Case ID: ad_92/html/0131-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker, P. J.:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In the Matter of the Application of Peter S. Quick, a Judgment Debtor, Respondent, to Be Discharged from Imprisonment. Charles E. Farrell, Jr., by Charles E. Farrell, his Guardian ad Litem, Appellant.
    
      Order to show cause shortening the time of notice of making an application to the court — it does not apply to the inauguration of a new action or proceeding, e. g., the discharge of an imprisoned debtor.
    
    Section 780 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the court, upon the presentation of an affidavit showing grounds therefor, to permit a motion to be made, through the medium of an order to show cause, on less than the eight days’ notice ordinarily required, only applies to matters already pending and over which the court has acquired-jurisdiction. The section does not apply to any of those steps which are required by statute to be taken in order to inaugurate a new action or proceeding.
    Consequently where a person imprisoned under a body execution makes application to .be discharged from imprisonment, pursuant to section 2205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that at least fourteen days before the peti. tion is presented to the court the petitioner must serve upon the judgment creditor a copy of such petition and schedules “ together with a written notice of the time when and place where they will be presented,” the court has. no power to dispense with the full fourteen days’ notice, as the proceedings for the discharge of an imprisoned debtor are not commenced until the pétition, schedules and affidavit, with due proof of service, as prescribed in section 2205 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are presented to the court.
    Appeal by Charles E. Farrell, Jr., by Charles E. Farrell, his guardian ad litem, from an order of the County Court of Saratoga County, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Saratoga on the 14th day of September, 1903, discharging Peter S. Quick,' a jiidgment debtor,-from imprisonment.
    On June 1, 1903, Peter S. Quick was arrested upon an execution against his person, for debt in the su,m of $2,221.55, at the suit of Charles E. Farrell, Jr., by his guardian ad litem Charles E. Farrell, and was imprisoned in the jail of Saratoga county. Upon September 4, 1903, lie procured an order from the county judge of that county, in substance, requiring said Farrell, by his guardian, to show cause at a Special Term of the County Court of that county to be held at the court house in such county on the 14th day of September, 1903, at ten o’clock a. bí., why an assignment, of the property of said Quick should not be made and he be thereupon discharged from his said imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of the statute concerning the “ Discharge of an imprisoned judgment debtor from imprisonment.” (See Code Civ. Proc. chap. IT, tit. 1, art. 3.)
    Such order was procured upon an affidavit of Quick, setting forth in substance that he was imprisoned, as above stated, that the next term of the County Court began on the 14th of September, 19.03, and that he desired to present his petition for discharge at such term; ■ that another term of said court would not be held until the first Monday in October; that he had no money to apply at a term of the Supreme Court, and that he would suffer greatly if he was compelled to wait and be longer deprived of his liberty. ■ He, therefore, asked for such order to show cause, and that a shorter notice than fourteen days be deemed sufficient.
    The order so obtained, together with a copy of the petition for his discharge and the schedules annexed, were served upon the judgment creditor on September fourth, and on the fourteenth Quick was ordered before the County Court and presented thereto his petition and schedules and the affidavit required by section 2204 of the Code. The judgment creditor, Farrell, then appeared specially for the purpose of objecting that the fourteen days’ notice required by statute had neither been given to nor served upon him or his attorney, and that the court had, therefore, no jurisdiction to proceed with the proceedings for discharge, and that the order to show cause was not warranted in these proceedings. The court overruled such objection and ordered that the matter proceed to a decision. The judgment creditor thereupon ■ withdrew, and such proceedings were taken that Quick was ordered discharged from imprisonment. From such order of discharge this appeal is taken.
    
      John L. Henning, for the appellant.
    
      John Foley and John A. T. Schwarte, for the respondent.
   Parker, P. J.:

One of the provisions of the statute under which these proceedings were taken requires that at least fourteen days before the petition is presented to the court the petitioner must serve upon the judgment creditor a copy of such petition and schedules “together with a written notice of the time when and place where they will be presented.” (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2205.)

It is conceded that such service was never made, and that without it, or some service equivalent to it, no order discharging the debtor could lawfully be made. The following cases are authority for the proposition that a serviceof the petition, schedules and notice as required in section 2205 of the Code is indispensable to invest the court with “ jurisdiction of the particular case.” (Bullymore v. Cooper, 46 N. Y. 236, 243; Goodwin v. Griffis, 88 id. 629; Seward v. Wales, 40 App. Div. 539.)

It is urged, however, that the county judge has excused the petitioner from making the service required by such section 2205, and has substituted therefor the order to show cause that was granted on September fourth ; and his authority to do so is claimed to be given by section 780 of the Code. That section provides that if notice of. a motion or of any other proceeding in an action (or in a special proceeding it may be conceded) before a court or'a judge is necessary, it must, if personally served, be at least an eight days’ notice, except where special provision is otherwise made by law ór by the General Rules of Practice; unless the court" or a judge, upon an affidavit showing grounds therefor, makes an order to show cause why the application should not be granted, and in such order directs that a service of less than eight days before it is returnable be deemed sufficient. Very evidently this section applies to matters that are already pending and over which the court has already acquired jurisdiction. In those instances, where by that section a motion of eight days is required, a judge may, on cause shown, require a less time by an order to show cause; but as to any of those steps that are required by statute to be taken in order to inaugurate a new action or proceeding such section cannot be made applicable. It may be said of this section, as was said of rule 38 of the General Rules of Practice. by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Argus Co. (138 N. Y. 557, 566), that it “ may well be construed as referring alone to those incidental applications ordinarily denominated motions, which are made during the progress of an action or special proceeding after its commencement, and not as embracing an application which is the foundation of a statutory remedy.”

The proceedings for the discharge of. an imprisoned debtor are not commenced until the petition, schedules and affidavit, with due proof of service, as prescribed in section 2205 are presented to the court. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 2208.) Therefore, when the order to show cause was granted, there was no proceeding whatever pending, ■ in which the order could be deemed to have been made. There was no motion to be then made which under section 780 could be made in eight days, • and which the petitioner might, under the same section, ask permission to make on a less time. But the order was in efiect a mere permission by the county judge to the debtor to inaugurate the proceedings, in a method different from that required by statute. It was a changing of the provisions of section 2205, and not a mere change of the eight days’ notice of motion' provided for in section 780 of • the Code. For such reason section 780 has no application whatever to the situation. It conferred no authority upon the county judge to dispense with the service required by section 2205, and, therefore, the case stands as if no service whatever under that section had ever been made. The county judge might as well have dispensed with the service of the petition and schedule altogether as to have made the order which he did make, and,, in effect, the County Court Jias made the order of discharge without any service whatever having been made upon the judgment creditor. Within the cases above cited such an order would be utterly unwarranted and should not be sustained.

The order, appealed from must be reversed, with costs.

All concurred, except Houghton, J., not voting.

Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.