Case ID: f-appx_678/html/0552-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Stanley R. TSUJI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAMEHAMEHA SCHOOLS, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-15105
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017 
    
    Filed February 23, 2017
    Stanley R. Tsuji, Pro Se -
    - John L. Knorek, Esquire, Attorney, Austin F. McCullough, Torkildson, Katz, Moore, Hetherington & Harris, Honolulu, HI, for Defendant-Appellee
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Stanley R. Tsuji appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his employment action alleging claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Smith v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s discrimination claim because Tsuji failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he was disabled, and whether defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating his employment were pretex-tual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining disability); Smith, 727 F.3d at 955 (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA discrimination); Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2001) (outlining requirements for showing that termination was pretextual).

The district court'properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s failure-to-accommodate claim because Tsuji failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he was disabled. See Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of prima facie case under the ADA for failure-to-accommodate).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Tsuji’s retaliation claim because Tsuji faked to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was a causal link between Tsuji’s protected activity and his termination, and whether defendant’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual. See Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of a prima facie case of ADA retaliation, and requirements for establishing pretext).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Tsujfs motion to vacate his reply brief is denied as -unnecessary.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.