Case ID: so2d_386/html/0220-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. FAULKNER, Justice", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ex parte ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD. In re BLOOD BROTHERS, INC., d/b/a Brothers’ Club and Lounge v. ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL BOARD et al.
    78-544.
    Supreme Court of Alabama.
    May 9, 1980.
    Rehearing Denied June 6, 1980. Certiorari to Court of Civil Appeals.
    Joe W. Adams of Steagall & Adams, Ozark, for petitioner.
    John D. Cates, Jr., Montgomery, for respondents.
   PER CURIAM.

We granted certiorari in this case to review the Court of Civil Appeals’ ruling that Regulation No. 44 of the Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board Rules and Regulations is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse.

The facts of the case are sufficiently outlined in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and the dissenting opinion of Justice Faulkner. In essence, the Court rejected Blood Brothers’ contention that the ABC Board could not lawfully regulate the type of conduct proscribed by Regulation No. 44 because it is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, it agreed with Blood Brothers that that portion of the regulation which prohibits “any other lewd or indecent conduct” is void for vagueness. In order to so hold, the Court accepted Blood Brothers’ contention that it had standing to raise the issue of the regulation’s constitutionality even though it was not unconstitutional as applied to Blood Brothers. We disagree.

The opinion relies on federal cases which establish the principle that a party may attack the constitutionality of a regulation if that regulation is vague as applied to others. See, for example, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). This rule, however, is an exception to general standing principles and is applied, as in the cases relied upon by the Court of Civil Appeals, where the challenged regulation is aimed at or infringes upon First Amendment rights. The exception is permitted because application of an unconstitutionally vague statute, even to permissibly prohibited conduct, may have a chilling effect upon the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Young:

This exception from traditional rules of standing to raise constitutional issues has reflected the Court’s judgment that the very existence of some statutes may cause persons not before the Court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression. [427 U.S. at 60, 96 S.Ct. at 2447]

To apply this rule in the current context is inconsistent with that part of the opinion below which holds that the ABC Board can pass regulations prohibiting lewd or indecent conduct on the premises of a holder of a liquor license. Although such a regulation might otherwise be suspect as a possible infringement on rights protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, as the Court of Civil Appeals points out, that regulations of this sort are within the broad scope of the states’ police power under the Twenty-First Amendment to control intoxicating liquors. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). See also Hasson v. ABC Board, 57 Ala.App. 349, 328 So.2d 603 (1976). Thus, the Court of Civil Appeals’ reliance on cases discussing standing in the First Amendment context are inapposite; the First Amendment is not called into play in this situation. Because Regulation No. 44 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to respondent, we hold that Blood Brothers does not have standing to challenge its constitutionality as applied to other, hypothetical parties.

The decision of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, JONES, ALMON, SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., concur.

FAULKNER and BEATTY, JJ., dissent.

BLOODWORTH, J., not sitting.

FAULKNER, Justice

(dissenting):

The petition for a writ of certiorari seeking a review of the Court of Civil Appeals’ reversal of a judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court refusing reinstatement of Blood Brothers’ liquor license is reversed by the majority. I would affirm.

On February 22, 1978, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board revoked Blood Brothers’ liquor license for violation of ABC Regulation No. 44, which reads “No licensee ■shall permit topless or bottonless [sic] dancers or performers or any other lewd or indecent conduct on the premise of such licensee.” The revocation was based on two incidents, one in January, 1977, when an ABC inspector observed a topless dancer performing in the club and a citation was issued to the club which stated topless dancing violated Regulation No. 44. Later, in June, 1977, officers of the Mobile County Sheriff’s Department raided the club and found six dancers performing with their breasts uncovered. These dancers and one club operator were arrested and found guilty of indecent exposure. Blood Brothers petitioned the Montgomery County Circuit Court for reinstatement of its license and was unsuccessful. Its appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals resulted in a reversal of the trial court.

The ABC Board contends that Blood Brothers had no standing to challenge the vagueness of ABC Regulation No. 44 when it is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to them, and that the regulation is not so vague that it is constitutionally invalid.

Regulation No. 44 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Blood Brothers, which admitted that its dancers were performing topless and pleaded guilty to indecent exposure charges. Blood Brothers thus has no standing to challenge the regulation under the traditional test of standing. It does, however, have standing under the exception to the traditional test that was stated as follows in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 59-60, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2447, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976):

This exception from traditional rules of standing to raise constitutional issues has reflected the Court’s judgment that the very existence of some statutes may cause persons not before the Court to refrain from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-614 [, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830,] . . . Nevertheless, if the statute’s deterrent effect on legitimate expression is not ‘both real and substantial,’ and if the statute is ‘readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts,’ see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125, the litigant is not permitted to assert the rights of third parties.

The very existence of this regulation may cause certain persons not involved in this case to refrain from constitutionally protected expression, dancing, for fear of engaging in what could be found to be “other lewd and indecent conduct.” Dancing before an audience for entertainment is a medium of expression enjoying prima facie protection under the First Amendment. Such dancing, even topless dancing, loses that privileged status only because it is obscene. In Re Giannini, 69 Cal.2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal.Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 910, 89 S.Ct. 1743, 23 L.Ed.2d 223 (1969). In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1974), the United States Supreme Court stated:

Although the customary “barroom” type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. La-Rue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances.

The regulation has a real and substantial effect on expression that is prima facie protected. ABC Regulation No. 44 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction, as has been evidenced by the Board’s rewriting the regulation in an attempt to make it more explicit.

The ABC Board argues that this First Amendment interest in nude dancing is outweighed by the state’s broad powers to regulate liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972), and thus Blood Brothers has no standing to sue. While the Court did approve of California’s regulation, prohibiting certain nude entertainment in establishments holding a liquor license, and stated that the Twenty-First Amendment gave the states broad latitude to ban such dancing as a part of their liquor licensing program, the California regulation was considerably more specific in stating the prohibited conduct than is ABC Regulation No. 44.

The ABC Board may enact regulations under the Twenty-First Amendment and the police power but such regulations still must be measured by the standards of the Constitution of Alabama. Although California v. LaRue gives alcoholic beverage control boards broader latitude under the Twenty-First Amendment to regulate expression in establishments licensed to sell liquor by the drink, it does not deny a party standing to challenge those regulations under the Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. exception when they are asserted to have constitutional faults such as vagueness or overbreadth.

ABC Regulation No. 44 is so vague as to be constitutionally invalid. What is “lewd and indecent conduct” is subject to numerous interpretations and definitions. The ABC inspector who investigated the violations, and an ABC administrator who testified at the hearing, could not furnish a uniform interpretation of the regulation. It is not clear if the Board intended the proscribed “lewd and indecent conduct” to be judged by obscenity standards, the indecent exposure statute in Code 1975, § 13-1-111, or some other standard. If the standard was obscenity, no determination was required to be made that the conduct was offensive to contemporary community standards and appeal to a prurient interest.

Furthermore, the regulation does not restrict topless dancing but topless dancers. It is not clear that the regulation would not bar a fully clothed topless dancer from the licensed premises. It is not certain from the language of the regulation whether all performers or just topless ones are prohibited.

The test to determine whether a statute, or in this instance a regulation, is void for vagueness is whether it is so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Devine v. Wood, 286 F.Supp. 102 (M.D.Ala.1968). ABC Regulation No. 44 would leave men of ordinary intelligence puzzled as to its exact meaning and correct application. The Court of Civil Appeals was correct in holding the regulation unconstitutionally vague.

I would affirm.

BEATTY, J., concurs. 
      
      . California ABC Rule 143.3(1) provides in relevant part:
      “No licensee shall permit any person to perform acts of or acts which simulate:
      “(a) Sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are prohibited by law.
      “(b) The touching, caressing or fondling of the breasts, buttocks, anus or genitals.
      “(c) The displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals.”