Case ID: ohio-law-abs_2/html/0616-03.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CUSHING, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 637
    COLLINS, Admr., v. REIERING
    Ohio Appeals, 1st Dist., Hamilton County
    No. 2269.
    Dec. 17, 1923
    473. ESTATES — Suit by administrator of a mother’s estate to recover from the son, money spent by the mother for the benefit of the son, is within the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas, and a general denial raises issues of fact for a jury
   CUSHING, J.

Epitomized Opinion

Published Only in Ohio Law Abstract

Original action in the Common Pleas, wherein William B. Collins, administrator of the estate of Mary Reiering, deceased, was plaintiff, and Joseph B. Reiering, son of said deceased, was defendant. The petition asked for the the recovery of a sum of money which the mother had in 1917, when the son was absent in the war, paid to the Norwood Sash & Door Co. for material previously furnished by the company to the son for the construction of a house. The petition sought to recover also for board and lodging which the mother had furnished the son. The answer was a general denial.

Attorneys — Ed. H. Williams and Wm. R. Collins, for Collins; Karl H. Caldwell, for Reiering; all of Cincinnati.

At the trial, on motion of defendant, the Common Pleas directed a verdict for defendant and dismissed the action on the ground that even though the money was advanced as alleged in the petition, that money upon the death of the mother became what the law terms an advancement, that it was an irrevocable gift by a parent tq a child in anticipation of the child’s future share of the parent’s estate and is to be taken into account upon distribution. Another reason for the ytriap. court’s action was that the Probate Court and not the Common Pleas had jurisdiction to determine what share the son should receive out of the estate. Upon error, prosecuted by Collins, the Court of Appeals held:

The general denial denying all the allegations of the petition, put in issue questions of fact for the determination of a jury. The word “advanced” as used in the petition cannot be construed to mean advancement in its legal sense. Moreover, this allegation is denied by the answer.

The action was properly commenced in the Common Pleas. The Probate Court would not have jurisdiction to determine the question whether or not the son was indebted to the estate That was a question of fact for the jury. Judgment reversed and cause remanded.