Case ID: f-appx_530/html/0058-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Lahim KADRIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-1882.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 22, 2013.
    Michael P. DiRaimondo, Marialaina L. Masi, Stacy A. Huber, DiRaimondo & Masi, LLP, Melville, N.Y., for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. Sca-dron, Assistant Director; Genevieve Holm, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Present RICHARD C. WESLEY, DENNY CHIN, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Lahim Kadria, a native and citizen of Albania, seeks review of the May 3, 2012, order of the BIA denying his second motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Lahim Kadria, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 3, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. We review the BIA’s denial of Kadria’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kadria’s 2011 motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as he filed it more than eight years after the BIA’s order upholding an immigration judge’s underlying merits decision, and had previously filed a motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (providing that only one motion to reopen may be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Although these time and number restrictions do not apply to a motion to reopen seeking to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Kadria did not demonstrate a change in conditions in Albania.

The evidence submitted indicated a continuation, from the time of Kadria’s initial application to the time of his motion to reopen, of sporadic political violence and divisiveness between the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party. It also reflected the inclusion of the Democratic Party in the coalition government, a decrease in the amount of politically motivated detentions, and a marked progress towards greater democratization. Because the evidence did not document any current harm to Democratic Party supporters, let alone an increase in such harm since the time of Kadria’s hearing in 2001, the BIA reasonably concluded that Kadria had not demonstrated a material change in conditions. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that when the agency explicitly considers relevant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, this Court reviews the agency’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard); see also Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] eompare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”). Moreover, because there is no indication that the BIA failed to consider any evidence, Kadria failed to demonstrate a due process violation. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (“[W]e presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless the record eompellingly suggests otherwise.”); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir.2006) (noting due process requires that an applicant receive “a full and fair opportunity to present [his] claims” (quoting Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 155)).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).