Case ID: sw_272/html/0454-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BERRY, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FRAZIER v. STATE.
    (No. 8095.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 13, 1925.)
    1. Homicide <&wkey;300(3) — Refusal of charge on self-defense held erroneous, where court limited defendant’s right of self-defense.
    In murder prosecution, refusal of charge that,' under certain circumstances, defendant did not, by arming himself, abridge his right of self-defense, held erroneous, where court gave charge on provoking the difficulty, thereby limiting defendant’s right of self-defense.
    2. Criminal Iaw&wkey;>730(6) — Argument of prosecuting attorney as to good reputation of deceased held reversible error.
    In. murder prosecution, argument of prosecuting attorney with reference'to good reputation of deceased, which was not in issue, held reversible error, where court refused to sustain defendant’s objection thereto and to instruct jury to disregard.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Eelix D. Robertson, Judge.
    Abe Erazier was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Nelms & Short, of Dallas, for appellant.
    Shelby S. Cox, Dist. Atty., of Dallas, and Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   BERRY, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Dallas county for the offense of murder, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a term of seven years.

Very briefly stated, the facts show that the deceased and appellant were very close neighbors in an addition of the city of Dallas; and that they had had various wordy differences and difficulties prior to the immediate time of the. killing. Appellant’s testimony shows that on the day of the night on which the killing occurred deceased violently cursed and abused him and applied to him many vile and opprobrious epithets, and that at the time of the diffi"culty appellant and deceased met and deceased again abused appellant, and appellant walked into his own home and got his pistol and returned to where deceased was; it being appellant’s theory that he was in fear of his life from deceased and armed himself and returned for the purpose of amicably settling the difficulty.

By bill of exceptions No. 2, appellant complains of the court’s action in refusing to charge the jury that if they should find and believe that the deceased threatened the defendant with an assault and drove the defendant into his own home, 'and as the defendant entered his home cursed and abused the defendant and threatened the defendant, then the defendant had the right to arm himself and to return to the presence of the deceased in an effort to settle the difficulty in an amicable way; and also requested the court to instruct the jury that the fact that defendant did so arm himself would not in any way abridge his right of self-defense. Under the facts of this case, the charge embodying the principle stated should have been given; the court having given a charge on provoking the difficulty, thus limiting appellant’s right of self-defense.

Bill of exceptions No. 7 complains of the closing argument of an attorney for the state. • The argument complained of was as follows:'

“Mr. Burnie Banker was' not armed, my friends. That’s a lie; that’s a lie, you know it as well as I know it. They ask you if you men find him guilty, to be merciful. He has been a good man. Let me tell you about that. Burnie Banker has been a good man, but let me tell you, my friends, the reason that the state is not permitted to introduce the good reputation or character of a deceased, unless they open if up, unless they attack his reputation. The reason is that the state has its hands tied, in other words, my friends, unless they attack his reputation, then the state cannot bolster it up; then we are powerless to bring witnesses here tó show you he was a good man and a law-abiding citizen. We are powerless to do that, because the law won’t permit us to do this, God knows we would have done it, if they had opened up the avenue and given us the legal right to do it.”

The argument was objected to, and the court was requested not to permit it, which request was by the court refused. A special charge was offered asking the court to instruct the jury that it was improper, and not to consider it, and this special charge was refused. This argument was a flagrant violation of the rules and practices of legitimate debate. It could have no other effect than that of permitting the prosecuting attorney to give in evidence facts against the defendant. The court should not have permitted this procedure, and his action in refusing to sustain appellant’s objection thereto, and his further action in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard it, were both erroneous. Haygood v. State, 269 S. W. 438, and cases there cited; Skirlock v. State, this day decided.

There are many other assignments of error in the record properly preserved by bills of exception, but we take it that they may not occur on another trial of the case.

For the errors above discussed, it is our opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
      <&wkey;>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBBRin all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes