Case ID: fla_17/html/0123-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "The Chief Justice", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Sanderson's Administrators, Appellants, vs. Thomas and Livingston for use of Inglis, Appellees.
    1. Cauáe of action on merchant’s account accrued against intestate in January, 1868; intestate died in Jyne, 1871, and letters of administration issued in November, 1871; suit commenced in August, 1876, plea of statute of limitations which was passed February 27, 1872; no allegation that claim had been presented, under the statute of non-claim, to the administrators; on demurrer to the plea, Held: That the plea was good.
    
      Prolixity or superfluous statement of facts leadlug to a single conclusion of law, does not necessarily render a plea demurrable for duplicity.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.
    The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.
    
      Fleming & Darnel and Ilartridge for Appellants.
    The first ground of demurrer we did not understand as seriously urged on the hearing.
    . The facts set forth in each plea form but one connected proposition and defense.
    “No matters, however multifarious, will operate to make a pleading double that together constitute but one connected proposition or, entire point.” Stephens on Pleadings, page 262.
    If it should be held that the last clause of the 8th plea —that the action was not commenced within six months after the approval of the Statute of Limitations, was immaterial — it would only be rejected as surplusage, and cannot be held to make the plea double, because it could not be construed to be a separate defense of itself.
    “Matter immaterial cannot operate to make a pleading double.” Stephens5 Pleadings, page 259.
    The 8th and 9th pleas aforesaid are drawn under the act of the Legislature of the State of Florida, entitled “An Act .of Limitations in Civil Actions,” approved February 27th, 1872, (Ph. Laws, ch. 1869,) and more particularly under the latter clause of the 15th section of said act, which is as follows:
    “If a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause .of action survives, an action may be commenced against his executors or administrators after the expiration of that time and within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary, or of administration.”
    It was contended on the other side that the said J. P. Sanderson having died, as is shown by the plea, before the passage of the Statute of Limitations now in force, that the statute has no application to this action, or, at any rate, the time limited by the statute does not commence to run until the date of the act.
    "We think that this objection is fully met by the construction of the statute by this court, in Spencer vs. McBride, 14 Fla., 403, where the court use the following language:
    “The proposition that the act relates only to rights of action to accrue in the future is in conflict with the express letter of the statute and the manifest intention of the Legislature. It would make the statute perpetuate in part the very evil it was conceived to remedy. It is too clear for argument that if the limitation thus enacted refers only to rights of action that aré to accrue in future, then all the rights of action that have accrued in the past are without limitation under this act, and the suspending act of 1861 is still in force as to them.55
    And again, “The general power of the Legislature over the subject of limitation of actions is too well settled to admit of question. It is also well settled that statutes of this character apply to rights of action existing at the time of their passage, -provided a reasonable time is left after the passage of the act for the party to exercise the right before it would operate as a bar.55
    In Ross vs. Duval, 13 Peters, the Supreme Court of the United States use this language: “It is a sound principle that where a statute of limitation prescribes the time with in which suit shall be brought, or an act done, and a part of the time has elapsed, effect may be given to the act, and the time yet to run being a reasonable part of the whole time, will be considered the limitation in the mind of the Legislature in such cases”
    The intention of the Legislature in framing the 15th section of the act of February 27, 1872, as it applies to claims against,the estates of deceased persons, was doubtless to enlarge the time limited by the statute independent of this section for such period as shall exist between the expiration of the time for commencing the action, as generally provided, and the expiration of one year from the date of the issuing of letters of administration on the estate, if such, in-teravl shall exist.
    In the case‘at bar, the claim accrued as set up in the 9th plea on January 9, 1868, and the four years expiring January 9, 1872, it would have come under the 19th section, and the time limited.by the statute have run six months after its approval to August 27 1872, but for the provision of the 15th section, which extends» it still further, reaching to November 7, 1872, one year after the issuing of letters of administration, being eight months and eleven days after the passage of the statute of limitations, and two months and eleven days longer than the period held by this court, in Spencer vs. McBride, to be a reasonable time given after the passage of the act within which to commence the action.
    It was contended by the appellees that the defendants administrators are trustees of all creditors of the estate, and come within the class excepted' from the operation of the statute by the 20th section.
    And in support of the proposition that administrators are trustees cite McDonald, administrator, vb. Bogue, 14 Fla., 363.
    The 20th section, above referred to enacts “that the act shall not apply with respect to any monies or property held or collected by any officer or trustee or his sureties.55 To give the 20th section the construction contended for by the appellees, would be repugnant to, and in effect nullify section 15, which expressly names administrators, and the time within which an action, having accrued against the intestate in his lifetime and not barred at the time of his death, may be commenced against such administrators, and would be in violation of the following rule of interpretation laid down in Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, &c., 144, as established by the American courts:
    “In the construction of a statute every part of it must be viewed in connection with the whole, so as to make all its parts harmonize, if practicable, and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each.55
    * “It. is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended any part of' a statute to be without meaning.55 Cites in support of the rule, Ogden vs. Strong, 2 Paine R., 584; 1 Kent Com., 162; People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532.
    Although an administrator may, in some instances, occupy the position of a trustee as to a specific property or fund held for creditors, certainly the popular and received import of the word trustee, as used in the statute, is not administrator, nor are the words synonymous in their popular or received import, and it seems to us that it would be a forced construction to interpret the word trustee, in the ’ 20th section, to mean administrator, and thereby antagonize the 20th section to the 15th section of the act.
    If, on the contrary, we give the word trustee its popular and received import, we harmonize the different portions of the statute, and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each.
    Again, the language of the 20th section refers to some specific property or fund in the hands of a trustee, and by him held for the benefit of his cestui que trust, and even though it should be held that the term trustees included administrator, it would only apply to an action to reach some specific property or money in the hands of the administrator held for particular creditors.
    Let us now examine the case in 14 Fla., (McDonald vs. Bogue,) above referred to, and relied on by appellees.
    There was an attempt in that ease to construe the statute of limitations of February, 1872,- the suit having been commenced more than a year anterior to the passage of that act, and it is there decided, reaffirming Hart vs. Bostwick, 14 Fla., 172, that there was no statute of limitations in force at the time that the suit was commenced.
    It seems to us that the decision in the above cause sustains us. Though not positively deciding as the statute of 1872 was not involved in the case, it seems very strongly intimated by the court that, in an ordinary action at law, the statute of limitations may properly be pleaded against administrators, the decision being based upon the fact that McDonald, the administrator, held a fund which had been raised from the sale-of the intestate’s property for paying certain particular claims which had been presented within the two years admitted, and a dividend paid thereon. A very different state of facts from the case at bar, where there is no particular fund held by the administrator which is sought to be reached, but an ordinary action at law, not commenced within the time limited by the statute.
    If it were held that administrators 'are trustees, so that no statute1' of limitations could run in their favor ’against creditors, even though expressly named therein, the same principle would apply to the requirement, likewise a statutory provision, that ¿1 claims must be presented within two years after the publication of the administrator’s notice to creditors, or the same will be barred.
    
      Angus Patterson for Appellee.
    This is a suit brought by'the defendants in appeal upon an open account made by John P. Sanderson, in his lifetime, and was presented to his administrators, the plaintiffs in appeal, within the two years after notice required by the statute of non claim.
    
    There were several pleas filed, to which demurrers were interposed and sustained, and to these decisions the defendants, plaintiffs in appeal, submitted by pleading over. Ellison vs. Allen, 8 Fla., 206; Johnson vs. Pensacola and Per-dido E. E. Co., 16 Fla., 623.
    There is no bill of exceptions. Eule 97, Thom. Dig., 351; Eobinson vs. Mathews, 16 Fla., 319; City of Jacksonville vs. Lawson, 16 Fla., 321; Proctor vs. Hart, 5 Fla., 465; see, also, 5 Peters, 199; 4 How., TJ. S., 298; 8 Fla., 14 and 16; 3 Fla., 110.
    As to the facts and the merits of the case there is no dispute.
    The defendants, plaintiffs in appeal, rely mainly upon the statute of limitations.
    John P. Sanderson died in the year 1871, and notice to debtors and creditors was given by publication in the year 1871, and the claim in this case was presented in due time. The claim was not barred at the death of the intestate, as there wjas no statute of limitations in force in this State. Hart vs. Bostwick and wife, 14 Fla., 162; McDonald, administrator, vs. Bogue, 14 Fla., 363.
    The statute of limitation passed in the year *1872, the only statute of limitation in force, does not apply "to monies or property held or collected by any officer or trustee, or his sureties.” See acts of 1872, Laws of Florida, ch. 1869, sec. 20, last clause.
    An administrator is a trustee, and holds the proceeds or moneys of the estate in trust — first, to pay the debts; second, to pay the legacies; third, to distribute the residue; and therefore the statute does not bar the claim of a creditor who has presented his claim as the law directs. Me-Donald, Adm’r vs. Bogue, 14 Fla., 363; Haynes, Adm’r". vs. Bessellien et al., Ark., 499; Thom. Dig., 206; par. 3; McHardy et al. vs. McHardy’s Ex’rs, 7 Fla., 301, and cases cited, 313, 314 and 312 of the opinion.
    The administrator is also an officer, (2 Bl. Com. margin, 496; 2 Bouv. L. D., 85,) and until he performs all his duties as such officer, and is discharged, the Statute of Limitations will not bar the claim of any one entitled to the moneys in his hands as such officer. Thom. Dig., 207, par. 7; Thom. Dig., 211, sec. 11, par. 1.
    The 15th section of the Statute of Limitations doeB not apply to this case, because the administration had been long going on before the statute was passed.
   The Chief Justice

delivered the opinion of the court.

This cause was heard below before a referee in Duval county.

John P. Sanderson died June 29, 1871. Letters of administration were issued to appellants November 7, 1871. This action was assumpsit, commenced by summons in August, 1876, upon an itemized account for goods sold, the last item of which is dated January 9, 1868.

There was a declaration filed, to which several pleas were pleaded by defendants, after which the declaration was amended, to which the same matters, in other form, were pleaded by defendants.

The first plea was a general denial of indebtedness, upon which plaintiff took issue. Six additional pleas were filed, to all of which plaintiff demurred (except the sixth plea), and the demurrers sustained. The "sixth plea” does not appear to have been disposed of, as far as can be discovered.

Defendants afterwards filed two additional pleas, numbered eight and nine.

The 8th plea alleged that Mr. Sanderson died June 29, 1871, before the expiration of four years after the cause of action accrued; that letters of administration were issued November 7, 1871; that this suit was not commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued, nor within one year after the letters were issued, nor within six months after the approval of the Act of Limitations of February 7, 1872.

The 9th plea set forth the date of the accruing of the cause of action, the death of Sanderson, the issuing of letters November 7, 1871, and that the suit was not commenced within four years after the letters of administration were issued.

The plaintiff demurred to these pleas: 1, for duplicity; 2, the statute does not bar the action against defendants as administrators or as trustees; 3, the Act of Limitations, of February 27, 1872, does not apply to this action; 4, the statute of non-claim was the only 'statute of limitation in force.

The referee sustained the demurrer, and the cause being submitted, judgment was rendered for plaintiff, which was recorded in the Circuit Court, and the defendants appealed.

The appellants assign for error the judgment sustaining the demurrer, and overruling the eighth and ninth pleas.

The act of February 27, 1872, limiting the time for commencing civil suits, provides, in section 10, that actions “for any article charged in a store account shall not be barred until four years,” and must be commenced within that time after the cause of' action shall have accrued. Counsel agree that this is a suit upon a “store account.”

Section 15 provides a limitation of the time for commencing actions by and against executors and administrators, and that “if a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced against his executors or administrators after the expiration of that time, and- within one year after the issuing of letters testamentary or of administration?’ By section 19, all actions not barred by statute before the approval of the act, are not affected by the limitations of the act until six months after its approval.

It was urged on the argument, for appellees, that the general statutes of limitation did not apply to the circumstances of this case because of the operation of the “statute of non-claim?’ It must be remarked, however, that there is no allegation in the declaration, and no admission in the eighth and ninth pleas, that the claim had been “presented” to the administrators otherwise than by the commencement of this suit. If it was intended to present this question, some facts should have been 'stated in the pleadings upon which the point can arise. The point stated by counsel is, that after a claim is presented to the administrator, the latter, having the assets in charge, is a trustee as to all persons entitled to any share or payment out of such assets. But there is nothing here informing us that this claim has ever been so presented. The statute of non-claim, therefore, does not enter into this case.

The cause of action accrued in 1868. Sanderson died in 1871, and letters were issued in November of that year. The cause of action was not barred at the date of the act of 1872, because there was no statute limiting the time for commencing suit then in existence. As to all classes of action not barred^ but which would be barred by the terms of •the act of 1872, the time for bringing suit was limited to six months after its passage and approval, to-wit: by August 27, 1872. '

This was held by the court in Spencer vs. McBride, 14 Fla., 403.

This suit was commenced in August, 1876, and it is obvious that it was not commenced until long after the statutory period of limitation, more than four years and six months after the cause of action had accrued having elapsed, and no intervening disability affecting the question.

The pleas do not appear to be liable to demurrer for duplicity. Both show 'that the suit was not commenced within the time limited by law. Prolixity or superfluity of statement does not necessarily render the pleas double.

The referee erred in sustaining the demurrer to the 8th and 9th pleas to the declaration, and the judgment must be reversed with otosts.

Note. — Mr. Justice Westcott did not sit at thé hearing of this cause.