Case ID: us-ct-cl_11/html/0054-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Miller Mr. Justice Clifford", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

McKEE’S CASE,
    (10 Court of Claims R., p. 231; 91 U. S. R., p. 442.)
    Archibald McKee et al., administrators of Vigo, appellees, v. The United States, appellants.
    
      On the defendants' Appeal.
    
    
      Virginia expends money and contracts debts during the revolutionary toar. The United States assume all claims against Virginia allowed by her before a specified day. Colonel Vigo advanced money to the State, but Ms claim was not allowed till after the specified time. Congress pass a private act clothing the Court of Claims “with full jurisdiction to adjust and settle the same.” It also provides that the court shall “ he governed hy the rules and regulations heretofore adopted hy the United States in the settlement of like cases.” The heirs of Colonel Vigo bring their suit under this aet. It appears on the trial that Congress has generally given interest in similar eases. The court below decides that the purpose of the private act is that if the claim ivas duly allowed and audited, so as to be a valid claim against the State of Virginia, it is to be allowed now as against the United States ; and that if interest has been uniformly allowed in similar eases by Congress, it constitutes a rule to be adopted by the court m this case, notwithstanding the provision in the Amended Court of Claims Act, (12 Slat. L., p. 765, § 7,) that “nointerest shall he allowed on any claim,” “unless upon a contract exjiressly stipulating for the payment of interest.” Judgment for the claimants. The defendants appeal.
    
    I. Where a private act refers to the Court of Claims “ with full jurisdiction to-adjust and settle the same,” a claim for money furnished the troops of the State of Yirginia during the revolutionary war, which has become barred hy the Act 5th August, 1790, (which provided that no claim should he-admitted as against the United States that had not been allowed hy the State before the 24th of September, 1788,) the purpose of the act must he to remove the bar and authorize judgment on the claim.
    
      II. A draft drawn by General George Rogers Clarke during the revolutionary war, upon the State of Virginia, for military supplies furnished the Virginian troops, duly accepted, but not paid, and the claim thereon audited and allowed by the commissioner of revolutionary claims of Virginia, in 1835, constitute a just claim against Virginia, and, apart from any legal bar from lapse of time, a just claim against the United States.
    III. Where Congress has generally allowed interest upon a certain class of claims, and refers oue of that class to the Court of Claims with instructions “ to adjust and settle the same; and, in making such adjustment and settlement, the said court shall he governed hy the rules and regulations heretofore adopted hy the United Stales in the settlement of like cases," the court should award interest, notwithstanding the provision in the Amended Court of Claims Act, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 7,) “ that no interest shall he allowed on any claim unless upon a contract expressly stipulating for thepiayment of interest." . *
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The court found the following facts:
    I. This case was referred to the Court of Claims by the private act of Congress, approved June 8,1872, set forth in the petition.
    II. Among the papers and official documents referred by Congress to the Court of Claims are certain letters, purporting to be original communications from the auditor of the State of Virginia to committees of the House of Representatives, inclosing copies of the accounts of General George Rogers Clarke and of Oliver Pollock, the commercial and financial agent of Virginia, at the city of New Orleans, in the years 1778 and 1779. These communications are ancient writings, purporting to be original, which cannot be authenticated at this time. By these communications and accounts it appears that General Clarke drew a bill of exchange for eight thousand seven hundred sixteen dollars and forty cents, ($8,710.40,) dated December 4th, 1779, described in the petition, and that Col. Francis Vigo, deceased, advanced to General Clarke the value thereof, and that the money so advanced was (used in the military service of the State of Virginia, ás set forth in the petition, and that the bill was presented for payment to the drawee, but was not paid, for want of funds, and that it has not since been paid.
    III. Among the papers also referred to this court by Congress is one purporting to be original, the authenticity of which cannot now be determined, being the award or adjustment of the claim of Oolouel Yigo against the State of Virginia by the commissioner of revolutionary claims for the State of Virginia, together with copies, certified by the commissioner, of the evidence referred to in his award. The award is in the following terms:
    Oeeice oe the Commissioner oe
    Revolutionary Claims eor the State of Virginia,
    
      Richmond, December 16, 1835.
    I have examined the claim of Francis Vigo, of Vincennes, and State of Indiana, for supplies furnished to the Illinois regiment in the fall of the year 1778, to the amount of eight thousand six hundred and sixteen dollars, evidenced by a set of bills of exchange drawn by George R. Clarke on Oliver Pollock, at New Orleans, for the said sum of $8,616, (which said bills have been lost or mislaid,) and which the said Vigo alleges remains unpaid to this day. I have examined also every public document within my reach which I. believed would give information respecting the transactions in which the claims of individuals against the State of Virginia for supplies furnished to the Illinois regiment originated, and especially respecting the claim of Colonel Vigo. In this examination and investigation 1 have ascertained the following facts, to wit:
    1st. That Francis Vigo was the “ Spanish merchant,” as he has been called by way of honorable distinction, who was renowned for his integrity, liberality, and benevolence, as well as from hi's firm friendship for and disinterested and efficient support of Virginia in the war of the Revolution.
    2d. That, being the subject of a foreign power, he warmly espoused the cause of the colonies against the mother-country, and made large sacrifices in supporting the western troops of Virginia.
    3d. That bills of exchange were drawn by General Clarke in the year 1778 upon Oliver Pollock, at New Orleans, in favor of Francis'Vigo, for upwards of $10,000, for supplies furnished by him to the Illinois regiment in that year. That these bills were protested by Mr. Pollock (who was the agent of the State) for the “ want of funds.” That some of them were sold by M. Vigo, and afterwards paid by Virginia. That one, amounting to $298, was paid by the said Pollock to the said Vigo. That the bill for $8,616 was one of them which was not parted with by M. Vigo, but remained in his possession (that is to.say, the second of the set remained in Ms possession the set consisting of Nos. 1 and 2, and the 1st having been lost) until he suffered with a long and severe illness, commencing 1802, and continuing for several years. That during this illness he handed over the said bill for $8,616 to Judge Jacob Burnet, of Ohio, to obtain something, if possible, from Virginia upon it. (See statements of Francis Vigo, Pierre Menard, Jacob Burnet, all on oath; and also, as proof of the credit which should be given to the statements of the said Vigo, see the affidavits of John Badollet and Nathaniel Ewing, and statement of General Harrisoh, and letters from Generals Wayne, Clarke, and Knox, &c.)
    4th. That the said bill of $8,616 was drawn for supplies actually furnished to the Illinois regiment under the command of General G. E. Clarke by the said Francis Vigo. (See the memorial of Francis Vigo, which has been sworn to, and the affidavits of Pierre Menard and J. Badollet.)
    5th. That this set of exchange (both first and second) have been lost. (See here also Francis Vigo’s statement on oath, and the affidavits of Jacob Burnet and Nathaniel Ewing.)
    6th. That the said amount of $8,616 remains at this day unsatisfied and due to the said Francis Vigo. (See said Vigo’s statement on oath, Pierre Menard’s affidavit, and the affidavit of John Badollet and Nathaniel Ewing; also certificates of the auditor and treasurer of Virginia.)
    7th. That all General Clarke’s bills on Pollock at New Orleans were for specie. (See General Clarke’s certificate, Journal of the House of Delegates, May session, 1783, page 73.)
    8th. That the smaller bills which were drawn in the latter part of the year 1778 by General Clarke upon Oliver Pollock in favor of Francis Vigo, and which he says in his memorial were parted with by him, and afterward paid by Virginia, are proved, by the Illinois documents and papers now in my possession, to have been paid by Virginia. But these documents and papers furnish no iiroof whatever of the payment of the said larger bill of $8,616, the amount of which is now claimed by Francis Vigo.
    In conformity with the foregoing facts, which are set forth in pages 1, 2, and 3 of this paper, I have adjusted the claim. It gives me pleasure to be able'to make a favorable adjustment, and to ascertain the sum of money due from the State of Virginia to a man who has rendered the most important services to bis adopted country, and who, if Ms neighbors, who are-among the most distinguished men in the part of the United States in which he resides, are to be believed, is one of the most upright and honorable of men.
    STATEMENT.
    
      The State of Virginia to Francis Vigo, Dr.
    
    1778. To advances made to General Clarke for the use of the Illinois regiment under tbe command of the said Clarke... $8,616 00
    To interest on the same, at 5 per cent, per an-num, from March 20, 1779, to January 10, 1835 . 24,038 85
    Total.. 32, 654 85
    After having made a satisfactory examination of the evidence touching this claim, I have adjusted it according to the above statement, and have found a sum of money due to the said Francis Yigo, of principal and interest, amounting to thirty-two thousand six hundred and fifty-four dollars and eighty-five cents.
    JOHN H. SMITH,
    
      Commissioner, <fhc.
    
    IY. No rules and regulations have heretofore been adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases, except such as may be inferred from the policy of Congress when passing private acts for the relief of various persons. When passing such private acts Congress has allowed interest upon the claim up to the time that the relief was granted.
    V. The claimants are the legatees and heirs of legatees of Col. Francis Yigo, as set forth in the petition; the executors and administrators of the estate of Colonel Yigo are deceased, and the estate has been settled, excepting this claim, as set forth in the petition.
    
      Mr. Solicitor General Phillips for the United States, appellants :
    The act is a private act, and so its words are those of the claimants. Any doubt arising thereupon is therefore to be resolved against the claimants. The act does not acknowledge the claim to be just. Whether it be just is the main question submitted thereby to the Court of Claims. In order that the court should find the claim to be justly due by the United States, it was necessary that some previous statute should have made it so.
    No statute is cited by the claimants showing that Yigo at any time had a claim against the United States. All that the acts and ordinances of October 16,1780, and 7th of May, 1787, and August 5, 1790, relied upon by the claimants, prove, is that similar claims when allowed by Virginia were to be or have been paid by the United States to the latter.
    It appears, from the legislation, that the UniLed States acknowledged the justice of a claim by Virginia for expenditures of the sort mentioned above, but did not make themselves debtors to those who, in such matters, had dealt with the State. On the contrary, an examination and allowance of such claims by Virginia was a necessary prerequisite to even an examination of them by the United States. The former proceeding was to ascertain their authorization by the State, and the latter to ascertain whether, if so authorized, they belonged to the class of debts which the United States had as above engaged to pay.
    To the present day there has been no change of legislation upon this topic that will authorize this Vigo claim to be considered as a claim directly against the United States.
    It has never been alloived by Virginia.
    At a very early day Mr. Vigo endeavored to secure its payment by that State, but for some reason or other, now forever hidden, along with most other reasons upon which many persons who one hundred years ago thought themselves creditors failed to establish their claims, it was not paid, or even allowed. Unless we regard ourselves as more intelligent upon this matter than were those contemporaneous with it, or that we are more honest than our fathers, it should be concluded that it was not paid or allowed for some good reason. If we knew what that reason was, we might sit in judgment upon it, and perhaps conclude that it was invalid. But we are not at all informed what it was. In such a state of the case, it seems impossible to deny that what was done was properly done.
    If we look at the case by the record which comes before the court, a record based upon such facts as the diligence of the claimants has been áble or has thought best to produce, the claim is one of extraordinary merit. It presents a case in which a generous, innocent foreigner, under the most noble impulses, succored a detachment of the revolutionary army while involved in the Illinois wilderness, and, by a disinterested, and perhaps lavish, use of his private means, enabled them to secure to the Union the splendid territory beyond the Ohio. I need not enlarge upon this topic. 'The bare facts are more eloquent than any comment that I can make upon them. What is material to observe in this connection is, that notwithstanding these merits, at once so solid and so impressive, the public men who were contemporary with the act declined to recognize them. More than this, Mr. Yigo survived to a most venerable old age, preserving all the while the esteem of the leading citizens of that community, survived amidst the wonderful development and prosperity of the children of those whom hó had aided, all the while cherishing and pursuing this claim, yet none the less was it constantly disregarded. It seems impossible that there should net have been very powerful countervailing reasons to produce action like this upon the part of Yirginia. This state of the case is mentioned here in order to direct attention to the importance of the link missing in the case of the claimants, viz, an allowance by Yirginia — that allowance which, except perhaps, in special cases depending on their own reasons, Congress has always required before ordering such claims to be paid. It seems evident that when Congress referred to the Court of Claims the Yigo claim, “along with all the papers and official documents belonging thereto,” it did not give any especial sanction to such “ papers.” They were doubtless papers filed before Congress by the claimants, and were sent, valeant quantum vol-eante to the court, for the purpose of being scrutinized as to both their competency and their weight as evidence. That the claimants had to say that such papers and records were produced from the files of the Congressional Committee on Claims was not equivalent to saying that thereby they were produced from a repository which of itself gave them authenticity.
    Upon the record, therefore, I submit that judgment must necessarily be reversed. However, I need not place the case upon such dry technical ground. From public documents now on file in the archives of the Government, which I suppose the court may, sua sjponte, 
       examine, it appears that Mr. Smith was a commissioner on the part of Virginia to “investigate and adjust” revolutionary claims against that State, and that Ms function was limited to reporting his action to the general assembly for confirmation, or the contrary, by that body; that he did not so report this claim, but sent it directly to Congress$ such report having been written on the 16th of January, 1835, and presented to Congress on the fifteenth day thereafter, viz, February 4, 1835. (Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, Twenty-seventh Congress, A. D. 1842, 2d session, vol .2, No. 525; and also same session, vol. 5, No. 1028.)
    That document is an adverse report by the Committee on Revolutionary Claims upon this Vigo claim.
    It is too elaborate for quotation here, but it sets out substantially the following defense to the claim, as against the United States: General Clarke reported to Virginia the amount of the bill of exchange as one item of his military expenditures, previously to the settlement made between that State and the United States by the commissioners appointed under the condition in the deed of cession, and that commission awarded, and Virginia accepted, the round sum of $500,000 in full of all such expenses, “including all expenses of troops.” There is, therefore, a very violent if not conclusive presumption that the award covered this very item. Although the bill had not then been paid, yet the presentation of the claim by Virginia amounted to its allowance, and no more was required for its acceptance by the United States.
    It is from this document, which probably escaped the attention of the court below, that I have ventured to say that the learned counsel for the claimants is mistaken in supposing that the commissioners referred to in the deed of cession were not appointed. Their names are given in the above report, and it is said that no copy of their award can be found, but that on the 27th of June, 1790, General Knox, at that time Secretary of War, stated in an official report the substance of their conclusions to have been as aforesaid.
    Upon the whole, neither the findings of facts nor the archives of the Government (perhaps included iu the “official documents” or “official acts” referred by the act of 1872) warrant the judgment given below.
    
      Judgment should have been rendered for the defendant.
    The second assignment of error is in regard to the allowance of interest. So far as I know, this is the first case in which interest has been allowed for so long a period. I refer the court in this connection to its own language in Gordon v. United States, (7 Wall., 188.)
    This question must turn entirely upon the wording of the above act of 1872, inasmuch as under the general law the Court of Claims has no authority to allow interest in such a case. (Rev. Stats., § 1091.)
    No doubt Congress had the power to order that interest should be paid, and the existence of such order would have precluded the propriety of judicial criticism thereupon. I submit that no such order has been given by the above act of 1872. The words therein relied upon by the claimants for this purpose are : “And in making such adjustment and settlement the said court shall be governed by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases, giving proper consideration to official acts, if any have heretofore been had in connection with this claim, and without regard to the statute of limitations.” In connection with this the court find “No rules and regulations have heretofore been adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases, except such as may be inferred from the policy of Congress when passing private acts for the relief of various persons. When passing such private acts Congress has allowed interest upon the claim up to the time that the relief was granted.”
    It seems—
    That “rules and regulations” in the above connection refers to the action of the departments under general principles governing “like cases,” and not to the exceptional dealing evidenced by special acts of Congress. Prior legislation for special cases is not included in these words. They are well known to refer to the quasi legislation by heads of departments,- &c., in reference to matters ordinarily coming before them;
    Also, that the court will sua sponte inform itself of the action of the United States by rules and regulations in such cases;
    Therefore, that the above finding of the Court of Claims appears to be inadvertent, inasmuch as it can be seen that “rules and regulations” have been heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases, and that these rules exclude interest unless given in terms by an act of Congress.
    
      
      Mr. W. Penn Clarice, for the appellees:
    The liability of the United States to pay this claim dates bach to the cession of what ivas known as the Northwest Territory by the State of Virginia in 1783, and prior to the adoption of our present Constitution. It grows out of a solemn compact between Virginia and this Government, which compact was invited by the Congress of the Confederation.
    In the light of previous legislation, the Act 8th June, 1872, is to be considered and construed. The learned Solicitor-General, on behalf of the appellants, insists, not only that it is a private act and to be construed most strongly against the appellees, but that it does not acknowledge the claim to be just. He furthermore asserts that, “in order that the Court of Claims should find the claim to be justly due by the United States, it was necessary that some previous statute should have made it so.” In this view I cannot concur. The act itself, to say nothing of previous acts of Congress having reference to revolutionary claims, recognizes the claim as one subsisting against the Government. By it, full jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Claims — not to determine whether the claim is just, but— “to adjust and settle the same,” i. e., ascertain the amount due, and in making such settlement or adjustment the court is required to be “governed b3rthe rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases.” And, in order that the court might be able to make such settlement and adjustment, “all the papers and official documents belonging thereto,” and then before Congress, were referred to that tribunal. Giving the words “ adjust” and “ settle” all their ordinary signification, they mean no more nor less than this, that Congress, recognizing the liability of the United States to pay the claim, and waiving the right of the Government to plead the statute of limitations, instructs the court, upon the papers, to ascertain the amount due, and then to settle it, in the only way a court can settle anything, viz, by the rendition of a judgment. The language used in the act means no more than a merchant or business man would intend when instructing his cashier or clerk to adjust and settle a bill, and in either case the instruction must be regarded as an admission of the justice of the claim. And that it was the purpose of Congress by this enactment to recognize the justice of Colonel Vigo’s claim, and treat it as a subsisting liability against tlie Government, must be evident from the fact that the claim had been barred from prosecution by the act of Congress of August 5, 1790, and could not have been enforced against the United States, even under this special act of 1872, if Congress had not provided that the statute of limitations should be waived or disregarded.
    • It is nest objected by the Solicitor-General that it was not a claim against the United States, for the reason that it had never been allowed by the State of "Virginia. To this it is a sufficient answer to say. that all the papers in the case, which were before Congress and which that body referred to the Court .of Claims, disclosed the fact that the claim had never been allowed by the State of Virginia, and it chose to waive that prerequisite. The Act 8th June, 1872, at least, does not require that the fact of the allowance of the claim by the State of Virginia should be established, and it is, therefore, to be inferred that Congress did not deem the proof of that fact to be essential. The probability is that for some reason, now unknown, the claim never was presented to the State of Virginia, and unless it had been presented and allowed by that State prior to the 24th day of September, 1788, it could not have been allowed at all, as the act of August 5, 1790, excluded claims which had not been allowed by the State prior to the first-mentioned date. It was within the province of Congress to dispense with this proof, and that it did dispense with it is clear from the language of the act referring the case to tho Court of Claims for adjustment and settlement.
    The next ground of objection urged against the judgment below, by the learned representative of the Government, goes to the competency of the papers referred to the Court of Claims as evidence. Among the papers is one purporting to be a report of the “commissioner of revolutionary claims of the State of Virginia,” dated the 16th of December, 1835, (not January 16,1835, as stated in the brief of the Solicitor-General,) favorable to the claim; and we are told that Congress, in referring-this and the other papers to the court, to be used in the adjustment of the claim, “did not give any especial sanction to-such papers.” “They were sent,” says the Solicitor-General, “valeant quantum valeant, to the court, for the purpose of being scrutinized as to both their competency and their weight as evi-deuce.” And as to the report of the commissioner, we are told further on that the court “ expressly decline to determine its authenticity. Its character and contents must, therefore, be rejected from the findings of fact.” This position, it seems to me, is nothing more nor less than an objection to the competency of the testimony, which might have been properly made in the court below, and which cannot be raised for the first time in the appellate tribunal. The record does not show that the testimony was objected to in the court below on the ground of its want of authenticity, and that the objection was overruled -, and unless the record established this fact, the error •of the court would not be apparent. The report of the commissioner of the State of Virginia is embodied in the record as a part of the facts found, and if the court below had not been satisfied in some manner that it was what it purported to be, it would hardly have been regarded as evidence of the statement and admission of the claim by that officer. All of the papers were referred to the court, for the reason that they were' original ancient writings which bore internal evidence of their own authenticity, and which Congress knew could not now be established by proof, all the parties thereto being dead. Hence they were referred to the court, to be used as evidence in the adjustment and settlement of the claim, as the only proof that at this late day could be obtained. Congress having waived all questions as to the competency of the proof by virtually making'it testimony, the courts are precluded from overriding the judgment of its members.
    The second assignment of error, which goes to the allowance of interest, is the most material, and I proceed now to the consideration of that question.
    By the act under which this suit was commenced, full jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Claims to settle and adjust this claim, and in making such adjustment and settlement, the court is required to “ be governed by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settleme?it of like cases, giving proper consideration to official acts, if any have heretofore been had in connection with this claim.” This is the language of the statute, and the question now is, what was the intention and purpose of Congress by its use ? That it means something — that it was used for some purpose — none can well deny. If Congress intended that the Court of Claims should adjust and settle the claim upon the basis of allowing’ only the face of the draft, why not say so in the few words that would have been required to express that purpose, and why require that court, in making the settlement, “ to be governed by the rules and regulations he retofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases ?” In the light of the compact with Virginia and other States, and previous legislation, the meaning of this language i s clear and explicit. Congress knew that all previous revolutionary claims, whether for services rendered or money advanced, had been paid with interest, from the date the funds were furnished, or the services rendered, and it was the intention of those who enacted this statute, to confer upon the court below the authority to render like equal and impartial justice to the claimants in this case — the descendants of one who, though a foreigner, rendered a voluntary service to the troops of Virginia which resulted in untold benefit to this nation. By no other construction can effect be given to the words of the statute, and without this construction the language is meaningless. As I understand the language used, it is the intention of the act that the Court of Claims, in making an adjustment and settlement of the claim, shall do so upon the principles on which similar revolutionary claims have been allowed and paid, which principles have been established by Congress itself.
    What, then, are “the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement” of cases like the one at bar, by which the court below was required to be governed in the adjustment and settlement thereof? As I have shown above, the first law enacted by Congress making provision for the payment of the States for claims growing out of the war of the Revolution, the act of May 7,1787, provided that the accounts should be adjusted on uniform and equitable principles, and the subsequent statute of August 5,1790, enacted after the adoption of our present national Constitution, adopted the same basis of settlement. These and the subsequent legislation of Congress must be the “ rules and regulations heretofore adopted,” to which reference is made in the act of 1872, and by which the court is to be governed in the adjustment and settlement of the claim.
    What, then, are the equitable principles applicable to this case? And the answer naturally is, the amount of the draft, with legal interest from its date up to the time of payment. This is the rule of damages in all such cases, and is the rule established by Congress itself with reference to these revolutionary claims. In the act of 1787, heretofore cited, Congress provided that on the accounts of the States for advances and disbursements made for the use of the United States, “interest shall be allowed at the rate of six per cent, per annum,” agreeably to the resolves of Congress, (1 Laws of the U. S., ed. 1815, 663;) and the fifth section of the act of 1790, in like manner, provided that the balances struck between the States and the United States should also bear interest, (2 Laws of the U. S., ed. 1815, 174.) And this rule has been consistently adhered to ever since in all cases of individual revolutionary claims allowed by Congress. The statutes are full of such cases, and in support of this proposition I shall here refer to a few of the many private acts which have been enacted by Congress for the relief of those who rendered services to the nation in its struggle for independence.
    Citations from the statutes, commencing with the very organization of the Government, and running up to the year 1837, establish the proposition I have heretofore stated, that on claims for money advanced, supplies furnished, and services rendered to the revolutionary cause, legal interest was allowed from the date the funds were advanced, the supplies furnished, or the services rendered. This has been the uniform policy of the Government, as defined by Congress and carried into effect by the executive departments. And this policy has been steadily adhered to by later Congresses. Without going through all the statutes to establish this assertion, I beg leave to cite two acts of comparatively modern date: On the 3d of March, 1847, an act was approved for the relief of the legal representatives of Simon Spaulding, which provided that there be paid to the party named in the act the amount of a final certificate issued to Spaulding for the sum of $760, dated July 28, 1783, together with interest thereon from the 22d of March, 1783, (6 Stat. L., 46.) And on the 18th of August, 1856, an act was approved which directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay to Thomas H. Baird, administrator of the estate of Absalom Baird, a commissioned surgeon in the army of the Bevofation, the sum of $10,074.84, with interest thereon from 27th day of October, 1805, to the 1st day of June, 1S56, and providing for the deduction of a previous payment made to said Spaulding. There may be, and doubtless are, later acts of this character, but deeming the foregoing citations sufficient to establish the principle, I have not thought it necessary to pursue the investigation further.
    Thus Congress has repeatedly and constantly recognized the obligation of the Government, from its earliest period up to a late date, to pay interest on claims growing out of our revolutionary struggle, and the cases cited are the “ official acts,” which this court, in determining the case at bar, is required by the act of 1872, under which the suit is brought, to give “ proper consideration.” And under these “official acts,” in connection with this claim, which, constitute “the rules and regulations heretofore adopted,” and by which this court is required to be governed, the claimants may reasonably insist upon their right to legal interest from December 4, 1779, the date of the draft to Vigo for $8,716, up to the time pf the rendition of the judgment.
    But aside from the contract made with the several States, for which ample consideration was paid by the cession of territory or otherwise, it may be stated as a general proposition that it has been the uniform practice of the Government, sanctioned by numerous statutes, where money has been advanced for the United States, or where drafts drawn by its disbursing-officers have been protested for non-payment, upon the settlement of such claims to allow interest from the time of such advances or the non-payment of such drafts. There are a large number of special statutes making provision for such settlements and the payment of the accruing interest.
    It may be contended, however, that this class of revolutionary claims are not entitled to bear interest until after the same have been settled and a certificate of final settlement issued. Many of the statutes cited above disprove this position, and show that Congress, when providing for the settlement of such claims, undeviatingly authorized the payment of interest from the date of the rendition of the services or the furnishing of the supplies.
    The second answer to the proposition that we are not entitled to interest is that the law of 1872, under which this suit is brought, is the latest expression of the legislative will upon this subject, and must prevail. That act, as I have already shown, contemplates the payment of interest; or, in other words, it requires this court, in the adjustment and settlement of the claim, to be “ governed by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases,” and I have conclusively demonstrated that the “rules and regulations heretofore adopted,” and the “official acts”.which have been had, have recognized and established the right of the claimants in like cases to the interest upon which we insist in this case. Need I cite authorities to prove that where two statutes are conflicting, the one last enacted must be regarded as repealing, by implication, the former one so far as they are inconsistent? No principle of the law is better settled, and none is oftener called into requisition. (Davies v. Fairbarn, 3 How., 636; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass., 537; Commonwealth v/’ Cooley, 10 Pick., 3; Pierpoint v. Crouch, 10 Cal., 315; Norris v. Croclcer, 13 How., 429; Sedgw. on Statute Law, 126.)
    Now, so much of the proviso in the tenth section of the act oí 1863 as prohibits the allowance of interest on the claim now before the court (if the case comes within the class of claims mentioned in that proviso) is utterly repugnant to the act of 1872, under which the court is now acting, which requires the court to be “ governed,” in making its adjustment, “ by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases,” for those rules and regulations, and the official acts referred to in the statute, as I have conclusively shown, do allow interest in all such cases. The language in the act of 1872, just quoted, must mean something, and it can only bear the construction here given to it. This act, then, so far as this case is concerned, repeals by implication the prohibition of the allowance of interest in the former statute, and the position assumed must be overruled, leaviugthe claimants to receive from the hands of this court the same measure of justice that has been heretofore meted out by Congress to other claimants similarly situated.
    
      
      
         Teschmaker’s Case, 22 How., 405 ; Romero’s Case, 1 Wall., 721.
    
   Mr. Justice Miller

delivered the opinion of the court.

The claim of the State of Virginia to dominion over that region of country called the territory northwest of the Ohio Eiver, which is now filled with a population of many millions and divided into five States of the Union, was not undisputed in the days when that State was a province of Great Britain. The French had numerous settlements there, and the government of Great Britain claimed, both by the acquisition of Canada and by settlement, a large part of that loosely-defined country. They had their military posts there as well as peaceful villages. The Indians also denied all right of the Colony of Virginia to rule over them, and some of the most warlike tribes of that race were known to occupy, with claim of exclusive right, the largest part of the country.

During the revolutionary war General George Rogers Clarke, acting under a commission from the State of Virginia, fitted out a warlike expedition, and starting from the falls of the Ohio, now called Louisville, made his appearance suddenly before the military post of Kaskaskia, then held by the British, and captured it and several other posts, and in the course of one of the most romantic campaigns which tbe history of that region down to this day affords, effectually settled the right of Virginia to supremacy in that quarter.

General Clarke was not very vigorously supported by Virginia in this enterprise, for it occurred during the war of the Revolution, and that commonwealth, as she now called herself, was engaged in more pressing affairs. It seems, however, that the State had in New Orleans an agent on whom Clarke drew several drafts for funds to aid him in the matter, most of which were paid.

In the year 1778 he drew one of these drafts in favor of Francis Vigo for $8,616, which was not paid, for want of funds. This draft was given for supplies furnished to Clarke’s regiment, and has never yet been paid. It does not appear that the State of Virginia ever denied the justice of this debt, but by the finding of the Court of Claims, from which this record comes to us on appeal, it does appear that an officer of that State, called the commissioner of revolutionary claims, examined into this one in the year 1835 and adjusted it, including interest, at $32,654.85.

Iu the course of the negotiation for the relinquishment of title by the States to their outlying territories, one of the resolutions passed by the Continental Congress, October 16, 1780, 6 Journal of Congress, 213, was, that when so ceded, “ the necessary and reasonable expenses which any particular State shall have incurred since the commencement of the present war, in subduing any British post, or in maintaining forts or garrisons within and for the defense, or in acquiring any part of the territory that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States, ■shall be re-imbursed.”

The debt represented by this draft comes directly within the language of this resolution, which was repeated by the Virginia legislature in the act of cession.

But by the Act August 5,1790, by which Congress constituted a board of commissioners to adjust all claims of the several States against the United States, there was a provision that no claim of a citizen of a State should be admitted as a claim against the United States which had not been allowed by the State before the 24th day of September, 1788. As the claim of Vigo on account of this draft had not then been allowed by the State of Virginia, this proviso has remained as a perpetual bar to its payment or allowance by those commissioners or by ■any other officer of the Government.

Congress, however, by many private acts has authorized the payment of other claims similarly barred. This claim has been constantly pressed upon the attention of Congress by the heirs of Vigo, until finally the case was, by the Act June 8,1872, referred to the Court of Claims, in the following language:

“ The claim of the heirs and legal representatives of Col. Francis Vigo, deceased, late of Terre Haute, Ind., for money and supplies furnished the troops under command of General George Rogers Clarke, in the year 1778, during the revolution^ ary war, be, and the same hereby is, referred, along with all the papers and official documents belonging thereto, to the Court of Claims, with full jurisdiction to adjust and settle the ■same; and in making such adjustment and settlement the said court shall be governed by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in the settlement of like cases, giving proper consideration to official acts, if any have heretofore been had in connection with this claim, and without regard to the statutes of limitations.”

We entertain no doubt that the claim was a just claim in the hands of Vigo against the State of Virginia, and that, under the resolutions of the Congress of the United States and the State of Virginia, it belonged to that class of claims which Congress had assumed on receiving from that State the cession of the territory northwest of the Ohio. The wisdom of the act ■of Congress of 1790, in fixing a date after which the States could not make allowances of claims which should bind the United States, is apparent; and nothing could be more just or honorable than that Congress, when appealed to for a relaxation of this salutary general rule of exclusion, in favor of the private citizen who had a meritorious case, should grant relief. It seems clear to us that in the act of 1872 Congress did mean to remove this bar of the lapse of time, and to authorize the Court of Claims, if they found the claim to be a just one, to settle and allow it.

That the allowance of the principal sum was right, we think beyond question, but the allowance of interest admits of discussion.

It has been the general rule of the officers of Government in adjusting and allowing unliquidated and disputed claims against the United States to refuse to give interest. That this rule is sometimes at variance with that which governs the acts of private citizens in a court of justice would not authorize us to depart from it in this case. The rule, however, is not uniform, and especially is it not so in regard to claims allowed by special acts of Congress, or referred by such acts to some Department or officer for settlement.

The very careful brief of counsel for claimant has with much labor collected numerous cases in which interest has been allowed by Congress in the adjustment of disputed claims. The fifth section of the act of August 5,1790, already referred to, directed the commissioners who under that act were to settle the claims of the States against the General Government to allow interest, and but for the bar of time in that act this case would have come under that statute. The act under which the Court, of Claims took jurisdiction of this case directed it to be “governed by the rules and regulations heretofore adopted by the United States in settlement of like cases.” This is a like case-to those in which interest was to be allowed by the act of 1790;.

The bill of exchange drawn by Clarke in favor of Vigo is an instrument which, by the commercial usage of all nations, bears interest after due. It also evidences the claim as a liquidated sum. There has never been any dispute about the amount, due if the claim was legal. And though the United States is not directly bound by the instrument, yet, if they choose to remove' the bar of time, as the act of 1872 does in express terms, and' it is found that the claim is one which the Government has by law agreed to pay, we see no reason why it should not be paid in full, with all its legal incidents, as the State of Virginia should and would have paid it had not the liability been assumed by the United States when she received the cession of that immense country — a consideration ample enough for this and all other obligations she assumed in that contract.

The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Clifford

dissenting :

I dissent from so much of the opinion of the court as allows interest to the claimant. Unless where the contract is express to that effect, the United States are not liable to pay interest. Interest should never be allowed on old claims, where payment has been deferred, because the accounting-officers of the Treasury were of the opinion that further legislation was necessary to authorize their allowance, unless the new law clearly provides for the payment of interest as well as principal.

Mr. Justice Hunt concurred in this dissent.

Mr. Justice Davis did not hear the argument in this case, and took no part in its decision.