Case ID: ohio-st_63/html/0165-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      By the Court :", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

State ex rel. Guilbert, Auditor v. Halliday, Auditor of Franklin County.
    
      Two statutes irreconcilable — Effect given to later — Bill not law until signed by presiding officer — Order of signatures prevail.
    
    1. In so far as two statutes are irreconcilable, effect must be given to the one which is the later.
    2. A bill can not become a law until it has been signed by the presiding officer of each house; and when one bill was so signed after another bill so signed on the same day, the former is the later enactment.
    (Decided June 19, 1900.)
    Mandamus.
    The 74th General Assembly enacted two laws, each purporting to amend and supplement section 2813 of the Revised Statutes. They are designated as House Bill No. 777 and Senate Bill No. 309. By House Bill No. 777 it is provided that “the decennial county board of equalization shall complete its work of equalization on or before the fourth Monday of February * * * néxt following the beginning of the equalization.” By Senate Bill No. 309 it is provided that the county board of equalization “shall convene at the office of the county auditor on the third Monday of July, one thousand nine hundred, and every tenth year thereafter; and shall close their sessions on or before the first Monday in October then next following.” Both of .these bills were passed and signed on the same day, April 16, 3.900; but the relator avers that Senate Bill No. 309 was signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House after House Bill No. 777 was signed. The defendant in his answer, “admits the enactment of said laws as averred in the petition.”
    The relator alleges that he instructed the defendant that in pursuance of his duties as auditor of Franklin county he should observe the provisions of said Senate Bill No. 309 as governing the sessions of the decennial county board of equalization, and that defendant refuses to obey said instruction; and the relator prays for a writ of mandamus to compel defendant to observe the requirements of section 2813 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by said Senate Bill No. 309.
    The answer of the defendant assigns as a reason for not obeying the instruction of the relator, that both of said laws so passed are so irreconcilable that effect cannot be given to either; and that the old section 2813 of the Revised Statutes has not been thereby repealed, amended nor supplemented.
    The relator demurs to the answer.
    
      J. M. Sheets, Attorney General; J. E. Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Smith W. Bennett, for the relator.
    Where the acts are irreconcilable, how construed?
    Here is an illustration of two acts passed on the same day, establishing different times for the performance of the same acts or duties, by the same board, and at least as to questions of time, are inconsistent with each other.
    Remembering the well established propositions that repeals by implication are not favored, and that acts apparently repugnant should be harmonized, if possible, we must conclude that it is impossible to harmonize so widely different dates as are here apparent; hence, the latter act repeals the former, and we apply the rule, that
    “In so far- as the two sections are irreconcilable with each other, effect must be given to the latter.” The State ex rel. v. Com’rs Shelby Co., 36 Ohio St., 326; Strauss v. Heiss, 48 Md., 292.
    “Fractions of a day may be noticed to prevent great mischief or inconvenience.” Hampton v. Erenzeller, 2 Browne (Pa.), 19.
    “The same rule that requires the harmonization of two acts passed the same session, if possible, applies with at least equal force to acts passed on the same day.” Black v. Scott, 2 Brock., 325; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y., 330; State v. Rackley, 2 Blackf. (Ind.), 249; State v. Clark, 54 Mo., 216.
    We have found but two cases presenting an inconsistency as to the time of the operation of two different acts, and the court construed the limitation in the former to be repealed by the limitation in the latter act.
    “The 9, Geo. 4, c. 61, which prohibited keeping open public houses during the hours of afternoon service, was held repealed by implication pro tanto by the 18 and 19 Viet., c. 118, which prohibited the sale between three and five o’clock P. M., the usual hours of afternoon service. If both acts had coexisted, it would have been in the power of the clergyman of every parish to close the public houses for four hours instead of two, by beginning the afternoon service at one or five o’clock P. M., an intention too singular to be lightly attributed to the legislature.” (But the court does not say whether the “singular intention,” was keeping the church open so long, or the public house so short a time.) Rex. v. Whitely, 3 H. & N., 143; Johnson v. Bush, 3 Bank Ch. (N. Y.), 207.
    
      It will be observed % the court, that it is averred in the petition of the plaintiff and admitted by the defendant, that Senate Bill No. 309 was signed last, and hence is the latter law. A bill does not become a law until signed by the presiding officer of each house. Constitution of Ohio, Art II, Section 17; State v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St., 254.
    If the acts are irreconcilable but in part, the balance of each may stand as one act.
    It would appear to be a very plain proposition, that the latter enacted act does not repeal the former, save, to the extent that the two are repugnant, or inconsistent. State ex rel. v. Commissioners, 36 Ohio. St., 326; Hendersons Tobacco, 78 U. S., 652; Wood v. U. S., 16 Pet., 342; Fabbin v. Murphy, 95 U. S., 196.
    How far are the acts irreconcilable? It would seem that the only inconsistency in the acts is the times of beginning and ending the labors of the board, The times mentioned in section 2813 of Senate Bill 309, should supersede the times mentioned in old section 2813, Revised Statutes, and the Senate Bill amends that section; and it supersedes section 2813a of the House Bill as to the limitation, because it is the latter act.
    Therefore it appears to us that if section 2813 of the Senate Bill was permitted to stand as it was passed, and read into it the balance of section 2813a from House Bill No. 777, the legislative will could thus be ascertained. In that way a law consistent with all other laws upon the same subject is left to stand.
    
      Taylor, Seymour cfi Webber, for defendant. Submitted no brief.
   By the Court :

In so far as these two enactments are irreconcilable, affect must be given to the one which is the later law. State ex rel. v. Commissioners Shelby Co., 36 Ohio St., 326. A bill cannot become a law until it has been duly signed by the presiding officer of each house. Const., Art. II, sec 17. State ex rel. v. Kiesewetter, 45 Ohio St., 254. It is averred in the petition and admitted in the answer that Senate Bill No. 309 was signed by che president of the Senate and the speaker of the House after House Bill No. 777 was so signed on the same day. The former is, therefore, the later enactment.

■Peremptory Mandamus allowed.