Case ID: scl_1/html/0470-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      The Court\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Sasportas against Jennings and Woodrop.
    Duress of der^some cir-avoicfa^nan’s note or bond,
    tion of prize belongs l>'ex-thesutmiraitw have nothing If so, then all other matters springing in-ofsuchaques-cxciusireiyto alsoad A con" demnation of goods in some potent juris-sohiteiy1S ne-Sr&SS can be devest-ed out of the original own-
    CASE on a demurrer. The defendants shipped a quam dty of rum on board the British sloop Bell, of Jamaica, hound to Charleston ; which sloop, on her passage, was captured by a vessel acting, or pretending to act, under a commission from the French republic, and brought into the port of Charleston. The rum was afterwards ordered to be s°bl for the benefit'of the captors, as lawful prize, by Mons. the French consul residing here.- Previous, however, to this, the defendants had put in their claim for the ruin, as being American citizens, and the bona fide , owners of the rum, which was refused. At the sale, the defendants'were the purchasers, and gave their notes to the plaintiff, as agent of the captors, for the amount of the saiesi an(l by this means repossessed themselves of their property, so captured. When these notes became due, the defendants were advised not to pay them, on the ground that they were, in fact, compelled or obliged to give them, in order to get back their property out of the hands of the privateersmen.
    The action was then commenced. The defendants put _ ... in a special plea, stating the duress of their goods, and a compulsion to give these notes, in order to regain possession of their property! And further, that this court had no jurisdiction of the cause, as it naturally involved in it the question of prize or no prize, which exclusively belongs to the admiralty jurisdiction. To this the plaintiff demurred; and for cause of demurrer alleged, that duress of goods (which, however, he denied in this case) would not avoid so deliberate an act as the giving the se notes j and that this was a contract cognisable by a common law court, and not of admiralty jurisdiction. The defendants joined in demurrer, So that two questions came before the court for their consideration,
    1st. Whether duress of goods would avoid a man’s act or not ? 2. Whether this court would take cognisance of the cause, originally of admiralty jurisdiction ?
    There was however a third point, and the most material of any, though not submitted by the pleadings, and which naturally arose out of them ; which was, 3. Whether, upon a supposition that this court cannot take cogni-sance of a case which originally and exclusively belongs to the admiralty jurisdiction, it will of a matter incidentally springing out of it ?
    On behalf of the plaintiff, it was argued, on the first ground, that duress of goods will not avoid a man’s deed ; because the party may have adequate satisfaction in damages, for any injury he may receive ; and for that purpose the counsel relied on 2 List. 48;* and 1 Black Conn 431. That, however, in the present case, there was no kind of duress but a voluntary contract at a public sale, where the law was open for redress of every kind of injury whatever.. The defendants were perfectly free to contract for the rum, or not, as they thought proper. There was no compulsion on them; no threats. Every step respecting the contract, and giving the notes in question, was the result of deliberation and free will. That it was unnecessary to go into the consideration of a note of hand ; it carried with it upon its face a valuable consideration, and no construction whatever could draw it into the admiralty jurisdiction. It was a contract cognisable in the common law courts only, and not elsewhere. That the rurp. in question, had been -taken on the high seas, and had been upwards of twenty-four hours in the hands of the captors, which devested the original owners of their property, so that they could have no further interest, in it. And although there had been no regular condemnation, yet that only respected the distribution of capture, not the devestment of the original owners. That the defendants, therefore, could have no claim to the rum in question ; and if no claim, then they could not even have an equitable pretext for detaining the money in their hands, under colour that they had no other mode left to regain their property.
    2. On the second ground, the counsel did not contend that this court could take notice of a prize cause, or one of admiralty jurisdiction ; but denied that this was a question of prize or no prize, or an incident springing out of it. That it did not appear to be a cause of'this kind, from the face of the proceedings.
    
      For the defendants, it was replied, that duress of goods would avoid a man’s deed in some particular instances; for the necessities of a man might, in many cases, be so urgent and pressing, as not to admit of the ordinary modes of redress by due course of law, however able the other party might be to make him compensation, or to satisfy him for any injury he might sustain ; and relied on Astley v. Reynolds, (2 Sir. 916.) where a pawner of goods paid 61. more than was really due to the pawnee, and upon an action of assumpsit, recovered it back again ; because it was said, this payment was by compulsion, and the plaintiff could not do without the plate pawned; so that an action of trover would not do for his business ; therefore it must have been paid by the plaintiff relying on his remedy to recover it back again. From whence the counsel in this case urged, if assumpsit would lie to recover back money paid under the circumstances as in Astley v. Reynolds ; that if a demand was made for money supposed to be due under similar circumstances, the defendants might defend them» selves against so unjust a claim. That the situation and calling of the captors, made it more urgent and necessary :n this case, than perhaps in any other which could occur, -,.o induce the defendants to regain their effects by any possible means short of force, out of their hands. They were ■privateersmen ; the very import of the term was sufficient to convey an adequate idea of them : transient persons, not one of whom might ever be found again here, after once leaving the port; or if found not worth a shilling to make reparation in damages. This case, therefore, was much stronger than any mentioned in the books, and fully justified the defendants in not paying the notes thus given for their goods, so illegally detained from them. As to force, they had none at command, to oblige the captors to relinquish ; and if that were practicable, it might' endanger the peace of the 'country; whereas the present mode was a peaceable one, which prevented every thing like- hostility, and was fully sufficient for every purpose they wanted.
    2. On the second ground it was clear, they said, that a court of common law could not take cognisance of a prize cause. All the writers on the laws of nations, concurred on this head and laid it down as a well established rule, that the question of prize Or no prize, must be determined by thejHS belli, and belongs exclusively to the prize court, in the admiralty jurisdiction. That the reasoning was so strong in the case of Leceaux v. Eden, (Doug. S72.) that it was unnecessary to mention any other; nay, the plaintiff himself, conceded the point.
    3. On the third point, the defendants’ counsel contended, that although the notes were not (abstractly considered) a matter of admiralty jurisdiction ; yet, as they incidentally sprung out of the capture, and was a consequence of it, and the money mentioned in them, depended upon the determination of the previous question of prize or no prize, it was such an incident attached to a prize cause, as could not be severed from it, without manifest injustice to the defendants. That the notes in question, were only evidences of the contract, made to get back the rum into the defend-anti’ possession; which contract, however, whether good or bad, binding or nugatory, still depended on the right of property in the rum. For if the rum was still the property of the defendants, any contract made to pay for what was their own, was void and of no effect. On the contrary, if it was in the captors, then they were bound to pay ; which still brought the grand question back to the consideration of prize or no prize ? That even if the rum had been the property of enemies, instead of friends and neutrals, there must have been a condemnation in a court of competent jurisdiction. (Lindo v» Rodney,) Here was no condemnation or •investigation in a court competent to decide upon it; it was sold by the arbitrary order of the French consul. That with regard to the effects of this sale, it might well be compared to the case of pirates, who took goods at sea, and sold them on land ; v/here it was adjudged to belong to the admiralty jurisdiction. For that which is an incident to the original matter, shall not take away the original jurisdiction. Doug. 583. That the opinions of the judges in the case of Leceaux v. Eden, (Doug. 579.) were also clear on this point. That where the injury was the natural consequence of the capture, the admiralty has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction. That where the admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction of the matter, it ought to have jurisdiction of every thing necessarily incident to it. And that if the original taking be not a trespass cognisable at common, law, it leaves it with all its incidents, to the court which has original jurisdiction. From all whfch authorities and opinions, it was sufficiently clear, that whatever was an incident to a case of admiralty jurisdiction originally, should be tried by the admif altj, and not by a court of common law.
   The Court

(present, Burke, Waties, and Bay, Justices)

took time to consider this case ; and after mature deliberation, were of opinion that this court had not jurisdiction of the cause. That with regard to the first point, submitted by the pleadings, they were decidedly of opinion, that there jnight be cases v/here duress of goods would avoid p, man’s act; and that there was nothing from 2 Inst. 483. and 1 Black. 131. to the contrary. Both Lord Coke and Judge Blackstone lay down the principles of law generally, without recurring to exceptionable cases out of the general rule. The very reason they assign, appears to confirm this opinion. They both say that duress of goods will not avoid a man’s deed ; because the party injured may have adequate satisfaction in damages for the injury. This then obviously presupposes two things : 1st. Ability in the person or persons to make recompense. 2dly. A prompt and effectual method to compel this satisfaction. But where these essentials are wanting, the reason ceases, and with it, the principles on which the law was founded. Had either of these great sages of the law. contemplated, in the cases quoted, the inability of persons to make compensation, or a want of a speedy tribunal to compel it to be made ; they would, no doubt, have laid down principles applicable to such cases, and that too, very different from those relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel. Besicles, it is too obvious, that the immediate necessities of a man may be so great and urgent, as not to admit of ordinary modes of redress, however able the party might be to make satisfaction. It would, therefore, be extremely hard to say that in cases of this sort, even where the party is sufficiently able, that duress of goods should not avoid a man’s act. The reason in the case of Astley v. Reynolds is very strong to this point. There, the court said the party paid his money relying on his legal remedy to recover it back again. It is clear then, that where-ever assumpsit will lie for money extorted by this kind of duress of goods, a party may defend himself against any claim upon him for money to be paid in consequence of any contract made under similar circumstances.

2. As to the second point, the court said it was a very clear rule of law, that the municipal courts of a country could not take cognisance of matter which was to be determined by theyhs belli, which was a part of the law of nations ; and therefore, every thing relating to, or governed hyit, must be determined by that court which has (he general jurisdiction of such cases*; which, by the common consent of all nations, belonged to the admiralty jurisdiction^ They said Leceaux & Eden’s case, and the authorities there referred to, together with the reasoning and opinions of the . , . , judges upon them, were so strong and conclusive upon this head, that it was needless to do more than to refer to the case itself.

3.- On the third point, the court were equally clear, that the notes in., question were only evidences of a contract made at a sale of the rum as a lawful prize ; and therefore formed such an incident as naturally brought them within the admiralty jurisdiction, which had the original cogni-sance of the question of prize or no prize. It was admitted by all parties, that the rum in question, was shipped on board the British, sloop Bell, a? the property of the defendants, who- were American citizens — that it was seized by a French privateer, brought into the port of Charleston, and ordered, by the French consul, to be sold as lawful prize ; and that at this sale, the defendants purchased it, and gave their notes for the purchase-money, in order to get possession of the rum. These notes then, were evidently the last links in- the chain of events, which was fastened to the admiralty jurisdiction originally, and which could not be severed from the others- without the most glaring injustice to the defendants ; for it. must be obvious that the validity of this contract depended upon the legality of the prize. If the rum still remained the property of the defendants, there was no one principle of law or justice existing, which could- make them pay for what was their own before, or which could support or defend any contract made to pay for it. If, on the contrary, the rum vested in the captors, then the contract was binding; which still involved in it the consideration of prize or no prize, and brought it back to the admiralty jurisdiction, to which it originally belonged. The case of Leceaux v. Eden was strong in point: that was an action of false imprisonment, brought by the second mate of a ship which was taken as a prize by the defendant, who was commander of a letter of marque.. The ship and cargo were afterwards liberated by the admiralty, and the captor condemned in costs and damages ; upon which the plaintiff brought this action, as he had been confined on board. The ° action of false imprisonment was apparently a common law case, as much so as the present one on the notes of hand, appeared to be. But the court, in that case, did not sustain it; because it was an incident springing out of a cause originally of admiralty jurisdiction ; and they said, that wherever the injury is the natural consequence of the capture, the admiralty has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction. The case of the pirates was also strong : there, goods were taken at sea, and sold on land ; and it was contended, that this sale on land, made a contract cognisable at common law; but the court adjudged otherwise — that as the original taking belonged to the admiralty, every thing which was incidental to, or sprung out of it, should belong to it also. So in Turner & Carey’s case, against Nele, (1 Leo. 243. 1 Sid. 367.) where an Ostender was taken for a Dutch ship, and brought into port, and libelled as prize ; but restored to the owners. The Ostenders libelled in the court of admiralty, for damages which the ship sustained while in port, and a prohibition was prayed; but refused, on the ground that the original was a capture at sea, and the bringing into port, in order to have her condemned as a prize, is but a consequence of it; therefore, not only the original, but the consequences, shall be tried by the admiralty; so the prohibition was refused. All these cases, and many others referred to, go to establish the principal point contended for by the defendants — that whatever is an incident springing out of a prize case shall, as well as the original capture, be tried by the admiralty jurisdiction.

The court said they would take notice of one thing more in this case, lest their silence upon it might be construed into an acquiescence of the principle laid down by the counsel for the plaintiff, in the course of the arguments, and quoted from Vat lei: “ That a seizure as prize, and twenty- “ four hours possession by the captors, or bringing the u prize into a place of safety, vested the property in the “captors.” (Vattel, 571, 572.) This, they said, was a doctrine they by no means assented to. In the case of Lindo v. Rodney, (Doug. 591.) Lord Mansfield, in one of the most learned and elegant opinions he ever delivered in Westminster-Hall, as the unanimous opinion of the King’s Bench, declares, that after searching the admiralty records from the earliest periods, and examining all the treaties and marine laws then existing, (in 1781,) the court was decidedly of opinion, that no property vests in any goods taken at sea or land, till a sanction of condemnation. That the marine ordinances of France, their instructions to their captains of private ships of war, and a variety of subsisting treaties for one hundred years past, all confirm the position, that no one is to sell, or purchase, before the admiral, &c. shall have declared the ship or goods taken, to be good and lawful prize. Lord Mansfield, in the same opinion, says, that mutual convenience, eternal principles of justice, the wisest regulations of policy, and the consent of all nations, have established a system of procedure, a code of laws, and a court for the trial of prize or no prize. After all these authorities, and the reason of the thing itself, which appears to be a part of the acknowledged law of nations on the subject, a bare dictum of Vattel, that twenty-four hours possession vests the property in the captors, however respectable his authority may be in other respects is not of sufficient weight to justify the position contended for; especially, when it is recollected that he borrowed the idea from Grotius, who wrote about two centuries ago, when commerce and navigation were extremely circumscribed indeed, and when mercantile transactions were very little known, and less attended to by those who had the direction of national transactions. Besides, as a very ingenious author observes, “ both Puffendorf and Grotius are of too fo- “ rensic a cast, to be admitted of general use at this day. “ They are too much mixed up with the civil law and the “ customs of Germany, to answer the present exigencies of M trade, or extension of commerce.” A variety of treaties, conventions, and customs, have been introduced since, by the modern commercial nations, in favour of trade, and their mutual intercourse with each other; that the law of nations has almost entirely changed from what it was two centuries ago. If this doctrine should really prevail, and be considered as . the general law of nations at this day, no property at sea would be safe ; it would all be in the power of captors, to be disposed of at pleasure, without regard to the rights of neutrals, friends, or fellow-citizens. How could the property of persons of this description be distinguished, ascertained, or reclaimed, unless there was some tribunal of competent jurisdiction to investigate and determine the right ? How could those rights be protected, or the faith of treaties observed, without some mode of examination, or power to compel restitution ? Such a doctrine, as has already been observed, would really lay every thing prostrate on the ocean, at the mercy of armed vessels and ships of war. An investigation, therefore, in a court of competent jurisdiction, to adjudge and condemn what is lawful prize, appears from the best authorities, and wisest regulations of nations, to be absolutely necessary, before the property can be devested out of the original owner. Upon the whole, the court were of opinion, that the demurrer in this case ought to be sustained, • which will injure neither party; but leave the question of prize or no prize, with all its incidents, to the admiralty, which had the original jurisdiction of the cause, and among them, the contract in question.