Case ID: miss_20/html/0355-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice ThacheR", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

James Parker, Administrator of Hector McNeill, vs. Lavisa McNeill.
    A daughter is a competent witness in her mother’s behalf during the lifetime of her .mother, in a suit between a third person and her mother, the latter claiming the property in controversy, although her testimony might go to show title in her deceased father to the property.
    Admissions made by a party to a controversy, may be the best or the weakest evidence, according to the attendant circumstances, by which they are to be weighed.
    Where the complainant, who was an administrator, filed his bill, not under oath, claiming certain slaves in the possession of the defendant, as the property of his intestate; and the defendant denied under oath the allegations of the bill, and the proof, while it tended to establish title out of the defendant, tended also to establish it out of the complainant’s intestate; it was held, that the bill must be dismissed.
    On appeal from the vice-chancery court at Oarrolton, Hon. Henry Dickinson, vice-chancellor.
    The facts of the case sufficiently appear from the following opinion delivered by the vice-chancellor :
    By the Chancellor.
    The complainant, the administrator of Hector McNeill, filed this bill to recover from Lavisa McNeill certain slaves, to wit, Abel and his wife Columbia, and their six children.
    
      Lavisa McNeill is the mother of Hector McNeill; and the widow of John McNeill, who died in the state of North Carolina in 1840. ■
    The bill is not sworn to, but states, that the slaves belong to the estate of Hector McNeill; that the said Hector always claimed them as his own; paid taxes for them, and exercised every act of ownership, except, that he permitted the negro woman, Columbia, and the smaller children to remain with the defendant; that the negro man, and such of the children as were large enough to work, worked on the farm with the other hands of Hector McNeill, and went to the house of defendant to eat and sleep, because they constituted a part of said family of slaves; that Hector, by permitting said slaves to live with the defendant, only intended to discharge his duty as a son, in gratuitously extending his kindness to a widowed mother, without intending to divest himself of his title to the slaves; that said slaves are adversely claimed by said defendant, who has possession of all of them, claiming that they belong to her, as her own property.
    The defendant denies that the slaves are the property of the estate of Hector McNeill, or that he had any right, or claimed any right to possession of them; and states, that she resided in North Carolina until the death of her husband in 1840; and shortly after, some time in 1841, removed to this state. That Columbia was purchased for her, when said slave was about eleven years of age, and about twenty years ago, and delivered into her possession, and she has remained in her possession and use from that time until the present; and that the children named in the bill are the issue of Columbia, and have all been born while said slave was in the possession of defendant. That some seventeen years ago, the negro man Abel was bought', then about fifteen years of age, and possession delivered to her, and continued from that time to the present. She denies that Hector McNeill ever had possession or use of said slave, until after her removal to this state, and then not as his property, but by her permission. She allowed him to have Abel’s services on the farm in compensation for attention, advances, and expenses, such as payment of taxes, &c. The answer also alleges, that the contracts of purchase for said slaves were made by Hector McNeill, as agent, but denies that the property was delivered to him, or that they were purchased with his money; and charges that they were purchased for her separate benefit, and that her possession has continued undisturbed by adverse claim.
    Two questions are presented.
    1. Should the depositions of Sarah Sinclair and Calvin R. Sinclair be excluded % .
    2. Does the proof establish that the slaves mentioned in the bill were the property of Hector McNeill at his death ?
    1. The witness, Sarah Sinclair, is the daughter of John McNeill and the defendant; her deposition was read by the defendant at the hearing, and excepted to for incompetency, on the ground that her relationship to the defendant made her an interested witness.
    The principle of law, that the heir or distributee is incompetent in an action affecting the estate, is relied upon to exclude this witness. This cannot disqualify the witness in the present suit, as there is no question presented by the pleadings in relation to any estate or property, of which the witness is heir or dis-tributee.
    Neither the bill nor the answer allude to any estate of John McNeill, deceased; but on the contrary, the litigation is between the administrator of Hector McNeill and Lavisa McNeill, who is charged with claiming the property in her own right, and adversely to the claim of the right of property in the estate of Hector McNeill. It is no where charged in the bill, or alleged in the answer, that the slaves were ever claimed or owned by John McNeill, in his lifetime, or regarded by any one as a part of his estate, since his death in 1840. The bill does not even mention the name of John McNeill; and the answer mentions him only in regard to a matter collateral to the issue between the parties to the present suit.
    The answer charges that Abel and Columbia were purchased for the defendant and delivered into her possession, for her separate benefit and 'maintenance; and that the possession has continued. with her. She has introduced the witness to sustain this answer. The fact that the witness is her daughter, and may possibly at some future period be benefitted by the success of the mother, does not exclude her evidence; but on the contrary, it is clearly settled that she is a competent witness.
    The exception to the competency of this witness is, therefore, overruled.
    I find nothing in the papers to sustain the exception to the deposition of the witness, Calvin R. Sinclair. It does not appear in what manner he is interested or related to the defendant, by whom he is offered.
    2. Does the proof establish that the slaves were the property of Hector McNeill, at his death 1
    
    The bill is not a sworn bill; the allegations which assert title in Hector McNeill, are all fully denied by the answer.
    Prior to the year 1818, the husband of defendant owned a small amount of property, consisting principally of a family of negroes. He became embarrassed, and his slaves were carried off, that they might not be subjected to the demands of his creditors. From that time up to the period when Columbia was purchased, he was in embarrassed circumstances, and unable to hold property in his own name. In this condition he remained until the purchase of Abel in 1830, and until his death in 1840. The slaves, Abel and Columbia, were purchased by Hector McNeill. Columbia was immediately after the purchase in the family/of John McNeill, and the boy, Abel, was placed there a short time after the purchase. John McNeill died in 1840, and in 1833 Hector McNeill removed to the state of Mississippi. The slaves, Abel and Columbia, remained with the defendant, in the state of North Carolina, until 1841, when the defendant, and the slaves and their increase, came to the state of Mississippi. Here Columbia and the children remained with the defendant on a place belonging to Hector McNeill; and Abel and one of the boys worked a portion of the year 1837, during the day, with Hector McNeill’s hands, and at night returned to the house of the defendant, where they slept and ate their meals.
    
      During this time the slaves were called Hector McNeill’s, but the possession and control of them, as before remarked, was with the family of John McNeill, during his lifetime, and with the defendant after his death. The use and possession was undisturbed and unquestioned, until after the death of Hector McNeill, and the appointment of the complainant as administrator of his estate in 1847. In this statement of facts, there is no discrepancy in the testimony of complainant and defendant worthy of remark; and all which is thus proved is consistent with the statements both of the bill and answer, and neither proves that the property belonged to Hector McNeill, as charged in the bill; or that it was the separate property of the defendant, as alleged in the answer.
    The only direct evidence upon the question at issue, consists in the declarations of Hector McNeill and the defendant.
    The testimony is unsatisfactory and inconclusive; and as the affirmative is with the complaiuant, the defendant must succeed, though no title be established in her, unless it be shown by the testimony, that the property belonged to Hector McNeill.
    Three witnesses were -examined by the complainant.
    Neill McNeill and James Leizenbury testify, that they frequently heard John McNeill and the defendant say that the negroes belonged to Hector; and Neill McNeill says, that the defendant, a few days after the death of Hector, stated to him that the slaves were Hector McNeill’s property.
    These statements, some prior and others subsequent to the death of Hector, furnish the only direct testimony to sustain the bill of the complainant.
    In my opinion they are not sufficient against the sworn answer of the defendant, and the additional testimony furnished by the defendant’s witnesses.
    John McNeill was in embarrassed circumstances, and unable to hold property in his own name, from the time these slaves come into the possession of the family, until his death, as the proof clearly establishes. This fact is well calculated to weaken the force of statements made at that time, that the property belonged to Hector; and without any justification of. the deception, we may safely conclude, that such conversations furnish as much evidence of a motive to elude creditors, as of title to the property in Hector McNeill.
    The conversations of the defendant, spoken of by the witnesses, as having taken place a few days after the death of Hector, are unsatisfactory, and should be received, as evidence against her, with great caution. Neill McNeill and James Sellers both testify, that she was greatly depressed; that she was apprehensive that she would not be able to retain tho property; that she was grieved because Hector had made no arrangement for her security. But in all these conversations she said that Abel was purchased with John McNeill’s money; and to Lei-zenbury she said she did not know whose money was paid for Columbia.
    Although I have admitted Sarah Sinclair as a competent witness for the defendant, I do not regard her deposition, (subject as it is to many exceptions,) as furnishing much testimony; but if it adds little to the title of the defendant, it weakens to some extent the claim of the complainant.
    From a very careful examination of this case, I am satisfied that the bill is not sustained by the proof.
    Bill dismissed.
    The complainants appealed.
    Brooke, for appellant.
    Sheppard, for appellee.
    The admissions that complainant has relied on to support his title, were not made by the parties with the intention to admit Such fact from the conviction of its truth.
    “Admissions, when proved, are the weakest testimony deemed admissible.” 2 J. J. Marshall, 65.
    “It is a dangerous species of evidence, and to be received with the greatest caution.” 4 Monroe, 236, 241.
    In every view of this case the motive and purpose for which the admissions were made is-obvious and apparent, and destroys their force, and fully satisfies the mind that they were not made from convictions of truth.
    
      Bat if these admissions were received, their only effect under the circumstances of this case would be to establish a fraudulent title and claim, such as a court of equity would not protect or uphold, and to which would be applied the maxim “ih pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis et defendentis.”
    
   Mr. Justice ThacheR

delivered the opinion of the court.

Hector McNeill’s administrator filed his bill in the vice-chancery court of the northern district, for the specific recovery of two slaves, Abel and Columbia, and six children, their issue, charged to appertain to the estate of said Hector McNeill. The bill charges that Hector always claimed the slaves as his property, paid taxes for them, and exercised acts of ownership over them; that he permitted the female, Columbia, and some of the small children, to remain with the defendant, but that the man and the larger children worked upon his farm. This bill was not filed upon oath.

The answer of Lavisa McNeill, under oath, replies that she is the widow of John McNeill, who died in North Carolina in 1840, and that she removed to this state shortly after that event in 1841. It denies the material charges of the bill, that Hector either had or claimed any right to the slaves. It alleges that Columbia was purchased for her twenty years ago, and Abel some seventeen years ago, both for her separate use and benefit. It likewise alleges, that Hector never had possession of any of the slaves until after her arrival in this state, and then only by her permission, and as compensation for advances and expenses made upon her behalf.

On the part of the complainant, the strongest-feature in support of his bill are certain admissions alleged to have been made by the defendant as to Hector McNeill’s title to the slaves. But it appears that these admissions were made just after his death, and at a period when the defendant was troubled and distressed about the property; and it is clear from other testimony, that they were not made with a conviction of their truth. Admissions may be the best or the weakest evidence according to their attendant circumstances. The truth of the case, as gathered from all the testimony, seems to be, that the slaves were purchased by the money of the defendant’s husband when he was in embarrassed circumstances, and every effort was made to seclude them from his creditors. It is certain that Hector never had them in possession for a great length of time after this purchase, and not at all until after the defendant’s removal to this state. It is by no means proved, that he asserted a title to them during his lifetime. The testimony of Mrs. Sarah Sinclair discloses most probably the true state of the title to the negroes. She declares that the defendant had told her that the slaves were called Hector’s, in order to screen them from her husband’s creditors. Her testimony also tends to weaken the credibility of one of the complainant’s witnesses as to the admissions of the defendant respecting the slaves.

Mrs. Sinclair is a daughter of the defendant, but she is a fully competent witness to testify in the behalf of her mother, during her mother’s lifetime.

All the charges of the bill not sworn to are denied upon oath, and the preponderance of the testimony, however it may affect the defendant’s title, certainly is strongly against the title of the complainant’s intestate; and nothing was left to the vice-chancellor iii such a state of case but to dismiss the bill.

Decree affirmed.