Case ID: ga_20/html/0142-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Lumpkin, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 29.
    James Chance, plaintiff in error, vs. James B. Beall, administrator, &c. defendant.
    
       Where a contract for tlio sale of land is in -writing — is certain — and fair la all its parts — is for an adequate consideration, and capable of being performed, it is just as much a matter of course for a Court of Equity to detree a specific performance of it as it is for a Court of Law to give damages for it in other cases.
    
      
       The Act of 1799, authorizing and empowering executors and administrators to make titles to land -where the vendor dies, is permissive only, and not imperative.
    In Equity, from Baker. Decided by Judge Alexander A. Allen, May Term, 1856.
    James Chance filed his bill, alleging that on the 15th day of October, in the year 1850, he purchased from Greenyille Spence, then in life, but since deceased, certain lands in the 8th district of Baker County, to-wit: the south-east corner of lot No. 84, consisting of seventy-five acres, and the whole of lot No. 85, except thirty-five acres in the south-east corner, and containing, in the aggregate, 290 acres, more or less; for which he gave Spence his two promissory notes, for ¡§600 each, and received from him a bond conditioned to make titles, upon the payment of the said notes; that before the payment of the purchase money and the conveyance of title, the vendor, Sponce, died; and that James B. Beall qualified as his administrator and possessed himself of his estate, and also of the said two promissory notes; and that afterwards the complainant, Chance, paid the money due thereon to said administrator, and demanded the title according to the provisions of said bond, which last the said administrator refused to give. Prayer for specific performance, &c.
    The defendant answered the bill admitting these facts, but refuses to make the conveyance required of him as administrator, because, he says, that “ from his information, received from complainant himself in divers conversations, (and ?) from advice which he has received, that said Chance did enter into a treaty for the purchase of portions of lots of land situate in the County of Baker, and of the district the eighth, to-wit: all that part of lot-of land No. eighty-five, lying northwest of a large pond situate there, containing two hundred acres, more or less, and of lot of land No. eighty-four, seventy-five acres, situate in the south-east corner of said lot of land, and not said portions of lots of land as described in complainant’s said bill of complaint, and as described in said-, exhibit marked A, attached as aforesaid to said bill of complaint.” And farther,- “that he is advised, informed and! believes, that said Chance and Spence, after agreeing upon the terms of sale of said portion of lots of land as are described in this defendant’s answer to complainant’s bill, and they being unable to draw in proper form a bond to' make titles, called upon and selected Mr. William Bassett of said State and County, to draw the said bond; for they and the said William, not fully understanding the true original contract, proceeded to draw up and deliver to said Chance, and Spence then and there confiding in him, a bond to make titles to the-parts of land as were described therein.” And farther, defendant says “ that he believes said bond does not carry out the original contract, as intended by both Chance and Spence,, as he is advised and believes, and does not agree with the-terms of the original contract between said parties, as hereinbefore described and expressed.”
    Defendant makes a tender of the conveyance of the land,, as by him described in his answer, and different from the description contained in the bond of his intestate.
    The cause went to trial upon the bill and answer, which* were read to the Jury; and thereupon, Counsel for defendant', moved the Court to dismiss said bill for want of equity; and' after argument had, the Court sustained the motion and ordered the bill dismissed. Complainant excepted, and assigns-the same as error.
    M. G. Slaughter, for plaintiff in error.
    W. E. Smith, for defendant.
   By the Court.

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

While it is true that it is discretionary with Courts off Equity to decree a specific performance or turn the parties-over to their remedy at Law, yet, it will be found that in just. such a case as this, where the contract is in writing and is certain, and is fair in all its parts, and is for an adequate consideration, and is capable of being performed, it is as much a matter of course for Courts of Equity to decree a specific performance, as it is for a Court of Law to give da.mages for the breach of a contract.

It is argued that there was an ample remedy at Law, -ip this case, under the Act.of 1799, (Prince, 280,) authorising and empowering executors and administrators to make titles where the vendor dies. But that Act is permissive only and not imperative. And in this very case, the administrator refused, and still refuses, to convey.