Case ID: f-appx_598/html/0520-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Joshua STRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-36208.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Nov. 3, 2014.
    
    Filed March 17, 2015.
    Merrill Schneider, Schneider Law Offices, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Adrian Lee Brown, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Portland, OR, Lars J. Nelson, Assistant. Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Joshua Strong appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for child disability benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Strong contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) failed to develop the record sufficiently by denying Strong’s request for a psychological evaluation to ascertain his current IQ scores. He also argues that the record is ambiguous and incomplete without such evidence because it would be probative of his current work-related capabilities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2012), and affirm.

Strong’s contention that the ALJ failed to fulfill his duty to develop the record sufficiently is unpersuasive. The evidence was not ambiguous, and the record allowed the ALJ to evaluate Strong’s capacity to work. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.2001). The ALJ reasonably supported his findings that Strong’s learning disorder constituted a severe impairment, and that Strong was limited to entry level jobs, by citing Strong’s subjective testimony and objective medical findings, including his 1998 and 2001 IQ scores, school records, and the assessments of the state disability examiners. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110-11; Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1147.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.