Case ID: scl_2/html/0204-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      The, Court.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Nathaniel Bliss Neal against Philip Lewis.
    
      Charleston District,
    
    1798.
    In a declaration. for slander, where there are some counts good and others bad, a general verdict orfinding will support the good counts. A man may insert as many counts as he pleases, and if any one is good, it is sufficient.
    Unless damages are very outrageous, court vvill not grant a new trial in slander.
    SLANDER. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion in arrest of judgment.
    The declaration in this case contained several counts :
    1. For calling the plaintiff a rascal, a scoundrel, a liar and villain.
    2. For calling him a damned swindler.
    3. For calling him rascal, thief and scoundrel.
    4. For repeating that plaintiff’s bills had been protested in England, and that he was unworthy of credit.
    After a very long trial, and a great deal of testimony on both sides, the jury found a general verdict against the defendant, with 3,000 dollars damages, without distinguishing on which of the counts in the declaration they founded their verdict.
    This was, therefore, a motion in the first place in arrest of judgment; or, if the court should not think proper to grant that motion, then for a new trial.
    In support of the motion in arrest of judgment, it was contended, that this declaration contained several distinct counts, separate and independent of each other, some of which were actionable, and the others not actionable ; and as the jury have found a general verdict on the whole, without distinguishing on which their verdict for such large damages was founded, whether on the counts that are actionable or not, the verdict was void in law for uncertainty. That any judgment entered up on such a verdict would be erroneous, as peradventure it might be on the counts which were not in themselves actionable. It would, therefore, be a kind of hazarding cast to find out on which of them the defendant had been found guilty ; and no person, from the perusal of the record, could tell what was really the law in regard to actionable words or not. It would appear to be so vague and indefinite, that there could be no coming at any thing like certainty from it; or, for aught that appeared, the jury might have given 500 dollars on the first count, 1,000 on the second, 500 again on the third, and, lastly, 1,000 on the fourth and last count; so that, in reality, they might have taken upon them to say that every count in the declaration was actionable, against every principle of law upon that subject. If, however, the court should be of opinion that the above grounds were not sufficient in law to arrest the judgment, the counsel for the defendant urged, that his client was well entitled to a new trial. First, for excessive damages, beyond all proportion to any injury the plaintiff could have sustained by occasion of speaking any of the words charged; and also because the judge who tried the case had not clearly distinguished to the jury, and explained to them the nature of the counts, and pointed out those which were actionable, and those which were not so ; when it was highly presumable if he had done so, the jury might have been induced to find very small damages, if any at all, for the plaintiff; but by suffering them all to go to the jury, they went with accumulated weight against defendant, which may have Induced them to give such outrageous damages. Whereas, should the court now send it back to an¿ other jury, to whom these necessary explanations might be made, a reasonable or moderate verdict might be obtained, even if the defendant should not be acquitted of the slanderous charge. Another ground in favour of the new trial was taken in the argument, which was, that improper testimony had been permitted to go to the jury. Mr. Adam Tienno, a witness sworn in the cause, was allowed to give evidence of the contents of letters he had received in the way of business from the plaintiff’s father, who was a merchant in London, mentioning letters he had received from Lewis, the defendant, from Charleston, very injurious to his son’s reputation and credit as a merchant, and requesting him to make the necessary inquiries about the matter, for his, the father’s, information and satisfaction; which, it was alleged, was suffering parol evidence to be given of the contents of letters in the hands of a third person.
    See tie ease of Neabiggin Wife, ante, p.
   The counsel for the plaintiff were about to proceed in reply, but were stopped by

The, Court.

They observed, that although the jury might have taken upon them the knowledge of the law, and distinguished in their verdict on which of the counts in the declaration they found the defendant guilty of slander, yet they appear to have taken a safer course, by finding a general verdict, which is sufficient in law, if any one of the counts in the declaration is good. They compared it to an indictment which contained a number of counts, some good, others irrelevant; a general verdict or finding will support the good ones. So in pleadings in civil suits or actions, where there are various counts in a declaration, if any one of them S00c^ a general verdict will support that count. And indeed it was for this very reason that the law allows a man to insert as many counts In his declaration as he pleases, in order that if one or more fail, the others may bear him out, if the evidence is sufficient to support such count or counts. On this ground, therefore, the court saw no reason to arrest this judgment.

With respect to the motion for a new trial, the damages did not, upon due consideration, appear to be so outrageous as defendant represented. The parties were both merchants in this city, and depended much upon their credit, both at home and abroad, for their prosperity and success in life. Any thing, therefore, which went to destroy either the credit or reputation of such a man, was an evil of a very serious nature. Swindling, mentioned in the second count, is a crimen falsi, an offence which, if true, would render a man infamous. Theft, mentioned in the third count, is a febny, which, when committed under some circumstances, would affect a man’s life; and saying of a merchant that he is a bankrupt, or words to that effect; that his bills were protested, or that he was unworthy of credit, mentioned in the last count, has a tendency to ruin the reputation of a mercantile man. All these injuries appear to have been offered or committed against the plaintiff in this action by the defendant. Shall this court, therefore, take upon themselves to say, that 3,000 dollars for such gross slanders were unreasonable or outrageous damages ? They have no such power. It was for the jury to determine upon that point, and they have done so. The court, therefore, sees no ground to order a new trial on that account. As to the evidence offered by Mr. Tunno, of the contents of a mercantile letter in the way of trade, it is every day’s practice to allow it, and without it commerce could not be carried on, or good faith supported or maintained with merchants abroad, and the letter in question appears to have been one of that kind.

The rule for new trial was discharged.

Present, Burke, Grimke, Waties and Bay.