Case ID: va_18/html/0234-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Hough v. Shreeve.
    Argued Wednesday, November 8th, 1815.
    i. Statute — Chancery Proceedings — Application—In= junctions, — The 3d section of the act of January 20th, 1804, “concerning the proceedings in courts of chancery,” does not apply to a bill which is not merely a bill of injunction, but has the farther object in view of obtaining a decree for a conveyance.
    In August, 1811, the appellant filed a bill, in the superior court of chancery for the Richmond district, against Benjamin Shreeve and Landon Carter, surviving executor of George Carter, praying an injunction to a judgment in an action of trespass on the case brought by Shreeve, in the Haymarket district court, against the complainant for overflowing, with a mill pond, certain land which he claimed as his, and to all future actions for the same cause ; and, that the said Shreeve might be compelled to convey to the complainant the overflowed land in controversy. The injunction was granted.
    The defendant, Shreeve, having answered, the complainant replied ; sundry affidavits and depositions were taken, and exhibits filed ; and, a motion being made for dissolution of the injunction, it was dissolved by the court on the 22d of June 1812. At June term, 1813, the chancellor, “being of opinion, that it should have been dismissed at the last term, under the act of the general assembly,  but was omitted by a mistake of the clerk,” decreed-; that the bill be dismissed, with costs, “agreeably to the terms of that act.”
    The complainant appealed to this court.
    The case was elaborately argued upon the merits, by Wickham for the appellant, and Wirt for the appellees ; but, as the decision by this court was upon a single point of law, so much of the argument as related to that point only will here be inserted.
    
    Wickham contended that the chancellor ought to have entertained the bill as an original bill. The act of assembly of January 20th, 1804, relied upon in the decree, applies only to cases of bills having no object but an injunction. The bill, in this case, was for a farther object, the recovery of the title to the land.
    Suppose, in a bill for specific per formanee of a contract *for a tract of land, the plaintiff prays an injunction to stay waste. In that case, the injunction is ■collateral to the main subject of controversy. Yet, according to the chancellor’s opinion, if it be dissolved, the bill must be dismissed by the clerk at the next term. But, under the act of assembly, the clerk would do right in not dismissing such a bill, because a sufficient cause against the dismission, (to wit, that it had a farther object in view, besides the injunction,) would appear on its face. For the same reason, the bill now in question ought not to have been dismissed.
    Wirt. The words of the act of assembly are general; — comprehending all injunctions.
    Wickham. General expressions in a law may be controlled by the evident intention of the legislature. But, if the strict words of the act are to be insisted upon, the bill could not be dismissed, but “at the next term —which was not done.
    Wednesday, November 15th, 1815.
    
      
      Statute — Chancery Proceedings — Application—Injunction. — The statute I Rev. Code ch. 66, § 60, directing the dismission of bills of injunction, at the next term, etc., after the dissolution of the injunction, unless cause be shewn to the contrary, does not apply to cases in which the bill claims other relief besides the injunction. Pulliam v. Winston, 5 Leigh 324. In this case, it is said (p. 327), “There can be no question, that this decree must be reversed, upon the authority of the cases of Hough v. Shreeve, 4 Munf. 490, and Singleton v. Lewis, 6 Munf. 397. In those cases, it is decided, that the provision of the statute, under which the county court proceeded in dismissing the bill, does not apply to a bill which is not merely a bill of injunction, but has other objects besides those of injoining a judgment at law.” And in Muller v. Bayly, 21 Gratt. 531. it is said: It is well settled that § 4 of chap. 179 aforesaid, applies only to a pure bill of injunction, and not to a bill seeking other relief, to which the injunction sought is merely ancillary. This was expressly decided by this court in the recent case of Winston v. Midlothian Coal Mining Co., 20 Gratt. 686. See also, 2 Rob. Old Pr. 249, and the cases there cited of Hough v. Shreeve, 4 Munf. 490 ; Singleton v. Lewis. 6 Munf. 397; Pulliam v. Winston, 5 Leigh 324.” To the same effect, the principal case is cited in Alford v. Moore, 15 W. Va. 606; foot-note to Pulliam v. Winston, 5 Leigh 324.
    
    
      
       See Rev. Code, 2d vol. ch. 29, sect. 3, p. 29.
    
   The president pronounced the court’s opinion, as follows :

The court (not deciding, at present, on the merits of the cause) is of opinion, that, as the bill of the appellant had a double, or twofold object, first to injoin the appellee Benjamin Shreeve, from harassing him with vexatious actions of trespass ; and, secondly, to obtain a decree for the overflowed land in «controversy, the cause is not within the intent or meaning of the third section of the act of the 20th of January 1804.

Decree reversed, and the cause remanded to the court of chancery, there to he re-•docketed, for farther proceedings to be had therein as an original bill.