Case ID: f-appx_599/html/0642-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

David Wayne KIEHLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles L. RYAN and Attorney General of the State of Arizona, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 12-16443.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted March 13, 2015.
    Filed March 24, 2015.
    Keith J. Hilzendeger, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Matthew Binford, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondent-Appel-lee.
    Before NOONAN, W. FLETCHER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

David Wayne Kiehle appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We affirm.

We review a district court’s denial of a habeas petition de novo. Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir.2010). We may grant relief if the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

1. Kiehle asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attorney’s failure to participate in supplemental closing argument. We decline to expand the certificate of appealability to encompass the uncertified issues raised in Kiehle’s opening brief because Kiehle has not made “ ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)).

2. Generally, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a petitioner must show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In United States v. Cronic, the Supreme Court held that prejudice may be presumed when.“the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” 466 U.S. 648, 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).

The Arizona Superior Court did not unreasonably conclude that Cronic “is inapplicable to this case.” No Supreme Court precedent supports finding a Cronic violation under the circumstances presented here: the trial court’s decision to permit supplemental closing argument presented Kiehle’s attorney with a difficult situation, but as the district court explained, Kiehle’s attorney “could have emphasized that the fingerprints were not David’s, could have sought to implicate B., could have suggested that an unknown party was in the house, or could have merely expounded on the standard of reasonable doubt.” The circumstances were such that a competent lawyer could provide effective assistance. Cf. id. at 660-61, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)).

3. Kiehle’s motion to supplement the district court record is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.