Case ID: iowa_1/html/0143-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Weight, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Edmonds, Assignee v. Montgomery & Shaw.
    In an action on a judgment rendered in another state, if the record shows that the defendant appeared by attorney, it is sufficient, without disclosing the name of the attorney who thus appeared for defendant.
    Where the record shows that the plaintiff’s attorney produced a power of attorney to confess a judgment, and that its execution by defendants, was duly proven to the satisfaction of the court, the further entry, that another attorney, after such proof, appeared and waived errors, and confessed judgment, we can but regard more as a matter of form than as going to the substance, so far as relates to an examination of the judgment in our courts.
    If the judgment of a sister state is simply erroneous, and not void, it will be valid here upon its face.
    A judgment may be assigned, so that the assignee can sue thereon in his own name.
    
      When a judgment is assigned, the assignee becomes the pa,rty in interest', and, under our Code, the suit must be brought in the name of the real party-interested.
    Cinder the act of January 24, 1853, which provides that in all actions, then or thereafter to be instituted in our courts, upon any note, bill, bond, or other evidence of debt or liability, it shall not be necessary to prove the execution or assignment of the same, unless such execution or assignment is specificaEy denied by the defendant, under oath, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the assignment of the judgment, until it was denied by the defendant, under oath.
    
      Appeal from the -Polk District Court.
    
    This suit was determined at tbe March term, 1855, of tbe Polk District Court. Tbe plaintiff declared upon a judgment rendered in tbe Circuit Court of Shelby county, Indiana, in tbe year 1842, against said Montgomery & Sliaw, in favor of Joseph J. Boone, and which judgment, be avers, was assigned to him by one Kinsley, tbe administrator of said Boone, on tbe 9th day of November, 1850. Tbe judgment declared on, in substance, recites that at tbe March term, 1842, of the said Sbelby Circuit Court, tbe said plaintiff (Boone) appeared by Maybew, bis attorney, and bled Ms declaration against tbe said defendants, and also a power of attorney executed by said defendants, which was duly proven to b§ so executed by said defendants before, and to tbe satisfaction of said court, by a competent witness, for tbe uses and purposes expressed; and that, thereupon, came tbe said defendants, by-, an attorney at law of said court, and, by virtue of said power of attorney, waived error for want of writ and service, and confessed that they Gould not deny tbe plaintiff’s action, with other averments in tbe usual form, closing with a judgment against defendants, in favor of Boone, under and by virtue of said power of attorney. To tbis petition, defendant Montgomery answered, in which be denies: L His indebtedness-; 2. Tbat be executed any power of attorney authorizing any attorney to confess sucb judgment; 8. Tbe assignment of said judgment to Edmonds; 4. Tbat it is bis property; 5. That Kinsley bad been appointed administrator of said Boone’s estate, or bis authority to assign said judgment; and, also, avers that said Boone had not departed this life. This answer was not sworn to. To this answer, the plaintiff teplied, reaffirming the allegations of the petition, and denying the averments of the answer. „„ The only evidence introduced on the trial, by the plaintiff, was the transcript sued ■on. None was offered by the defendant, to sustain his answer. A jury was impanneled to try the issues, to whom the court, at the request of the defendant, gave the following instructions: ■ •
    
      “ 1. That -it was necessary, when a judgment by confession is sued on, that the name of the person authorized to appear and confess judgment, should appear in the record.
    
      “ 2. That before the plaintiff can recover in this action, he must show, by the record sued upon, that the defendants were served with process, or that they appeared in .person, or by some attorney named as such in saidrecord.
    “3. That in-order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, he must prove to the jury the assignment of said record to the plaintiff-”
    The plaintiff asked for the following instruction: “ That it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the assignment bf the judgment in this'-cause to plaintiff, because the assignment was not denied under oath,” which was refused. To the giving, and refusal to give, these instructions, the plaintiff excepted. The jury returned a verdict for defendants. A motion was made by -the plaintiff for a new trial, alleging that the court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the verdict was 'against the law and evidence, whieh motion was overruled, and judgment Tendered against plaintiff for costs. The plaintiff appeals, and in this court assigns as error the giving the above instructions, and the refusal to grant a new trial.
    
      J. F. Jewett, for appellant.
    
      Sates & Finch, for appellee.
   Weight, C. J.

Tbe first and second instructions we will consider 'together, as they in substance contain tbe same proposition. Tbat proposition is, tbat plaintiff could not recover on tbe proof made, because tbe name of tbe attorney confessing tbe judgment did not appear on tbe record. No sufficient reason or authority has been urged at law, fox this ruling; neither, indeed, do we think there can be.

It will be observed tbat no objection is taken, tbat tbe court bad not jurisdiction of the subject matter. It is not claimed tbat defendants were not brought into‘court by tbe ordinary service of summons or notice. These instructions do not deny but tbat defendants might appear by attorney and confess judgment, and a judgment so rendered, upon such confession, would be regular. But because tbe name of tbe attorney does not appear in tbe record, therefore, tbe judgment cannot be collected here. It must be concluded tbat tbe appearance of tbe defendants amounts to tbe same, whether in person or by attorney. This record does show tbat defendants appeared by attorney. There is no- evidence to contradict tbe fact, and tbe record must therefore be taken as true. See Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Patterson v. The State of Indiana, 2 G. Greene, 492. Tbe reasoning used in tbe latter case, is entirely applicable to tbe case at bar. See also Fields v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C. 155; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vermont, 263.

So far as tbe question is concerned at this time in this court ’(however it may be in an appellate court of Indiana), we regard it immaterial whether any attorney, other than Maybew, appeared. It is shown tbat be produced tbe power of attorney, and tbat its execution by tbe defendants, was duly proven by competent evidence, to tbe satisfaction of tbe court. Tbe further entry, tbat another attorney, after such proof, appeared and waived errors and confessed judgment, we cannot but regard more a matter of form, than as going to tbe substance, so far as relates to tbe examination of it in our courts. Eor it must be borne in mind, tbat if tbe judgment was simply erroneous, and not void, it would be valid here upon its face. But suppose tbis record bad-said tbat said defendants appeared bj attorney, without pretending to set forth bis name, would not the judgment un-impeached, be valid here ? We can see no reason why it would not. Says the court in the case of Shumway v. Stillman, above cited, that if the record of the judgment states the fact, that defendant did appear by attorney, that is suf-' ficient evidence of the fact, until contradicted, and that, of course, by proof. To allow parties to avoid judgments rendered in other states, for such technical and unfounded reasons, would be to entirely destroy the faith and credit due to judicial proceedings, and leave nothing to intendment or presumption, but require proof of that which all our courts concede to b g prima facie true, if not conclusive.

Next as to the proof of the assignment. And here the first question that arises, is, can a judgment be assigned, so that the assignee thereof can sue thereon in his own name ? We hold he can. When assigned, he is the party in interest, and under our Code, the suit must be brought by the real party in interest. Section 1676. To hold otherwise, would be to allow a suit to be prosecuted in the name of a party not having an interest in the subject matter, which is not permissible bjr the spirit or the letter of our law. The assignee, of course, takes it subject to any defences which the judgment debtor may have against it. In this view, and this right being so protected, the defendant cannot object ; and we see no reason in principle, why such assignee is not the proper person to prosecute the suit in his own name. See upon this subject, the cases of Ford v. Stuart, 19 Johns. 342, and Bridge v. Johnson, 5 Wend. 342.

Then, should this assignment have been proved, not having been denied under oath. By an act, approved January 24, 1853 (Laws of 1853,187), itis provided, that in all actions then or thereafter to be instituted in our courts, upon any note, bill, bond, or other evidence of debt or liability, it shall not be necessary to prove the execution or assignment of the same, unless such execution or assignment is specifically denied by defendant under oath. We think this statute is decisive 'upon this question. This judgment may be said to be both an “ evidence of debt,” and a “liability,” and as such it was not necessary to prove the assignment thereof, until denied under oath. This assignment was not denied under oath, and therefore the court below erred in giving the third instruction asked by defendant, and refusing the instruction asked by plaintiff. We do not, of course, mean that it was not necessary that the assignment should appear on the transcript or record, but what is meant, is, that if there was what purported to be an assignment, no proof was necessary to show its execution, until the same was denied under oath.

Judgment reversed.