Case ID: f-appx_583/html/0743-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jorge L. MONTES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Amy MILLER, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 12-55756.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted July 10, 2014.
    Filed July 23, 2014.
    Christopher Fields, Lee & Fields APC, Edward Young Lee, Law Offices of Edward Y. Lee, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Noah Hill, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Jorge Montes, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § § 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the district court’s order denying the petition, see Hibbler v. Benedetti, 698 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (9th Cir.2012), and we affirm.

Montes contends that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably determined that his confession was voluntary and was not the product of the interrogating officers’ threats of familial separation and suggestions of leniency.

The California Court of Appeal’s determination that Montes’ confession was voluntary was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See id. at 1146 (noting that habeas relief is only available if the state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding); see also Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (“[O]nly voluntary confessions may be admitted at the trial ...”). The California Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Montes’ confession was the result of the polygraph examiner’s indisputably permissible statements, and not the product of the officer’s interrogation tactics was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of evidence that Montes maintained his innocence despite the officer’s coercive tactics, and only confessed after being told he had failed the polygraph examination. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that a state court’s factual determination is unreasonable where there is no supporting evidence in the record).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.