Case ID: fla_113/html/0743-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Buford, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

J. K. Lawton, Hettie S. Reynolds, et vir., v. Carolyn M. McIlvaine.
    152 So. 179.
    Division B.
    Opinion Filed January 15, 1934.
    
      Robert Brodie and A. C. Brooks, for Appellants;
    
      W. T. Martin, for Appellee.
   Buford, J.

In this case Hettie S. Reynolds and her husband, D. W. Reynolds, executed a mortgage to Lawton. Afterwards they executed a mortgage to Carolyn M. Mcllvaine encumbering the same property but before that mortgage became effective Lawton entered into a binding stipulation that his mortgage should constitute an inferior 'lien to that of the Mcllvaine mortgage. Later certain liens accrued against the same property and Mcllvaine was required to discharge those liens' to protect her mortgage. Thereupon she accepted a deed conveying the fee simple •title from Mrs. Reynolds and her husband to herself, the deed containing the clause, “subject to one first mortgage, paving liens, taxes' and mechanics and other liens now of record against same.”

Mcllvaine went into possession of the property.

Subsequent to all these transactions, Lawton filed suit to foreclose his mortgage. Mcllvaine filed answer alleging that her mortgage was a prior lien to that of the Lawton mortgage and prayed affirmative relief of foreclosure. In due course, testimony was taken and chancellor entered a decree in favor of Mcllvaine as a superior lien holder and Lawton as an inferior lien holder.

The appellants contended that because of the merger of the title in Mcllvaine that her mortgage was satisfied and that Lawton’s mortgage became a- first lien. It is the contention of the appellee that there was' no merger but that the title was taken simply to protect the lien.

We think the law. applicable to this case was enunciated by this Court in the case of Jackson v. Relf, et vir., 26 Fla. 465, 8 Sou. 184, in which it was said:

“A merger takes place when a greater estate and a less meet in one and the same person, in one and the same right, without any intermediate estate, the lesser estate being thereby merged in the greater; but the merger is not a necessary result of the union of the two estates in the same person. The intention and interest of the party who unites the two estates in himself will determine whether or not a merger takes place.
“Where a mortgage encumbrancer becomes the owner of the legal title, or of the equity of redemption, a merger will not be held to take place if it be apparent that it was not the intention of the owner, or if in the absence of any intention, the merger would be against his manifest interest. And a purchase of the mortgaged estate at a tax sale by ■the mortgagee to protect the mortgage lien and save the property from being lost to him, does not effect a merger.”

It appears that the chancellor resolved the facts against the contentions of the appellants and we have been shown no good and sufficient reason for overruling his conclusion. The decree appealed from should, therefore,' be affirmed. It is so ordered.

Affirmed.

Whitfield, P. J., and Brown, J., concur.

Davis, C. J., and Ellis and Terrell, J. J., concur in the opinion and judgment. ...