Case ID: f-appx_447/html/0279-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Re Ina GUNAWAN, Irsan Sutanto, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-1799-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 12, 2012.
    H. Raymond Fasano, New York, NY, for Petitioners.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Alison M. Igoe, Senior Litigation Counsel; John M. McAdams, Jr., Civil Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Re Ina Gunawan and Irsan Sutanto, natives and citizens of Indonesia, seek review of an April 8, 2011, decision of the BIA affirming the February 2, 2009, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Sandy K. Horn, denying their application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Re Ina Gunawan and Irsan Sutanto, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/180 (B.I.A. Apr. 8, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/180 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 2, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions for the sake of completeness. Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.2008). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379 (2d Cir.2007).

Petitioners have not argued in their brief that the agency erred in finding their asylum application untimely, or in denying their application for CAT relief. Further, petitioners failed to raise their argument that they belong to a disfavored group before the agency, and we decline to consider the unexhausted claim. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004).

We find that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that petitioners did not establish past persecution. The incidents complained of — including robberies and thefts, a groping incident at a shopping mall, Gunawan fleeing from rioters who were near her mother’s store, and petitioners having been near a church when it was bombed — did not rise to the level of persecution. See Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 342 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above mere harassment, to constitute persecution).

We further find that the BIA properly determined that petitioners did not establish a pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians, and thus did not establish that it was more likely than not that they would be persecuted if returned to Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004). The agency reviewed the evidence, including United States State Department Country Reports, and determined that instances of violence against Chinese Christians in Indonesia have decreased, the Indonesian government recognizes Christianity, and Chinese Christians play a significant role in the economy. See Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.2009). Petitioners’ argument that Sanioso is distinguishable, and that this case is analogous to Mufied v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.2007), is without merit. The agency reviewed the evidence and correctly applied the “pattern or practice” standard to their claim. See Santoso, 580 F.3d at 112; cf. Mufied, 508 F.3d at 92-93 (remanding to the BIA where the agency failed to address petitioner’s pattern or practice claim).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).