Case ID: us-ct-cl_31/html/0325-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

T. R. AND T. P. GOSSETT v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMANCHE AND KIOWA INDIANS.
    [Indian Depredations No. 4946.
    Decided June 1, 1896.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    Two of the depredations set up are sustained hy corroborative proof. The third is only supported hy the testimony of the claimants themselves. The depredation was committed in 1867, and the claim was not presented to the Government until suit brought in this court in 1891.
    I.These Indian depredation cases, where a party can bring an action at law twenty-four years after his cause of action arose without previous notification of any kind, are without a precedent in the history of jurisprudence.
    II.The fact that a jury may believe or disbelieve testimony is not the sole criterion in the determination of facts. It is the duty of courts to see that a sufficiently stable foundation is laid upon which to rest a verdict and to set aside verdicts which are against the weight of evidence.
    III.The court reiterates the rule laid down in Stone?s Case (29 C. Cls. R., 111). Where a case is first brought to the attention of the defendants by an action in this court, after a great number of years, and is supported only by the testimony of the parties in interest, the court will not find the facts, but will dismiss the case as unsupported by sufficient proof.
    
      The Reporters1 statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of tbe case as found by the ■court:
    I. At the time of the depredations hereinafter found the claimants were citizens of the United States, residing in Cook County, Texas. The depredations were committed without the consent of the claimants and without any cause or provocation on their part or on that of any agent of theirs, and the property has never been returned or paid for.
    II. At the time of the depredations aforesaid the defendant Indians were in amity with the United States.
    . III. On the 26th September, 1866, the defendant Indians •seized and carried away ten head of horses, the reasonable value of which at the time and place of taking was $355.00.
    IY. On the 12th April, 1868, the defendant Indians seized and carried away forty-five horses, five of which were after-wards recovered by the claimants. The reasonable value of the forty horses not recovered at the time and place of taking was $1,000.00.
    Y. The depredation alleged to have been committed by the defendant Indians on the 15th October, 1867, is supported only by the testimony of the claimants themselves. The claimants, never presented this claim to the Department of the Interior, nor to Congress, nor to any officer or agent of the Government until their petition in this case was filed in this court on the 5th October, 1891.
    Upon the foregoingfindings of fact the court decided as conclusion of law:
    1. The claimants should recover for the depredations committed by the defendant Indians on the 26th September, 1866, and on the 12th April, 1868, $1,355.00.
    2. The claimants should not recover for the depredation alleged to have been committed on the 15th October, 1867.
    
      Mr. William JB. Matthews for the claimant.
    
      Mr. W. H. Robeson (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Howry) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In the case of Stone (29 C. Cls. R., 111), this court held that when the ownership of the property, the possession of it, the quantity of it, the value of it, and the fact of the depredation depend exclusively upon the testimony of the party in interest and a single witness the court will not allow such testimony wholly unsupported to control a decision though the witnesses be neither contradictory nor impeached. It should be added that that decision was made in a case where a claimant had never presented his claim to the Department of the Interior or to Congress or to any officer or agent of the Government until after the lapse of more than twenty-eight years when he filed his petition in this court.

In the present case the second depredation alleged in the petition occurred on the 15th October, 1867, and no presentation of the claim was made until the petition was filed in this court on the 5th October, 1891, an interval of more than twenty-four years. It is supported only by the testimony of the two parties claimant.

A distinction is sought to be drawn between this case and Stone’s by the claimants’ counsel founded upon two facts — that the claim here is for a trivial amount, and that it is supported by the testimony of two claimants instead of one. '

In the Stone Case the court did not pass upon or question the credibility of the witnesses. It siuqply ruled that in such a case such evi dence is insufficient to support a judgment. The ruling was as if another court should refuse to allow a case to go to a jury, saying that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is not sufficient to support a verdict. It was not the case of an issue submitted to a jury and the jury refusing to find a verdict for the plaintiff because the jurors did not believe his witnesses.

These Indian depredation cases — cases where a man can bring an action at law more than twenty-four years after his cause of action arose, without previous notification of any kind to put the defendant upon inquiry — are without a precedent in the history of jurisprudence. To allow such a suit to be maintained and a recovery to be had, exclusively upon the testimony of the party in interest and one corroborating witness for no other reason than that the testimony is not contradicted and the witnesses are not impeached, will be to put the defendant at the mercy of any unscrupulous party who may have brought a suit. Such a result will not be the due administration of justice.

Every court as a court owes protection to the parties before it. Verdicts are set aside as against the weight of evidence, and verdicts are not allowed where they will be unsupported by sufficient evidence. The fact that a jury may believe or disbelieve testimony is not the sole criterion in the determination of facts. It is not the duty of a court to criticise the witnesses, or weigh the testimony, or on the testimony to reach a different conclusion from that of the jury; but it is the duty of the court to see that a sufficiently stable foundation is laid upon which to rest a verdict, and to set aside the result of a jury’s deliberations where the verdict appears to the court to be clearly against the weight of evidence, i. e., where it would be prejudicial to the due administration of justice to allow such.a,verdict to stand.

The court must therefore reiterate in the present case the rule laid down in Stone’s, that where a claim has never been presented to any officer or department of the Government and bas been first brought to the notice of the defendants by an action in this court, begun after a great number of years and supxiorted wholly by the testimony of the parties in interest without sufficient corroboration by other witnesses, or by other evidence, documentary or circumstantial, the court will not make a finding of fact analogous to a special verdict, but will dismiss the case as unsupported by sufficient proof.

The judgment of the court is that the claimants recover for the first and third of the alleged depredations $1,355, and that as to the second depredation of the 12th April, 1867, their petition be dismissed.