Case ID: f-appx_456/html/0685-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rodney Deon HOLLIE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Anthony HEDGPETH, Warden; Attorney General of the State of California, Respondents-Appellees.
    No. 10-55331.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Oct. 12, 2011.
    Filed Oct. 31, 2011.
    Jeffrey S. Kravitz, Kravitz Law Office, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    E. Carlos Dominguez, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
    Before: PREGERSON and D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and LYNN, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Barbara M.G. Lynn, District Judge for the LI.S. District Court for Northern Texas, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Rodney Deon Hollie (“Hollie”), a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and we affirm.

1. Hollie is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the state court’s denial of his motion for a separate jury trial on Counts 1 and 2 (“motion to sever charges”), violated his constitutional right to due process. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may only grant a state prisoner habeas relief if the state court’s denial of the prisoner’s claim contravenes “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate trials on different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process. See Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.2010) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986), provides “clearly established federal law” governing a state court’s denial of a motion to sever).

2. The state court’s denial of Hollie’s motion to suppress his confession was not “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Hollie has not pointed to an obvious defect in the state court’s fact finding process. Cf. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1005 (9th Cir .2004) (finding state court factual finding unreasonable where state court failed to “consider, or even acknowledge” the testimony of a key defense witness).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Because Hollie does not claim that the state court's denial of his motion to sever his charges was based on an erroneous factual finding, Section 2254(d)(2) does not apply to this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (permitting habeas relief when the state court's rejection of a claim was "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”).