Case ID: f-appx_510/html/0565-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Debra Taylor JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-16527.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Feb. 11, 2013.
    Filed Feb. 22, 2013.
    Sheila Thomas, Law Offices of Sheila Thomas, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Christopher Kee, Etna, CA, Kerry R. O’Donnell, Steve Cikes, Senior Counsel, Steven Patrick Shaw, Renne Sloan Holtz-man Sakai LLP, San Francisco, CA, Timothy Yeung, Esquire, Renne Sloan Holtz-man Sakai LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Appellant Debra Taylor Johnson appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, the City of Oakland (“City”), in her employment action alleging racial and gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. Cnty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.2003), and affirm.

The district court determined that Johnson established a prima facie case of discrimination and properly granted summary judgment because Johnson failed to meet her burden of establishing that the City’s decision denying her request for retroactive salary and cost of living allowance (“COLA”) increases was a pretext for discrimination. The City articulated a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason,” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), for denying Johnson’s request, viz., her position was established at a flat-rate salary by City Council ordinance and was not eligible for salary increases, and Johnson had already received COLA increases that were approved by the City Council. Johnson has not persuaded us that a “discriminatory reason more likely motivated” the City or shown that the City’s explanation is “unworthy of credence,” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Indeed, Johnson has presented no “specific and substantial” circumstantial evidence showing pretext. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir.2002).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.