Case ID: ny-st-rep_9/html/0503-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McAeam, Ch. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

W. Hallett Phillips, Resp’t, v. Daniel N. Stanton et al., App’lts.
    
      (City Court of New York, General Term,
    
      Filed April, 1887.)
    
    Attorney’s fees—Entire contract—Legal services—How estimated— Bill oe particulars—What to contain.
    The plaintiff, an attorney and counsellor, was retained by the defendants to defend an action in the United States court. He was successful, and rendered a bill of particulars itemizing the services and charging $1,500 for the whole. The defendant applied for a further bill requiring the plaintiff to put a separate value upon each item. The application was denied. On appeal: Held, that the defendant was not entitled, as of right, to the further bill; that the services were rendered under one entire contract, and the plaintiff was entitled to put a gross value upon the whole. The professional standing, eminence and ability of the person who renders services, the manner of their performance, the magnitude and difficulties of the case and the success of the undertaking, are all considerations to be kept in view in fixing the value of professional services at the termination of the litigation.
    The plaintiff, an attorney and counselor at law, sues to Tecover for services performed and moneys expended at the request of the defendants in defending an action brought in the supreme court of the United States by the state of Alabama. The action is upon a quantum, meruit, and not upon any special agreement as to the rate of compensation. The complaint charges that the services were reasonably worth §1,500, and that the moneys expended amounted to thirty-two dollars. The bill of particulars furnished, recites that the services for which compensation is daimed were rendered in a suit, the object of which was to recover from the defendants the sum of §3,000,000 as damages sustained by the state of Alabama from acts of the defendants, ’who were officers and stockholders of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad Company. It also recites the fact that the state of Alabama was the endorser of the bonds of the railroad company, and had loaned to it State bonds for a large amount, and states the additional fact that the decision of the court was in favor of the defendants, whom the plaintiff there represented as counsel. An itemized account is also furnished giving the particulars of the services rendered, with the date and order of their performance. No fault is found with the bill in any of these respects. The objection urged is that the estimate value is not put-upon each particular item or service, and the object of the defendant’s motion was to require the plaintiff to furnish these different estimates of value going to make up the-aggregate sum claimed. The plaintiff insists that as his-charge of $1,500 “is made as a whole,” and consists of successive efforts to accomplish one object, that he cannot be-required to put a separate value upon each detail or item of the service. The court below coincided with this view,- and declined to require the plaintiff to give the desired-information, and from the order denying the motion the defendant appeals.
    
      Alexander & Ash, for app’lt; Stanley, Clark & Smith,, for resp’t.
   McAeam, Ch. J.

Under the broad rule declared in Dwight v. Germania (84 N. Y., 493), Tilton v. Beecher (59 id., 176), People v. Tweed (63 id., 194), the court below might have exercised its discretion, and ordered the plaintiff to furnish a further bill of particulars, giving the separate estimates of value on each particular item of the service rendered, for on the cross-examination of the plaintiff the defendant, will be entitled to test the propriety of the aggregate charge-by assailing the value of the items that compose it. But-the court below denied the application, and the question presented to us, is whether the court below erred in disposing of the matter as it did, and the proper consideration of the subject requires us to refer to the adjudged cases’bearing upon the relation of an attorney towards his client. The rule of law undoubtedly is, that an attorney who is, retained generaUy to conduct a legal proceeding, enters into an entire contract to conduct the proceeding to its termination Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y., 524.

This was the character of contract the plaintiff entered' into with the defendant, and he performed it by bringing-the litigation to a successful termination. The service contracted for was entire, and has been fully executed. It involved a series of acts tending to bring about the final result, but it does not follow that the defendant is entitled, as of right, to a separate estimate of value on each of the several acts performed to accomplish the one object.

“It is not necessary,” said Robertson, Ch. J., in Johnson v. Mallory (2 Robt., 683), “in an action for having completed a piece of work by numerous successive acts of' service, all contributing to such completion, to set out each service so contributing and its character. There is scarcely an article made or work accomplished that has not been so, by means of a series of efforts. The painting of a picture, building a machine, or trying a cause, are illustrations of such a course of action. Every blow of an artisan’s hammer is a separate labor, yet the aggregate of a day’s work is charged, because it is the usual mode of measuring such services consisting of a great many particulars.”

In Garfield v. Kirk (65 Barb., 464), it was held, that to entitle an attorney to recover for professional services rendered to his client, he is not required to swear to each notice drawn and served, and how much it is worth; that it is enough for him to prove in general terms, the proceedings in a cause, the time occupied in the performance of any part of the services by which their value was enhanced, and the value of the whole, or in detail, as he-may elect.

In Betts v. Betts (4 Abb. N. C., 324), attorneys in their bills, charged aggregate sums for aggregate work, without dividing charges into items, and it was held to be a proper form of bill in cases involving great labor.

The plaintiff has given each successive act o'f the service, with the time of rendition, and the aggregate value of the whole. These successive acts being steps in the performance of one entire contract, the bill furnished is complete, and the defendant cannot, as of right, obtain a further bill. Johnson v. Mallory, snpra; Bangs v. Ocean National Bank, 53 How. Pr., 51.

The professional standing, eminence, experience and ability of the person who renders services, the manner of their performance, the magnitude and difficulties of the case, and the success of the undertaking, are all considerations which are to be kept in view in fixing the value of professional services at the termination of the litigation. It may be difficult to govern one’s self by this standard in estimating separately a series of acts leading to the grand consummation of the whole, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the plaintiff declined to split his charge into fragmentary items, with separate valuations attached to each.

We find no error which requires a reversal of the order, which will be affirmed, with costs.

Browne, J., concurs.