Case ID: us-ct-cl_19/html/0292-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Weldon, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

GEORGE T. DEARING v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
    [No. 274.
    Decided March 17, 1884.]
    
      On the Facts.
    
    The levy court, having jurisdiction of roads, contracts for the mating of one. Its funds being exhausted, and the contractor refusing to-carry on the work, one W. advances the money and takes a draft drawn by the committee in charge and accepted by the treasurer. This is indorsed over to the claimant.
    I.Though the levy court of the District of Columbia had not power to-borrow, yet it might discharge a lawful indebtedness by means of a-draft or due bill.
    II.If a contractor agrees to receive a draft or due bill in lieu of money,, and at the same time requests that it be delivered to a third party who has advanced him money to carry on his work, the transaction is a form of payment.
    III. A body corporate having power to contract a debt may discharge it by means of a draft or due bill issued to a third person at the request of the contractor, if thereby the claim of the contractor be extinguished.
    IV. The District Claims Act, 1880 (1 Supplmt. R. S., 562), invests this court-with “ original, legal, and equitable jurisdiction ’’; and under that grant of equity jurisdiction, the court may subrogate a third person in . .- the rights and equities which a contractor has transferred.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the ease :
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court t
    
    I. In the year 1870 the levy court of the county of Washington, District of Columbia, had a contract with Albert Gleason for the grading by him of a road within its jurisdiction for the ■sum of $1,600.
    II. While the work was in progress the funds of the court became exhausted, and there was not money sufficient to pay for the whole of the work to the extent of $400. Gleason, the ■contractor, refused to proceed with the work until he was paid. Whereupon J. W. Wright, who was personally interested in the convenience of the road, paid Gleason $400, and took from the chairman of committee of improvements the order for "which this claim is brought. Gleason completed the work, and has ■not been paid except as stated.
    III. Upon the payment of the money there was issued to J. C. Wright the following order:
    “Washington, D. C., September 1, 1870.
    “ Nicholas Callan, Esq.,
    “ Treas. of Levy Court:
    
    
      “ Pay to the order of George H. Plant, chairman of committee of improvements, $400 for labor on Sherman avenue, and to draw six per cent, interest until paid.
    “ George H. Plant,
    “ Chairman of Committee of Improvements, L. C.
    
    
      “ (On the margin:) $400. Accepted. N. Callan, Treas. Levy Court.”
    Said paper was indorsed by said Plant in blank, was transferred by delivery to T. D. Winter, who filled up the blank in-dorsement to himself. Winter then indorsed it to plaintiff, who is now the legal holder of it.
    On the paper is the following memorandum:
    “ Rec. and filed July 29,1872.
    “ Z. Richards,
    
      '“Auditor.”
    
    No part of the claim sued for was ever presented to the late board of audit of the District of Columbia, and disallowed by it. No person has ever been paid for the work.
    
      Mr. D. O’C. Callaghan lor the claimant.
    
      Mr. J. C. Fay (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendant.
   Weldon, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In the year 1870, the levy court of the county of Washington, District of Columbia, made a contract with Albert Gleason to grade a road within its jurisdiction, for which he was to> be paid the sum of $1,600.

During the progress of the work, the funds of the court having become exhausted, the contractor refused toj'prosecute the work until he was paid in full the amount of the contract price.

In order to relieve the embarrassment of the situation, the original holder of the order in controversy (being interested in the convenience of the road), proposed to the contractor and the levy court that he would pay the amount of the balance-of the contract price to the contractor, which he did, by the consent of all parties, and took in the settlement of the work the order or due bill on which this suit is brought.

No brief has been filed for the defendant, but it was contended in the oral argument that the transaction involved the legal elements of a loan of money ; that the levy court had no-authority to borrow money, and therefore the execution of the paper was ultra vires, and void in law.

Conceding, for the purpose of this decision, that the levy court had no legal authority to borrow money, it does not follow that the plaintiff cannot recover in this case.

The levy court having the power to employ Gleason to do-the work, it had the right to pay him, and not having the money either at the end or during the progress of the work, it had a right to give him an order showing its indebtedness to him; and if he directed that such order be delivered to some third party, the court had perfect power to give the order to-such third party, if thereby the claim of Gleason against the defendant was extinguished.

We have deduced this view of the transaction from the evidence in the case, as will be seen by the findings of the court.

The statute giving this court jurisdiction of the claim provides that the court “ shall have original, legal, and equitable jurisdiction.”

The contract between Gleason and the levy court being free from all taint of illegality, under the broad jurisdiction of a. court of chancery, can there be any doubt of the right and duty of the court to subrogate the rights and equities of the contractor to the benefit and behoof of the claimant ?

The defendant received the benefit of the labor of Gleason,, and has never paid any person for it; the order now stands as the representative of its indebtedness for that labor; and there is no reason either at law or in equity why the defendant should not pay.

It is therefore the judgment of the court that the plaintiff recover the sum of $494.