Case ID: f-appx_6/html/0125-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Willie PALMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. John B. TAYLOR, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 00-6915.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 28, 2001.
    Decided March 16, 2001.
    Willie Palmer, pro se. Linwood Theodore Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, VA, for appellee.
    Before LUTTIG and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Willie Palmer appeals the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal substantially on the reasoning of the district court. See Palmer v. Taylor, No. CA-99-794-A (E.D.Va. June 13, 2000). Notably, Palmer claims that, pursuant to the recent case of Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000), the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding his ineligibility for parole. Palmer was convicted of robbery and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony; his conviction and sentence became final in 1997. While the Supreme Court of Virginia recently announced a new rule of criminal procedure that requires that the jury be instructed as to a defendant’s ineligibility for parole in non-capital state trials, the United States Supreme Court has not held that due process requires such an instruction in non-capital state trials. Consequently, a decision in Palmer’s favor would require the enunciation and retroactive application of a new rule, in violation of § 2254(d)(1) and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). See Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 406 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that § 2254(d)(1)’s retro-activity limitation is more stringent than Teague’s), aff'd, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000). Thus, this claim is without merit.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED.