Case ID: va_61/html/0573-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JOYNLS, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Winston & als. v. The Midlothian Coal Mining Co. & als.
    March Term, 1871.
    Richmond.
    Injunctions — Jurisdiction of Courts. — where a hill seeks relief, and asks for an injunction to restrain the sale of real estate in another county, as ancillary to the relief sought, the court of the county or city where the defendants, or some of them reside, has jurisdictions of the cause; and the order for the injunction properly proceeds from the court of that county or city.
    On the 19th day of May, 1869, Joseph P. Winston and a number of other persons, claiming to be creditors of the Midlothian Coal Mining Company, and suing for themselves and all other creditors and stockholders of said company who would come in and make themselves parties in the cause, filed their bill in the Circuit court of the city of Richmond, in which they allege that they are creditors of the company to the amount' of about $40,000. That, in 1866, the directors of the company had issued its bonds to the amount of $60,000, secured by a deed of trust upon the real property of the company in the county of Chesterfield, in which deed Robert A. Lancaster and Charles S. Mills were the trustees. That these bonds were placed in the hands of Lancaster & Co., who were brokers, for sale upon commission. That in March, 1867, the said board of directors directed the issue of not more than $75,000 of the bonds of the company, which were secured by another deed upon the said property of the company, in which the said Lancaster and James R. Branch were the trustees. That $60,000 of these bonds were issued 'and placed in the hands of Lancaster & Co. *for sale. And that another deed was executed, conveying all the unincumbered property of the company to Lancaster and Mills, to secure certain negotiable notes executed by the directors of the company individually, to the amount of $15,000, for the benefit of the company. They charge that there was both usury and fraud in the mode of Lancaster & Co.’s dealings with these bonds, which they set out; and that they had sold to one Burrus a large amount of them at a great sacrifice, they being at the same time the agents of the company to sell, and the agents of Burrus to buy. They insist that the bonds and deeds of trust are void because of the frauds practiced, and because they are in contravention of the act of Assembly of Virginia, and the bankrupt law of the United States; or under the former the plaintiffs are -entitled to share equally with the creditors, attempted to be secured by them.
    They state, further, that the trustees in the deeds of trust had advertised to sell the property on the next day, and if the sale- is made it must be, under the circumstances, at a ruinous sacrifice; and in fact can only be purchased by Burrus, to be paid for by the bonds of the company which he holds. And making the trustees in said deed, the directors of the company, Lancaster & Co. and Burrus, parties defendants, and calling for a discovery from Lancaster & Co. and Burrus, they pray that Lancaster & Co. may be required to render an account of all their dealings and transactions in the premises with the said Midlothian Coal Mining Company ; that the alleged sales of said bonds, as against the said company and the complainants, may be decreed to be null and void, and that they may be required to be given up and cancelled; that said deeds of trust may be declared void; that an account may be taken by one of the commissioners of the court, of all the said dealings and transactions; that the plaintiffs, *as creditors of said company,, may in any event be let into and have equal benefit under said deeds of trust with Lancaster & Co. and others, if said deeds or any of them shall be held to be valid; that the trustees and all others may be enjoined from selling the said property until the further order of the court; that a receiver may be appointed; and for general relief.
    Before filing the bill in the clerk’s office, the plaintiffs presented it to the judge of the Circuit court for an injunction, which he awarded. But whilst the clerk was making out the process, another order of the judge was presented to him, by which it was ordered, that if any of the defendants in said bill, or any one for them, shall execute and file with the clerk of the court a bond in the penalty of $60,000, with good security, with condition to comply with the decree which may be rendered by the court on the hearing of the cause, then the sale may take place in accordance with the terms of the advertisement. And this bond was executed.
    On the 20th day of May, 1869, George L. Bidgood and others, creditors and stockholders of the Midlothian Coal Mining Company, filed their petition in the cause, in which they prayed to be admitted as plaintiffs therein. They adopt the allegations of the bill, and the stockholders who unite in said petition, pray for themselves and the other stockholders, that the sale of the property may be enjoined. Upon the filing of this petition the judge awarded a peremptory injunction restraining and forbidding the trustees from selling the property.
    The process issued on this last injunction was served on Mills at 20 minutes past ten o’clock of that day, by leaving a copy at his dwelling-house, and on Branch at IS minutes past eleven o’clock, in the same way. Lancaster was returned not found, and no inhabitant.
    On the 12th of June, 1869, Julia A. Woolridge, *Thomas C. and John C. Howard, filed their petition in the cause, asking to be made parties; they claimed as large stockholders in the company. After setting out their interest, they stated that the trustees, notwithstanding the injunction, and that they were notified of it by written notice from the counsel of the plaintiffs, had proceeded to sell the property, and that Burrus had become the purchaser at $145,000, with notice that the injunction had been issued.
    It appears that the plaintiffs proceeded regularly to mature the case for a hearing; process was issued which was served on the company and on several of the directors, on Lancaster & Co., and on the three trustees, and at the rules held on the last Monday in June, the bill was taken for confessed as to them.
    It appeared in the case that the real estate of the Midlothian Mining Company, and the personal property included in the deeds of trust, was located in the county of Chesterfield; but the principal office of the company was in the city of Richmond. The trustees, Mills and Branch, two of the partners of the firm of Lancaster & Co., and -several of the directors of the company, lived in the city.
    On the 21st of July, 1869, Lancaster and Mills filed their motion in writing in the cause, praying that the injunction awarded on the 19th of May and on the 20th of May, 1869, be dissolved, and that the plaintiffs’ bill be dismissed. And they assigned, as the ground of the motion, that the bill in the cause is a bill for an injunction to restrain a sale apprehended by the plaintiffs, which was to take place in the county of Chesterfield; and that the orders awarding said injunctions were improperly directed to the clerk of the Circuit court of Richmond. That jurisdiction of the bill was in a Circuit, County or Corporation court of Chesterfield ; and that the Circuit court of Richmond had no jurisdiction of this bill. This motion the court ^overruled. But on the 13th of October, 1869, on the motion of Lancaster & Co. to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the bill and petitions, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the suit; the court did dissolve the injunction. And though in that order the question of dismissing the bill was reserved, yet on the next day it was taken up; and the bill and petitions were dismissed. From these orders the plaintiffs obtained an appeal from a judge of this court.
    Lyons, J., Alfred Jones and John Howard, for the appellants.
    Heeson, Meredith and Ould & Carrington, for the defendant.
    
      
       Injunctions — Interpretation of Statute. — In Muller v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. 531, the court said: “It is well settled that § 4, of chapter 179, aforesaid, applies only to a pure hill of injunction, and not to a hill seeking other relief, to which the injunction sought is merely ancillary. This was expressly decided by this court in the recent case of Winston & als. v. The Midlothian Coal Mining Company & als., 20 Gratt. 686. See also, 2 Rob. Old Pr. 249. and the cases there cited of Hough v. Shreeve, 4 Munf. 490; Singleton v. Lewis, etc., 6 Munf. 397; and Pulliam v. Winston, 5 Leigh 325.”
    
   JOYNLS, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Though the bill in this case prays an injunction to restrain the sale of the property of the Midlothian Company then about to be made, it also prays that the deed of trust under which the sale was to be made, may be set a side for usury and fraud. The prayer for the injunction was merely ancillary to the other and principal relief prayed for, its obj ect was only to hold and preserve the property until the title to it could be litigated and decided. Our opinion is, that section 4, ch. 179, of the Code, does not apply to a case like this; but applies only to what may be called a pure bill of injunction : that is to say, to a bill which has no other object than an injunction. It is hardly necessary to add, that if it should appear in any case that the prayer for other relief beyond the injunction is merely col-orable, and thrown in to give jurisdiction, it will not be allowed to take the case out of the provision of section 4, ch. 179, of the Code.

The Circuit court of Richmond, therefore, had jurisdiction of the case, and its order dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill must be reversed.

*The decree was as follows:

The court is of opinion, for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record, that though the bill in this case prays an injunction, it also prays other relief, to which the prayer for an injunction is ancillary ; and that the orders of the said Circuit court of Richmond, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill are erroneous. Therefore it is decreed and ordered that the said orders of the Circuit court of Richmond, dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill, be reversed and annulled, and that the appellees pay to the appellants their costs by them expended in the prosecution of this appeal; and the cause is remanded to the Chancery court of Richmond for further proceedings, &c.

Decree reversed.