Case ID: us-ct-cl_21/html/0505-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Blatchford", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JAMES S. HART, Administrator of Simeon Hart, deceased, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    (16 C. Cls. R., 459; 118 U. S. R., 62.)
    
      On the claimants Appeal.
    
    The case is transmitted to this court by the Secretary of War. Some of the items of demand so transmitted accrued prior to April 13, 1861, and were in favor of a person who encouraged the rebellion. Some grew out of transactions between a contractor who aided the rebellion and Army officers who, about the same time, went over and joined the insurgents. The remaining items rest on vouchers given for supplies purchased across the lines on the 22d April, 1861.
    The court below decides—
    (1.) The Joint Resolution 2d March, 1867 (Eev. Stat., § 3480), which prohibits officers of the Government from paying claims that accrued prior to April 13, 1861, in favor of persons who promoted or encouraged the rebellion, in. effect prohibits the heads of Departments from transmitting them to this court under the Act 25tli June, 1868 (Eev, Stat., § 1063).
    (2.) Where a claim is transmitted, which the officer transmitting it is by law forbidden to pay, the court does not acquire jurisdiction and cannot determine it upon the merits.
    (3.) The Act '¿0th April, 1790 (1 Stat. L.,112), and the Act 17th July, 1862 (12 id., 589), subjected a person guilty of treasonable conduct to criminal conviction and confiscation of his property, but imposed no disability as to receiving debts due to him.
    (4.) An Executive pardon would relieve the person pardoned from penalties and disabilities; but could not authorize officers of the Government to pay him moneys which might be due to him, if they were prohibited from so doing by a subsequent statute.
    (5.) The Joint Resolution 2d March, 1867 (Eev. Stat., § 3480), operated upon nothing conferred by the pardon of the Executive, and does not conflict with the pardoning power of the President.
    (6.) Congress have a constitutional right to prohibit the officers of the Government from paying persons who encouraged rebellion, and they cannot consider such claims, although the claimants may have received an Executive pardon.
    (7.) The Act 25¿/( June, 1868 (Eev. Stat., § 1062), authorizing heads of Departments to transmit claims, confers on claimants neither right nor remedy which did not exist before, and does not extend to claims reserved for future legislation by the Joint Resolution 2d March, 1867 (Eev. Stat., § 3480).
    
      (8.) The provision authorizing the head of a Department to transmit a claim “where any authority, right, privilege, or exemption is claimed or denied under the Constitution” (§ 1063), cannot he invoked in aid of jurisdiction when payment is forbidden by an act within the constitutional power of Congress.
    (9.) The rule of international law which converts all inhabitants of an enemy’s country into enemies, and makes unlicensed dealings with them illegal is inflexible. Nevertheless, in applying the rule to transactions interrupted by the outbreak of a, 'civil war,, courts endeavor to mitigate its severity where its rigid application must produce inequity ; but they never sway from it except for such a purpose.
    (10.) On the 22d April, 1861, it was illegal for a military officer to trade with an insurgent across the military lines, and all claims growing out of the transaction are absolutely void.
    The decision of the court below is affirmed on the same grounds.
   Mr. Justice Blatchford

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court, April 26,1886;