Case ID: scl_10/html/0051-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Coloock, J. Nott, and Oheyes, JJ.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Mitchell v. Poyas.
    The statute of limitations runs against dower, 
    
    A plea shall be taken most strongly against the defendant; therefore, a plea, stating that the defendant had been five years in quiet and peaceable possession, is insufficient, inasmuch as it does not state the possession to have been adverse and actual: Leave, however, given to defendant to plead de novo, or to amend his plea, on payment of costs.
    This was an application for dower, tried before Mr. Justice Grimke, at Charleston, January Term, 1817.
    *The declaration was filed, and two pleas were put in by defendant.
    1. That the plaintiff had relinquished her dower — And
    
      2. That the defendant had been in the quiet and peaceable possession of the premises for five years, before the summons was issued in this ease.
    On the first plea issue was taken, and to the last there was a general demurrer.
    After argument, the presiding Judge overruled the demurrer.
    A motion was now made to reverse the decision, and for leave to enter up judgment on demurrer for the plaintiff, on the following grounds :
    1. That the statute of limitations does not run against dower, but from the time of the demand thereof, and a denial of the right.
    2. Because the plea in this ease was substantially defective, in not showing that the possession relied upon in this case, was an adverse and actual possession. which only can give a right by the construction of the statute.
    The counsel for the demandant, upon being informed that the first ground had been determined in the case of Ann Ramsay v. Dozier, at Columbia, in-, 1814, against him, proceeded to his argument, on the second ground, and contended that it was a plea in bar, and must be construed strictly, and most strongly against the defendant. That no intendment will be made in its favor; but on the contrary, that every intendment will be made against it. That the plea only stated that the defendant had been possessed for five years, from which it did not necessarily result, that such possession was adverse and actual, and if it were not, it would be no bar to the recovery. That admitting the plea to be true, (which was the effect of the demurrer, (yet the defendant could not hold in exclusion of the demandant’s claim.
    To this the defendant’s counsel replied, that all the necessary circumstances, implied by law, need not be Expressed, and the law implies that the possession must be adverse and actual, which can bar the claim. That the plea was to be considered in relation to the other parts of the pleadings, and the claim of the party, and, therefore, the plea should be considered as sufficient; for it must mean to answer the claim which is stated to exist a.t the time of the issuing of the summons, and means, of course, that there had been five years possession before that period.
    
      
       This was likewise decided in the case (quoted by the Court,) of Ramsay vs. Dozier, at Columbia, 1814, (3 Brev. 246,) Justices Bbevaed, Bat, Colcock, and Nott, concurring; Justice Smith, dissenting. Mr. Justice Brevard, also, in delivering Ms opinion, said that the same point had been decided in the case of Lide vs. Reynolds, (1 Brev. 76,) in 1802. Vide Camport et ux. vs. Wright, Dyer 224. Moor Pl. 154. Bac. Abrid. Tit. Dower, F. Otherwise held in Connecticut, 1 Swift’s System, 256; and see Hitchcock vs. Harrington, 6 John. 291. R.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Coloock, J.

The rules which prevail in the construction and allowance of a plea in bar, are,

1. That it is to be construed most strongly against the defendant.

2. “That a general plea, if bad in part, is bad for the whole,” (1 Chitty on Pleading, 522.)

The plea states that the defendant “has been five years in the possession of the premises.” Now there is no technical meaning which is attached to the word “possession,” by which we are necessarily and unavoidably to understand an actual and adverse possession; on the contrary, it is a word of indefinite import, both as to its nature and its extent, and, therefore, may mean a possession by lease, for an unexpired term, or at will and undetermined, or by construction of law.

In order to test the correctness of the plea, let us suppose that the defendant had taken issue; and at the trial it had appeared that the right of the demandant had accrued two months previous to the action, and that the defendant had been in possession for five years, by a lease from her hu'sband. The verdict might have supported the plea, and yet not decided the rights of the parties. The issue would have been immaterial.

Pleas are either dilatory pleas, or pleas to the action. Dilatory pleas are to the jurisdiction of the Court, the disability of the plaintiff, or in abatement. The . plea in this case is to neither of the points. It was then *certainly intended as a plea in bar to the action, and it is essential to such a plea, that it answer the plaintiff’s allegations, in every material point, and that it be so pleaded as to be capable of trial. (3 Black. Com. 303.) By this test it is clear that the plea is defective.

When a plea has two intendments, it shall be taken most strongly ag’ainst the defendant. (Chitty, 522.) In illustration of this, it is said, if in trespass, the defendant plead a release, without saying at what time it was made, it shall be intended to have been made before the trespass was committed.” I am then certainly bound to say, that the possession of the defendant, as stated in his plea, is not adverse from the plaintiff’s claim, and that the plea is insufficient.

The Court, however, will give the defendant leave to plead de novo, or to amend his defective plea, upon the payment of costs, otherwise judgment for the plaintiff in demurrer.

Johnson, J., concurred.

Nott, and Oheyes, JJ.

We concur in this opinion on the ground, that the plea did not state the defendant to have been five years in possession, after the accruing of the plaintiff’s right of action. 
      
       See Moore vs. Burbage, 2 McMul. 170; 4 Post, 108; 7 Rich. 432; 5 Strob. 157; 1 McM. 291; 3 Hill 197, contra; 2 McM. 170; 4 Rich. 14, 23; 5 Rich. 361; 6 Rich. 27, 395; 10 Rich. 94, 371; Chev. 94.
     
      
       Tread. 112; 3 Brev. 246.