Case ID: f-appx_356/html/0079-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jose Lidio CABRAL-CABRAL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 05-75182.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Nov. 17, 2009.
    
    Filed Dec. 7, 2009.
    Alejandro Garcia, Law Offices of Alejandro Garcia, Commerce, CA, for Petitioner.
    CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Erika Johnson-Brooks, Esquire, Assistant U.S., USLA-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Lidio Cabral-Cabral, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for a § 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings, Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

Cabral-Cabral’s contention concerning the retroactive application of 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is foreclosed by Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 997-99 (9th Cir.2007). Cabral-Cabral’s contention that his conviction under California Penal Code § 288(a) is not a crime of violence is also foreclosed. Mejia, 499 F.3d at 999.

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary denial of Cabral-Cabral’s application for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Mejia, 499 F.3d at 999. Cabral-Cabral’s contention that the IJ violated his due process rights by disregarding his evidence of hardship to his wife and misapplying the law to the facts of his case is not supported by the record and does not amount to a colorable due process claim. See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005).

Cabral-Cabral’s due process rights were not violated by the admission of his probation officer’s report because the report was probative and its admission was not fundamentally unfair. See Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310-11 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that “[t]he sole test for admission of evidence [in a deportation proceeding] is whether the evidence is probative and its admission is fundamentally fair”); Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir.1975) (“Hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings, which need not strictly follow conventional evidence rules.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.