Case ID: us-ct-cl_22/html/0118-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Pee curiam :", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

WILLIAM E. SINGLETON v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 14744.
    Decided March 14, 1887.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    A clerk of a United States court renders five acts of service in connection -with, the payment of jurors and witnesses. Two are required by orders of the court; two by a demand of the marshal. The judge acts upon each report, and the accounts of the clerk are approved by him. The marshal insists upon having orders to pay witnesses and jurors certified by the clerk and attested by the seal of the court, though the Comptroller previously prescribed a simple certificate as a sufficient voucher. *
    I.As it is made the duty of Circuit and District Courts to determine whether a witness or a juror is entitled to be paid, and to make the necessary orders therefor (Rev. Stat., § 855), those courts are necessarily invested with discretion to determine in what manner the facts shall be ascertained and the form in which orders shall be made.
    II.A marshal cannot prescribe the form of the vouchers upon which he will pay witnesses and jurors; that discretion is properly exercised by ■ the authority which has power to pass upon his accounts, the Comptroller of the Treasury.
    III.The seal of a court when affixed to writs and exemplifications authenticates the utterance of the court to persons beyond itself.
    
      IV. The marshal being an officer of the court required to attend each sitting (Eev. Stat., § 787) is cognizant of the orders of the court without their being exemplified by its seal.
    V. If the Comptroller of the Treasury prescribe a certificate of the clerk as a sufficient voucher forthepaymontof witnesses and jurors, the marshal cannot throw additional labor upon the clerk or additional expense upon the Government by requiring exemplified copies of orders.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    I. The claimant, William E. Singleton, was clerk of the United States District and Circuit Courts for the eastern district of Texas from the 1st day of July, 1885, to the 31st day of October, 1885. His account for services as said clerk, verified by his oath, was presented to said court, in the presence of United States district attorney, and an order approving the same was duly entered of record. The account thus approved was presented for payment to the accounting officers of the Treasury, aud they refused payment for the following services, to wit:
    For making and recording in the minutes of the court one hundred separate reports of the attendance and -travel of one hundred United States jurors, one folio each, at 15 cents per folio ........ $15 00
    For making one hundred copies of separate orders of court for marshal to pay one hundred United States jurors, one folio each, at 10 cents per folio...........................-................... 10 00
    For making one hundred certificates to copies of orders of court for marshal to pay one hundred United States jurors, one folio each, at 15 cents per folio...............-............................ 15 00
    For affixing one hundred seals of court to said copies of orders of court for marshal to pay one hundred United States jurors, 20 cents each...................................-................. 20 00
    For making aud recording in the minutes of the court one hundred and eighty-three separate reports of tbe attendance and travel of one hundred and eighty-three United States witnesses, one folio each, at 15 cents per folio...................................... 27 45
    For making one hundred and eighty-three copies of separate orders of court for marshal to pay one hundred and eighty-three United States witnesses, one folio each, at 10 cents per folio............. 18 30
    For making one hundred and eighty-three certificates to copies of orders of court for marshal to pay one hundred and eighty-three United States witnesses, one folio each, at 15 cents per folio..... 27 45
    For affixing one hundred and eighty-three seals of court to said copies of orders of court for marsh al to pay oue hundred aud eighty-three United States witnesses, 20 cents each.................... 36 CO
    II. Similar services had been charged for in previous accounts and payment allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury. The services were actually performed under the following orders and directions :
    
      “ Monday, February 9,1885.
    “ It is ordered by the court that the clerk of the court take the proof individually by affidavit of the attendance and travel of witnesses and jurors as they are discharged, and at once report the same to the court for approval, that orders for pay ment may be made.
    “ Monday, September 14,1885.
    “ Ordered, That the clerk of the United States District Court for the eastern district of Texas, holding sessions at Jefferson, Tex., ascertain by oath or otherwise the respective amounts due to the several jurors and witnesses of the United States and report the same to the court for its approval or rejection, as the case may be.”
    III. The services were rendered subsequent to the latter order, to wit, between the 15th September and the 31st October, 1885. The judge of the district court acted upon the several reports of the clerk and approved or rejected each severally. The account of the clerk charging for these several reports and copies of orders in the case of each juror and witness was approved by the district judge; and the reports and entries of orders by the clerk were pursuant to his personal instructions and with his knowledge. The marshal of the court insisted upon having copies of the several orders certified by the clerk and exemplified by the seal of the court, and avowed an intention not to pay a witness or juror unless he received such an exemplified copy.
    IV. On the 11th July, 1885, the Comptroller of the Treasury addressed to the United States attorney for the eastern district of Texas, and on the 21st July, 1885, to the claimant, the letters given below:
    “Treasury Department,
    “First Comptroller’s Oeeice,
    “ Washington, D. 0., July 11,1885.
    “Asa E. Stratton, Jr., Esq.,
    “ U. S. Attorney, Eastern District of Texas,
    “ Galveston, Tex.:
    
    “ Sir : The plan adopted in your district, as also in the other districts of Texas, of ascertaining the amounts due witnesses and jurors, and of directing payment thereof, is calculated unnecessarily to enhance the fees of the clerks, as it occurs to me.
    “ In very few districts in the United States are separate reports and orders made in the case of each individual witness and juror, the prevailing practice being for tbe witness or juror, immediately on his discharge, to present himself to the clerk, and prove on oatb his attendance and travel. Tbe clerk thereupon gives him a certificate of tbe facts' sworn to, which certificate be presents direct to tbe marshal, who pays accordingly,, taking, of course, tbe party’s receipt for tbe payment. The marshal’s pay-roll, thus made up, is presented at tbe close of the term to the court for approval when tbe proper order is made. If desirable, a general order of court might be made directing tbe marshal to pay witnesses and jurors according to certificates thus given them, which would be ample protection to tbe marshal in tbe matter of bis accounts. Tbe clerk’s fees are thus 25 cents in the case of each witness and juror, viz, 10 cents for the oatb and 15 cents for the certificate, instead of tbe $1.05 which one of tbe clerks in your State has managed to charge.
    “Again, tbe plan now practiced in Texas seems to have had its origin in a desire to enable tbe witness or juror, if tbe marshal did not have money in band to pay him, to dispose of bis claim to some one willing to purchase. Of course, the United States recognizes no person in the matter except tbe original claimant, any assignment or attempted assignment of tbe claim being void. (§ 34$7, Kev. Stat.) Tbe marshal is not a purchaser of these claims; be is merely tbe disbursing officer of tbe United States for tbe payment of them.
    “All fees charged for services in connection with tbe subject-matter of this letter by tbe clerks in your State prior to tbe present fiscal year, and heretofore suspended as being unnecessarily large, will be allowed; but your attention is thus called to tbe matter in tbe hope that you may bring it to tbe consideration of tbe court, and secure a modification of tbe present practice. You will'thus relieve tbe clerks of tbe hardship of doing work which will not be approved in their accounts by this office after tbe beginning of the present fiscal year.
    “ Yery respectfully,
    “M. J. Durham,
    ' “ Comptroller.”
    “ Treasury Department,
    “First Comptroller’s Oeeice,
    “ Washington, D. C., July 21,1885.
    “ W. E. Singleton, Cleric, <&c.:
    
    “ Sir: An account, viz, No. 92768, has been stated in your favor and certified for payment, in which you are allowed suspensions per report No. 88410 $143.60, suspensions per report No. 89883 $26.10, and suspensions per report No. 91183 $103.90, making a total of $273.60.
    “ In tbe above allowances are included tbe fees charged in tbe matter of determining the amounts due jurors and wit-
    
      nesses. But beginning with the present fiscal year this office will not allow the clerk such fees as your present practice induces him to charge. To prevent an apparent hardship on the clerk the district attorney has been requested to call the matter to the attention of the court with a view to effecting a change in the manner of doing the business as at present conducted.
    “This office has now done as much as it can do to avoid making its action in this matter retroactive.
    “Very respectfully,
    “M. J. Durham,
    “ Comptroller.”
    
    
      Mr. G. G. Lancaster for the claimant:
    These reports .and copies were made by the clerk under the orders of the court and for the protection and benefit of the United States. The orders of court are mandatory on the officers of the court, and they are compelled to obey the same under penalty of removal or contempt of court. The clerk has no discretion to discriminate what orders of court should be obeyed and what ignored. (2 Bouv., 490.)
    Every court has inherent incidental authoñty to adopt such rules of, practice, and exercise such powers, as may be proper for the transaction of its business. (Duncan’s Heirs, do., v. United States, 7 Pet., 435; Wayman, &c., v. Southard, do., 10 Wheat., 1.)
    It was necessary for the clerk to furnish each juror or witness with a copy of the order to pay, with the certificate of the clerk and seal of the court attached, that the juror or witness could receive pay for attendance and travel from the United States marshal. The marshal could not pay without this evidence of the court’s order, and this evidence he demanded for his own protection as well as for the United States. (§§ 855 and 911, Rev. Stat.)' The certificate and seal are clearly authorized by the 8th and 14th clauses of section 828, Revised Statutes, and the necessity is fully proven.
    It is not reasonable that the service should be performed without compensation. As it is for the benefit of (the United States) it is reasonable that (the United States) should pay for it. (14 Blatchf., 225.) It is consonant with the principles of justice and equity that compensation for that service should be made according to a liberal view of the statute that applies to it rather than to deny it. The conclusion might be different if the officer were compensated in part by a salary, but he is not.
    
      “Where the words of a statute, prescribing compensation to a public officer, admit of two interpretations, they should be construed in favor of the officer.” (Morse v. United States, 4 0.01s. R., 141.)
    
      Mr. Felix Brannigan (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ho'ioard) for the defendants:
    1. It is not denied that the district judge had power to make the orders referred to. These orders appear to have been made with a view of guarding against irregular and improper practices. They must meet with approval, and are certainly not subject to be revoked or nullified by any other court.
    2. But it does not follow from this admission that any special fees accrued to the clerk of the court under either order of the court. Chapter 16, Title XIII, of the Revised Statutes, contains, in the most detailed manner, a statement of the compensation that shall be allowed to clerks and other officers of the courts of the United States. Section 823 says that “no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed.” The services for which the clerk now charges the United States are not specially provided for by name.
    3. If these services are, by any implication, to be regarded as being provided for in section 828, they must be considered as having relation to the clerk’s duty of “taxing costs,” so far at least as witnesses are concerned. Before the clerk can tax any bill of costs he must ascertain the amounts due the witnesses in the case. For taxing costs, making dockets and indexes, “ and all other services ” in a suit, not otherwise specially provided for in the bill, the clerk is entitled to a fee of $3, or $2, or $1, as the case may be.
    4. A fee is prescribed “for affixing the seal of the court to any instrument when required.” This excludes the right to a fee for affixing the seal of the court to any other instrument There is no order of court or law that required the clerk to affix a seal to any paper for which he now demands compensation. If Congress had intended that the clerk should have a special fee for such services as are now claimed, the fee or fees would have been specified.
    5. If the duty of ascertaining the amounts due jurors was formerly a part of the duty of the clerk in taxing costs, he cannot now claim compensation for being relieved of that duty by statute, in addition to his fee for taxing costs. The question of what the marshal or his deputy or clerk would or would not do in the matter of paying witnesses or jurors, is not pertinent to this suit. The main question is, as to whether under the clerk’s fee bill in section 828 of the Revised Statutes, the particular services of the clerk in the matter under consideration are or are not provided for by fees, in addition to the fee for taxing costs. Certainly the charge for the seal of court is excluded, as its use was not “required” by law nor by the order of court.
    6. No separate reports of attendance of jurors or witnesses were required by the last order of court; no copies of any report or order were required by that order; no certificates were required by the order of court; and it is only by implication that any entry on the minutes of the courts is required. But certainly the last order of court did not require a separate entry in the minutes in regard to the attendance of or the amount due each juror or witness.
    7. The accounting officers are required to administer the law in relation to the clerks’ fees according to the true intent of the fee bill, namely, that allowances shall not be made for unnecessary services, or for the multiplication of fees, in cases when by economical administration only one fee was necessary for the ends of justice.
    8. In regard to this economical administration of the fee-bill section, the accounting officers of the Treasury Department are expressly empowered by the statutes to supervise the charges of the officers and to overrule the action of tbe judge in such matters.
   Pee curiam :

The court is of the opinion that inasmuch as it is made the duty of Circuit and District Courts to determine whether a witness or a juror is entitled to be paid, and to make the necessary orders therefor (Rev. Stat.,4§ 855), those courts are necessarily invested with power and discretion to determine in what manner the facts shall be ascertained, and the form in which every order shall be made. It may be that in some instances a number of witnesses or jurors can be grouped in one report or in one order, and that in others they should be acted upon severally; and every court must determine for itself which course should be pursued.

But the court is also of the opiuiou that a marshal cannot prescribe the form of voucher upon which he will pay witnesses and jurors, and that that discretion is properly exercised by the authority which has power to pass upon his accounts, the Comptroller of the Treasury. The seal which was affixed to these vouchers was the seal of the court, and not the seal of the clerk. The seal of a court is affixed to writs and exemplifications, and authenticates the utterance of the court to persons beyond itself. The marshal, like the clerk, was an officer of the court, by law required to attend each sitting of the court (Rev. Stat., § 787), and in the eye of the law was equally cognizant of the orders of the court. For the court to exemplify its orders to its officers by its seal was to exemplify them to itself. If the Comptroller of the Treasury had prescribed an exemplified copy of every order under seal as the only voucher to be recognized by the accounting officers, the marshal would have been justified in demanding them and the clerk would have been entitled to remuneration for making them; but in the face of the very plain instructions given by the Comptroller it is not perceived that the marshal had the slightest authority to throw this additional labor upon the clerk or this additional expense upon the Government.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover for reports made to the district court and for unexemplified copies of orders furnished to the marshal the sum of $70.75.