Case ID: f-appx_325/html/0468-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Manuel MURUETA-ESPINOSA, Appellant.
    No. 08-2669.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
    Submitted: Jan. 13, 2009.
    Filed: April 20, 2009.
    
      John E. Beamer, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Appellee.
    Nicholas Drees, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, IA, for Appellant.
    Manuel Murueta-Espinosa, Des Moines, IA, pro se.
    Before MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KAYS, District Judge.
    
      
      . The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.
    
   PER CURIAM.

Manuel Murueta-Espinosa challenges his 24-month prison sentence imposed by the district court after he pleaded guilty to one count of being an illegal alien who returned to the United States without proper consent following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1). On appeal, Murueta-Espinosa argues that the district court erred in classifying his prior conviction under Iowa Code § 714.7, “Operating Vehicle Without Owner’s Consent,” as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.

I.

On appeal, we review the sentence to ensure that the district court did not commit a significant procedural error such as misealeulating the Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We review a district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir.2005).

In United States v. Lindquist, we expressly held that a prior Iowa conviction for operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent constituted a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 2K2.1(a). 421 F.3d 751, 753-55 (8th Cir.2005). Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Be-gay v. United States, holding that to be considered a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the crime must be similar in kind to the example crimes listed in the statute. — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1583, 1585-86, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). In United States v. Williams, we held that, in light of Begay, the Missouri offense of auto theft without consent should no longer be considered a crime of violence under § 2K2.1. 537 F.3d 969, 975-76 (8th Cir.2008).

Here, Iowa’s statute for operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent is analogous to Missouri’s auto theft without consent statute. Compare Iowa Code § 714.7 (“Any person who shall take possession or control of any ... vehicle ... without the consent of the owner of such, but without the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof ....”) with Mo.Rev.Stat. § 570.030 (“A person commits the crime of stealing if he or she appropriates property ... of another with the purpose to deprive him or her thereof ... without his or her consent....”). Iowa’s statute and the Missouri statute discussed in Williams are sufficiently similar such that the decision in Williams controls this ease. Therefore, we hold that the Iowa offense of operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent is no longer a “crime of violence” for purposes of§ 2L1.2.

II.

Accordingly, we vacate Murueta-Espi-nosa’s sentence and remand for resentenc-ing in accordance with this opinion. 
      
      . The distinction between "crime of violence” under § 2K2.1 and under § 2L1.2 is immaterial for purposes of this decision.