Case ID: f-appx_419/html/0132-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Enrique REYES-FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2293-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 19, 2011.
    
      Howard Laurence Baker, Wilens & Baker, P.C., New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director; Rosanne M. Perry, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROBERTA. KATZMANN, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Enrique Reyes-Francisco, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a May 13, 2010 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reconsider its denial of his motion to reopen. IN RE ENRIQUE REYES-FRANCISCO, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ], 2010 WL 2224601 (B.I.A. May 13, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006). As an initial matter, because Reyes-Francisco has filed a timely petition for review from the denial of his motion to reconsider, but not from the underlying decision for which reconsideration is sought, we review only the denial of the motion to reconsider. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 89-90 (2d Cir.2001). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review his ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Ms. Sheri Paige, which he raised in his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Reyes-Francisco’s motion to reconsider. Reyes-Francisco argues that the BIA erred in finding that he could not properly bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against Mr. Mario DeMarco — the sole principal of the law firm that employed Reyes-Francisco’s attorney of record, Mr. Mark C. Salvucci— when Mr. DeMarco did not personally represent him in his removal proceedings. In rejecting this claim, the BIA reasonably relied on the agency’s regulations, which recognize only those attorneys who submit a notice of appearance and personally practice before the Executive Office for Immigration Review. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(i) (defining the term practice as “the act or acts of any person appearing in any case, either in person or through the preparation or filing of any brief or other document, paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before or with DHS, or any immigration judge, or the Board.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1292.4(a) (“An appearance shall be filed on the appropriate form by the attorney or representative appearing in each case”); cf. Fuentes-Argueta v. INS, 101 F.3d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir.1996) (finding no denial of the right to counsel in the decision of an Immigration Judge declining to recognize as counsel of record an attorney who had not filed a formal notice of appearance). Furthermore, contrary to Reyes-Francisco’s argument, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by failing explicitly to consider his challenge to its due diligence finding because its alternative finding that there was no basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Mr. DeMarco was dispositive of Reyes-Francisco’s motion to reconsider. See Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2006) (requiring an alien to demonstrate due diligence independent from the requirement of demonstrating ineffective assistance of former counsel).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).