Case ID: so2d_371/html/1101-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. SCHWARTZ, Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Renae Irene MUSKIN, Appellant, v. Joe MUSKIN, Appellee.
    No. 78-1319.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 19, 1979.
    Morrow & Morrow and Steve G. Morrow, Jr., Miami, for appellant.
    Klein, Oshinsky & Solomon and Michael B. Solomon, Hallandale, for appellee.
    Before HENDRY, KEHOE and SCHWARTZ, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Affirmed upon the authority of Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So.2d 111 (Fla.1967); White v. White, 338 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); and Rubio v. Rubio, 347 So.2d 1093 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).

SCHWARTZ, Judge

(dissenting).

By entering judgment on the pleadings for the appellee-husband, the trial judge ruled that, as a matter of law, the agreement between the parties was a “property settlement” which was not subject to modification. I believe that the issue should not have been determined upon the face of the agreement alone, and that, as the court held in the recent case of Coffin v. Coffin, 368 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), which is very closely on point, “. . . the parties’ intentions [should] be fully explored at trial See also Cambest v. Cambest, 367 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So.2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). I would therefore reverse the judgment below and remand the cause for trial.