Case ID: ala_39/html/0440-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "STONE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ex Parte CAIN.
    [PETITION POR HABRAS CORPUS.]
    1. Exemption of “ ministers of religion” from military service, under act of congress approved February 17, 1864. — A “ minister of religion, authorized to preach according to the rules of his^church,” and “ regularly-employed in the discharge of his ministerial duties” on the 17th February, 1864, is exempted from military service by tbe 10th section, of the act of congress approved on that day; and his right of exemption is not forfeited by the fact that he receives no compensation for his clerical services, and is engaged in a secular pursuit as the means of subsisting himself and his family.
    2. Jurisdiction of State courts to discharge enrolled conscript from, custody of Confederate States officer. — The State courts have jurisdiction, on habeas corpus, to discharge from the custody of an enrolling officer of the Confederate States a person who, though held as a conscript, is exempted from military service, as “ a minister of religion authorized to preach according to the rules of his church,” by the 10th section of the act of congress approved February 17th, 1864.
    Application by Robert Gain, for tbe writ of habeas cprjous, by wbicb be sought to procure bis discharge from tbe custody of Oapt. John M. Slaughter, tbe enrolling officer of tbe Confederate States for tbe county of Tuskaloosa, who bad arrested him on tbe 10th August, 1864, and held bim as a conscript under the acts of congress. Tbe petition was first presented, on tbe 11th August, 1864, to the Hon. Wm. S. Mudd, judge of tbe third judicial circuit, who, on tbe bearing under tbe writ, refused to discharge tbe petitioner, and remanded bim to tbe custody of tbe enrolling officer. Tbe petitioner now renews bis application to this court, and attaches to bis petition, as an exhibit, a certified copy of tbe proceedings bad on tbe bearing before Judge Mudd. Tbe petitioner claimed to be exempt from military service, on tbe ground that be was “ a minister of religion, authorized to preach according to tbe rules of bis church, and regularly employed in tbe discharge of bis ministerial duties.” Tbe enrolbng officer, in bis return to tbe writ, .denied tbe petitioner’s right of exemption on tbe ground specified; asserted bis right to detain him as a conscript, under the orders of his superior officers, and the authority of instructions from the bureau of conscription at Eichmond, because he was “ not exclusively dedicated to the ministry, •did not make preaching the business of his lifeand insisted that the judicial officers of the State had no jurisdiction to interfere with his custody of the petitioner. On the evidence adduced at the hearing, Judge Mudd decided, that the petitioner did not make out his claim of exemption on the ground of his clerical profession; to which ruling and decision the petitioner reserved a bill of exceptions.
    Wffi. E. Smith, for the petitioner.
    E. H. Maeb, for the Confederate States.
   STONE, J.

“ Every minister of religion, authorized to 'preach according to the rules of his church, and who, at the passage of this act, should be regularly employed in the discharge of his ministerial duties,” is exempted from ■military service in the armies of the Confederate States. Act of congress approved February 17th, 1864, section 10, subd. 3. The proof in this case is clear, full, and convincing, that on the 17th of February, 1864, for many years preceding, and ever afterwards, the petitioner was a minister of religion, being regularly ordained, in the Primitive Baptist church, and was regularly employed in the discharge of his ministerial duties. Neither this court, nor any other authority, judicial or executive, in this government, is a hierarchy, clothed with the power of determining the orthodoxy of any religious sect or denomination. It does not vary the question, in the present case, that Mr. Cain belonged to a sect of religionists, who perform ministerial labor gratuitously; and that therefore he resorted to some secular employment, as a means of subsisting himself and his family. If regularly employed as a minister, the fact that, in the interval between his appointments, he pursued some other vocation, which did not, according to the rules of his church, disqualify him for the sacred functions of the ministry, cannot take his exemption from him. The language of the act of congress is, “regularly employed.” The word regularly means, according to rule — in uniform order — methodically. It is not the synonym of continuously. Mr. Cain was employed in the discharge of his ministerial duties regularly — according to rule — and was, therefore, exempt from military service, under both the letter and the spirit of the act of congress.

The State courts have jurisdiction of the question presented in this case. Mr. Cain, as we have shown above, “ stands absolutely and unconditionally exempt from military service, because he belongs to [a] sect or class which the act of congress declares operates an exemption.” The enrolling officer has erroneously applied Ms authority to a person not within its scope.-Ex parte Hill, 38 Ala. 429, 458.

The counsel engaged in this cause have agreed to a state of facts, and have consented that a final judgment may be rendered, without awaiting a return to the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, under the proof, is entitled to his discharge; and the writ of habeas corpus is ordered to issue, unless the counsel engaged are content to apply to the judge below for the relief they seek, as herein indicated.