Case ID: f-appx_502/html/0692-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Miguel Angel GARIBAY, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-50378.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Dec. 5, 2012.
    
    Filed Dec. 20, 2012.
    James Peter Melendres, Assistant U.S., Bruce R. Castetter, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Jami Lynn Ferrara, Law Office of Jami L. Ferrara, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: WARDLAW, BEA, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Miguel Angel Garibay appeals his conviction following a conditional guilty plea to charges related to possession of raeth-amphetamine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. We affirm.

The Border Patrol Agents’ decision to detain Garibay was supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that Garibay was engaged in criminal activity. See United States v. Arvizu, 584 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Agent Ballow, whom the district court found credible, testified that he relied on the following factors in deciding to approach and stop Garibay: (1) the presence of Garibay’s vehicle in an area known for drug smuggling, near the border, and at a gas station located at the last exit before a Border Patrol checkpoint; (2) the vehicle’s clean and empty appearance, with Mexican license plates; (3) the information from the records cheek, which included numerous instances of the vehicle entering the United States and being sent to secondary inspection, and at least once due to the nervous behavior of its driver; (4) Garibay’s attempt to pay for an energy drink with a $100 bill and not possessing any smaller bills; (5) Garibay’s answer of “no” to the question of whether Garibay or the car had entered the United States recently; and (6) the inconsistency between Garibay’s name and the name of the individual who had driven the vehicle across the border hours earlier. These factors gave rise to a reasonable suspicion to detain Garibay. United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2007).

Further, Garibay’s 23 minute detention was not impermissibly long. The Agents acted sufficiently diligently in searching Garibay’s vehicle to comply with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Villasenor, 608 F.3d 467 (9th Cir.2010) (45 minute wait for drug detection dog acceptable).

Finally, Garibay’s detention did not ripen into an arrest. Garibay was detained for a short period of time and was free to sit in or stand by the car throughout the detention. See United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir.2001) (evaluating length and intrusiveness of stop to determine whether it has ripened into an arrest). We note that Garibay does not challenge the search of his vehicle.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.