Case ID: f-appx_577/html/0019-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Randolph JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ONONDAGA COUNTY RESOURCE RECOVERY AGENCY, and its fifteen member executive board, Joseph Fontanella, individually and in his official capacity as OCRRA Transfer Director, as Aider and Abettor, Thomas A. Rhoads, individually and in his official capacity as Ocrra Executive Director, as Aider and Abettor, Maureen Nosik, individually and in her official capacity as OCRRA Personnel Analyst, as Aider and Abettor, Jeff Cooper, individually and in his official capacity as OCRRA Assistant Deputy Director, as Aider and Abettor, Mark Donnelly, individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of the Board and board member, as Aider and Abettor, Defendants-Appellees.
    
    No. 13-4135-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 26, 2014.
    Randolph Jones, pro se, Syracuse, NY, for Appellant.
    Ted H. Williams, David Capriotti, Harris Beach PLLC, Syracuse, NY, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption as shown above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff Randolph Jones, proceeding pro se, appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Jones asserts that the district court committed multiple substantive and procedural errors in dismissing his claims of employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 1983, and 1985, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), id. § 2000e et seq., and New York law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and will affirm only if there is no genuine issue of material fact, such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Guippone v. BH S & B Holdings LLC, 737 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir.2013). In making that determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Jones and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See DiStiso v. Cook, 691 F.3d 226, 229-30 (2d Cir.2012).

Here, upon an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we conclude, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court in its published opinion, see Jones v. Onondaga Cnty. Res. Recovery Agency, 973 F.Supp.2d 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2013), that summary judgment was properly awarded as to the challenged claims.

We have considered Jones’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . Jones does not challenge on appeal the district court's conclusions that (1) his claims under New York State Human Rights Law are barred because they were adjudicated by the New York State Division of Human Rights in defendants' favor, (2) his Title VII claims relating to events that occurred before January 2009 are time-barred, (3) his Title VII hostile work environment claims are unexhausted, (4) his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is barred by the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine, or (5) N.Y. Pub. Auth. Law § 2825 is inapplicable. Accordingly, we deem these issues abandoned. See Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir.2006) ("When a litigant — including a pro se litigant — raises an issue before the district court but does not raise it on appeal, the issue is abandoned.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).