Case ID: f-appx_700/html/0580-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Wallace JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The BEST SERVICE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 17-55213
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2017
    Wallace Jones, Lakewood, CA, pro se.
    Brian Craig Nelson, Assistant General Counsel, Clark Garen, Law Offices of Clark Garen, Rachel C. Zwernemann, Rachel Zwernemann, Culver City, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Wallace Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo . a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FCRA claim because Jones failed to allege that the defendant, a debt collector, had requested his credit report for any reason other than to attempt to collect on the debt, and requesting a credit report with the intent to collect on a debt is one of the permissible purposes under the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally, construed, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court properly dismissed Jones’s FDCPA claim because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient to show actionable conduct under the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (explaining prohibited practices under the FDCPA); Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 341-42.

We do not consider claims dismissed with leave to amend that Jones failed to re-allege in his second amended complaint. See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 973 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to replead claims after dismissal with leave to amend amounts to waiver).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       jjjjs disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.