Case ID: ny-super-ct_58/html/0377-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court.—Ingraham, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CHARLES S. HINE, Respondent v. THE MANHATTAN RAILWAY COMPANY, et al., Appellants.
    
      Errors, not so prejudicial as to call for a reversal, instances of.
    
    Where the main issue in an action in equity was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining a continuing trespass by the defendants on certain premises, and the evidence'justified a judgment for injunction, and the court, at defendants’ request, undertook to ascertain the value of the premises so that on payment of such value the injunction could be dissolved, and in so doing erroneously, under defendants’ objection, admitted evidence of offers made for the property, such error is not cause for reversal of a judgment adjudging that defendant be perpetually enjoined until the payment of the amount found and adjudged to be the value of the premises, which amount was abundantly sustained by competent evidence. One of plaintiff’s witnesses, under defendants’ objection, testified that a certain piece of property sold for $29,000; afterwards defendants’ witness testified in chief that it sold for $29,500.
    Held,—the admission of the testimony given by the plaintiff’s witnesses was not cause for reversal.
    Before Freedman and Ingraham, JJ.
    
      Decided November 3, 1890.
    
      Davies & Rapallo, attorneys, and Brainera Tolies of counsel, for appellants.
    
      Arnoux, Ritch & Woodford, attorneys, and Wm. H. Arnoux of counsel, for respondent.
   By the Court.—Ingraham, J.

The appellants relied on two exceptions taken to the admission of evidence.

The first exception is to the ruling of the court overruling an objection to a question asked of the plaintiff as to offers that he had received for the property in 1871, or 1872. That this evidence was incomplete to prove the value of the property is clear, but the value of the property in 1871 or 1872 was not the main issue involved in the case, and while we think it was error to overrule the objection it does not follow that the judgment should be reversed. As was said in McGean v. The Manhattan R. R. Co., 27 State Reporter, 339. “ The court must be satisfied upon an examination of the whole case that the appellant was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence to warrant a reversal.”

This was an action in equity for an injunction to restrain-a continuing trespass. The evidence justified the judgment for an injunction, and at the request of defendants the court undertook to ascertain the value of the premises appropriated by the defendants, so that on the payment of the value of such property the injunction could be dissolved. The amount which the court fixed as the value of the property appropriated by the defendants was abundantly sustained by competent evidence. An examination of the case has convinced us that the defendants were not prejudiced by this- testimony.

The same may be said of the other testimony, an exception to the admission of which, the defendants rely on. The defendants’ witness Hawes also testified to the sale ; there was a difference between them of only $500, Martine saying it sold for $29,000, and Hawes, the defendants’ expert, saying that it sold for $29,500. Whether it was one or other was evidently immaterial. The question as to the right of the defendants in a street opened during the occupation of this city by the Dutch is settled in this court, and we have nothing to do but follow former decisions.

On the whole case we think that no error was committed which calls for a reversal, and the judgment should be affirmed with costs.

Freedman, J., concurred.