Case ID: f-appx_711/html/0420-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gilbert Lee MEDINA, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-10159
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 12, 2018  Honolulu, Hawaii
    Filed February 14, 2018
    
      Gregg Paris Yates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ — Office of the US Attorney, Honolulu, HI, for Plaintiff-Appellee
    John Schum, Attorney, Law Office of John Schum, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, CLIFTON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

After a jury trial, Gilbert Medina was found guilty of multiple offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment. Medina argues that the district court allowed improper witness testimony and that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. We affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed testimony about an effort to collect Medina’s drug debt. See United States v. Preston, 873 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2017). While the personal knowledge requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 602 does not allow a witness to “speculate, guess, or voice suspicions,” it does allow “opinions and inferences grounded in observations and experience.” United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Evid. 602. At trial, a coconspirator testified about her knowledge of and involvement with the drug conspiracy, including delivering narcotics to Medina and her attempt to collect money from him for prior drug transactions. Her testimony was based upon “inferences grounded in observations and experience,” and was not improper. See Whittemore, 776 F.3d at 1082 (citation omitted). Moreover, because the testimony was “offered against an opposing party and ... was made by the party’s cocon-spirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy,” it was not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony about drugs found ht another coconspirator’s house. Along with Medina’s written confession, up to nine packages sent between Medina and the coconspirator from December 2012 to March 2013, and other evidence in the record, the testimony was relevant to whether the coeonspirator was Medina’s drug source. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. The coconspirator did not need to be named in Medina’s indictment in order for the testimony about the drugs to be admitted. See United States v. Sangmeister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1982).

Finally, any improper testimony was harmless error. See United States v. Edwards, 235 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Such decisions will be reversed for an abuse of discretion only if such nonconsti-tutional error more likely than not affected the verdict.”). The jury heard testimony from six coconspirators, testimony about Medina’s signed confession, and a recording of Médina planning a drug transaction. It is clear that any error did not affect the verdict.

2. Medina’s challenges to his life sentence also fail. At every stage of the proceedings the Government explained that it would seek a 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement if it had the necessary state court documents, and it updated Medina and the district court on its progress in acquiring the documents. The Government’s effort to seek the enhanced sentence was not vindictive or retaliatory.

Medina’s claim that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment is foreclosed by our precedent. See United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a drug conviction); see also Miller v. Gammie, 336 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a three-judge panel is bound by circuit precedent unless “the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.