Case ID: so3d_234/html/0269-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Judge Terri F. Love LOBRANO, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JOHN BEGNAUD ELECTRIC MOTORS, INC. v. ALTERNATIVE WELL INTERVENTION, LLC
    NO. 2017-CA-0548
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    December 20, 2017
    
      Stephen D. Marx, CHEHARDY, SHERMAN, WILLIAMS, MURRAY, RECILE, STAKELUM & HAYES, LLP, One Galleria Boulevard, Suite 1100, Metairie, LA 70001, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/AP-PELLEE, JOHN BEGNAUD ELECTRIC MOTORS, INC.
    Robert G. Harvey, Sr., 600 North Car-rollton Avenue, New Orleans, LA 70119, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, ALTERNATIVE WELL INTERVENTION, LLC
    (Court composed of Judge Terri F. Love, Judge, Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge, Sandra Cabrina Jenkins)
   Judge Terri F. Love

|, This appeal arises from a contract for the construction and sale of a rig that plaintiff was building for defendant. Defendant instructed plaintiff to cease work on the rig after the rig was over halfway completed. Plaintiff requested payment for work completed and presented an invoice signed by the president of defendant. The trial court awarded plaintiff $262,500.00, plus interest from the date of judicial demand, as well as all costs. Defendant appealed contending that the trial court awarded a windfall amount considering the original contract price of the rig and electrical equipment that was never delivered to plaintiff.

We find that the evidence demonstrates that the rig was over halfway completed. Additionally, plaintiff remains obligated to pay for the electrical equipment that had yet to be delivered. Further, the former president for defendant signed no less than two documents acknowledging the $262,500.00 debt. As such, we find that the trial court did not commit manifest error by finding for plaintiff for $262,500.00. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Alternative Well Intervention, LLC (“AWI”) provided “workover services to oil and gas companies in the Gulf of Mexico.” John Begnaud Electric Motors, Inc. (“JBEM”) previously constructed three rigs for AWI and was awaiting the final payment on rig 3 when AWI contracted with JBEM for the construction of rig 4 for $387,029.00. Once JBEM received the final payment on rig 3 and received the initial payment of $96,757.25 for rig 4, construction began. After the oil and gas market suffered a downturn, AWI ordered JBEM to halt construction on rig 4. AWI asked JBEM to submit an invoice for the amount of work completed on rig 4. The invoice reflected that AWI owed JBEM $262,500.00 for rig 4.

12JBEM then needed cash and assigned the invoice to Crestmark Capital (“Crest-mark”). John Stansbury, the former president of AWI, signed the invoice as an acknowledgment. Further, Mr. Stansbury accepted and agreed to the assignment by signing an “Invoice Acknowledgment Agreement” (“IAA”) from Crestmark acknowledging the assignment and his ability to bind AWI. AWI never paid Crestmark on the invoice. JBEM repaid Crestmark for all of the monies Crestmark extended for the invoice. Crestmark then reassigned the invoice back to JBEM. AWI never paid JBEM.

JBEM filed a petition seeking the $262,500.00 payment from AWI. AWI filed Exceptions of No Right of Action and No Cause of Action. The Exception of No Right of Action was based on the premise that JBEM no longer possessed rights regarding the invoice. The trial court granted the Exception of No Right of Action with the right to amend. The Exception of No Cause of Action urged that JBEM was not entitled to attorney’s fees. The trial court granted the Exception of Nó Cause of Action. JBEM then filed -its First Supplemental and Amended Petition, which included the documentation concerning the assignment and reassignment of the invoice. The matter'then proceeded to a bench trial.

The trial court found for JBEM and awarded $262,500.00, plus interest from the date of judicial demand, and all costs. AWI’s Motion for Devolutive Appeal followed.

AWI contends that the’ trial court erred when computing the amount owed to JBEM. Specifically, AWI maintains that it should not be required to pay for a transformer JBEM did not accept delivery on and should not be held responsible for almost the entire agreed upon contract price for a finished rig 4.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Louisiana courts of appeal apply the manifest 'error standard of review in civil cases.” Detraz v. Lee, 05-1263, p. 7 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 557, 561. “[A]-factual finding cannot be set aside unless the appellate court finds that the trier of fact’s determination is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.” Id. To reverse a fact finder’s factual determinations, “an appellate court must review the record in its entirety and (1) find that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for-the finding, and (2) further determine that the record establishes that the fact finder is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous.” Id. “Thus, the issue before the court of appeal is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.” Snider v. Louisiana Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 14-1964, p. 5 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d. 319, 323. “The appellate court must not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own factual- findings because it would have decided the case differently.” Id. Furthermore, “[w]here the factfinder’s determination is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be. manifestly erroneous.” Id.

“Where one or more legal errors interdict the trial court’s fact-finding process, however, the manifest error standard becomes inapplicable, and the appellate court must conduct its own de novo review of the record.” Hamp’s Const., L.L.C. v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 10-0816, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/1/10), 52 So.3d 970, 973. “A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial.” Id. “Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights.” Id.

“ ‘The manifest error standard of review also applies to mixed questions of law and fact.’ ” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hotel Mgmt. of New Orleans, 4L.L.C., 16-0822, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/3/17), 219 So.3d 435, 438, quoting A.S. v. D.S., 14-1098, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/8/15), 165 So.3d 247, 254. “Conversely, purely legal issues ‘are reviewed with the de novo standard of review.’ ” State Farm, 16-0822, p. 3, 219 So.3d at 438, quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 16-0008, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/8/16), 195 So.3d 687, 689.

VALUATION OF COMPLETED WORK

AWI asserts that the trial court committed manifest error by including the price of an undelivered transformer in the award to JBEM.

“Although a plaintiff can establish damages through evidence consisting only of his or her.testimony, such testimony is subject to the trier of fact’s evaluation of credibility.” Doucette v. Guient, 15-1346, p. 11 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/29/16), 208 So.3d 444, 452.

JBEM presented the live testimony of John Begnaud, the president and owner of JBEM; the deposition testimony of Mr. Stansbury, the former president of AWI; the contract for rig 4; the final invoice to AWI; and several Crestmark documents, including the IAA, regarding the assignment of the final invoice.

Mr. Begnaud testified that AWI previously contracted with JBEM for the construction and sale of three rigs prior to contracting for rig 4. As reflected by |Bthe invoice/contract entered into evidence, the price of rig 4 was $387,029.00. JBEM and AWI agreed upon three payments for rig 4:25% as a down payment, 50% when halfway completed, and 25% when completed.

Mr. Begnaud testified that when AWI halted construction of rig 4, JBEM was “better than half way finished.” AWI also requested that JBEM calculate the price of the work completed. Mr. Begnaud stair ed that he deducted the 25% already paid and the labor and materials remaining from the project price of $387,029.00 .to calculate the amount owed. JBEM’s final invoice to AWI was for $262,500.00. Mr. Begnaud stated that'no deviations or alterations were made from the contract. Further, Mr. Begnaud testified that JBEM never accepted delivery of. the “specially ordered” $174,500.00 transformer needed for rig 4 because JBEM was waiting to get paid for it.' ...

Mr. Begnaud testified that when Mr. Stansbury was presented with the invoice, he did not express' concérns regarding the amount. AWI had “a hard time coming up with the money to pay” JBEM, so Mr. Begnaud stated that JBEM decided to assign the invoice to Crestmark. Mr. Stans-bury signed and dated the invoice, September 9, 2014. Mr. Begnaud testified that this’ signified AWI would pay Crestmark directly. ’Not having received any payments from AWI, Crestmark demanded that JBEM buy the invoice back. Crest-mark then reassigned the invoice back to JBEM; Mr. Begnaud stated that AWI never paid the invoice.

Mr. Stansbury, the former president of ÁWI, testified that the investor group of AWI decided to halt construction on rig 4. Mr. Stansbury stated that “we signed” the invoice. “so he could factor it.” Further, Mr. Stansbury testified that he signed the IAA from Crestmark that indicated AWI would pay Crestmark. ^However, Mi\ Stansbury stated that AWI agreed to pay Mr. Begnaud and Mr. Begnaud would then pay Crestmark. Mr. Stansbury stated that he was “helping John out so he could factor the invoice.” Mr. Stansbury had no reason to believe that rig 4 would not have been completed by JBEM if AWI had not halted construction.

In regards to the transformer JBEM ordered from Bayou Buff Electric (“Bayou Buff’), Mr. Stansbury testified that Bayou Buff was closed. Mr. Stansbury was unaware if Bayou Buff demanded payment for the transformer from JBEM. Mr. Beg-naud stated that the transformer “was special ordered” with “no returns” and that Bayou Buff telephoned JBEM about the rig numerous times. Bayou Buff had not pursued legal action against JBEM “yet.”

After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court held in favor of JBEM and awarded $262,500.00. The trial court found that the alleged “fact that Bayou Buff is out of business does not mean it is not legally entitled to collect for the custom electrical equipment that [JBEM] ordered. It is true that [JBEM] has not been sued by Bayou Buff — yet.” Further, the trial court stated that, “regarding the amount that AWI should be obligated to pay,” the final invoice and the IAA from Crestmark were signed by Mr. Stansbury and acknowledged AWI’s debt.

3. The contract provided that twenty-five percent of the contract price was due initially, fifty-percent at the halfway mark (“second draw”), and the last twenty-five percent due upon completion. It is undisputed that JBEM completed over fifty percent of rig 4 before AWI halted construction. Halting construction after JBEM completed over fifty-percent of rig 4 connotes that a larger monetary amount would be due to JBEM instead of the second draw amount asserted by AWI. ^Additionally, AWI contends that it should not be responsible for the cost of the transformer. However, it is undisputed that JBEM specially ordered the transformer from Bayou Buff. While AWI asserts that Bayou Buff closed, thereby erasing JBEM’s obligation for the transformer, no proof was presented.

Also, upon our review, it is clear from the record that Mr. Stansbury signed and dated the final invoice for work completed from JBEM. Further, he signed the IAA, wherein he confirmed that he had the authority to issue checks to pay the invoice assigned to Crestmark and to approve the invoice for payment. Mr. Begnaud testi-fíed that JBEM was over halfway completed with the construction of rig 4. Although AWI contends that Bayou Buff will never seek payment for the specially ordered transformer valued at $174,500.00, AWI did not present evidentiary proof that JBEM would not be obligated to Bayou Buff. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court committed manifest error by finding for JBEM or for ordering payment for $262,500.00, which exceeded the $193,514.50 second draw amount, and affirm.

DECREE

|sFor the above-mentioned reasons, we find that the record documented that JBEM ordered the transformer from Bayou Buff and continues .to be obligated to pay for same. Considering this and that rig 4 was over halfway completed when AWI halted construction, we find that the trial court did not commit manifest error by awarding JBEM $262,500.00. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS

JENKINS, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT ,

LOBRANO, J.,

DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.

hi respectfully dissent. I find' that by awarding damages as if the contract for the construction of rig 4 were complete, the district court incorrectly classified the contract between John Begnaud Electric Motors, Inc. (“JBEM”) and .Alternative Well Intervention, LLC (“AWI”) as a contract of sale rather than a contract to build, which caused the district court to incorrectly calculate damages in its award. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment awarding damages to JBEM in the amount of $262,500.00 for the, expense and labor needed to complete rig 4 and for sales tax is contrary to law. As I find that the district court committed legal error by failing to classify the contract between JBÉM and AWI as a contract to build, I would conduct my own independent de novo review of the record, find that the 12parties entered into a contract to build, and award damages to JBEM for the “expense and labor already incurred” on the contract as set forth in La. C.C." art. 2765. I would therefore reverse the district court’s judgment and award damages to JBEM -in the amount of $90,215.75.

AWI agreed to a contract with JBEM for JBEM’s construction of rig 4. The contract price was for $368,599.00 plus sales tax of $18,430.00. AWI paid a twenty-five percent (25%) down payment in the amount of $96,757.25 as provided by the contract. The contract listed thirteen (13 or XIII) items to be constructed relative to rig 4, along with the price of each item. In particular, ítem I, an electrical transformer,' had a' corresponding price of $174,551.00. In addition, JBEM included a line item for sales tax payable to the City of Scott of $18,430.00.

There is no dispute in the record testimony .that following JBEM’s initiation .of work on the contract, the parties agreed that JBEM would stop work and bill AWI for the work performed to date. It is also undisputed that JBEM built Items II through IX of the contract, and those items remained in JBEM’s possession.

John Begnaud (“Mr. Begnaud”) testified that JBEM “special ordered” Item I, the transformer, from a third party supplier, Bayou Buff Electric. There was no testimony that the transformer was completed. There,was no contract, invoice, purchase order, demand letter, or any other evidence admitted into evidence establishing JBEM had incurred an expense for the purchase of the transformer.

In its judgment, the district court awarded damages in the amount of | <¡$262,500.00 on the basis of a subsequent invoice submitted by JBEM to AWI dated September 9, 2014. However, the testimony reflects that the $262,500.00 was a revised price agreed to by the parties to complete rig 4 after consideration of the $96,757.25 down payment made by AWI to JBEM. Mr. Begnaud testified that he calculated the amount of the September 9, 2014 invoice by determining the cost of “the work left to be done and the material left to buy” and deducting that amount, as well as the 25% down payment, from the original contract price. Nothing in the record established that the parties entered-into a binding settlement agreement establishing the $262,500.00 as an agreed upon amount that AWI would pay JBEM for early termination of the contract.

Contracts to build are differentiated from contracts of sale by the obligations they create. 24 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Sales § 1:10 (2017). Contracts to build create obligations to “do,”, whereas contracts of sale create obligations to “give.” See id.; FMC Corp. v. Continental Grain Co., 355 So.2d 953 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/8/1977). In the case sub judice, the contract at issue created both an obligation to do something and an obligation to give something. When contracts create both types of obligations, one of those obligations is- “fundamental,” and governs the classification of the contract. 24 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Sales § 1:10 (2017); Conmaco, Inc. v. S. Ocean Corp., 581 So.2d 365, 369 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/30/1991). As the contract was negotiated prior to construction of rig 4, and the primary purpose of th.e contract was for JBEM to provide its labor and skill to construct rig 4, the contract is properly characterized as a contract to build. See, e.g., Conmaco, Inc. v. Southern Ocean Corp., 581 So.2d 365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Ortego v. Dupont, 611 So.2d 792 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); Henson v. Gonzalez, 326 So.2d 396 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).The district court’s ruling demonstrates that the contract in this case was improperly viewed as a contract of sale as opposed to a contract to build.

Given that the contract is a contract to build, La. C.C. art. 2765 is applicable to the facts of this case. Article 2765, provides that the “proprietor has a right to cancel at pleasure the bargain he has made, even in case the work as already been commenced, by paying the undertaker for thé expense and labor already incurred, and such damages as the nature of the case may require” (emphasis added). Pursuant to La. C.C. art. 2765, it was JBEM’s burden of proof at trial to establish the “expense and labor already incurred,’ and such damages as the nature of the case may require.” Mr. Begnaud testified based on his personal knowledge that JBEM successfully completed Items II through IX of the quote issued February 12, 2014 ■ to AWT'. AWI offered no -rebuttal, and-in-fact the record indicates •there was no dispute as to those items. However, I find that JBEM failed to carry its burden with respect to the electrical transformer with a corresponding price of $174,551.00 (Item -I of the quote), Items X through XIII of the quote, and the sales tax. With respect to the. electrical transformer,: Mr. Begiiaud testified that he special ordered it from Bayou Buff Electric, but offered no proof that JBEM actually incurred the expense of the transformer.

’ It is well-settled law that “[s]peculative damage awards without a basis of detail or specificity are not' permitted.” Overton v. Shell Oil Co., 2005-1001, p. 19 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/19/06), 937 So.2d 404, 416. As this Court recently explained in Caruso v. Chalmette Ref., LLC, 2016-1117, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/28/17), 222 So.3d 859, 867, reh’g denied (7/12/17):

[A] plaintiffs burden must be borne by competent evidence showing the extent of the damages and a plaintiffs own uncorroborated personal estimate of loss alone is insufficient to carry his burden. See Tudor Chateau Creole Apartments P’ship v. D.A. Exterminating Co., 5Inc., 96-0951, p. 8 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 691 So.2d 1259, 1264. It is true that when a party has suffered damages but cannot establish them with legal certainty, the courts have discretion to fix the amounts thereof. The latter rule has no application when the damages sought are easily proven, but such proof is not forthcoming. See Banner Chevrolet, Inc. v. Kelt, 402 So.2d 747, 752 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1981).

In Transier v. Barnes Bldg., LLC, 2014-1256, pp. 19-20 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/10/15), 166 So.3d 1249, 1263-64, the appellate court held that the lower court abused its discretion in awarding damages to a contractor under La. C.C. art. 2765 when the contractor failed to “provide a single receipt or invoice” to prove his claim for damages; i.e., the expenses incurred. With respect to the transformer, no witness testified to any personal knowledge that the transformer was completed, and the record lacks any evidence corroborating JBEM’s claim of any expense incurred or obligation to Bayou Buff Electric for the cost of the transformer.

Similarly, there was no offer of any proof that JBEM actually incurred the expense of the sales tax and the record provides no basis for the district court’s award of $12,500.00 in sales tax. In fact, no sales tax would be due since the record is clear there was no sale of tangible personal property.

Thus, I find that JBEM carried its burden of establishing that it incurred the expense and furnished material with respect to Items II-IX as set forth in the quote of February 12, 2014. I further find that JBEM failed to carry its burden of proof with respect to Item I (the electrical transformer), Items X through XIII, and City of Scott sales tax. Under La. C.C. art. 2765,1 calculate the amount to be awarded to JBEM as the sum of the values of Items II through IX of the February 12, 2014 quote totaling $186,973.00, less the down payment of $96,757.25.

. For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s judgment and award damages to JBEM in the amount of $90,215.75. 
      
      . The dissent relies upon a distinction between a contract of sale and a contract to build in order to conduct a de novo review of the record. We find that distinction to be without a difference under the facts and circumstances of this case. Traditionally, courts examine whether the contract at issue was one for sale or build when the classification determines substantial rights of the parties and primarily concern the construction or sale of a building/home. See Conmaco, Inc. v. S. Ocean Corp., 581 So.2d 365 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (determining whether redhibition applied). See also Martinez v. Reno, 99-114 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/15/99), 742 So.2d 1014 (determining right to damages for mental anguish); Morris & Dickson Co., Inc. v. Jones Bros. Co., Inc., 29,379 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/11/97), 691 So.2d 882 (determining prescription); Mayerhofer v. Three R’s Inc., 597 So.2d 151 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1992) (right to nonpe'cuniáry damages depends upon classification); Degeneres v. Burgess, 486 So.2d 769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (classification governed prescriptive period and plaintiffs’ recourse).
      The present case only concerns damages for the breach of contract wherein the president of AWI signed the invoice containing the amount owed for the work completed and further acknowledged this exact amount owed to JBEM in correspondence with Crestmark. The amount on the invoice includes the “expense and labor already incurred.” La. C.C. art. 2765.
     
      
      . The dissent states that "the testimony reflects that the $262,500.00 was a revised price agreed to by the parties to complete rig 4 after consideration of the $96,757.25 down payment made by AWI to JBEM.” We disagree. Mr. Begnaud testified that the $262,500.00 invoice "was the invoice to them when they told us to shut it down. Right there, we had invoiced them to that point.” Counsel then asked: "does this ... represent all of the labor costs and the material costs incurred by Rig Electric, you know, over and above the first payment that you had received?” Mr. Begnaud responded, “Yes, sir.” Further, Mr. Begnaud stated that the $262,500.00 invoice was calculated by deducting the first 25% payment, deducting the work remaining, and deducting the materials left to purchase. Nothing in the record contradicts this testimony.
     
      
      . The dissent further states that "[n]othing in the record established that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement establishing the $262,500.00 as an agreed upon amount that AWI would pay JBEM for early termination of the contract.” While the final invoice from JBEM may not met the requirements of La. C.C. art. 3072 (formal requirements of a compromise), the record evidence demonstrates that Mr, Stansbury acknowledged that AWI owed JBEM $262,500.00 for the work completed on rig 4. Not only did Mr. Stansbury sign the invoice, he signed Crest-mark’s irrevocable-acknowledgment that the invoice was assigned to Crestmark and that AWI would pay Crestmark $262,500.00 pursuant to the invoice.
     
      
      . The trial court erroneously referenced $80,000.00 as the price of the transformer.
     
      
      . Again, we note that the final invoice amount was justified because JBEM was over halfway completed with rig 4 when AWI halted construction.
     
      
      . The majority opinion results in a total payment of $342,149.75 plus $17,107.50 in sales tax from AWI to JBEM as follows: the district court's award of $250,000.00 plus $12,500.00 sales tax against AWI plus the down payment of $92,149.75 plus $4,607.50 sales tax. This amount constitutes, for all practical purposes, the full amount of the cost of rig 4, which is undisputedly not complete and in no way usable for its intended purpose. Although, as discussed infra, the contract at issue is a contract to build, it is important to note that the concept of "substantial performance” should not be applied to this case. Substantial performance is a concept applied when a construction may be fit for the purposes intended. See Airco Refrigeration Service, Inc. v. Fink, 134 So.2d 880 (La. 1961). If a contractor has substantially performed such that the construction is fit for its intended use, he is entitled to recover the full contract price. Id. In the case sub judice, the testimony absolutely forecloses the application of substantial performance, as Mr. Begnaud testified that rig 4 was only "better than halfway finished” and the entirety of the record discloses no testimony or evidence indicating that rig 4 was fit for its intended purpose.
     
      
      . A trier of fact’s factual conclusions regarding breach of contract claims are typically governed by the manifest error standard of review. See Brenner v. Zaleski, 2014-1323, p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/3/15), 174-So.3d 76, 79. However, where an error of law taints the fact finding process, the appellate court must conduct its own de novo review. MST Enterprises Co. v. City of New Orleans, 2015-0112, pp. 5-6 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/29/15), 174 So.3d 195, 198.
     
      
      . • The record in this matter establishes that the contract' consisted of nothing more than a one-page contract to build dated February 19, 2014 with the attached February 12, 2014 quote of construction costs and a purchase order dated February 19, 2014.
     
      
      . Items 11 through IX are as follows:
      II Telescopic light stands with sling $38,685
      III Receptacle lighting panel with slings $ 9,300
      IV BOP closing unit (labor and material electrical hook) $ 6,694 .
      V 20x8x4 Baskel/fab/paint/stress test/slings $26,620
      VI - 8x8x4 Baskel/fab/paint/stress test/slings $18,360
      VII 4x4x4 Basket/fab/paint/stress test/slings $23,120
      VIII Electrical Transformer Skid/fab/paint/stress test/slings $21,311
      IX Air Compressor Skid/fab/paint/stress test/slings $42,883
     
      
      , See fn. 4, supra.
      
     
      
      . Items X through XIII of the quote are as follows:
      X Spare Parts for Rig $3,575
      XI 125’ Feeder Wire for Tool Hose $1,000
      xn 125’ feeder wire for mud pump $1,000
      xm Price Increase on Metal - 2% (1/1/14) $1,500
     
      
      . Under La. R.S. 47:302(A), the , sales tax is imposed upon the "sale at retail” of tangible personal property. Under La. R.S. 47:301(10)(a)(ii), a "sale at retail” for purposes of the imposition of the sales and use tax levied by a political subdivision is defined as a "sale to a consumer or to any other person for any purpose other than for resale in the form of tangible personal property... ”