Case ID: f-appx_93/html/0495-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Salima RASSOULL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAXIMUS, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 03-1756.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Jan. 28, 2004.
    Decided March 17, 2004.
    
      J.P. Szymkowicz, John T. Szymkowicz, Szymkowicz & Szymkowicz, L.L.P., Washington, DC, for Appellant. Walter H. Ryland, Monica McCarroll, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Salima Rassoull appeals a jury verdict finding that Maximus, Inc.’s interception of a telephone conversation from fellow Maxi-mus employee Karen Reddon did not violate the Electronic Communications Privacy Act., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(d)(2) (2000); see 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (providing private right of action).

Rassoull first contends that the district court erred by failing to issue jury instructions and verdict forms explaining that the affirmative defense of consent could be invalidated if the defendant intercepted the call for a criminal or tortious purpose. Because Rassoull failed to object at trial, her claim is reviewed for plain error on appeal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 590-91 n. 2 (4th Cir.1985). Because Rassoull has failed to show that she presented an evidentiary foundation sufficient to support the jury instruction requested, we find no error. See United States v. Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1131 (4th Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849 (4th Cir.1996); see also In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir.2003).

Rassoull also contends that both she and Reddon only consented to the interception of business calls. However, viewed in the light most favorable to Maxi-mus, the evidence permitted reasonable jurors to determine that Reddon consented to the interception of the call. Accordingly, we find no basis upon which to overturn the jury’s verdict. Simmons v. Bell Telephone Co., 611 F.2d 342 (10th Cir.1979); Coates v. Daugherty, 973 F.2d 290, 293 (4th Cir.1992).

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Because Reddon called Rassoull from a Maximus phone, it is Reddon's consent to interception that is at issue. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(d)(2) (interception is not unlawful where either party to the call consents to interception).
     
      
      . To the extent Rassoull raises any argument about applicability of the business extension exception to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, such argument is misplaced because the jury's verdict did not address this exception.