Case ID: f-appx_549/html/0668-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Shawn Lawrence DESAUTEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TETRA TECH EC, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-35136.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Nov. 19, 2013.
    
    Filed Dec. 11, 2013.
    Shawn Lawrence Desautel, Chewelah, WA, pro se.
    Mitchell C. Baker, Richard R. Mene-ghello, Fisher & Phillips LLP, Portland, OR, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:ll-cv-00187-EFS.
    Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Shawn Lawrence DesAutel appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed DesAutel’s action because his claims were barred by the separation agreement that he voluntarily entered into with his former employer, Tetra Tech EC, Inc. See Stro-man v. W. Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 461-63 (9th Cir.1989) (a settlement agreement may waive Title VII claims if the waiver is voluntary, deliberate, and informed); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 120 Wash.2d 178, 840 P.2d 851, 856 (1992) (discussing enforceability of releases under Washington law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DesAutel’s motion to strike Tetra’s motion to dismiss because DesAutel failed to show any reason to strike the motion. See El Pollo Loco, Inc. v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.2003) (providing standard of review).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying DesAutel’s motion for sanctions because DesAutel failed to comply with the mandatory twenty-one day notice requirement. See Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 788-89 (9th Cir.2001) (providing standard of review and concluding that party was not entitled to Rule 11 sanctions because it failed to serve its Rule 11 motion on the opposing party twenty-days before filing the motion with the court).

DesAutel’s contention that the district court was biased is not supported by the record.

Because DesAutel does not raise the district court’s denial of his motions for entry of default and default judgment in his opening brief, the issues are waived. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (“This court will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in appellant’s opening brief.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.