Case ID: f-appx_448/html/0379-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Roderick Lemar GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 10-5202.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Sept. 29, 2011.
    Decided: Oct. 4, 2011.
    John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant. Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
   Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Roderick L. Green pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to bank robbery and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), 2113(a), (d) (2006), and was sentenced to a total term of 121 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Green’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the district court complied with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 when it accepted Green’s guilty plea and whether the sentence imposed was reasonable. Although informed of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, Green has not done so. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We conclude, based on our review of the transcript of Green’s guilty plea hearing, that the district court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Green’s guilty plea. The court ensured that Green understood the charges against him and the potential sentence he faced, that he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, and that the plea was supported by an independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir.1991). Accordingly, we affirm Green’s conviction.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. First, this court must assess whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir.2010). We also must consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examining] the totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir.2010). In this case, the district court correctly calculated and considered the advisory Guidelines range and heard argument from counsel and allocution from Green. The court considered relevant § 3553(a) factors and explained that the within-Guidelines sentence was warranted in light of the nature and circumstances of the offense. Further, Green offers no grounds to rebut the presumption on appeal that his within-Guidelines sentence of 121 months imprisonment is substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Green.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Green, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Green requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Green. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.