Case ID: f-appx_464/html/0035-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Rakeem FIGUEROA, aka Rawly, Defendant-Appellant, Rasheen Jones, aka Easy, Jamel Jordan, aka Jigga, Defendants.
    No. 10-3248.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    March 13, 2012.
    Katherine Alfieri, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Amy Busa, Celia A. Cohen, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, DENNY CHIN, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Rakeem Figueroa appeals from a 48-month sentence of imprisonment entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York following his conviction of multiple counts of distribution of cocaine base, in violation' of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

Figueroa argues that the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court miscalculated the amount of drugs attributable to him. The quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant is a question of fact which we review for clear error. See United States v. Richards, 302 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir.2002). “[I]f the evidence—direct or circumstantial—supports a district court’s preponderance determination as to drug quantity, we must sustain that finding.” United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 175 (2d Cir.2008). “[I]n reviewing a legal challenge to a quantity finding we are mindful of the Guidelines’ express instruction that where there has been no seizure of narcotics, or where the quantity seized does not reflect the true scale of the offense, a sentencing judge should approximate the relevant drug quantity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In making that approximation, “the court has broad discretion to consider all relevant information.” United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 215 (2d Cir.2002).

The district court’s finding that Figueroa was responsible for more than 50 grams of crack cocaine was not clearly erroneous. Through undercover drug buys, NYPD officers purchased from (or observed in the possession of) Figueroa and his co-conspirators only marginally less than 50 grams of crack. But in addition, Figueroa admitted at trial that he sold to customers other than the undercover officers, that he frequently purchased approximately 3.5 grams of crack at a time, and that he aimed to sell a significant amount of that per day. This was ample evidence to support the district court’s finding.

Figueroa also challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable. We will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (in banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Figueroa provides no reason why his substantially below-Guidelines sentence was excessive. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.2006) (“[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.”).

We have considered Figueroa’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.