Case ID: ny-sup-ct_65/html/0376-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Pratt, J :", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CATHERINE McLAUGHLIN, Respondent, v. WILLIAM W. ARMFIELD, Appellant.
    
      Mre escapes in a manufactory — duty of the owner to erect them, without notice from the commissioner.
    
    Under the statute (§ 16 of tit. 14 of chap. 583 of the Laws of 1888), directing that any building occupied, or built to be occupied, as a manufactory “ shall be provided with such fire-escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved by the commissioner,” the duty rests upon the owner to bring the subject before the commissioner and obtain his direction in the premises; and where an accident ~ occurs, because of the absence of such fire-escapes from the building, the owner cannot- avoid responsibility by alleging that, the statute does not declare absolutely that fire-escapes shall be erected by the owner, but only that “such fire escapes and doors as shall be directed and approved.by the commissioner ” shall be erected, or by alleging that he had no personal knowledge that the fire-escapes were not erected as required by law.
    
      Appeal by tbe defendant William W. Armfield from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court, entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe county of Kings on tbe 6th day of March, 1890, and also from an order, entered in said clerk’s office on tbe 15th day of Mareb, 1890, denying tbe motion of tbe defendant to set aside tbe verdict and for a new trial.
    Tbe action was brought to trial before tbe court and a jury at tbe Kings County Circuit on tbe 5th day of March, 1890, and a verdict was rendered in favor of tbe plaintiff for tbe sum of $2,000.
    Tbe action was brought against tbe owner of a building in tbe city of Brooklyn, which was four stories in height and was built to be occupied as a factory, and was, in fact, occupied as a factory, in which tbe plaintiff was employed, and which, it was alleged, tbe defendant, tbe owner, bad wholly neglected to provide with any fire-escapes, or to have any ladder or stairway built to the scuttle or place of egress in tbe roof.
    Tbe complaint alleged that fire broke out in tbe building; that the plaintiff’s means of escape down tbe stairs of tbe building were cut off by smoke and fire, and she was compelled to jump from one of tbe rear windows to tbe roof of a small wooden structure in tbe rear of the manufacturing building, a distance of about thirty feet, and was severely and permanently injured, and demanded damages to tbe amount of $25,000.
    
      John H. V. Arnold, for tbe appellant.
    
      Andrew I. Ga/rdiner and Frederic A. Wan'd, for tbe respondent.
   Pratt, J :

Tbe appellant, for five years before tbe accident, bad owned and collected rent from tbe defective buildings. If, under those circumstances, be can avoid responsibility by alleging be bad no personal knowledge that tbe fire-escapes were not erected as required by law, tbe statute would be a snare and not a safeguard.

The appellant argues that, as tbe statute does not in express terms declare that fire-escapes shall be erected by tbe owner, the duty cannot be placed upon him by a judicial construction of tbe law.

Tbe law enacts that any building occupied, or built to be occupied, as a manufactory shall be provided with such fire-escapes as shall be directed by the commissioner. We think the initial.duty rests upon the owner, that he should bring the subject before the commissioner and seek his direction.

The statute is intended to protect human life; its intentions are easily discovered, and no reason is perceived why the court should strain after so strict a construction of its language as to deprive it of all useful operation.

The appellant argues that, had plaintiff not given way to fright, and exercised a sound discretion as to the method of escape adopted, she might have found a safe egress by another window.

All those considerations were properly submitted to the jury. Their finding was adverse to defendant, and was sustained by the testimony.

It follows that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Barnard, P. J., concurred.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.