Case ID: f-appx_563/html/0089-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Reina GUNAWAN, Irsan Sutanto, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4818 NAC.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 24, 2014.
    Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron, Assistant Director; Aaron D. Nelson, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioners Re Ina Gunawan and Irsan Sutanto, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review of the BIA’s November 16, 2012 decision denying their motion to reopen. In re Re Ina Gunawan, Irsan Sutanto, Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/180 (B.I.A. Nov. 16, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

The BIA’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). There is no dispute that Petitioners’ July 2012 motion was untimely, as the BIA issued the final administrative order in April 2011. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day period to file for reopening); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As the BIA concluded, the Petitioners’ evidence failed to establish changed conditions for ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia.

The BIA reasonably found that despite the slight increase in the reported number of religiously-motivated acts of violence, there was no significant change in the type of attacks (including the destruction and forced closure of Christian churches) or the sporadic nature of the incidents of religious violence. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard). Given that attacks against Christians remained sporadic and concentrated in a few regions, and the Indonesian government both respected religious freedom and prosecuted perpetrators of religious violence, the BIA reasonably found that any change was not material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir.2009) (upholding agency’s rejection of pattern or practice claim when background materials noted only sporadic, localized religious violence in some of the 6,000 inhabited islands of Indonesia); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that asylum applicant alleging persecution at the hands of non-state actors must demonstrate that government is unwilling or unable to control those actors).

Because the evidence Petitioners submitted was insufficient to establish a change in conditions in Indonesia since the time of their hearing, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying their motion as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.