Case ID: f-appx_541/html/0112-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jesse REED, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-4820.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 12, 2013.
    Tamara B. Thompson and Brenda K. Sannes, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, New York.
    Charles F. Willson, Nevins Law Group LLC, East Hartford, CT, for Defendant-Appellant.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant Jesse Reed pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to one count of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court (Mordue, J.) sentenced Reed principally to 120 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently.

On appeal, Reed challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, specifically the district court’s two-level increase in his offense level pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). We apply de novo review to the district court’s rulings on questions of law, including Guidelines interpretation, and clear-error review to its rulings on questions of fact, including those that inform Guidelines application. See United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 474 (2d Cir.2008).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues presented for review.

Section 2G2.2(b)(3) of the Guidelines provides a range of enhancements for child pornography offenses involving distribution. A five-level enhancement applies if the offense involved distribution “for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.” § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). Pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F), a two-level enhancement applies if the offense involved distribution other than distribution described in § 2G2.2(b)(3)(A) through (E).

We recently held in United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2013), that the distribution enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) applies when a defendant “knowingly plae[es] child pornography files in a shared folder on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network ... even if no one actually obtains an image from the folder.” Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, while there is no requirement of intent to distribute for § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) to apply, there is a knowledge requirement: the defendant must know that depositing files into the folder will make the files available to others. Indeed, we observed that the record in Reingold made “plain that [defendant] ... knew from the start that distribution was a necessary condition of receipt ... and, with that knowledge, took deliberate and purposeful actions to effect that distribution.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

Reed argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). We do not decide the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but we remand for further proceedings. Where, as here, the district court failed to make a finding of fact necessary to apply an enhancement under the Guidelines, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for further proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Scotti, 47 F.3d 1237, 1251-52 (2d Cir.1995).

The pre-sentence report recommended a five-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). In his sentencing memorandum, Reed objected to the enhancement, arguing “[t]here is no proof in the probation report or in any of the discovery materials ... that Mr. Reed was aware of or made a conscious decision to activate ‘file sharing’ on his computer because he received or expected to receive something of value.” At sentencing, the district court agreed that the five-level enhancement was unwarranted “because there is no evidence that [Reed] shared or distributed child pornography in anticipation of or while reasonably believing in the possibility of the receipt of child pornography in return.” Instead, the district court explained it was applying the two-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) “because the forensic evidence confirms that more than 600 image and video files of child pornography were located in peer-to-peer sharing folders on [Reed’s] computer and these files are being offered for sharing.”

The district court did not, however, make any finding as to whether Reed “knowingly plac[ed]” child pornography files into shared folders. Reingold, 731 F.3d at 229 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, Reed specifically argued, albeit in the context of the enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), that there was no evidence that he was aware “file sharing” was activated on his computer.

We acknowledge that there is evidence in the record that Reed was a sophisticated and long-time computer user. While these facts arguably could support an inference that Reed knew he was placing files in a peer-to-peer sharing folder, the district court did not make such a finding, as Reingold requires. We remand in accordance with the procedures of United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir.1994), for the district court to consider the question, after giving the parties an opportunity to be heard.

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings as consistent with this order. 
      
      . The government argues that plain error review applies as Reed did not specifically object to the two-level enhancement. We disagree. Reed made a lack of knowledge argument in opposing the five-level enhancement.
     
      
      . In the interest of judicial economy, this panel will retain jurisdiction over any subsequent appeal. See Jacobson, 15 F.3d at 22. Accordingly, either party may notify the Clerk of a renewed appeal within fourteen days of the district court’s decision.