Case ID: f-appx_710/html/0226-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM: \n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Jorge Roberto MORALES, Defendant-Appellant
    No. 17-10378 Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Filed January 30, 2018
    James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    Christopher Allen Curtis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, Stephen J. Green, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jorge Roberto Morales appeals following his guilty plea conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He first asserts, relying on Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (NFIB), that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it regulates conduct that falls outside the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. We have rejected such a challenge, explaining that NFIB “did not address the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and it did not express an intention to overrule the precedents upon which our cases — and numerous other cases in other circuits — relied in finding statutes such as § 922(g)(1) constitutional.” United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2013). We have consistently upheld § 922(g) as being “a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 145. Thus, as Morales acknowledges, Alcantar forecloses his argument.

Additionally, Morales contends, in reliance on Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 129 S.Ct. 1886, 173 L.Ed.2d 853 (2009), that his indictment should have been dismissed because it failed to allege that he knew that the firearm he possessed had at some point traveled in interstate commerce. Under United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1988), a § 922(g)(1) conviction “requires proof that the defendant knew that he had received (or possessed or transported) a firearm but does not require proof that he knqw that the firearm had an interstate nexus or that he was a felon.” United States v. Schmidt, 487 F.3d 253, 254 (5th Cir. 2007). We have determined that Dan-cy is still good law even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Flores-Figueroa, which addressed the mens rea element of a different statute. See United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 2009). In view of Rose, Morales’s contention is foreclosed, as he concedes.

Accordingly, Morales’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the judgment is AFFIRMED. 
      
      
         Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.