Case ID: misc_43/html/0376-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Scott, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Louis Finkelstein, Appellant, v. Daniel Meenan, Respondent.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
    March, 1904.)
    Discontinuance upon payment of costs — Leave refused a plaintiff where granting it might possibly give him an unfair advantage.
    A plaintiff brought an action in the Municipal Court of the city of Mew York for a sum greater than $250 and that action was at the instance of the defendant removed to the City Court of said city under L. 1902, ch. 580, § 3, upon the ground that the damages claimed exceeded $250. Afterwards the plaintiff brought a second action in the Municipal Court, on the same claim, for $249 and thereafter asked of but was refused by the City Court leave to discontinue the first action on payment of costs.
    Held, that leave to discontinue the City Court action was properly refused as the conduct of the plaintiff indicated a determination to try the case in the Municipal Court ,and justified a suspicion that this determination rested upon the belief, ill founded if entertained, that the defendant would be at a greater disadvantage in that court than in the City Court.
    Appeal from an order of the City Court of the city of ¡New York, denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to discontinue. This action was brought in the Municipal Court of said city to recover $266.50, but 'was removed into the Oity Court of said city. The second action was brought in the Municipal Court to recover $249 on the same claim, and was between the same parties.
    Herman Gettner, for appellant.
    Cornelius Huth, for respondent.
   Scott, J.

It is undoubtedly the general rule that a plaintiff may discontinue on payment of costs where no counterclaim has been interposed and no interest of third parties has intervened. The leave to discontinue still, however, rests within the sound discretion of the court and may properly be denied where it appears that to grant it would enable' the plaintiff to gain an unfair advantage. Kruger v. Persons, 52 App. Div. 50. It is quite obvious that i-n commencing his second action in the Municipal Court the plaintiff reduced the damages he claimed for the purpose of preventing a removal of the cause into the City Court. By thus bringing the second action and moving to discontinue the present, even at the expense of paying costs, he indicated a very positive determination to try the action in the particular court in which both actions were originally brought. Those were circumstances which justified the suspicion which the judge below evidently entertained, that this determination rested upon the belief on the part of the plaintiff that the defendant would be at a greater disadvantage in the Municipal Court than in the City Court. We make no doubt that this belief, if entertained, was ill founded, but the plaintiff did nothing to remove the impression of unfairness which the peculiar circumstances of the case suggested. The order appealed from gives the plaintiff leave to renew, and upon such renewal he can show, if the facts warrant it, that the doubt suggested as to the good faith of his practice is unfounded. This is the proper course for him to pursue.

Freedman, P. J., and Blanchard, J., concur.

Order affirmed, with costs.