Case ID: ill-app_197/html/0302-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Supreme lodge Order of Mutual Protection, Complainant. Anna E. Eckhardt, Appellee, v. Pauline Eckhardt and Beulah Eckhardt, Appellants.
    Gen. No. 21,348.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Whindes, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1915.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed January 3, 1916.
    Statement of the Case.
    Interpleader by the Supreme Lodge Order of Mutual Protection against Pauline Eckhardt, Beulah Eckhardt and Anna E. Eckhardt, claimants, to a fund admitted to be due by said Lodge Order under a benefit certificate issued to Charles W. Eckhardt. Prom the decree entered on the bill awarding the fund to Anna E. Eckhardt, Pauline Eckhardt and Beulah Eckhardt appeal.
    In the original benefit certificate Beulah Eckhardt, then the wife of Charles, was named as the beneficiary. In March, 1913, Beulah brought suit for divorce in the Chancery Court of Shelby county, Tennessee, charging desertion. Defendant was served and appeared by counsel. After hearing, a decree of divorce was entered finding that the court had jurisdiction and that complainant had sustained her charges by evidence, and ordering defendant to pay complainant, $1,000 in full of alimony, which was paid. No appeal was taken and the decree is still in force. Subsequently Charles Eckhardt married Anna Marley, the other claimant herein.
    Under the |( laws of the Lodge Order a member had the right at any time to change his beneficiary, and after his marriage to Anna, Charles surrendered .his original certificate, and a new certificate was issued in which Anna Eckhardt was named as beneficiary. The fund which is the subject-matter of this litigation arises from the payment of this last certificate.
    Abstract of the Decision.
    Estoppel, § 71*—when one invoicing jurisdiction estopped, to deny it. The jurisdiction of a court of a suit for divorce cannot be questioned in a subsequent proceeding by the party at whose request and upon whose testimony as to jurisdiction of facts such court found that it had jurisdiction, especially where such party has received the benefits of the divorce litigation and rights of others have accrued thereunder, it being immaterial whether the adjudication in the divorce litigation was procured through misrepresentation of facts or misrepresentation of the law.
    Albert H. Fry, for appellants.
    Robert Van Sands, for appellee Anna E. Eckhardt.
   Mr. Presiding Justice McSurely

delivered the opinion of the court.