Case ID: f-appx_695/html/0718-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie HAMILTON, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-4478
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: July 26, 2017
    Decided: August 17, 2017
    
      Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Andrew W. Grindrod, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Christopher Catizone, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
   Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronnie Hamilton, Jr., pled guilty without a plea agreement to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in •violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012). He was sentenced to a term of 32 months’ imprisonment. Hamilton alleges on appeal that the district court procedurally erred by incorrectly calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.

We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. In determining procedural reasonableness, this court considers whether, among other things, the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 49-51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Hamilton asserts that the district court miscalculated his Guidelines range by erroneously finding that his prior conviction in Virginia for unlawful wounding qualified as a crime of violence, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4B1.2 (2015), and enhancing his base offense level accordingly.

Hamilton’s claim is unavailing. The Supreme Court recently held in Beckles v. United States, — U.S. —, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017), that the Guidelines are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 892, 895, 897. The Court explained that, unlike the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, which was invalidated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), “§ 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause is not void for vagueness.” Id. at 895, 897. Hamilton’s Virginia conviction for unlawful wounding remains a crime of violence under the residual clause post-Rec/cfes, notwithstanding that the Government conceded in the district court that the residual clause was void for vagueness. See United States v. Lee, 855 F.3d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that Virginia conviction for unlawful wounding qualified as a crime of violence under the career offender guideline’s residual clause).

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED