Case ID: johns_2/html/0165-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SpknceR, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Coleman against Wise and others, Administrators of Winton.
    This cause came before the' court, on a writ of error, from the Mayor’s Court, of the city of New-Yorlc. From the record it appeared that Robert Stewart and Hamilton Stewart were partners in trade, and that the defendant below on the second--day of December, 1803, made a • J .■ promissory note, payable to them or to their order, 45 days after date, for 200 dollars, whicli they indorsed to Winton, the intestate. . To the declaration on this note by the indorsee, the defendant below pleaded mom as- , 1 sump sit. At the trial of the cause in the court below, a bill of exceptions was tendered, and sealed by the judge, It states that the plaintiffs produced and proved the note and indorsement's, &c. That the defendant below set up usury in his defence, and offered one Arden as a witness, to prove the following facts ; that Arden, about the 18th of May, 1803, made a note in favour of the defendant for. 400 dollars, payable to .him or order in 60 days, which was indorsed by the defendant at the request of, and for the accommodation' of Arden, who carried the note to Alexander L. Stewart, and negotiated it with him at án usurious rate of interest. When the note was payable, it was taken up and paid by two other notes of 200 dollars each, drawn by Arden, and indors- ■ ed by the defendant, and delivered to. him* who gave them to A. L. Stewart, or to Robert and Hamilton Stewart, by the order of Alexander ', and who were acquainted with the previous transactions. These notes were not paid, and were protested in the name of Robert and Hamilton Stewart, as the holders, for non-payment. The defendant then made and delivered to them two promissory notes of 200 dollars each, payable to them, or or-, der, for the purpose of taking up the protested notes ; which, however, by the consent]of the defendant, were retained by R. & H. Stewart.- The notes -last made by (,he defendant were not paid, but withdrawn from thé'- ; bank by Ins request, on the days on which they became’ payable, and- the' suit below was on one of those notes.The plaintiffs’' counsel objected-to Arden-,-as aninterest-ed witness-,-, and therefore incompetent to prove thesefacts.- The defendant' then produced a release by him5 to Arden ;■ he was still objected to, but the Court declared him to be competent. - He was then sworn on his; voir dire, and being asked by the plaintiffs’ counsel,- whether he did not consider himself bound in honour to pay the defendant any moneys which- should be recovered against him' in that suit, the defendant objected to the' competency of the question put to tlie witness, but the’ court overruled the objection ; the question- was- again-put to the witness,-who answered-in the affirmative.— The court then rejected him as an incompetent witness.The jury thereupon found a verdict for the plaintiffs, on: which the court gave judgment.-
    
      whose name negociable 3 ««teisnota competent wit-«ess to im-liciity of the ^hethe^apor. son who considers himself bound in ho-the iosin^par*y’ though ™- obligation, is a ness ?
    
      
      Wells for the plaintiffs in error.
    The general rule,that a person whose name appears on a negotiable in- - strument, and who has thereby contributed to give £'*] it currency, shall not be admitted as a witness to invalidatesuch instrument, is founded on principles of commercial policy and general convenience. It narrows the law of evidence, and ought' never to be applied, except in a-case where the reason of the rule exists, not when thequestion arises-between the original parties, but Between-one ofthem and an'innocent'indorsee, who may have been'wholly ignorant of the' previous transactions,- and ought not to be affected by them.- R. & H. Stewart took the' note payable to-themselves, with a full-knowledge of the usury, and of all the circumstances, and they are, in fact' tile real parties.- Winton was a mere nominal- person,, whose name has been used as-a cover for the real actorsv Neither' Winton nor his administrators,- had any knowledge of the making of the note^ which was for the sole' account of the Stewarts, who made use of their names for their own benefit.-
    
      Another ground of objection to the witness, is, that he declared that he thought himself bound in honour to pay the defendant below, in cáse the plaintiffs recovered judgment against him. The objection of interest is a legal objection. It is a question of fact, not. of opinion. Should a witness say he was not interested, yet his inte* rest might be proved by evidence offered on the other side.. The rest of the world might suppose a witness bound in honour to pay a debt, yet from a want of honourable feelings he might not think himself bound. Other evidence, however, cannot be resorted to, to show his honorary obligation. Again, the interest of a witness may be released, so as to render him competent; but a mere honourable obligation cannot be released. To render a witness incompetent, there must be a legal interest which is susceptible of being released. This interest is not the privilege of the witness ; and if the party doe every thing in his power to remove the objection, he ought not to be deprived of the benefit of his testimony, from any feelings of honour which he may choose to express, or which may influence his mind. Arden was released ; he could neither gain nor lose by the event of this suit; his legal interest was thereby removed, and this ought to put an end to the legal objection. This case is different from that in which the witness apprehends that he is interested, for the influence of this belief will be the same, as if he were really to gain or lose in the event. A person may be a compel ent witness, notwithstanding an existing bias on his mind. The de-cisión m strange, as to the effect of an honorary obligation, is a very loose note. In Trelawney v. Thomas,
      
       it was considered that where the'witness was not interested in the event of the suit, the objection went to his competency, not to his credit. But if Arden was an incompetent witness to prove the usury, still on the authority of the case of Baker v. Arnold,
      
       he was competent to prove the fact, that the note in question was given for another person.
    
      Sanford and Colden, contra.
    It has been attempted to except this case from the operation of the rule laid down in Walton v. Shelly,
      
       and which agrees with the rule of the civil law, that no naan shall be allowed to allege his own turpitude. The rule is general, that no man shall be permitted to impeach a security he has given, though not interested in the event of the suit. No distinction, like that contended for by the other side, exists. The same rule has been adopted and establshed by this court in the case of Winton v. Saidler.
      
    
    That Arden was an inadmissible witness,on the ground of interest, cannot be doubted, if all the decisions on this point are attentively examined. The casé in Strange
      
       has been recognised by subsequent decisions, as well as by all the elementary writers. No witness ought to be allowed to testify with a bias on his mind, since the object of all testimony is to establish the truth of facts. Notions of honor produce a strong bias, and, in some minds, the strongest that can exist. The witness is under a moral, as well as honorary.obligation to pay Coleman. But it is said, that if the witness was inadmissible to .prove the usury, lie ought to have been received to prove a particular fact. But he was offered to prove the whole case, not a single fact only.
    
      
      
         1 Strange,
      
    
    
      
      
        \ Term,30t. -dshhurst, J.
      
    
    
      
      
        Ben. ^aclt' 3
    
    
      
       i Caines, 2&8’
    
    
      
      1 Term,, 298.
    
    
      
       Cited in 1 Caines, 272.
    
    
      
      
        Fotheringham v. Get ecnwood, p. 189.
    
    
      
      
         Peake's Law of Eo. (2d edition) 157. 1 Hen. Bile. 307. Esipinasse's Digest, 707. 1 Salk. 283. ■ in notes. ' 1 Morgan's Essays, 283, Ld. Camden's opinion in the case of Hmd-son y- LCersep, 12 Finer Jib. Evid. F. § 37. 1 pames. ;3KU. 1 Dallas, 62. 2 Dallas, 50.
    
   SpknceR, J.

delivered the opinion of the court. The-question in this case is, whether Arden was rightly ex_ eluded from giving evidence on the trial. The defence set up was usury, in a note which was the basis and consideration, of the one then in suit. The original note had been made by Arden, indorsed by Coleman, and passed to Alexander Stewart. It is, perhaps, a fair presumption that, notwithstanding the different transactions in renewing the notes, and changing the payees, the plaintiffs below are in the precise situation of Alexander Stewart, the original indorser. Arden- was rejected on the principle that he declared' himself, when interrogated on the voir din, bound in honour to pay whatever should be recovered in the suit from Coleman; but his situation appearing on the bill of exceptions, the'court is bound to say, whether in point oflaw, he could be admitted to give evidence to invalidate a negotiable note of which he was the maker. This point has been too solemnly settled by this court, to admit of doubt. In the case of Winton v. Saidler, decided in July term, 1802, it was settled that upon principles of public policy, a person whose name appeared on a negotiable note, and who had contributed to give it currency and circulation, should not be-admitted asa witness to invalidate it. That case adopted the decision in Walton v. Shelly, in which the court of King’s Bench proceeded on the precise ground of public policy, in rejecting the testimony of a party to negotiable paper, considering his signature as an affirmation, that to his knowledge there is no legal objection to the security. That case also settles another principle', that it is -immaterial whether the suit be directly on the note alleged to have been usurious, or whether it comes in question collaterally ; the cases the court there considered as the same,' because they involve in them the validity of the original notes. • -

The counsel for the plaintiffin error relied on the case of Baker v. Arnold, as an authority for the admission of Arden, as a witness; but the only point settled by that case was, that 'Lombard, the payee and indorser, might be heard as a witness to testify only when he indorsed the note. The judges, who were for admitting him to that point, say, “the sanction his name gives is, that the paper is valid, because the transaction is legal and honest, and he must say nothing that contradicts thisand again “this Would not impeach the validity of the note, and is therefore, not within the decision of Walton v. Shelly, nor of Winton v. Saidler.’’ It is to be noticed in this case, that Arden \vas called to make out the whole of the case, as well the original usury, as the knowledge and agency of Alexander Stewart; and we were all of opinion that he was incompetent for that purpose. “It would (in the language of Justice JBuller) be attended with consequences the most injurious to society, if these securities might be cut down by the persons passing them ; it is only for two men to conspire together to cheat all the world.”

The court give no opinion on the other point, how far an honorary obligation disqualifies a witness; on the first ground the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. 
      
       1 Term. 296.
     
      
       1 Caines, 259.
     
      
      
         Peake, 118.
     
      
      Tlie doctrine maintained in this case is now overruled by very recent decisions. The comprehensive principle regulating the competency’ of witnesses had been for many years departed from : in England it was no(. rgyjy-gj until the year 1791), (7 T. R. 597. 601.) and in this state it was recognised with yet greater reluctance. But m the two cases, Stafford v. Rice, and Bank of Utica v. Hill, and reported in the fifth volume of Cowen. The rule “ that every person is a competent witness who is not interested in the event of the cause rendered infamous b y crime, or ex_ eluded for infidelity,” is re-established : and it is now law in this state, . J that the maker or other person whose name appears on a promissory note is acompetent witness to show that it was void in its creation for .. usury or other cause.