Case ID: so_138/html/0867-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "OVERTON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

(173 La. 871)
    STATE v. McGUIRE.
    No. 31502.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Nov. 30, 1931.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1932.
    George Wray Gill and Warren M. Simon, both of New Orleans (Gill & Simon, of New Orleans, of counsel), for appellant.
    Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., E. R. Sehowalter, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Eugene Stanley, Dist. Atty., and Chandler C. Luzenberg, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., both of New Orleans, for the State.
   OVERTON, J.

Defendant was informed against in. that, on June 20, 1931, in the parish of Orleans, and within the jurisdiction of the criminal district court for that parish, he did then and there feloniously and unlawfully steal, take, and carry away fourteen automobile tires, each of the approximate value of $7.35, all of a total value of $102.91, the said automobile tires then and there being in course of transportation over the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kentucky, and domiciled in the city of Louisville, in that state, with 'branch offices in the city of New Orleans, state of Louisiana, the said railroad being then ánd there engaged in the business of a common carrier, the said fourteen automobile tires being then and there in the custody of the said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company and in transit on the said railroad from the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of Gadsden, Ala., consignor, to the Sears, Roebuck Company of Lake Charles, La., consignee.

The bill of information was filed under Act No. 211 of 1920, the pertinent part of which •reads:

“Any person who shall steal or who shall break or open any bos, case, bag, or other receptacle with intent to steal any goods, wares, merchandise, or other articles or objects of any description while in course of transportation from consignor • to consignee shall be deemed guilty of an offense and on conviction fined not less than Fifty nor more than One Thousand Dollars, and imprisoned with or without hard labor for not less than six months nor more than six years.

A motion to gnash the bill of information was filed by defendant, and a bill was reserved to tbe overruling of the motion. The motion rests upon the grounds of the vagueness of the bill of information; the failure of the bill (to set out directly or indirectly the ownership of the goods alleged to have been stolen; the failure of the bill to set out a description of tbe goods stolen; tbe failure of tbe bill to set out that the goods were contained in or vvere takqn from any box, case, bag, or other receptacle, as required by law, or 'that any such receptacle was broken or opened; tbe failure of tbe bill to set out tbe jurisdiction of tbe court; and, generally, that the bill is insufficient to charge either larceny or a violation of Act No. 211 of 1920.

A comparison of the substance of tbe bill of information with Act No. 211 of 1920 Shows that every element essential to charge a violation of that act is set out in the bill fully and with dearness. Therefore, the ground of vagueness lacks foundation.

As to the alleged failure of the bill to set out tbe ownership of tbe property stolen, tbe offense charged, is a statutory offense, and the statute, denouncing it, does not require that the ownership of the property be alleged. It sufficed to charge tbe offense in the language of the statute or in words unmistakably equivalent thereto. Marr’s Grim. Jur. (2d. Ed.) § 325, page 483. Even in ordinary cases of larceny, it is 'rather as part of the description and to identify the stolen property that an indictment is required to name the owner of the property. State v. Acebal, 110 La. 129, 34 So. 303; Marr’s Crim. Jur. (2d Ed.) § 168, p. 273. Moreover, the ownership of property stolen may be laid in tbe mere possessor. State v. Babineaux, 146 La. 290, 83 So. 558. Here tbe information, in effect, so lays it, for it alleges that tbe property was stolen while in tbe custody of tbe Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and in transit from tbe Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company to the Sears, Roebuck Company. It amply appears from tbe bill that the property stolen was noi: the property of defendant, but of another. The statute requires nothing more in this respect.

As to tbe failure to describe tbe property, sufficiently to identify it, we .think that the bill is not amenable to such an objection. It describes tbe property as fourteen automobile tires, each of the approximate value of $7.35, and as being in transit 'over tbe Louisville and Nashville Railroad from a named consignor to a named consignee.

As to tbe failure to allege that tbe property was contained in a box or other receptacle, which was broken by defendant, such an allegation would have been inappropriate to that part of the statute under which the state was prosecuting. The statute under which the state was proceeding, namely, Act No. 211 of 1920, creates two offenses — one of stealing property while in transportation .from consignor to consignee, and the other of breaking or opening any box or other receptacle with the intention of stealing property during such course of transportation. It was under the provision, denouncing the first offense, that tbe prosecution was liad. This provision contains no such ingredient as the breaking open of a receptacle.

As to the failure to set out the jurisdiction of the court, this position is without foundation, since the bill in clear language expressly sets it forth.

As to the general allegation that the bill is insufficient under Act No. 211 of 1920, what we have said discloses that, in our view, there is mo reason to consider it insufficient.

The next five bills relate to tbe admission of a confession made by defendant. Tbe substance of all five is that tbe confession was not a voluntary one, but was made under duress and as a result of gross abuse, and while defendant was cold and sleepy. Defendant alone testified that he was subjected to duress and gross abuse. Four or five witnesses testified that there was -no duress used or abuse indulged in, but that the confession, which was made immediately after tbe arrest, was made freely and voluntarily. Tbe evidence satisfies us that the confession was freely made. In fact, there was little left for defendant to do but to confess, for he was caught assembling the tires, preparatory to •removing them from the ground, where they had been thrown from the train.

Another bill of exception was taken to the overruling of a motion for a new trial, but it presents nothing reviewable in this court that has not already been considered.

The last bill was reserved to the overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment. The motion in arrest is directed, in large part, to matters not appearing on the face of the record, such as whether the state proved the jurisdiction of the court, and hence are not reached by that motion. The only matter set up in the motion which may be said to be reached by it is the alleged failure of the bill of information to set forth the jurisdiction of the court, and this matter has been considered in passing on the motion to quash.

The verdict and the sentence, appealed from, are affirmed.