Case ID: h-j_3/html/0329-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Chase, Ch, J. Buchanan, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Buchanan's Lessee vs. Steuart.
    Appeal from Baltimore County Court. This was an action of ejectment for all that part of a lot of ground situate in the city of Baltimore, being part of a lot of ground distinguished on the plot thereof by the number 25, beginning for the said part at the end of 115 feet from the S W corner ot Conawago and Charles-streets, where they intersect each other, and running thence, binding on Charles-street 97 feet to Mushberger's line, thence westerly 150 feet 6 inches, more or less, ^-Liberty, or 10 feet lane, thence N Easterly, binding on said Liberty or 10 feet lane S6 feet, and thence with a straight line to the beginning. The defendant, (now appellee,) took defence on warrant, and plots were made.
    1. At the .trial the plaintiff offered in evidence a grant to Thomas Todd for Todd's Range, dated the 8th of 
      August 1720. And proved that the Tót of ground de» signated On the plot exhibited, arid which was made evidefióe by fhé consent of the parties, beginning at A and running iti B, to C, to D, and thence id A, Was and is part of ToiÍaÚs Range, and is a true location of the lot of ground distinguished on the plot of the city of Baltimore by the lot Ño. 25 5 and that a certain Richard CroxalR being; seized of the said lot of ground, by his last will dated the fOth of Apiil 1785, devised to his ■wife Eleanor Cróxall, and her heirs; all that part of the said lot of ground, which is described as follows on the plot — Beginning at F, running ter B, to C, to 12, thence' to F. The other clause in the will, necessary to be me.ritioned, was — “I also give my nephew Richard Croxülí, his heirs and assigns, for ever, my tracts of land called, &c. “also part of the lot or lots of land, with the’ improvements thereon erected, lying and being in Ballimore-town, vithin the following limits, viz* Beginning at the first beginning of the lot number 23, at the inJ tersection of Charles and Market-streets, and running thence, bounding on Oharles-slreet, then W until it intersect the ground leased by me to the said Andrew Buchanan, then bbunding on the said groitfrd, and running S until it intersects Market-street, then bounding on Market-street E to the beginning, save and except thereout the part of the said lot conveyed by me to the said Andrew Buchanan, on which his warehouse is-erected on Oharles-slreet; and also save and except part of the said lot already conveyed by me to my nephew James Croxall, and also save and except my brick warehouse, With the ground it stands on, which is lately sold. I also do appropriate, and it is my will and desire, that the ground under the following limits shall be open for' an inlet to my improved ground, so long as the owner or' possessor of the said’ improved ground may think it convenient or proper, viz. Beginning at the' N end of Andrew Buchanan's warehouse, and running N (jn Charles-street 13 feet W parallel with Market-street, to Andrew Buchanan's ground, then S’ 13 feet parallel with Charles-street, then E parallel with Market-street, to the beginning. Item. I give and bequeath to my nephew Richard Croxall, his heirs and assigns, for ever, the part of my unimproved ground in Baltimore town, under the following limits, viz. Beginning at the distance of 48 feet from the N end of Andrew Buchanan’s warehouse, and running thence and bounding on Charles-street 99 feet, then W parallel with Market-street, to intersect the western limits of my said ground, then bounding on the said limits and Andrew Buchanan’s ground, until it intersects the YY line of the ground conveyed by me to Rachel Croxall^ and her son Richard, and thence E parallel with Market-street to the beginning. Item. I give apd bequeath to my niece Mary Howard, her heirs and assigns, for ever, part of my improved groupd in Baltimore town, under the fol - lowing limits, viz. Beginning at, the distance of 142 feet from the N end of Andrew Buchanan’s warehouse, and running thence N on Charles-street S3 feet, then W parallel with Market-street to intersect the western limits of my said ground, then with the said limits until it intersects the W line of my bequest by this my will to my nephew Richard Croxall, and then E parallel with Market-street to the beginning. Item. I give and bequeath to. my dear and loving wife, her heirs and assigns, for ever, all the remaining part of my unimproved ground in Baltimore town, under following limits, viz. Beginning at the distance of one hundred and seventy-five feet from the N eud of Andrew Buchanan’s warehouse, and running thence N op Charles-street to die utmost limits of the said ground, then on Conawaugoe-street with the extent thereon, then with the lane until it intersects the W line of my bequest to my niece Mary Howunl, and then E parallel with Market-street to the beginning.” “And in case my said nephew Richard Croxall, should not be living at the time of my decease, but not otherwise, then it is my will, and l do hereby give and devise to my nephew James Croxall, all the real estate,” &c. “I have by my said will given and devised to my said nephew Richard Croxall,” &c. Richard Croxall, the testator, afterwards died seized of the said lot of ground, and Eleanor Croxall, after the deatli of Richard, and on the 6th of February 1804, by deed duly executed, acknowledged apd recorded, conveyed to the lessor of the plaintiff, George Buchanan, and his heirs, all that part of the said lot of ground so as aforesaid devised, which is described on the plot as follows, and for which the presept ejectment is brought — Beginning at Ms running to fo C, to 0} thence to M. The said part is described in the said deed as follows, to wifi “All that part of a lot of ground, situate and being in the city of Baltimore, being part of the original lot of Baltimore-toim^ distinguished on the plot thereof by the number 25, beginning for the said part hereby given,” &c. “at the end of 115 feet from the S W corner of Conawago and Charles-streets, where they intersect each other, and running thence parallel and binding on Charles-slreet 27 feet, to Mushberger's lino, thence westerly 150 feet 6 inches more or less, to Liberty or 10 feet lane, thence N easterly binding on said Liberty or 10. feet lane, 36 feet, and thence ■with a straight line to the beginning.” The plaintiff further proved, that Charles-street and Conawago-slreet in the city of Baltimore, are truly located on the plot- The defendant claimed title to ail that part of lot No. 25, which is designated on the plot as follows: Beginning at N, running to B, to G, and thence' to N. And to shew a title in Thomas Gittings and Eleanor Croxall, under whom he claimed, and that Richard Croxall did not die seized of the property described in the ejectment, read in evidence a deed from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings, dated the 22d of March 1784, for “all that lot or parcel of ground situate and lying in Ballimore-town, which is known and distinguished on the plot of said town by the No. 25, and beginning for the same, at the N end of Charlcs-street, on the W side thereof, where it intersects 6onawago-street, and running then.ee S, bounding on Charles-slreet, 60 feet, thence W to LihertyAxac, then with the lane to Cona.wago-slreef, then with Conawc/gosireel tp the place of beginning. To have and to hold the said lot or parcel of ground above described, and premises, unto the said Thomas Gitlings, his heirs and assigns, forever, &c.” And a deed from Thomas Gittings, and the before mentioned Eleanor Croxall, to him the defendant, dated the 8th of May 1801, for “all that lo,t,” &c. (describing it as mentioned in the above deed from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings,) “to have and to hold the same pud every part thereof, unto the said Richardson Sleuart, bis heirs and assigns,"? &c. The defendant further gave in evidence, that the deed from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings, not being recorded within the time prescribed by law, an application was made by Thomas Gitlings to' the court of chapcery for the purpose of having the said' ¿seed recorded according to the act of assembly in such case made and provided, and that after due proceedings were bad thereon, the chancellor, by bis decree dated the 15th of May 1802, ordered said deed tobe recorded, which was done, The plaintiff then proved, that the ground included in the metes and bounds, courses and distances, mentioned in the said two last mentioned deeds, begins on the plot at H, and runs to I, to J, to K, and then to H. He further proved, that that part of lot No. 25, which is devised by the wii! of Rickard Croxall to Mary Howard, is truly located on the plot as follows: Beginning at 3, running Us N, thence to, C, thence to 2, thence to 1. And that Mary Hovjard died before Croxall, the testator. And that that part of lot No. 25, which was devised by Richard Croxall to James Croxall by said will, beginning on the plot at A, runs to J, to 2, to D, to A, and that James Croxall was, at the death of Richard Croxall, bis sole heir at law. He also proved by James Croxall that Thomas Gittings never made any claim on him, or set up any title or claim, to his knowledge, to that part of lot No. 25 which he, James Croxall, took under the will of Richard Croxall, or to that part of lot No. 25 which he, James Croxall, inherited as heir at law to the said Richard Croxall. The defendant then prayed the court to direct the jury, that upon the foregoing facts, and under the construction of the aforesaid deeds, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. This opinion the court, [_Nichohon Ch. J.] gave to the jury. The plaintiff excepted.
    
      T and K, by their deed of bargain and sale, con» veyed to R ‘‘all that lot or jm’oci, of ground sitúa fe and lying in Haititoore’toxvti* which i knovtu aud distinguished on the plot of said town by the No. 25, anil beginning for the same at,” describing the same by courses ami distances, “to have and to hold the same, and every part thereof^ onto the .said R,”' &e —Held, that the hole of the lot passed by the general descnptí» on of alj that lot No. 25, although it was not ii.cludv ed within the spe* cial description by course and tils* Pavol evidence is inadmissible to prove that is sVas the intention of a grantor, in a deed of bargain and sale, to convey a lot of ground foy the coupes aud distances ¡üse$ theieittj aud not to ymvey bh& ^vhule lots
    
      2. The plaintiff then prayed the court to direct the jury, that if they should be of opinion from the evidence, that ifc was the intention of Richard Croxall to convey to Thomas Gittings only that pari of lot No, 35 which is contained in the metes and bounds, courses and distances, expressed in the deed from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings, and that it was the intention of Thomas Gittings and Eleanor Croxall, only to conyey to the defendant that part of lot No. 25 which is contained in the metes and bounds, courses and distances, expressed in the deed from Eleanor CroxullvaA Thomps Gittings to the defendant, then the. plaintiff was entitled to recover. The court refused to. give this direction. The plaintiff excepted; and the verdict and judgment being against him he appealed to this court, ' ■ " .....■ '
    
    
      The cause was argued before Chase, Ch. J. and BN chanan, Earle and Johnson, J.
    
      W, Dorsey, Harper and Brice, for the Appellant,
    stated that the question wfts, whether or not the whole of lot Nq* / 25 was conveyed by the deed from Bichará Croxall to Thomas G}llings, or only the part agreeably to the particular description in that deed? They contended, that there-being two descriptions in the deed, one general, and the other special, the special description was to govern. They referred to Shep. T. 89, 95, 99, 100. Co. Litt. 42. Hawkins vs. Hanson, 1 Harr. & M‘Hen. 523. Helms's Lessee vs. Howard, 2 Harr. & M‘Hen. 87; and Carroll et al. Lessee vs. Norwood, 1 Harr. & Johns. 173.
    
      Marlin, and Pinkney (Attorney Geperal U. (S'.) for the Appellee,
    cited Shep. T. 88, 95, 98, 99, 246. Bac. Ab. tit. Grant, (H) 662. Lodge's Lessee vs. Lee, 6 Cranch, 237. The act of 1715, ch 47, s. 10. Carroll et al. Lessee vs. Norwood, (5 Harr. & Johns. 163, 164.) Gittings Jrs. Lessee vs. Hall, 2 Harr. & Johns. 117. Howard vs. Moale, et al. Lessee, Ibid 249, 263. Dorsey's Lessee vs. Hammond, 1 Harr. & Johns. 193; and Co. Litt. 183.
   Chase, Ch, J.

delivered the opinion of the court, The question in this case arises on the legal effect and opera- . tion of the deed from Eleanor Crox(dl and Thomas Gütings, to Biehardson St mart, the defendant below, as to the quantity of the land conveyed by it to Steuart. In deciding- this question; the court must be governed by those rules and principles of the law, which have been established by t]ie courts of justice, and resorted tp by them in expounding deeds.

It is truc, and has beep conceded, that there are no technical or precise form of words appropriated by law, as exclusively or particularly necessary in the description or Resignation of the thing to be granted.

ft is equally wel] established, that the intention of the parties should prevail in expounding deeRs, it not repugnant to some principle or maxim of the law, which is to be collected from the whole of the deed.

It is a position not to be controverted, that a Reed is to be construed prost beneficially for the grantee, whenever there is a necessity for resorting to that maxim.

The apparent intention on the face of the deed is, that all of the !ot Ño. 25, should pass to the grantee, ,And the general words, all the lot No. 25, and which is know?! and distinguished on the plot of the town by No. 25, are fully competent to transfer the whole; there is nothing in ihe additional description by cotirse and ríistancé, from which it can be intended or inferred, that the general description was to lie limited or modified, but it is to be presumed that it corresponded with the general description, and was inserted to define the location of the lot No. 25, and show Its true position; and there is not any thing appearing in the deed indicative of an intention to convey less than the whole lot.

On the location of the lot No. 25, according to its true limits, it appears that ¿0 feet south with Charles-street will not extend to tire end of the' line of that course, so as to gratify the subsequent runnings, and include the whole of the lot No. 25, in conformity to the general description.

What then is the true construction of the deed, having respect for the principles laid down? If the specific or additional description is adhered to, the general description must be rejected, and the intention of the parties, apparent on the deed, disregarded, and a construction will prevail in subversion of the principle, which declares that the deed shall be construed most beneficially for the grantee.

By elongating the south course to ihe end of that line, the genera! description is complied with, the subsequent runnings gratified, the whole of the lot included, and the apparent intention of the parties fulfilled; or if the general description is adhered to, atid the particular rejected, the intention of the parties appearing on the deed will be effectuated, and a construction given most beneficial for the grantee.

■ The collateral circumstances, that the grantors did not bold all the lot No. 25, cannot affect the construction. The deed will pass the whole, if they had the whole, or whatever part they possessed less than the whole, and it cannot be inferred, from that circumstance, in contravention of what appears in the deed, (hat it was intended by the parties to transfer only that part included within the specific or additional description, and more especially as the grantors, at the time of making, the deed, held more of the lot than is contained within the said description.

.The Court concur with the court below in tire opinions expressed in each of the bills of exceptions.

Buchanan, J.

This case depends upon the true construction of the deeds from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings, and Thomas Gittings and Eleanor Croxall to' Richardson Sleuarl, and the only question for decision is, whether they respectively passed the Whole of the lot No. So, or only so much thereof as is embraced within the courses and distances expressed? The leading principle in the interpretation of deeds is, that the Construction be made upon the whole of the deed taken together, and not upou disjointed parts of it, so that every part, if possible, be made to take effect, as nearly, according to the intention of the parties,-as the rules of law will admit. ’No technical form of words is necessary, but the parties, who may be presumed acquainted with the subject matter of the contract, are left to the use- of such words of description as are best suited to the thing intended to be conveyed. The construction, therefore, should be, “reasonable and ‘agreeable to common understanding.” With this guide Í have endeavoured to arrive at the intent and meaning of the parties to the deeds in question, and it appears to me that no more of lot No. 25 was intended to be passed, than that part which is embraced within-the courses and distan»^ xes set out.

The courses and distances include but a very small proportion of the whole lot, and it is difiicuU to believe that Croxall and Gittings did not know the extent of the lot at the time of executing the deed between them, and that the courses of that deed included only a part of it. ’ if the courses had been omitted, the' whole lot would have passed by the preceding general Words of description, “all that lot,” &c. and it would have been unnecessary to resort to courses and distances, or any other description, if it was the intention of the parties that the whole should pass. It is evident then, that the parties did not mean to effect their purpose by the use of the general description or designation of the lot, by its number on the plot of Baliimor e-town, or to rely upon it as the description of the thing intended to be conveyed; for if they did, they would not unnecessarily have resorted to another more precise. The object,’ therefore, of inserting the courses and distatices, seems to have been to designate particularly What was intended to be conveyed.

To rely upon the number of the lot alone for coming at the intention of the parties, would be to exclude the courses and distances, or qualifying expressions, in violation of the rule, that “the construction be made upon the entire deed, and not merely upon disjointed parts of it,” the courses and distances evidently appearing upon the plots in the cause, not to be co-extensive with thé Wholé lot.

But if the rule is adhered to, each part of the description will have its office, the number of the lot, as designating the general object of the' parties in pointing out the place or thing to which the courses and distances are meant to be applied,, and the courses and distances as restricting the genera! object, and defining the particular part of it intended to be conveyed.- There is no- necessity for rejecting either part of the description,- but (lie generality of the first part may, and,- I think,- ought to be restricted by the latter, to come at the intention of the parties, and thus «¡very part of the deed may be gratified.

It is laid down in books of authority, that if a Than grants '■‘Ids manor of Bale” without saying where it lies, it is a good grant, and the whole manor passes; but that if he grants ‘'his manor of Dale rn Dale,” and a part of the manor lies in Dakj and a part in some other place* that pari of the manor o'nly which lie's in Bale will pass* and for this reason, that the general description by name, which' if it stood alone would pass the whole manor, is limited and restricted by the subsequent qualifying words in Dale„ which show the intention of the parties, that no more than the part lying in Dale should pass.

in this case the grant is-of “all that lot or parcel of ground situate* lying and being- in BaUimore-tavm, which is known and distinguished on the plot of said town by No. 25, and beginning for the same at the' south end of Charles-street on the West side' thereof, where it intersects Conawago-street,- and running thenee south, binding, on Charles street, sixty feet, thence west to Liberty-lane* then with the lane' to Conawago■ street* then with Conawago-street to the beginning.”

The Words “situate, lying and being, in Batlinioretown,” are' eertainly only descriptive of the place where the lot lies# and no other office can be assigned thetn, and the only office of the words “known and distinguished On the plot of said town by No; 25,” is to set out the name or v J number of the lot# and can have fío more forcé than any other description of land by name would have in the construction of a deed.

The case then stands as' if the expression^ Were “all that lot or parcel of ground called No. 25,” which certainly are not more general than the words “my manor of Dale,” pud the subsequent qualifying expressions “beginning,” &c. are not less' restrictive than the Words" “in Dale,” in the ease put,1 from which, and other similar and equally strong- cases to be found in the books, I cannot distinguish this. The case of Lodge vs. Lee, cited from Cranch, and" the cases of Gittings vs. Hall, and Howard vs Moale, do not, I think, affect this case. The intention of the parties,, when it can be ascertained, and not the strict and precise signification of the words used, is to be regarded; the true construction, therefore, of every deed, must depend upon its own expressions, and in this case# without resorting to the rule “verbafortius accipiuntur contra proferentem-,” which is not favoured in" law# and “never to be relied upon but where all other rules of exposition fail;” but construing the deed from Richard Croxall to Thomas Gittings, according. to the intention of the parties, as it seems manifest to me, I am of opinion# that nothing more passed than what is contained within the courses and distances; and that the deed to Richardson Sleuart, having the same expressions with those used in the deed to Gittings, must receive the same construction.

It is therefore my opinion, that the appellant is entitled to recover, and that the judgment of the court below ought to be reversed on the first bill of exceptions, but affirmed on the second, it being clearly the province of the court, and not the jury, to give construction to the deeds in question.

judgment affirmed.