Case ID: so2d_569/html/1388-03.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. STONE, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In the Interest of A.B., a child.
    No. 90-1549.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 28, 1990.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The state concedes that appellant’s sentence should be reversed based on In the Interest of D.D., 564 So.2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), where we held the serious habitual offender section of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violates a juvenile’s due process rights.

Accordingly, the appellant’s sentence is reversed. We remand for resentencing.

WARNER and GARRETT, JJ., concur.

STONE, J., concurs specially with opinion.

STONE, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur because the constitutionality issue has already been resolved by In the Interest of D.D. However, I do not agree with the decision in that case. In my judgment, prior arrest criteria can be used, by the court or the department, in determining whether an adjudicated delinquent juvenile should be treated as a serious offender and such use does not violate due process. I would not have construed the portion of Florida Statutes Chapter 39 in question as necessarily governed by State v. Potts, 526 So.2d 63 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870, 109 S.Ct. 178, 102 L.Ed.2d 147 (1988).