Case ID: sw_291/html/1105-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BETHEA, J., PER CURIAM. LATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JONES v. STATE.
    (No. 10348.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 26, 1927.
    Rehearing Granted March 2, 1927.)
    1. Forgery &wkey;>2l — Statute on principals applies to forgery statute as if part thereof (Pen. Code 1925, art. 1010).
    The statute on principals applies to forgery offenses as if embraced in the statute, under Pen. Code 1925, art. 1010, providing that, upon indictment for forgery of land title, it shall only be necessary to prove that accused took one step with fraudulent intention.
    2. Forgery <&wkey;29(2) — Indictment and proof for forgery of land title need not specify fraud and injury intended (Pen. Code 1925, art. 1006).
    Upon indictment, under Pen. Code 1925, art, 1006,’for forgery of land title, it is not essential that indictment allege and proof substantiate an intention to defraud and injure in some definite and specific manner.
    
      On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Criminal law.<&wkey;673(l) — Refusing instruction that defendant’s reputation as lawbreaker affected only suspended sentence, not guilt, was error.
    In land title forgery case, held error to refuse instruction requested by defendant, not testifying; that evidence of his reputation as lawbreaker affected only granting of suspended sentence, and not question of guilt.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from'District Court, Navarro County ; Hawkins Scarborough, Judge.
    . Jeff Jones' was convicted of forging a land title, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded on ¡rehearing. .
    W. H. Jack Jr., W. H. Jack, Sr., and S. H. Jack; all of Corsicana, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, .State’s Atty., of Austin, and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., of Gíoesbéck, for the- State.
   BETHEA, J.,

The appellant was convicted in . the’district court of Navarro county of forging a landtitl.e, denounced by article 1006, P. 0., and his. punishment assessed at 5 years in the penitentiary.

We havÁcáréfully examined the statement of facts and finid the same amply sufficient to Support the'verdict of the jury.

The appellant’s bills of exception 5, 6, and 7 complain of the argument of the prosecuting attorney. We have carefully examined these three bills and hold that, while the argument complained of should not have been indulged in by the state’s attorney, the same does not appear to have been appropriated by the jury, in view of the fact that they assessed the lowest penalty fixed by the law.

Bill of exceptions No. 8 complains of the action of the court in giving the following charge to the jury:

“Jt is sufficient if it-appears that possibly somq one might be injured or defrauded thereby.”

We are unable to agree with the appellant’s contention. That part of the charge complained of- and quoted above is only a portion of paragraph 5 of the court’s main charge, and, when read and considered along with the entire paragraph, it presents no error.

The appellant, by a number of bills of exception complains of the learned trial judge’s charge on principals. We are unable to agree with this contention. The statute on principals applies to all offenses, so far as forgery is concerned, exactly the same as if the statute was embraced in and made a part of the -forgery statute.

“Where several combine to forge and pass a forged instrument, accused doing one act, and his confederates others, all are principals, and may be prosecuted as such.”

See Phillips v. State, 6 Tex. App. 364; Dillard v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 177 S. W. 99; Ferguson v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R. 641, 187 S. W. 476; art. 1010, P. C.

The appellant, by his bills of exception Nos. 17, 18, and 19, insists that the indictment in a case of this character must allege, and the proof must substantiate, the intention to defraud and injure in some definite and specific manner, and contends that the charge of the court in the instant case instructed and authorized the jury to convict the appellant upon the basis of an indefinite and uncertain “intent to defraud and injure.” We are unable to agree with this contention. This question is fully and ably discussed in the case of Decherd v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 105, 283 S. W. 168.

There are other questions raised in the record, but we do not deem them of sufficient materiality to call for discussion.

There being no errors disclosed by the rec'ord, and the facts' being sufficient to support the verdict, the judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing ¿pinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

It appears from appellant’s motion for rehearing that the point now raised and relied upon escaped us in our original consideration of the case. Appellant did not testify as a witness upon his trial. He filed an application for a suspended sentence. His bill of exceptions No. 20 sets up that the state introduced four witnesses, each of whom testified that he knew the general reputation of appellant in the community in which he lived as to being a'peaceable, law-abiding citizen, and that such reputation was bad. Appellant had introduced no testimony on this point.- In this condition of the record- appellant, upon examination of the charge of the court prior to its being read to the jury, presented his written objection to same because it did not instruct the jury that the testimony relative to appellant’s reputation could be considered by them only as affecting the granting of a suspended sentence, and that it should not be considered in determining whether or not appellant was guilty of the offense charged. In this connection appellant presented a special charge, seeking to have the jury told that the testimony relative to his reputation for peace and quietude was introduced and should be considered by the jury solely in .connection with recommendation of a suspended sentence, and that the jury were not to consider said testimony as to his general reputation for any purpose whatever in determining the guilt of the accused of the offense charged. v This charge was refused. In this connection, attention is further called in the motion for' rehearing to the fact that there is a bill of exceptions complaining of the argument of the county attorney to the jury in regard to the testimony as to appellant’s bad reputation; said exception complaining that the county attorney had argued to the jury that proof of such reputation might be considered by them in determining appellant’s guilt.

The question raised in bill of exceptions No. 20 has been before this court before. See Bride v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 635, 218 S. W. 762, from which we quote:

“Evidence was admitted on behalf of the state attaching the reputation-of appellant, and.tending to show him guilty of other offenses than the one on trial. The trial court failed.to limit the purpose for which this evidence was admitted. Appellant in due time and manner excepted to the charge of the court because' of said omission, and no correction was made in said charge. This should have been done; The charge in such case should have limited the purpose and effect of such testimony. . The evidence was harmful to appellant. Williamson v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 289, 167 S. W. 360.”

We are of opinion that testimony showing that the accused has the reputation, in the community in which he lives, of being a lawbreaker would necessarily be very harmful tb him in the estimation of the jury. We see no reason to doubt the correctness of our opinion in the Bridé Case, supra. The hurt of the failure to limit the jury’s consideration of said testimony to the purpose for which it was admissible; viz., combating appellant’s right to a suspended sentence, and that alone, is emphasized by the bill of exceptions complaining of the argument of the county attorney and his wrongful use of the testimony before the jury.

The motion for rehearing is granted, the af-firmance is set aside, and the judgment is now reversed and the cause remanded. . 
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