Case ID: sw_300/html/0064-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CINADR v. STATE.
    (No. 11169.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 23, 1927.
    1. Criminal law <&wkey;(3 — Statute, declaring that one needlessly killing an animal is guilty of offense, held indefinite and inoperative, within Constitution and statute (Const, art. I, § 10; Pen. Code 1925, arts. 6, 1374).
    Pen. Code 1925, art. 1374, declaring that whoever needlessly kills an animal is guilty of an offense, held too indefinite to meet requirement of Const, art. 1, § 10, providing that accused had right to demand nature and cause of accusation, and also Pen. Code 1925, art. 6, providing that penal laws so indefinitely framed that they cannot be understood are inoperative.
    2. Animals <&wkey;45 — State is empowered to protect animals from wanton abuse or destruction.
    It is within state’s power to protect’animals from brutality or wanton abuse or destruction.
    3. Criminal law &wkey;>l3 — Statutes denouncing offenses must use language with degree of certainty as will meet requirements of Code (Pen. Code 1925, art. 6).
    Where attempt is made to denounce an act as a crime, the language of statute must be selected with degree of certainty as will not fall short of requirement of Pen. Code 1925, art. 6, which provides that penal laws indefinitely framed or of doubtful construction are inoperative.
    Appeal from Lavaca County Court; C. L. Stavinoha, Judge.
    Frank Cinadr, Sr., was convicted of needlessly killing an animal, ánd he appeals.
    Reversed, and prosecution ordered dismissed.
    Will T. Bagby, of Hallettsville, -for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The offense is needlessly killing an animal; punishment fixed at a fine of $10.

The charging part of the information reads thus: “Did needlessly kill one hog.” In the Penal Code 1925 are found several statutes protecting animals. In article 1371 the keeping of a dog accustomed to attacking other animals named in the statute is forbidden. Article 1372 forbids the owner of premises under an insufficient fence from injuring by the means named in the statute animals getting into his inclosure. Article 1373 is directed against one who kills or wounds an animal with intent to injure the owner thereof. Article 1375 forbids the mistreatment of impounded animals. Article 1376 forbids cruelty to fowls, poultry, and other birds in transportation. Other statutes on the subject, without application to the present matter, are found in chapter 12, tit. 17, P. C. 1925, notably articles 1462 and 1467. Article 1374 upon which the present prosecution rests, so far as it relates to the offense, declares that whoever needlessly kills an animal is guilty of an offense. The statute names a number of other offenses in which the language chosen is probably' not subject to the criticism that it is indefinite. The appellant insists that the term “needlessly killing an animal” is indefinite .to a degree that it fails to meet the constitutional and statutory provisions requiring that one charged with an offense be informed of its nature. In article 1, § 10, of the Constitution, of Texas, it is said:

The accused “shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof.”

In article 6 of the Penal Code 1925 it is said:

“Whenever it appears that a provision of the penal law is so indefinitely framed or of such doubtful construction, that it cannot be understood, either from the language in which it is expressed, or from some other written law of the state, such penal law shall be regarded as wholly inoperative.”

The language chosen in the statute under consideration to define the offense of which the appellant is convicted is not deemed such as to meet the requirements of the statutory and constitutional provisions quoted. There are statutes in this state expressly sanctioning the killing of wild animals and fowls (which are likewise animals) for sport, and the right of property in domestic animals is not open to question; nor is the exercise of judgment by the owner to slaughter such animals tlie proper subject of legislative restriction sueb as would follow an application of tbe language in question.

It is witbin tbe power of tbe state to protect animals from brutality or wanton abuse or destruction, and to protect tbe owner of animals against mistreatment is a principle of law thoroughly established through tbe decisions of this and other jurisdictions. See 1 Ruling Case Raw, §§ ÍOS^IU, and cases cited in tbe notes. As we have indicated above, in our law is found a number of statutes directed to tbe end mentioned and many decisions upholding them. See 3 Vernon’s Tex. P. C. 1925, tit. 17, cc. 11 and 12.

Sueb statutes, however, where the attempt is made to denounce an act as a crime, must select language with a degree of certainty such as will not fall short of the requirements of article 6, supra. The principle of law upon which the conclusion stated is found is exemplified in many decisions of this state. Among them are Sogdell v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 66, 193 S. W. 675; Griffin v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 498, 218 S. W. 494; Ex parte Slaughter, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 213, 243 S.W. 478, 26 A. L. R. 891; Wimberly v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 152, 265 S. W. 155, and cases therein cited. Also Russell v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 512, 228 S. W. 566; Ex parte Humphrey, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 502, 244 S. W. 822; Dockery v. State, 931 Tex. Cr. R. 220, 247 S. W. 508; Ex parte Von Koenneritz, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 294, 261 S. W. 570; Overt v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 202, 260 S. W. 856; and cases therein cited.

The judgment is reversed, and the prosecution is ordered dismissed. 
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