Case ID: sw_288/html/0226-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BAKER, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BAKER v. STATE.
    (No. 10369.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 10, 1926.)
    1. Criminal law &wkey;451 (4) — Testimony that defendant “went to cut” deceased held not conclusion of witness.
    In murder trial, state witness’ testimony that defendant “went to cut” decedent held not a conclusion, but a shorthand rendition of facts.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;1169(9) — Admission of testimony that defendant “went to cut” deceased held not reversible error, in view of uncon-troverted fact that he cut deceased.
    Admission of testimony that defendant “went to cut” deceased held not to require reversal of conviction of manslaughter, where there was no controversy that defendant cut deceased.
    3. Homicide <&wkey;l56(l) — Evidence that blood spurted from deceased’s neck when defendant stabbed him there held admissible to show character of wound and defendant’s intent.
    In murder trial, testimony as to seeing blood spurt from deceased’s neck when defendant stabbed him there, and doctor’s testimony that blood was all over porch when he arrived, held admissible to show character of wound and defendant’s purpose and intention.
    4. Homicide <&wkey;l88(5) — Exclusion of evidence of deceased’s general reputation as dangerous character elsewhere than in community of his residence held not error, in absence of evidence of threats against defendant.
    Bill complaining of exclusion of testimony in murder trial that deceased’s general reputation “in the flat” was that of dangerous and violent character held to show no error, as qualified by court’s statement that no evidence of threats by deceased against defendant was introduced and that inquiry was not as to deceased’s general reputation in community where he resided.
    5. Criminal law &wkey;>l09l (3)— Bill of exception, not setting out answer to question on cross-examination complained of, is defective.
    Bill of exception to court’s action in permitting district attorney to ask defendant certain question on cross-examination held defective in not setting out answer. j
    6. Homicide 169(1) — Permitting cross-examination of defendant as to state’s witness having told, him not to gamble in domino parlor, which he was doing at time of homicide, held not error.
    Permitting district attorney to ask defendant on cross-examination if state’s witness had not told him many times not to gamble in domino parlor, held not error, where record clearly showed that deceased and defendant were gambling on domino game at time of homicide.
    
      7. Criminal law <&wkey;llll(3) — Bill of exception to argument, qualified by court’s statement that he had no recollection nor record of occurrence, cannot be considered.
    Bill of exception to district attorney’s argument, qualified by court’s statement that he had no recollection nor record of occurrence complained of, and did not know whether it occurred or not, cannot be considered.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Potter County; Henry S. Bishop, Judge.
    Sam Baker was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    E. T. Miller, of Amarillo, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., of Groesbeck, for the state.
   BAKER, J.

The appellant was convicted in the district court of Potter county for the offense of manslaughter, and his punishment assessed at two years in the penitentiary.

The record discloses that the appellant, his brother George Baker, Arthur Johnson, and the deceased, Antonio Metters, were engaged in a domino game, and that the deceased and appellant were betting on the result of the game. A controversy arising, the deceased and Johnson, his partner, quit the game, and the deceased put a $5 bill that the appellant had on the board in his pocket. The appellant caught deceased by his shoulder,' drew his knife, and demanded the return of his money, which was refused; the deceased at the time having his right hand in his pocket. After the return of the money had been demanded two or three times, and other parties had made the same request, the deceased returned the money with his left hand. The appellant then demanded that deceased taka his right hand out of his pocket, but deceased refused to do so and continued to hold his hand in his pocket and appeared to be working his hand, when the appellant stabbed him in the neck, from the effects of which the deceased bled to death within a short time thereafter. The appellant testified, and introduced other evidence to the effect, that the deceased had threatened his life, and that he cut deceased believing at the time that he was preparing to. kill him (appellant) or inflict upon him serious bodily injury. The court charged on murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, and self-defense.

There are six bills of exception in the record. In hill No. 4 complaint is made to the action of the court in permitting the state’s witness Brown, in relating what he saw the appellant do, to state: “So he went to cut Antone, and his brother grabbed him.” The appellant contends that the statément to the effect that he “went to cut Antone” was a conclusion of the witness’ and that the admission of the same oyer his objection was reversible error. We are unable to reach this conclusion. We think it was only a shorthand rendition of the facts. At any rate, there is no controversy in the record but that the appellant cut the deceased, and if this evidence were subject to the criticism made, it would not be such error as would require a reversal of this case.

In bills of exception 5, 11, and 13 complaint is made to the action of the court in permitting the state’s witnesses to testify, in effect, that when the appellant stabbed deceased in the neck, they saw the blood spurt therefrom, and in permitting the doctor to testify that blood was all over the porch when he arrived to attend the deceased. It is contended that this testimony w@.s of such a prejudicial nature that it was error for the court to admit same. We are unable to agree with this contention and are of the opinion that this testimony was admissible in behalf of the state to show the character of the wound inflicted, and also as bearing on the purpose and intention of the appellant. In Underhill on Criminal Evidence (3d Ed.) § 515, it is stated:

“Evidence that there was a great effusion of blood may be admissible to show the nature of the wound.”

Also see Thomas v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 345, 72 S. W. 178. In section 540 of Underhill’s Criminal Evidence it is stated:

“The intention to do great bodily harm, to murder or to commit any other crime by means of an assault, may be inferred from the circumstances. * * * The intention may be inferred from the force or direction, or from the natural or contemplated result of the" violence employed, from the weapon or implement used by the accused,” etc.

In bill No. 7 complaint is made to the refusal of the court to permit the appellant to show by the witness Brown that the deceased’s general reputation “in the flat” was that of a dangerous and violent character. The court, in qualifying this bill, states that at the time it was offered no evidence had been introduced to show threats made by the deceased against the appellant; that same was indicated to appellant’s counsel; and that said testimony was never thereafter offered. The qualification also states that said inquiry was not to the general reputation of the deceased in the community where he resided, but “down in the flat,” which was not a call for general reputation. This bill, as qualified, shows no "error.

In hill of exception No. 14’complaint is made to the action of the court in permitting the district attorney to ask the appellant, on cross-examination, if the witness Brown had not told him many times not to gamble in the domino parlor. This hill is defective in failing to set out the witness’ answer, if ’any was made, and for that reason we are unable to determine the supposed error complained of. Hennington v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. It. 12, 274 S. W. 509. Many other authorities could be cited if. necessary. We fail to see any possible error that could be shown in this bill even if it contained the answer to said question, as the record clearly -shows that the deceased and appellant were gambling on the domino game in question.

In bill No. 20 complaint is made to the argument of the district attorney before the jury, which the court qualifies by stating that he has no recollection of this incident occurring, and has no record of the occurrence, and does not know whether it occurred or not. This court recently held in the Bart Watson Case, on rehearing (No. 9819) 287 S. W. 265, opinion delivered November 3, 1926 (not yet officially reported), that we could not consider such a bill for the' reason that it failed to show affirmatively that such argument was made.

After a careful examination of the entire record, and failing to find any reversible error therein, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is accordingly" so ordered.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court. 
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