Case ID: tenn_16/html/0092-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CatRon, Ch. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Hays, lessee, vs. M’Guire, et al.
    
    A plaintiff in ejectment, in deducing her chain of title, offered in evidence a deed from A to B, which had been executed before the passage of the act of 1831, ch. 90 , but was registered afterwards, and after the commencement of the suit. Tiie defendants were neither purchasers from, nor creditors of A. It was held, that the deed passed the title, as between the parties from its date, and was admissable in evidence before thle jury.
    As against creditors of, and purchasers from the bargainor, a deed, by ■virtue of the act of 1831, ch. 90, only takes effect from its registration.
    An action of ejectment was brought by plaintiff in error, against the defendants, in the circuit court of Haywood county, and at the last term the cause was tried and judgment and verdict for defendants.
    The plaintiffs in error claimed under a grant issued by the State of North Carolina, and mesne conveyances frota the grantor to himself. One of the deeds forming a connecting link in his chain of title, was executed by Joseph Greer, to Thomas Rowan, previous to the passage of the act of 1831, ch. 90, but was registered and proved since the passage of that act, and after the commencement of this action.
    The defendants claimed under a grant issued tó —— Flowers, but they were neither creditors ór' purchasers of " Gréer, the báfgainor, in the deed above mentioned,, as executed befóre, but registered after thé commencement of the suit.
    The jüdge charged the jury, that iri order to enable the lessor of the plaintiff to maintain his action, it was necessary for him to prove that he was seized in fee, at the time of the demise laid in the declaration, of the premises in dispute, and which he claimed. That registration of a deed, according to the forms and requisites of law was substituted for livery of seizin; but that registration, subsequent to such demise, would not, under the existing acts of assembly, relate back, but she would only be seized from llie time of registration. Upon this charge the jury found a verdict for defendants; plaintiffs moved-for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and exception taken to the opinion of the court.
    
      W. II. Loving, for plaintiff in error.
    The counsel for plaintiff in error insists, that the deed takes effect from the time of delivery, after registration, unless creditors or subsequent purchasers are concerned, and that they are the only persons who can contest it. See acts of 1715, ch. 38, sec. 5: Cooke’s Rep. 254-5: 2 Haywood’s Rep. 287, Clark vs. Arnold. See also the act of 1817, ch. 45, sec. 1: 1827, ch. 59, séc.-l.
    The latter act declares deeds may be registered at any time, and be as good and valid as if registered'within the time prescribed by law; provided, that nothing in this act contained shall affect the rights of creditors, or bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consideration without notice. This provision repeals, or at least, so far alters the second section of - the act of 1819, ch. 49, as to malee the deed good and valid, when registered at any time, against all persons, only those excepted by the act of 1827, and consequently leaves the deed to take effect from the registration, subject as therein stated. Besides, the second section of the act of 1819, ch. 47, operates prospectively only, as will appear from the provisions of the first section.
    Does the act of 1831, ch. 90, sec. 6, alter or change the registration laws upon this subject; or is it only cumulative, and provision made thereby, the -more effectually to provide against fraud, in cases relating to the rights of bona fide creditors, or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration without notice; the latter proposition is the one contended for by the counsel for plaintiff in error.
    The latter part of the 6th section, of the act" of 1831, proves that it alono has reference to cases, where the contesting parties claim through or under the same claim of . , ° r T ° , ,, . , , ,. title or grantee, it uses these words, “and any deed oí conveyance, bill of sale, or other instruments above mentioned, which shall be last executed, but first registered, shall have preference thereof; unless it is proved in a court of equity, according to the rules of that court, that such subsequent purchaser had full notice of the previous conveyance; and the liens of judgments and executions, as here regulated, shall have preference to any deed, or bond, or other instrument, not registered at the time, the said lien of said judgment or execution attached.
    The 12th section gives additional proofs that the act applies, or takes effect, only when creditors and purchasers are concerned; indeed, no other conclusion can be arrived at, from reading the preamble of the act, or any section thereof.
    Counsel for plaintiff insists, that when A and B claim title to the same piece of land, adversely, aid by distinct titles, and A, or those claiming under him, have the older and better claim, B’s claim must be postponed in favor of A’s, although B’s may have been first registered; aid that this must be the construction of all the statutes taken together on this subject.
    For defendant in error it was contended, that, The act of 1819, ch. 49, sec. 2, requires all deeds to be proved and registered within twelve months, or the same shall be void, as to creditors and purchasers of the grantor or bargainor. The section of the act declares, explicitly, if they a-e not registered within that time, they may be registered at any time afterwa’ds, but de-cla’es they shall only take effect from their registration.
    By this act, it is manifest, as between the paties themselves, and in a court of law, the legal title only passed from registration. Whatever, therefore, may be the right of the bargainor in chancery, it. is clear he has no title before registration, which can be asserted at law. Sullivan’s, lessee, vs. Robertson, 2 Yerg. Rep. 91.
    
      llie act of 1827, ch. 59 altered this rule, and by virtue oí tins act, where creditors and purchasers are not concerned, the deed when proved relates to, and vests the title from its date. But the act of 1831, repealed the act of 1827, and according to the sixth and twelfth sections of that act, the legal title to land, in no case, whether creditors or purchasers are concerned, or not, passes until registration. The act maltes no exception in favor of the parties, nor gives to the deed, as between them a different effect, from what it is declared to have as against creditors and purchasers. The act not having made the exception, the court cannot malte it. Patton vs. M’Clure, M. & Yerg. Rep.
    Registration by these acts, is a substitute for livery of seizin, until which, at common law, the legal title did not pass.
    
      Jl. B. Bradford in reply.
    On the trial the plaintiff offered in evidence a deed from Joseph Greer to Thomas Rowan, dated many years ago, which deed was registered since the act of 1831, on the subject of registration, and after the commencement of file suit, but before the trial. The only question in the record is, whether the legal title had relation back, from the registration of the deed to the date thereof? The act of 1817, ch. 45, sc. 1, expressly declares, that the registration shall have such relation back, as against bargainor, grantor, and all others purchasing with notice. This section maltes provision for deeds theretofore made, but not registered within the time prescribed by law. The second section provides for' deeds thereafter to be executed, but does not affect any deeds executed previous to the passing of the act.
    The act of 1827, ch. 59, sec. 1, provides that all deeds theretofore made, as well as those thereafter to be made, may be registered at any time; provided, it does not affect ^16 ^ cre<iitors or subsequent purchasers, for a valuable consideration without notice. This clearly shows, tliat the title will in all cases have relation back to the date of the deed, except against creditors and purchasers without notice, who might be thereby injured. And the act of 1831, ch. 90, intended to remedy this evil; namely, that a man might keep his deed twelve months in his pocket, then register, and thereby defeat a subsequent purchaser without notice: (See the caption of the act.) It therefore gives no time to the grantee to register in, but in the ■sixth section, provides, that the deed shall take effect only from the registration, meaning that if there are in the mean time, creditors or subsequent purchasers without notice, the deed, or rather the title, shall not relate back to the date of the deed, as against them, as it had done under previous laws, but so far as they were concerned it should take effect only from registration. The latter part of the section shows this to be the intent of the legislature; and the twelfth section of the same act, is more decisive of that fact; it pronounces the deeds not registered void against creditors and purchasers without notice, ' but against none others, and of course as against all other •persons >the title would relate back to the date of the deed; and when tire deed is registered, it is notice to all the world, from its registration, and vests the title from ■the date against all but those excepted. M’Guire is not a creditor nor subsequent purchaser, for valuable consideration without notice, therefore the title will relate back as to him. Hay claims under a grant of' die State of North Carolina. M’Guire claims under a grant to-Flowers, therefore, a title in the plaintiff in error, prima facie good, is sufficient. In the case of Jackson vs. Dillons, lessee, 2 Ten. R.ep. 2C5, the judge says, “there is and ought to be a distinction between the situation of a person who claims under the same original title, and one who does not. In the one case it would seem, that a strict examination should take place, but in the other it would seem sufficient, if a title prima fade good be designed, so that the cotirts would be more strict in examining the titles of the parties, where they purported to be derived from the same source, and were conflicting, than they would; where the titles are derived from different sources; and M’Guire cannot claim the favor of a creditor or subsequent purchaser.
   CatRon, Ch. J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

The circuit court charged the jury, that registration of a deed subsequent to the demise laid in the declaration, would not, under the existing act of Assembly, that of December, 1831, relate back, but would only be a seizure from tire time of registration.

Before the passage of the act of 1819, deeds registered at any time, related to the time of making tire deed, and vested the title from that time, (2 Ten. Rep. 48), so, that nothing was more common than to cause deeds to be registered, to make out the chain of title, during the progress of a trial in an action of ejectment.

Then came the act of 1819, ch. 47, the first section of which, allowed twelve months for all deeds heretofore made, and not registered within the time prescribed by law, to be registered. And the second section declared, “That hereafter all deeds of conveyance, or other instruments of writing required by the laws of this State to be registered, shall be registered within twelve months from the execution thereof; and if any person shall fail to have his or her deed, or other instrument' of writing as aforesaid, registered within the time by this act prescribed, such person, or persons, may at any time thereafter have his,-her, or their deed, or instrument of writing, registered; in which case, such deed or other instrument of writing shall only operate and take effect from the time when so registered.”

This statute, it was insisted, only operated as to per-' sons ^av™§ contending titles, and not as between grantor and grantee; as to deeds when registered in time, the deed related to the time of execution, and might be registered after the suit was brought, and be given in evidence; but .this court held that the law was general, and the court could make no exception to it, grounded on implication, however reasonable in particular cases, and that a deed not registered intime, did not relate.

In 1827, the Legislature restored the former law upon the effect of registered titles, in terms the most general, perhaps, found in any statute upon the subject. It is declared, “that all deeds of conveyance, grants, bills of sale, or other instruments of writing now executed, or which may be heretofore executed and made, and required by file laws of this State to be recorded or registered; and which was not, or may not be registered within the time prescribed by law for such registration, may at any time hereafter be recorded or registered; and'when so registered or recorded, shall be as good and valid in law, as if registered within the time prescribed by law: provided, that nothing in this act contained, or such registration, shall affect the rights of creditors or bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice.”

Thus the law stood until the act of 1831 took effect. The preamble informs us, that the 'registration laws, as they then existed, did not answer the purpose for which they were originally designed, to wit: to give notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers. The five first sections prescribe the mode of proof, and what instruments shall. be recorded, and where; and tlie sixth section declares the effect they shall have; that they shall be received in evidence; and any instruments so proved and registered as aforesaid, shall take effect only from the time they are registered; and any deed of conveyance, bill of sale, or other instruments above mentioned, which shall be last executed, but first registered, shall have preference thereof, unless it is proved in a court of equity according to the rules of said court, that such subsequent purchaser had full notice of the previous conveyance; and the liens of judgments and executions (as hereinafter regulated) shall have preference to any deed or bond, or other instrument not registered at the time the said lien of said judgment or execution attached.”

The seventh and eighth sections regulate the mode of fixing liens by judgments, so as to attain certainty in the evidence; and the 9th and 10th sections prescribe the mode of probate in certain cases, as do the l'lth, 13th, 14th and i5th sections, regulate details; but the twelfth section comes in aid of <;he sixth, and declares, “that all such deeds and other instruments, mentioned in the first section of this act, not so proved and registered as aforesaid, shall be null and void, as to existing or subsequent creditors, or bona fide purchasers, without notice; and in case of marriage contracts, shall be void, as to existing or subsequent creditors of the husband or purchasers, without notice from him; and all deeds of gift for slaves, shall be in writing, or the same shall be utterly void and of no effect whatsoever; and all the aforesaid instruments so registered as aforesaid, shall be notice to all the world from the time they are registered.”

' - To ascertain what was the intention of the Legislature, we must enquire what description of contracts, executed and executory, are required to be registered by the first section. It provides, “that all deeds for the absolute conveyance of lands, tenements and hereditaments, all bills of sale for the absolute conveyance of slaves, or other personal property; all mortgages and deeds of trust, of either real or personal property; all deeds of gift; all powers of attorney, authorizing the conveyance of real or personal property, or for other purposes; all marriage contracts or agreements; all bonds or agreements in writing, for the conveyance of real or personal property, shall be acknowleged by the party or parties executing the same, or be proved by at least two subscribing witnesses, in the manner hereinafter prescribed, and bo thereupon registered.”

The sixth section enacts, that any of said instruments, when proved and registered, may be given in evidence, and shall take effect only from the time they are registered, as against an instrument of younger date, but first registered, which shall have preference in favor of a subsequent purchaser without notice; and until the deeds or agreements be registered, the property conveyed or contracted for, shall be subject to execution, and the lien of judgments against the vendor. It can be safely affirmed, that bills of sale for personal property other than slaves, household goods, horses, stock, &c. are effectual between the parties thereto, without being registered; as are powers of attorney appointing agents to sell goods, and as certainly are bonds and agreements to convey personal property, or real either. Yet, if tye take a part of a clause of tire sixth section, in disconnexion from the succeeding context, and disregard the whole scope and import of the act, reading it, “and any said instruments so proved and registered as aforesaid, shall take effect only from the time they are registered,” we may force the conclusion that a bill of sale for property, or a power of attorney to an agent to sell the most trifling articles, or an agreement to deliver property, or a title bond, have no effect, and cannot be sued upon till registered. The twelfth section, in language free from confusion, informs us against whom the instruments enumerated, are only to take effect from the time they are registered, to wit: “as to existing or subsequent creditors or bona fide purchasers, without notice.” But as between grator and grantee, this statute neither expressly repeals, or impliedly alters the act of 1827, which is in affirmance of that of 1715, ch. 38, sec. 5, on which all our register titles to lands are grounded, (2 Ten. Rep. 48, 264), and which, as regulated by the act of 1831, surely ought not to be disturbed further than this act has gone. The evils that threatened the country by the enact-meat of the statute of 1827, wore commented upon in 1828, in Washington’s lessee vs. Trousdale, (M. & Yer. 387) with a design to produce restrictivo legislation, principally for the protection of creditors and purchasers; restriction was intended by the act of 1831, not a repeal, and therefore, the statutes must be construed in connexion, arid the foregoing, on the point presented, is the obviously true construction. The judgment of the circuit court must, therefore, be reversed, and another trial be had, giving effect' to the title papers, as between grantor and grantee from the date of their execution.

Judgment reversed.