Case ID: mass_19/html/0358-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Gurdon Bulkeley et al., Appellants &c., versus Daniel Noble, Administrator &c.
    No particular form of words is required to constitute an advancement, but they must be such as to show an advancement was intended.
    Where a child gave a receipt for articles delivered, promising to return them,if call ed for, and the parent wrote underneath, that they were not to be exacted, but were to answer as a part of the child's portion, it was held to be an advance meat.
    
    So of the words, “Articles that 1 let my daughter N. have/'in a book containing memorandums made by a parent of advancements to his other children.
    An advancement cannot be proved by parol evidence.
    The declaration of an intestate that there was to be no deduction from the share ol either of his children, is inadmissible as evidence to control a charge made by him in writing.
    Noble, administrator on the estate of Samuel Porter, presented a petition to the judge of probate, praying that a certain sum of money in his hands might be ordered to be distributed among the widow and heirs of the intestate, and at the same time produced papers containing the following me morandums in the handwriting of the intestate.
    “ Received the undermentioned articles of household furniture of Samuel Porter, to return if called for by said Porter,” &c. (Signed) “Samuel Rhoades” (husband of the intestate’s daughter Lucy). “ This may certify that the above receipt I shall not exact, neither would I have my executors or administrators do it. Samuel Porter. 10th Sept. 1805. But the abovesaid articles to answer as a part of mv daughter Lucy’s portion.”
    “ Received, Oct. 4th, 1804, of Samuel Porter the following articles of household furniture, which I propose to rectum to said Porter if he should call for them,” &c. (Signed) “ Thomas G ” (the rest of the name of Greaves, husband oi the intestate’s daughter Minerva, being cut out). “ N. B. The above not to be taken from said Greaves, except I call myself for them, but to answer a part of my daughter Minerva’s portion. Samuel Porter.”
    In a memorandum book, containing charges of the articles above mentioned, was the following entry: — “ 1820. Articles that I let my daughter Nancy Porter” (wife of Gurdon Bulkeley) “ have in Albany.”
    These memorandums were considered by the judge of probate as evidence of advancements to the intestate’s children, Lucy, Minerva and Nancy, and he decreed accordingly. Whereupon appeals were severally made in right of those children, for the following reasons.
    1. Because the writings before mentioned were not such as by the statute are to be considered as evidence of advancements. 2. Because the judge rejected evidence of the declaration of the intestate made after those writings, that there was to be no deduction from the share of either of the daugnters before mentioned. 3. Because he rejected paroi evidence that sums of money had been paid over by the intestate to two other children.
    Dewey, for the appellants,
    suggested, as to the receipit given by Rhoades, that the intestate could not change tne contract into an advancement, without the consent of tne other party.
    The receipt given by Greaves was cancelled. There was no evidence that the memorandum at the bottom of it was made after the signature of Greaves was cut out.
    The articles received by Nancy Bulkeley cannot be viewed as an advancement, the memorandum not showing any intention on the part of the intestate that they should be so considered. The St. 1783, c. 36, § 7, which says, that “ where any personal estate delivered a child shall be charged m writing by the intestate, or by his order, or a memorandum made thereof, or delivered expressly for that purpose, before two witnesses who were bid to take notice thereof, the same shall be deemed and taken an advancement,” is repealed by toe provision in St. 1805, c. 90, § 3, that all gifts or grants of any estate in advancement, “ and which shall be expressed in such gift or grant, or otherwise charged by the intestate in writing or acknowledged in writing by the child or grandchild, 
      as made for such advancement, such estate &e. shall be taken by such child or grandchild, towards his share of the intestate’s estate.” Ellis v. Paige, 1 Pick. 45 ; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass. R. 545. An entry like the one in question, in an account book, would be a charge, if it related to a stranger, but such memorandums respecting a child are made merely for the purpose of keeping an account of expenses.
    To the second reason of appeal he cited Scott v. Scott, 1 Mass. R. 528 ; Quarles v. Quarles, 4 Mass. R. 683 ; Jackson v. Matsdorf, 11 Johns. R. 91. To the third, Green v. Gill, 8 Mass. R. 111 ; Commonwealth v. Cutter, ibid. 279.
    
      Noble, contrà,
    
    contended that where property delivered to a child is charged in writing by the intestate, it is an advancement under either statute, the same words, with an immaterial transposition, being used in each, in relation to such a charge ; and that the words in the last statute, “ as made for such advancement,” qualify only the clause immediately preceding, respecting an acknowledgment by the child.
    The evidence of the declarations of the intestate was properly rejected. A charge of an advancement resembles a will; which cannot be revoked by parol. Jackson v. Kniffen, 2 Johns. R. 31. The statute requires written evidence of an advancement, and the admission of parol evidence to contradict it would open á door to fraud and perjury, which the statute was intended to prevent.
    
      Dewey said, in reply, that the modes of revoking wills were founded on express statute provisions.
    The opinion of the Court was read by Lincoln J., at May term 1825, as drawn up by
   Parker C. J.

We think the decree of the judge of probate ought to be affirmed in the whole.

With respect to Mrs. Rhoades and Mrs. Greaves, they stand on the same footing. The memorandam in regard to articles delivered clearly manifests an intention to charge those articles as advancements. The form first adopted had the appearance of a loan, but the memorandum at the bottom states expressly that the articles received by the husband were on account of the wife’s portion. It is said that it does not appear that the memorandum respecting Greaves was made after the cancelling of the receipt; but it is sufficient that it was made by the intestate, and had reference to the preexisting receipt, and it is pretty clear also from inspection, that it was made subsequently to the cancelling of the receipt. This is such a memorandum as the statute requires.

The question in respect to the amount considered as advanced to Mrs. Bulkeley, is somewhat more doubtful, but the form of the charge in the little memorandum book indicates the same intention as in the other cases. The words, “ Articles that I let my daughter Nancy Porter have,” dj not imply a gift or a debt necessarily ; they are quite as applicable to an advance of the articles towards her portion. No particular form of words is required by the statute, to constitute an advancement, but it must be charged as such, that is, it must be charged in such manner as to show that to have been the intention. And upon considering this charge, made in the same book in which the other portions are entered, and considering the form of words used, we are satisfied that in regard to this daughter the same intention is manifested as towards the others.

With respect to the parol evidence offered to prove an advancement to two other children, we think it perfectly clear, that in rejecting it the judge of probate acted in conformity with the statute, which by implication excludes all such evidence ; and in those two cases there was no xvritten evidence. Nor would it have been proper to have admitted the supposed declarations of the intestate, to contradict the xvritten evidence.

Decree affirmed. 
      
       See Ashley, Appellant, 4 Pick. 21; Bullard v. Bullard, 5 Pick. 527; Hall v. Davis, 3 Pick. 450.