Case ID: so2d_927/html/1037-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "KLEIN, J. REYES, ISRAEL U., Associate Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Quincy JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 4D04-2014.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    May 10, 2006.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sue-EUen Kenny, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   KLEIN, J.

Appellant was convicted of shooting a deadly missile and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. We affirm on all issues except the firearm enhancement of his sentence for shooting a deadly missile. Although some cases hold to the contrary, we conclude that the use of the firearm was an essential element of the crime.

As a result of appellant’s shooting several times into a house, he was found guilty of shooting a deadly missile. Because the jury found that he discharged a firearm, the trial court enhanced the offense. He argues that the enhancement amounts to an illegal sentence because the firearm enhancement statute, section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2001), does not apply to felonies in which the use of a “weapon or firearm” is an essential element.

The conviction for shooting a deadly missile is based on section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied ... shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Our weapon or firearm enhancement statute, section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides for enhancement to a higher degree of felony except for “a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element.” Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases section 3.3(b) expressly defines “weapon,” for purposes of applying section 775.087(1), the weapon enhancement statute, as follows:

A “weapon” is legally defined to mean any object that could be used to cause death or inflict serious bodily harm.

The instruction was adopted in 1981, and in State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408 (Fla.2004), our supreme court held that the instruction is the definition of weapon as used in section 775.087. Accordingly, the crime of which appellant was convicted has, as an essential element, the use of a weapon.

The state relies on our decision in Robertson v. State, 807 So.2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), in which the issue was whether additional sentencing points are authorized when the defendant uses a firearm and is convicted of shooting a deadly missile. We held that it was permissible to impose the additional sentencing points because possession of a firearm was not an essential element of the crime. We relied on Bradford v. State, 722 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), which came to the same conclusion for sentencing points. Before Bradford, the first district held in Horn v. State, 677 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), that the use of a firearm wás a necessary element of shooting at an occupied vehicle in violation of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (1993). The third district has also held that the use of a firearm is a necessary element of shooting into an occupied vehicle. Jones v. Singletary, 621 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

We do not deem it necessary, at the present time, to determine if there is an inconsistency between Robertson, which involved sentencing points, and the present case, which involves the enhancing of the felony to a higher degree, because the analysis involves different statutes. Although it is arguable, from White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 (Fla.1998), that the analysis should be the same, we have concluded that the sentencing points issue should await a case involving that precise question.

We accordingly remand for resentencing on the conviction of shooting a deadly missile. We have considered the other issues and find them to be without merit.

Reversed.

STONE, J., concurs.

REYES, ISRAEL U., Associate Judge,

concurring specially in part.

It is my opinion that the majority reached the right conclusion, but for the wrong reasons, regarding the firearm enhancement issue. Therefore, I concur only in the judgment for the reasons stated herein.

The first consideration of statutory construction is the plain meaning of the statute, because legislative intent is derived primarily from its language. See State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680 (Fla.2004); State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So.2d 898 (Fla.1996). Florida courts have long held that one of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that statutory language be given its plain and ordinary meaning unless words are defined therein. See Se. Fisheries Ass’n v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla.1984); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471 (Fla.1992); State v. Del Castillo, 890 So.2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). If not defined in a statute, a court may refer to a dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning that the legislature intended to ascribe to a term. See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997).

Additionally, where the language of the statute is clear and amenable to a reasonable and logical interpretation, courts are without power to diverge from the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the plain language of the statute. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1220 (Fla.2000). A court cannot construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. See Velez v. Miami-Dade County Police Dep’t, No. SC04-1944, — So.2d -, 2006 WL 345702 (Fla. Feb. 16, 2006). To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power. See McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)).

Section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2004), states in pertinent part:

Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, shoots at, within, or into, or throws any missile or hurls or projects a stone or other hard substance which would produce death or great bodily harm, at, within, or in any public or private building, occupied or unoccupied ... shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

Although the terms “weapon” and “firearm” are not used in the statute, the terms “shoot” and “missile” are used. Since those terms are not defined in the statute, this court must look to the dictionary to determine the meaning of “shoot” and “missile.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1259 (4th ed.2000), defines “shoot” as “[t]o hit ... with a missile fired from a weapon.” Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary 1378 (6th ed.1990), “shoot” “generally implies the use of firearms.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 872 (4th ed.2000), defines “missile” as “[a] ... weapon that is fired ... at a target.” Fired means to have been discharged from a firearm. Id. at 512.

The question now becomes whether a weapon or firearm is an essential element of the crime by application of section 776.087(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2001):

Unless otherwise provided by law, whenever a person is charged with a felony, except a felony in which the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element,^[] and during the commission of such felony the defendant carries, displays, or uses, threatens to use, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm, or during the commission of such felony the defendant commits an aggravated battery, the felony for which the person is charged shall be reclassified ... [i]n the case of a felony of the second degree, to a felony of the first degree.

(Emphasis added).

Thus, the plain meaning of the modifier “essential” is at issue. Again, since the term “essential” is likewise, not defined in the statute, this court must look to the dictionary to determine the meaning of that term. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 469 (4th ed.2000), defines “essential” as “basic or indispensable; necessary.” Id. According to Black’s Law Dictionary 546 (6th ed.1990), “essential” means indispensably necessary, requisite.

If the reasonable and obvious implications of the word “shoot,” as used in the statute, are that one must use a firearm or other weapon to shoot or fire a missile (itself a weapon), then the reasonable and logical interpretation of the statutory language is that a weapon or firearm is indispensably necessary or a basic requisite for the commission of the felony enumerated in section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001). Thus, the use of a weapon or firearm clearly becomes an essential element of that felony.

Accordingly, since the unambiguous plain language of both statutes is controlling and this court cannot abrogate legislative power, I would reverse on that basis. 
      
      . The elements of the subject crime are derived from the statutory definition of section 790.19, Florida Statutes (2001). See § 790.19, Fla. Stat. (2001); Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46 (Fla.2002).
     
      
      . I do not maintain that the weapon at issue here was the projectile/missile. The weapon at issue was the firearm. Nowhere in the record did the defendant, in raising his objection, ever state that the weapon in question was the missile/projectile. Since the trial court was not afforded an opportunity to address it, the defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal. See Cornwell v. State, 425 So.2d 1189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (to satisfy the requirements of the contemporaneous objection rule, an objection must be specific enough to inform the judge of the alleged error and to preserve the issue for intelligent review on appeal).