Case ID: ark-app_24/html/0068-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      John E. Jennings, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Billy Ray SHELTON and Sarah Shelton v. Hugh KELLER, Hugh Keller III and Patsy Keller
    CA 87-378
    748 S.W.2d 153
    Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division I
    Opinion delivered April 20, 1988
    
      Mitchell, Williams, Selig & Tucker, by: Mike Wilson, for appellants.
    
      William Reed, for appellees.
   John E. Jennings, Judge.

It is generally true that in order to obtain a decree of specific performance of a contract for the sale of personal property, it must be shown that the property is “unique.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-716 (Add. 1961); 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 82 (1977). This rule has no application to real property because the law regards land as unique. See Dickinson v. McKenzie, 197 Ark. 746, 126 S.W.2d 95 (1939); D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 12.10 (1973); 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 76 (1977).

Appellees correctly point out that chancery has some latitude of discretion in granting or withholding specific performance depending on the equities of the particular case. See Langston v. Langston, 3 Ark. App. 286, 625 S.W.2d 554 (1981). But in the case at bar the court did not decline to grant specific performance because of the equities. The court’s judgment was based upon a failure of proof, when such proof is not required by the law.

The case is remanded to the chancellor with directions to enter a decree of specific performance.

Reversed and remanded.

Corbin, C.J., and Cracraft, J., agree.