Case ID: mass_13/html/0165-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Curia.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ezra Brown and Others versus Mary Anderson, Administratrix, &c.
    A promise by an administrator to pay a debt of the intestate will not take the demand out of the statute of 1791, c. 28, limiting suits against administrators to four years, f
    t See Dawes, Judge, .fyc. vs. Shed el al, 15 Mass. Rep. 6.
    Case upon four several promissory notes made to the plaintiffs by Edward Anderson, the defendant’s intestate.
    The defendant pleads in bar (protesting that she had not, at the commencement of this action, nor at any time before nor since, any goods or estate of the said Edward Anderson, deceased, in her hands), that, more than four years next before the commencement of this suit, namely, at, &c., on, &e., she was duly appointed administratrix of the goods and estate of the said Edward Anderson, and then and there accepted said trust; and afterwards, and within three months thereafter, namely, at, &c., on, &c., she gave due notice thereof, as the law requires ; and this, &c.
    The plaintiffs reply, that the estate of the said Edward Anderson is * fully sufficient to pay all the just debts which the said Edward Anderson owed at the time of his decease, together with the charges of the last sickness and funeral expenses of said deceased, and the charges of administration upon his estate ; and that they, the plaintiffs, at, &c., on, &c., and within four years next after the defendant’s acceptance of the trust of administratrix of the estate of the said deceased, exhibited and presented to the defendant the several promissory notes declared on in this action, the same being then all due and payable, and demanded of her the payment thereof; and the said Mary, in consideration of the solvency of the estate of the said Edward Anderson, and of its sufficiency to pay all the debts, &c., of the deceased, promised the plaintiffs, in her said capacity, to pay them the amount of their said several demands declared on, in a reasonable time ; and aver, that a reasonable time had elapsed before the commencement of this action, & c.
    To this replication the defendant demurs generally, and the plaintiffs join in the demurrer.
    
      Longfellow, for the defendant.
    The replication is bad, as a departure from the declaration. In the latter the promise is alleged to have been made by the intestate ; and the replication avers a promise by the defendant.  If the plaintiffs intended to rely on the promise of the administratrix, they should have declared upon it.
    
      But an administratrix cannot, by her own promise, take the case out of the statute of 'limitations ; 
       which was enacted as well for the safety and benefit of the heirs as of administrators.
    Hopkins, for the plaintiffs,
    contended, that his replication was no departure from the declaration ; and he cited and relied on the authorities in the margin. 
    
    The merits of the replication rest upon the construction to be given to the statute of 1791. The words of this statute are not stronger than those of the general statute of limitations ; and as to these, the construction has been such as to let in the slightest acknowledgment, without any promise. An acknowledgment, even pending the suit, * will take a case out of the general statute.  The provision of the general statute is founded on a presumption of payment; that of the statute of 1791, upon the supposition that executors and administrators will be improperly vexed by suits, if the creditor lies by without making any demand for four years. When the presumption is removed in either case, the statute is not intended to operate.
    An administrator represents the person of his intestate ; and may renew a promise made by the deceased, to which the statute might have been pleaded. 
    
    
      
       1 Chitty on Pleading, 204. — Sarell, adm. vs. Wine, 3 East, 409.
    
    
      
      
        Stat. 1791, c. 28.
    
    
      
      
        Com. Dig. Pleader, F. 11, cites Leon. 156, 3 Leon. 203. —1 Lev. 81. —2 Wils 8 Cro. Jac. 140
    
    
      
       2 Burr. 1099.
    
    
      
       8 Mass. Rep. 133. — 6 Johns. 112.
    
   Curia.

The provision of the statute of 1791, upon which the defendant’s plea in bar is predicated, was intended for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons, and of those interested in them; and not for the personal convenience of the executors or administrators.

The general statute of limitations has always been considered as furnishing to debtors prima facie evidence of payment; and any counter evidence is admitted. An acknowledgment of the debt, therefore, by an executor or administrator, as well as by the original debtor, has been held to avoid that statute. But the statute we are now considering has no regard to the payment or non-payment of the debt ; it was designed to produce a speedy settlement of estates, that the heirs might be quieted. A promise of the administrator can, therefore, have no effect to bind tbe estate. He may decline pleading the statute ; but, if he does, without consent of the heirs, he may expose himself for his unfaithful conduct. The promise creates only a personal obligation on the part of the person making it; but cannot affect the estate,

Replication adjudged bad. 
      
       See Thompson vs. Brown et al., 16 Mass. Rep. 178