Case ID: minor_1/html/0395-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Judge Crenshaw\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Clemens against Judson and Banks.
    
      December, 1825.
    3, To sustain a judgment the Court will infer that a cause was continued by operation of law, although the continuances do not appear on the Record.
    2, Not necessary that notice for judgment nunc pro tunc should appear.
    5, Such judgment, if by default and final, should be for principal, and interest only to the time when judgment should have been entered.
    AT November term, 1821, of the Circuit Court of Mobile County, (to which the writ was returned executed) Judson and Banks filed their declaration in assumpsit against Joshua Clemens on a promissory note. In the Record next after the declaration, and as of May term, 1823, is the following entry : “ Judgment by default final.” At February term, 1824, on motion of plaintiffs for a judgment nunc pro tunc, a judgment in due form was entered for f 1111, being the amount of the note and interest up to that time.
    
      Clemens here assigns as Errors.
    1, The cause was discontinued, no proceedings having been had at May term, 1822, or at November term, 1822.
    2, The judgment nunc pro tunc was entered without giving notice to defendant.
    3, The judgment is for too large an amount
    
      Randall, for plaintiff.
    
      Acre, for defendants in Error.
   Judge Crenshaw

delivered the opinion of the Court.

As to the 1st and 2d assignments, it is the opinion of the m ajority of the Court, that, though the continuances do not appear to have been regularly entered of Record, yet to sustain a judgment it is to be inferred that the cause was continued by operation of law.

That it was not necessary to give notice of a motion to enter judgment nunc pro tunc. I think that notice was necessary, but that the notice need not appeár of Record.

As to the third assignment, it appears that the interest was computed up to the time when the judgment nunc pro tunc was entered. It should have been computed only up to May term, 1823, when the default was taken, and the judgment should have been entered. For this reason, it is the unanimous opinion of the Court that the judgment be reversed and the proper judgment now rendered here-.