Case ID: ill-app_189/html/0461-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Charles Bruhl, Appellee, v. William J. Anderson, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 19,861.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1913.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed November 19, 1914.
    Statement of the Case.
    Charles Bruhl, plaintiff, brought action against William J. Anderson, defendant, to recover for personal injuries sustained by him on May 11, 1912, when, in endeavoring to'cross a public street in the city of Chicago he was struck by defendant’s automobile. Plaintiff charged the negligent driving of the automobile at a high rate of speed. The place of the accident was a residential district of the city of Chicago.
    From a judgment for seventy-five hundred dollars in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
    The evidence showed, without contradiction, that the accident happened about eight o’clock in the evening; that at that time it was dark, was raining hard and there was a high wind; that the pavement on Washington boulevard is an asphalt pavement fifty feet in width; that just before the accident, plaintiff was walking north on the west sidewalk on 41st avenue with an umbrella over his head; that as he reached the end of the sidewalk at the curbstone on the south side of the boulevard pavement, he hesitated a moment, raised his umbrella, looked in both directions, “saw nothing,” and then started across at a “trot,” or fast walk, holding his umbrella down over his head and shoulders; that at that moment, defendant’s automobile, with two headlights and two oil lamps burning, came along the boulevard from the west at a rate of speed estimated by defendant’s witnesses at from twenty-five to thirty-five miles an hour, and by plaintiff’s witnesses at from thirteen to fifteen miles an hour; that as the automobile approached the intersection, the chauffeur saw plaintiff walking across, called out: “Hey, there,” turned the front wheels to the north and applied the emergency brakes. The sudden locking of the rear wheels caused the automobile to “skid” around towards the south, and it “skidded” across the street intersection, turning • completely around, and finally came to a stop, facing southeast, at or near the curbstone at the northeast corner. As it whirled around, the right fender hit appellee, throwing him to the pavement. He fell on his back, face upward, and as the fender passed over him he took hold of it with both hands and held on until the automobile came to a stop. When he was pulled from under the machine his back was broken. The distance from the south curbstone to the point where appellee was struck by the automobile was approximately twenty-five feet, and while plaintiff was crossing this space at a fast walk or trot, the automobile traveled at least one hundred feet, if not twice or three times that far.
    
      Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Automobiles and garages, § 2
      
      —when negligence of pedestrian is question for jury. Where a pedestrian in crossing a street in a blinding rain storm looked up the intersecting street but failed to see a fast approaching automobile or to distinguish its lights from other street lights, the question of contributory negligence raised an issue for the jury, whose finding of the absence of such will not he disturbed.
    2. Automobiles and garages, § 2
      
      —when failure of pedestrian to see approaching automobile does not constitute negligence. A pedestrian’s failure to see an automobile approaching in a blinding and tempestuous rain storm, with its lights difficult to distinguish from street lights, or even his failure to look at all, held not to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law, under the circumstances of the instant case.
    3. Automobiles and garages, § 2
      
      —when proof of unlawful speed constitutes prima facie case. Under the Motor Vehicle Act of 1911, §§ 10, 17, J. & A. ¶¶ 10010, 10017, proof that a pedestrian was injured by defendant’s automobile, on a public street in a residential portion of the city, while the automobile was being operated at a speed in excess of fifteen miles an hour, made out a prima facie case of negligence on the part of defendant.
    Miller, Gorham & Wales, for appellant.
    Ansel M. Lasley and Frank A. Lasley, for appellee.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Presiding Justice Fitch

delivered the opinion of the court.