Case ID: us-ct-cl_25/html/0323-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BichardsoN, Oh. J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CHARLOTTE A. WADDELL, Executrix, v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Departmental 28, Congressional 131.
    Decided April 21, 1890.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    A claim rejected by the accounting officer thirty-five years ago is transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury. Also a claim for marshal’s fees ■which accrued forty-seven years before it was presented to the Treasury.
    I.The court has no power under the Tucker Jot (24 Stat. L., p. 505, 5 13) to render judgment upon the merits where a'claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
    II.The accounting officers can not open and re-examine cases decided by their predecessors except for fraud, errors of calculation, or newly discovered evidence ; and the Secretary of the Treasury can not transmit a claim rejected by the accounting officers under one of his predecessors.
    III.The accounting officers have no right to settle a stale claim; and the Secretary of the Treasury is without power to transmit it under the Bowman Act.
    IY. A stale claim is one that has not been presented for a long' period of time, during which the claimant has slept upon his rights. But there is public indebtedness which lapse of time will not render stale, such as bonds, coupons, etc.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claimant is executrix of the estate of William O. H. Waddell, deceased.
    II. Said W. C. H. Waddell was appointed marshal of the United States for the southern district of New Tork by Andrew Jackson, President, and by that appointment and re-appointment held the office from November 7,1831, to December 10, 1839, when his last commission expired,
    III. In 1846 the claimant’s testator (W. C. H. Waddell) presented to the Treasury Department for adjustment and payment accounts for fees, disbursements, cartage, labor, storage, insurances, and other costs in cases in which the United States were a party, which costs had previously been taxed and allowed by the district judge of the United States for the southern district of New York. These accounts were examined by the accounting officers, and on the 7th day of April, 1851, the sum of $3,829.42 was allowed and subsequently paid, and the balance, $10,927.04, was disallowed by the First Comptroller. No further action was taken for the collection of the claim until December 5,1885, when it was again presented to the Treasury Department for payment by the attorney of the present claimant as executrix.
    Another claim is thus stated in the petitions: “Fees, expenses, and poundage upon the service of a warrant of distress issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury in the nature of a ca. sa. et fi. fa., dated November 12, 1838, against Samuel Swartwout, late collector of customs for the port of New York, for the sum of $1,344,119....$18,102.33.”'
    This last-mentioned claim was never presented to the Treasury Department until December 5, D85, when, with the other accounts, it was sent to the Department and payment demanded by said attorneys of the present claimant. No allegations are made of fraud, mistake in matters of fact arising- from errors in calculation, or newly discovered material evidence.
    The court decided as conclusions of law:
    Upon the prayer for judgment in the amended petition in Departmental case No. 28, the claimant’s amended petition must be dismissed on the ground that the claims are barred by the provisions of section 1069 of the Kevised Statutes.
    The first claim of $10,927.04 can not be re examined by the present accounting officers because it was disallowed by their predecessors more than thirty-five'years ago, and accounts once settled by accounting officers can not be re-opened except for fraud, manifest mistake in matters of fact arising from an error in calculation, or newly discovered material evidence.
    The second claim for $18,102.33 can not be considered by the accounting officers because it is a stale claim which accrued, if at all, more than forty-seven years before its presentation to. the Treasury Department.
    
      
      Mr. George A. King, Mr. IT. W. Belhnap, and Mr. J. W. Douglass for the claimant:
    No act of Congress has ever up to this time prescribed any limitation upon the presentation of claims to the accounting officers of the Treasury. Special limitations there undoubtedly have been in several cases, as for instance that made by the Act of March 3, 1869 (15 Statutes at Large, 334), upon the presentation to the Second Auditor of claims for additional bounty under the act of July 28, 1866, which limitation was from time to time extended by no less than five subsequent statutes, until it finally expired by the terms of the Act of July 5, 1876 (16 Statutes at Large 74), on July 1,1880. The same is true as to claims for horses lost by officers and enlisted men in the military service of the United States, which, after being on several previous occasions limited in time, were finally, by act of January 9, 1883, 22 Statutes at Large, 401, required to be filed within one year after the passage of that act, after which time they were declared to be forever barred. So by section 3228 of the Revised Statutes all claims for the refunding of internal taxes alleged to have been erroneously collected must be presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within two years after the cause of action accrued. But these special statutes of limitation do but emphasize tbe general rule that no statute of limitations has ever enacted a general limitation upon the presentation of claims against the Government.
    The question is not a new one in this Court. In the case of IAppitt v. United, States (14 O. Gis. R. 148) the point was stated in the opinion of the court delivered by Judge Nott.
    ' This case was taken to the Supreme Court and affirmed, United States v. IAppitt (100 U. S. 663).
    The ruling of this Court in McClure v. United States (19 C. Cls. R., 18) follows this view. And for a practical illustration of a case where a claim was considered and determined by this Court on its merits where the claim itself was about one hundred years old, see the case of Williams v. United States (15 O. 01s. R., 514) where the question of limitation was raised on behalf of the Government, but does not seem to have been deemed of sufficient importance to be alluded to in the elaborate opinion of the Court (pp. 520-532), which was based entirely upon the merits of the claim.
    
      If, however, it should be held that there is a presumption of payment of the claim arising simply from the lapse of time, it must still be held by the court that that presumption is a rebut-table one, just as was held in Blount v. United States (21 C. Ols. R. 274), was allowable with reference to the presumption of payment by the Confederate government in cases of ante helium mail contract claims.
    
      Mr. Héber J. May (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Cotton) for the defendants.
   BichardsoN, Oh. J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

This case is before us under three distinct provisions of the statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the court.

1. June 5, 1884, it was transmitted by the Committee on Claims of the House of Representatives for a tinding of fact by the court under section 1 of the Bowman Act of March 3, 1883, chapter 116 (22 Stat. L., 485). In that case the claimant filed her petition April 22, 1885.

2. April 8, 1886, it was transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, under section 2 of that act, for finding of facts, conclusions of law, and opinion. In that case the claimant filed her petition April 20, 1886.

3. After the passage of the act of March 3,1887, chapter 350 (24 Stat. L., 505), the claimant filed an amended petition in the latter case which, after setting out the allegations of facts relied upon, prays that the court will find as a conclusion of law that there is due the claimant the sum of $32,868.79, and that the court will thereupon proceed to render judgment in her favor for that amount m accordance with the provisions of section 13 of the latter act. That section is as follows:

“Sec. 13. That in every case which shall come before the Court of Claims, or is now pending therein, under the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act to afford assistance and relief to Congress and the Executive Departments in the investigation of claims and demands against the Government,’ approved March third, eighteen hundred and eighty-three, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court, upon the facts established, that it has jurisdiction to render judgment or decree thereon under existing laws or under the provisions of this act, it shall proceed to do so, giving to either party such further opportunity for hearing as in its judgment justice shall require, and report its proceedings therein to either house of Congress or to the Department by which the same was referred to said court.”

There are two claims in the case transmitted by the Secretary of the Treasury, differing somewhat in the principles of law to which they give rise.

The first is a claim presented to the Department and disallowed more than thirty-five years ago by the predecessors of the present accounting officers, who were asked, after that lapse of time, to pass upon and allow it, without allegations of fraud, mistake, or newly discovered evidence.

The second claim accrued, if at all, more than forty-seven years before it was presented to the Treasury Department, December 5, 1885.

Both claims are barred by the Revised Statutes, section 1059, from the jurisdiction of the court to render judgment, as they accrued, if at all, more than six years before the filing of the petition, and section thirteen of the act of 1887 authorizes a judgment in petitions under that act or the acf of 1883 (the Bowman act) only when “ it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court, upon the facts established, that it has jurisdiction to render judgment or decree thereon under existing laws or under the provisions of this act.” There is no provision in the act itself for judgment in such case, and the preexisting law forever barred the claims. The amended petition must therefore be dismissed.

The two claims can not be received, examined, and allowed by the accounting officers of the Treasury for other reasons not alike in relation to each claim.

The first claim, disallowed more than thirty-five years ago, has passed beyond the control of the accounting officers and the head of the Department who have been appointed since the time of that disallowance. The law has been too well settled to be in doubt at this time, that public officers can not open and re-examine cases decided by their predecessors except for fraud, mistake in matters of fact arising from errors in calculation, or newly discovered material evidence. (United States v. Bank of Metropolis, 15 Pet., 401: Lavalette's Case, 1 C. Cls. R., 149; Jackson's Case, 19 C. Cls. R., 504; Illinois Case, 20 C. Cls. R., 342; Day’s Case, 21, C. Cls. R., 262. Opinions of Attorney-G-eneral, vol. 9, p. 34: vol. 12, pp. 172, 358; vol. 13, pp. 387, 456; vol. 14, p. 275 )

The second claim, which accrued, if at all, in 183S, was'not ]>resented to the Treasury Department until December 5,1885, a period of forty-seven years. It is therefore a stale claim, which the accounting officers have no right to receive, examine, and settle. It was not the purpose of Congress by the Bowman act and the act of 1887 to open and revive stale claims, but rather to provide for a judicial investigation of live and open accounts which are within the cognizance of the accounting officers, and for the determination of other matters. (McClure’s and Porter’s Cases, 19 C. Cls. R., 18.)

It has often been said that there-is no statute of limitation applicable to claims required to be presented and examined by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, and that is undoubtedly so. But there is an unwritten law recognized by courts of equity and admiralty in which no statute of limitation is applicable against entertaining and enforcing stale claims (Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U. S. R., 387, and numerous cases there cited; Willard v. Dorr, 3 Mason C. C. R., 161), and that law the accounting officers may rightly invoke and rely upon.

A stale claim is one that has not been presented for payment for a long period of time, during which the claimant has slept upon his rights and thus created a presumption that the claim was never an honest and just one,,and that he has been waiting until it was forgotten by the alleged debtor, and all evidence against it is lost or destroyed. Courts of equity usually follow the law and adopt the statutes of limitation as fixing the period beyond which delay requires explanation, and which, unless satisfactorily accounted for, will constitute a bar to demands. We see no reason why the accounting officers may not rightly adopt the same rule.

But there is much indebtedness of the United States which no lapse of time in making application for payment renders stale, such as interest on registered bonds and other balances stated in favor of parties on the books of the Treasury Department, as to which the only proof to be made is the identity of the claimant or his right to represent the record-creditor (Rev. Stat. sees 306, 307, 308, Hall’s Case, 17 C. Cls. R., 39); the public debt evidenced by bonds and coupons of record in the Department, and, no doubt, other indebtedness of like kind which we have not considered.

The clerk will certify the findings of fact and conclusions of law and opinion to the Treasury Department for its guidance and action, will certify the findings of fact with this opinion to the Committee on Claims of the House of'Representatives, and will enter judgment in the case transmitted to the court by the Secretary of the Treasury (Departmental, Ho. 28) dismissing the amended petition.