Case ID: f-appx_494/html/0184-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

QIN ZHOU, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-4189.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 5, 2012.
    
      David X. Feng, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Lisa Morinelli, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Qin Zhou, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 19, 2011, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Qin Zhou, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 19, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). There is no dispute that Zhou’s 2011 motion to reopen was untimely because her administrative order of removal became final in 2009. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Zhou argues that her motion to reopen is excused from the time limitation based on changed conditions arising in China since the time of her 2007 merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen as untimely.

Initially, the BIA reasonably determined that Zhou’s motion failed to establish changed conditions in China because her conversion to Christianity in the United States, which occurred after her removal order, was a change in personal circumstances, not a change of conditions “arising in” China. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).

Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that the background evidence submitted with Zhou’s motion to reopen did not show that the Chinese government’s treatment of Christians had changed since the time of her 2007 hearing. See Matter of S-YG-, 24 I & N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007). The BIA compared the evidence of country conditions after Zhou’s 2007 hearing with the evidence in the administrative record at the time of her hearing, and reasonably concluded that the record did not establish worsening conditions for Christians. See Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam) (the BIA is not required to “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 84.1(b).