Case ID: so2d_400/html/0195-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. COWART, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William Floyd MEYERS, Sr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 80-1082.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    July 1, 1981.
    
      James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Brynn Newton, Asst. Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant’s split sentence on count 1 is reversed for resentencing in conformity with Villery v. The Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla.1981) [1981 F.L.W. 313], a decision which was not available to the trial judge because it issued after the sentencing in this case. Appellant’s judgments and sentences are affirmed in all other respects.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFÍNGER, J., concur.

COWART, J., dissents with opinion.

COWART, Judge,

dissenting:

I dissent for the reasons expressed in the dissent to Lauxman v. State, 402 So.2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Wesley v. State, 400 So.2d 175 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Furthermore, although Villery has effectively repealed split sentences under section 948.01(4), Florida Statutes, it should be noted that the benefits of that sentencing concept are still available to trial judges where, as here, an accused is subject to separate sentences on two or more counts. This may be accomplished by sentencing the defendant to confinement on one count and ordering probation on another count and providing for the latter count to run consecutive to the first.