Case ID: f-appx_550/html/0166-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William T. COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCK HILL MUNICIPAL COURT; Judge Long; Judge Modlz; Unknown Rock Hill Municipal Court Defendants, May be amended, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-7280.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Dec. 27, 2013.
    Decided: Jan. 16, 2014.
    William T. Coleman, Appellant Pro Se.
    Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
   PER CURIAM:

William Coleman appeals the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against the Rock Hill Municipal Court and Judge Modlz for the reasons stated by the district court. See Coleman v. Rock Hill Mun. Court, No. 0:12-cv-01909-JFA, 2013 WL 3929784 (D.S.C. July 29, 2013).

However, we agree with Coleman that the favorable termination rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), does not bar his pro se § 1983 action against Judge Long. See 512 U.S. 477, 487 & n. 7, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (“[I]f the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”). We nevertheless affirm the district court’s judgment on this claim on alternative grounds. See MM ex rel. DM v. Sch. Disk of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.2002) (“[W]e are entitled to affirm the court’s judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are apparent from the record.”). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Judge Long is entitled to absolute judicial immunity because his actions were well within the scope of his jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1987).

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before this Court and argument will not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.