Case ID: ill_63/html/0141-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Scott", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Frederick Hensoldt v. Town of Petersburg.
    1. Spibituous liqtjobs—sale in violation of ordinance. An ordinance relating to licenses, and providing a punishment for sales of liquor without a license, was assailed on the ground that it was void, for the reason that the license, fee was so unreasonable as to amount to a prohibition, the charter conferring power only to regulate the traffic. The defendant not having offered to pay any license, and having sold without trying to obtain any license, it was held, that the question urged was not involved in the case, and its discussion was declined.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Menard county; the Hon. Charles Turner, Judge, presiding.
    This yvas a suit for the violation of an ordinance of the town of Petersburg. Proof of three sales of liquor Avas made, and that the defendant had no license. It appeared that the corporate authorities had raised the license fee from §200 to §600 per annum, which was urged as amounting to an absolute prohibition. It did not appear that defendant attempted to procure any license whatever.
    Messrs. Prickett & Hamilton, and Mr. Oscar A. De Leuw, for the appellant.
    Mr. H. W. Branson, and Messrs. Egberts & Green, for the appellee.
   Mr. Justice Scott

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case does not differ materially from the case of Hensoldt v. The President and Trustees of the Town of Petersburg, ante, p. 111.

The same objections were insisted upon in that case as are relied upon to reverse this one. It is unnecessary for us to restate our views on the same questions.

It is insisted, as an additional reason for reversing this judgment, that the amount fixed by the ordinance under which these prosecutions were commenced, for a license to sell liquors in the town, is so excessive and unreasonable in amount as to constitute prohibition, and therefore renders the ordinance void; and that the authority in the charter to regulate the traffic in intoxicating liquors does not confer the power to prohibit all traffic in them. We do not think that this question can arise in this case, and therefore decline to discuss it.

For the reasons given in the former opinion, this judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.