Case ID: mich_132/html/0075-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Grant, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STROUB v. MEYER.
    1. Negligence — Driving on Street —Injury to Pedestrian — Contributory Negligence — Questions for Jury.
    Plaintiff’s wife, after dark, but when the streets were well lighted, attempted to cross from the curb to a street car, a distance of 24 feet. When starting, she looked up, and could have seen defendant approaching with a horse and buggy, at a rate of six miles an hour. There was a controversy as to the distance he was from her at the time. His horse was under control, and, seeing her danger, he reined in his horse, which slipped, and fell upon the pavement, striking and injuring her. Held, that whether defendant was guilty of negligence, and plaintiff’s wife of contributory negligence, were questions of fact for the jury.
    2. Same.
    It may be negligence, under some circumstances, to drive along a crowded city street at a less rate of speed than six miles an hour.
    Error to Kent; Perkins, J.
    Submitted December 3, 1902.
    (Docket No. 141.)
    Decided December 29, 1902.
    Case by John B. Stroub against Barney Meyer for loss of services of and expenses in caring for his wife, caused by injuries resulting from defendant’s negligence. From a j udgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.
    Affirmed.
    Plaintiff sued the defendant to recover for the loss of the services of his wife, and the expenses incurred in taking care of her, from injuries claimed to have been the result of the defendant’s negligence in driving his horse and carriage on one of the streets of the city of Grand Rapids. He recovered a verdict of $101.50. The accident happened after dark on the evening of October 11th, the last day of a street carnival. Mrs. Stroub was waiting with others for a street car, at the southeast corner of Canal and Bridge streets. It was raining. The stores and all the public places were lighted, as were also the electric lights in the streets. A car had come from the south, and stopped about 30 feet south of the south line of Bridge street for passengers to get on and off. Four persons — two women and two children — started from the sidewalk for the car, preceding Mrs. Stroub. Defendant drove along Canal street from the south, between the car and the curb, going, according to his «own testimony, six miles an hour, and, according to other witnesses, faster. Mrs. Stroub and others, desiring to take the car, went from the curb to the rear of the car, thus going diagonally towards the defendant. Defendant was superintendent of the city lighting plant and the waterworks, and was driving from the former to the latter. There was no occasion for haste. One Kelly, his driver, was with him. The gong attached to his carriage was rung at frequent intervals. Mrs. Stroub, when about halfway from the curb to the car, was struck by the defendant’s horse, thrown down, and injured.' The distance in a direct line between the side of the car and the curb was about 24 feet. Defendant, upon seeing the danger she was in, reined in his horse, which slipped upon the pavement, fell upon his haunches, and slid from two to six feet. The witnesses do not agree upon the distance. The jury, in reply to three special questions, found that Mrs. Stroub, at the time of starting for the car, could see the defendant approach with his horse and buggy; that she then looked up the street towards the point whence defendant was approaching; and that defendant had his horse under control.
    
      Moses Taggart (G-anson Taggart, of counsel), for appellant.
    
      Dunham & Malcolm, for appellee.
   Grant, J.

(after stating the facts). The defenses urged are no negligence on the part of the defendant, and contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Stroub. We think both defenses were properly submitted to the jury. The law does not permit parties to drive under all circumstances along the crowded streets of a city at the rate of six miles an hour. In some places, and under some conditions, it would be negligence to drive faster than a walk. It depends upon the condition of the streets, the number of people crossing, of carriages on it, the degree of.light, and various other conditions. Defendant knew that people were getting on and off this car; that it had stopped for that purpose, and that those standing on the sidewalk would probably hurry across the street to reach the car. We are not prepared to say that, even under his own statement, he was not guilty of negligence in driving at the rate of even six miles an hour. It is said his horse was under control. So he might be under the driver’s control if he was going 10 miles an hour. The fact that the driver had the horse well in hand, and that the horse was not frightened, do not show conclusively that the defendant was not guilty of negligence. It was his duty to approach this place at a rate of speed reasonably slow. Travelers on foot had as much right to the use of this street, to go to and from the car, as he had to ride along it. It was the duty of both to use reasonable care to avoid accident. It is well known that street cars in cities stop but a brief time to permit passengers to get on and off, and that passengers are required to move rather speedily.

The women who preceded Mrs. Stroub testified that they did not see defendant’s horse and carriage. Let it be granted that they, as well as Mrs. Stroub, should have seen it. They were entitled to believe that defendant would approach the place at a reasonable rate of speed. Passengers differ as to the distance defendant was away from the place of the accident. It was raining. Many people were on the streets and sidewalks. Her conduct depended on the distance the horse and carriage were from her, and her ability to determine the speed at which they were approaching. It was a question for the j ury to determine whether, under all the circumstances, Mi*s. Stroub was guilty of negligence in attempting to cross.

Judgment affirmed.

The other Justices concurred.