Case ID: ala_134/html/0134-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DOWDELL, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

McKinney v. The State.
    
      Indictment for Arson.
    
    1. Confession; when shown to he voluntary. — A statement made by a sheriff in a conversation wi,th the defendant, while the latter was in his custody under á charge for another and different offense and before any charge had been preferred against him, in the pending case, that he, the sheriff, understood that a reward or $500 had been offered for the arredt of the person who committed the offense charged in the present indictment, and that it was his custom to divide the reward with .those who helped him to find out the guilty person, is a promise of a collateral benefit to the defendant and offers no hope or favor in respect to the charge for which he was being tried; and such promise does not render the confession subsequently made by the defendant involuntary, and, therefore, inadmissible m eyidence.
    2. Voluntary confessions;< what a question for the jury and what for the court. — As to whether or not a confession made by a defendant is voluntary or involuntary, is a preliminary question addressed to the court, and after the introduction of such confession the we.ght that shall'be accorded it is a question for the jury; and charges which refer the admissibility of confessions in evidence to the jury are erroneous and properly refused.
    Appeal from the County Court of Clay.
    Tried before tlie Hon. M. N. Manning.
    The appellant in this case was indicted, tried and convicted of arson in t-lie second degree in setting fire to and burning a storehouse: containing a stock of goods of the value of $3,000.
    On the trial of the case the burning of the storehouse and the ownership' thereof ivas proved' as laid in the indictment.
    Upon the introdction of W. D. Mayo he testified that he was the sheriff of Clay county at the time the defendant in this case was arrested; that he was arrested on a charge for burning a-gin house owned by one Richards; that while he was in jail on the charge for burning said gin home, the witness had a conversation with the defendant; that he did not offer him any inducements whatever, nor did he make any threats to get him to whatever, nor did he make any threats to get him to make any statement; that he, the witness, went to the jail to feed the defendant., was alome and unarmed; that in this conversation the: defendant told the Avitness that he set fire to and burned the storehouse of Mr. Wilson, the burning of AAdiich Avas charged in the indictment in the present case. The witness then gave in detail the confession of the defendant as made at that time.
    On the cross-examination of the ' Avitness Mayo, he testified that after1 he had arrested the defendant on the charge of burning Richard’s gin ’ hose, and while ho Avas carrying him to jail, he said something to him about the burning of Wilson’s store, and in the conversation the defendant said something that made the witness believe that he kneAV ivlm did the burning, and then continuing, the witness testified as, follows: “I suggested that I understood there Avas a $500 reAvard and tha.it it had been my custom after a matter of that kind had occurred to divide the reAvard Avith those Avho helped me to locate the parties.”
    The defendant objected to the introduction in evidence of the confession of the defendant made to the witness Mayo, upon the ground that it was not shoAvn to have been voluntary. The court overruled the objection and' Avitness the defendant moAred to exclude the testimony of the Avitness Mayo as to the confession made’by the defendant, upon the grond that it was not shown to have been voluntary. The court overruled the objection, and the motion, and to each of these rulings the defendant separately excepted.
    . The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately exceoted to the court’s refusal to give each of them as asked: (1.) “If the jury believe from the evidence that’any inducements \vere offered to the defendant to procure a confession from the, defendant, then the jury Must not consider' such confession against the defendant.” (2.) “If the jury believe from the evidence that any threats were made against the defendant to induce him to malee confessions, then the jury must not consider such confession against the defendant.” (3.) “The court charges the jury that before the defendant can be convicted on a confession, the confession must be shown to have been made voluntarily, without. having been influenced by threats or promises of reward.”
    No counsel marked as appearing for appellant.
    Chas. G. Brown, Attorney-General, ■ for the State,
    cited Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108; Golson v. State, 124 Ala. 8; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 69; Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560; Washington v. State, 53 Ala. 29; Levison v. State, 54 Ala. 520.
   DOWDELL, J.

In a criminal case, a confession that is made on a. promise of some collateral benefit to the defendant, no hope or favor being held out in respect to the criminal charge against him, is not considered involuntary, and is, therefore, admissible in evidence. 1 Greenleaf on Ev., (16th ed.), page 359, § 2206; McIntosh v. State, 52 Ala. 355; Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60.

The admissibility of the confession in evidence, is a preliminary question, and is addressed to the court. What weight shall be accorded it, when admitted in evidence, is a question for the jury. — Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108; 1 Brick. Dig., 509, § 858 et seq.

The statement made by the sheriff in a conversation with the defendant, while the latter Avas in his custody under a charge for another and different offense, and before any charge had been preferred against him in the present case, that he, the sheriff, understood that a reAvard of $500 had been, offered, and that it was his custom to divide the reward with those who helped him to find out the guilty parties, if considered, as a promise to the defendant, it held out to him. no hone of ésca.pe- from a conviction or of lessening his punishment in the particular case. The benefit to be derived was simply collateral, and a,s was said in McIntosh v. State, supra, tlie confession was voluntarily made, without the appliances of hope or fear.

Idle charges requested by the defendant were properly refused, as'they referred the admissibility of the Confession to the jiiry; a question exclusively for tlie determination of the court, — Bob v. State, 32 Ala. 560; Washington v. State, 53 Ala. 29; 1 Brick. Dig., 509, §§ 858 et seq.

We find no error in the record, and the judgment must be affirmed.