Case ID: va_19/html/0350-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JUDGE ROAITE", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John E. Royall’s Administrators v. Lucy Royall’s Administrator.
    Feb. 19th, 1816.
    1. Case Agreed — Effect—Case at Bar. — A son being: possessed of a life estate in certain slaves, with a contingent limitation, to his mother and her heirs, upon his dying without issue living at the time of his death; — the mother died in his life time, leav-him her only heir; and he afterwards died, without such issue: — the administrator of the mother brought an action of detinue for the slaves, against a person who was one of the co-heirs and distributees, and also one of the administrators, of the son, (but not charged as such in the declaration.) and obtained a judgment upon a case agreed, by which the parties rested the decision of the cause upon certain specified points of law; viz. whether the limitation to the mother was legal and valid; and whether (notwithstanding her death in the life time of the son, who was her only heir,) the slaves, so limited to her on his-death, became vested in her administrator: — it was decided that such case agreed did not abandon or relinquish the title of the administrators of the son to the slaves in question; but the recovery was had in subordination to their ulterior right, arising from the circumstances, that all the debts of the mother had been paid by the son in his life time; that he died greatly indebted; and that the slaves in question were necessary to pay his debts; which circumstances, (though mentioned in the case agreed,) were not included in "the points thereby submitted.
    2. Same — Same—Same-Injunction.—And on a bill in equity filed in their favour, the judgment was perpetually enjoined; on the ground that they, as representing him, were entitled to the slaves; and, being in possession, should not be compelled to relinquish that possession, and afterwards be put to the circuity of another action to recover them back.
    See, to the same effect, Wilson and Trent v. Butler and others, 3 Munf. 559.
    
      The appellants, Eittlebury Royall and John Royall, administrators of John E. Royall deceased, tiled their hill of injunction in the superior court of chancery for the Richmond district, setting' forth, that Joseph Royall departed this life some *time in the year 1784, after having made and duly published his last will and testament, since admitted to record, of which a copy was made an exhibit; Eucy Royall being his widow, and John R. Royall his only son ; that, after the death of the latter, (who died in possession of the whole estate left by the said testator, except what he had sold,) and eight years after the death of the widow, Richard Eppes, without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, obtained the administration of her estate, though her son John E. aforesaid had paid her funeral expenses and debts, and taken possession of all her estate ; that the said Richard, having obtained this legal advantage, then brought a suit in the Peters-burg district court against the complainant John Royall, holding as administrator of the deceased John E. Royall, for certain slaves which he the said Richard administrator of Eucy Royall claimed, as given to her by the will of her husband aforesaid; that, in the progress of that suit, a case was agreed, stating the facts correctly ; and, thereupon, a judgment was entered for the plaintiff at law. which judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals.
    
    The complainants did not mean to controvert the propriety of that judgment, but contended that, although Richard Eppes as administrator aforesaid, was entitled to claim and to have the slaves recovered, yet, that he must hold them subject to the law of distributions ; and, as it was a fact, stated in the case agreed, that no debts remained due from the estate of Eucy Royall, there could be no reason why the complainants, “who were the paternal uncles of the said John E. Royall, being his father’s only brothers,” should not be permitted to retain in their hands what the said Richard would be compelled to distribute between them.
    The complainants farther represented that Eppes was the nephew of the said Eucy, and pretended that he, in that character, as well as his brothers and sisters, were entitled to a portion of the estate of the said John E. Royall: — how far this mig'ht be correct, they submitted to the court to decide : — but, whatever might be the proportion to which the maternal as well as paternal relations of the said John E. Royall might be entitled, there could be no doubt that the debts due from the estate of the said John E. Royall must be first satisfied, and that the residue only would be liable to distribution. — They concluded ^therefore with praying “such relief as their case required.”
    The record of the suit in the Petersburg district court, being exhibited with the bill, contained the case agreed, (partly set forth in 2 Munf. 479 — 481;) in which it was also stated, that John E- Royall died greatly indebted ; that the slaves in question were necessary to pay his debts; and that the defendant at law was the administrator and one of the co-heirs and distributees of the said John E- Royall, deceased.
    The answer of Richard Eppes admitted the truth of the facts set forth in the case agreed at law, but insisted that the plaintiffs, as representatives and distributees of John E. Royall, had no manner of claim to distribution of the estate of Eucy Royall, “for it is of her estate that distribution is demanded that the whole question arising in this controversy had been already determined in the court of law, and the plaintiffs stated no equitable matter on which they could ground their application for relief in equity ; and that, the estate of Eucy Royall the mother, not being liable to the debts of John E. Royall the son, the plaintiffs had no claim to relief on that head.
    Chancellor Taylor dissolved the injunction, and afterwards dismissed the bill with costs ; from which decree the plaintiffs appealed.
    
      
       See monographic note on “Injunctions” appended: to Claytor v. Anthony, 15 Gratt. 518.
    
    
      
       See the case of Royall v. Eppes, 2 Munf. 479 — 491.
    
   February 19, 1816,

JUDGE ROAITE

pronounced the court’s opinion, as follows :—

This is a bill by the appellants administrators of J. E. Royall against the appellee as administrator of Eucy Royall, praying to injoin a judgment, whereby the latter recovered against John Royall, one of the appellants, four negroes, formerly the property of her husband Joseph Royall, deceased. —The ground the bill takes is that, admitting that judgment rightly decided the negroes to have been the property of Lucy Royall, and as such recoverable by her administrator to pay her debts, and for distribution, yet that the judgment should be enjoined ; — for that it was agreed in that cause, and is now agreed in this, that all the debts of Eucy Royall were paid; — and on the further ground that the property in the said slaves, subject to her administrator’s claim as aforesaid, was in John E. Royall as distributee to his mother, and is now in the appellants as his administrators, *is necessary to pay his debts, and that the surplus belongs to them as his legal representatives. — The appellants have not shewn in this suit, that they only are his legal representatives, even on the paternal side, and under a supposition that his estate is not to be divided into moieties under the act of descents ; but, nevertheless, in their character of administrators, they may be entitled to recover. —If the debts of his mother are all paid, and the son, the intestate of the appellants, was her distributee, the appellants should recover as representing him ; and being in possession of the property, should not be put to the circuity of another action to recover back property taken from them under the judgment. — On inspecting the record referred to in this case, it appears that the judgment was rendered upon certain points submitted to the court, which do not go to abandon or relinquish the title of the son to the negroes in question ; but the recovery was had in subordination to the ulterior right now asserted : nor are the appellants estopped, ( as was argued,) by the agreement, in the case, that John Royall, one of the appellants, “was not the legal representative or distributee of Eucy Royall;” for if, as the fact is, John E- Royall was such distributee, and the appellants his distributees and administrators, that is sufficient to entitle them to recover. — It is also to be remarked, that, in that action, the appellants were not sued as administrators of J, E. Royall, and therefore, as against them, the appellee was clearly entitled to recover.

-The judgment in that action declared the property to be that of Eucy Royall; subject, however, as is aforesaid, to this claim ; the said J. E. Royall succeeded, as sole distribu-tee to his mother, and having died without mother, brothers or sisters, or their descendants, the whole personal estate of the said John E. Royall is divisible into moieties, to go to the paternal and maternal kindred, according to the provisions of the act of descents.

The court is therefore of opinion, that the decree should be reversed, and the judgment enjoined ; that the cause should be retained, and the appellants decreed to make up an account of their administration ; and that the surplus, after the debts of the intestate John E. Royall shall have been paid, shall be decreed to be distributed according to the principles now declared ; with liberty to the parties to this suit, and others supposing ^themselves entitled, to shew them selves to be so entitled, by being made parties or otherwise. And the cause is remanded, to be proceeded in pursuant to the principles of this decree.