Case ID: f_77/html/0607-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "WHEELER, District Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES v. SCHULZE et al.
    (Circuit Court, S. D. New York.
    December 9, 1896.)
    Customs Duties — Classibtcation—Antitoxi n.
    Antitoxin is dutiable, under paragraph 59 of the tariff act of 1894, as a medicinal preparation not specially provided for, and is not entitled to free . entry, under paragraph 664, as vaccine vims.
    This was an appeal by the government from a decision of the board of general appraisers, reversing the decision of the collector of the port of New York as to the classification of certain merchandise, imported by Schulze, Berge & Koechl. The merchandise was invoiced as “Blood Serum — Diphtheria Remedy,” and it was shown to he an agent for the prevention and cure of diphtheria, produced from the blood of horses by treatment with the diphtheria poison. The collector assessed a duty of 25 per cent, ad valorem, as upon a medicinal preparation. The importers claimed exemption from duty, directly or by similitude, or component of chief value, under paragraphs 367, 404, 470, or 664, Act 1894,
    dames T. Van Rensselaer, Asst. IT. S. Atty.
    Comstock & Brown, for defendant.
   WHEELER, District Judge.

The tariff act of 1894 places a duty, by paragraph 59, on “all medicinal preparations not specially provided for,” and by paragraph 664 puts on the free list “vaccine virus.” This importation is of antitoxin. It was classified under the former paragraph, and the protest raised the question whether it should he free under the latter. Antitoxin is a different thing from vaccine virus. It comes from a different source, is used for a different although somewhat similar purpose, and operates in a different way. The former seems to cure disease, and the latter introduces a milder form to obviate what would he worse. The latter has such a well-defined meaning, applicable to one thing, that, against a first impression, it does not now seem capable of covering, by any implication, such a different thing as the former. Decision of general appraisers reversed.