Case ID: f-appx_508/html/0661-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rachelle Lynette CARLOCK, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-50511.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 11, 2013.
    
    Filed Feb. 14, 2013.
    Fred Sheppard, Assistant U.S., Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant U.S., Mark R. Rehe, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Shereen Joy Charliek, Esquire, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rachelle Lynette Carlock appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 120-month sentence imposed following her guilty-plea conviction for possession of a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(a)(B)(ii); and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Carlock contends that in granting a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3558(e), the district court should have considered factors unrelated to her substantial assistance, including the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. She argues that the district court’s interpretation of section 3553(e) is contrary to the language of the statute and Supreme Court precedent. She further contends that the district court’s interpretation creates a perverse incentive for defendants. Carlock’s contentions are foreclosed. See United States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir.2011), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2703, 183 L.Ed.2d 60 (2012); United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.2009).

Carlock also contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of section 3553(a)’s parsimony principle. Because the district court was not allowed to further reduce Carlock’s sentence on the basis of section 3553(a)’s factors, this contention fails. See Jackson, 577 F.3d at 1036.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.