Case ID: tenn_23/html/0039-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "GkeeN, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Planters’ Bank vs. Bradford.
    The notary in this case had been informed some fifteen months before the day of protest, by the endorser, that he resided at Jackson. He, without enquiry, transmitted a notice to Jackson to the endorser. The endorser had removed some five months before the protest, under circumstances of peculiar notoriety. Held, that clue diligence had not been used to ascertain the residence of the endorser, and that he was discharged.
    The Planters’ Bank instituted an action of debt in the-circuit court of Madison county, against A. B. Bradford. The declaration avers, that W. B. Miller executed bis bill single to P. M. Miller on the 18th day of March, 1839, promising to pay him the sum of $4000 four months after date, at the Planters’ Bank at Nashville, Tennessee; that P. M. Miller endorsed and delivered the note to A. B. Bradford, and that Bradford endorsed and delivered it to the Planters’ Bank. The defendant pleaded nil debet, and issue was thereupon submitted to a jury at the December term, 1842: Read, judge, presiding.
    The plaintiff introduced a bill single made and endorsed as set forth in the declaration, and the protest of Alpha Kingsley, notary public, endorsed as follows: “20th July, 1839. I put notices of this protest in the postoffice at Nashville, addressed to P. M. Miller and A. B. Bradford, Jackson, Tenn.” The deposition of Kingsley was read. He stated, that he was notary public in the city of Nashville; that on the 20th day of July, 1S39, there came into his hands, as notary public, the bill single above described; that he duly presented said bill single for payment; that it was not paid, and that he thereupon protested the drawer and endorsers, and on the same day (20th) 'deposited notices in the postoffice at Nashville, addressed to Bradford and Miller, at Jackson, Tenn. in time to go by the first mail leaving Nashville after said demand and protest; that he addressed the notice to Bradford at Jackson because he had previously transmitted several notices of protest to him at that place, at which Bradford then resided, and that he knew that he continued to reside there, from the statements made to him by Bradford the last time he saw him, and that previous to July, 1839, he had not heard of the removal of Bradford from Jackson.
    The defendant introduced testimony showing that he removed from Madison county, Tennessee, to Holly Springs, Mississippi, on the 9th or 10th of March, 1839; that his removal was generally known; that he was major-general of the militia of the western division of the state; that on the 12th of February, 1839, he published in the Jackson Telegraph his resignation of this office and his intended removal; that about forty numbers of the Jackson Telegraph were sent to subscribers residing in the town of Nashville, amongst others to three of the leading directors of the Planters’ Bank; that the governor of the state issued a proclamation, which was published in the Nashville Whig, directing the election of a successor; that several of the directors of the bank took the Whig at the time of the publication of this proclamation; that Bradford was well known in Nashville; that his removal was known to many persons in Nashville.
    Kingsley, whose deposition was taken by defendant, stated that the last time he saw the defendant Bradford was in February, 1838.
    Hobson, the cashier of the Planter’s Bank, testified that he did not know of the removal of Bradford at the time the notice was transmitted, nor did he know that any of the directors of the bank did.
    
      It appeared that Nashville and Jackson were distant from each other about 150 miles; that a tri-weekly stage ran between them, and that there was much intercourse between the inhabitants of the two places.
    The defendant offered a witness to show that the signature of P. M. Miller, the prior endorser, was a forgery. This evidence was rejected by the court.
    The charge of Read, presiding judge, is set forth in the opinion of the court which follows.
    The jury rendered a verdict for, the defendant. A motion for a new trial was made, and overruled; judgment rendered, and plaintiff appealed.
    
      McLanahan for plaintiff.
    The question in this case is, was there a proper exercise of diligence in sending the notice, to fix the liability of defendant as endorser. Should the notary, who believed he knew as well where Gen. Bradford resided as any man in Nashville, have made enquiry as to his place of residence? Diligence is only necessary in such cases where the, holder knows, or ought to know, that there is occasion for the exercise of it. 3 Wend. Rep. 410. The holder in this case certainly did not know that there was any occasion for the exercise of diligence. Ought he to have known it? Had he any right to suppose that a man who had resided for a number of years in Jackson and had filled many important offices in the state, had quit his home for another? It seems that it would, in the absence of some information on the subject, be a very unreasonable supposition.
    Suppose the note had been presented by some other notary public in Nashville, who really did not know the residence of the endorser, and he had gone to Alpha Kingsley and enquired, and Kingsley had informed him that Jackson was the place. Would not that have been sufficient? It certainly would. Mr. Kingsley was an old acquaintance, and would have been presumed to know where the endorser resided. If another could rely upon his information without the imputation of negligence, why could he not rely upon the same information'himself? Due diligence in the eye of the law is such precaution and attention as a reasonable man would ordinarily exercise in the management of his own affairs.
    The fact that some of the directors were subscribers to newspapers that published the removal of defendant, is entitled to no weight as evidence. See 2 Hum. Rep. 112.
    Notice to a director as an individual, would not bind the corporation. 4Paige’s Rep. 136; 14 Mass. Rep, 61; 22-Pickering’s Rep. 35; 24 ib. 276.
    If the holder of a negotiable instrument use due diligence to ascertain the residence of endorsers, it is sufficient to bind them, though notice is sent to a place other than their residence. 1 Johns. Rep. 296; 9 Yer. Rep. 254.
    
      A. O. W. Totten for defendant.
    No diligence whatever was used to learn the residence of defendant, and the plaintiff’s case rests solely on the belief of the notary that defendant still resided at Jacltson, and this belief was predicated on information received sixteen months before the protest. But the proof shows most conclusively, that with even the slightest diligence, the notary could have learned the defendant’s residence; that several of the directors of the bank, whose agent he was, could have informed him; the keeper of the Inn, known by the notary to be the defendant’s boarding house,, and numerous others, the principal citizens of Nashville, could have given the desired information. The notary alone seems to have been ignorant of defendant’s residence, which was known to almost every one besides. His change of residence had acquired a degree of notoriety, by reason of the facts stated in the proof, unequaled, perhaps, in any other instance of removal from the state.
    The holder of a bill or note is excused for not giving regular notice.- of its dishonor to the endorser, -‘of whose place of residence he is ignorant, if he use reasonable diligence to discover where the endorser may be found.” Chitty on Bills, 487, margin. “Ignorance of the residence may excuse notice, but reasonable diligence must be used to obtain knowledge.” 3 Camp. 262; Chitty on Bills, 488, margin. As to what is reasonable diligence in such cases, vide Chitty on Bills, 487, note k; ib. 488, note 1; 12 East, 433; Chapman v. Lipscomb, 1 J. R. 294; 
      Bank of Utica v. Demotl, 13 J. R. 432; Bank of Utica v. Philips, 3 Wend, 416. The cases decided in this State having reference to this question, are, Marsh v. Barr, Meigs, 68; Nichol v. Bate, 7 Yer. 305; Dunlap v. Thompson, 5 Yer. 67; Davis v. Williams, Peck, 191. The cases of the Bank of Utica v. Philips, and Dunlap v. Williams, were cases of removal after the paper was endorsed, and are in many other respects widely distinguishable from the case before the court: and all the cases do require the exercise of diligence to excuse notice, and fully sustain the principle first assumed.
    Where the drawer has removed from where the instrument represents him to reside, or where he resided when it was drawn, the holder is bound to use reasonable diligence to find out the place to which he has removed; and if he succeed, to present it for payment, to charge the endorser. 3 McCord, 394, cited in 1 Chitty on Bills, 488, note 1.
    2. Due diligence is a mixed question of law and fact; but whether due diligence has been used to discover the residence of the endorser, is a question of fact for the jury; and that is the very question which they have determined in this case, as the charge of the judge left the whole matter to the juiy. 12 East, 433, cited in Chitty on Bills, 487, note k; 10 Peters’s R. 588; Nichol v. Bate, 7 Yer. R. 309.
   GkeeN, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action brought by the Planters’ Bank against A. B. Bradford, as the endorser of a bill single drawn by W.-B. Miller and payable at the Planters’ Bank at Nashville. Notice of nonpayment was sent to Jackson, Tennessee, in due time. But Bradford had removed his residence from Jackson, to Holly Springs, Mississippi, about five months before the note fell due, and was a resident of Holly Springs at the time said endorsement was made. Bradford was well known in Nashville, and the notary who gave the notice knew him personally; and feeling confident that he knew Bradford’s residence to be at Jackson, he made no enquiries as to his place of abode. He did not know of Bradford’s removal; and Bradford had told him, sixteen months before the nqte fell due, that Jackson was his residence. Bradford had resided many years in Jackson, was major-general of militia at the time of his removal, and when he removed, published an address to the people stating his removal to Holly Springs as the cause of his resignation; and the governor published a proclamation, directing an election for a successor. The newspapers containing these publications were received by many persons in Nashville, and by several of the directors of the bank. There.is considerable communication between Nashville and Jackson, the places being distant one hundred and fifty miles, and a tri-weekly mail stage regularly passing between them. Bradford was settled at Holly Springs immediately after his removal from Jackson, as a practicing lawyer, and his residence there was well known in the surrounding country and was known by many persons in Nashville. The court charged the jury, that the holder of negotiable paper must demand payment when it falls due, and forthwith notify the endorser of the nonpayment; that notice sent by mail, addressed to his nearest postoffice, would be sufficient, and that it must be so addressed, unless the holder had a reasonable excuse for not doing so. A reasonable excuse would be, that the endorser had a fixed residence at a particular place, known to the holder or agent, and had removed so recently, or so privately, that such holder or agent could not be reasonably supposed to have notice of his removal; or if the holder or agent used due diligence in making enquiry as to the residence of the endorser, and could not ascertain it, and therefore directed the notice to his last place of residence; that upon these principles the jury must determine whether the holder in this case used due diligence. The jury found for the defendant, and the court refused a new trial, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. The only question now for consideration is, whether the plaintiff used due diligence to give the defendant notice. The defendant’s residence had been at Holly Springs for five months before the note fell due, and that was his domicil at the time he endorsed the note. There has been unusual publicity attending his removal.from Jackson to Holly Springs. He had been a general of militia for the western division of the state, and a proclamation for the election of a successor was published in the papers, and the election to supply the vacancy occasioned by his resignation had taken place. A popular election, agitating the entire western division of the state, would be likely to attract attention at Nashville, and to elicit enquiries as to the circumstances which brought it about; and this would lead to a knowledge of the resignation and removal of the defendant.

Upon the whole, we think the holder and its agent were culpably negligent in relation to the transmission of notice in this case. The notary had heard the defendant say, sixteen months before the note fell due, that he resided at Jackson, and he acted upon this knowledge without enquiry. Now, if he had not known the residence of the endorser, and had made enquiry of one man only, by whom he had been told that the endorser had lived in Jackson sixteen months previously, but that he knew nothing of him since, and upon such information notice had been sent to the wrong place, no one would hold such enquiry to have been due diligence. But we do not perceive that the case is different, where a party acts upon his own knowledge, which is equally imperfect. It is a reasonable presumption, that men at Nashville, engaged in trade, dealing largely in negotiable paper, protesting many notes and notifying many endorsers, would, under all the circumstances of this case, have been informed in relation to Bradford’s residence; and the failure to obtain such knowledge, is evidence of negligence, the consequence of which they must suffer, rather than that the endorser should bear it, who by reason of that negligence failed to receive notice. Judgment affirmed.