Case ID: f-appx_11/html/0161-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Karl T. HOYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION; Yolanda Townsend Wheat; Dennis Dollar, Individually and in their official capacities as Members of the Board; William E. Reukauf, Individually and in his official capacity as Acting Special Counsel, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 00-2085.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted March 13, 2001.
    Decided April 25, 2001.
    James J. Butera, Dennis M. Hart, But-era & Andrews, Washington, DC, for appellant.
    Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Rachel C. Ballow, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, VA, for appellees.
    Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Karl T. Hoyle appeals the district court’s order granting the Appellees’ motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Hoyle was a schedule C federal employee who served as Executive Director at the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). Hoyle was terminated by the NCUA Board of Directors (“the Board”), which voted two to one to terminate Hoyle’s employment based on his responsibility for illegal employment practices. The dissenting vote was offered by Board Chairman Norman E. D’Amours. Hoyle asserts only D’Amours held the power to terminate his employment.

Because the district court considered materials outside the parties’ pleadings, we construe its action in granting Appellees’ motion as granting summary judgment. See Fed.R.App.P. 12(b). In reviewing an appeal from a district court’s grant of summary judgment, this court conducts a review de novo, assessing whether there is a genuine question of material fact, drawing all factual contentions and justifiable inferences to favor the nonmovant. See, e.g., Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 606 (4th Cir.1999). A district court’s dismissal of a plaintiffs action for failure to state a claim is also reviewed de novo, construing factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and is appropriate where “no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir.1996) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)).

We conclude the district court correctly determined that Hoyle failed to state a wrongful termination claim. The Board’s powers are established by the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1766 (1994) (“the Act”). Under the Act, the Board, not the Chairman, is the head of the NCUA. The Board has power over all executive functions. 12 U.S.C. § 1766(d). The NCUA Chairman acts as the Board’s spokesperson and representative. 12 U.S.C. § 1752(e). The Board, as head of the NCUA, has authority to appoint and terminate employees. 12 U.S.C. § 1766(i); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259, 10 L.Ed. 138 (1839).

Since the Act provided clear authority for the Board to terminate Hoyle’s employment, Hoyle’s claim of wrongful termination fails even when the factual allegations are construed in the light most favorable to him. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.