Case ID: nc_195/html/0062-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Adams, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CALDWELL COUNTY v. R. A. DOUGHTON et al.
    (Filed 31 January, 1928.)
    1. Taxation — Levy and Assessment — Review, Correction, or Setting Aside Assessment.
    The right of .a dissatisfied taxpayer on lands to have the value of his property reduced for the purposes of taxation in proceedings before the State Board of Assessments by original proceedings, under the statute of 1925, was superseded by the statute of 1927, requiring certain proceedings before the board of county commissioners to originally be had, and when the question involved is solely as to whether such value theretofore fixed and agreed upon be reduced, original proceedings before the State Board will be disregarded and considered as a nullity.
    2. Statutes — Construction—In Particular Classes of Statutes.
    An amendment to a statute by the Legislature may in proper instances be regarded as an interpretation of a former act and considered by the courts as persuasive authority.
    Appeal by plaintiff from Schench, J., at August Term, 1927, of Caldwell.
    Reversed.
    The defendants are the State Board of Assessment, hereafter designated Board of Assessment, the individual members thereof, and A. L. Watts. They were notified that the plaintiff would apply to the Superior Court for a writ of certiorari to view an order of the defendant board in accordance with a petition or complaint containing in substance the following allegations: (1) On 25 October, 1919, the Watts Cotton Mill Company, hereafter designated Watts Company, listed its real property in Caldwell County at $250,000; and on the first Monday in April, 1923, tbe board of commissioners, pursuant to tbe Public Laws 1923, cb. 12, sec. 124, determined by resolution tbat tbe taxable property of tbe county bad been assessed at its true value in money, tbat a reassessment was unnecessary, and tbat real property in tbe county should be entered upon tbe tax books for tbe next quadrennial period at tbe value wbicb bad previously been assessed. (2) On 18 June, 1923, tbe Watts Company, having sold a part of its land, listed tbe remainder for taxation at $213,016; and on 3 April, 1926, it conveyed to A. L. Watts all its land in Caldwell County except about 30 acres, thereby reducing tbe quantity in tbe county to 595 acres, wbicb on 2 July, 1926, was listed by Watts at $171,991. (3) Neither tbe Watts Company nor Watts in 1919, or 1923, or at any other time prior to 1927, made any complaint to tbe county board of equalization or other officers in regard to this valuation, but in April, 1927, Watts did request of tbe chairman of tbe board of commissioners a reduction, wbicb was refused at a regular meeting of tbe board. (4) Watts thereafter filed with tbe Board of Assessment a petition for a reduction in valuation, and tbe board made an order tbat tbe property be assessed at $100,000, as of 1 May, 1926, for tbe purpose of taxation for tbe year 1926. (5) Tbe defendant Watts is due as taxes for 1926 tbe sum of $2,710.12.
    Tbe summonses were issued 19 August, 1927, and were duly served with a copy of tbe complaint and tbe notice. At tbe bearing Watts paid tbe taxes admitted to be due upon tbe valuation fixed by tbe Board of Assessment and tbe record of tbe board was made a part of tbe record in tbe cause.
    Tbe defendant board and tbe defendant Watts filed separate demurrers for defect and misjoinder of parties defendant; for failure to state a cause of action in tbat it is sought to review tbe order of tbe Board of Assessment in a direct proceeding against it, whereas tbe remedy, if any, is by appeal or certiorari; and in tbat tbe only alleged cause of action is a want of jurisdiction on tbe part of tbe Board of Assessment to bear and determine tbe matters in controversy. Tbe demurrers were sustained and tbe plaintiff excepted and appealed.
    
      Squires & Whisnant for plaintiff.
    
    
      Frank Nash and, Walter D. Siler, Assistant Attorneys-General for the Board of Assessors.
    
    
      W. G. Newland, F. A. Linney and J. H. Burke for A. L. Waits.
    
   Adams, J.

The plaintiff alleges, and by demurring the defendants admit, that on 25 October, 1919, the Watts Company listed its real property in Caldwell County at an accepted valuation of $250,000; that on the first Monday in April, 1923, the board of commissioners, pursuant to the Public Laws of 1923, ch. 12, sec. 124, determined by resolution that taxable property in the county had been assessed at its true value in money; and that real property therein should be entered on the tax books for the next quadrennial period at the value previously assessed; also that on 18 June, 1923, the Watts Company, having sold a part of its land listed the remainder at an accepted valuation of $213,016. The mill was sold to A. L. Watts on 3 April, 1926, and on 2 July, 1926, the land, then reduced to 595 acres, was listed for taxation at $171,991, a sum approved by the county authorities as a proper basis for the assessment of taxes.

In 1923 the land owned by the Watts Company was given an assessed value for the next four years. Public Laws 1923, ch. 12, secs. 114, 120. The board of county commissioners constituted the board of equalization in each county (sec. 18) or the board of equalization and review (sec. 122); but it was provided in section 18 that the board should not increase or diminish the assessed value of any lands, except in the year in which the lands were valued for taxation, unless such valuation were affected by extraordinary circumstances, the facts in connection with which were to be found by the board. Whether the difference between $213,016, the assessed value of the land on 18 June, 1923, and $171,991, the assessed value on 2 July, 1926, was a diminished valuation or an apportionment of the assessed value among the Watts Company and the purchasers of parts of the land, we need not inquire; for the property in question was listed after the sales at a valuation which was acceptable to the plaintiff.

In addition to the sections heretofore cited from the act of 1923, the Machinery Act of 1925 contains a provision for specific complaints in reference to the valuation of land. The board of county commissioners is authorized to hear and determine specific complaints of overvaluation or undervaluation of any particular tract of real property after the general equalization order has been made — -the aggrieved party to file with the clerk of the board sometime in May or June of the current year an application in the prescribed form. Public Laws 1925, ch. 102, sec. 109.

The act of 1927, continues all the foregoing sections and provides that the application for relief shall be heard not later than 15 July, and that any property owner may except to the order of the board of county commissioners and appeal therefrom to the Board of Assessment by filing written notice of such appeal and the grounds therefor with the board of commissioners within ten days after final action and by filing with the Board of Assessment notice of such appeal and a copy of the statement of the grounds therefor within ten days after filing such notice with the board of commissioners. Thereupon the Board of Assessment must fix a time for tbe bearing and after observing tbe required formalities may reduce, increase, or confirm tbe valuation determined by tbe commissioners.

It is admitted that neither tbe Watts Company nor A. L. Watts observed any of these statutory requirements at any time. Tbe only semblance of observing them was bis conference with tbe chairman of tbe board of county commissioners in April, 1927, when tbe board was not in session; and after tbe board bad made an order declining bis application for relief be neither excepted nor appealed.

Tbe first step in tbe present proceeding was tbe filing by A. L. Watts of a written application in tbe office of tbe Board of Assessment in Raleigh for a reduction in tbe valuation of tbe mill property.' Tbe application was filed on 25 May, 1927; but before this time tbe act of 1925, cited in bis brief and apparently relied on by tbe appellee Watts (Public Laws 1925, cb. 102, sec. 5, subsec. 3), bad been superseded by tbe act of 1927. Public Laws 1927, cb. 71, sec. 5, subsec. 3. Tbe latter act went into effect 9 March, 1927. Tbe section on which tbe appellees base their agreement (act 1925, supra,) authorized tbe Board of Assessment: “To receive complaints as to property liable to taxation that has not been assessed or of property that has been fraudulently or improperly assessed through error or otherwise, and to investigate tbe same, and to take such proceedings and to make such orders as will correct tbe irregularity complained of, if found to exist. Tbe said board shall constitute a State board of equalization of valuation and taxes. In case it shall be made to appear to tbe board that any tax list in any county in tbe State is grossly irregular, unlawfully or unequally assessed, it shall be tbe duty of tbe board to correct such irregularities, and to equalize tbe valuations of property, in a particular county, upon complaint to it of particular taxpayers, or upon its own initiation, under rules and regulations prescribed by it, not inconsistent with this act.”

Upon tbe admitted facts it is manifest that tbe property was neither fraudulently nor improperly assessed in 1923, and that the first clause of tbe section is not controlling. Tbe last clause affords relief against “any tax list which has been irregularly, unlawfully, or unequally assessed.” Tbe purpose contemplated is revision of tbe “tax list,” whether upon complaint of individual taxpayers or upon tbe initiative of tbe board. Whether tbe section'is applicable to tbe appellee’s petition is a matter of grave doubt; but if it is, we are still of opinion that there was error in granting tbe relief sought. Tbe appellee’s petition is addressed to a reduction in value of tbe mill property as a whole; tbe plaintiff’s complaint is based primarily upon tbe Board of Assessment’s power to reduce tbe value of tbe real property owned by tbe Watts Company or by Watts individually. Affixed to tbe complaint is a list of tbe property returned for taxation: 595 acres valued at $171,991; total value of all real and personal property on 1 May, 1926, $183,116. Tbe order of tbe Board of Assessment reducing tbe total valuation to $100,000 necessarily involves reduction in tbe valuation of tbe real property — and tbis reduction, tbe appellant contends, was not made in compliance witb law.

Moreover, in 1927, the General Assembly amended the section we have quoted by adding' this proviso: “Provided,, that no appeal shall be considered or fixed values be changed, unless notice of the same is filed within ninety days after the final values are fixed and determined by the board of commissioners of the county.” Public Laws 1927, ch. 71, sec. 5, subsec. 3. This being the only provision in the section for an appeal, it may be regarded as a legislative interpretation that without the proviso the statute contemplated an appeal from the board of commissioners, as essential to the exercise of jurisdiction in matters of this kind by the Board of Assessment; and such legislative construction though not controlling is entitled to respectful consideration. Sash Co. v. Parker, 153 N. C., 130; Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C., 441. This conclusion is fortified by section 110 of the act of 1927 (ch. 71), which in like manner provides for an appeal from the board of county commissioners.

The Watts Company did not contend that its property was overvalued in 1923, or at any other time; and A. L. Watts, who bought the property on 3 April, 1926, made no formal complaint to the board of county commissioners. His informal statement to the chairman was made, not in “May or June of the current year” (Laws 1925, ch. 102, sec. 109), but in the month of April, 1927; and on 12 August, 1927, the Board of Assessment ordered that the revaluation be assessed as of 1 May, 1926.

We understand it not to bave been tbe intention of tbe General Assembly to confer upon tbe State Board of Assessment original jurisdiction to bear and determine at all times indiscriminate complaints by individual taxpayers of tbe overvaluation of their property, but as to controversies similar to tbis, which arise upon tbe admitted allegations of tbe complaint, to confer jurisdiction to review tbe final orders of tbe county board of equalization in thé manner provided by law. In tbe case before us tbis course was not pursued, and as tbe proceeding before tbe State Board of Assessment was not authorized by statute it must be dismissed. Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is

Reversed.