Case ID: f-appx_393/html/0478-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tigran GUYUMDZHYAN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 07-50431.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 10, 2010.
    
    Filed Aug. 26, 2010.
    Jason P. Gonzalez, Esquire, Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Robert H. Rexrode, III, Esquire, Law Offices of Robert Rexrode, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Tigran Guyumdzhyan appeals from certain specified conditions of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 922(g)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Guyumdzhyan contends that various financial conditions of his supervised release including requiring him to disclose financial information as directed by the probation officer, prohibiting him from applying for a loan, opening a line of credit, or conveying significant assets without approval of the probation officer, and paying his drug and alcohol treatment costs as directed by the probation officer are not within the district court’s statutory discretion. The district court did not plainly err in imposing these conditions because they reflect Guyumdzhyan’s offense, history and characteristics, serve the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation, and are no greater than necessary. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(d); United States v. Garcia, 522 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir.2008).

Guyumdzhyan also contends that these financial conditions result in an impermissible delegation of the court’s authority to the probation officer. The district court did not plainly err by impermissible delegation. See United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam); United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 880-81 (9th Cir.2005).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.