Case ID: f-appx_585/html/0616-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Bayasgalan TSERENOCHIR, aka Bayasgalan Dserenochir; et al., Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-73882.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Oct. 8, 2014.
    Filed Oct. 31, 2014.
    Haitham Edward Bailout, Esquire, Law Offices of Haitham E. Bailout, Burlingame, CA, for Petitioners.
    Walter Bocchini, Esquire, Trial, Liza Murcia, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
    Before: W. FLETCHER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

1. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) abused its discretion in denying Bayasgalan Tserenochir’s motion to reopen as untimely. Tserenochir was entitled to equitable tolling until March 25, 2010, when he consulted with his third and current lawyer, because “despite all due diligence” he was “unable to obtain [the] vital information” underlying his claim for reopening — the ineffectiveness of his initial counsel. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc). Our analysis in Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2007), forecloses the BIA’s finding that Tserenochir did not exhibit due diligence. As in Ghahremani, Tserenochir hired new counsel after the BIA denied his initial appeal, a “paradigmatic” example of due diligence. Id. at 1000. And as in Ghahremani, that Tsere-nochir’s second lawyer did not tell Tsere-nochir about the ineffectiveness of his first lawyer does not undermine Tserenochir’s claim of due diligence. Id. Equitable tolling ceased in March 2010 when Tsereno-chir learned of his initial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and Tserenochir filed his motion to reopen on April 19, 2010, within the 90-day ■ statutory window. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C) (i).

2. The BIA also abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on the ground that Tserenochir was not prejudiced by his first lawyer’s deficient performance. Counsel’s performance was “so inadequate that it may have affected the outcome of the proceedings” in at least two ways. See Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir.2004). First, Tserenochir’s initial lawyer met with him for only 20 or 30 minutes before his hearing. Counsel’s lack of preparation left Tserenochir “alone, bewildered, and unrehabilitated as a witness.” See id. In particular, with more time, counsel might have noticed Tsereno-chir’s moderate cognitive impairments and could have explained some of Tserenochir’s nonsensical answers to the Immigration Judge (IJ).'

Second, even if the IJ had been inclined to conclude that Tserenochir’s testimony alone did not establish a claim to asylum, competent counsel could have bolstered Tserenochir’s claim using corroborating documents or witnesses. Tserenochir’s wife and daughter witnessed Tserenochir’s arrest and beating, yet Tserenochir’s first lawyer did not call them as witnesses at the hearing. And two of the categories of corroborating documents we identified as missing in Tserenochir’s first petition for review — medical records and records of political activity — were readily available, yet Tserenochir’s first lawyer did not make any effort to obtain them. See Dsereno-chir v. Holder, 365 Fed.Appx. 825, 827 (9th Cir.2010).

Taken as a whole, the record indicates that Tserenochir has at least a “plausible claim for relief,” which he should be allowed to present to an IJ without interference by constitutionally deficient counsel. See Lin, 377 F.3d at 1031. Accordingly, we grant Tserenochir’s petition for review and remand to the BIA with instructions to reopen.

GRANTED AND REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.