Case ID: f-appx_535/html/0061-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FANG JIN YANG, aka Olivia Chung, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-2158.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 17, 2013.
    Garry J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Attorney General; Leslie McKay, Assistant Director; Ilissa M. Gould, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Fang Jin Yang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 8, 2012, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Fang Jin Yang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 8, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (citing INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 322-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992)). When the BIA considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

An alien may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Yang’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than eight years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The BIA found no material change because the evidence Yang adduced demonstrated the continual targeting of unregistered religious groups since the time of her last hearing rather than worsened conditions for individuals similarly situated to her. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. Contrary to Yang’s contention, the record does not compel the conclusion that BIA failed to consider any material evidence of changed country conditions. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 337 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).