Case ID: sw_298/html/0900-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BUCKLEY v. STATE.
    (No. 11029.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 22, 1927.
    Rehearing Granted Oct. 19, 1927.
    1. Criminal law &wkey;>!098 — Statement of facts consisting of questions and answers transcribed from stenographic notes cannot be considered.
    Statement of facts consisting wholly of questions and answers from stenographic notes cannot be considered.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;>l09l (2) — Bill complaining of refusal of time to tile motion for continuance, not showing meritorious reason for delay, held insufficient.
    Bill of exceptions complaining of refusal to give necessary time to file motion for continuance was insufficient, where it • did not show there was meritorious reason for delay, and named no witness who would testify, and stated no fact on which Court of Criminal Appeals could pass judgment to determine if there was error.
    3. Criminal law <&wkey;>l 115(2)— Bill complaining that defendant was tried before jurors not composing regular panel, lacking facts showing irregularity held not to show error (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 640).
    Bill complaining that defendant was tried before jurors not composing regular panel, which is authorized by Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 640, was insufficient to show error, where no facts were stated warranting Court of Criminal Appeals in concluding that in trying case before jury summoned by sheriff there was reversible irregularity.
    4. Criminal law <&wkey;!Ú9l (I I) — Bill consisting wholly of questions and answers cannot be considered.
    A bill of exceptions consisting wholly of questions and answers cannot be considered.
    5. Criminal law <&wkey;III4(2) — Bill failing to state surrounding facts to enable court to determine whether complaint is meritorious éan-not be considered.
    A bill of exceptions which fails to state such surrounding facts as would enable Court of Criminal Appeals to determine whether complaint was meritorious cannot be considered.
    6. Criminal law <&wkey;875(l) — That jury used word indictment instead of information did nbt vitiate verdict.
    In prosecution for unlawfully carrying pistol, that jury in their verdict used the word indictment instead of information held insufficient to vitiate verdict.
    7. Criminal law <&wkey;l 120(8) — Bill failing to state facts from which reviewing court could determine whether matter complained of took place, cannot be considered.
    Bill of exceptions containing recital that court erred in permitting state to prove offense of carrying a pistol occurred near residence of state’s witness, and would not permit defendant to explain why he was at the residence, which did not contain statement or other facts from which Court of Criminal Appeals could determine whether the matter complained of took place, cannot be considered.
    8. Criminal law <&wkey;ll!4(2) — Objection based on no facts certified by trial judge can be given no weight on appeal.
    An objection based on no facts certified by the trial judge can be given no weight on appeal.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    9. Criminal law <&wkey;265 — Refusal to delay trial for two days after filing of complaint held reversible error (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 514).
    Where information was. filed on March 2, 1927, and trial took place on the same day, refusal to delay trial, on defendant’s insisting on delay of two days was under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art.^514, reversible error.
    Appeal from Sabine County Court; R. H. Dent, Judge.
    
      Roy Buckley was convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded on rehearing.,
    Jas. G. Barker, of Hemphill, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, and the Assistant Attorney General, for the’ State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The offense is the unlawful carrying of a pistol; punishment fixed at a fine of $100.

The complaint was filed on the 6th of November, 1926. The information was filed and the trial took place on March 2, 1927.

The purported statement of facts is not in a condition for consideration for the reason that it consists wholly in questions and answers transcribed from the stenographer’s notes. See Vernon’s Ann. Tex. C. C. P., 1925, vol. 3, p. 100, art. 760, note 23.

There are four bills of exceptions. In the first bill complaint is made of the “refusal to give necessary time to file a motion for a continuance.” The,re is nothing in the bill to show that there was any meritorious reason for a delay. It names no witnesses that would testify and states no other fact upon which this court could pass judgment to determine that there was error.

Bill No. 2 complains that the appellant was tried befo,re jurors who did not compose the regular panel. The statute authorizes such action. See article 640, C. C. P. 1925. The bill states no facts which would warrant this court in concluding that in trying the ease before a jury summoned by the sheriff there was any irregularity requiring or justifying a reversal. See Murff v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 617, 281 S. W. 1077.

Bill No. 3 consists wholly of questions and answers, and for that reason cannot be considered. See Jetty v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 346, 235 S. W. 589. Moreover, it fails to state such surrounding facts as would enable this court to determine whether the complaint is meritorious or not.

Bill No. 4 seems to complain of the fact that the jury, in their verdict, used the word “indictment” instead of “information.” This, in our judgment, would not vitiate the verdict. The bill also contains a recital in these words:

“Because the court erred in allowing the state to prove that the alleged offense occurred near the residence of the state’s witness, Ira Mc-Lemore, and would not permit the defendant, nor Ms witnesses, to explain to the jury why he, the defendant, was at the residence of the said Ira McLemore at the time of alleged offense.”

The bill fails to contain any statement of other facts from which this court can determine whether the matter complained of took place. An objection based upon no facts certified by the trial judge can be given no ’’weight upon appeal. Holmes v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. R. 42, 282 S. W. 585; Quinney v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 358, 216 S. W. 882.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Attention is drawn to the fact that in stating that the complaint was filed on the 6th day of November, 1926, this court is mistaken. The complaint appears to have been sworn to upon that date, but was not filed until March 2, 1927. On the same day (March 2, 1927) the information was filed and the trial took place against the will of the appellant, he insisting upon a delay of two days. Upon the overruling of that motion, a written request for time within which to prepare a motion for a continuance was made, which was also denied. As the record is now presented, it appears that, in refusing to delay the trial for two days after the filing of the complaint, a right conferred upon the appellant by statute was denied him. In article 514, C. C. P. 1925, it is said;

“In all cases the defendant shall be allowed two entire days, exclusive of all fractions of a day after his arrest, and during the term of the court, to file written pleadings.”

The duty of the court to accord the time mentioned has been held imperative many times by this court. See Arrelano v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 198 S. W. 314; Evans v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 32, 35 S. W. 169; Woodall v. State, 25 Tex. App. 617, 8 S. W. 802; and numerous authorities collated in Vernon’s Tex. C. C. P. 1925, vol. 1, p. 405.

For the reason stated, the motion for rehearing is granted, the affirmance is set aside, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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