Case ID: mich_271/html/0274-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Butzel, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

RAK v. LAKE.
    1. Appeal and Error — Automobiles—Contributory Negligence— Directed Verdict — Evidence—Inferences.
    On defendant’s appeal from denial of Ms motion for a directed verdiet because of alleged contributory negligence of driver of plaintiff’s car imputable to plaintiff, Supreme Court must accept testimony and inferences most favorable to plaintiff.
    
      2. Automobiles — Directed Verdict — Contributory Negligence — Question for Jury — Intersection.
    On defendant’s appeal from denial of his motion for a directed verdict, the question of contributory negligence of plaintiff’s driver held, for jury where there is evidence to support his claim that, although he had observed defendant before either reached icy street intersection, plaintiff’s driver accelerated his speed only after he saw defendant slow down and believed he was going to stop, collision occurred after plaintiff’s ear had more than half crossed the street on which defendant was driving and evidence shows collision would not have occurred had latter remained on the right side of the street.
    Appeal from Jackson; Williams (Benjamin), J.
    Submitted January 25, 1935.
    (Docket No. 155, Calendar No. 38,260.)
    Decided April 8, 1935.
    Case by John Bak against William H. Lake for personal injuries received in collision of automobiles at an intersection. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.
    
      James R. Breakey, Jr., for plaintiff.
    
      Whiting & Kleinstiver, for defendant.
   Butzel, J.

On February 6, 1931, between 5:30 and 6 p. m., John Bak was riding in a Ford car driven by Ms step-brotber, Joe Porabiacki, in a westerly direction along the northerly side of Chapin street in Jackson, Michigan. At the same time Dr. William H. Lake was driving his car in a northerly direction on Pleasant street, towards the intersection with Chapin street. Chapin street extends east and west and is paved with concrete, except between the rails of a single track car line in the center of the street, which is paved with brick. It is 32 feet wide from curb to curb. Pleasant street extends north and south, is uneven and unpaved, and is 26 feet 3 inches wide from curb to curb. Tbe testimony indicates that Lake drove bis car across Chapin street at tbe intersection, and struck Rak’s car after tbe latter bad passed more than half way through tbe intersection; that bad Lake’s car in crossing remained on tbe right side of Pleasant street, tbe accident would not have occurred.

Defendant appeals from a substantial judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff. Tbe sole question on appeal is whether tbe judge should not have taken tbe case from tbe jury and directed a verdict in favor of tbe defendant, as requested, on tbe ground that tbe driver of plaintiff’s car was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in not coming to a stop when, as claimed by tbe defendant, be did not know whether defendant would be able to stop or control his car on account of tbe icy condition of tbe streets. There was considerable snow and ice in spots on both streets at tbe time of tbe accident, particularly at tbe intersection. There is some testimony to indicate that plaintiff could have stopped bis car in time to avoid tbe accident and that be knew, or should have known, that tbe ice and snow on tbe roads would make it difficult for Lake to come to a stop.

This is not a case where two drivers approach an intersection from different directions on icy pavement without looking or paying any attention to one another’s rights, and thus collide at tbe intersection. Porabiacki, driver of tbe car in which plaintiff was riding, claims that be was about 15 feet east of tbe east curb line of Pleasant street when be first observed defendant’s car, which was then 50 feet south of tbe south rail of tbe street car track on Chapin street; that just as be was about to enter tbe intersection, be observed defendant’s car a second time, and that defendant was then about 30 feet south of the south rail of the car line; that he saw that defendant had slowed down, and believed that he was going to stop and permit the Ford car to drive by, and he therefore proceeded to cross the intersection. Although Porabiacki’s testimony was contradictory, and in fact inconsistent with a written statement made by him immediately after the accident, in determining whether defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, we must accept the testimony and inferences most favorable to the plaintiff. Grodi v. Mierow, 244 Mich. 511. There being some testimony to support Porabiacki’s claim that he accelerated his speed only after he saw defendant slow down and believed he was going to stop, and in view of the further fact that plaintiff was more than half way across the intersection when the accident occurred, so that there would have been no collision had defendant remained on the right side of the street, it was for the jury to determine whether driver of plaintiff’s car acted in a reasonably prudent manner, giving proper attention to the condition of the road. See Harris v. Bernstein, 204 Mich. 685, and Grodi v. Mierow, supra, where the facts were somewhat similar although there was no icy condition of the streets.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.

Potter, C. J., and Nelson Sharpe, North, Fead, Wiest, Bushnell, and Edward M. Sharpe, JJ., concurred.