Case ID: so2d_605/html/1113-03.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DENNIS, J., \n      WATSON, Justice, LEMMON, Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Louisiana v. Jay E. BOWEN.
    No. 92-KK-1500.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    Oct. 9, 1992.
   In re Bowen, Jay E.; — Defendant(s); applying for supervisory and/or remedial writ; Parish of East Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court, Div. “C”, No. 3-90-698; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. KW92 0370.

Denied.

DENNIS, J.,

concurs for the reasons expressed by him and HALL, J., in concurring in the denial of writs in State v. Brossette, 599 So.2d 1092 (La.1992).

WATSON, J., concurs with reasons.

LEMMON, J., dissents in part with reasons.

WATSON, Justice,

concurring in the writ denial:

Taking evidence from a purported expert “concerning the characteristics generally exhibited or lacking in a child molester” or any other type of criminal is dangerous business. First, every serious trial might turn into a battle between the State’s and the defendant’s experts. Next, the attention of the jury may well be confused and turned from the facts of the case at hand. Finally, such evidence is not sufficiently relevant to be admitted. I respectfully concur.

LEMMON, Justice,

dissenting in part.

Evidence of the information in the expert’s report (as described by the trial judge) was properly excluded as opinion evidence that defendant was innocent. La. Code Evid. art. 703. Nevertheless, an expert may testify as to his experience concerning the characteristics generally exhibited or lacking in a child molester, and the defense may produce fact evidence that the accused does or does not exhibit these characteristics without violating the rule against opinion evidence on the ultimate issue and without permitting the accused to speak through an expert in order to avoid taking the stand.