Case ID: f-appx_706/html/0445-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Theresa M. SCHOENBART, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. U.S. BANK, as Trustee FOR LSF9 MASTER PARTICIPATION TRUST; Quality Loan Service Corporation; Caliber Home Loans, Inc.; Does, 1-20, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-16871
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 8, 2017  San Francisco, California
    Filed December 19, 2017
    Jason Wallace Estavillo, Attorney, Law Offices of Jason W. Estavillo, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant
    David Taro Biderman, Esquire, Perkins Coie LLP, San Francisco, CA, Mary P. Gaston, Esquire, Attorney, Kristine E. Kruger, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Seattle, WA, Kathleen Stetsko, Attorney, Perkins Coie LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and LUCERO  and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Carlos F. Lucero, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Theresa M. Schoenbart appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her first amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and the court’s subsequent denial of her motion to amend that complaint. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. Schoenbart lacks standing under California law to bring this preemptive action to block a nonjudicial foreclosure. Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 795-98 (2016). The language of the deed of trust does not confer such standing. Id. at 796-98. Nor do California Civil Code sections 2924(a)(6) and 2924f, the California Homeowner Bill of Rights provisions under which Schoenbart sues. Lucioni v. Bank of Am., N.A., 3 Cal.App.5th 150, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 421-24 (2016); see also Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924.12(a)(1), .19(a)(1).

2.' The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schoenbart’s motion to amend her first amended complaint. Schoenbart’s proposed second amended complaint contained only one new factual allegation: that “[Washington Mutual] through December 31, 2007, securitized and sold [$]82,000,000,000.00 (82 billion dollars) of loans, which included Plaintiffs loan.” But this new allegation does not cure her lack of standing under California law, and given California’s blanket ban on preforeclosure suits like Schoenbart’s, see Saterbak, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d at 795, further amendment in this regard would be futile. Denial of Schoenbart’s motion to amend was therefore permissible. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011).

3. We need not resolve Schoenbart’s argument regarding tender. The district court denied Schoenbart’s motion not because of Schoenbart’s failure to tender but because her proposed second amended complaint failed to state a plausible'claim for relief. Because we affirm the dismissal of Schoenbart’s complaint on other grounds, this issue is moot. See, e.g., Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1114 n.2 (9th Cir. 2017).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.