Case ID: pa_98/html/0159-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Sterrett", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Fosselman versus Elder, Executor, etc.
    A testatrix executed a will in 1878, in due form, by which she bequeathed various legacies to a niece, Isabella Fosselman, who lived with her. She afterwards died suddenly in January, 1880. Among her papers was found a sealed envelope indorsed in her handwriting thus: “ Dear Bella, this is for you to open.” The contents of the envelope were a promissory note for $2,000 and the following paper, also in testatrix’s handwriting: “ Lewistown, Oct. 2, 1879. My wish is for you to draw this 2,000 dollars for your use, should I die sudden.- Elizabeth Fosselman.” An amicable issue having been framed between Isabella Fosselman and testatrix’s executor to determine the ownership of the promissory note, — Held, that the indorsement on the envelope and the contents thereof constituted together a valid testamentary disposition of the note to the plaintiff in the issue, operating as a codicil to testatrix’s Will, and that therefore plaintiff was entitled to judgment.
    May 24th 1881. Before Mercur, Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett and Green, JJ. Sharswood, O. J., absent.
    Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflm county: Of May Term 1881, No. 154.
    This was an issue amicably framed between Isabella Fosselman, plaintiff, and G. "W. Elder, executor of Elizabeth Fosselman, defendant, to determine the ownership of a certain promissory note dated October 2d 18.79, made by T. F. McCoy, president of the board of trustees of the Presbyterian Church of Lewistown, to Elizabeth Fosselman.
    There was no dispute as to the facts of the case, which are fully set out in the opinion of this court, and of which the following is a brief resume: Elizabeth Fosselman conducted a millinery- business, in which she was assisted by her husband’s-, niece, Isabella Fosselman, who resided with her and her bus-band. Her blood relations lived at a distance. After tbe death, in January. 1880, of Elizabeth Fosselman, who had made a will in J uly 1878, her executor found among her papers a sealed envelope, inscribed “Dear Bella: This is for you to open.” When opened by Isabella, it was found to contain the note in question for $2,000 and a paper containing these words: “ Lewistown, October 2d 1879. My wish is for you to draw this 2000 dollars for your own use should I die sudden. — Elizabeth Fosselman.”
    On the trial before Junkin, P. J., the Court instructed the jury that if the paper just quoted was genuine, to find for the plaintiff, reserving the question whether the said paper, in connection with the note to which it referred and the indorsement on the envelope, constituted a testamentary disposition.
    Yerdict for the plaintiff accordingly, subject to the question reserved.
    The Court subsequently entered judgment on the reserved question in favor of the defendant, holding that although the writing inclosed in the envelope was a testamentary paper, yet it was incapable of execution and void for uncertainty, because the testatrix had not sufficiently designated the object of her bounty; and that parol evidence was not admissible to explain who was intended by the prououn “you,” contained in the said testamentary writing; and holding further that the indorsement on the envelope was no part of the will, and could not be admitted to probate with the inclosed writing.
    Junkin, P. J., filed the following opinion :
    First, as to the exhibir “ A ” being testamentary in its character. It was to take effect after death, and contains a disposition either of $2,000, or a note for that amount, found in the same envelope. In Cock v. Cooke, L. B., 1 P. & D. 241, a duly executed paper in these words, “ I wish my sister to have my bank book for her own use,” held testamentary ; also, In the goods of Coles, L. B., 2 P. & D. 862. In Doe d. Cross v. Cross, 8 Ad. and Ellis, N. S. 714,.where a person being in India executed the following instrument: “Know all men,” &c., “ that I make E. my lawful attorney for me, and in my name and to my use to ask, demand,” &c. “ And I do empower her,
    the said E., to hold and retain all proceeds of the said property for her own use until I may return to England and claim possession in person, or in the event of my death, 1 do hereby, in my mime, assign and deliver to- said E. the sole claim to the before mentioned property, &c.” He died in India, without having returned to Great Britain, and it was held that the writing operated as a devise to E. Ch. J. Denman said : “ What principle of law is there to prevent it from being a will ?” So Mars-den, In re, 1 Swab. & Trist. 542, where, one being informed that he could not recover from his present illness, expressed a wish that his wife should be in a condition to receive at his death certain sums of money in two savings banks, and signed, in the presence of two witnesses, orders for the payment of the money to her by the banks, and died the day after. The court granted administration to the widow, with the orders annexed, as containing the will of the deceased; and there are many similar cases cited by Redfield on Wills, p. 180, 181, &c. in footnotes.
    The next question is, has testatrix sufficiently designated the object of her bounty? Exhibit “A” does not name Isabella, the plaintiff, but the envelope is addressed to her, and is this address a part of her will ? It is in testatrix’s own handwriting, but it is not signed at the end thereof. Unless, then, the words written on the envelope, “ Dear Bella, this is for you to open,” can be made a part of the will, the $2,000 bond or note is not -given to any one by name or description. In Wikoff’s Appeal, 3 Harris 290, Chief Justice Gibson declares that it is a rudimental principle that a will may be made on distinct papers, as was held in the Earl of Essex’s case, cited 1 Show. 69, that it is sufficient that they are connected by their internal sense, by coherence or adaptation of parts. In Ginder v. Farnum, 10 Barr 98, several sheets of paper fastened together by a string, with the signature of the testator at the end thereof, were held sufficient under the act of assembly. But here there was inherent evidence on the face of the papers, and no proof of any fraudulent addition. The most diligent search has disclosed no case in which a mere address or indorsement on an envelope or wrapper containing a will has ever been admitted to probate as a part of the inclosed will. Whenever a letter has been shown to be testamentary it was complete in itself, requiring no aid from the envelope, as see Morrill v. Dickey, 1 Johnson Ch. 153. This case is so novel that we must reason upon elementary-principles. Now it is undoubted that had the words “Dear Bella, this is for you to opon,” been added, without the testatrix’s signature to the foot of the signed will (“ A ”) the writing would have constituted no part of the will “AHays v. Harden, 6 Barr 409. Then if the words attached to the foot of the will “ A” itself could not be probated as part of that will, because unsigned by the testatrix, there is far less reason to hold the same words a part of the will when found indorsed on a mere envelope inclosing the will. In the nature of things, the indorsement of the words on the back of the envelope was done subsequent to tbe execution of tbe will “ A,” and could not be a part of the will itself, nor intended as a paid, but were used to identify the will itself, and point out who was entitled to its custody. The truth is very manifest, namely : that Elizabeth Eosselman contemjdated a gift of the $2,000 trustee note, and had no occasion to say anything more definite than what the signed paper contained. It will be observed that exhibit/1 A ” in no manner refers to the writing on the envelope so as to make the indorsement a part of the will, and the rule is that “ a reference in a will may be in such terms as to exclude parol testimony, as where it is to papers not yet written, or where the description is so vague as to be incapable of being applied to any instrument in particular. But if there is a reference to any written document described as then existing in such terms that it is capable of being ascertained, parol evidence is admissible to ascertain:" Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P. C. 427; In the goods of Mary Sunderland, dec’d, 1 Courts of Probate and Divorce, L. Rep. 1865-9, p. 198, 199, 200.
    "We reach the conclusion that the indorsement on the envelope is no part of Elizabeth • Fosselman’s will, and that exhibit “ A ” alone can be probated.
    The will then reads thus :
    “Lbwtstown, October 1-2, 1879.
    “ My wish is for you to draw this 2,000 dollars for your own use should I be called off sudden.
    “ Elizabeth Fosselman.”
    The next question is, who is “ yon ”? There are millions of people in the world who could be addressed as you, and here is a patent ambiguity on the face of the will. Hero, too, this anomalous will presents what, it is safe to say, has never occurred before, namely, a bequest in the second person without naming the legatee. Sir James Wigram’s VI. proposition is: “ Where the words of a will, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine the testator’s meaning, no evidence will be admissible to prove what the testator intended, and the will (except in certain special cases — see proposition VII.) will be void for uncertainty.” Proposition VIL — “Notwithstanding the rule of law which makes a will void for uncertainty, where the words, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine the testator’s meaning, courts of law, in certain special cases, admit extrinsic evidence of intention to make certain the person or thing intended where the description of the will is insufficient for the purpose. These cases may be thus defined : Where the object of the testator’s bounty, or the subject of disposition (i. <?., the person or thing intended), is described in terms which are applicable indifferently to more than one person or thing, evidence is admissible to prove which of the persons or things so described was intended by the testator.” He then enumerates the instances where it- has been held that parol evidence is not admissible: (1) To fill up a total blank in a will: Baylis v. Attorney-General, 2 Atk. 239 ; Castledon v. Turner, 3 Atk. 257; Hunt v. Hort, 3 Br. C. C. 311; or (2) of inserting a devise omitted by mistake : Lady Newburgh’s case, 5 Madd. 364; or 3, of proving what was intended by an unintelligible word; ... or (31) of ascertaining an intention which upon the face of the will was indeterminate, as in case of a devise to one of the sons of A, who hath several sons: 2 Vern. 265, and see Altham’s case, 8 Pep. 155.
    It is undoubtedly settled by innumerable cases, both here and in England, that parol evidence cannot be received to explain the intention of a testator, except in two specified cases: (1) Where there is a latent ambiguity arising dehors the will, as to the person or subject-matter meant to be described ; and (2) to rebut a resulting trust: Kent in Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Ch. 231; Wallize v. Wallize, 5 Smith 242, where the authorities are cited.
    In Newell’s App., 12 Harris, 199, Woodward, J., says: “A W'll must be judged ex viseeriíus suis, and unless there be latent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is not to control its construction, yet it has always been held that a defective designation of the devisee or legatee intended may be repaired by parol proof. If the person to take be not in some sort described in the devise, evidence will not be admitted to show who was intended, for that would be to make a will by parol; but where there are words of designation, though a mistake of the name, the ambiguity may be removed by evidence dehors the will.” So in Best v. Hammond, 5 Smith 412 ; 3 Watts 241; 8 Harris 55 ; 6 Casey 425. The characteristics of all the cases of latent ambiguities are that the words of the will do describe the objects or the subjects intended, and the parol evidence does not vary the instrument, but enables the court to reject one of the subjects .or objects to which the description in the will applies, and determine which of the two was signified by the description used in the will: Doe v. Morgan, 1 O. & M. 235; Redfield, 562, note. Redfield, p. 500-502, says: “Perhaps a solitary dictum may occasionally be met with ... in favor of the admission of parol evidence to explain an ambiguity or uncertainty appearing on the face of a will, through Lord Thurlow says there is no such case. If there be, we may venture to say it is no authority. If a will be uncertain or unintelligible on its face it is as if no will had been made, quod voluit non dixit”
    
    
      In Still v. Hoste, 6 Madd. 192, the bequest was to Sophia1 Still, daughter of Peter Still. He had two daughters, Selina and Mary Ann. Except for the descriptive addition, “ daughter of Peter Still,” the bequest was clearly void, it appearing that there was no such person as Sophia Still. Bnt that name being rejected, the bequest stood, “to the daughter of Peter Still,” and he having two daughters, this made a clear case of latent ambiguity, and parol evidence was received to show which daughter was intended. In Price v. Page, 4 Ves. 680, the bequest was to-Price, thé son of-Price ; the plaintiff: being the only person claiming it, evidence was received to show that testator said he would provide for the plaintiff, and had left him something in his will. Careless v. Careless, 1 Mer. 384, the devise was to Robert Careless, my nephew, the son of Joseph Careless. It appeared that testator had no nephew Robert, who was the son of his brother Joseph, as he had in fact no such brother, but he had two nephews Robert, sons of his brothers John and Thomas. The description of the devisee was, therefore, irrelevant, and wholly void, and the name only remaining, with the addition of my nephew, was definite enough till it appeared there were two nephews of that name, which made it a clear case of equivocation, according to Lord Bacon’s maxim for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
    It will be observed that in the cases cited, and indeed in all belonging to the class of latent ambiguities, there is a name, or part of a name, or some designation as nephew or son, sometimes wholly wrong, as in Beaumont v. Fell, 2 Peere Williams 140, still a clue to the intent of the testator; while in the case before us there is neither name nor description of the legatee, simply “ my wish is for you to draw,” &c. There is not even a misdescription to show'that she meant some person. It is practically a blank, is not so strong or clear as an initial letter, for an initial letter might lead to something. But even an initial letter is insufficient, as shown by Clayton v. Son Nugent, 13 M. and W. 200, 206. Plere the testator did not name any devisees, but gave his real estate first to K., then to . . ., then to L., then to M.., &c. The testator, on a piece of paper attached to the will, at the time of the execution, stated that “the key and index to the letter, initials, &c., was in a writing case in the drawer of a writing desk, on a card.” After, or at the time of the testator’s decease, a card was found in the place designated, explaining the meaning of the initials and characters used in the will. This was dated nearly a year before the will, and a witness had seen a similar card before the testator two years before his decease. It was .held that the card was not admissible to explain the meaning of the will. Kell v. Charmer, 23 Beavan 195, may seem in conflict with the case just cited. There testator gave to his son William a legacy expressed thus : i. x. x.; and to another son, o. x. x. Testator was a jeweler, accustomed to use certain private marks to denote prices in his business. Extrinsic evidence was given to show that these letters represented the sums of £100 and £200. This case is questioned, and if conceded to be law, it must stand upon the difference between it and Clayton v. Nugent (supra) in this, that characters standing for amounts of money are found in the will itself, whereas in the other case the offer was to incorporate other writings as part of the will, not referred to in the body of the will. Clayton v. Nugent (sipra) furnishes an additional authority against admitting the indorsement on the back of the envelope to probate as a part of the will of Mrs. Fosselman.
    We have been much embarrassed with this view of the case, to wit: The testator, having given the legacy to “ you,” thus designating some one, why may we not show by parol who was intended by the pronoun ? That where the bequest is so given, all living persons are comprehended in the designation, why not, as where the description fits two or more, hear evidence of the intent to give to one of the many? We answer,that while the reasoning is plausible, still we are bound by the rule that patent ambiguities cannot be explained by evidence dehors the will. It is plain that this will does not tell you to whom the legacy is given, and this is the essence of a patent ambiguity; we would then be making a will for the testatrix, because, while she has not given the slightest clue — not even the sex — to enable us to discover the object of her bounty, we will do that for her whenever we name anybody as entitled to take.
    We conclude that although the paper “ A” is the testament of Elizabeth Fosselman, yet it is incapable of execution, and is void for uncertainty; not so amusing as David Kelley’s will, in 1 Casey 461, but quite as incomprehensible without the aid of forbidden evidence.
    As this was an issue to try the ownership of the $2,000 note given by the trustees of the Presbyterian Church to Elizabeth Fosselman on the 2d October 1879, the real purpose was to determine the character of the paper “ A,” and although found to be a will, still, being void for uncertainty, the issue must be found against the plaintiff.
    And now, to wit, 18th April 1881, we determine the question reserved in favor of the defendant. By the Court.
    The plaintiff took this writ of error, assigning for error the entry of judgment for the defendant on the question reserved, and the decision of the court that the indorsement on the envelope, being no part of the testatrix’s will, cannot be admitted to probate ; and that although the paper “A” is testamentary, yet it is incapable of execution and void for uncertainty.
    
      A. Heed,, for the plaintiff in error.
    The court below erred, we think, in holding-that the address on the envelope could not be admitted to probate in connection with the testamentary writing inclosed in it. It is settled that a will may be on distinct and separate papers, if they are connected by their internal sense, by coherence or adaptation of parts: Wikoif’s Appeal, 3 Harris 281: Ginder v. Farnum, 10 Barr 98. The envelope and the inclosure sealed therein were closely connected in these respects. Similar indorsements on letters of a testamentary character have been admitted to probate in connection with the letters: In re Goods of Jane Wedge, 2 Notes of Cases 14; In re Goods of Jane Taylor, 4 Ibid. 290. In both of these cases, the pronoun “ you,” occurring in the testamentary letters, was referred to the name of the person addressed on the outside of the letter. The fact that envelopes have come into use since those cases' were decided, does not change the principle, especially where, as in this case, the envelope was sealed and the address was thus physically connected with the inclosure. One of the reasons of the court below for rejecting the envelope was stated to be that “ in the nature of things the words on the back of the envelope were written subsequently to the execution of the paper inclosed.” That is a mere presumption. Many persons write the address on the envelope first and the letter afterwards. In either case, the address comes first in the natural order of things, and in reality the address and the letter are parts of the same testamentary act.' If the envelope were admitted to probate, the address would dissipate all uncertainty as to the person referred to in the letter by “ you.” There is then a certain bequest to a certain person. It is settled that where a testator refers in his will to a separate paper to be taken as part thereof, the separate paper is entitled to probate. W hile there is no direct reference in this letter to the address, yet the natural relation between a letter and its address is such as to bring this case within the principle referred to.
    But we also contend that the court erred in excluding extrinsic evidence, apart from the address, to explain who “ you” is in the letter. The true rule deducible from the authorities is that where the testator has fixed on a certain person as a legatee, but from the generality or relative character of the words, it is uncertain who the person is, extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the person, and then the will acts in propria 
      vigore-, and not from the extrinsic testimony: 2 Williams on Executors, 1238; Shores. Wilson, 9 Clark & Fin. 186. This is not like the case where the name is left in blank or the name is wholly wrong.
    
      Frank, R. Schell (A. B. Wanner with him), for the defendant in error.
    Our statute of wills provides that a will shall be signed “ at the end thereof,” and this must affirmatively appear. In this case, it does not appear that the envelope was written before the signature, but the presumption is the other way. The address on the envelope, not being referred to in the will as in existence, cannot be admitted to probate as an identified paper : 1 Jarman on Wills (ed. 1881) 38 ; Castledon v. Turner, 3 Atk. 257 ; Chambers v. McDaniel, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 226, 229 ; In re Goods of Hunt, 2 Rob. Eccl. Rep. 622 ; Sandford v. Raikes, 1 Mer. 646. Being unsigned, it cannot be admitted as a codicil. The address itself, “Dear Bella,” is uncertain and requires extrinsic evidence to show who was intended. In the cases of Wedge and Taylor, the entire name was superscribed. But those English cases are not in point under the terms of our statute expressly requiring a will to be signed “ at the end thereof.” To admit the envelope would open the door to fraud, as nothing would be easier than for one to substitute another envelope for the original.
    Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain a patent ambiguity, arising from the use of the word “you” or “her”: Castledon v. Turner, supra ; 1 Jarman on Wills 730.
    June 13th 1881.
   Mr. Justice Sterrett

delivered the opinion of the court,

The facts upon which the question of law in this case arose were either admitted or established by the verdict.

In the second item of her will, dated July 18th 1878, the defendant’s testatrix made the following provision for the plaintiff, viz.: “ I do will, devise and bequeath to Isabella Fosselman (who has lived with me many years), the house and lot wherein I now live, together with all the furniture and personal property that may be therein at the time of my decease ; by furniture and personal property I mean everything I may have at my decease, except notes and bonds, and evidences of debt, and also one thousand dollars in cash, to be paid to her as soon as practicable after my decease, provided nevertheless the legacies herein bequeathed shall be forfeited if she claims any compensation, for services rendered me, from my estate.” The testatrix having died suddenly in January, 1880, the will was duly probated a few days thereafter, and letters testamentary issued to defendant, tlie executor therein named. While he and the appraisers were engaged in making the inventory, a sealed envelope was found among the valuable papers of the deceased, on which the following words, addressed to the plaintiff, were indorsed, viz.: “ Dear Bella, this is for you to open.” The envelope was immediately handed to her, and being opened in the presence of the executor and appraisers, it was found to contain a paper, of which the following is a copy, viz.:

“Lewistown, Oct. 2d 1879.
“ My wish is for you to draw this 2,000 dollars for your own use should I die sudden. “ Elizabeth Eosselman.”

It also contained a note for $2,000, made by the trustees of the Presbyterian Church of Lewistown, dated October 2d, 1879, and payable to the order of testatrix one year after date, with interest at the rate of live per cent.

After a memorandum of these papers was made by the appraisers the executor took possession of them; and the right of the plaintiff to collect the note-or receive the proceeds thereof having been denied by the residuary legatees, an amicable issue was framed between her and the executor, to test her right thereto. On the trial, there was no dispute as to any of the material facts. It was conclusively proved by two witnesses that the indorsement on the envelope, and the paper of which the foregoing is a copy, were both in the handwriting of Mrs. Eosselman, and there was not the slightest evidence to cast any suspicion on the integrity of the transaction. The learned judge submitted the case to the jury, with instructions to render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, unless they found that the said indorsement and paper Were not genuine, or had been fraudulently altered ; subject to the opinion of the court on the question, whether the paper of October 2d, 1879, in connection with the accompanying note of same date, and the indorsement on the envelope is a testamentary disposition of the note or the proceeds thereof.

In his opinion on the reserved question, the learned judge has conclusively shown that the paper referred to is testamentary in its character, intended to take effect upon the death of Mrs. Fosselman, and clearly designated the accompanying note as the subject of the bequest. These conclusions are so fully sustained by both reason and authority that it is. unnecessary to add anything to what has been, so well said,-in the opinion of the court below, on that subject.

The only remaining question is whether the testatrix has sufficiently designated the plaintiff as the object of her bounty in the paper that is claimed to operate as a codicil to her will. The court below held that she had not, and accordingly entered judgment in favor of the defendant non obstcmte veredicto. In this we think there was error. It is true the testamentary paper of October 2d 1879, does not designate the plaintiff by name, and if we had no written evidence to show who was meant by the pronoun “ you,” the bequest of the note would be void for uncertainty ; but it is a settled fact that the envelope is addressed to the plaintiff, and why should not that indorsement in the handwriting of the testatrix be taken as part of the testamentary disposition ? It is well settled that a will may be written on several separate pieces of paper. It is not even essential to its validity that the different parts should be physically united : it is sufficient if they are connected by their internal sense, or by a coherence and adaptation of parts; Wikoff's appeal, 3 Harris 281. It was held in Grinder v. Farnum, 10 Barr 98, that where a will is written on several sheets of paper, fastened together by a string, proof by two witnesses of the signature of the testator at the end thereof is sufficient; and that the question whether there has been a subsequent fraudulent addition to or alteration of the instrument is for the jury, as in other cases. In the Goods of Wedge, 2 Notes of Glases, a portion of a letter was admitted to probate as the will of Jane Wedge, who, on the third page of the letter wrote, and, in the presence of two witnessess, as required by the English statute, subscribed her name to the following, viz.: “ When I dey I would like you to bury me and take all I got for your treatment to me, and by somethin for your little girl.” The subscribing witness testified that after the paper was signed and attested the deceased folded up the letter, and in their presence wrote the superscription it bore. In holding that the paper was clearly entitled to probate, the court said: “ The letter is addressed to Mr. Henry Frost, and by ‘you5 the testatrix could mean no, other person to be legatee than the person she addressed. I am of opinion, therefore, that the person is executor according to the tenor, and that probate should pass to him.” That case is cited with approval in the Goods of Taylor, 4 Notes of Cases 290; in which Mrs. Taylor made her wiíl in the form of a letter, addressed on the outside to Sir George Simpson, and, after bequeathing her personal effects to her daughter, added the following: “I hereby appoint you my executor to carry this my will into effect.” Administration with the paper annexed was claimed by the daughter on the ground that no executor wras designated in the will; but the address on the letter was admitted to show that by “ you” the testatrix meant Sir George Simpson, the person to whom the letter was addressed, and probate was accordingly decreed to him as executor. In both these cases no envelope was used. The letters were in the form generally in nse before the introduction of envelopes; but that fact cannot affect the principle. A separate paper enclosed and sealed up in an envelope is just as much a part of the letter as if the name of the person to'whom it is addressed was indorsed on the paper itself. There is no room in either ease to doubt that the writing inside is addressed to the person whose name is written outside ; and so far as security against fraudulent alteration or substitution of one paper for another is concerned, the one is just as safe as the other before the seal is broken. Either of them is more secure than separate papers attached merely by a string, as in Ginder v. Farnum, supra.

It is also urged as-an objection to considering the address on the envelope as a part of the testamentary paper, that the former was written after the other was signed, and therefore the letter should not be considered as having been signed at the end thereof, as the statute requires; but the objection is without merit. It assumes what may or what may not have been the fact. It is not an uncommon thing for persons to indorse the address before writing the letter; but if it were shown affirmatively tliat the address on the envelope was written last in order of time, it would be unimportaut. The natural order of reading ought to control, and that is the name of the party addressed first, and then what is written to or concerning him. If the signature of the writer is appended to what is written it fully meets the requirements of the statute.

Without pursuing the subject further we are of opinion that the inscription on tlie envelope should be read as tbe preface to and in connection with the paper enclosed therein, and that they together constitute a valid* testamentary disposition of the accompanying note, operating as a codicil to the will of the testatrix.

Judgment reversed, and judgment is now entered in favor of the plaintiff on the question of law reserved.