Case ID: nys_3/html/0608-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Barker, P. J., (after stating the facts as above.)\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Gould v. Gould.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department.
    
    January 11, 1889.)
    1. Trusts—Resulting Trusts—Conveyance to Third Person.
    Under 1 Rev. St. N. Y. p. 788, § 51, providing that no trust shall result in favor of the person paying the consideration when the title is taken in the name of another, where a husband causes the title to land purchased by him to be taken in-the name of' his wife, without fraud on her part, the beneficial interest vests in her; and her oral promise to convey to the husband when he shall so desire, whether made before ■ or after the taking of the deed, is not binding.
    3. Same—Improvements—Liability of Grantee.
    When, after the conveyance, the husband leased the land, he cannot recover, for improvements made thereon without any promise on the wife’s part to reimburse - him.
    Appeal from special term, Monroe county.
    Action by Bufus Gould against Harriet A. Gould. Plaintiff appeals from, a judgment entered on a decision dismissing his complaint upon the merits. The respondent is the wife of the appellant, and their marriage was prior-to the transactions involved .in this action. The object of the suit is to compel the respondent to convey to the appellant the title to certain premises, conveyed to her by a third party, the consideration money being paid in advance by the appellant. It is stated in the complaint that the premises ■ were conveyed to the defendant with the consent of the plaintiff, who bases, his demand for relief upon the fact asserted by him that at that time, and subsequently, his wife made an oral promise to convey the premises to him whenever he should request it. All the evidence as to what the transaction, in fact was, and the circumstances connected with it, is in the plaintiff’s own evidence, who testified, substantially, that at the time the deed was-made out and delivered he had a talk with his wife, and the language which lie used in giving his testimony is as follows, viz.: “I had a little talk before■ I went up to get the papers made out, in regard to the title. I said I could. have it made out in her name, and of course she would convey it to me at anytime. She was present. * * * I paid the other $40 the day the papers were made out. It was my money. * * * Question. What was said by your wife on the subject of conveying the property to you afterwards? Answer. She agreed at different times to deed it to me. Q. What was said at the time the deed was made to her? A. I don’t think there was a word mentioned to anybody, in any shape, or any manner, in the squire’s office, at the time the deed was made to her. We had a talk before we started to go over there. Q. What talk did you have with your wife before the deed was made about having the property deeded back to you some time? A. I said you can have the papers drawn to you, and you will make it to me any time. She was satisfied. She said: ‘ Yes; all right.’” The full consideration for the premises was $500. After the conveyance was made to the defendant, they were leased and managed by the plaintiff, and he testified that he improved the property by erecting buildings thereon at the cost of $2,000. In 1881 the parties separated, and have not lived together since. Upon this evidence the plaintiff rested, and on the defendant’s motion the plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed, with costs.
    Argued before Barker, P. J., and Bradley and Dwight, JJ.
    
      William, B. Edmonds, for appellant. Raines Bros., for respondent.
   Barker, P. J., (after stating the facts as above.)

The plaintiff admits in his complaint, as he also states in his evidence, that the premises were deeded to his wife with his consent. This vested in her the fee-simple to the land, although her husband paid the grantor the consideration money. Ho resulting trust arises out of the transaction in his favor. The rule of the common law has been abrogated by our statute relative to uses and trusts, which declares: “Where a grant for a valuable consideration shall be made to one person, and the consideration therefor shall be paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the person by whom such payment shall be made, but. the title shall vest in the person named as alienee in such conveyance. ” 1 Rev - St. § 51, p. 728. It is not asserted by the plaintiff that his wife violated any trust in procuring the deed, or in any manner deceived or defrauded him ire the transaction, so as to make a case within the exception to the provisions, of the said section, as provided in section 53. Garfield v. Hatmaker, 15 N. Y. 475; Everett v. Everett, 48 N. Y. 218; Norton v. Stone, 8 Paige, 222. The plaintiff voluntarily made improvements on the land without exacting any promise from his wife that she would reimburse him for the outlay which he made. As between themselves, the legal rights of the wife are precisely the same as if her husband had owned the premises when the improvements to the property were made, and he had afterwards voluntarily caused the title to be conveyed to her as a gratuity for her support and maintenance. The promise of the wife to reconvey the premises to her husband is not binding on her, either in law or in equity. Any attempt to enforce the promise by judicial decree would be in defiance of the provisions of the statute of frauds. Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur.