Case ID: so2d_731/html/0722-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. COPE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

James FLUCKERS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 98-2598
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    March 10, 1999.
    Rehearing Denied May 19, 1999.
    James Fluckers, in proper person.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before COPE, GREEN, and FLETCHER, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GREEN and FLETCHER, JJ., concur.

COPE, J.

(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The record now before us does not conclusively refute that part of defendant-appellant’s Rule 3.850 motion in which he asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense to the specific intent crime of burglary. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(i). I would remand for further proceedings on that issue as to the burglary charge only. See Bartley v. State, 689 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Flores v. State, 662 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Young v. State, 661 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Durden v. State, 657 So.2d 919 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

Appellant is not entitled to a hearing on the voluntary intoxication issue as relates to false imprisonment, because it is a general intent crime; the misdemeanor battery claim, which is immaterial in the scheme of things and the sentence has already been served; and the auto theft charge, because the evidence showed that the car had been stolen at an earlier date. I concur with the majority’s affirmance on the remaining issues.