Case ID: ohio-st_70/html/0380-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Davis, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

State of Ohio v. Knapp.
    
      Phrase corpus delicti defined — Proof of, in trial for murder — Extra-judicial confession admitted as evidence, when — Effect of other confessions of crime than the one in trial — Not error to allow whole-confession to be admitted — Jury may take confession with them — Presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt — Defense of insanity — Court procedure — Criminal law.
    
    1. The phrase corpus delicti as used in criminal law means the substance of the crime; and on a trial under an indictment for murder, proof of the manner and means in and by which the crime was consummated, does not relate to the corpus delicti, but is proof relating solely and directly to the accused’s guilty agency in the crime.
    2. In such case, when the proof of the death is direct and positive, if the circumstances shown are of such force when taken together as to leave no room for doubt that the deceased was murdered, any extra-judicial confession b,y the prisoner, if otherwise competent, may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of establishing his connection with the crime.
    3. If the facts extrinsically proved by the state corroborate the confession, then full, direct and positive evidence of the corpus delicti is not indispensable to admit the confession in evidence; and if such extrinsic corroborative facts, when considered with the confession, persuade the jury beyond a. reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt as charged, such evidence will.support a verdict of guilty. Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St., 146, approved and followed. ‘
    
      4. Where the prisoner has made a written confession admitting that he has perpetrated the crime charged in the indictment and other crimes, and the whole of the confession is offered by the state and is objected to on the part of the defendant, it is not error to allow the whole confession to go to the jury when the court at the time instructs the jury that it is admitted only to prove the killing of the person named in the indictment, and that they should disregard any portion of the confession which does not relate to such killing; and further that they should not permit the statements in the confession to prejudice them against the defendant, for the reason that they were only trying him on the charge of killing alleged in the indictment.
    
      5. Where the accused has made a written confession, under oath, in which he admits the killing charged in the indictment against him and the confession contains admissions of other murders, the action of the court in permitting the jury to have the confession with them in their room while considering upon their verdict is not prejudicial error.
    ■6. Where the court after stating the rule of law as to the presumption of innocence, adds that “in all doubtful cases this • presumption is sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the prisoner” and immediately follows it by a statement of the rule that unless the jury find the accused to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal, such instruction is neither erroneous nor misleading.
    "7. A statement by the court in its charge to the jury, that “Sane men who are innocent, as a rule, do not make confessions of crime,” the defense of insanity and confessions by persons of sound and unsound mind being the subject of the instruction to the jury, such statement is’not prejudicial to the defendant.
    (No. 8737
    Decided June 28, 1904.)
    Error to the Circuit Court of Butler county.
    The defendant was tried and convicted of murder in the first degree. The victim of the murder was his wife, Hannah Gr. Knapp. The indictment charged that the defendant murdered his wife by choking .and strangling her until she died. The state introduced evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti .and supplemented it by certain confessions as follows : ‘ ‘ That before the finding of the body and on the day of his arrest the said defendant made a confession, first to the mayor of the city of Hamilton, and then to the chief of police of the city of Hamilton, in the presence of said mayor, in which Knapp said that he had killed his wife in the early morning of December 22, 1902, while she was asleep in bed; that at that time she was attired in but a night gown and a pair of stockings, and that he had killed her By 'choking her upon the neck with his hands thereby strangling her to death, and that after he had so choked and strangled said Hannah G-. Knapp that he procured a shoe box from a business house in Hamilton, Ohio, and hired a horse and wagon; that.he took the shoe box to his residence where laid the dead body of his wife, and that he doubled the body up, Hannah Gf. Knapp being a small woman weighing less than one hundred pounds, and placed it in this shoe box, and that he then secured the assistance of a passerby in having the box placed in the wagon, and that he drove to a point south of the corporate limits of the city of Hamilton, Ohio, along the roadí adjoining the Great Miami river to a point near what is known as the sucker hole, where there is an eddying current in the Great Miami river, and that he threw the box containing the dead body of his wife attired in this night gown and stockings aforesaid, into the Great Miami river, and that he returned the horse to the stable, went to Cincinnati,, afterwards returned to Hamilton, went to West Virginia, and thence to Hamilton, and thence to Indianapolis, where he married another woman, and was afterward arrested.” The state also offered a written confession which is as follows: ‘ ‘ Confession of Alfred A. Knapp. On June 21, 1894, I killed Emma Littleman in a lumber yard in Gest street, Cincinnati. And on August 1, 1894, I killed Mary Eckert in Walnut street, opposite the Y. M. C. A. building in Cincinnati. And August 7, 1894,1 killed my wife Jennie Knapp under the canal bridge at. Liberty street and threw her in the canal in Cincinnati. And in July, 1895,1 killed Ada Gebhart in Indianapolis, Ind. And on December 22, 1902,1 killed my wife Hannah Knapp at 339 South Fourth street in Hamilton, Ohio, and threw her in the river out by Lindenwald. This is true. Alfred A. Knapp. Hamilton, Ohio, February 26, 1903;-’ I make ’this statement by my own free will, and mot by the request of any officer or any one else.' Alfred A.' Knapp. ’ ’ This was sworn to - before Mayor Bosch' of Hamilton. Objection to the same was made and overruled, and the entire paper read to the jury; motions to exclude the whole paper,- and all- parts except that relating to Hannah Goddard Knapp, were made and overruled on the ground that the paper was one and indivisible; exceptions 'were- duly taken. The testimony in behalf of the defendant, as well as the testimony offered by the state in rebuttal, was all in •relation to the alleged insanity-of the defendant at the time of the murder. A large number of exceptions were taken on the trial. Oh a petition in error 'by the defendant, in which seventy-one errors were-alleged, the circuit court found that there was error in the proceedings as-follows': - :
    
      “First. That the state of Ohio failed to prove-according to law that the deceased came to her death in the manner and by the means alleged in the indictment; and that -the state produced no evidence-of the cause, manner or means of the death aside-from the alleged confession of the defendant in error, the defendant named in said indictment.
    
      “Second. That the court of common pleas erred in admitting in evidence the alleged written confession of the defendant in error, the defendant in said .cause in said court of common pleas, of other crimes than that charged in the indictment and in permitting the prosecuting attorney to read said alleged written confession as a part of Ms argument to the jury, and in permitting the jury to have said alleged written confession in the jury room during their deliberation upon the verdict.
    
      “Third. That the court of common pleas erred in its general charge to the jury in’ instructing the jury that ‘in all doubtful cases the presumption of innocence is sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the defendant.’
    
      “Fourth. That the court.of common pleas erred in giving to the jury the following instruction as part of its general charge: ‘ Sane men who are innocent, as a rule, do not make confession of crime.’ ”
    The circuit court for said reasons reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas and remanded the cause for a new trial. The state excepted to the ruling of the circuit court and its judgment of reversal; and prosecutes this proceeding in error to reverse the judgment of the circuit court and to.affirm the judgment of the court of common pleas.
    
      Mr. Warren Gard and Mr. R. 8. Woodruff, prosecuting attorney, for plaintiff in error.
    The contention of the state here is, that the corpus delicti was a question to be proven to the satisfaction of the jury, and that all of the testimony in the case was properly submitted to the jury for the purpose of having the jury decide whether the body found was the body of Hannah Gf. Knapp, and whether said Hannah G. Knapp came to her death at the hands of the defendant, Alfred A. Knapp, in the manner and by the means set forth in the indictment, and that the fact that the death of the woman was shown, and the finding of the body under conditions and circumstances entirely consistent with the statement of the defendant made before the finding of the body, allows properly the statement or confession of the defendant as to the means he employed to kill said deceased to be properly put in evidence, not as alone establishing his guilt as charged in the indictment, but that it be taken and used for that purpose in connection with other evidence. Blackburn v. The State, 23 Ohio St., 146; Hotelling v. State, 2 Circ. Dec., 366; 3 C. C. R., 630;. Abbott’s Criminal Trial Brief, sec. 156; State v. Davis, 48 Kan., 1; 28 Pac. Rep., 1092; People v. O’Neil, 109 N. Y., 251; Dunn v. State, 34 Tex. Crim. Rep., 257; 30 S. W. Rep., 227.
    The circuit court held that in permitting the paper in its entirety to go to the jury, permitting the prosecutor to read it to the jury and permitting the jury to take it in the jury rooms on retirement, that the court below erred, and indicated that while so much of the written confession as related to the killing of Hannah Gr. Knapp was admittedly competent, that the paper writing as made by the defendant should have been obliterated or blotted or cut out so that there would appear therein no statement of any other crime.
    In the trial of this cause in the court of common pleas the court not only once, but several times told the jury that the accused was on trial but for one crime, and that crime the killing of Hannah Gr. Knapp, as alleged in the indictment, and that the accused was not to be prejudiced by statements made by him as to tbe commission of any other crime or crimes than tbe one mentioned in tbe indictment.
    Declarations must be considered in their entirety. 3 Rice on Evidence, sec. 492.
    Suppose that tbe defendant in tbe common pleas court bad written two lines upon one sheet of paper, one line reading “I did not kill Hannah G. Knapp” and tbe other line reading immediately below tbe first “I did kill Hannah Gr. Knapp;” it is evident that tbe state could not cut tbe last line from tbe sheet and introduce it as an admission of guilt, nor could tbe state’s attorney paste tbe slip over tbe first line totally obscuring it and then offer tbe paper as evidence, yet tbe circuit court in its opinion intimates that this should have been done. Tbe written confession was and is an entirety. It should have been received as a whole unchanged and without obliteration, or else altogether rejected. Tbe confession must be taken as a whole. Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 218.
    Therefore it must be true that it is proper to allow tbe entire writing to be read to tbe jury, even though it contains admissions of guilt of crimes other than tbe one charged in tbe indictment, tbe court first' cautioning tbe jury to disregard all tbe parts not referring to tbe particular crime under investigation and which is charged in tbe indictment.
    We submit tbe following authorities that under tbe rules of law tbe entire confession was competent as evidence to go to tbe jury to tbe caution of tbe court and tbe instruction of tbe court that it was only received as bearing upon tbe crime mentioned in tbe indictment. Abbott’s Criminal Trial Brief (2 ed.), p. 453, sec. 133; State v. Underwood, 75 Mo., 230; 
      Gore v. People, 162 Ill., 259; 44 N. E. Rep., 500; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 ed.), 568, 569, 574, 576.
    The circuit court also said that when the common pleas court said “sane men who are innocent, as a rule, do not make confession of crime,” the court erred and indicated that the judge in so charging usurped the power of the jury in telling the jury what his experience of the actions of men was.
    It is contended by the state that this is not a personal observation of the court or an instance of the court’s experience of men charged with the commission of crime, but that it was a logical deduction and a proper statement of law considered in the light of all the authorities bearing upon the question of admissions and confessions and presumptions arising from either. Rice on Evidence, sec. 306; Greenleaf on, Evidence, sec. 215-219; Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St., 98.
    
      Mr. Thomas H. Darby and Mr. John M. Thomas, for defendant in error.
    It is necessary under the laws of Ohio, that the manner and means of death in a charge of murder in the first degree shall be set out in the indictment.
    In Ohio we have no statutes upon the subject of criminal pleading, and necessarily the rules of the common law upon that subject are applied.
    Section 7217, Eevised Statutes, expressly warrants the omission of the manner and means of death in murder in the second degree and manslaughter, and sets out what will be sufficient allegations in either case.
    The failure to enumerate murder in the first degree in this section indicates most clearly that the legislature intended to leave the indictment in first degree as it had been.
    It has been held in Ohio that, previous to the passage of section 7217, it was necessary, even in a case of manslaughter, to set out the maimer and means of killing, and it was also held that the indictment for manslaughter in the ordinary common law form was sufficient in Ohio. Sutcliffe v. The State, 18 Ohio, 477; Michael v. Florida, 40 Fla., 265; Dyre v. State, 14 Tex. App., 185; Edwards v. State, 27 Ark., 493; Commonwealth v. Martin, 125 Mass., 394; 2 Bishop New Crim. Proc., sec. 514-1; Lamberton v. State, 11 Ohio, 282; Ellars v. State, 25 Ohio St., 385; Blair v. State, 3 Circ. Dec., 242; 5 C. C. R., 496; Fouts v. State, 8 Ohio St., 114.
    There is no law in Ohio that allows the proof of an essentially unlike means of death to that averred. Section 7215 in no wise applies to the necessary averments setting forth the essential elements of murder in the first degree. Burke v. The State, 34 Ohio St., 79.
    It is necessary when the means of death is alleged in a certain way, that that way must be substantially proven. If it is not substantially proven, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. R. v. Martin, 5 Car. & P., 128; Guedel v. People, 43 Ill., 226; Helmerking v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky., 74; 47 La. An. (1), 158.
    Upon an indictment charging the offense of cutting with intent to kill a verdict of cutting with intent to wound will not be sustained. Barber v. State, 39 Ohio St., 660; Riflemaker v. State, 25 Ohio St., 395.
    In no case that we have found, has it been maintained that the corpus delicti can be proven by the confession of the defendant unsupported by other testimony tending to prove the unlawfulness of the killing.
    There must be some independent evidence of a crime before the confessions can be received dr justify a conviction, and in the absence of that independent evidence, the defendant is entitled to . be acquitted.
    No effort was made to prove that the same were procured by improper means. The testimony of all persons who heard the verbal confessions was before the jury. Theirs was the only testimony given and no claim was made by the defendant on their examinations, either preliminary or before the jury, that they or either of them had improperly induced defendant to confess.
    The paper as to the offense charged did not contain one item or iota of evidence as to any new fact in the case.
    It was the duty of the court to interpose of its own motion, when such evidence was offered, to prevent such an enormous and unprecedented wrong to any one on trial. Reed v. State, 15 Ohio, 217; McHugh v. State, 42 Ohio St., 158; State v. O’Connor, 65 Mo., 374.
    Over defendant’s objection, the court permitted the jury to take in its retirement the said alleged written confession to aid the jury in determining the issue of the killing of Hannah G. Knapp. Stites v. McKibben, 2 Ohio St., 592; Dunn v. P., 172 Ill., 582; McGuire v. The State, 2 Circ. Dec., 318; 3 C. C. R., 551.
    The court expressly recognizes the fact that a mere withdrawal of highly prejudicial evidence from a jury does not withdraw the prejudicial effect upon the jury’s mind, and that proper cases occur in which, notwithstanding such withdrawal, a new trial should be granted.
    If there can be a case in which incompetent, prejudicial evidence was offered without any color of right or any reason except prejudice to the defendant, we have shown it in this case. Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App., 273; Erben v. Lorillard, 19 N. Y., 302; Coleman v. People, 58 N. Y., 555; Rochester v. Shaw, 100 Ind., 258; State v. Noland, 85 N. C., 576.
    The court charged the jury on the subject on the presumption of innocence, as follows: “In all doubtful cases, this presumption is sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the defendant.”
    We submit to the court that this charge was misleading and incorrectly stated the law, because in any doubtful case the law does not justify conviction, and it is not necessary to add to the doubt which may exist in the case, the presumption of innocence in order to turn the scale in favor of the defendant. Donaldson v. The State, 5 Circ. Dec., 98; 10 C. C. R., 613; Harrington v. The State, 19 Ohio St., 269.
    The court also charged the jury as follows: “Sane men who are innocent, as a rule, do not make confession of crime.” State of Ohio v. Tuttle, 67 Ohio St., 440; Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St., 146; McGuire v. State, 2 Circ. Dec., 318; 3 C. C. R., 551; State v. Leuth, 3 Circ. Dec., 48; 5 C. C. R., 94.
    The following cases confirm the principle laid down in the “Leuth” case (5 C. C. R.), and in each one of them, there was required the positive evidence of death by violence, before the court would permit a conviction of the accused based upon confessions.
    For cases of larceny under this rule, see 111 Ill., 386; 92 Ill., 342; Andrews v. People, 117 Ill., 201, Robbery: See 89 Mo., 424; two cases of murder, Pitts v. State, 43 Miss., 472-481; 4 Minn., 386; see also 26 W. Va., 116; Dreessen v. State, 38 Neb., 375; Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, secs. 324, 325, 632 and 633, and 1 Whart. Cr. Law, sec. 311; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss., 472; People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y., 110; 16 N. E. Rep., 529; 4 Am. St. Rep., 423; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence (16 ed.), sec. 30.
    The constitution of Ohio guarantees to the defendant that he shall have the right “to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof. ’ ’ Article 1, sec. 10.
    This provision prevents trying persons for offenses of which they have not been indicted, and concerning which they have had no opportunity to prepare for defense, and evidence of which would prejudice their lawful defense.
    • The courts of Ohio have ever held the law to be that where one is charged with a single offense, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible.
    On an indictment for one sale of liquor to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated, evidence of other ■sales is inadmissible. Stockwell v. State, 27 Ohio St., 563; Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St., 54; Barton v. State, 18 Ohio, 221; Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St., 100; Snurr v. State, 2 Circ. Dec., 614; 4 C. C. R., 393; Cheny v. State, 7 Ohio, 222; Knight v. State, 54 Ohio St., 365.
    The rule is the same whether the evidence offered of the other crimes is independent and direct evidence thereof, or evidence of confessions of the accused.
    Fortunately the question presented here is almost new in this particular form, while the principle underlying it is as old as the subject of evidence itself. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 155 Mass., 537; Commonwealth v. Keys, 11 Gray, 323; R. v. Butler, 2 Carr. & Kir., 221.
    A statement in a dying declaration that the accused had made prior threats against deceased, is inadmissible in evidence, being no part of the res gestae, but the remaining parts are admissible. State v. Moody, 18 Wash., 165; State v. Wood, 53 Vt., 560; State v. Perigo, 80 Ia., 37.
    The objectionable part of such dying declaration should be stricken out before reading. Jones v. State, 71 Ind., 67; People v. Sing, 64 Cal., 253.
   Davis, J.

The circuit court held (Knapp v. State, 25 O. C. C., 571) that “where the indictment charges that the crime was committed by choking and strangling to death the deceased, the corpus delicti in such case consists of the death of the victim together with facts which show that she met her death by being choked and strangled, and it is incumbent on the state, in order to warrant a conviction, to prove, other than by extra-judicial confessions of the accused, the death of the victim and that the crime was committed by the> accused substantially in the manner charged in the indictment.” Assuming for the purposes of this case only, that under the code of criminal procedure of this state the description of the crime in the indictment and of the manner in which it was done must be strictly proved, and that the' failure to so prove it would he a material variance, we nevertheless think that proof of the manner and means and by which the crime is consummated does not relate to the corpus delicti, but is proof relating directly and solely to the accused’s guilty agency in the crime... Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, and the substance of the crime charged in this indictment is that Hannah G-. Knapp was murdered.

The proof of her death is direct and positive, so that if the circumstances shown are of such force when taken together as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that she was murdered, then any extra-’ judicial confession by the prisoner, if otherwise competent, may be considered for the purpose of establishing his connection with the crime; and if the facts extrinsically proved by the state corroborate the confession then “full, direct and positive evidence of the corpus delicti is not indispensable” to admit the confession in evidence. People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. (N. Y.), 53; State v. Hall, 31 W. Va., 505; Winslow v. State, 76 Ala., 42; Ryan v. State, 100 Ala., 94; State v. Keeler, 28 Ia., 551; and see State v. Lamb, 28 Mo., 218. And if such extrinsic corroborative facts, when considered with the confession, persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt as charged, such evidence will support a verdict of guilty. In Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St., 146, the counsel for the prisoner asked the court to instruct the jury as follows: “Mere extra-judicial confessions alone cannot be used to prove the body of a crime, and also to identify the prisoner. They cannot alone be received to prove the body of the crime at all.” The court.refused to so instruct the .jury; but instead charged as follows: “Mere extrajudicial confessions alone cannot be used to prove the body of the crime, and also to identify the prisoner. But they may be taken in connection with other evidence in the case, either positive or circumstantial, in making out what is called the corpus ■delicti.” This court held that there was no error in that instruction.

Upon the trial of this case the state proved that the deceased was the wife of the prisoner; that the last time the deceased was seen alive she was in company with her husband at their rooms on December 21, 1902; that on the following morning, December 22, 1902, he hired a horse and spring wagon at a livery stable; that early on that same morning he had obtained from a shoe store a packing box, such as is used for packing shoes, and took it to his residence; that on the same morning he was seen with the horse and wagon on a road near the banks of the Miami river a short distance below the city of Hamilton; that the wagon contained a .box of the size, dimensions and description of a shoe box; that in February, 1903, the body of the deceased was found floating in the Ohio river near New Albany, Indiana; that said body was not clothed save by the fragments of a night gown and by black stockings, one of which covered a white stocking bandage over' a sore or abcess upon one of the legs; that when the body was found it was in a cramped or doubled up condition, with the knees drawn up toward the chin; that the identification of the body was complete by her friends, and that this was made certain by a ring on one of the fingers, ear rings in the ears and by other marks; that on the morning of the disappearunce of the deceased the defendant wrote a note to an nncle of the deceased stating that he and his wife had gone to Cincinnati and would not réturn until .after Christmas ;• that he went to Cincinnati to the home of his sister and inquired for his wife, saying that she had been called to Cincinnati by a telegraphic message from his sister; that he made conflicting statements concerning said message, its contents, the time and manner of its receipt and the time of her leaving Hamilton; that he remained in Cincinnati for several days and pretended to search for his wife; that he returned to Hamilton and made other conflicting statements relating to the disappearance and absence of his wife; that he said his wife had gone away and would not return; that he sold and gave away the personal clothing and effects of the deceased; that all of her clothing except a night gown and a pair of black stockings and a white stocking covering the abscess on one of her legs remained in their house after her disappearance and was disposed of by defendant; that he sold part of his household goods and shipped the remainder to Indianapolis; that he returned to Cincinnati and pretended to be making preparations to go to West Virginia; that after this he spent one day and one night in Hamilton during which time, speaking of the absence of his wife, he said that he knew that she would never return; that he then went to Indianapolis, Indiana, where about February 3, 1903, he was again married.

The circumstances detailed above, except the finding and identification of the body which occurred later, led to the arrest of the defendant on February 25, 1903, upon the charge of murdering his wife, Hannah G. Knapp; and on the same day he made the verbal confession which will be found in substance in the statement of the cáse above. The finding of the body and its identification followed within a very few days.

Now there is no room for dispute upon the proposition that the facts so shown by the prosecution and extrinsic to the confession are strongly corroborative of it and even would seem to conclusively establish its truth. Therefore, under the ruling in Blackburn v. State, supra, the confession may be taken in connection with the other evidence and used for the purpose of proving the body of the crime. It is true that outside of the confession there is nothing in the evidence to show that the deceased came to her death by choking or strangling; but as we have said the manner of producing the death is not an essential part of the crime. Murder may be committed in innumerable ways; but the statute defines the crime in the words, “Whoever purposely, etc., kills another.” The statute does not, nor did the common law, make the manner of killing an essential element of the crime. We think therefore that the circuit court misconceived the scope of the corpus delicti and by so doing erred in holding that the state had failed to prove according to law that the deceased came to her death “by the manner and means alleged in the indictment. ’ ’

The circuit court also held that the court of common pleas erred in admitting in evidence the written confession of the defendant in its entirety. This written confession contained admissions of the killing of four women besides the one for whose death he is now prosecuted, and at as many different times. It does not very clearly appear upon what reasoning the circuit court arrived at this conclusion. But in substance the counsel for the defendant argue that the written confession is unnecessary evidence for the state, irrelevant and prejudicial; that it is unnecessary evidence because the state already had the benefit of oral confessions in detail relating to the crime for which he was tried; that so far as it relates to other crimes it is irrelevant and raises issues which cannot be tried in this case; and that it is prejudicial to the defendant because it may have impressed the jury with the idea that he is an habitual criminal. As to the first point it is only necessary to advert to the principle that there is no limit except the discretion of the court, to the admission of cumulative evidence on the same point. On occasions during the trial when the question as to the competency of this evidence arose, the court said to the jury that it was admitted only to prove the killing of Hannah Gr. Knapp; that they were to disregard all portions of it which do not relate to said killing; and that they should not permit the statements in the confession to prejudice them because they were only trying the defendant for killing Hannah Gr. Knapp. The state could not lawfully be permitted to give evidence to prove as facts pertinent to the case, that the accused had perpetrated other crimes; but it does not require close analysis to demonstrate that giving in evidence a formal written confession in which the accused admits that he has been guilty of other like crimes stands upon a different footing. In the latter case he admits the crime charged and others with it. In the other he stands as denying all. If the confession is to be offered as evidence, it is the well settled and undoubted right of the accused to have all of it. admitted, whether -it be exculpatory or inculpatory in effect. The defendant in this case was being defended on the ground of insanity. There are statements in the confession which may well have been, used to support that plea. The jury found that the-defendant was not insane; and it is conceivable that, if the whole confession had not been admitted in evidence that would have been now assigned for error..

In Gore v. People, 162 Ill., 259, it was held that confession by the accused of a crime other than that, charged in the indictment, while not admissible as a. substantive fact, may, when not separable from a. competent confession, go to the jury under cautionary directions from the court. In the opinion, Phillips, J., said: ‘ ‘ Objection was made to the admission of evidence showing defendant made statements as-to the commission by him of other crimes than that for which he was on trial. Evidence of confession of other crimes is not admissible as a substantive fact. But it appears when the confession by defendant as to the crime charged was made he also admitted in the same conversation that, he had committed the other crimes referred to;, and when the witness was called upon to give defendant’s confession he stated all defendant said at that, time as a part of an inseparable admission or confession. The court correctly instructed the jury as-to the purpose for which such statements were admitted, and cautioned them not to consider the statements as to the other crimes as evidence of the commission of the crime charged. ’’ State v. Underwood, 75 Mo., 230, is also in point.

But the statements made in the confession. as to other crimes were not, and could not he,, prejudicial. They were not more prejudicial than the admission that the prisoner was guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. The chief,, if not the only, defense was insanity. That defense was not sustained. The jury could not do otherwise, therefore, than to return a verdict, of guilty upon the admission that he was guilty of the crime charged in the indictment. That alone, with the other evidence in the case, was sufficient to sustain, and even to require, a verdict of guilty. How could the statements as to other crimes. affect a verdict in this case which was assured without them? But it may be answered that they may nevertheless have influenced the minds of the jury in arriving at their verdict. The court had cautioned, the jury not to consider those statements for any purpose and when we find in the record abundant evidence to support the verdict we cannot presume that they did consider statements which could have-no bearing to establish guilt as to the crime charged..

The circuit court found that the court of common-pleas erred in the following particular portions of' the charge to the jury, viz.: “In all doubtful cases, this presumption (i. e. the presumption of innocence) is sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the. defendant.” And “Sane men, who are innocent, as. a rule, do not make confession of crime. ’ ’ The first, of these propositions was stated in connection with the rule as to presumption of innocence and the rule-as* to reasonable doubt. The second stands in intimate connection with the instructions as to confessions by insane or sane persons. When considered in the light of what is said in connection, we do not think that either of these propositions is misleading or improper. Indeed, we think that both of them standing apart from the context are more favorable to the defendant than to the prosecution.

As the circuit court found no error in the record save as considered above, and as we are of the opinion that the circuit court erred in all of those particulars.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and that of the court of common pleas affirmed.

Spear, C. J., Shauck, Crew and Summers, JJ., concur.