Case ID: scl_4/html/0403-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BRevaRD, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    MAY, 1810.
    The Administrators of M. Lide v. John Lide, and others.
    The Courts of Ordinary in this State were not originally of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, hut purely civil.
    A will shall not be set aside on account of any persuasions or representations of the testator’s wife, whde the testator is at the point of death, to induce him to.make her a more liberal provision than he is disposed to make, although it should appear that such persuasions had prevailed on him to comply with her wishes; provided it shall appear the testator was of sound mind, and was not imposed on by false representations, and that the provision made for the wife is not greatly disproportionate and unreasonable.
    Motion for a new trial. Appeal from the Court of Ordinary of Marlborough district, decided in the District Court of Marlborough, before Smith, J.
    The jury found for the defendants; from whose decision this motion was submitted by way of appeal.
    On petition to the Court of Ordinary, to prove the last will of Thomas Lide, deceased, the same 'was opposed ; and on the trial, the clause of the will which was attempted to be impeached, was as follows : “ I give and bequeath to my beloved wife Mihatabel Lide, £50 sterling money annually during hey natural life, to be made and raised out of the crops and profits of my plantation,, and paid to her by my executors or administrators annually, in lieu of her part or portion of my estate; also, one bay horse called Randolph. And whereas my said wife at the time of my marriage with her, was entitled to a part of the estate of Charles Irby, Esquire, deceased, and which by special contract with her, I was not to receive any part of: I do, therefore, give and bequeath unto my said wife, her heirs and assigns, forever, all, and every part and parcel of the said Charles Irby’s estate, which I am, or might be entitled to, in consequence of my said marriage with her.” Evidence was given to prove that the annuity of £50 was given by the testator under an impression that Mrs. Lide was pregnant, and that Charles Irby’s estate was insolvent; and that these impressions were without foundation. The evidence produced, Only amounted to a suspicion, that Mrs. Lide had induced her husband to believe, while he lay on his death bed, that she was pregnant, and that she might have persuaded him to make the liberal provision he did in his will, under ^lat ™Press'oa> ar|d with an idea that the estate of Charles Irby would prove insolvent. But it appeared that the' testator, at the ^me making his will, was of sound mind, and clear memory, and was a man of firm character, and good sense.
    The motion for a new trial was submitted on two grounds. 1. That no evidence was given which proved fraud, or misrepresentation, on the part of the plaintiff’s intestato, in obtaining the provision made by the will, in her favor ; and that erroneous impressions, by other means, on the mind of a testator, are not sufficient to overthrow a will, otherwise legally made. 2. That the evidence, at most, only proved that the person instructed to draw the will, omitted a condition which ought to have been annexed to it; which would not invalidate it.
    The case was argued by Witherspoon, and Nott, for appellees.
    Branding, on the other side, was stopped by the court.
    For the appellees, it was contended, that this court had no jurisdiction, or power, to entertain and decide on appeals from the Courts of Ordinary, determined in the District Courts. That appeals from the Courts of Ordinary, decided in the District Courts, are to be regarded as final and conclusive. The matters of fact decided on in the District Court were exclusively for the consideration of the jury. . The construction was referred to, and the act of assembly of 1799, which directs the mode of appeal from the decisions of Courts of Ordinary, and the County Court act, P. L. 372. No appeal, it was said, lies from a decision by any court of appellate jurisdiction. The Courts of Ordinary, it was urged, sprang from the courts ecclesiastical in England. This court, or the District Courts rather, may restrain them when they exceed their jurisdiction ; but if they decide improperly, within their jurisdiction, the courts of law cannot correct or control them. The parties may, however, appeal on matters of fact to be tried by a jury. No appeal lies from an appeal decided on. In England, although an appeal lies to the delegates, it is by virtue of a special commission. The evidence before the jury warranted the verdict.
   BRevaRD, J.,

delivered the opinion of the whole court. After stating the case, and the questions discussed in the argument,, he proceeded as follows: In expressing my opinion on these two points, I shall be as concise as possible. On the first point it has been said, that the Court of Ordinary being of ecclesiastical origin, must stand on the same ground with respect to other courts of the coun. try, as the courts ecclesiastical do in England; and that a judgment, or decision, made within their jurisdiction, although erroneous, cannot be overruled, or questioned, in any other court, unless some express power be given by statute law, for that purpose ; and that in the matter now under consideration, no such power is given to this court, to entertain an appeal from the Court of Ordinary. The answer to this objection is, that whatever may have been the origin of the Courts of Ordinary in England, in this country they are purely civil in their institution and jurisdiction. We have not, nor had we ever, an ecclesiastical establishment, clothed with any civil powers. But it has been further said, that although an appeal lies from the judgment, or order of a Court of Ordinary to the Court of Common Pleas, yet must the appeal be tried pursuant to the County Court law ; and that no appeal lies from the Circuit or District Court, on an appeal determined in the Court of Common Pleas by a jury. To this the answer is, that trial by jury in the Courts of Common Pleas must be according to the principles of law, and the rules of those courts; and that the parties have a constitutional right of appeal to this court in every case tried in the courts of the district's respectively, upon questions either of fact, or law ; and that it is the duty of this court to take cognuzance of the appeal, and decide upon it. In regard to the second point in the case, it is only necessary to observe, . that the verdict is manifestly against evidence. For although it has appeared from the evidence given on the trial, as reported .by the judge who presided at the same, in the District Court, that the testator might have been, and probably was, influenced, in some degree, by the representations and persuasions of his wife, in making the provision for her he did, and to a more liberal extent, perhaps, than he otherwise would have done ; yet the evidence by no means proved any fraud, or imposition, in obtaining the will. The testator was compos men. tis, and acted with deliberation. And it has not appeared that the provision made for the wife by th§ will, was at all unreasonable, or disproportionate. .

New trial granted.