Case ID: so2d_479/html/0225-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "FERGUSON, Judge. JORGENSON, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BRAMAN MOTORS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellant, v. John WARD and Silver Lady Motors, Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees.
    No. 85-344.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Dec. 3, 1985.
    
      Norman S. Klein and Linda A. Fenner, North Miami Beach, for appellant.
    Charles S. Domina, Coral Gables, for ap-pellees.
    Before NESBITT, FERGUSON and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
   FERGUSON, Judge.

This appeal is brought to review an order denying a preliminary injunction. Braman Motors, Inc. claims entitlement to an injunction to prevent a former employee from soliciting its Roll Royce service customers from a list which was cultivated over a period of years at considerable expense. Ward, the former employee, argues that (1) the list of Rolls Royce owners is not entitled to protection because the information is available from public records, and (2) his actions constituted lawful competition. The record does not support either of Ward’s arguments.

The entire evidence before the trial court consisted of Braman’s uncontroverted affidavits. John Ward had been employed at Braman for over six years and had access to the names and addresses of Braman’s Rolls Royce customers. Shortly after leaving Braman’s employ Ward wrote to the customers informing them of his association with another company, Silver Lady Motors, Inc., which would compete with Braman. A manager employed by Rolls Royce Motors, Inc. swore by affidavit that the customer list is confidential and that the names of its Rolls Royce owners are not available to the general public. Further, Braman’s managers swore that the number of customers had grown over a long period of time at Braman’s effort and expense.

This case is factually indistinguishable from Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So.2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (en banc), where we held that the denial of a preliminary injunction to prevent use of a confidential customer list by former employees was an abuse of discretion. See also Erik Electric Company v. Elliot, 375 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). The controlling law is thoroughly reviewed in the two cases.

Our decision in this interlocutory appeal is based on a finding that appellant has made a showing, reasonably free from doubt, that maintenance of the status quo is necessary to prevent irreparable injury. See Sackett v. City of Coral Gables, 246 So.2d 162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971). The evidence presented by this sparse record, and the conclusions reached here based on that evidence, will not be binding after a full hearing on the merits where appellees may be able to show that appellant’s customer list does not qualify as a trade secret. See Ladner v. Plaza Del Prado Condominium Association, Inc., 423 So.2d 927 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (factual findings made at a hearing for preliminary injunction are not binding at the trial on the merits), rev. denied, 434 So.2d 887 (Fla.1983).

Reversed and remanded with instructions to grant a preliminary injunction.

NESBITT, J., concurs.

JORGENSON, Judge,

dissenting.

I would affirm the trial court’s order. Braman Motors failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

First, there can be no trade secret in a customer list which consists solely of information that is available from public records. The fact that Braman Motors says that its customer list is a trade secret simply does not make it so. Rolls Royces, like other more common vehicles, are required to be licensed and registered with the State of Florida. See generally ch. 320, Fla.Stat. (1983). The names and addresses of Rolls Royce owners are, therefore, a matter of public record. See generally ch. 119, Fla.Stat. (1983).

Second, there was no evidence that the customer list was a trade secret or confidence of Braman Motors. The affidavit of Gustavo Velazquez, a zone manager employed by Rolls-Royce Motors Inc., is of no help to Braman Motors. Mr. Velazquez stated only that Rolls Royce, which is not a party to this action, regards the names and addresses of all purchasers of its automobiles to be confidential. The relevant inquiry is whether Braman Motors regarded its customer list to be a secret or confidence. There is nothing in the record which would indicate that there was an express agreement on the part of Ward not to use the customer list after leaving the employment of Braman Motors or that Ward’s knowledge of the information contained in the list was obtained in confidence. As the court stated in Inland Rubber Corp. v. Helman, 237 So.2d 291, 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970):

In absence of an agreement between the parties providing therefor, the use of a former employer’s customer lists is not subject to injunction unless such lists constitute or are in the nature of trade secrets and knowledge thereof was obtained in confidence. This is particularly so where the names of such customers are readily obtainable from classified telephone directories and like sources.

Accord Renpak, Inc. v. Oppenheimer, 104 So.2d 642, 645 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (“Knowledge acquired by an employee concerning names and addresses of customers is not the property of the employer unless such has been obtained in confidence.”).

Third, there is no evidence in the record that would establish that the names of the Braman Motors’ customers who were contacted by Ward were taken from a customer list of Braman Motors.

The principles announced in Renpak and Fish v. Adams, 401 So.2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), should control. Both of those cases stand for the general proposition that an employee may compete against a former employer and, in so doing, take with him a customer list that he himself has developed. See Fish, 401 So.2d at 845; Renpak, 104 So.2d at 645. The court’s reliance on Unistar Corp. v. Child, 415 So.2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (en banc), and Erik Electric Co. v. Elliot, 375 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), is, in my view, misplaced. Both Unistar Corp. and Erik Electric Co. involve customer lists which were highly refined and a key ingredient to the business of the respective companies. No such showing is made in this case. Additionally, in both of those cases, there was evidence that the lists involved therein were confidential. Unistar Corp., 415 So.2d at 734; Erik Electric Co., 375 So.2d at 1138.