Case ID: f-appx_648/html/0733-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert S. CROWLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael BOOTHE, Dr.; Laura Brooks, MS, LPA Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35204.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 13, 2016.
    
    Filed April 19, 2016.
    Robert S. Crowley, Palmer, AK, pro se.
    
      Mary Barbara Pinkel, State of Alaska Department of Law, Anchorage, AK, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Alaska state prisoner Robert S. Crowley appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious dental needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal on the basis of res judicata. Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Crowley’s action as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Crowley alleged nearly identical claims against defendants, or their privies, in a prior federal action in which there was a final judgment on the merits. See id. (elements of res judicata); United States v. Schimmels (In re Schimmels), 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir.1997) (privity for purposes of the doctrine of res judicata is a “legal conclusion designating a person so identified in interest with a party to former litigation that he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) (dismissal for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order “operates as an adjudication on the merits”).

Contrary to Crowley’s contention, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss after the deadline for dispositive motions had passed because defendants demonstrated good cause. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607, 609 (9th Cir.1992) (setting forth standard of review and “good cause” requirement to modify a scheduling order).

Appellees’ “Motion to Strike Appellant’s Request for Status Update Hearing,” filed on January 25, 2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.