Case ID: f-appx_378/html/0099-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Francis ANDERSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. FRAYNE, Jill Rosario, Suzanne Ducate, Defendants-Appellees, T. Lantz, Defendant.
    No. 09-3339-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 25, 2010.
    Francis Anderson, Somers, CT, pro se.
    Ann E. Lynch, Assistant Attorney General (Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General, on the brief), Hartford, CT, for Appel-lee.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES and ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges, J. GARVAN MURTHA, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable J. Garvan Murtha, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Francis Anderson, pro se, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues raised on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We ask whether the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we “resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the record reveals that the District Court properly found that Anderson had submitted insufficient evidence to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. We therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants for substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s order.

We have considered all of Anderson’s arguments on appeal and have determined that they are meritless.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s July 16, 2009 judgment is AFFIRMED. Anderson’s motion regarding “imminent danger,” which we construe as seeking injunctive relief pending appeal, is DENIED as moot. His motion for appointment of counsel is likewise DENIED as moot.