Case ID: mass_18/html/0477-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The Inhabitants of Shelburne versus The Inhabitants of Rochester.
    A letter from the overseers of the poor of one town to those of another, to obtain a .reimbursement of the expenses of supporting a pauper, was received and answered. A mistake in this letter was corrected in a second letter, which was received hut not answered, referring to the first. Held, that the second, which by itself was an insufficient notice, might be taken in connection with the first, so as to constitute a sufficient notice from the time when the second was received.
    A notice respecting a pauper whose Christian name was Sally, calling her Sarah or Sally was held tobe sufficient.
    Assumpsit to recover for expenses incurred by the town of Shelburne, from October, 1820, until May, 1821, for the relief of Sally Reed, a pauper,whose settlement was admitted, for the purposes of the trial, to be in Rochester.
    The St. 1793, c. 59, § 9, upon which this action was brought, provides that it shall be the duty of overseers of the poor, in then respective towns, to provide for the immediate relief of persons residing or found therein, not belonging thereto, but having lawful settlements in other towns, when they'fall into distress and stand in need of immediate relief; the expenses whereof, incurred within three months next before notice given to the town to be charged, may be sued for, &c.
    The only question in this case was, whether such notice had been given to the overseers of the poor of Rochester, as to render that town liable for the expenses incurred by the town of Shelburne.
    ^ _ On the 30th of October, 1820, the overseers of Shelburne wrote to the overseers of Rochester, as follows : “ We some weeks since notified you respecting Mary Reed, an inhabitant of your town, who has become chargeable in Shelburne in consequence of sickness, but have not yet received any return. She still continues feeble and unable to provide for herself We, therefore, request you to settle the expense which has already been made, and take such measures for her remov&c.
    To this letter the overseers of Rochester returned the fol lowing answer, dated (he 22d of December, 1820. “Your letter of the 30th October came to hand the 10th November, which informs us that Mary Reed has become chargeable in your town, and requesting payment for past charges and pr*> vision for her future support, which we refuse to grant, as wn do • not consider the town of Rochester is the place of btiir inhabitancy.”
    The overseers of Shelburne wrote another letter to the overseers of Rochester, dated the 15th of January, 1821, as follows : “We find it necessary to correct our mistake by informing you that it is Sarah or Sally Reed, and not Mary, who is on expense in this town. She came from Abington to this place, and has been supported for some time past at two dollars per week, exclusive of doctoring, which we have and shall continue to charge to the town of Rochester till she is otherwise provided for.”
    This letter was received on the 3d of March, 1821, by the overseers of Rochester, who returned no answer.
    It was agreed that, if these letters constituted a sufficient notice, the defendants should be defaulted and judgment entered for a sum fixed by the parties ; but if not, that the plaintiffs should become nonsuit.
    
      Mills and Grennell, for the plaintiffs.
    The two letters from the overseers of Shelburne, taken together, comprise all the facts material to be stated in such a case, and constitute a sufficient and legal notice, binding upon the town of Rochester from the date of the second letter. Dalton v. Hinsdale, 6 Mass. Rep. 501; Quincy v. Braintree, 5 Mass. Rep. 86. It is not necessary that the entire notice should be on one piece of paper. It is a common practice to refer to other papers in the most formal written instruments. A letter referring to another writing not signed is a good contract in writing under the statute of frauds, and the writing referred to makes a part of the contract. Tawney v. Crowther, 3 Bro. C. C. 318. The first letter contains all the material facts, the second corrects the mistake in the pauper’s Christian name, by describing it to be Sarah or Sally, which are the same. In Embden v. Augusta, 12 Mass. Rep. 307, notice that the “ family of J. S.” had become chargeable, was considered by the Court to be too general. So, in Shutesbury v. Oxford, 16 Mass. Rep. 102, notice that “ D. R. and his family ” had become chargeable, was considered to be defective on the same ground. The notice in the present case is not liable to this objection. The second letter constitutes of itself a sufficient notice, since all the facts which need be communicated are either expressly stated, or obviously and necessarily to be inferred from it. The statute does not require a request of removal in order to support this action.
    
      Lyman and Forbes, for the defendants.
    If the plaintiffs had sent only the first letter, the notice would plainly have been defective, since that letter describes the pauper, to whom relief was given, to be Mary Reed, whereas the action is brought to recover for expenses incurred for the support of Sally Reed. The first notice being defective, the second letter must be considered as an original notice, and, being so considered, it is insufficient, because it does not state that the pauper is in need of immediate relief, nor that her settlement is in Rochester, nor does it require her removal. The notice required by the 9th section is subsequently defined in the 12th, which requires that it should be m writing, and that it should request a removal of the pauper. This section provides that the overseers shall send a u ritten notification ; it does not say written notifications. Two defective notices cannot be coupled to make one sufficient notice. Jacob v. Marsh, Barnes, (3d ed.) 297 ; Swaile v. Leaver, ibid. 299 ; King v. King, 2 Lill. Pr. Reg. 240. To hold that a subsequent notice may remedy a defect in a preceding one would occasion confusion, uncertainty and difficu^y t0 the overseers in the discharge of their duties, since it supposes the overseers for the time being to have knowledge of all the notices previously given, not only to themselves, but also to their predecessors in office.
    But the two letters taken together do not constitute a sufficient notice. The second letter describes the pauper to be Sarah or Sally Reed, and must mean that she has two Christian names, (which she cannot have ; Evans v. King, Willes, 654,) or that she has one of these two, but which one the overseers do not know. The same precision ought to be required as to the Christian name and surname, but a notice that Sarah Reea or Sally Stiles had become chargeable, would doubtless be defective. If Sarah or Sally be considered as one name, the evidence does not support the declaration ; in which the pauper is described as Sally, not as Sarah or Sally. Scott v Soans, 3 East, 111.
   Parker C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court. There is no question except whether the notice sent to the overseers of Rochester is sufficiently particular in its statement to bind that town. That they had notice in fact cannot be doubted ; the first letter informs them that a woman, by the name of Reed, whose settlement is in their town, had been supported at the expense of Shelburne. The mistake of the Christian name gave them a right to refuse to answer the charge, though it can hardly be doubted, that they were aware of" their liability except for this mistake. The letter of January 15th, connected with the information previously given, contains a perfect statement of all which it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to disclose, and we can see no good reason why they should not be considered together, the first having been received and answered, and the presumption of law being, that it remained in possession of the overseers of Rochester when the second letter was received. The second letter plainly refers to the first, and the silence of Rochester, after the receipt of the second, is strong evidence that they had no defence to make to the application. The agreed fact, that the settlement of the pauper is in Rochester, furnishes the reason of their answering the first letter, and de dining to answer the second.

The objection, therefore, must be merely a technical one, of which to be sure the defendants have a right to avail themselves, if the law is with them ; but we cannot think it is. It is said the notice must be one entire thing, and cannot be made out from several independent facts, each of which taken by itself would be insufficient; but it is not easy to perceive why, if all the facts necessary to constitute legal notice are severally communicated, before a suit is commenced, it should be considered nugatory, merely because they came to the knowledge of the party to be charged at different times, he having the whole before him at the time his duty to act upon them commences. An agent is bound by his instructions, although he may receive them by successive communications, on the ground that they are all before him when he is bound to act. The two letters being supposed to be both before the overseers of Rochester, and containing together every fact necessary to be known, it would be an undue preference of form to substance, to allow the objection which is made on this account.

It was objected, however, that even if all the facts contained in both letters were comprised in the last, there is still a defective notice, as the Christian name of the pauper is put in the alternative, Sarah or Sally ; but although this gave occasion for an ingenious argument, the objection is not a sound one. Even if these were two names, there was sufficient in the letter to put the defendants upon an examination of the facts. 
      
      
        Bangor v. Deer Isle, 1 Greenl. 329; York v. Penobscot, 2 Greenl. 1; Dover v. Paris, 5 Greenl. 430; Chichester v. Pembroke, 2 N. Hamp. R. 530; Ware v. Williamstown, 8 Pick. 388; Lanesborough v. New Ashford, 5 Pick. 190; Walpole v. Hopkinton, 4 Pick. 358; Orange v. Sudbury, 10 Pick. 22; Uxbridge v Seekonk, ibid. 150.