Case ID: f-appx_385/html/0051-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CHANG JU YE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 09-4839-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 20, 2010.
    Fuhao Yang, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Carl H. McIntyre, Assistant Director; Justin R. Markel, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    
      PRESENT: REENARAGGI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Chang Ju Ye, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 29, 2009, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Chang Ju Ye, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. October 29, 2009). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (3) (ii).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the birth of Ye’s two U.S. citizen children and his participation in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) reflected changes in his personal circumstances and rather than changed country conditions in China. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006) (making clear that the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen may not be suspended because of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances” that is “entirely of [the applicant’s] own making after being ordered to leave the United States”). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the documentary evidence Ye submitted did not meaningfully demonstrate that conditions in China have changed. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir.2006); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008).

Contrary to Ye’s argument, the record does not compellingly suggest that the BIA failed to consider any material evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 337 n. 17 (presuming that the agency “has taken into account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise”). Rather, the BIA properly declined to credit Ye’s unsworn and unauthenticated evidence based on the Immigration Judge’s underlying adverse credibility determination. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 146-49 (2d Cir.2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.