Case ID: f-appx_699/html/0743-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Malik Dil AWAN, AKA Dil Muhammad, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-72929
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    Filed October 30, 2017
    Garish Sann, Esquire, Attorney, Law Offices of Garish Sarin, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner
    Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Virginia Lum, Attorney, OIL, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Malik Dil Awan, a native and citizen of Pakistan, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial' of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Awan’s motion to reopen, based on lack of notice, where Awan was personally served with two prior hearing notices containing his address of record, filed a letter with the court indicating he would be leaving the country prior to his hearing date, and timely appealed the immigration judge’s in absentia order. See Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (BIA does not abuse its discretion unless it acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); cf. Khan v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 2004) (actual notice is sufficient to meet due process requirements). Based on the evidence in this case, Awan has not shown that the BIA erred in determining his statement in support of the motion to reopen was inherently unbelievable. See Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-79 (9th Cir. 2011).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.