Case ID: sw_276/html/0694-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BEERY, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

GILLESPIE v. STATE.
    (No. 8972.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 15, 1925.)
    1. Criminal law @=>792(2) — Charge on principals held proper in view of evidence.
    In prosecution for possession of intoxicating liquor for purpose of sale, where accused’s testimony clearly and cogently raised issue of principals, charging on principals was proper.
    2. Criminal law @=>814(17) — On direct and positive testimony on behalf of state, failure to charge on circumstantial evidence was not error.
    In prosecution for possession of intoxicating liquor with intent to sell, where state’s evidence was direct and positive, failure to charge on law of circumstantial evidence was not error.
    3. Criminal law @=>419, 420(11) — Refusing to permjt accused to testify to details of conversation with unknown person held not error.
    In prosecution for possession of intoxicating liquor with intent to sell, defended on ground that liquor was left with accused by unknown man, and in which accused was permitted to testify that when such man got out of car and left him he was to be gone a short time, refusing to permit accused to testify to details of conversation with such person was not error, in view of fact that state had not offered any part of such conversation.
    
      Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Palo Pinto County; J. B. Keith, Judge.
    C. W. Gillespie was convicted of possessing intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., for the Státe.
   BEERY, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Palo Pinto county for the offense of having intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale in his possession, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of one year.

The state’s testimony shows that appellant was arrested while alone in his automobile in the town of Mineral Wells, and that in said car at the time was found a certain carton of fruit jars containing an aggregate of about four gallons of corn whisky. The state also proved by two witnesses that shortly before the arrest he offered to sell them corn whis-ky. The appellant claimed that a stranger, whose name was thought by him to be Feast, after asking for a ride from Palo Pinto to Mineral Wells, had put the; carton in the car at the former place and left it in the car on reaching the latter place, and that the appellant had no knowledge that it contained whisky, and had no ownership therein.

Appellant complains of the charge of the court on principals, because he claims there is no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, showing that defendant acted with any one therein. This objection is not tenable. The defendant’s testimony clearly and cogently raised the issue of principals, and the court’s charge submitting this issue is a clear and concise exposition of the law.

We cannot sustain appellant’s contention that the law of circumstantial evidence should have been charged, because the state’s evidence is direct and positive that appellant possessed the liquor, and that he offered liq- or for sale.

Bill of exception No. 2 complains of the court’s action in not permitting appellant .to testify to the details of a conversation he had with the man he hauled from Palo Pinto to Mineral Wells, to the effect that—

“When said unknown man got out of defendant’s automobile he asked defendant how long he was going to be there, * * * and that said man told defendant he wanted to leave his carton in Ms car while he went to the post office garage on business, and that, if he was unable to close up his business deal with a negro there, he would come back and get the carton and remain in Mineral Wells, otherwise he wanted to go to Fort Worth with the. defendant.”

The court permitted appellant to testify fully as to the ownership of the whisky being in the unknown man, -and to appellant’s lack of knowledge of the placing of the liquor in the .car. He was also permitted to testify that, when the unknown man got out of the car and left him, he was “to be gone a short time.” This clearly protected any right appellant had in the matter. The state had not offered any part of this conversation, and therefore, in our opinion, the authorities cited by appellant are not in point.

Finding no error in the record, it is our opinion that the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.

Affirmed.

PEE CURIAM. The foregoing opinion ot the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
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