Case ID: ny-sup-ct_17/html/0158-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Davis, P. J.:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

THE PEOPLE ex rel. GEORGE WILLIS v. THE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL SESSIONS, Respondents.
    
      Criminal lam — evidence of a/nother distinct crri/me,for purpose of showing intent— admissibility of.
    
    The plaintiff in error was tried and convicted of petit larceny, the offense having been committed while the complainant was changing a ten dollar bill for him on January 20, 1876. Upon the trial the prosecution was allowed to prove that he had attempted to commit the like crime in the same manner on the 29th of February, 1876, in order to prove intent. Held, that the .evidence was inadmissible.
    
      Weymcm v. People (4 Hun, 511); Bielschofslcy v. People (3 id., 40) distinguished.
    Certiorari, to review the conviction of the relator of petit larceny by the Special Sessions.
    The evidence on the part of the prosecution tended to show that, on the twentieth of January the jfiaintiff in error entered the complainant’s place of business and requested change for a ten dollar bill. Complainant gave him a five dollar bill and five ones, and relator said, “Won’t you give me a good five dollar bill; I want to send it in a letter ? ” Complainant ojxened his drawer again and gave him a clean one, when he said: “ Can you give me a stiff one ; a new one ? ” Complainant did so, and relator said: “ That will do,” and took it. Complainant said: “ You are going to give me five dollars, aint you ? ” and the prisoner replied that he had done so. ' In the confusion of tbe transaction tbe complainant was perplexed about tbe precise nature of tbe transaction, and tbe relator went out before complainant was quite certain wbetber or not be bad lost tbe bill.
    Upon tbe trial tbe prosecution was allowed to prove tbat tbe relator, on tbe twenty-ninth of February, attempted to play tbe same trick upon one Meyer, living in Greene street..
    • Wm. F. Howe, for tbe relator.
    
      B. K. Phelps, for tbe people.
   Davis, P. J.:

On tbe trial evidence was given tending to show tbat tbe relator, on tbe 20tb January, 1876, committed tbe crime of petit larceny of tbe property of one Poden, charged in tbe complaint.

Evidence was then offered, on tbe part of tbe respondent, tending to prove tbat tbe relator committed, or attempted to commit, tbe like crime of larceny of tbe property of one Meyer, on tbe 29th of February, 1876.

This evidence was objected to by tbe relator’s counsel.

Tbe objection was overruled and an exception was taken.' Tbe court received tbe evidence, on tbe ground tbat it tended to show tbe intent. After tbe evidence was in, tbe relator’s counsel objected, upon the ground tbat it is a circumstance wbicb occurred between tbe defendant and another, at an entirely different place ; tbat it is an entirely different offense, if any.”

He therefore asked tbat it be stricken out; tbe court below overruled tbe objection and denied tbe motion. No connection whatever was shown between tbe transactions, and tbe ’ latter took place more than a month after tbe former. Tbe cases cited by tbe counsel for tbe people (Weymans Case, 4 Hun, 511; Bielschofsfky Case, 3 Hun, 40), were eases in wbicb tbe other transactions admitted in evidence were connected more or less directly with tbe particular transaction charged against tbe accused.

They were intimately related both in point of time and in matter of fact, and were therefore held to fall within tbe rale wbicb permits evidence of other offenses for tbe purpose of establishing intent.

In The People v. Copperman (56 N. Y., 593), it was held tbat it was not competent upon tbe trial of one offense, to prove that the prisoner committed another not connected with it.

The true rule is laid down with great clearness by Daniels, J., in Weyman v. People (4 Hun, supra), and it requires that the transactions shall be so connected as to time, and so similar in their other elements, that the same motive may reasonably be imputed to them. And he extended this rule to cases of larceny. In this case, however, the offenses were distinct and independent of each other, and the most that the second one tended to prove was a propensity in the prisoner to commit the crime of larceny. It was error, under the circumstances, to receive the evidence, and the judgment must be reversed.

Beady and Daniels, JJ., concurred.

Judgment reversed.