Case ID: sw_278/html/0842-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "LATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BELK v. STATE.
    (No. 9448.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 9, 1925.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1926.)
    1. Threats &wkey;l(2) — Place of writing “anonymous letter” reflecting on chastity of female held immaterial.
    One who writes and delivers anonymous letter reflecting on chastity of female is guilty of an offense, regardless of whether the letter was written in presence of injured female and delivered to her by writer; an anonymous letter being one that has no name signed.
    2. Threats <&wkey;l(2:) — Anonymous letter, requesting sexual intercourse, held to reflect upon female’s virtue.
    Where defendant wrote' anonymous letter, asking a female to allow him to have sexual intercourse with her, his contention that letter was reflective only because of character of proposal was not well taken because such letter reflected most forcibly upon female’s virtue and chastity.
    Appeal from Bowie County Court; S. I. Robison, Judge.
    Walter Belk was convicted of a violation of the law forbidding the sending, delivering, etc., of an anonymous letter reflecting on the chastity of a female, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Lincoln & Barkman, of Texarkana, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   LATTIMORE, J.

This appeal is taken from a conviction for a violation of the law forbidding the sending, delivering, etc., of an anonymous letter reflecting upon the chastity of a female, with punishment fixed at a fine of $250 and 30 days in the county jail.

We find nothing in appellant’s motion to quash the complaint and information, or in his motion in arrest of judgment. The alleged anonymous letter was set out fully in the pleadings, and innuendo averment was resorted to in order that certain expressions used in the letter might be made plain. Both motions referred to were couched in general language, and charged that no offense against the law was pleaded. The letter follows:

“Listen, C., if you will give me some, I will get you a coat, and lend you my silver fox fur to wear this winter. Answer, and return this letter, and don’t tell no one that I told you this, for what people don’t know don’t hurt them.”

The proof showed without contradiction that. Cecil Belk, the alleged injured female, understood the expression “if you will give me some” in accord with the explanatory averments appearing in the pleading.

In his brief appellant urges that the statute was not made to cover a case where the alleged anonymous letter is written in the presence of the female and delivered to her by the writer; and that the language of the letter is reflective only because of the character of the proposal made to the young woman. Bradfield’s Case, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 353, 166 S. W. 734, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 696, holds that one who writes and delivers such letter is guilty, and we fail to see any distinction in the criminality of the act of one who wrote the letter in the same room or place where the addressee is, and the one who wrote it in a different place.

A letter asking a female to allow the writer to have sexual intercourse with her most forcibly reflects upon her virtue and chastity. The very proposition is based upon and imputes to her a want of virtue and chastity, and embodies the belief of the writer in such fact.

Being unable to agree with the contentions made on behalf of appellant, and finding no error in the record, the judgment will' be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellant again urges that, because he wrote in her presence the unsigned letter which was delivered to the prosecuting witness, his case is not covered by the statute. We are unable to follow his reasoning. If the statute only intended to punish for the concealment of the identity of the writer, one would go free who delivered a scurrilous, unsigned letter, but informed the recipient who wrote it. The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. A letter which has no name signed is anonymous.

The rules of construction laid down in Bradfield’s Case, supra, are inserted in that opinion to make plain the court’s conclusion that he who writes and pérsonally delivers a defamatory, anonymous letter or written instrument of some character is within the comprehension of the statute. We are in accord with said rules, and believe them intended to punish any person evil enough to write and send or deliver a written instrument reflecting upon the integrity, chastity, virtue, good character, or reputation of the addressee, who was also cowardly enough to refuse to put his name to the document, so that he might unquestionably be called upon to answer for his act. One who signs a document of any character has less chance to escape whatever consequences may be entailed by its execution or delivery than he who thus refuses to identify himself, but writes anonymously. We do not think the question at all material as to when, where, or how he writes or makes the written instrument. If he sends it or delivers it to the person for whom it is intended, and it is unsigned, and of the character referred to in the statute, he should be punished.

The motion for rehearing will be overruled. 
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