Case ID: f-appx_707/html/0209-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Sundari Karma PRASAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK; Carolyn D. Nelson; Viviene B. Cheek; Jonathan D. Headlee; Hamilton L. Hendrix; David Arnold Carpenter; Jane Justice; S. Massey-Taylor, Commonwealth Hampton Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-7224
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: December 21, 2017
    Decided: December 28, 2017
    Sundari K. Prasad, Appellant Pro Se.
    Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Sundari Karma Prasad seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing without prejudice her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action for failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s order to submit a second particularized complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because the deficiencies identified by the district court may be remedied by supplementing the complaint as directed, we conclude that the order Prasad seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an ap-pealable interlocutory or collateral order. Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 892, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED 
      
       We do not remand this matter to the district court, though, because the court previously afforded Prasad the chance to further partial-larize and amend her complaint, and she failed to do so, Cf. Goode, 807 F.3d at 629-30.