Case ID: f-appx_19/html/0149-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John P. KIM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louis CALDERA, Secretary of the Army, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 01-1097.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 31, 2001.
    Decided Oct. 1, 2001.
    Thomas J. Gagliardo, Silver Spring, MD, for appellant. Kenneth E. Melson, United States Attorney, Mark David Maxwell, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, VA, for appellee.
    Before WILKINS, TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

John P. Kim appeals the district court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to dismiss and dismissing with prejudice Kim’s employment discrimination action alleging retaliation. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the joint appendix, and the distinct court’s reasoning stated from the bench and find no reversible error. We agree with the district court that Kim suffered no adverse employment action and, therefore, failed to state a prima facie case of retaliation. See Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 863, 866 (4th Cir.2001); Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir.1981) (en banc). Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Kim v. Caldera, No. CA-00-1531-A (E.D. Va. filed Dec. 15, 2000; entered Dec. 18, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Where, as in this case, the district court considered matters outside the pleadings, it should have treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998). Because Kim had ample notice of a possible conversion and because Rule 12(b)(6) does not impose on the district court "an obligation to notify parties of the obvious," id. at 261, we find that any error in the court’s characterization of Appellee’s motion as a motion to dismiss was harmless error.