Case ID: sw_146/html/1190-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "HARPER, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

McMILLAN v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 17, 1912.
    State’s Rehearing Denied May 15, 1912.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 598) — Continuance— ■ Absence of Witnesses.
    A continuance for the absence of witnesses, subpoenas for whom had been returned unserved, should have been granted where the motion was based on an affidavit giving the places of residence and business of each of the witnesses, and stating that they would testify to accused’s whereabouts during all of the evening and night when the crime was committed.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1335-1341; Dec. Dig. § 598.]
    2. Criminal Law (§ 917) — Motion for New Trial — Refusal of Continuance.
    A motion for a new trial on the ground that a continuance was improperly refused should have been granted, where it was supported by the affidavit of the absent witnesses that they would testify to accused’s whereabouts when the crime was committed, making it impossible, if their testimony were true, that he could have committed it.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal ■Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2161, 2162; Dec. Dig. § 917.]
    3. Criminal Law (§ 417) — Trial—Evidence —Admissibility.
    On a trial for the robbery of a watch, it was competent for a police officer to Jestify that a third person, who had the watch in his possession, called it to the officer’s attention, that he went to the police station, examined the records, and then took possession of the watch, which proved to be the one stolen, although this did not take place in accused’s presence.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 950-967; Dec. Dig. § 417.]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 819) — Trial—Remarks -of Judge — Instructions to Disregard.
    On a trial for robbery, where the prosecuting witness identified accused as the thief,' a requested instruction to disregard the court’s remark, in the presence of the jury, that he could not charge on circumstantial evidence, because there was an eyewitness, should have been given; the remark being improper and calculated to impress the jury that the testimony of the prosecuting witness was true and .his identification sufficient to justify a conviction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1992; Dec. Dig. § 819.]
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Dallas County; Robt. B. Seay, Judge.
    Peter McMillan was convicted of robbery, and be appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for tbe State.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   HARPER, J.

Appellant was indicted for robbery, tried, and found guilty, and bis punishment assessed at 18 years’ confinement in tbe penitentiary.

1. When tbe case was called for trial, appellant filed bis first application for a continuance on account of the absence of Roxy Coldwell, Alma Webster, Lillian Rose, C. C. Marshall, John Jones, R. L. Jones, Aleñe Moss, Effie Flossman, John King, Ike Howeington, Reid Connor, and Ned Walker, showing that in the application for these witnesses he stated the place of residence and place of business of each of these witnesses, all of whom are alleged to reside in the city of Dallas. To the application be attaches the subpoenas, showing that the sheriff bad returned the process, after the case was called for trial, indorsed that the witnesses could not be found. He states he expects to prove by these witnesses that, on the night before the defendant was arrested and charged with this offense alleged in the indictment, all of above-named witnesses were with the defendant at the Model Theater at 2211 Elm street In the city of Dallas, Tex., and by the witness Lillian Rose that the defendant called at her bouse at about 5:30 p. m. on the day before bis arrest, and remained there until’ about 7 or 7:30 o’clock of that evening, and accompanied her to the Model Theater, 2211 Elm street, in the city of Dallas, Tex., where said witness and this defendant met all of the witnesses whose names appear above or herein, and remained in company with said witness and the above-named witnesses at said Model Theater on said street in the city of Dallas, Tex., until about 11:30 or 12 o’clock at night; the same being the night before the defendant’s arrest for this alleged offense And by the witnesses Roxy Coldwell, Alma Webster, C. C. Marshall, John King, John Jones, R. 'L. Jones, Aleñe Moss, Effie Floss-man, Ike Howeington, Ned Walker, and Reid Connor this defendant expects to prove and can prove that they were with this defendant on the night before be was arrested for this alleged offense, at the Model Theater, having met him there about 7:30 p. m. on said night, and that they were all together from about 7:30 to 11:30 or 12 o’clock on said night, bearing this defendant tell of bis trip as special waiter for Ex-President Roosevelt to El Paso, Tex., and that this defendant left the said Model Theater in company with 'Lillian Rose, Roxy Coldwell, and Reid Connor. That by the witnesses Roxy Coldwell and Reid Connor and Lillian Rose defendant expects to prove and can prove that this defendant, Lillian Rose, Roxy Coldwell, and Reid Connor went to the home of Lillian Rose from said theater, reaching there about 12 or 12:30 p. m., and that the last-named four witnesses engaged in a game of cards, and continued to play until about 4 o’clock the following morning, and that the defendant and Reid Con-nor, Roxy Coldwell, and Lillian Rose remained there in said house in the rear of 231 (old number) Live Oak street the balance of said night, and that this defendant was not separated from the last-named witnesses from 7:30 o’clock on the evening before bis arrest until about daylight on the day of his arrest, and it would have been impossible for defendant to commit said offense on that night.

Attached to the motion for a new trial is the affidavit of a number of these witnesses, who swear that they would testify to the facts alleged in the application, and a number testify that they were at the point designated in defendant’s application, and attach affidavits that they were at such places on the day of the trial. The record makes it plainly manifest that by a postponement or continuance of the ease the attendance of all the witnesses could have been secured. He had his subpoena issued in ample time for all of them to have been summoned, as in his application he stated the street and number where they could be found. The testimony, if true, was material to his defense. Mr. Hamilton testified that on the night these witnesses say they would swear appellant was at the theater with them, about 9 o’clock at night, the defendant knocked him down and robbed him of a watch and some money; that he had never seen defendant before that night, but he could identify him. as the man; and his testimony has support in that of Mr. Zimmerman. Appellant in his testimony denies being the man, and says he can prove by the witnesses named that he was not the man; and a number of these witnesses swear they would have so testified, if they had been summoned. The application for a continuance should have been granted, and it was error to overrule the motion for a new trial, when the grounds in the application for continuance are supported by the affidavits of the witnesses that they would have so testified, as they are in this instance.

2. Appellant in one of his bills also complains that the officer was permitted to detail a conversation between himself and Mr. Zimmerman in the absence of the defendant. It was proper to permit the officer to state that Mr. Zimmerman called his attention to a watch in his possession; that he returned to the police station and examined the records, and then took possession of the-watch, which proved to be the watch lost by Mr. Hamilton; but the other details of the conversation ought not to have been admitted.

3. It is also made to appear by a bill that while the court was reading his charge to the jury, tearing out a portion of his charge, he remarked: “I can’t give a charge on circumstantial evidence, because there was an eyewitness.” This remark was made in the presence and hearing of the jury, and defendant’s counsel requested the court to instruct them not to consider the remark, contending that such remark was calculated to impress the jury that the statement of Mr. Hamilton was true, and his identification of defendant sufficient to authorize his conviction. The remark would perhaps have had this tendency, and should not have been made; but, if made in an unthoughted moment, the instruction requested by defendant should have been given.

4. The other bills are too incomplete for us to review the matters set up therein. We are inclined to think they would present no error; but, for the errors above pointed out, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.