Case ID: ga_48/html/0034-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      McCay, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John L. Screven, receiver, plaintiff in error, vs. William L. Clark, defendant in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    Equity — Receiver.-—A receiver appointed by a Chancellor to “collect” the effects belonging to a corporation, a defendant in a suit pending in chancery, has no authority to bring a suit in order to get possession of the effects, unless he be specially authorized so to do by the order of the Chancellor, and if he bring such suit and fail to show the order, he cannot recover.
    Equity. Receiver. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. October Term, 1872.
    John R. Screven, as receiver of the Brunswick and Albany Railroad, brought trover against William R. Clark, for eight box, railroad freight-cars, of the value of $15,000 00. The defendant pleaded the general issue. Upon the trial, the only evidence introduced of the authority of the plaintiff to institute said suit, was the following order:
    *“RuEus B. Burrock, Governor, who sues for the interest of the State of Georgia et al., vs. Jacob Dart et al.
    
    
      "Bill, etc., in Glynn Superior Court.
    
    “At Chambers, Blackshear, Ga., Oct. 30th, 1871.
    “It appearing to the Court that since the filing of complainant’s bill in the foregoing cause, John R. Screven, the receiver appointed by the Governor of Georgia, has accepted said trust:
    “It is ordered that said John R. Screven be, and he is hereby appointed, temporary receiver of the Brunswick and Albany Railroad Company, and of all its property of every kind. And he is hereby ordered to collect immediately all said property together, and hold the same subject to the further order of the Court. Granted by me, at Chambers, this 30th day of November, 1871.
    (Signed) “Wirriam M. Sessions, J. S. C., B. C.”
    When the evidence was closed, the Court charged the jury that the order aforesaid did not authorize the receiver to institute a suit; to which charge the plaintiff excepted.
    The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Whereupon the plaintiff assigns the charge aforesaid as error.
    Moses & Downing, for plaintiff in error.
    Ingram & Craweord, for defendant.
    
      
      Equity — Receiver—Suits against. — In DeGraffenried v. Railroad Co., 57 Ga. 23, the court said, citing the principal case, that “a receiver appointed by a court of chancery cannot be sued for the assets placed in his hands or be disturbed in the possession and management thereof, without first obtaining leave of the court, appointing him is not an open question ip the courts of the state.” See Rncy. Dig. Ga. Rep., vol. 11, p. 83.
    
   McCay, Judge.

The rule is perhaps an arbitrary one, but it is, nevertheless, well settled that a receiver has no right to sue without express authority from the Chancellor; his general authority to collect and keep the assets is not sufficient to justify him in bringing an action: Daniel’s Chancery Practice, 1988, et seq. A receiver is at last only an officer of the Court, and the foundation of the rule, probably is, that it is always for the Court itself to determine whether it shall be dragged into litigation. At law, the party having the legal right to sue is *the proper party, and if one comes suing for the property of another, he must show, as part of his right to recover, the authority he has to come into a Court of law, asserting another’s right. We think this failure to show any authority to sue is fatal to the case of the plaintiff below, and do not go into the other question argued; though we think the evidence of a right of property in the company is strong, and that the order in favor of the Dawson Manufacturing Company does not affect the title. Their claim on the fund by the terms of the order did not cease until they got the cars.

Judgment affirmed.