Case ID: f-appx_694/html/0055-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

XIA LI, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    16-844
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    August 10, 2017
    FOR PETITIONER: Joshua Bardavid, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Tracey N. McDonald, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Xia Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 7, 2016, decision of the BIA denying Li’s motion to reopen. In re Xia Li, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 7, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). In her motion to reopen, Li asserted that conditions for Christians had worsened in China excusing the untimely filing of her motion and demonstrating her pri-ma facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on her conversion to Christianity in the United States. It is undisputed that Li’s 2015 motion to reopen was untimely filed more than six years after her order of removal became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Li failed to demonstrate such conditions.

“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.” In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007). As the BIA found, the U.S. Department of State reports demonstrate that the Chinese government has viewed unfavorably and mistreated unregistered Christian groups continuously since before Li’s 2007 hearing. Li’s evidence further demonstrates that the treatment of unregistered religious groups varies widely from region to region, and it does not reveal increased persecution of such groups in Li’s home province. Cf. Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 142, 149 (finding no error in the BIA’s requirement that an applicant demonstrate local enforcement of a government policy in a manner that would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution when the country conditions reflect local variations in enforcement). .

Accordingly, because the BIA reasonably found that Li did not demonstrate a material change in conditions in China, it did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.