Case ID: va_5/html/0177-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "LYONS, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Rowe and Others v. Smith.
    [Tuesday, May 7, 1799.]
    Evidence — Deposition between Different Parties.’’— Depositions taken in a cause relative to the same subject, hut not between the same parties, cannot he read in evidence in a subsequent suit.
    John Smith brought a writ of right in the District Court of King and Queen, against Rachel Rowe, devisee and widow of Richard Rowe, deceased, and John Rowe, son and devisee of the said Richard Rowe, deceased, for one tenement and sixty-three acres of land, in the county of King and Queen. The common plea was put in for the tenants, and issue joined in the usual manner.
    On the trial of the cause, the tenants filed a bill of exceptions to the Court’s opinion, which stated, that the demandant offered in evidence the depositions of Benjamin Scott and Anthony Perryman, two witnesses now deceased, taken in an action of trespass formerly in this Court depending between Rachel Rowe plaintiff, and Justice Beadles defendant, and prayed that the same might be admitted to be read in evidence in this cause, to which the tenants objected, alleging that the said parties were not parties to this suit with those who were parties to that cause, but that the Court over-ruled the objection; because it appeared that the said action of trespass was brought by Rachel Rowe, who is the same Rachel Rowe now one of the tenants in this suit, for a trespass, supposed to be committed on the premises now in dispute, by Justice Beadles, who claimed the lands under the present demandant; who had before that time covenanted with the said Beadles to convey to him the lands in dispute, being then in possession of part of the premises; and the depositions related to the same title of the said lands, as well in the action of trespass as in the present suit, and they were taken in the said action of trespass, after due notice of the time and place of taking the same; and 488 *that it likewise appeared that, at the time of bringing the said action of trespass the said Rachel Rowe was tenant for life, and John Rowe, the other tenant in the present suit, was reversioner in fee of the same.” Verdict and judgment for the demandant: From which judgment the tenants appealed to this Court.
    Warden, for the appellant.
    The: depositions were not taken in a suit between the same parties; and, therefore, there was no opportunity of cross-examining. Besides, the subject in controversy was not the same in both Courts.
    Marshall, contra.
    The subject of controversy was precisely the same, in both suits; for, in both, the title to this land was in question.
    As to the objection, that the parties were not the same in both Courts, there is no weight in it: Because, the rule is, that verdicts (and, therefore, I infer depositions,) may be given in evidence between privies, as assignees, descendants, or purchasers. So that I conceive, whenever the title is the same and comes from the same source, the deposition in one suit may be read in another. In this case, the plaintiff in the first suit was a purchaser under the plaintiff in this.
    Cur. adv. vult.
    
      
      See Chapman v. Chapman, 1 Munf. 389; mono-graphic note on “Depositions” appended to Field v. Brown, 24 Gratt. 74.
    
   LYONS, Judge.

Delivered the resolution of the Court, that the depositions were not admissible, and, therefore, that the judgment ought to be reversed. That if there be a recovery by verdict against tenant for life, this is no evidence against a reversioner. Buller’s N. P. 232, cites Yelv. [23, Brode v. Owen,] and by parity of reasoning, the depositions in the present case ought not to have been read in evidence.

The judgment was as follows: “The Court is of opinion that the said judgment is erroneous in this, that the said Court permitted the depositions of Benjamin Scott and Anthony Perryman taken in an action brought by the appellant Rachel, against one Justice Beadles, for a 489 ^'trespass supposed to have been committed by the said Beadles on the premises now in dispute as stated in the bill of exceptions, filed in this suit, to be read in evidence on the trial against the appellant John, who was not a party in the action of trespass aforesaid, and does not claim or hold the said premises from or under the said Rachel Rowe or Justice Beadles, and who, not having had the liberty of cross-examining the said witnesses, should not be injured or bound by what he ■was not allowed to contest. Therefore, it is considered that the said judgment be reversed and annulled, and that the appellants recover against the appellee their costs by them expended in the prosecution of their appeal aforesaid here, and it is ordered, that the jurors’ verdict be set aside, and a new trial be had in the cause, and that on such trial the said District Court do not permit the depositions aforesaid to be read in evidence.”

Judgment reversed.