Case ID: wis_235/html/0675-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Fairchild, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Legault, Respondent, vs. City of Owen, Appellant.
    
      September 12 —
    October 8, 1940.
    
    
      For the appellant there was a brief by Robert J. Cunningham of Janesville and Richard F. Gaffney of Owen, and oral argument by Mr. Cunningham.
    
    For the respondent there was a brief by Rush, Devos & Skroch of Neillsville, and oral argument by A. L. Devos.
    
   Fairchild, J.

A county adopting the county system of relief “assumes complete responsibility” for relief and support of the poor. Washburn v. Bayfield County, ante, p. 215, 292 N. W. 912. It is considered that case rules this.

The objection that the adoption of the county system of poor relief was not legal was properly disposed of by the trial court. We agree with the conclusion in its memorandum decision “that the county of Clark, within which the said city of Owen is located, at the time the hospitalization and the surgical and medical treatment was furnished was on the county system of pauper relief.” The county board of that county on May 25, 1938, according to the records of its county clerk, decided that on June 1, 1938, that county would “go entirely on the county system of relief.” The resolution was adopted by a clear majority of the members of the board and placed the county under the county system of poor relief.

The application of sec. 49.18, Stats., relied upon by the respondent, is determined by the system of poor relief in existence. The mayor of the city of Owen could not, by his act, place an obligation on that city which under the law could be the obligation only of Clark county. The chairman of the county board after investigation refused to recognize the claim as a proper one. The conclusion that any claim which might exist would be against Clark county takes out of the case any basis for liability on the part of the city. Sec. 49.18 merely authorizes the proper executive officer to act for the governmental unit he represents when that unit has a liability to discharge.

By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.