Case ID: nc_9/html/0555-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Taylor, Chief-Justice. Hill, Judge. Henderson, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John Moore v. Willis.
    From Robeson.
    A. being tiU'cli indobted, io defraud lib cvcdUom, evch:u\fYed a neg^o fjuT9 wish B. for ?b negro boy, and took íioin B. a b*il oí sale for the boy, which conveyed hh.; So Ah infant :;ou. After wards C. purebas* cd í¿io boy of A. and sold him to C. by whom he was sold to the T)o feu deni. In an action for the slave, brought by ike infant; «on, again,-i\ the Defendant, the last purchaser ; it was hold, that the lie* fondant was not estopped by die deed horn id to the Plaintiff A\‘> inhml íoa $ that an estoppel, beery the coneludon of the truth, io not to be favoured ; that wIkvc there is no mutuality, there can be no esto one! 5 and tliai e.,Aop2>vis preclude a. party from controverting fact", not few i I'M in the cam put, th.e Boibmvtnt controverts no fie: \n 1ho PLmiüífb? bill a. sale, but rn:bf od that the fraudulent, intention of the father, combined with the condec ral ion moving from Jam, made the slave in question, the properly of the father, as t purchasers and creditors \ and this was mere inference of law.
    
    
      Iktime for negro slave .Jock. Flea, the general issue. Ficiiusii'i dafcrd the slave b/ virtue of a biil of sai:*, irons Jiluten torito ío iíhustof,, im*de 20th of December 1802 ; afc the time of this mile, Flaiwtiir was an infant, this suit w‘«is faiüiíEOüce.íl before he came of age. Tbs Defendant o bio tied ¡tow, under a bill of cale from .Tatars Smith, awi foe following facts appeared its evi-ítofíce. George iioare, lb;her oí the ¡Piehtiiii’, was much indebted, and being i:i possension of a negro girl Kate, Todiwd Itoi intention to exchange hei* wish Smith for Jock, anil to procure from Smith a bill of sale for Jock *:o son’ ^0 Plaintiff; he assigned as a reason for this, that he could not pay his creditors, and that there were gomo of them he did not mean to pay ; that if lie made the exchange, Jock might be retained by his son and be of service to him, (George) during his life, and after-wards to his son. George Moore did make the exchange, and Smith gave the bill of sale, under which Plaintiff claimed. Á few days after this exchange, one Pittman obtained two judgments against George Moore for £lTS, and the executions issuing- thereon wore returned, nulla bona; after this, Pittman rrroh: rd dock of George Moore for a valuable rsmcMcvation, and sold him to James Smith, before monttoned, tor a valuable consideration. and Smith sold him to the Defendant, for a valuable consideration. The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s claim was founded in fraud.
    
    
      Daniel, Judge, charged the Jury, that if George Moore designed and intended to defraud his creditors or subsequent purchasers, when he made the exchange with Smith, yet if Smith did not know of his design, and was not intentionally aiding him in the plan, then the Defendant would not be estopped by the deed of sale from Smith to the Plaintiff, bat would be entitled to consider the sale from George Moore to Pittman, as good against the Plaintiff; and the after circumstance of the negro Jock having been sold to Smith, and then to the Defendant, could not prevent the Defendant availing himself of all the rights which the law gave to Pittman, a mb if Smith was not concerned in the fraud (if any was committed) the Defendant was not estopped by Smith’s deed to the Plaintiff. Yerdict for the Defendant, new trial refused, judgment and appeal.
    
      
       Another point made in the case was, whether the Defendant might give in evidence a registered copy of the deed from Willis to George .Moore.
    
   Taylor, Chief-Justice.

Smith wss & {.urckií '-r ios1 ü, v.KKi-^jsÍC rou.'díxraíioí* frese j’itbKaa» v/1m> v."l:í b fine-sección oí tlio negro, under a deed from Goojvyo Moore, Pstiiuan was íí creditor oí íseci*fsrí* «lien í’so eraisartge took place, ami one of those vvhosa vk> conveyance to John Moore was designed to defraud 5 it was, consequently void against bun* and be might have levled his execution on the property slid had it sold. jGat if, instead of so doing, he üioníyStt fíí*í*pei* to take it lu past saüsfyntiosi of his debt, it was doing, by the agreement ©f tin- pnrties, \\bat tbe law would have eui'crccc in a a-©thei* mode. Tbe act against fraudulent convoy acres, a as friended for the protection of cívíllvim; and ofrere, Laving actions and debts against the iVasidn'ent bkaws*,, and when h n,¿kcs the convcyaiMv valid ugaisis;; Isiist, it is tina be may derive no benefit, from tho properly» iu opposition to their interests j bt.’t whets they claim through him, tho spirt of the at; is obeyed, i’ilitu&n has a double claim, as a emliler tm.l as a subsequent pimá¡u«ei> for a valuable cmiRidor&'.í»», opposed only by the claim of John Moore, the child of tieorge, and a volunteer, wlto can only be favoured at the cxpeiibe of a claim ku.sre blroite; and ¡aemorfrus.

This is considering tho enso, ns if í’-eorgo ftíe»."?, in» steed of procuring a deed from SiEiii.1i to John Moore, Lad fast taken a deed to himseif, and then convey ed Í» John ; and tin’s view of the ease placer, »1! the claimants, under Pitman, upon safe ground. As to (ho objection that Ciuiih, and consequently his vendor, is eutopj.'ed ñon? deny ing the title of John Moore, it is believed (hat the doctrine of estoppel has no bearing «pon tSuH case. Viiiivs does not deny that Bissith mace a deed «.o John Moore., but contends that the tille, conveyed by if, is at an end by the operation of law, and the act of the parties. While that title suhdsied, it would not have been competent for him or Smith to deny it, but the property being restored to the purposes from which the deed at tempted to divert it, the estoppel is at an end. So in an ejectment by landlord against a tenant whose lease is expired, the tenant is not estopped from shewing that the landlord’s lease- is expired — (4 Term. Rep. 082.)

On the other question in this case, it is clear, that under the circumstances stated, a registered copy of the deed to George Moore from Willis, was proper evidence, the Defendant not having, and having no right to the original.

Hill, Judge.

It cannot be denied, hut that the title to the slave in dispute, passed out of James Smith, by bis bill ox sale, to John Moore, the son. But I think the Defendant’s defence, in this case, is not weakened by that admission, because, according to the facts stated in this case, although the title passed out of Smith it did not vest in John Moore. Circumstances over which Smith had no control, vested the right and tille to the slave in George Moore, the father, at least as far as creditors and others were concerned, and the title conveyed to Pittman by George Moore, and by Pittman to Smith, and by Smith to the Defendant, is not contradictory to the title which passed out of Smith, when he executed the bill of sale to John Moore, but sprung from it, is conformable to it, and built upon it. I, therefore., think, for these reasons, that the verdict is right, and the rule for a new trial should be discharged.

Henderson, Judge.

An estoppel is the conclusion of the truth, it is therefore, not to be favoured, and it arises from solemn act, either of the party, or of a jury or any other tribunal appointed by law' to ascertain facts. Which, when once thus solemnly fixed, arc forever conclusive on the parties and privies in a!) controversies between ¿herd. For estoppels are mutual, and wh-re-there is no mutuality there, can be no estoppel. But it is the facts which the party is thus precluded from controverting, not ihe law. Feels being in themselves nsioerííii», and msting in <Iv. knowledge of die p-vrtics asr/i to be shewn by tesiiaiouy, when once ibis Kok'üiH si: :::ío« k'dpyiiCiif ia me-,to os* found in manner aíbrcs-db, ¡Í ia ever after received as iho real irutb of the osa¡¡, ¡km-beirg no touebstoii - by which the abso-luto ti-i’ib rjits bo aoi’crisitnod, and also ibas, there may i)0 PJ1 'Uto of J'UfyS'-ÜOi!. Bui she liUY ;5C;S not SC Oil *Jlie acbn'»v„lc<<gss;o:f.i «¡Tibe party, it is ea open, notorious, and jK-blio rale. It is too saca' boto-vo.! A. and B. sirs it is boiVieciii id. usa! C. No ftouinv, l- ■''•■incut of the party can niter cr cbungc it, or pmdstslc iintnn at sill times from jiísíhíÍü.?; on sis due administre..ion. Thus, if A. bargain and sell ío ÍL by ind.-nUire, iso thereby af-fi.-vaa that be bail title when be cxecaied the deod, and should A. not have tide at lite fiase, bal afterviurds acquire one, in an action brought by Lim against il. JJ’s title ssrarails,, :;i>‘ because A. pasfied *o kssn any title by his deed, for he land name then 'to pass, Sito broiir.ae A. is pi ecludc.d íVo:ii shewing iirl fart. But if a person* through conniiAi-aikiSdi of ualur.'J ton- ami afíbcíioa, give lands to :: itoviigor. or to an lik-ay íLisuíe obiM, ho may recover those iLs-ds of too sA-auge:? or the child, for to do so he conireveir-i no fad, diilhmjjoeil isa too deed ; for they may al! be adm-'íted to be trae, and yet tire title to re-ñida where if was, for the facts therein afilnucd are not sufficient to paso ihe tide for tbs' v/ant «f a consideration. This is .natter of law, and will so be deduced by tie Court, notwithstanding any úerinrationa in the deed by the party, that the died shall 1st\e£h‘,lml to vans the estele. In die case mow under consideration, the Defendant controverts no fací in the bill of salo to the Plalsitííis, bat ho insirto: that tbo fraudulent intention of the father, combined wMito.e ccosideraiion moving front hint, makes the i.la,o in qnestoi» tiie property of the father, ns to pureiia-.ei*» and crcdHors. This is mere inference of law from the facts. The party cannot be es-topjyto from siicwkr; ISie law..