Case ID: paige-ch_6/html/0182-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "The Chancellor.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Saxton vs. Wyckoff and others.
    1836. October 4.
    An injunction ought not to be granted to stay a party from making a summary application to the supreme court to compel an attorney of that court to pay over monies which the applicant alleges has received by the complainant for his use in the character of attorney.
    This was an application to dissolve an injunction, which had the effect of preventing the defendants from applying to the supreme court for an order to compel the complainant to pay over monies which he had received or collected as an attorney of that court.
    
      J. Rhoades, for the defendants.
    
      J. L. Tillinghast, for the complainant.
   The Chancellor.

An injunction ought not to be granted to stay the defendant from making an application to the equitable powers of the supreme court, to compel the plaintiff to pay over monies received by him in the character of an attorney of that court. The court before whom the application was intended to be made was perfectly competent to give to the complainant any equitable relief to which he might be entitled. And there is nothing in the bill in this case to show that any discovery is necessary to enable that court to do perfect justice between the parties. The supreme court also is the appropriate tribunal to settle a controversy between an attorney of that court and his client, in relation to the duties of the former in his character of an officer of that court.

In this case also it was a gross imposition upon the officer to whom the ex parte application for an injunction was made, to state a case in his bill which was intended to deceive such officer, by alleging that proceedings had been commenced by the defendant in the supreme court for the recovery of money, and that no issue had been joined or verdict or judgment rendered in that court. It is very evident that the bill was thus artfully drawn for the mere purpose of inducing the officer who allowed the injunction to suppose it was an ordinary proceeding by suit in that court instead of a summary application against the complainant in bis character of attorney. This injunction was also irregular in not having the clause inserted therein to enable the defendant to proceed to a judgment or decision in the supreme court. It must therefore be dissolved with costs.