Case ID: va_5/html/0023-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "ROANE, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Grymes v. Pendleton.
    [Thursday, October 26, 1797.]
    Appeal — Interlocutory Decrees. — No appeal lies from an interlocutory decree of the High Court of Chancery.
    The question was, whether there can be an appeal from an interlocutory decree of the High Court of Chancery, before the final decree is pronounced, although the interlocutory decree may have decided the title or settled the principles of the cause?
    
      
      Decrees — Interlocutory.—It will be seen from the examination of the numerous decisions of this court on the subject of the finality of decrees, in reference to appeals, bills of review, etc., that they have all been founded upon the idea that a decree is not final, unless the cause itself has been thereby terminated in the court below. Thus, though a decree decides upon the question of title, or otherwise settles the principles of the cause, (Young v. Skipwith, 2 Wash. 300 ; Grumes v. Pendleton, 1 Call 54; McCall v. Peachy, 1 Call 55 ; Bowyer v. Lewis, 1 Hen. & M. 554;) though it dismisses the plaintiff’s bill as to one of two separate subj ects of controversy, and as to the others also determines the rights of the parties, (Templeman v. Steptoe, 1 Munf. 339 ;) though a decree nisi directs that the tract of land in the bill mentioned be surveyed, and a part thereof allotted to the plaintiff, and that the defendant shall execute to him a conveyance for such part, and pay the costs of the suit, (Aldridge v. Giles, 3 Hen. & M. 136 ;) though the decree directs the defendant to pay the plaintiff hires to be ascertained by commissioners, and to deliver up the property, to be sold by the commissioners, and the proceeds applied to the payment of the plaintiff’s claim, and the costs of the suit, and the residue, if any, to be paid, to the defendant, (Mackey v. Bell, 2 Munf. 523 :) though, at the suit of creditors against executors and devisees, it empowers the executors to sell such of the lands held by the devisees as, after application of the testator’s goods and credits, shall be necessary for the payment of his debts, (Goodwin v. Miller, 2 Munf. 42;) though it awards to the plaintiff his principal money, interests and costs, if it directs, in the event of an unproductive execution, that certain trust property shall be delivered by the defendant to the marshal to be sold, and the proceeds, after deducting a sum to be deposited for another, to be applied to the satisfaction of the plaintiff, (Hill v. Fox, 10 Leigh 587 ;) though, in a mortgage suit, it forecloses and directs the sale of the property, (Fairfax v. Muse, 2 Hen. & M. 558 ; Ellzey v. Lane, 2 Hen. & M. 592; Allen v. Belches, 2 Hen. & M. 595;) yet in all these cases the decree is only interlocutory, if something yet remains to be done in the cause, and so the parties are not put out of court.
      One of the latest cases on this subject is that of Templeman v. Steptoe, 1 Munf. 339. It was there held that a decree dismissing the bill as to the personal estate, and as to the real estate in determining the rights of the parties, but directing an account to be taken, is not final in any respect between the parties retained by court; but is subject to revision in every part at any time before a final decree. The judges cited, on pp. 363, 368, 369, the principal case ; Young v. Skipwith, 2 Wash. 300 ; McCall v. Peachy, 1 Call 55, as sustaining this view. The principal case is further cited upon this subject in Cocke v. Gilpin, 1 Rob. 35 ; Royall v. Johnson, 1 Rand. 427; Ryan v. McLeod, 32 Gratt. 378 ; State v. Hays, 30 W. Va. 119, 3 S. E. Rep. 184. For a full discussion, see monographic note on “Decrees” appended to Evans v. Spurgin, 11 Gratt. 615.
    
   ROANE, Judge.

My opinion is, that there can be no appeal from an inferior Court until a final decree. Before that period, the appellate Court has no jurisdiction. The words of the law are so explicit, that argument cannot render them clearer.

EEEMING, Judge. I do not see any difference between this case and that of Young v. Skipwith, [2 Wash. 300], I think there cannot be any appeal, before 55 the *final decree of the High Court of Chancery. Till then, this Court has no jurisdiction of the cause.

CARRINGTON, Judge. I am clear that no appeal lies until a final decree. Although this- may be inconvenient, the Court cannot alter the law.

PER CUR. Remand the cause to the Court of Chancery to be further proceeded in.