Case ID: ed-smith_4/html/0333-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Woodruff, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William C. Carpenter v. Gilbert Sweet.
    Where the assignor of a thing in action was examined as a witness for his assignee under § 399 of the Code—as that section stood before the amendment of April 13, 1857—the defendant could only offer himself as a witness to the same matter to which the assignor had testified, and not to matter which does not controvert, qualify nor explain the facts testified to by such assignor, but goes in avoidance or discharge of the liability resulting from those facts.
    Thus, where a plaintiff proved by such assignor, a sale of a chattel to the defendant; it was not competent for the defendant to testify, on his own behalf, to a subsequent payment for the chattel, or a release, or infancy, or other matter in avoidance of the legal consequences of the fact sworn to by the assignor.
    The decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Gardiner v. Clark, (17 Barb. S. C. Rep. 638,) dissented from.
    Whether such payment might have been testified to by the defendant, where the purchase and payment were simultaneous, and the assignor was examined as to the transaction generally! Quere.
    
    The above section of the Code has been amended, and the range of a defendant’s testimony in such case enlarged by the legislature. (See note, referring to chap. 353 of the session laws of 1857.)
    Tms case involved the construction of § 399 of the Code, as that section read prior to the amendment passed in April, 1857. The appeal was brought by the defendant to contest a judgment rendered against Mm by the Third District Court. 
    
    
      William C. Carpenter, plaintiff in person.
    
      Edward P. Clark, for the defendant.
    
      
       Since the decision in this case, the provision in § 899 of the Code, upon the construction of which the appeal was determined, has been amended so as to read as follows: “ When an assignor of a thing in action or contract is examined as a witness on behalf of any person deriving title through or from him, the adverse party may offer himself as a witness to the same matter in his own behalf, and shall be so received, and to any matter that will discharge Mm from any liability that the testimony of the assignor tends to render him liable for.” The words in italics have been added by the amendment. The decision is interesting as a part of the history of the changes which have been and which arc proceeding in our law of evidence. The report may also be useful in other states, where the New York Code has been in the main adopted, and where the section in question remains in the form wherein it stood before the adoption of this amendment. (See laws of 1857, vol. 1, p. 744, chap. 363.)-Rep.
    
   By the Court.

Woodruff, J.

The views expressed by tMs court in Ward v. Ingraham (1 E. D. Smith, 538) seem to me conclusive in the present case. Section 399 of the Code of Procedure provides, that when an assignor of a thing in action, &c., is examined as a witness on behalf of any person deriving title through or from him, the adverse party may offer himself as a witness to the same matter, and shall be so received.

This action is prosecuted by the plaintiff, as the assignee of Thomas Law, to recover money due from the defendant for a horse alleged to have been sold by Law to the defendant. On the trial the plaintiff examined Law, his assignor, and proved by him the sale and delivery of the horse to the defendant, the price thereof, and the assignment to the plaintiff. The defendant then offered himself as a witness on his own behalf, and to the three facts above mentioned he was plainly competent; in relation to the alleged sale and delivery, the price, and the assignment he might testify, for to these matters the assignor had testified. ’ But he was also offered to prove, and, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s objection, was permitted to testify, that he had paid for the horse the full price. When such payment was made, he did not state. This was not the matter respecting which the assignor had been examined, but was new matter—matter entirely consistent with the truth of all that the assignor had testified, and tending, not to controvert, qualify, explain or make more full or definite the case made by the plaintiff’s witness, but to establish a defence in avoidance of the plaintiff’s case. The object of the section of the Code referred to was to place the parties in respect to any fact which might be within the knowledge of the parties to the transaction only, so far upon equal ground, that if the plaintiff relied upon the assignor as to any fact in his case, the defendant might, as to such fact, controvert the evidence by his own oath. Thus, if the plaintiff relied upon the assignor to prove a sale, the defendant might testify to the matter of the sale, with its terms, conditions, subject and accompanying circumstances; and so as to delivery, price, or any other fact on which his claim depends. I do not think that practically the rule operates equally, and if the legislature had gone further and applied to this examination the provisions of section 395, so that when the assignor was examined, the defendant might testify to discharge himself of any liability resulting from the facts testified to by the assignor, it would seem to have made the rule more equitable, but such is not the meaning of section 399. Where a sale is proved, proof of payment is not the same,” but new matter. The case of Gardiner v. Clark, 17 Barb. S. C. Rep. 538, is in conflict with these views; and I exceedingly regret that, on a subject of so great importance, there should not be uniformity of decision. But with a disposition to regard the opinion of the Supreme Court in that case with great respect, I have not been able to bring my mind to the conclusion that our views of the construction of the Code in this particular are erroneous. To give full effect to the decision referred to is, in substance, to strike out of the section the words “ to the same matter,” for, according to the opinion of Mr. Justice Bacon, whenever an assignor is called to testify to facts which charge the defendant with a liability, the defendant may testify to any other facts whatever, occurring at the same or at any other time, which will operate either to controvert those facts, or avoid their legal effect; i. e., he may deny what the assignor testifies, or may show facts inconsistent with his evidence, or may avoid the liability cast upon him by testifying to independent matter, as a release, infancy, payment or statute of limitations, and the like. That is to say, the Supreme Court construes the section as if it meant, that when the assignor is called to establish a liability, the defendant may testify to any defence, “the same matter,” in this view, being not the facts to which the assignor testifies, but the cause of action his evidence tends to establish, and every fact which will tend to defeat it. In my opinion, the legislature have used the language in a more restricted sense, and with the same distinctions with which these terms and their opposite are used in pleading. Thus, section 147 refers to matters appearing in the complaint. Section 149 permits an answer which shall controvert the allegations in the complaint, or “ a statement of new matter constituting a defence or counter claim.” Formerly, section 153 allowed a reply whenever the answer contained new matter; (Code of 1849 ;) now a reply is allowed when the new matter constitutes a counter claim. Section 154, again, speaks of “new matter constituting a defence,” &c. Section 165 recognizes the distinction between the “ matter charged” by the plaintiff and matter in mitigation, or justification, or avoidance. And section 168, again, recognizes the same distinctions, and shows that in the Code the term new matter has the same meaning that it had before the Code. If the terms, “ the same matter” and “ new matter,” have, when applied to pleadings, the same signification they have had heretofore, it seems to me clear that, when applied to evidence to be given under the pleadings, they must have the same signification. A party must, in his proof, be confined to his allegations.

Suppose the complaint avers a sale and delivery, and the answer contains two defences, the one a general denial of the facts charged and the other a counter claim, is there any doubt that the latter defence is to he deemed new matter in every sense, both for the purposes of pleading and proof? If so, and the assignor testified to the sale, can the defendant be received to testify to the new matter constituting a counter claim ? I think not, nor to payment, or release, or other new matter. So the rules governing the conduct of a trial; as where a plaintiff, having rested his case, is not, in general, permitted, after the defendant’s evidence is in, to go into matter not opened by the defendant’s evidence; and if the defendant’s evidence is confined to rebutting the very same facts or matters to which the plaintiff’s witnesses have testified, the plaintiff cannot examine further witnesses. The strikingly dissimilar language used by the legislature in sections 395 and 397 contrasted with 399, shows that they used • the language of the last named section in the sense we have given it. Thus, in section 395, it is provided that a party examined by the adverse party may testify on his own behalf in respect to any matter pertinent to the issue. But if he testify to any new matter not responsive to inquiries put to him, or necessary to explain or qualify his answers, or discharge him when his answers would charge himself, such adverse party may offer himself as a witness to such new matter, and shall be received. This shows that the legislature, in this section, had distinctly in view the distinction between the same matter elicited by the inquiries of the adverse party and new matter; and that in this example they intended expressly to provide that a party, so examined, might not only give evidence touching the same matter thus inquired of, but might discharge himself when those matters would tend to charge him; while, on the other hand, when such adverse party offers himself, he is strictly confined to the new matter testified to. And, in section 397, the legislature provides, that when a co-plaintiff or co-defendant is examined as a witness, the other plaintiff or defendant may offer himself as a witness to the “same cause of action or defence;” showing, in both these sections, not only a design to admit a wider range of examination, but also a plain recognition of the difference between an examination of the witness or party to the same matter, and his examination to new matter, on his own behalf. The terms of section 399 confine the examination of the defendant to the same matter testified to by the assignor, and do not, (as is done in § 395,) intimate that he may testify to any matter which will discharge him, when the evidence of the assignor would charge him, as Mr. Justice Bacon obviously holds. The legislature did not, I think, make use of language so widely different without intending to make a distinction, nor do I think they used the terms, “ the same matters,” without intending the very same matters to which the assignor testifies, and no other; otherwise, why did they use those words at all ? If, in any case, this construction gives the plaintiff an undue advantage, we must regret it; but we cannot, I think, provide the remedy. It will rarely be true, that when a sale and payment are part of the same transaction, the assignor can be so examined by the plaintiff as not to open the door to the defendant to testify to all that took place at the time; for if leading questions are not permitted, and the assignor is examined in relation to the transaction between himself and the defendant generally, then, even under the views I have above expressed, the whole transaction would be the matter testified to, and the defendant could testify to the whole. But I cannot find warrant for saying that he may testify to other facts, occurring at another time, forming no part of the transaction testified to, merely because the legal effect of the assignor’s evidence is to charge him with a liability, which he can only avoid by showing subsequent payment, release, or by testifying to his infancy or other matter entirely consistent with what the assignor has sworn to, but going to new matter in avoidance.

I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed.

Judgment reversed.