Case ID: tenn_36/html/0672-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "OaeutheRS, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ralph Shelton et al. vs. Bailey Johnson et al.
    
    1. Lis Pendens. The doctrine of, has no extra-territorial application. Jurisdiction. The rule that a suit pending is a notice to all the world of the equities of the parties thereto in the subject-matter of litigation, is to be restricted, in its application, to all persons within the jurisdiction or State where said suit is pending: it has no extra-territorial application. Thus, lights acquired in this State in property which at the time was in litigation in the Courts of a sister State of the IJnion, are not affected by the doctrine of lis pendens, although said Courts of a sister State had ample jurisdiction over said property at the time such litigation was commenced.
    2. Same. Same. Case in judgment, where, pending a suit for certain slaves in the Courts of another State, said slaves were removed to this State and were bought here by an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, who held and claimed them adversely as his own for the period necessary to perfect his title under the statute of limitations, it is held that the operation of the statute of limitations, and the title so derived, are not affected by the pendency of said suit in another State.
    3. Same. Same. Gonstiiutional Law. Cons. XI. S., Art. 4, \ 1. The clause of the Federal Constitution which requires that “full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State,” does not mean that all the effects and consequences of a litigation in one State shall follow the subject-matter thereof into another. It has no reference to the doctrine of lis pendens, nor is there any recognized comity between the States of this Union which would authorize such an interpretation.
    4. Same. In what the rule is founded. Notice. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded more upon the necessity for it, to give effect to the proceedings of Courts, than upon any presumption of notice. But whether based upon the idea of notice, or it be a positive, arbitrary rule, suggested and sanctioned by policy or necessity, there is no principle more éssential to the proper administration of justice, when restricted in its application within its proper limits.
    FROM DAVIDSON.
    This bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Nashville on the 28th of July, 1856, by Ralph C. and William Shelton, to recover certain slaves in the possession of the defendants. The slaves in controversy have been in the possession of the defendants, and those under whom they claim as innocent purchasers for value and without notice, for more than twenty years. The complainants insist that they are not barred by the statute of limitations, because during all that time and longer there has been a litigation pending in the Courts of Virginia about these slaves, to which the persons through whom the defendants claim title were originally made parties defendant. The defendants filed a demurrer to the bill, and at the November Term, 1857, Chancellor Frierson gave a decree sustaining the demurrer. The complainants appealed.
    E. H. Ewing and R. H. MoEwen, for the complain-
    John A. MoEwen, for the complainants:
    The question in this case is as to the extent of the doctrine of Us pendens, or whether the pendency of a suit in the State of Virginia is notice to purchasers in Tennessee of property in litigation in the former State.
    The text writers, in discussing this question, use the broadest and most general language; and if there be any thing in the use of words, then does the doctrine of Us pendens apply equally “to all the world.” Eor instance, Mr. Story, in the first volume of his work on Equity, § 406, uses this language, and it is almost identical with that of other writers and authorities: “A lis pendens, however, being only a general notice of an equity to all the world,” etc. The question is, what do the Courts mean when they say that lis pendens is notice to “all the world?” Do these words apply only to persons within the jurisdiction of the Court; or to all persons, in whatever jurisdiction, who have in any way connected themselves with the subject-matter of the litigation?
    The doctrine is founded rather upon public policy than the justice of its application in particular cases; for it will readily he admitted that its application is sometimes attended with great hardship. Upon this ground it was established in this country in the early cases of Murray vs. Ballew and Murray vs. Finster, 1 and 2 Johns. Chan. Rep.; and in Pitcher vs. Livingston, 4 Johns., Chancellor Kent uses this language: “ I have no doubt the rule will sometimes operate with hardship upon a purchaser without actual notice; but this seems to be one of the cases in which private mischief must yield to general convenience; and most probably the necessity of such a hard application of the rule will not arise in one out of a thousand instances. On the other hand, we may be assured the rule would not have existed, and have been supported for centuries, if it had not been founded in great public utility.”
    Inasmuch, therefore, as the rule does not proceed upon the idea of actual notice, it is difficult to see why its operation should be restricted to the jurisdiction of the Court in which the litigation is pending. The rule oi lis pendens is even higher in its nature than what in law is called “ constructive notice;” for while the latter, according to the authority of Rogers vs. Jones, 8 New Hampshire Rep., is only “a legal presumption of so high a nature as to be conclusive unless rebutted,” the former operates as an inflexible rule of public policy, and cannot be rebutted at all. And it would seem, therefore, that if any difference were made at all between subjects of the home jurisdiction and foreigners, it should be in favor of the former.
    Since the rule may be regarded as clearly established, to some extent or other, by an unbroken course of judicial decision, we think that the same ample interpretation should be given to it as is given to our domestic registration acts. When it is said that the registration of a paper is notice “to all the world,” the Courts mean precisely what they say — that the act is notice “to all the world,” whether within or beyond the limits of the State. It is true that foreign tribunals may choose, as they have the power, to give a different effect to such registered instruments, but this does not weaken the argument in favor of a consistent and uniform construction by the domestic Courts. This would seem to be particularly appropriate in this country, for the States of this Union constitute but one people, and are not, as among themselves, foreign sovereignties.
    Notwithstanding the frequency with which it might be supposed that such a state of facts would exist in this country, it is singular that no case can be found presenting the precise question now before this Court, and we are left to argue what ought to be decided from what has already been established. The authorities already referred to, together with the cases of Griffith vs. Griffith, 1 Hoff., Jackson vs. Ketcham, 8 Johns., Owings vs. Myers, 3 Bibb, and other leading cases collected in the second volume of White & Tudor, proceed upon a substantial similarity of facts, unlike the present case in one of its main features; but they furnish the principles, it is thought, upon which this case can and should he decided for complainants.
    But it is argued that, though the doctrine of Us pen-dens might otherwise operate in fayor of complainants, they have lost its aid by delay in the prosecution of their suit in Virginia. In the nature of things, there can be no settled rule on this subject. In the case of Watson ys. Wilson, 2 Dana, the Court uses this language in laying down a general rule, if it can be called such, for the diligence proper to be shown by a plaintiff in the prosecution of his suit: “We deem it strictly proper that he should be held to something like reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his suit, to entitle himself to the protection of the rule.” The same Court, in deciding that cause, cites “a case decided by Lord Clarendon,” and approved by Lord Nottingham, in which “the bill was filed in 1640, abated by a death in 1648, the purchase made in 1661, and the bill of revivor not filed till 1662; still the purchaser was held bound.” It is true that this case has not been uniformly approved, but it has at least aided in establishing the rule that the plaintiff must be guilty of culpable negligence or laches in prosecuting his suit to enable the purchaser to escape the doctrine of lis pendens. And it is now insisted that, when all the circumstances of the case now before the Court are considered, it will appear that the complainants have been guilty of no such laches.
    
    W. E. CoopeR, for the defendants:
    1. The complainants insist that the pendency of the litigation in the State of Virginia prevents the bar of the statute of limitations in tbis State. We think the doctrine of Ms pendens has no extra-territorial effect, but is merely a rule of policy, like the rule that every man is presumed to know the law, which the Courts of every country apply in reference to the legal proceedings of their own Courts. A man in one State is not presumed to know the laws of another State, neither is he compelled to take notice of a Ms pendens in such foreign State.
    2. This point was conceded in the Court below, but it was insisted that the comity existing between the different States of this Union might alter the case. I understand the rule to be otherwise well settled on principle, although the precise point seems never to have been decided. Neither by the Constitution nor by the acts of Congress in regard to the effect of the judgments of one State in another State have the judgments of one State been endowed with the force of judgments in any other; and though conclusive both in pleadings and evidence as matters of estoppel, (on the parties,) they possess no legal authority in themselves. 2 Amer. Leading Cases, 571; 13 Pet., 312; 4 McCord, 278; 7 G. & J., 474.
    3. It results, moreover, from the definition of notice by Ms pendens, that it cannot continue after a final decree, which necessarily puts an end to the pendency of the suit which constitutes the notice. Leading Cases in Equity, part 1, vol. ii.,.p. 158; JPriceys. White, 1 Bailey’s Equity, 234; Ibid., 208; Turner vs. Qrebell, 1 Ohio, 304.
    4. The protection afforded, by the institution of a suit against the intervention of the claims of purchasers may also be lost before it is terminated, by negligence in its prosecution. Leading Cases in Equity, 158; Q-ibler vs. 
      Trimble, 14 Ohio, 323; Trimble vs. Boothby, Ibid., 109; Watson ys. Wilson, 2 Dana, 406.
   OaeutheRS, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises a question upon the application of the doctrine of lis pendens in a shape in which it has not before perhaps been presented to our Courts. It comes up upon demurrer to the hill. The facts set forth in the hill are these: Joshua Shelton, of Virginia, by his will, left the slaves from which those in controversy descended to his wife Polly Shelton for life, and then to the complainants. In 1819, they filed their hill in the Chancery Court at Lynchburg, Virginia, against the widow and Bell and Woodruff, upon the ground that they had conspired to defeat the remainder, and to have the same made secure by bond for the forthcoming of the slaves at the termination of the life-estate. The security was given under an order of the Court by Bell, but his sureties became insolvent, and he removed with the slaves to Tennessee in 1820. The defendants hold said slaves as purchasers from Bell or his vendees, either mediate or immediate. By a decree of 24th June, 1853, the rights of the parties were adjudicated and settled in that suit; and the case still continuing on the docket, an order was made in 1856 that Ralph Shelton and another should pursue the slaves, and, if necessary, bring suit for them. In pursuance of that authority, this bill was filed on the 28th July, 1856. Polly Shelton died in 1850.

It is further charged in the bill that said Bell claimed the negroes as his own in Tennessee from 1820 to about 1838, when he conveyed those now sued for to Eerrell to defraud his creditors. He sold Matilda and her children to Johnson, who died, and they were bought at the public sale of the property by defendant Alford, who now holds and claims them. In 1844, said Jonathan Bell sold Wesley, another one of the slaves, to David A. Bell, his son, to defraud his creditors, and he,' in the same year, sold him to Robards, and he to the defendant Bailey Johnson.

Eor these slaves this bill is filed against Alford, Johnson, and David A. Bell. The defendants demur, upon the ground that, by the showing of the bill, they are protected by the statute of limitations. In answer to this, the complainants contend that the defence cannot be allowed, because of the pendency of their suit in Virginia for these slaves from the year 1819 until the present time, and that by the doctrine of lis pendens no valid right could be acquired to these slaves to which they claimed title in their suit finder any of the defendants in the same. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer, upon the ground, as he states in his decree, “that the pendency of the litigation in the State of Virginia, mentioned in the bill, was no notice to the defendants of complainant’s rights, nor of such litigation, and consequently that the complainants’ claim to the negroes in controversy has been long since barred by the statute of limitations.”

Without stopping to inquire for the present whether there are no other grounds upon which the decree could be maintained besides that on which the Chancellor places it, we will briefly examine that. The argument here is confined to that point, and if that is with the defendants it is certainly decisive of the case, without reference to other grounds that might probably, in reference to the statute of limitations, be assumed.

Then, if the pendency of a suit in the Courts of this State for personal property would prevent the operation of the statute in favor of one claiming adversely upon a title and possession commencing during the pendency of the suit, which question need not now be considered, would a suit in another State have the same effect? or, in other -words, does the doctrine of Us pendens have estra-territorial application? •

The rule on this subject is, that any interest acquired in the subject-matter of a suit while it is pending will be regarded as a nullity as to the plaintiff’s title, which may be established by a judgment or decree in the suit.

The rule is generally placed on the ground of notice either actual or constructive. The law presumes that “judicial proceedings during their continuance,” says Adams in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, at page 157, “are publicly known throughout the realm.” In note 1 on the same page it is laid down that “the whole world — that is, all men in that jurisdiction or State — are warned that they meddle at their peril with the property sued for, and specifically pointed out, in such judicial proceedings.” Such is there said to be the principle of lis pendens. This rule is founded more upon the necessity for it, to give effect to the proceedings of Courts, than upon any presumption of notice. Without such a principle, all suits for specific property might be rendered abortive,, by successive alienations of the property in suit; so that at the end of one suit, another would have to be commenced; after that, another, by which it would be rendered almost impracticable for a man ever to make bis rights available by a resort to the Courts of justice. Whether this rule is founded on the idea of notice, or is a positive, arbitrary rule, suggested and sanctioned by policy or necessity, there is certainly no principle more essential to the administra'tion of justice than the doctrine of Us pendens, though attended with occasional hardships. But if extended beyond its proper limits, it would become unjust and pernicious. This whole doctrine is very fully examined in French vs. Loyal Company, 5 Leigh, 646-681; 2 Rand., 102; and Leading Cases in Equity, part 9, vol. ii., 158.

But the question here is not so much what the doctrine is, as the extent of its application. A very able and ingenious argument is made in this case to prove that the same effect must be given to the pendency of a suit in this respect in all the States of this Union that it has in the local forum.

We are referred to Article 4, § 1, of the Constitution of the United States to establish this position. “Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to ^the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.” It is argued that the suit in Virginia was a “judicial proceeding,” and that as its effect, under the doctrine of Us pendens, would there be to avoid all cotemporary sales of the property, the same effect must be given to it in this State.

By the next clause, Congress is required to prescribe by general laws the manner in which such “records and judicial proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.” This provision has never been held to authorize the issuance of final process to execute decrees and judgments of another State. It only recognizes the rights of parties as settled according to such record, and becomes the foundation of an action in any other State in the place of the original cause, and closes all investigation of the merits, where it appears the Court from which the record comes had jurisdiction of the parties, with some few excepted cases. This is what is meant by giving “full faith and credit.” It does not mean that all the effects and consequences of a litigation in one State shall follow it to another.

The principle of Us pendens is, as we have seen, to prevent any obstruction being thrown in the way of the execution of a judgment after it has been pronounced at the end of a litigation in the Courts, by intervening rights acquired to the thing sued for. Nights so acquired will not be permitted to frustrate the objects of a suit in Court, but will be passed over as if they had never existed. But the judgments of sister States cannot be executed here by process, and therefore the reason of the rule does not apply. There is no recognized comity between the States that would require such an effect to be given to judicial proceedings, of „which we are aware.

It is a very strong and forced presumption to make, in most cases, within the same State, that all its citizens have knowledge or notice of all the suits that may be pending in all the Courts of record in the State. But though we know it is the presumption of an impossibility, yet the urgent policy of the rule has forced its adoption. But it would be an absurd and unreasonable extension of it to make it apply to every Court in the Union. This would shock the common sense of mankind, and bring odium upon the whole doctrine. The phrase thrown out in the books, in laying down the rule that “ Us pendens is notice to all the world,” must he limited in its construction to all persons within the jurisdiction or State where the suit was pending. It cannot he carried further upon correct principles or reason, and there is no authority on the question to control us.

The result is that the decree of the Chancellor is correct, and must he affirmed.