Case ID: wis_163/html/0577-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "WiNslow, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

State ex rel. Ervin, Respondent, vs. County Board of Supervisors of Vilas County and another, Appellants.
    
      May 23
    
    June 13, 1916.
    
    
      Statutes: Construction: Legalizing acts of county hoard: Division of town: Apportionment of indebtedness: Constitutional law: Special legislation: Local law: Title: Sufficiency.
    
    1. 'Ch. 17, Laws 1915, legalizing “all acts and proceedings” of the county hoard of Vilas county “relating to the detaching of certain territory” from one town and attaching parts thereof to other towns, “and in creating” two new towns from other parts thereof, validated, all the proceedings of the hoard relating to such readjustment and rearrangement of the town government in the county, including the apportionment of the net indebtedness of the town from which the territory was detached.
    2. Although, under sec. 672, Stats., the county hoard had no authority to apportion such indebtedness, the legislature, since it might have given such authority, could validate the unauthorized apportionment.
    3. Such validating act is not a special law for “incorporating any . . . town,” within the meaning of sub. 9, sec. 31, art. IV, Const.; nor is it a special law “for assessment or collection of taxes,” within the meaning of sub. 6 of that section.
    4. Under sec. 18, art. IV, Const., where a local law has one fundamental object and the various provisions of the law are mere details which relate or are germane to that object, it is sufficient to state that general object in the title.
    5. Ch. 17, Laws 1915, embraced but one general subject, and its title — “An act to legalize the acts of the county board ... in detaching certain territory from the town of . . . and attaching the same to the towns of . . . and in creating the towns of . . . in said county” — was sufficient without any specific reference therein to the apportionment of the indebtedness of the town from which the territory was detached.
    Appeal from a judgment of tbe circuit court for Vilas county: Chestee A. Eowlee, Judge.
    
      Reversed.
    
    
      Certiorari to set aside an ordinance passed by tbe County Board of Supervisors of Vilas County May 13, 1914, creating tbe town of Lincoln in Yilas county and determining tbe proportion of tbe indebtedness of tbe town of Eagle River chargeable thereto. Tbe petition challenges tbe validity of tbe ordinance because (1) tbe board did not consider tbe credits to which tbe new town was entitled by reason of buildings and other property retained by the town of Eagle River; (2) tbe county board bad no power to determine tbe amount of indebtedness chargeable to tbe new town; (3) tbe board failed to fix a time for tbe town boards to meet to determine tbe question of tbe apportionment of indebtedness and credits between tbe new town and tbe town of Eagle River out of which it was carved.
    It appears by tbe return that on May 13, 1914, seven ordinances were' passed by tbe defendant board, numbered from 1 to I inclusive; that each of tbe ordinances numbered from 1 to 5 purported (1) to detach territory from tbe town of Eagle River and attach it to another existing town, and (2) to determine tbe total indebtedness of Eagle River in excess of its credits and what proportion thereof should be paid by tbe town to which tbe territory was added; that ordinances numbered 6 and 7 each purported to (1) detach territory from Eagle River and establish a new town (one called Lincoln and tbe other Washington), (2) fix a time and place for tbe first town meeting, and (3) determine tbe amount of tbe indebtedness of Eagle River in excess of its credits and tbe portion thereof to be paid by tbe new town. It further appeared that tbe ordinances were duly recorded and published and copies filed in tbe various offices required by tbe statute and that a validating act was passed by the Wisconsin legislature known as cb. 17, Laws 1915. This act is entitled “An act to legalize tbe acts of tbe county board of Vilas county in detaching certain territory from tbe town of Eagle River and attaching tbe same to tbe towns of Conover, State Line, Presque Isle, Plum Lake and Earmington and in creating tbe towns of Lincoln and Washington in said county and in detaching certain territory from the town of Farming-ton and attaching the same to the town of Conover in said county.”
    The first section of said act reads as follows:
    “Section 1. All acts and proceedings of the county board of supervisors of Vilas county had on the thirteenth day of May, A. D. 1914, relating to the detaching of certain territory from the town of Eagle River in said county and attaching parts thereof to the towns of Conover, State Line, Presque .Isle, Plum Lake and Farmington and in creating the towns of Washington and Lincoln in said Vilas county; and all acts and proceedings of the county board of supervisors of Vilas county had on the third day of December, A. D. 1914, relating to the detaching of certain territory from the town of Farmington and attaching the same to the town of Conover in said county are hereby legalized.”
    The relator is a resident and taxpayer in the territory constituting the town of Lincoln and sued out this writ May 7, 1915.
    The circuit court adjudged that those parts of the ordinance creating the town of Lincoln (being ordinance number 7) which purport to determine the amount of the indebtedness of the town of Eagle River in excess of its credits and to determine the amount of such excess chargeable to the town of Lincoln were illegal and void, and from this judgment the defendants appeal.
    For the appellants there was a brief by O. H. Weigand and Curtis, Van Doren & Cole, and oral argument by Ceorge Curtis, Jr., and Llewellyn Cole. .
    
    For the respondent there was a brief by Niles A. Colman and Eberlein & Larson, and oral argument by Albert 8. Larson.
    
   WiNslow, C. J.

By sub. (1), sec. 670, Stats. 1913, the county board of any county is authorized to set off, organize, ' vacate, and change the boundaries of the towns in the county. It bas been- held by tbis court tbat tbis subdivision does not authorize tbe division of a town and tbe creation of a new town, but merely tbe change of boundaries of existing towns. State ex rel. Rosander v. Lippels, 133 Wis. 211, 113 N. W. 437.

By sec. 671 tbe county board is given power to divide a town provided tbat such division shall have been approved by vote of tbe electors at tbe next preceding annual town meeting pursuant to notice founded upon a petition of electors previously filed.

By sec. 672 it is provided tbat when a new town is formed from parts of an existing town or towns, or when territory is detached from one town and attached to another, tbe boards of tbe towns interested in tbe settlement shall meet in joint session and determine what portion of tbe indebtedness of tbe town from which tbe territory is taken shall be chargeable to and be paid by tbe new town or tbe town to which tbe territory is attached and what part of tbe credits shall be received by such last named town.

It is apparent from examination of these sections tbat ordinances numbered from 1 to 5 were valid so far as tbe detaching of territory from one town and attaching it to another was concerned, and tbat ordinances 6 and 7 were invalid so far as tbe creation of tbe two new towns was concerned, and tbat those parts of all tbe ordinances purporting to apportion tbe excess of indebtedness over credits were invalid.

Tbis was tbe situation when tbe validating act set forth in tbe statement of facts was passed, and tbe serious question is whether tbis act validated those parts of tbe ordinances relating to tbe apportionment of tbe excess of indebtedness as well as those parts relating to tbe detachment and division of territory.

We are clearly of opinion tbat tbis question should be answered in tbe affirmative.

As already stated there was no necessity for validating those portions of tbe first five ordinances which detached territory from one existing town and attached it to another, so, if the legislative intent was not to affect in any way the ap-portionments of the excess of indebtedness over credits, the legislature must be convicted of passing an entirely useless act so far as the first five ordinances were concerned. They needed no validation and every one must have known it.

Over and above this consideration, however, we can entertain no doubt from the comprehensive wording of the act and its title that the legislative intent was to cover the whole subject and validate all the proceedings of the board relating to this readjustment and rearrangement of the town government of Yilas county.

It is very evident that the whole scheme was viewed as one on the part of the county board and, quite as evident, we think, that it was viewed in the same way by the legislature.

“All acts and proceedings” . . . “relating to” the detaching of territory, “and in creating the towns of Washington and Lincoln,” are legalized. In our judgment the words “relating to” qualify the creation of the new towns as well as the detaching of .territory from old towns. The grammatical construction is not accurate or happy on account of the insertion of the word “in”'before “creating,”'but no such circumstance as this should interfere with evident intent. “All the acts and proceedings relating to” the creation of the towns of Washington and Lincoln must certainly include the proceedings fixing and apportioning the excess of indebtedness between those towns and the existing towns from which they were taken.

It is familiar law that the legislature may validate an act which it might have authorized in the first instance. Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 401. It is undoubted that the legislature could have given the county board authority to apportion the indebtedness and credits (such authority'in fact existed for years and until the passage of ch. 62 of the Laws of 1909), hence it could .validate the present unauthorized act of the board.

Rut it is said that this is a special act incorporating a town and hence void under sub. 9 of sec. 31 of art. IV- of the state constitution, which prohibits special legislation incorporating “any city, town or village.” It is sufficient to say in answer to this obj ection that it has been held by this court that the carving of a county into new towns by act of the legislature was not “incorporating” such towns within the meaning of the constitution. Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 605, 14 N. W. 833. This rule has not since been departed from. State ex rel. Graef v. Forest Co. 14 Wis. 610, 43 N. W. 551. If the legislature could create a new town by direct act, it could do so by a validating act.

Again, it is said that the law is a special law for the assessment or collection' of taxes and hence prohibited by sub. 6 of see. 31 of art. IV of the constitution. We have been unable to see how the law can be considered as a law for the collection or assessment of taxes. It simply determines what part of the net indebtedness of the town of Eagle River the new town shall pay.

The law is unquestionably a “local” law within the meaning of the constitution and hence can embrace but one subject which must be expressed in the title. Sec. 18, art. IV, Const. This provision, however, is to receive a liberal construction so that the legislative purpose may be accomplished if possible. Where there is one fundamental general object and the various provisions of the law are mere details which relate or are germane to that object, it is enough to state that general object in the title. The details are necessarily and logically included therein. In re Southern Wis. P. Co. 140 Wis. 245, 122 N. W. 801. We regard the clauses which apportion the net indebtedness of the old town as details which, though not necessarily included in the creation of the new town, are germane thereto and so closely and naturally connected therewith that they are sufficiently expressed in the title of the act before us.

By the Court. — Judgment reversed with costs, and action remanded with directions to the trial court to render judgment affirming the action of the county board.

Eoseitberry, J., took no part.