Case ID: njl_3/html/0248-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Kirkpatrick, C. J. Rossell, J. Pennington, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

[*] THE STATE against VAN HOUTEN.
    On in.dictment for passing counterfeit money, the passing other false money admitted, to prove a scienter and intent.
    The defendant was indicted at the Hunterdon Oyer and Terminer, for uttering and publishing as true, a [496] counterfeit ten dollar bank bill of the Bank of the United States. This indictment was moved by certiorari to this court, and a trial ordered at bar; on trial it appeared that the defendant lived at Patterson, in Essex, that one evening in Trenton (the defendant being a stranger there) he called at the store of Mr. Samuel Paxton, and passed the bill on which the indictment was found, that he purchased a pair of gloves, and offered the bill in payment, that the bill was taken and the balance paid to Van Houten, that the bill was false and counterfeit.
    The Attorney-General then offered to prove that the defendant had passed other counterfeit bills the same evening in Trenton at several stores, under very suspicious circumstances, and also at other places on the road the same day.
    This testimony was objected to on the part of the defendant by his counsel, on the ground, first, that the facts offered to be proved were no way connected with the crime charged against the defendant; and second, that it would be giving-in evidence a substantive offense, different from the one charged in the indictment.
    It was answered on the part of the State, that the fact of uttering and publishing the bill as true, being proved, and that the bill was false, the only evidence now wanting to convict the defendant, was a proof of a knowledge that the bill was countei-feit at the time of passing it; that the evidence offered was not to prove the fact of uttering, that was already proved; that the knowledge of the bills being counterfeit, rested in the mind of the defendant, and was susceptible [*] of no other proof than the attending circumstances ; that the facts intended to be proved were, that the defendant before he came to town, on the road between Brunswick and Trenton, had passed counterfeit bank bills; that he offered at the turnpike gate, and other places, counterfeit bills of ten and twenty dollars, and other small expenses on the road; when at the same time he had small change with them, more than sufficient for those small expenses ; that when he arrived in Trenton, he did not put up in town, but passed the bridge, and put up his horse at a tavern in Morrisville; and then returned in the evening to Trenton on foot, and went round to different stores and offered counterfeit bank bills of ten and twenty dollars in payment of trifles which he purchased, receiving the difference in good money.
    The following authorities were cited in favor of this testimony: — Hale’s Pleas of the Crown, 299; 1 Burr. 647, 147, Kelyng, 33, Hawk. c 46 s. 34; 2 Stra. 1230.
    
    
      ■ The counsel for the defendant, in reply, contended, that the admission of the testimony offered, would not [497] only be subversive of every sound rule of evidence, .but dangerous to the rights and liberties of the citizens.
   Kirkpatrick, C. J.

Was against the admission of the testimony.

Rossell, J.

Could not perceive any legal objection to the admission of the testimony.

Pennington, J.

Was clearly of opinion that the whole of the conduct of the defendant from the time he left Newark, the day before he passed the bill at Trenton, until he was apprehended the same evening, was a proper subject of inquiry; not however to prove the fact that he passed the bill, or that the bill itself was counterfeit, but the knowledge that he [*] had of its being counterfeit at the time of passing it; and the fraudulent and evil intent with which he did it.

The facts being proved on the part of the State, as opened by the attorney-general, the jury found the defendant guilty. 
      
       This question had arisen at the Hunterdon oyer and terminer, at which the Chief Justice presided: when he presided as in the present case. It also had been raised at the Essex oyer and terminer, at which Pennington, Justice, presided, when he gave an opinion similar to the one he gave in this cause. In this cause, both the Chief Justice, and Pennington J., argued the question at some length; and although the Reporter might be able to state from memory his own argument, yet as he has not the argument of the Chief Justice, he is not sure it would be correct to give the opinion of one of the judges without the other, in a case circumstanced as the present is.