Case ID: va_2/html/0714-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "ROANE, J. CARRINGTON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Bogle and Scott v. Fitzhugh.
    October Term, 1796.
    notion — Rehearing; at Subsequent Term — Consent of Parties. — The second scire facias against the special bail issued on the 3d of April, 1771, returnable to the October term, and was returned non est. At June Court, the bail moved to surrender the principal, which was refused. Afterwards, at*a Court held in July 1773, the motion was renewed, by consent of parties, when the Court allowed the render. The second motion being by consent, was properly before the Court, and the decision of it was correct, since the writ being made returnable to an improper term, (October instead of May) it was merely void, and consequently the first motion was made in time.
    Jurisdiction — Consent of Parties. — Consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction where the Court has it not. But this rule is applicable only to a case of original jurisdiction.
    The appellants having recovered a judgment against B. Grymes in Spotsylvania Counts’ Court, issued a capias ad satis-faciendum, which was returned “not found.’’
    The second scire facias against the appellant, the special bail, issued on the 23d of April 1771, returnable to the October court following, which was likewise returned “not found.”
    At June court, in the same year the special bail brought the principal into court, and delivered him up in discharge of his recognizance. The plaintiffs refused to receive, or to charge the principal in execution, alledging, that it was then too late for the special bail to make the surrender, of which opinion was the court, the appel-lee then put in a plea which was joined.
    Afterwards at a court holden in July 1773, the appellee again moved to surrender the body of the principal, in discharge of his undertaking as special bail, and the motion coming on to be reheard by consent of parties, the court were of opinion, that the render might then be made; whereupon the principal rendered himself up. in discharge of his special bail, who was thereupon discharged from his recognizance, and it was further ordered, that the defendant should pay costs. Erom this order and judgment, the plaintiffs appealed and the same was affirmed in the District Court of Fredericks-burg from whence an appeal was prayed to this court.
    
      
      See monographic note on “Jurisdiction” appended to Phippen v. Durham, 8 Sratt. 457.
    
   ROANE, J.

The only doubt which I have had respecting this case was, whether the District Court did right in affirming the *last judgment of the County Court? It occurred to me upon the first impression of the case, that the County Court, having once decided the question finally, even the consent of parties could not give them jurisdiction, to rehear and redetermine it at a subsequent term. But upon further reflection, I am satisfied, that if the first judgment of the court was wrong, we may correct it, and now give the judgment, which ought then to have been given. That there is error in it, there can exist no doubt; the writ was made returnable to the October instead of the May court, as it ought to have been, and the offer to surrender, was prior to the return day improperly named in the writ. I think the proceedings ought to be reversed, and the first judgment of the County Court corrected.

CARRINGTON, J.

I discover no objection to the last judgment of the County Court.

It was a renewed motion; brought on and reheard by consent of parties, and it is every day’s practice to reinstate suits, which have been dismissed, or tried, with the consent of parties, and thus to give jurisdiction to the court to rehear and determine them. The return day of the second scire facias as stated in the writ, was proper, or it was not; if the former, then the surrender was made before the return day, and consequently in good time; if the latter; then the court should have quashed it, in which case also, the bail was in time: So that either way, the first judgment was erroneous.

The objection as to jurisdiction, goes only to original jurisdiction; such, as for a Court of Chancery to try a cause for assault and battery, or the like. But in this case, the court had complete cognizance of the subject matter, and might properly rehear the motion which was brought before them.

The judges were formerly very strict, respecting the privilege of the special bail, to discharge himself after a return of non est inventus, upon the capias against the-principal. The recognizance in strictness became forfeited by this return, and the plaintiff was, and still is at liberty to proceed immediately against the bail.

At first, the bail was allowed to discharge himself by bringing in the body before, or upon the return day of the first scire facias, afterwards greater liberality prevailed, and the indulgence was extended to the return day of the second writ.

In this case, the motion to surrender the principal, was made before the return day of the second scire facias, and though overruled upon the first attempt, no objection could exist against the ^'repetition of it at a subsequent day. The scire facias being made returnable to an improper court, is merely void, and though it could not be amended, it ought to have been quashed. But being void, the bail hada right to take advantage of it, and deliver up the body of the principal. I am for affirming the judgment.

The PRESIDENT. It is apparent, that the County Court acted in the first instance under a mistake, supposing the scire facias to have been returnable to May court, as it ought to have been, instead of October. If this had really been the case, their judgment would have been proper. Afterwards, the defect in the writ was discovered, and to prevent a writ of error, the consent to rehear the motion was probably accorded.

It is very true, that consent of parties cannot give jurisdiction, where the court has it not. But this principle is only applicable to a case of original jurisdiction. I think the judgment of the District Court right, and that it should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.