Case ID: f-appx_570/html/0690-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DELSON GROUP, INC, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GSM ASSOCIATION, a British nonprofit organization and GSMA Ltd, a Georgia nonprofit corporation, Befendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-16809.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Jan. 17, 2014.
    Filed April 21, 2014.
    Jing James Li, Lilaw Inc., Los Altos, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    William H. Brewster, Esquire, Sabina Vayner, Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: ALARCÓN, TALLMAN, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Delson Group, Inc. appeals from the district court’s order dismissing Delson’s trademark action against GSM Association. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

The district court did not err in dismissing GSM’s complaint as a collateral attack against a judgment rendered by a Georgia district court. Although a district court may entertain such an attack, they are “disfavored.” F.D.I.C. v. Aaronian, 93 F.3d 636, 639 (9th Cir.1996). Accordingly, “[cjourts of appeals review with deference a [nonrendering] court’s decision to defer to the rendering court.” Id. In a similar context, we have instructed that “considerations of comity and orderly administration of justice demand that the nonrender-ing court should decline jurisdiction of such an action and remand the parties for their relief to the rendering court.” Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169, 172 (9th Cir.1964). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion by following these instructions.

Relying on Supreme Court dicta, Delson urges that a district court has no discretion to dismiss a collateral attack premised on the rendering court’s alleged lack of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has never squarely held as much, and our own precedent weighs against such a conclusion. See Treadaway v. Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences, 783 F.2d 1418, 1422 (9th Cir.1986) (“When a court entertains an independent action for relief from the final order of another court, it interferes with and usurps the power of the rendering court just as much as it would if it were reviewing that court’s equitable decree, Although justice may occasionally demand that sort of interference, the identification of those rare situations is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”)

Nor did the district court err in construing Delson’s complaint as an action seeking relief from the judgment of another court. The Georgia district court enjoined Delson from using the terms “Mobile World Congress” and “World Mobile Congress” to promote its events, while Del-son’s California action alleged that GSM had violated Delson’s trademark as to the same terms. Because a “request for a declaration that a prior order of the [Georgia district court] is null and void” is “at the heart of [Delson’s] complaint,” the district court did not abuse its discretion in construing Delson’s complaint as an independent action seeking relief from the judgment of another court. Treadaway, 783 F.2d at 1421; see also Aaronian, 93 F.3d at 639 (“The label affixed to the motion will not dictate the outcome of the [nonrendering] court’s decision.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.