Case ID: f-appx_271/html/0545-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Bradley ORNES, Suing as Bradley William Ornes, Appellant, v. Jeffrey R. EDBLAD, Sued as Jeffrey Ed-blad Isanti County Attorney; Susan A. LaBore, Isanti County Court Administrator; Thad N. Tudor, Assistant Isan-ti County Attorney (Prosecutor), Ap-pellees.
    No. 07-1872.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
    Submitted: March 26, 2008.
    Filed: April 3, 2008.
    Patrick Chinedu Nwaneri, Nwaneri & Associates, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant.
    Before MURPHY, COLLOTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Bradley Ornes filed motions for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction and a complaint alleging a violation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ornes sought declaratory and in-junctive relief related to his imminent state-court sentencing on criminal charges to which he had pleaded guilty. He asserted, among other things, that his change-of-plea hearing in state court violated the Supreme Court’s ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), that he was being denied his right to a jury trial on aggravating sentencing factors, and that the prosecutors’ failure to notify the state court of the constitutional defects amounted to bad-faith prosecution. The district court denied relief and dismissed the complaint, stating that Ornes had failed to show under Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 84-85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971), that his criminal case was one of “proven harassment” or bad-faith prosecution. Ornes appeals, noting that he has been sentenced based on the aggravating factors.

We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Ornes’s TRO motion, see Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110, 112-13 (8th Cir.1994), and because Ornes has already been sentenced, his request for preliminary injunc-tive relief is moot.

We conclude that dismissal was appropriate under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), which provides that federal courts should abstain from hearing cases when there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests, and when that proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions presented. See Norwood v. Dickey, 409 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir.2005). The propriety of Ornes’s plea and sentencing are issues that should be resolved by state tribunals, subject to review by certiorari or appeal in the Supreme Court, or on federal habeas corpus after exhaustion. See Perez, 401 U.S. at 84-85, 91 S.Ct. 674 (federal interference with state prosecution is improper; state defendant may present federal constitutional claims to state courts in manner permitted in that state; federal injunctive relief is appropriate only in cases of proven harassment or bad-faith prosecution, or in extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown); Bressman v. Farrier; 900 F.2d 1305, 1306 (8th Cir. 1990) (proper vehicle for state prisoner who is attacking length of his confinement is petition for writ of habeas corpus, which requires exhaustion of state remedies).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
      
      . The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.