Case ID: br_316/html/0182-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "THOMAS, Circuit Judge, THOMAS, Circuit Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re: UPLAND PARTNERS, A HAWAII LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Debtor, William S. Ellis, Jr., Appellant, v. Richard Emery, Trustee; Oniel Eugene Long, Jr., Trustee for the Gene and Sara Long Family Trust dated March 23, 1994; Sara Moreland Long, Trustee for the Gene and Sara Long Family Trust dated March 23, 1994; Roy Clark Kesner; William Lemke; KRS Development, Inc.; Masaru Sumida, Trustee under that certain unrecorded Self-Trusted Trust dated June 29, 1993; Charley Shiraishi, Trustee under that certain Revocable Trust of Charley Shiraishi, dated June 3, 1991; Banana Growers of Hawaii, Inc.; County of Maui; Richard B.; Kimo C. Leong; Charles H. Brower, Appellees, and Quadrant Holdings Pty, Ltd.
    No. 03-15621.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 15, 2004.
    
    Decided June 30, 2004.
    
      William S. Ellis, Jr., Honolulu, HI, pro se.
    Lyle S. Hosoda, Esq., Lyle S. Hosoda & Associates, Robert E. Strand, Esq., Carls-mith Ball, Christian P. Porter, Esq., Brooks Tom Porter & Quitiquit, Wray H. Kondo, Jonathan W.Y Lai, Wayne K.T. Mau, Esq., Joelle K. Chiu, Esq., Watanabe Ing & Kawashima, Komeiji LLP, Robert K. Matsumoto, Honolulu, HI, James B. Takayesu, Deputies Corporation Counsel, Wailuku, Maui, HI, for Appellees.
    Richard B., Honolulu, HI, pro se.
    Kimo C. Leong, Honolulu, HI, pro se.
    Charles H. Brower, Honolulu, HI, pro se.
    Before: LEAVY, THOMAS, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

William S. Ellis, Jr. appeals the district court’s order dismissing his appeal of a bankruptcy court order because he was not an “aggrieved party” entitled to appeal the decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we dismiss the case.

In addition to the traditional standing requirements, the bankruptcy court imposes an additional prudential standing requirement that a party must be a “ ‘person aggrieved’ by the bankruptcy court’s order.” Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir.1999). “An appellant is aggrieved if ‘directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court’; in other words, the order must diminish the appellant’s property, increase its burdens, or detrimentally affect its rights.” Id. (citing Fondiller v. Roberston (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir.1983)).

Whether Ellis is a “person aggrieved” is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. Id. The party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish standing to sue. See San Diego Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1996).

Ellis alleges that the bankruptcy court’s order decreased the value of the bankruptcy estate of which Ellis is an equity holder. Ellis’ argument fails. We find no evidence of record demonstrating how the bankruptcy court’s order decreases or increases the value of the estate. Ellis does state that the agreement at issue obligated other parties to make “certain payments” to the debtor; however, he has not alleged what these payments are or how they could be recovered.

In his individual capacity Ellis does not meet the definition of a “person aggrieved.” Our decision that Ellis lacks standing is based on statements by the bankruptcy court upon which the district court relied in making its determination that Ellis lacked standing. The bankruptcy court stated that it did not decide the following questions: (1) whether Ellis retained rights under the Second Amended and Restated Kulamanu Development Agreement (“SARKDA”); (2) whether Ellis had to be a party to an effective release of SARKDA; or (3) what effect the release would have without Ellis’ participation. Our decision is also premised on our understanding that Ellis retains the right to challenge the validity of the release order in a separate proceeding.

The district court properly determined that Ellis was not a “person aggrieved.”

DISMISSED.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge.

I agree that the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order should be affirmed. However, I would do so on the merits. I would hold that Ellis has prudential standing to pursue an appeal of the bankruptcy court order absent a final determination that he has no right, title, or interest in the property at issue and the Second Amended and Restated Kulamanu Development Agreement. See Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass’n v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 219 F.3d 895 (9th Cir.2000). 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.