertaking by the claimants (which had been complied with by them) to furnish the defendant’s family with groceries from day to day, as they might need.
    The claimants upon this evidence requested the judge to instruct the jury, that the assignment, being an entire assignment of the defendant’s wages for three months to April 1st, 1848, was an indivisible contract, and by its terms passed to the claimants all the defendant’s interest in his wages, for the term specified, in the absence of fraud; that the corporation were not chargeable as trustees, unless the defendant had a right of action against them, and was therefore entitled to his wages; that the claimants, having an assignment of the defendant’s wages for three months, in consideration of present indebtedness and future advances of goods, had a vested interest in the wages, and that the defendant had no right to the wages, but that the claimants had such right, and the right of delivering goods to the defendant, in exchange for them.
    The presiding judge declined to instruct the jury as requested, but did instruct them, that the assignment having been made to secure to the claimants the sum then due to them from the defendant, and also to secure them for what he might thereafter become indebted to them for advances they might make, they would have a right to hold, of the wages due at the time of the service of the writ, an amount equal to the debt due them when the assignment was made, and to all advances made after that time, and up to the time of the service of the writ; and that if the sums so due, and the advances so made were together equal in amount to the sum due for wages, they would not be chargeable as trustees; but if the sums, so due to the claimants from the defendant, were less than the amount in the hands of the supposed trustees, they would be liable as trustees for the difference.
    The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; whereupon the claimants alleged exceptions.
    This case was argued and decided at the last October term.
    
      A. R. Brown, for the claimants.
    
      B. F. Butler, for the plaintiff.
   Shaw, C. J.

The only question is, whether the Merrimack Manufacturing Company are chargeable as trustees. They disclose in their answer an assignment made by the principal defendant, a workman employed in their service, of the wages due and becoming due to him, for the quarter ending the 1st of April, 1848, for a good consideration; moneys previously advanced and to be advanced. This assignment was notified to the company and assented to by them.

This was a good assignment, in form, made on good consideration, and in the absence of fraud transferred the entire interest to the assignees. Weed v. Jewett, 2 Met. 608; Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335.

The court having declined so to instruct the jury, as prayed for by the assignees, and having instructed them, that the assignees could only hold to the amount of the money advanced by,them, at the time of the service of the trustee writ, the court are of opinion, that this direction was incorrect in point of law. Verdict set aside.