Case ID: dc_10/html/0081-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Humphreys Wylie, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JAMES F. MEGUIRE v. QUINTON CORWINE, EXECUTOR, AND DESSIE M. CORWINE, EXECUTRIX, OF RICHARD M. CORWINE, DECEASED.
    At Law. —
    No. 13,012.
    T. In an action upon a parol contract against executors, the plaintiff cannot he examined as a witness on ids own behalf to prove such contract, or to testify to conversations with the deceased, unless called by the opposite party or by the court to be examined. (IT. S.. Kev. Stats., sec. S5S.)
    II. A contract to pay plaintiff' one-half of all fees in prize and bounty cases, in consideration of his assistance in securing the other contracting party to be appointed by the government special counsel therein., and also in consideration of plaintiff’s assistance in arranging and carrying on such defenses, is illegal and void as against public policy..
    IIL Where the plaintiff addressed two letters to the deceased, to which-, the latter made no reply, tile jury are not to infer that the deceased* admitted the facts stated in such letters.
    IV. Payment of part of a debt is not a satisfaction of the whole; and a. receipt in full is no bar to a recovery of the balance, if the party giving it has been misled or deceived.
    V. But if the parties come together voluntarily, after the services have been rendered, and a dispute exists as to amounts due, and the plaintiff' accepts and receives the sum of $4,000 in full satisfaction-, and discharge of all claims in pursuance of a settlement-, and executes a receipt accordingly, he cannot afterwards maintain an action, for a larger amount.
    STATEMENT OF. THE CASE.
    The declaration contains three counts.
    The first count alleges a contract by Richard M. Corwine, deceased, to pay to the plaintiff one-half of all the fees in the 
      Farragut Prize and Bounty Cases, in consideration of the plaintiff’s assistance in securing the said Corwiue’s appointment as special counsel in the said prize and bounty cases, and also in consideration of plaintiff’s assistance in arranging and carrying on the defense in the said cases.
    The second count alleges that the defendant, Richard M. Corwine, having been appointed special counsel in the two cases aforesaid, agreed with the plaintiff, in consideration of his assistance to be rendered in conducting the defense thereof and procuring the necessary testimony, to pay to the plaintiff, one-half of all fees and compensation which he, the said defendant, should at any time receive in the cases aforesaid.
    These two counts make the necessary allegations on the part of the plaintiff of the fulfillment by the plaintiff of his part of the contract, and the receipt of fees by the defendant to the amount of ($25,950) twenty-five thousand nine hundred and fifty dollars, of which the plaintiff claims one-half.
    The third count is for work and labor done, for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff— the ordinary form of the common counts.
    The defendant pleaded nil debit and non-assumpsit. Both ■the declaration of the plaintiff and the pleas of the defendant ■were supported by the usual affidavit.
    At the time of trial the defendants amended the pleadings, •and filed additional pleas of accord and satisfaction and payment,
    Issue was taken on all the pleas. • The action is against the •executors of the deceased party, with whom the alleged contract was entered into; and on the trial of the case the plaintiff', who was the other party thereto, offered to prove the contract alleged in the declaration by his own testimony. An obj ection to this was sustained by the court; to which ruling the plaintiff' excepted. The plaintiff then introduced several witnesses, whose testimony tended to prove that the plaintiff possessed important information in reference to the captures made by Farragut at New* Orleans; that he had been a clerk in New Orleans, in the office of Colonel Holabird, chief quartermaster of the department of the gulf during the war, aud had possession of Colonel Holabird’s papers, from which he derived his information; that he made out lists and statements from said papers which were afterwards seen in the office of Richard M. Corwine, in his life-time, and that the latter ac-. knowledged tc several witnesses, in conversation, at different times, that he had an arrangement with the plaintiff by which he was to pay him one-half the fees he should receive in the Farragut cases, for his aid in getting him appointed as special counsel and for his assistance in procuring testimony andgiving information for the management and defense in said cases. The plaintiff also introduced two letters, dated respectively March 4 and 10, 1874, which he had addressed to said Richard M. Corwine, one of which w.as delivered to his son, the now executor, and the other was delivered to the said Corwiue in person, in which the amount of fees received are stated, and a demand is made for one-half of the balance, amounting to the sum of $8,500.
    It also appears from the deposition of E. L. Banfield, Solicitor of the Treasury of the United States, that the plaintiff communicated to him his information and suggested the name of said Corwine as a lawyer of experience and skill to take charge of the cases, and stated that if Corwine was employed by the government he should have the benefit of all the information he possessed. At the close of the plaintiff’s testimony, the defendant read to the jury the plaintiff’s receipt, in the following words:
    “ Received of R. M. Corwine four thousand dollars, which, with the sum heretofore paid me by him, is in full for all the services I rendered said Corwine in the way of collecting evidence and performing other duties for him, as the attorney of the United States, in the cases known as the Farragut prize and bounty cases, aud I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have no other or further claim against said Cor-wine, and take the above sum in full satisfaction and discharge. J. F. Meguire.
    July 81st, 1873.”
    
      He also read from the records of this court entries in the Farragut cases, from which it appeared that the award therein was confirmed in the general term, April 19, 1873, and that, ■the plaintiff was admitted to the bar September 23, 1872. The plaintiff'in rebuttal called William Blackford, who testified that he was present -when the receipt was given by the ■plaintiff. The money was paid to the plaintiff' by Quinton Corwfine, son of the deceased. The plaintiff offered to prove by this witness that the said Quinton stated that the sum there paid, together with a former payment, were one-half of all the fees received by the deceased in the Farragut cases. The testimony was excluded and an exception noted. The plaintiff’ offered to prove, by his own testimony, that the deceased had made a similar statement to him, and that it was in consequence of said statement, and in ignorance of the fact, that he gave the receipts, when a much larger sum had beeu received. There was the same objection, ruling, and exception as to the testimony of the previous witness. The evidence being closed, the court charged the jury that the contract set out in the first count of the declaration was illegal and void, and that the plaintiff could not recover on the second count unless the jury should find that the parties made another and distinct contract. To this charge the plaintiff excepted.
    The plaintiff' then asked the court to charge the jury as follows : “ If the plaintiff' caused to be presented to the testator the letters of the 4th and 10th of March, 1874, which have been read in evidence, and the testator made’ no reply to them, the jury may infer that the facts stated in those letters were admitted by the testator, and could not be denied by him. But such inference is a question for the jury alone, to be derived from all the circumstances of the case, and the conduct and language of the parties at the delivery of the said letters.” The court refused to grant this prayer, and the plaintiff’ excepted to this ruling of the court.
    The court granted the first and second prayers of the plaintiff, as follows, to which the defendants excepted:
    
      
      “ 1st. If any amount of money was due to the plaintiff from the testator, and the plaintiff agreed to accept a smaller sum in satisfaction of the whole, that agreement is no obstacle to the collection of the balance, unless the plaintiff received some other advantage sufficient to form a consideration for forbearing to collect the unpaid part of the debt Payment of part of a debt is not a satisfaction of the whole, considered either as paymeut or as an accord and satisfaction.”
    “ 2d. If the plaintiff was misled or deceived by the testator as to the amount of fees received by him, or if the testator concealed the said amount from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff acted in ignorance of the facts, and without a full knowledge of his rights, then plaintiff’s receipt of July 81, 1873, is no bar to the recovery of the full amount which he was entitled to claim from the testator.”
    The court granted the four following prayers asked for by the defendants, but as qualified by the first and second prayers granted to the plaintiff, to all of which the plaintiff excepted:
    1st. If the jury shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff', in October, 1869, made an agreement with the testator, E. M. Convine, deceased, that he would procure and induce the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States to retain and employ the said E. M. Convine, as special counsel for the United States, to defend aird protect the interests of the United Slates in two certain causes then pending in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in admiralty, and commonly known as the Farragut Prize Cases, and in the event of such employment would assist Corwine to procure evidence and information to aid in the defense of such suits, and in consideration of the procuring of said Corwine to be so retained and employed, and of such assistance in procuring evidence, said Convine agreed on his part that he would pay to said plaintiff one-half whatsoever fee or fees said Corwdne might receive for his professional services in such cases, the verdict must be for the defendants. Such an agreement is void, because it is contrary to public policy; and the plaintiff' cannot recover in any form of action for any services rendered or labor performed in pursuance thereof.
    2d. If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff agreed to procure the appointment of the testator, R. M. Cor-wine, by the Secretary of the United States Treasury, as special counsel to defend and protect the interests of the United States in the Farragut Prize. Cases, then pending in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and that said Corwine on his part agreed, in consideration of such procurement, to pay the plaintiff one-half of all the fees he might receive in such cases, such contract was void, and the verdict must be for the defendant.
    3d. If the jury shall find from the evidence that after the testator, R. M. Corwine, had been employed by the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, as special counsel, to defend the United States in the Farragut Prize Cases, and after all the evidence therein had been taken and submitted, and decrees rendered in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, from which appeals had been taken to the Supreme 'Court of the United States, the plaintiff and said R. M. Corwine voluntarily came together and made a settlement for the work and labor and all the duties performed by the said plaintiff in and about said cases, in consequence of which settlement the said R. M. Corwine paid to said plaintiff in cash the sum of $4,000, and that the plaintiff at the time of such payment signed a paper writing or receipt, and delivered the same to said Corwine, in the words and figures following, to wit, (here refer to receipt as set forth in above,) the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant.
    4th. If the jury find from the evidence, after the said testator, R. M. Corwine, deceased, had been employed and for a long time engaged in defending the said Farragut Prize Cases, and after the plaintiff had performed and rendered all his services in procuring evidence and information, a dispute existed between the plaintiff and said R. M. Corwine as to the amount of compensation .which said plaintiff was entitled to have from the said R. M. Corwine, and that said parties came together and agreed to and did settle the whole matter by the payment by said Corwine to the plaintiff of the sum of $4,000, to be received by said plaintiff in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims for such services, and that said plaintiff actually received said sum of $4,000 from said Cor-wine in pursuance of such settlement, the verdict must be for the defendant.
    
      F. P. Stanton, for plaintiff.
    The plaintiff was entitled to testify in his own behalf. (Rev. Stats., sec. 876.) The plaintiff excepted to the exclusion of Blackford’s testimony. Quinton Corwine was the , agent of his father when he paid the sum of $4,000 to the plaintiff and took his receipt. What he said in the very act of making that payment was a part of the transactions, and was admissible against his principal. The representations then made induced the plaintiff' to sign the receipt, and those representations were false. (1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 113; The American Fur Co. v. The United States, 2 Pet., 358.)
    The plaintiff' excepted when the court charged “that the contract set out in the first count of the declaration was illegal and void, and that the plaintiff could not recover on the second count unless the jury shall find that the parties made another and distinct contract.” This charge is, in substance, repeated by the court in granting the first and second prayers of the defendant; to which, also, the plaintiff excepted.
    The contract was not contrary to public policy. It was fair and honest on the part of the plaintiff, and does not come within the principle of any of the cases which have been cited to condemn it. The difference between all these cases and the one under consideration is briefly this: that the present plaintiff virtually stipulated with the government for the rendering of his own services in the defense of the Earragut cases. He was to assist Mr. Corwine, and to look to him alone for his compensation. There was no concealment or fraud. His proceedings were open and manly, and, so far from tending to injure the government, they actually promoted its interests. Mr. Corwine could not have claimed more than the government and the court were disposed to allow him as a just compensation for his services, including the assistance of the plaintiff; and it was notin the power of the plaintiff'to influence this allowance in any way whatever. There was nothing in the nature of the contract, or in the character of the services stipulated, conflicting in the least with the public welfare.
    The court below’ erred when it ruled that “the plaintiff could not recover unless the jury should find that the parties made another and a distinct contract.” This instruction compelled the jury to find against the plaintiff; Whereas the jury might well have inferred an implied contract to pay for the services of the plaintiff after the defendant had been retained in the cases. The defendant did, in fact, acknowledge his obligation and act upon it for some time afterwards.
    
      Enoch Totten, for defendants.
    This is a claim for compensation for services alleged to have been rendered by the plaintiff in procuring the employment of the late E. M. Corwine, in 1869, to conduct the defense of the Farragut Prize Cases, then pending.in this court. The allegation is that the plaintiff had “ the selection of counsel in said cases, the Treasury Department only restricting him to the selection of a man familiar with admiralty practice.” Startling as this proposition seems to be, it is seriously insisted upon. The plaintiff was not the Secretary of the Treasury at the time he undertook to dispense the patronage of the executive power of the nation. If he had been, the criticism upon an agreement to dispose of such favors for a consideration ought to be severe. The contract based upon -such a consideration cannot easily be supported. It is submitted that the contract alleged to exist here cannot be any more readily sustained. The law has been declared upon this subject, and it is to the effect that “all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointment to public offices, * * * are void as against public policy.”
    The appointment mentioned was an appointment to a public office connected with the administration of justice — a position of the most delicate trust; and also, as appears from the record, of some profit. Such agreements are void. (Norris v. Tool Co., 2 Wall., 45; Clippinger v. Hepbough, 5 W. & S., 315; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb., 489; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb., 361; Marshall v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 16 How., 314.)
    A contract which proceeded upon such a consideration, either in whole or in part, is wholly null and void. (Trist v. Child, 21 Wall., 441.)
    The rejection of the plaintiff as a witness in his own behalf was correct. (Rev. Stats. D. C.)
    The rejection of the prayer of the plaintiff’s counsel relating to the letters was also correct.
    The third and fourth prayers of the defendant granted by the court, which related to the settlement betweeu the parties, truly express the law upon the subject-matter. (Vedder v. Vedder, 1 Denio, 260; United States v. Childs, 12 Wall., 242.)
   Mr. Justice Humphreys

delivered the opinion of the court:

The first point made by .plaintiff in error or appellant, who was plaintiff below, is that the court excluded the testimony of plaintiff, who offered himself as a witness. This suit is against the representatives of a deceased person. The witness, not being called by the opposite party, nor by the court, to testify, was clearly incompetent, and the ruling of the chief justice holding the Circuit Court was altogether right, and it would have been error to have held otherwise.

The second and third exceptions relate to the same principles — that is, testimony against the deceased, whose lips are closed in the solemn vault. This testimony was excluded as evidence, and we think it was properly excluded. The charge of the court as to the first count in the declaration was correct. Such an agreement as set forth, amounts to no contract to be enforced in a court.

The charge as to the second count was correct.

The refusal to give in charge the first prayer of plaintiff was right. Plaintiff excepted to four prayers of defendant. The chief justice gave the charges as prayed, qualified by first and second prayers granted plaintiff. This was all correct, for these prayers were but a reiteration of the principles stated in the first charge.

If there was any error at all, it was in permitting the record to be incumbered with a repetition of what had been so emphatically and distinctly announced.

If counsel would take the trouble to examine Johnson v. Jones, 1 Black, 209, the teachings and injunctions of the Supreme Court of the United States might have some weight in the matter of exceptions.

We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Wylie, J.,

concurs in the judgment, but is of opinion that the witness Blackford was improperly excluded from testifying.