Case ID: f-appx_155/html/0421-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marvin Juan Sanchez ROSALES, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 05-10780
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    D.C. Docket No. 04-00178-CR-CG.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Sept. 23, 2005.
    
      David Andrew Sigler, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Kristen Gartman Rogers, Frederick W. Tiemann, Carlos Alfredo Williams Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Marvin Juan Sanchez Rosales appeals his 41-month sentence for illegally reentering the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a)-(b). The district court enhanced Rosales’ sentence based upon his previous deportation for a crime of violence. Rosales now appeals this sentence.

Because Rosales failed to object to his sentence, we review this issue for plain error. United States v. Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d 960, 961 (11th Cir.2005), petition for cert. filed, (No. 05-5141, July 1, 2005).

Rosales argues that the sentencing enhancements for prior convictions as authorized by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(b)(l)-(2) are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court, in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), recently questioned its previous holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). In Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, the Supreme Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) “is a penalty provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime. Consequently, neither the statute nor the Constitution requires the Government to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in the indictment.” Rosales contends that in light of Shepard, the holding of Almendarez-Torres is no longer good law, and the use of the fact of a prior conviction must now be alleged in the indictment and proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant as part of a plea agreement. Rosales concedes, however, that we have rejected this argument post-Shepard.

In Shepard, a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that, while a dispute over whether a burglary was a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act could be “described as a fact about a prior conviction, it [was] too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones[ v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) ] and Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.E.2d 435 (2000) ], to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to resolve the dispute.” Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1262.

In United States v. Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1307, 1316 n. 3 (llth Cir.2005) (per curiam), we noted that although Shepard “may arguably cast doubt on the future prospects of Almendarez-Torres’s holding regarding prior convictions, the Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Almendarez-Torres. As a result, we must follow Almendarez-Torres. ” Indeed, in considering a challenge to an enhancement pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326, we held that “Almendarez-Torres remains the law until the Supreme Court determines that Almendarez-Torres is not controlling precedent.” Orduno-Mireles, 405 F.3d at 963.

Because the Supreme Court has not overruled Almendarez-Torres, it controls the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in enhancing Rosales’ sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). Therefore, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.