Case ID: sw_230/html/0408-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J. HAWKINS, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

GUYON v. STATE.
    (No. 6182.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 6, 1921.
    Rehearing Denied May 11, 1921.)
    1. Robbery <&wkey;I7(5) — Indictment sufficient though it named special owner.
    Under Code Cr. Proe. 1911, art. 457, an indictment for robbery which named a special owner in possession is sufficient; consequently, though money stolen from a bank belonged to the corporate bank, the indictment is sufficient where an employee of the bank who was special custodian and had a special property therein was named as owner.
    2. Robbery <&wkey;>4 — Rules as' to allegation and proof of ownership not more restrictive than those pertaining to theft.
    The rules with reference to the allegation and proof of ownership in the offense of robbery are not more restrictive than those pertaining to the offense of theft.
    3. Robbery <&wkey;24(4) — Evidence held to show that person named as owner had special property.
    In a prosecution for bank robbery, where a bank employee was named as owner, evidence held to establish that he had a special property, being custodian of the funds.
    4. Robbery &wkey;>8, 27(5) — Although custodian of bank funds opened vault under threats, offense is still robbery, and charge on lesser degrees unnecessary.
    Where defendant, who was armed with a pistol, by threats forced the custodian of bank funds to open the vault, the fact of the custodian’s consent does not change the offense from robbery, and a charge on lesser degrees is unnecessary.
    5. Jury <&wkey;110(5)— Disqualification of juror waived by urging objection to dismissal of juror.
    In a prosecution for bank robbery, where a venireman stated that he had an opinion and was a director of the bank robbed, whereupon the district attorney asked that such juror be excused, and defendant’s counsel objected on the ground that the indictment named another as owner, and that the record did not disclose any interest of the bank which would disqualify the juror, defendant cannot be granted a new trial because such person served as juror, though the evidence showed that the funds stolen belonged to the bank, for he waived any disqualification.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    6. Robbery &wkey;?26 — Failure to submit question of ownership not error.
    In a prosecution for robbery, where the indictment laid ownership in one having cus.toay of the property, the failure 'to submit the question of ownership held not error; the undisputed evidence establishing the same.
    7. Criminal law <&wkey;800(2) — Failure of charge to define “money” not error.
    In a prosecution for robbery, where the indictment alleged that the property stolen was money, and the evidence showed it was $20, $10, and $5 bills, it was unnecessary for the court in its charge to define money for the term money must be presumed lawful money of the United States.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other,.definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst and Second Series, Money.]
    Appeal from District Court, Uvalde County; Joseph Jones, Judge.
    P. Guyon was convicted of robbery, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    L. Old, of Uvalde, for appellant.
    R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of robbery. Punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of 10 years.

In the indictment Lawrence Little is named as owner. Little was an employee of the Uvalde State Bank, a coporation, one Brashear was the cashier, and McNally the president. Little and Brashear, the cashier, usually reached the bank in the morning at about the same hour. They both, as well as the president, knew the combination to the vault and the safe in which the bank’s money was kept. The one first arriving would open the vault and arrange the affairs of the bank for the conduct of business. On the day the offense was committed Brashear was absent from town. Little went to the bank at his. usual time and found there the janitor, one Anderson. Soon after his arrival the appellant entered wearing a suit of overalls and a false face and carrying a pistol in his hand. By threats he caused Little to open the vault and the safe and to take therefrom the sum of over $6,000 in currency, which was delivered to the appellant. These facts were not controverted, but appellant insists that, inasmuch as the money taken was the property of the bank, there is a variance between the proof and the averment of ownership. The fact that the property belonged to the corporation did not render it necessary that it should be named in the indictment as the owner. Price v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 160, 115 S. W. 586; Ricks v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 677, 56 S. W. 928; Thurmond v. State, 30 Tex. App. 539, 17 S. W. 1098. Naming the special owner in possession would comply with the request of the law. Article 457, Code of Crim. Procedure; Otero v. State, 30 Tex. App. 450, 17 S. W. 1081; Bailey v. State, 20 Tex. App. 68; Alexander v. State, 24 Tex. App. 126, 5 S. W. 840. Branch’s Ann. Tex. Penal Code, §§ 2440 and 2477.

The rules with reference to the allegation and proof of ownership in the offense of robbery are not more restrictive than those pertaining to the offense of theft. Ruling Case Law, vol. 23, p. 1154, § 20, and notes.

Appellant Insists, however that under the evidence Little was a mere custodian or servant and therefore was not a special owner within the meaning of the law. The relation of Little to the personal property in the hank was disclosed by the evidence without conflict. McNally, the president, testified that he had supervision of the bank and was there practically every day; that both Brashear, the cashier, and Little were compensated with a salary; that Brashear ordinarily had the management of the bank’s affairs under the supervision of a board of directors and the president. Little kept the books and was head man in the absence of Brashear. Mc-Nally said that his principal work was to advise the cashier regarding loans and extensions, and that, in the absence of Brashear, Little’s authority was the same as th.e cashier. Little was assistant cashier. The cashier, according to the evidence, had authority to lend the bank’s funds. Little, in conducting the business, made loans. At the time the offense was committed there was no officer of the bank present save Little, and no other employee save the janitor. Its funds, after the safe was opened, was taken out- of the safe by Little. That Little was a special owner of the property and in possession of it at the time of the robbery under the evidence is not, we think, a matter of doubt. Bagley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 167; Branch’s Texas Crim. Law, § 781; State v. Carrol, 214 Mo. 392, 113 S. W. 1051, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 312, and note.

The evidence is not controverted that Little was caused to open the vault and safe and to deliver the money in obedience to the command of the appellant by 'holding in his hand a loaded pistol in a manner manifesting an intent and ability to enforce his demand by the use of the weapon. It is also in evidence, without conflict, that Little complied because he was put in fear of his-life by the acts of the appellant.

We discern no reason for charging on the lower grades of offenses. The evidence all pointed to the offense of robbery. The consent of Little to the delivery does charge the nature of the offense. Wharton’s Crim. Law, vol. 2, § 1091; Brown v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 334, 136 S. W. 265; Green v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 446, 147 S. W. 593.

The contention that the indictment is duplicitous in that it charges robbery by assault and by the use of firearms is one that this court sanctioned in the case of Murdock v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 263, 106 S. W. 374, but from which it later receded. Crouch v. State, 219 S. W. 1099, and cases therein cited.

One of the jurors on the special venire list on his voir dire stated that he had an opinion touching the merits of the case, and also that he was a director of the First State Bank of Uvalde. The district attorney thereupon asked that he be excused. The court assented, and appellant’s attorney interposed an objection stating that the indictment named Little as the owner, and the record did not disclose any such interest of the First State Bank as would disqualify the juror, whereupon the court withdrew the dismissal of the juror, and he was taken as a juror, the appellant, at the time, having unused peremptory .challenges. Upon these facts and the development in the evidence of the interest of the First State Bank in the money taken, the appellant, after verdict, sought a new trial because of the disqualification of the juror. The funds of the bank were recovered. If the juror was disqualified, the appellant had power to waive it. His waiver was affirmative, and appellant at the time was conscious of the fact that the money taken was the property of the First State Bank of Uvalde; that the vault and safe which he forced the officer to open belonged to the bank, and he was afforded the right to challenge the juror for cause, and had available peremptory challenges by means of which juror service upon the jury could have been avoided. By his conduct he willfully abandoned a known privilege, and after the verdict is not in a position, by reasserting it, to annul the result of the trial. The court was right in refusing to sustain this ground on the motion for a new trial. In a very recent case we have reviewed the subject of a waiver of the disqualification of a juror, and there will be found in the reasons given the citation of precedents and references to statutes contained in the opinion of Judge Láttünore in the case of Lowe v. State, 226 S. W. 675, all and more than will be demanded in the disposition of the point raised upon the present occasion.

There is no error revealed.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant has filed motion for rehearing in which he vigorously contends that we were in error in holding Little to have been the special owner of the bank’s property at the time of the robbery. We did not set out the testimony in full on the subject in the original opinion, but reached the conclusion that there was no merit in appellant’s contention.

Little was assistant cashier. In the absence of Brashear, the cashier, he performed all the duties of the cashier. Brashear was out of the city at the time of the robbery, and had been for two or three days. McNally, the president of the bank was in the city, but not in the bank, when the robbery occurred. Counsel for appellant lays stress on the fact that the evidence disclosed that Little was a “salaried” man; and therefore a servant of the bank, and special ownership could not therefore be álleged in him.

All officers of banks are salaried men, from the president down, and, in the sense that they are subject to the will of the directors, are servants of the bank; but, being a corpo-' ration, the bank can act only through its officers. Little in this case was one of the officers through whom the bank acted. We are referred to Hasley v. State, 222 S. W. 597, and, counsel quotes from, the opinion the following:

“Mr. Gibbs was simply a servant, with the custody of the property, under the supervision of Spence, and there was no evidence to support any other theory.”

Then he urges that, if Judge Lattimore was right in that opinion, then the court is wrong in the former opinion in this case. We believe the Hasley opinion is right, but do not agree with counsel that it must necessarily follow that the present one is wrong. In the Hasley opinion the very paragraph succeeding the one from which the above quotation is taken reads:

“Care, control, and management are not necessarily exclusive in one person, but may be joint in several, within the comprehension of our law of theft; and, unless the evidence raises the issue of exclusive care, control, and managment in some person other than the one named as the owner in the indictment, it is not necessary to present such issue to the jury.”

In view of the insistence of counsel for appellant upon this issue, we have again carefully examined the evidence, and believe we are justified in reaching the conclusion that the money of the bank was in the joint control, care, and management of the president, cashier, and assistant cashier, and that ownership could properly be alleged in the assistant cashier. Especially is this true where he was the only officer of the bank present at the time of the robbery. There was no such exclusive control, care, and management of the president, McNally, as made it necessary to aver ownership in him to the exclusion of the other officers; and the fact that he may have exercised general supervision under the direction of the board of directors would not change the rule.

Appellant contends the testimony raised an issue as to whether Little was in actual control, care, and management of the money, and that the trial judge committed an error in failing to submit such issue to the jury. If the issue was fairly raised, it ought to have been submitted. We cannot agree with the contention that it was raised. When the whole evidence is considered, it clearly reflects Little’s relation to the money, leaves no disputed ground, and, fairly construed, raises no .such issue; and we believe the court would have been wholly unwarranted in submitting it. What we have said above applies with equal cogency to the contention that the court ought to have submitted the question as to whether Little was a mere servant of the bank.

Appellant complains because we did not discuss his assignment of error to the court’s failure in his charge to define “money.” It has been held in many cases that it was sufficient description of the property stolen simply to say it was “money.” We do not take the time to cite the many cases, but some of them will be found collated under section 619, Branch’s Grim. Laws. It has also been decided in many cases that an allegation that property was “money” will be held to mean the money of the United States. The evidence in the instant case describes the property as $20, $10, and $5 bills, and repeatedly refers to the same as “money.” If it is sufficient to describe the property as “money,” and if that means United States money, and the evidence follows the description, and the property is continually referred to as “money,” the averments in the indictment are sufficiently met by the proof. Some of the cases cited by counsel for appellant in his brief on this point have been expressly overruled, and others by a general statement that all cases in conflict with the following are overruled: Berry v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 420, 80 S. W. 630; Ferrell v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 487, 152 S. W. 901; Sparks v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 154, 177 S. W. 968. It was not necessary for the court to define the term “money.” The confusion formerly existing upon this point we regard as settled by the overruling cases last above cited.

Being unable to agree with counsel’s contentions that our former opinion is erroneous, the motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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