Case ID: so2d_627/html/0525-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "RYDER, Judge. HALL, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Arturo SALINAS, Jr., Appellant, v. David MASON, Appellee.
    No. 92-04118.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Oct. 15, 1993.
    Rehearing Denied Nov. 29, 1993.
    J. Arby Van Slyke of J. Arby Van Slyke, P.A., Pensacola, for appellant.
    Michael R.N. McDonnell of McDonnell Law Offices, Naples, for appellee.
   RYDER, Judge.

Arturo Salmas, Jr. attacks the trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice his complaint alleging intentional sexual abuse which occurred approximately fifteen years ago. We reverse because this court recently ruled in Roof v. Wiley, 622 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993), rehearing denied, No. 91-04243 (Fla.2d DCA Aug. 24, 1993), that section 2 of Chapter 92-102, amending section 95.11, Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), revived for a four-year period previously time-barred causes of action based on intentional abuse or incest. The four-year window commenced April 8,1992, and Salinas’ complaint was filed within this period on August 26, 1992.

Reversed and remanded.

FRANK, C.J., concurs.

HALL, J., concurs specially.

HALL, Judge,

concurring.

Even though I am concerned with the potential for future enactment of further retroactive legislation dealing with statutes of limitation, I must agree with the majority that our decision is controlled by Roof v. Wiley, wherein we held that a party holds no vested right in the termination of a cause of action because of the running of the statute of limitation, and the legislature can revive an expired cause of action without the violation of a constitutional right. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Virginia reached the exact opposite decision in a well-reasoned opinion in Starnes v. Cayouette, 244 Va. 202, 419 S.E.2d 669 (1992).

Although, the parties have not raised the issue of the definition of abuse, for which section 95.11, Florida Statutes, refers to section 39.01(2) of the Juvenile Justice Act, I perceive a possible constitutional problem because the definition of abuse in the Juvenile Justice Act may be vague and overbroad in the context of section 95.11.