Case ID: f-appx_586/html/0453-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael Randal WARZEK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Frank X. CHAVEZ, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 13-16335.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 8, 2014.
    
    Filed Dec. 11, 2014.
    Arthur Guilford Dudley, Jr., Page & Dudley, Santa Cruz, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    David Rose, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: RAWLINSON and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and NAVARRO, Chief District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Gloria M. Navarro, Chief United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Michael Warzek appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and affirm.

We reject Warzek’s argument that the trial court’s admission of evidence related to his possession of child pornography violated his federal due process rights. Because the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the admission of propensity evidence violates due process, see Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866-67 (9th Cir.2006), the trial court’s admission of the pornographic images cannot amount to an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, see Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126, 128 S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008).

We likewise reject Warzek’s claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing the government to cross-examine him about the child pornography found on his personal computer. It was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the prosecutor’s questions were “reasonably related” to Warzek’s direct examination, where he categorically denied committing any sexual offense against the victim. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 759, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000).

Warzek’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim likewise fails because he cannot show that he is entitled to relief given the deference to Strickland claims reviewed under AEDPA. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). The state court of appeal held that “since all of the challenged questions related to the computer expert’s investigation and testimony, trial counsel could reasonably have failed to object because he held no doubt that the prosecutor” was permitted to ask the questions under state law. Because this court must deny relief if “there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” the state court’s stated rationale supports affirming the district court’s denial of War-zek’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.