Case ID: ny-super-ct_57/html/0348-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court.—Sedgwick, Ch. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

ELIZABETH C. BARTLETT Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK AND SOUTH BROOKLYN FERRY AND STEAM TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellant.
    
      Ferry boat, injury caused by bumping against landing-place, thereby throwing plaintiff down—Contributory negligence, matters not constituting— Negligence, presumption of, when not rebutted—Passenger and carrier, relationship of, establishment, continuation and termination of, effect of, effect of non-payment of fare.
    
    Plaintiff took passage at New York city on one of defendant’s ferry boats plying between that city and the city of Brooklyn. There is conflicting evidence as to whether when the boat reached Brooklyn, and while lying there, she left the boat and returned to it, or remained on board. She was, however, on board on the return trip. There was also evidence bearing on the payment or tender of the fare for the return trip. On the return trip she was in the upper saloon of the boat, and as it was running into the ferry slip, she prepared to descend to the cabin below for the purpose of disembarking. She had arrived to within about three feet of the head of the stairway leading to the lower deck or was descending the stairway without having hold of the stair rail, when the boat struck against the bridge so forcibly that it rebounded eight or ten feet, throwing her from her footing down to the bottom of the stairs, causing the injuries complained of. The striking of the boat in this manner was unusual. The plaintiff’s eyesight was impaired, and she was suffering from other physical weaknesses.
    On the question of contributory negligence, Held. (1) That the plaintiff standing at the head of the stairs or descending them at the time when the boat touched the wharf was not, as a matter of law, contributory negligence, there being nothing in the case either by way of evidence, legal presumption or judicial cognizance to indicate to her that an ordinary bump would so far disturb her footing as to call on her, in ordinary prudence, to foresee that either of the positions was dangerous. (2) That plaintiff’s impaired sight or other physical weakness did not, as matter of law, make such standing or descending contributory negligence ; and did not, as matter of law, make the non-exercise by h$r of a higher degree of care for her own safety contributory negligence. (3) That descending the stairs without talcing hold of the stair rail at the time when the boat touched the dock did not, as matter of law, constitute contributory negligence, it not appearing, as matter of law, that to so descend would be dangerous under ordinary circumstances, and that it follows that a refusal to charge as matters of law, that the defendant was not liable if the fact that the plaintiff did not take hold of the rail contributed to her injuries, was correct. (4) That all of such matters taken together did not, as matter of law. constitute con-tributary negligence. (5) The charge of the court, that if plaintiff was three feet from the gangway she was not, as matter of law, negligent, and that the jury must determine whether it was or was not negligence for the plaintiff to go down stairs under the circumstances of the case, was correct.
    On the question of defendant’s negligence, Held. (l)There being evidence that • the rebound from the bridge was unusual, an explanation was needed from defendant to meet the presumption of negligence thus created. (2) To overcome the presumption of negligence arising from an unusual occurrence taking place in the navigation of a boat, it is not sufficient to simply show that the pilot believed that the course pursued by him was necessary and acted on that, and that he and the engineer (the fault, if any, being attributed to them, or one of them,) were officers of skill, knowledge and experience, and that they used their best skill and judgment and that the xercise of such skill and judgment would not certainly insure the landing of the boat without incurring the result of an unusual shock or jar, and a refusal to charge requests based on the sufficiency of such matters, is not error.
    On the question of relation of carrier and passenger, Held, (1) It is immaterial whether one boarding a passenger boat, (there being no binding rule requiring fare to be paid before the boat started) for the purpose of being carried on its trip actually pays the fare or not; if he goes on the boat meaning to pay his fare and to be a passenger, the relation of carrier and passenger is formed and is not ended at least so long as he intends to pay at any point of the trip. (2) Conceding that the carrier may end the relation by reason of the non-payment of fare, yet he can only do so by demanding that the party either pay the fare or leave the boat. (3) As in the case at bar the jury might have found that plaintiff either remained on the boat or left it and returned, meaning to pay her fare and be a passenger, and as it was not shown that there was any final demand for payment and omission to pay accompanied by a declaration, or its equivalent, that she must go from the boat, and there being no proof of any rule of the company binding on her which required the payment of fare before the boat left the slip; the refusals to charge that if the jury found that plaintiff did not pay her fare for the return trip, then the defendant was not liable, and to charge that if the jury found that plaintiff left the boat when her fare for the return trip was demanded and subsequently returned without paying her fare then defendant was not liable, were correct. As to whether there was an attempt to evade the obligation to pay fare was not made a question for the jury.
    Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Ingraham, JJ.
    
      Decided January 6, 1890.
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered upon verdict of jury, and from order denying motion for new trial, made upon the minutes.
    
      Burrill, Zábrisláe & Burrill, attorneys, and John E. Burrill and J. Archibald Murray of counsel, for appellant, on the questions considered in the opinion, argued:—-
    I. Plaintiff stated that when the boat struck, she had risen from her seat on the upper deck, and walked forward to the stairway leading to the deck below, and was -standing up three feet from the top stair, and that her arms were occupied with her parasol, and she was buttoning one glove with her other hand, and that she had not hold of anything to sustain her, and had thus deprived herself of the means of protecting herself. The only difference between her and the defendant’s witnesses was as to where she was. Wherever she was at the time, she was in the condition stated. Defendant’s witnesses state that she was coming down the stairs, and had not hold of the stair rail. She says that she was not on the stairs at all, but admits that she was in the condition stated. The court first charged that if she was where she said she was, then, as matter of law she was not liable, and then charged that if she was where the defendant claims that she was, it was for the jury to determine whether she was negligent. The plaintiff’s recovery was had on the ground that the boat was moving at such a rate of speed as to render her striking the dock with force apparent to all, and to lead every one to conclude that the dock would be struck with such violence as to knock down those who did not protect themselves. Plaintiff from her seat on the upper deck had a clear view of the slip and bridge and of the “situation,” and must have known (if her wit- ' nesses testify truly), that the boat was moving rapidly, and under such circumstances as to render a collision inevitable. The evidence proved that the plaintiff was so feeble and that her vision was so defective as to have attracted the attention of the boat hands, one of whom assisted her on the boat. Under such circumstances we claim that the court erred in its charge in both respects. (1). It was necessary for the plaintiff to prove an absence of contributory negligence on her part. Arnold v. Canal Co., 15 N. Y. State Rep. 310; Rogeru v. Enoch Morgan Sons, 16 Ib., 693. Where negligence is the issue it must be an unmixed case, otherwise plaintiff will be non-suited, even though defendant is also negligent. Deyo v. R. R., 34 N. Y. 9; Reynolds v. R. R., 58 Ib. 250; Hale v. Smith, 78 Ib. 480, 483; Donelly v. R. R., 109 Ib. 16. (2). There was no presumption of law that the plaintiff by standing where she said she was, in the condition in which she was, was not guilty of negligence. On the contrary, the circumstances raise a presumption of negligence on her part. If there were any doubt on that point the question was for the jury. R. R. Co. v. Pollard, 22 Wall. 341; Nolan v. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 63, 67; Thurber v. R. R. Co., 60 Ib. 326, 331; Hayes v. Miller, 70 Ib. 117. (3) On the other hand, if the plaintiff was on the stairs and in the condition claimed by the defendants, her negligence was apparent, as no person exercising ordinary care would, under the circumstances, attempt to go down the stairs without leaving her hands free or protecting herself by taking hold of the railing, and it was not under the circumstances a question for the jury. (4). If the court was correct in submitting to the jury the question of negligence based on her being on the stairs, it was equally a question for the jury if she were where she claimed that she was. (5). Both propositions cannot be right, but one of them must be wrong. (6). The condition of plaintiff, the fact that her hands, arms and attention were all occupied at such a time materially impaired her ability either to perceive or to protect herself from impending danger, and constituted contributory negligence. Salter v. R. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 631; Palmer v. Dearing, 93 Ib. 7, 12. The plaintiff unnecessarily and improperly placed herself in a place of danger at the head of or on the stairs while the boat was entering the slip at a great rate of speed, and was thereby guilty of contributory negligence. Coleman v. 2d Ave. Co., 114 N. Y. 610 ; Dougan v. Champlain Co., 6 Lans., 430 (affd. 56 N. Y. 1). It is contributory negligence for a passenger to do any voluntary act which unnecessarily exposes him to the risk of such injuries as a traveller is liable to. He should neither sit nor stand at any place obviously not intended for the use of passengers on the journey. 2 Sher & Red. Neg., § 519; Ward v. R. R. Co., 11 Abb. N. S., 411 ; Solomon v. R. R. Co., 1 Sweeney, 298 ; Clark v. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. 135. So far as the passengers were concerned, the stairway was merely a means of entrance to the upper deck of the ferryboat at the commencement and termination of the trip and the plaintiff went there during the trip at her peril. Dougan v. Trans. Co., supra.
    
    II. The court erred in its charge, and refusals to charge, on the question of defendant’s negligence. There is no claim that the pilot and other employees were not competent. On the contrary, it was shown that Olsen was a skillful, experienced man, using his best judgment, and that the boats of the company were, as a rule, extremely well handled. The accident was in this particular case unavoidable. Inevitable accident is where a vessel uses proper precautions against danger and an accident occurs. .“The highest degree of caution that can be used is not required. It is enough if it is such as is usual under similar circumstances, and has been found by long experience to be sufficient to answer the end in view—the safety of life and property.” The “ Austria,” 14 Fed. Rep. 298, 300; The “ Grace Girdler,” 7 Wall. 203. Carriers are not bound to provide against every possibility of danger to passengers. When a passenger travels by ship or by railway or any other public conveyance, he expects to .take and does take, the hazard of such accidents as may occur to him without any want of care or diligence on the part of the carrier. McPadden v. Railroad Co., 44 N. Y., 478, 489. The carrier is bound to furnish suitable and safe accommodations for passengers, but the duty is not imposed upon him of providing that they encounter no possible danger. Loftus v. Ferry Co., 84 N. Y. 455, 460. He is called upon to provide only against such danger as may reasonably be apprehended. Cleveland v. Ferry Co., 68 N. Y. 306, 310. The burden is on plaintiff to establish defendant’s negligence. It is not enough to prove, facts from which the conclusion of negligence or its absence may be drawn. Hart v. Bridge Co., 84 N. Y. 56. In any event the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the rule referred to, and charged, by the court, because if any presumption of negligence on the part of defendant was raised by plaintiff’s testimony, that presumption was sufficiently negatived by the evidence as to the violent and changeable cross-currents as above stated. And the question whether the preponderance of proof was in favor of defendant should have been submitted to the jury. In this respect the court erred. Seybolt v. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562.
    III.—The court erred in refusing to charge in accordance with the requests to the effect that in view of her physical condition she should have exercised a higher degree of care.' The evidence shows that the plaintiff’s sight was very defective, and that she was weak and feeble in walking. Her eyes, even with proper glasses, had less than one-half of normal vision. The rule is that if one faculty of sense is defective common prudence requires that an increased vigilance should be exercised to avert danger. Gonzales v, N. Y. & H. Co., 1 Sweeny, 506; Same v. Same, 38 N. Y. Supr. 57; Pierce on R. R., p. 335; Beach Contrib. Neg., § 147. And the question whether, under the circumstances, it was negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering her physical condition, to stand where she said she did with her hands occupied, is the precise question to be submitted to the jury. In a case where plaintiff’s sight was defective, and she was injured by falling into an opening in the street, held to be a question for the jury whether her presence in the street without an attendant was contributory negligence. Davenport v. Ruckman, 37 N. Y. 568, 573. These requests should have been charged. Coleman v. 2d. Ave. R. R., 114 N. Y, 610.
    IV. The court erred in refusing to charge in accordance with the requests as to non-payment of fare when demanded. We submit that the court did not place this before the jury in the manner in which under the evidence the defendant was entitled to have it submitted, and that defendant was ' entitled to a specific charge in accordance with these requests. Coleman v. Co., supra. The. demand for fare was made by the pilot on the upper deck.' He was the only person authorized to demand payment of her fare. The pilot testified that he demanded payment of her fare, and the plaintiff, after searching in her pockets, said she had no change and would go downstairs, whereupon she went downstairs without paying her fare. The witness saw her leave the ferryboat and go on to the ferry bridge. She then spoke to the deckhand who was on the bridge by the windlass, asking for change for five dollars, which he could not give her. The deckhand did not notice where plaintiff went after this conversation. The plaintiff on the other hand testified she never left the upper deck and paid her fare when demanded. Under these circumstances it is for the jury to say whether or not plaintiff refused payment of her fare and thereupon left the boat. If such was the fact, then plaintiff’s subsequent return to the boat without the knowledge or assent of the defendant as a trespasser or as a free passenger imposed no duty upon the latter to carry the plaintiff safely. Those who have not paid their fare and are on the carrier’s vehicle neither by his invitation, authorization nor consent, are trespassers. “ There must be a true undertaking to carry or the relation of carrier and passenger will not be held to subsist.” Beach Contrib. Neg., § 58; Robertson v. R. P. Co., 22 Barb. 91; Eaton v. R. P. Co., 57 N. Y., 382, Waterbury v. N. Y., Cent., 17 Fed. R. 671, Flower v. Penn. R.: R. 69 Pa. 210.
    
      Thomas E. Bochfort, attorney, and with Edward B. Whitney, of counsel, for respondent, on the questions considered in the opinion, argued—
    I. As to the question whether the plaintiff paid her fare." The exception to the refusal to charge that if she did not pay her return fare defendant is not liable is disposed of by the case of Cleveland v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 68 N. Y. 306; Thomson on Carriers of Passengers, pp. 43—4 and cases cited. The evidence would not support a claim of fraud, But intent to defraud was not claimed on the trial, Even if the question had been raised it would have been a question for the jury, not the court. MacCullar v. McKinley, 99 N. Y. 357. It is too late to raise the question now. The only question raised was, did plaintiff pay the return fare ? In Doran v. East River Ferry Co. 3 Lans. 105, plaintiff had crossed on the ferryboat and was on her return trip, not having paid the return fare. She was held a passenger, and her recovery for negligence sustained. The court’s refusal to make this charge was correct on the authority also of Carroll v. S. I. R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 133. Bretherton v. Wood, 3 Broad & Bing. 54 ; Phil. R. R. R. Co., v. Derby, 14 How. (U. S.) 483 ; Reed v. Holbrook, 4 Bing. 628; Loomis v. Ferry, 17 Wend. 197. The request assumes as uncontradicted a fact not'in evidence, or, if in evidence, contradicted : namely, that if she did not pay her fare, she intended to defraud the company, and hence was a trespasser. This fact was for the jury; and hence the request was properly refused. Le Roy v. Park F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 56. When requests to charge matters of law are founded on facts not conclusively proven, it is not error to refuse the requests. Soria v. Davidson, 53 Super. Ct. 470. The exception to the refusal to charge that if she left the ferryboat when her return fare was demanded and afterwards returned without paying fare, then defendant is not liable, fails for the same reason. Defendant’s requests are an attempt to obtain a charge that actions capable of an innocent construction are fraudulent as matter of law. But the fraud in this-case, if any, is a question cff fact Macullar v. McKinley, 99 N. Y. 357; Swarthout v. Merchant, 47 Hun, 107; Syracuse Chilled Plow. Co. v. Wing, 85 N. Y. 426; Starin v. Kelly, 36 Super. Ct. 366. Moreover, the latter request is vicious as assuming a thing of which there is no proof, namely, that plaintiff did not pay after returning to the boat if she left. The pilot admits that he was not the only person authorized to collect, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, plaintiff is entitled to all presumptions of innocence and regularity. Morris v. Talcott. 96 N. Y. 107. The court is not required to change an assumed state of facts not proven on the trial. Pratt y. Ogdon, 34 N. Y. 20. Defendant should have introduced the element of intent to defraud into its request if it wished for an exception. But in that case the court might have granted the request. As a matter of fact, the court by clear implication charged the jury that the plaintiff was not a passenger unless she paid her fare thus favoring defendant more than the law would warrant. The whole charge must be read together, and isolated portions cannot be excepted to for incompleteness if the whole conveys the correct impression. Caldwell v. N. J. S. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 282 ; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 Ib. 492.
    II. Defendant’s negligence. In an action of this character, it is necessary only for the plaintiff to show a situation which must have been produced by abnormal causes. The onus then rests on the defendant to prove that the injury was caused without his fault. Seybolt v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co. 95 N. Y. 568. Such a situation was shown by plaintiff. Defendant knowing that the onus rested on it attempted in vain to explain the accident as due to extraordinary conditions. The charge is fully sustained by the case of Seybolt v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. 95 N. Y. 566; Breen v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. 109 Ib. 297. Smith v. British, &c. Packet Co. 46 Super. Ct. 87. There was no error in the charge that defendant was bound to use utmost care. Carriers of passengers are bound to use every precaution which skill, care and foresight can provide Caldwell v. N. J. S. B. Co. 47 N. Y. 288, “ utmost vigilance ” Carroll v. S. I. R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. 137; “ utmost care” Maverick v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co. 36 N. Y. 381; Kelly v. Manhattan Ry. Co. 112 Ib. 443, 451, “ highest degree of care ” Smith v. British, &c., Packet Co., 46 Super. Ct. 86.
    III. As to contributory negligence. It cannot be necessary to argue that a lady has the right to stand three feet from the stairway and put on her gloves while the boat is coming into port, and that this cannot in any case be contributory negligence. But defendant cannot argue that this point should have been left to the jury, for he made no such request, but, on the contrary, asked a direction of verdict in his own favor on the point. He is, therefore, estopped to deny that the court had the right to treat the question as one of law. Stratford v. Jones, 97 N. Y. 586 ; Dillon v. Cockroft, 90 Ib. 649 ; Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 Ib. 443-448 ; Herendeen v. De Witt, 49 Hun, 53 ; Goodwin v. Bunzl, 6 Civ. Pro. 226 ; Gregory v. The Mayor, 11 State Rep. 506.
   By the Court.—Sedgwick, Ch. J.

The action was for damages, from the negligence of defendant’s servants in managing a steamboat. The boat ran on a ferry belonging to defendant. The boat entered the slip on the New York side of the East river and • struck against the bridge so that the boat rebounded from the bridge eight or ten feet as the jury might have found. At this time the plaintiff was upon the upper deck, two or three feet from the head of a stairway leading to the lower deck. The re-bound of the boat threw her from her footing down to the bottom of the stairs. The testimony of the defendant’s witnesses contradicted the testimony of the plaintiff. The jury gave a verdict in her favor.

The learned counsel presents as an error which requires the reversal of the judgment, that the judge refused to charge, that if the jury find that the plaintiff was standing at the top of the stairs on the ferry boat, or was descending the same at the time when the boat touched the wharf, then the defendant is not liable.

If the request were valid, it would be so on the ground that the position of the plaintiff, referred to in the request, would indicate the contributory negligence of plaintiff. There would be no such indication, however, if the plaintiff, in taking the positions, had no reason to think that if the boat was about to touch the bridge in the ordinary way and not in the way exhibited in the case, she would lose her footing. There was no proof in the case, nor is there any legal presumption, nor is it matter of judicial cognizance, that an ordinary bump of the boat against the bridge would so far disturb the plaintiff’s footing, that the plaintiff was bound in ordinary prudence to foresee that either of the positions was dangerous.

The court also properly refused to charge the . matter of the request, that if the jury are satisfied that it was not safe for the plaintiff, in view of her impaired sight or other physical weakness, to stand at the top of the stairs on the ferry boat, or to descend the same while the boat was entering the slip, then they must find that she took the risk of any accident that resulted from being there.

The existence of the impairment of plaintiff’s sight, did not contribute to the accident unless she was bound, perhaps, to think that her sight if not impaired would inform her that the boat was on a dangerous course, likely to end in bodily harm to' her. But she was not bound to foresee the likelihood of an unskilful management of the boat, or, if by chance she did perceive that, to further foresee the actually dangerous result of that unskilful management. Nor is the request correct in supposing that the plaintiff could not recover if it was not safe for her to do the thing specified. She was not bound to be safe in fact, but to use ordinary means to secure the safety that would exist under ordinary circumstances, excepting so far as she was bound to perceive that, in fact, the circumstances were extraordinary.

I am of opinion that the request was properly refused which embodied the proposition, that, if the plaintiff descended the stairs without taking hold of the stair-railing at the time when the boat touched the dock, then the defendant is not liable. It is to be said of this, that it did not appear, as matter of law, that it would be dangerous under ordinary circumstances not to have the hand on the railing before a shock that might be anticipated should occur. If it were of ordinary character, a jury might find that a prompt taking hold of the railing might make one safe; and, on the other side, if the shock had unusually quick and extreme results, the jury would be at liberty to find that such results could not be guarded against by a taking hold of the rail simply.

If it were not matter of law that the plaintiff was negligent in not taking hold of the rail, then the court was right in, refusing to charge, as matter of law, that the defendant was not liable if the fact that the plaintiff did not take hold of the rail contributed to plaintiff’s injury.

1 The court charged, that if the plaintiff were three feet from the gang-way, as' she said she was, then she was not negligent. In my opinion this charge was correct. Negligence is omission, and to establish it there must be proof that those circumstances existed which called for the prudence which was not used. Nothing in the case showed that if the boat had struck the bridge in an ordinary manner . the plaintiff was in danger of being injured, because she was three feet from the stairs, much less in danger of being thrown downstairs.

The court then further charged, that the jury must determine whether it was or was not negligence for the plaintiff to go downstairs under the circumstances of the case. I have already expressed the opinion, that whether or' not the plaintiff was bound to apprehend that there was to be an ordinary or extraordinary shock, it was • not matter of law that she should not use the stairs, or, if she did use them, should have had her hand upon the rail. To make .it matter of law, it should have appeared, at least incontrovertibly, that there was reason to foresee that a person descending the stairs would be thrown from her balance in a dangerous direction, for the jury might find that there was one direction that was not dangerous, for instance, toward the rail itself, or the casing opposite to the rail.

The court was right in refusing the request to charge, that if the jury find that the pilot brought the boat into the slip at no higher speed than he believed to be necessary, the plaintiff should not recover. At least the proposition was incorrect in being placed upon the fact of belief, irrespective of that belief having been the result of an exercise of ordinary diligence in observing the condition of things and of ordinary judgment as to that condition. He may have acted as he believed to be necessary, without being properly careful in forming that belief.

For a reason of the same kind, the court rightly refused to charge, that if the jury find that the pilot and engineer were officers of skill, knowledge and experience, and that they were using their best skill and judgment in the handling of the ferry boat, and that even the exercise of such skill and judgment would not certainly insure the landing of the boat without incurring the result of such a shock or jar as is disclosed by the evidence, then the fact that such a shock or jar did occur, does not entitle plaintiff to recover. It may perhaps be the law, that the shock or jar, by itself, would not have justified a recovery. The matter, however, was stated as the consequence of the earlier part of the request being correct. This involved the use of such experience, skill and knowledge as the pilot and engineer had, which may have been in less than such experience, skill and knowledge as the defendant was bound to provide, that is, an amount of experience and skill ordinarily fit to meet the exigencies of such occasion and that might have been anticipated.

As there was evidence that the rebound from the bridge was unusual, there was needed an explanation from the defendant to meet the presumption of negligence there created, and the complaint could not have been dismissed" on the ground that there was an absence of testimony that tended to show defendant’s negligence. The testimony did not show, incontrovertibly, a sufficient explanation of the negligence presumed.

In my opinion the court was not called upon to charge the jury, that if they should find that if the plaintiffs sight was impaired or that she was suffering from weakness or any other physical disability, then it was her duty to exercise a higher degree of care for her own safety in order to compensate for such impaired sight or other physical disability, and if she did not use that higher degree of care the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. The plaintiff was bound' to use that average degree of care, suggested by the circumstances. And perhaps she was bound to consider her physical infirmities as circumstances, and to act in view of them and the other facts. But it was not a matter of law that her consideration of them should have led her to believe that her not using the higher degree of care, intended by the request, would likely contribute to the accident that occurred.

The defendant’s counsel asked a charge, that if the jury find that plaintiff did not pay her fare for her return trip ■ on defendant’s ferry boat from Brooklyn to New York, then the defendant is not liable.

The case was such that the jury might have found that the plaintiff did not pay her fare. Yet the not paying the fare, under the facts, was not conclusive that the defendant was not bound to use as respects the plaintiffs rights, the care due to a passenger. The jury might have found that the plaintiff went upon the boat meaning to pay her fare, and to be a passenger as of law and according to the implied request of the defendant, was her legal right. Until the relation then formed was legally ended, the defendant was bound, as respected her, to use the care due to a passenger. At least so long as she intended to pay her fare at any point in the trip, the relation was not ended by her conduct. That she intended to evade her obligation. was not made a question for the jury. It is not necessary to decide that the defendant might have ended the relation by demanding that she pay the fare or leave the boat. If there were a demand, as the pilot testified, that she pay the fare, and she omitted at that time to pay, it was not conclusively shown that the demand and omission were accompanied by the declaration, or its equivalent, that she must go from the boat. She acceded to the rightfulness of the demand and excused her not paying forthwith by asserting that she had lost a small coin. The pilot of the defendant testified. “ I said, I have got to collect the fare,’ and she said, ‘ I can’t find ten cents, and I will go downstairs. ’ ” Whether this, under the circumstances that it is not necessary here to give, was a peremptory assertion that she must leave the boat or gave her a further opportunity to pay her fare, was a question for the jury. If such an opportunity were given, then she remained possessed of the rights of a passenger until there should be a new demand of fare, another refusal, and action thereon by the defendant. The case did not show any new demand. I therefore think the ruling in this respect was valid.

The other request on the same subject was properly refused. It was, that if the jury find that the plaintiff left the ferry boat when her fare for her return trip was demanded, and that subsequently she returned to said ferry boat without paying her fare, then defendant is not liable. If she returned, prepared and meaning to pay her fare, she was entitled to the protection due to a passenger, although she did not thereafter pay, if there were no demand of it. There was no proof in the case that a rule of the company, that bound the plaintiff, required a payment of fare before the boat should leave the slip. The facts adverted to in the request might have made testimony relevant to the question of whether the plaintiff meant to defraud the defendant. That subject was not presented upon the trial.

The exceptions that relate to ruling upon matters of evidence have been specifically considered. None of them call for a reversal of the judgment.

The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed with costs.

Freedman and Ingraham, JJ., concurred.