Case ID: ga_48/html/0292-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "*Trippe, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

T. W. Brunson, plaintiff in error, vs. John J. Grant et al., defendants in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. Sheriff’s Sale — Purchaser—Notice.—This Court having held in the case of Bailey v. Park — 22 Georgia Reports, 116 — that a sale of land by the sheriff under an execution for the purchase money, in favor of the vendor against the vendee, where the vendee has only a bond for titles, and the vendor has not filed and had recorded in the Clerk’s office a deed to his vendee for the land, before the levy is made, is illegal and void, and also reaffirmed the same principle in Harvill v. Lowe and Smith, 47 Georgia Reports, 214, and this case coming within that principle, and the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale being charged with notice, the Court erred in dismissing complainant’s bill for want of equity: Code, section 3604.
    2. Same — Same—Right to Reimbursement. — If the purchaser at such sale be a third party, and has paid the price bid by him, and the same has been applied towards the extinguishment of the vendee’s debt, he is entitled to be reimbursed out of the land to the extent of such payment of such debt.
    Sheriff’s sale. Bond for title. Lien. Execution. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. May Term, 1872.
    T. W. Brunson filed his bill against John J. Grant and S. C. Lindsay, making the following case:
    On June 5th, 1869, Grant sold to complainant a certain tract of land in Muscogee county for $2,500 00, complainant paying $1,500 00 in cash, and giving two notes for $500 00 each, the first payable on September 1st, 1870, and the second *on November 1st, following, Grant executing to complainant his bond, conditioned to make him a valid title to said property, on the payment of the aforesaid notes. When the notes became due, complainant was ready and willing to pay off and discharge them, if Grant would execute to him a title to said land in accordance with the condition of said bond, but Grant failing to comply with his contract, the notes were not paid. At the May term, 1871, of Muscogee Superior Court, Grant obtained judgment against complainant for the principal and interest due on said notes, and had an execution levied upon the aforesaid land, under which the same was sold on the first Tuesday in November, 1871, to S. C. Lindsay, for $1,400 00, who was informed as to all the facts aforesaid, and was combining with Grant to defraud complainant. The property was worth a much larger sum than that for which it was bid,off, but the public, knowing the title to the same to be still in Grant, would not pay the market value. On December 7th, 1871, the sheriff executed a deed to Lindsay, ejected complainant therefrom, and placed him in possession. In pursuance of said fraudulent combination, on January 6th, 1872, Grant executed a fee simple title conveying said land to Lindsay.
    Prayer, that on complainant’s paying to said Grant the $1,000 00, with interest, due on said notes, the deeds aforesaid be canceled, and Grant compelled by decree specifically to per-from the obligations assumed.in said bond; that Lindsay be decreed to account to complainant for the rents and profits of said land; that the writ of subpoena may issue.
    ■ The defendant moved the Court to dismiss said bill for want of equity. The motion was sustained, and complainant excepted.
    Cary J. Thornton, for plaintiff in error.
    Beandeord & CrawEord, for defendants.
    
      
      Vendor and Purchaser — Sheriff’s Sale — Purchase Money — Judgment — Sale—Bid.—“Where the vendor of land who retained the title obtained against the vendee a judgment for a balance of the purchase money, and had the land levied on and sold, under an execution issued upon such judgment without first filing and having recorded a deed conveying the land to the vendee, the sale was' void, and one who bid off the land could not be compelled to pay the amount of his bid and accept the sheriff’s deed to the property.” McCord v. McGinty, 99 Ga. 307, 25 S. E. Rep. 667, citing principal case. See also, Upchurch v. Lewis, 53 Ga. 624.
    
   *Trippe, Judge.

In Parks vs. Bailey, 22 Georgia, 116, which is just-such a case as this, except that there the vendor was the purchaser, it was held that such a sale was illegal and void. That was under the Act of 1847, which is identical so far as it applies to this case, as section 3604 of the Code. In that case the Court say: “We are not disposed to weaken by construction'this salutary law. By having the deed to the defendant made and recorded before the levy could be made, thirty days, at least, must elapse before a sale could be effected; and that purchasers would be inspired with confidence to bid for the' property from the publicity given to the fact that the title was in the defendant.”

The same decision was made in Harvill vs. Lowe, 47 Georgia Reports, 214, where the deed was filed a day or two before the sale, under said section of the Code. In those cases, the vendor was the purchaser. Here a third party was the purchaser. But that party is charged to have notice of all the facts alleged in the bill. In the case in 22 Georgia, a portion of the purchase money had been paid. In the other case, none had been paid. In this case there had been part payment. The section of the Code referred to makes no distinction on this account. Its provisions are general, and covers all cases of sales under judgments in favor of vendors for the purchase money. Section 3528 was intended to provide for cases where judgments were in favor of third parties, and where part of the purchase money had been paid. Then a levy could be made under such judgments, a sale had “of the entire interest stipulated in the bond,” and an equitable distribution of the money made. Before this, such creditors were compelled to resort to equity, making both vendor and vendee parties, in order to reach the interest, which was only equitable, of the vendee. The creditor could make no deed, nor compel ■one to be made short of chancery. This section was intended as a remedy for the long and expensive proceedings that would otherwise have been necessary. We consider the *decisions .referred to as settling the question involved in this case.

Of course if the purchaser has paid his bid, and it has been appropriated to the payment of the debt due by complainant to his vendor, he is entitled to be reimbursed, and he should' be protected to that extent in any decree that may be rendered.

Judgment reversed.