Case ID: conn_3/html/0467-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Hosmer, Ch. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The town of Columbia against Williams and another.
    
      “ A slave set at liberty, ” within the meaning of the statute, tit, 150. c. l.s.ll., is one placed in a permanent condition of freedom, over whom the right of the master is extinguished.
    
      October 28.
    The town to which a slave “ belongs,” within the meaning of the statute, tit. 150. c. 1. s. 11., is that alone in which he has a legal settlement; the object of the statute being to furnish a remedy, in favour of the corporate body, already liable, by the law of settlements, for the maintenance of the slave, against the individual, or individuals, on whom the expense ought, ultimately, to devolve.
    THIS was an action of assumpsit, to recover of the defendants, as heirs of William Williams, Esq. late of Groton, deceased, the sum of 205 dollars, 56 cents, for necessary supplies furnished to Adam, a negro slave of said William Williams, Esq. The declaration stated, “ That in the town of Columbia, on the 6th of July, 1817, one Adam, a negro slave of William Williams, Esq. late of Groton, deceased, by the providence of God, became sick and unable to take care of himself, and the heirs, executors and administrators of said deceased, neglecting and refusing to relieve the said Adam, to save him from perishing, the select-men of said town of Columbia, as it was by law in such case their duty to do, did, between the said 6th day of July, 1817, and the 17th day of January, 1819, in meatf drink, nursing, medicine, &c. lay out, advance, and expend the sum of 205 dollars, 56 cents, of which the plaintiffs, this day, gave the defendants due notice, at Groton aforesaid : And the defendants, on the 4th day of Mareh, 1819, became and were liable by law, as heirs of said William Williams, Esq. having received from him a large and plentiful real and other estate, to pay the plaintiffs said sum of 205 dollars, 56 ceñís ; and being so liable, the defendants did then and there, in consideration thereof, assume upon themselves, undertake, and to the plaintiffs faithfully promise, to pay them said sum of 205 dollars, 56 cents, on demand.”
    
      Windham,
    
    The plaintiffs having introduced evidence to prove, that the defendants were the sons of William Williams, and the grandsons of William Williams, Esq. mentioned in the declaration ; that the latter person lived and died in Groton, possessed of a large estate, real and personal, and was master of the slave Adam ; that be died before the father of the defendants; but that both died before the cause of action, in this case, accrued ; and the expenditure by the plaintiffs, for the necessary support of Adam, being admitted ; to prove, that the defendants were in possession of a large estate, which came from their grand-father, the plaintiffs offered in evidence, copies of two deeds of gift of certain lands lying in Groton, one from the grand-father to the father of the defendants, and the other from their father to them. To the admission of these documents in evidence, the defendants objected ; but the judge admitted them.
    The defendants claimed, that although the plaintiffs should have proved all the facts stated in their declaration, they could not recover, without proof of an express promise ; and prayed the judge so to instruct the jury. But the judge refused to give such instruction, and instructed the jury, that upon proof of the facts stated in the declaration, the law would imply a promise to pay.
    The defendants claimed, that it was proved, that Adam was settled in the town of Groton with his master, and contended, that this action would not lie in favour of the town of Columbia, against the defendants, but if the defendants were liable at all, they would be liable to the town of Groton. On this point, the judge instructed the jury against the claim of the defendants.
    The plaintiffs having obtained a verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial, on the ground of the admission of improper evidence, and of a misdirection.
    
      Goddard and C. Perkins, in support of the motion,
    contended, 1. That the heirs of a deceased master of a slave, could, in no case, be subjected for the maintenance of such slave, unless they were heirs having assets by descent; and to shew this, the deeds of gift, offered in evidence by the plaintiffs, were irrelevant.
    2. That heirs within the statute, could not be subjected for the maintenance of any person, except “ a slave set at liberty by his owner.'1'1 It is not alleged in the declaration, nor was it proved on the trial, that Adam was a person of this description.
    3. That admitting the defendants to have been heirs, and Adam to have been a slave, within the meaning of the statute, still the town of Columbia could not maintain the action, not being the town to which such slave belonged. The word “ belong,” as used in this statute, denotes inhabitancy. Gro-ton alone was entitled to sue. [Some other points were made, and argued, which, from the decision of the Court, it has become unnecessary to state.]
    
      Lanman and Brainard, contra,
    contended, 1. That the liability of heirs was not limited to those who inherited property by descent, to the exclusion of such as received it by gift or devise. The statute, which creates the liability, makes no such distinction. <
    
    2. That “ a slave set at liberty,” within the meaning of the statute, is one in fact having his liberty—going at large—not under the controul of his master. Such a slave was Adam.
    
    
      ■ 3. That the term “ belong,” is used in the statute, in its popular acceptation, denoting the place of residence, at the time the relief is afforded, without including the idea of a legal settlement. The town in which the slave resides, must, from the nature of the case, be the town to afford the needed relief. The intention of the legislature, was, to give that town, for their indemnity, a right of action against the master, or his - . J heirs.
   Hosmer, Ch. J.

Adam, a negro slave of William Williams, Egq. ]ate of Groton, deceased, becoming sick, and the defendants, who are the heirs of the said William Williams, refusing to relieve him, the plaintiffs supplied him with necessary food, medicine and attendance, to a considerable amount.— The defendants, who had derived a large real and personal estate from the said William Williams, were notified, by the plaintiffs, of the advancements made, but refused to reimburse them ; in consideration of which, the plaintiffs contend, that by virtue of the statute, they have a right to recover ; and to this end they instituted their suit. It is not pretended, that the slave ever was an inhabitant of Columbia ; or that he ever was emancipated ; and from the facts conceded, it appears, that he belonged to Groton, and was never made free. The jury were instructed, by the judge, at the circuit, that if these facts were proved, the plaintiffs were entitled to their verdict.

The section of the law on which the action is founded, is expressed in the following words : “ And that all slaves, set at liberty by their owners, and all negro, mulatto and Spanish Indians, who are servants to masters for time, in case they come to want, after they shall be set at liberty, or the time of their said service be expired, shall be relieved, by such owners or masters respectively, their heirs, executors or administrators; and upon their, or either of their refusal so to do, the said slaves and servants shall be relieved, by the select-men of the town to which they belong ; and the said select-men shall recover of the said owners or masters, their heirs, executors or administrators, all the charges or cost they are at for such relief, in the usual manner, as in case of other debts.” Tit. 150. c. 1. s. 11. The persons to whom this section extends, are slaves set at liberty by their owners.” In its popular meaning, this expression is precisely commensurate with the words slaves emancipated. The proviso immediately succeeding the section recited, demonstrates, that this was the signification intended by the legislature ; the word emancipate, there used, intentionally co-extending with the phrase, “ set at liberty,” in the preceding section.

Undoubtedly, when no authority is exercised over a slave, and he is suffered, without restraint, to reside or migrate where he pleases, he in fact is free, and will continue so, until his master shall resume the government, which he has suspended ; but the slave has not been “ set at liberty.” This expression denotes the putting of him in a permanent condition of freedom, and implies the extinguishment of the right, which the master had over his slave, and not the mere temporary cessation of actual authority. It is manifestly obvious, that the slave in question has not been set at liberty, within the intention of the law.

When a slave, emancipated without the permission of the select-men of the town wherein he is settled, is reduced to want, the duty of relieving him is first devolved on his former owner. On his refusal to do this, of which the mere omission is held sufficient proof, the slave is to be relieved, by the select-men of the town “ to which he belongs.” It has been contended, by the plaintiffs, that a person belongs to the town in which he resides, and hence, that Adam was of Columbia, the place in which he had a residence, at the time of his sickness. But the meaning of the word belongs, on which this train of reasoning entirely depends, has been utterly misconceived.

By the law of settlements, the support of a slave in necessitous circumstances, is incumbent on the town in which he is a settled inhabitant: Of consequence, the supplies by Columbia, gave her a right to recover of Groton, But Groton, before the existence of the law on which the plaintiffs have founded their suit, was deficient in remedy against the master and owner of the slave. To correct this mischief, the act was made; and hence the word belongs, as used in the statute, denotes an inhabitant, and was intended to designate the remedy conferred on the town in which the slave was settled, to reimburse itself for the advancements made for his support. This,likewise, is the popular signification of the word, when applied to indicate the relation which an individual bears to a town, and harmonizes with the meaning of the same term, as used in many of our statutes. It, therefore, is indisputably clear,that the slave Adam did not belong to Columbia, within the intendment of the statute ; and that the plaintiffs have no causé of action against the defendants.

\ shall pursue the questions raised by the motion no farther, . . , , , a new trial must be granted.

All the other Judges concurred in the opinion, that the subject of the suit was not “ a slave set at liberty,” within the meaning of the statute. Peters and Bristol, Js., concurred in the opinion, that the town of Columbia was not the proper party plaintiff, as being the town to which the slave belonged; while Chapman and Brainard, Js., expressed, on that point, a contrary opinion.

New trial to be granted.