Case ID: so2d_650/html/1094-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. JORGENSON, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Theresa S. SCOTT and State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Child Support Division, Cross-Appellants, v. Don P. BENNETT, Cross-Appellee.
    No. 93-1912.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 22, 1995.
    Diane H. Tutt, Plantation, for cross-appellants.
    No appearance for cross-appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON and GREEN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We find an abuse of discretion in the failure of the trial court to order that any payment whatsoever be made by the father toward the $19,436.78 arrearage for the past due child support from the filing of the paternity petition to the date when the ongoing support obligation was established below. Larger v. Diaz, 595 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992); Onley v. Onley, 540 So.2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); see Puglia v. Puglia, 600 So.2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Since the father has already been ordered to pay $200.00 per month toward the $5,107.29 arrearage which accrued after that date we direct that those payments continue after the $5,107.29 has been fully paid, to be applied to the $19,-436.78 amount. The order under review is otherwise affirmed.

SCHWARTZ, C.J., and GREEN, J., concur.

JORGENSON, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it adopted the report of the General Master and reduced to judgment the amount of the father’s arrearages. The General Master fashioned the support payments and a payment schedule after carefully considering all of the father’s obligations, including his duty to support other dependents. I would affirm. See Puglia v. Puglia, 600 So.2d 484, 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“A trial court has discretion as to the manner in which the arrearage is to be repaid.”).