Case ID: f-appx_462/html/0076-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Laxmi GURUNG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-1942-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    
      Jason A. Nielson, Law Offices of Thomas Mungoven, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director; Andrew Oliveira, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Laxmi Gurung, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks review of an April 15, 2011, order of the BIA affirming the July 14, 2009, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Laxmi Gurung, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 15, 2011), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City July 14, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

Gurung argues that the agency erred in finding that she was not persecuted on account of her political opinion. Section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(i), applicable here because Gurung filed her application in 2007, see REAL ID Act § 101(h)(2), provides that an asylum applicant “must establish that [a protected ground] was or will be at least one central reason for” the claimed persecution. See Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2010). The statements contained in Gurung’s affidavit and testimony indicate that the Maoists came to her home to recruit members for their protest rally, and that it was her refusal to join, not her personal political opinion, that resulted in the harm suffered and subsequent visit and threats. Because the record shows that the Maoists were motivated by a desire to fill their ranks, the agency reasonably concluded that the harm suffered was not on account of a protected ground. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

Although Gurung contends that the IJ failed to consider Exhibit 5, the record shows that the IJ considered the letters from Gurung’s mother and the village committee, but ultimately based its finding on Gurung’s testimony, see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006), from which a reasonable factfin-der could conclude that the Maoists’ objective was to recruit Gurung for participation in their rally. See Matter of J-BN- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir.2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Gurung did not demonstrate that the harm she suffered, or her fear of future harm, bore a sufficient nexus to a protected ground.

Having found that Gurung did not establish a sufficient nexus to a protected ground, the agency did not err in denying her asylum and withholding of removal. See Jin Jin Long v. Holder, 620 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir.2010); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346 (BIA 2010) (holding that the “one central reason” nexus standard of the REAL ID Act applies to withholding of removal). Further, the agency reasonably denied Gurung CAT relief, as neither Gurung nor her family members had ever been arrested or detained in Nepal, and the only instances of harm or mistreatment that Gurung experienced in Nepal were insufficient to constitute persecution, much less torture. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482, 112 S.Ct. 812; Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir.2011). Aside from country conditions evidence of general human rights concerns in Nepal, Gurung failed to provide any evidence showing that someone in her particular circumstances would likely be tortured if returned to Nepal. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2005); see also Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir.2003).

Gurung’s challenge to the BIA’s adoption and affirmance of the IJ’s decision is meritless. See Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2008). Finally, we decline to address Gurung’s argument that the IJ failed to admit Exhibit 5 into evidence, as that specific argument was never raised before the agency. See Foster v. U.S. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004); Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2) and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).