Case ID: f-appx_459/html/0623-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Phiyen LESSOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J. C. PENNEY CORP INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-35157.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Oct. 13, 2011.
    Filed Nov. 23, 2011.
    
      Randy Perry Baker, Esquire, Randy Baker, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Gregory M. Bair, Senior Litigation Counsel, J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., Plano, TX, Gary Edward Lofland, Lofland & Associates, Yakima, WA, for Defendants Appellee.
    Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, PAEZ, Circuit Judge, and COLLINS, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Raner C. Collins, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Arizona, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Lessor is a Vietnamese immigrant who was given fewer opportunities than Caucasian stylists to attract customers, and was terminated from employment despite having been previously promoted. Thus, she established a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably. See Cornwell v. Medra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir.2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)).

J.C. Penney gave a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Lessor that was sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. See Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir.2007). It claimed she was terminated for refusing to accept a “performance plan” created for her after several customer complaints. But there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether J.C. Penney’s stated reason for terminating Lessor’s employment was pretextual. “[W]e have repeatedly held that a single discriminatory comment by a plaintiffs supervisor or de-cisionmaker is sufficient to preclude summary judgment for the employer.” See Dominguez-Curry, 424 F.3d at 1039.

Bates was involved in the decisionmak-ing process that led to Lessor’s termination, and Lessor recalled a conversation with Bates where the latter made discriminatory remarks. Moreover, the absence of a policy concerning customer complaints or “performance plans” supports an inference of discriminatory intent. See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir.2004).

REVERSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.