Case ID: ga_111/html/0855-03.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Simmons, C. J. Little and Lewis, JJ.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Devereux v. Atlanta Railway and Power Company.
   Simmons, C. J.

1. Section 2334 of the Civil Code requires all suits against railroad companies for damages to person or property to be brought in the county wherein the cause of action originates, with the sole exception that if the cause of action arises in a county where the company has no agent, the suit may be brought elsewhere. The sole jurisdictional fact being the place of the origin of the cause of action, and the statute not superadding the further fact of the residence of an agent as one requisite to jurisdiction, it must be held that the scheme of the law is to make the jurisdiction exclusive in the county where the cause of action originates when there is such residence, but elective when there is not. It follows that the present action was well brought.

Argued June 20,—

Decided August 7, 1900.

Action for damages. Before Judge Candler. DeKalb superior court. December 12, 1899.

Arnold & Arnold, for plaintiff.

Goodwin & Hallman and G. P. Goree, for defendant.

2. While no question as to the manner of effecting service is presented by the bill of exceptions, a court with jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter of an action necessarily has the power to take proper steps to have service duly made.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concurring, except

Little and Lewis, JJ.,

dissenting. We think the scheme of the statute is to fix the jurisdiction in the county wherein the cause of action originates, when the company has an agent there, and to constrain the bringing of it “in the county of the residence of such company” when it has no such agent. The word “ may” in the last sentence of the section has .the force of “shall,” or else that sentence adds nothing to the meaning of the law.