Case ID: sw_181/html/0455-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "HARPER, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JOHNSON v. STATE.
    (No. 3866.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 22, 1915.)
    1. Prostitution <&wkey;3 — Information — Sur-plusage-Striking Out.
    Upon an information charging defendant with alluring, procuring, and soliciting a female to be at a certain place to have unlawful intercourse with men, the further allegation that he gave numerous persons her location, and thereby procured men to meet her, whereby they had unlawful sexual intercourse with her, for which purpose the said meeting was brought about, if surplusage, leaving sufficient to allege the offense and to enable defendant to plead the judgment in bar of another prosecution, left the information good.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Prostitution, Cent. Dig. § 3; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>3.]
    2. Criminal Law <&wkey;1167 — Appeal — Sur-plusage-Harmless Error.
    Where alleged surplusage would not render admissible any testimony that would not otherwise have been admissible, the failure to strike it out was not reversible error.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3101, 3103-3106; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1167.]
    3. Indictment and Information <&wkey;120 — Surplusage.
    Alleged surplusage, which, if stricken, would leave an information sufficiently charging the offense, was not improper, as the pleader’s election to go into more detail than was necessary, and to give the method of the crime would not affect its validity.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §. 315; Dee. Dig. &wkey;120.]
    4. Criminal Law <&wkey;1102 — Appeal—Striking — Statement of Facts.
    Where the term at which defendant was tried adjourned September 25, 1915, and the statement of facts was not presented to the court for approval nor filed until November 10, 1915, and no sufficient reason for the delay was shown, the motion to strike out the statement of facts will he sustained.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Dec. Dig. <§=^1102.]
    
      Appeal from Jones County Court; J. E. Lindsey, Judge.
    Sidney Johnson was convicted of alluring, procuring, and soliciting a female to be at a certain place to meet and have unlawful intercourse with men, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    A. L. Brantley, of Graham, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was convicted under an indictment charging:

“That anterior to the presentment of this indictment Sidney Johnson, late of the county of Jones, on the 23d day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifteen, with force and arms, in the county of Jones and state of Texas, did then and there allure and procure and solicit a female person, Mrs. Willie Marie Johnson, to be at a certain place in the town of Stamford, to wit, a vacant lot near the public library in the town of Stamford, Tex., for the purpose of meeting and having unlawful sexual intercourse with male persons, and he, the said Sidney Johnson, did then and there give to numerous male persons the locations of said Willie Marie Johnson and thereby procured male persons to meet the said Willie Marie Johnson, whereby they did then and there have unlawful sexual intercourse with the said Willie Marie Johnson, for which purpose the said meeting was brought about.”

He filed a motion to strike out the following language in the indictment:

“And he, the said Sidney Johnson, did then and there give to numerous male persons the locations of said Willie Marie Johnson, and thereby procured male persons to meet the said Willie Marie Johnson, whereby they did then and there have unlawful sexual intercourse with the said Willie Marie Johnson, for which purpose the said meeting was brought about”

—alleging that said language was surplusage and would confuse the jury; that the remainder of said bill charges an offense against the law without this surplusage.

Surplusage never vitiates an indictment, if the surplusage can be stricken out, and the remaining language charge an offense. Branch’s Crim. Law, § 905, correctly states:

“If, eliminating surplusage, the indictment so avers the constituent elements of the offense as to ’apprise defendant of the charge against him, and enable him to plead the judgment in bar of another prosecution, it is good in substance, 'under our Code, and therefore sufficiently charges the offense.” Coleman v. State, 2 Tex. App. 514; Clark v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 641, 56 S. W. 621; Lomax v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 318, 43 S. W. 92; Jordan v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 222, 38 S. W. 780, 39 S. W. 110, and other cases cited under this section.

And, as the language used would not render admissible any testimony that would not have been admissible, the failure to strike it out does not present reversible error, if surplusage. ■

But we do not think the language used in. any sense improper in the indictment Appellant admits the indictment charges an offense, and says it would do so without this language, and, if the pleader elected to go more in detail than was absolutely necessary, and give the mode and method of procurement used, this would not affect the validity of the indictment.

The term of court at which appellant was tried adjourned September 25, 1915, and the statement of facts was not presented to the court for approval nor filed until November 10,1915. No sufficient reason is assigned for this delay, and the motion of the Assistant Attorney General to strike out the .statement of facts must be sustained. No other question is presented we can review, with no statement of facts we can consider.

The judgment is affirmed. 
      -«gr^For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes