Case ID: ill-app_207/html/0310-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Holdom", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Mary Schwarz, Appellee, v. Edgar S. Cooke, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 23,098.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Principal and agent, § 163
      
       — when claim, for rent not defeated by unauthorized act of former agents. Where the authority of a real estate firm to collect rent for an apartment building, a part of which was occupied by a member of the firm, is revoked, the fact that the firm credits such partner with payment of rent due cannot defeat the claim of the landlord for rent.
    2. Judgment, § 519* — when of forcible entry and detainer res adjudicate as to rent due. A judgment in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding that the rent is due from a tenant and unpaid is res adjudicate on such question in a subsequent action for rent, in the absence of proof of payment of the rent subsequent to such judgment.
    Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Frank H. Graham, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1917.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed October 2, 1917.
    Statement of the Case.
    Judgment by confession by Mary Schwarz, plaintiff, against Edgar S. Cooke, defendant, under a warrant to confess judgment contained in a lease between the parties, • which judgment was afterwards opened and defendant permitted to plead to the merits. From a judgment for plaintiff for $74.25, defendant appeals.
    Harris F. Williams, for appellant; W. Scott Hodges', of counsel.
    T. D. Hurley, for appellee.'
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Presiding Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.

3. Accord and satisfaction — what does not constitute. The settlement of an account for rent between a real estate firm acting as agent and a member thereof cannot be availed of as an accord and satisfaction between the landlord and tenant, since the defense of an accord and satisfaction, to be available, must be between the parties to the action and none other.