Case ID: scl_26/html/0010-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Evans, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

S. W. Bentley ads. D. Reynolds.
    Any words occasioning actual damage to one, are actionable, and it is not necessary that they should he defamatory.
    
      Sed, this doctrine, however, must he taken subject to the limitation, that the injury complained of must not he the unlawful acts of others, because they are answerable themselves, and the damage sustained must be the immediate consequence of the defendant’s words.
    Before Evans, J., at Union, Spring Term, 1839.
    This was a special action on the case. There was a demurrer, which bad been overruled by Judge Gantt, at the extra Court the week before. I did not, in consequence, look into the declaration, but tried the case on its merits, which will be disclosed by the evidence. The facts of the case were these : The plaintiff was the owner of a plantation and several negroes, with horses and stock. He built two boats, with which he started to Columbia, about the 13th December, 1831, with an intention to carry freight to Charleston. On the 26th December, Bentley, the defendant, put up an advertisement, the precise words of which I do not recollect, but in substance represented himself as the owner of all Reynolds’ property in case he did not return ; and to some of Reynolds’ creditors he said that Reynolds had gone to Ireland, or spoke of going there. In consequence of this advertisement, and the verbal statements of Bentley, all Reynolds’ creditors sued out attachments and levied them on his property, and some small executions were levied, and a mare worth ninety dollars *was sold for ten. The plaintiff was not pressing the executions until the attachments were levied. Reynolds, in some way, got information of what was going on, and immediately came back and saved his property from sale, under the attachments, by issuing out a writ of replevin. He incurred some expenses and sustained losses in consequence of this conduct of the defendant. He paid a part of the costs of an attachment; but, in general, the plaintiffs paid the costs. He incurred the expenses of the writ of replevin. This was estimated, at least, at twenty dollars to the attorney, besides the cost of executing it. He had to confess a judgment to McClure for his debt. lie lost about eighty dollars on the sale of his mare, which sale would not have been made but for the advertisement and rumors circulated by the defendant. The' defendant attempted to justify all these things, by proving that Reynolds had executed a paper to him, whereby he appointed him his heir, or agent, to take possession of his property ; and if he never came back, to be his forever. This was attacked as a forgery, or a fraud, and I presume was so regarded by the jury. I was of opinion, and so charged the jury, that the plaintiff could not, in this action, recover vindictive damages. The true measure of damages was the loss actually sustained. The proof of actual loss and expenses was : the cost he paid in one of the attachments, the cost of McClure’s action against him, which he would not have sustained but for the defendant’s conduct, the loss on the sale of the mare, and the expenses of the writ of replevin These might be estimated at more than $100. He had also incurred expenses in returning from Columbia, and losses by the detention of his property in the hands of the officers who had levied the attachments and executions. I thought, and so told the jury, they ought to give a verdict for all these, and any other losses or expenses which the plaintiff had sustained by reason of the defendant’s conduct, without abating one cent from the amount which the evidence would warrant. The jury found for the plaintiff, $300. The notice of appeal is annexed.
   Curia, per

Evans, J.

This is an action on the case. The declaration sets out, with sufficient certainty, the following facts, viz.: 1. That the plaintiff, a citizen of Union district, *was absent from home, attending to some private business, at or in the vicinity of the town of Columbia. 2. That whilst he was thus absent, the defendant, falsely and maliciously, and with intent to injure him, and to produce a belief amongst his creditors that the plaintiff was unable to pay his debts, and had absconded, and so concealed himself that the ordinary process of law could not be served upon him, said, of and concerning him, that the plaintiff had left the country, and would not return ; that all his property, consisting of land and negroes, and other chattels, belonged to him, the defendant, until the plaintiff’s return ; and if he never returned, was his, absolutely. 3. That in consequence of these false reports, divers of the plaintiff’s creditors, believing him to be an absconding debtor, sued out, and levied on his property, divers domestic writs of attachment, which they would not have done, but for the false statements of the defendant. 4. That by reason of the premises, the plaintiff was obliged to return, suddenly, to Union, leaving his business at and near Columbia unfinished, whereby he was put to great trouble and expense ; and that he sustained great loss and damage in paying the costs of the attachments, and discharging his property from the liens thereof. To this declaration there was a general demurrer, which was overruled by my brother Gantt, at the extra Court for Union, in March, 1839, and the case came on for trial, before me, at the regular term of the Court the week after. On the trial, all the material allegations in the declaration were proved by witnesses, and the plaintiff had a verdict. The defendant appealed, and moved this Court to reverse the decision of the Circuit Court on the demurrer, on the ground that no action lies on the case made in the declaration and proved on the trial. There are some other grounds, but this is the only one which it is thought necessary to consider. The case has been held under advisement for some time, on account of some deversity of opinion among us. During this interval, I have turned my attention particularly to that class of wrongs, for remedy of which an action on the case lies, and the result of my examination has been, that the imagination of man can scarcely conceive of a case where one man has sustained a direct pecuniary loss by the unlawful act, the fraudulent conduct, or the malicious words, of another, for which an action on the *case will not lie. The broad rule, as laid down in Comyn’s Dig., is, “that where one man has sustained a temporal losss or damage, by the wrong of another, he may have an action on the case, to be repaired in damage.” I do not propose to consider the great variety of cases in which relief is granted in this form of action, but shall confine myself solely to the inquiry, whether the plaintiff’s action can be sustained, according to the rules of law, and the authority of adjudged cases. To do this, we must understand the proper import of the defendant’s words, as laid in the declaration, and proved on the trial. As I understand them, they mean : 1. That the plaintiff had conveyed to the defends,nt all his property, without making any provision for his debts, and consequently, intended to defraud his creditors. 2. That he had removed or was removing, out of the State, without paying his debts, and was therefore either an absent or absconding debtor. These words, if spoken of a merchant or tradesman, would have been actionable per se. They are defamatory, for it is said in 1 Com. Dig., 261, (title action on the case, D. 25,) that for saying of a merchant or tradesman, “ that he is fled and gone, and I shall lose my debtor, “ that he is run away, and never will return,” an action lies. Now, it cannot be questioned that defamatory words, which, if spoken in relation to one’s trade or employment, are actionable per se, the same words, if spoken of another class of persons, are actionable, if the person of whom they are spoken has sustained, in consequence thereof, a direct pecuniary loss. But the authorities go still further than this. In Chitty’s Practice, (1 vol. 44,) after enumerating the various classes of words which are actionable on the presumption of damage, and dividing them iuto four classes, he says : “5th, any words occasioning actual damage.” Thus, in Shepard vs. Wakeman, (1 Lev. 58,) “Where the plaintiff was to be married to such a one who intended to take her to wife, and the defendant, falsely and maliciously, to hinder the marriage, wrote a letter to that person, that the plaintiff was contracted to him, whereby she lost her marriage. After verdict for the plaintiff, it was moved that the action lieth not, the defendant claiming title to her himself, like as Garad’s case, 4 Co., for slander of title. But after divers motions, the plaintiff had judgment, for it is found malicious and false. ” This case fully sustains the text in Chitty, *that words occasioning actual damage, are actionable, and that it is not necessary they should be defamatory. This doctrine, however, must be taken subject to the limitation that the injury complained of must not be the unlawful acts of others, because they are answerable themselves, and the damage sustained must be the immediate consequence of the defendant’s words. 8 T. R., 1 ; 2 Stark. Ev., 872. In conclusion, I am satisfied the loss sustained by the plaintiff was the direct consequence of the false and malicious assertions of the defendant. It is so alleged in the declaration, and was so proved on the trial; and also, that the suing out the attachments was not such an act as would have sustained any action, against those who sued them out, by the plaintiff. It is alleged in the declaration, and the demurrer admits it, that the design of the defendant was to produce a belief among the plaintiff’s creditors, that he had absconded, and so concealed himself that the ordinary process of law could not be served. He has no ground to complain that they believe him, and acted accordingly.

Dawkins, for appeal. Thompson, contra.

The motion dismissed.

Gantt, O’Neal, Earle, Butlee, JJ., concurred, RICHARDSON, J., dissented. 
      
      а) Campbell vs. Kinloch, 9 Rich. 310. An.
      
     
      
       Cheves, 19. An.
      
     
      
       See Kelly vs. City Council, 4 Rich. 431. Harrison vs. Berkley, 1 Strob. 548. Street vs. Augusta Insurance Co. 11 Rich. Also cases cited 2 Rice’s Dig. 295. An.