Case ID: la-ann_20/html/0165-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Howell, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 1624.
    A. Leggett, Administrator, v. Henry Goodrich.
    The act of Congress of 17bh July, 1862, entitled “an aot to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” was enacted in the interest of the Government, and not for the benefit of those against whom its provisions arc directed, and the nullity of transfers therein denounced relates to sales made to defeat the rights of the Government.
    Where a party has made a contract in violation of the confiscation laws, he cannot, in order to relieve himself, invoke the nullity therein declared.
    Defendant, Henry Goodrich, executed his throe promissory notes in favor of A. Legget, administrator, for six thousand dollars, the price of a tract of land, which he purchased on the L6th day of July, 1862, at probate sale, secured by mortgage on the land; plaintiff instituted an hypothecary action to force the payment of the notes, which the defendant resists on the grounds that the sale was a nullity, having been made in violation of the confiscation laws of the United States passed on 17th of July, 1862, the proclamation of the President of the United States, and the military orders of the commanding general: Held — 'That the defendant, having alleged and shown that he was, at the date of the sale thus made, engaged in open and aotive rebellion against the Government, was not in a position to invoke the benefits of the nullities of the sale declared by law, in order to relieve himself from the obligations which he had contracted.
    PPEAL from the District Court, Parish of Carroll, Fai'rar, J.
    
      W. G. Wyly, for plaintiff and appellant.
    
      BeFrance & Belony, and Sparrow & Montgomery, for defendant and appellee.
    
      Brief of plaintiff and appellant.
    
    
      * * * But the most remarkable feature of the case is the point upon which the Judge, a quo, decides. He decides that the defendant should be relieved from his onerous contract of sale, because he has alleged and proved himself to be a criminal.
    Defendant proves by his attorney of record, E. J. Delony, Esq., that he is a very unworthy man; that as postmaster of the United States, he swore to support the Constitution thereof, and afterwards, to-wit: in 1862, committed treason against the United States- by aiding in levying war against the same; “that during the year 1862, witness heard defendant say that he assisted in equipping one or more military companies for service in the armies of the late Confederate government,” etc. — See Record, page 15.
    Defendant’s attorney testifies that defendant, “ Goodrich, on the 18th December, 1862, was aiding and assisting the late rebellion against the United States. ” This was urged as the ground why he, Goodrich, should be relieved from liis onerous contract of sale made on that day with the late Samuel Neill.
    A man who has proved that he has attemped to destroy the life of the nation, asks the Court on that ground to do him a favor, to release him from an onerous contract. If lie, Goodrich, had been loyal, he could not liave asked this favor of the Court; but conceiting that his own crime gives him merit, he boldly asks the Court to relievo him from his onerous contract, and. expects a generous Government to do more for criminals than it could do for its loyal citizens. Treason is the worst crime known to the law; yet the District Judge felt obliged to relieve the defendant, Goodrich, and give him judgment, because he proved himself guilty of treason.
    The act of 17th July, 1862, to suppress the rebellion and discourage treason, has been most singularly interpreted by the Judge, a quo. Has treason been discouraged by beneii.tting the defendant, in relieving him from his contract with the late Samuel Neill? It is to encourage treason to thus reward men who have made their own crime the ground why they should be'released from their contracts. An act to discourage treason is thus construed to encourage it. (See Statutes at Large, No. 12, pages 589,590.) Not satisfied with proving defendant, Goodrich, the gravest criminal, the counsel for defendant was permitted to prove the deceased, Samuel Neill, was also guilty of treasonand had not returned to his allegiance up to his death, in 1863, although plaintiff’s counsel objected to any testimony calculated to criminate the deceased. (See Record, pages 15 and 16.) Plaintiff’s counsel objected to any proof of crime against the deceased, but his objection was overruled by the Court and the testimony received. * * ****** * * *
    If a lenient Government declines to enforce confiscation laws upon parties to the rebellion, does that justify avowed criminals to enrich themselves by judgments of Courts relieving them from their onerous contracts?
    Can laws of confiscation, enacted in the interest of the Government, with the view to suppress the rebellion and punish treason, be so construed as to benefit persons claiming merit for their crimes? See Statutes at Large, No. 12, pages 589, 590, 591. ******
    But the law of 17th July, 1862, upon which this order is made, does not contemplate any advantage to one of the parties, who avows his own criminality.
    The object of the act is explained by its preamble, to-ivit: “An Act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes.” See Statutes at Large, No. 12, pages 489, 490, and 491. Section 5 of said act declares “ that to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion it shall be the duty of the President of the United Staes to cause the seizure of all the estates and property, money, stocks, credits and effects of the persons herein after named in this section, and to apply and use the same and the proceeds thereof for the support of the Army of the United 1 States,” etc., etc.
    It is upon section 6 of said act that defendant relies; but an enlightened interpretation of said section would only construe invalid, sales made to defeat the confiscation denounced in a previous part of said section. * x
    It would be the strangest interpretation possible that the defendant, Goodrich, should be relieved from the payment of the notes herein sued upon after having undisputed ownership of the land ever since the day of sale, to-wit: December 16th, 1862.
    It is therefore contended that the defendant has judicially admitted the existence of the debt, after pleading thereto in reconvention. That the amended answer filed without leave of the Court cannot raise new issues, nor contradict the judicial admissions of defendant. That the act of 17th July, 1862, has no reference to the case at bar, and that the plea of defendant’s own crime cannot relieve him from his onerous obligation.
   Howell, J.

This is an hypothecary action to recover the amount of three promissory notes, given for the price of,. and secured by mortgage on a tract of land, situated in the parish of Carroll, the sale of which was made on 16th December, 1862. The defence is that said notes, by a clause in the act of sale, were to be applied to the payment of a prior mortgage on said land in favor of one Mrs. Caroline Bell, which the vendor failed to do, and in consequence the contract of sale was void, and the cash, portion of the price is claimed in reconvention. By ah amended answer, the nullity of the sale was further alleged, on the ground that both vendor and vendee were aiding and abetting the late rebellion, in violation of the proclamation of the President of the United States, and the orders of the commanders of this department. Judgment was rendered in favor of defendant annulling the sale, and plantiff appealed.

The first ground of defence is untenable, as plaintiff, in his capacity of administrator of the vendor, asks judgment for the purpose of appropriating the sums claimed according to the stipulations of the contract, and there is nothing to show that Mrs. Bell was to take the notes instead of the money. Defendant, the vendee, would not be relieved from payment by the transfer of the notes to her, and the suit is virtually for her benefit.

The second ground is still less tenable.

We do not consider that the laws of Congress, the proclamation of the President, and the orders of the military commanders referred to can be invoked, in such a case as this, by one who alleges his own violation of them. We view the law of Congress, passed on 17th July, 1862, “to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” as enacted in the interest of the Government and not for the benefit of those against whom its provisions are directed, and that the nullity therein denounced relates to sales made to defeat the rights of the Government.

It is therefore ordered that the judgment appealed from be reversed; and it is now ordered that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff, administrator of the succession of Samuel Neill, and against defendant for the sum of $6,000, with 8 per cent, interest on $2,000 thereof, from January 1st 1864, on $2,000 from January 1st 1865, and on $2,000 from January 1st-1866, with mortgage and vendor’s privilege on the land described in the petition, to-wit: N. E. ^ and E. % of N. W. % of section 36, T. 19, R. 9 East; also W. % of W. yz and S. E. of S. W. of section 30, T. 19, R. 10 East, containing 440 acres, with all the improvements thereon, from 16th December, 1862, and that a writ of seizure and sale issue against all of said land for the purpose of paying plaintiff in his said capacity, said sums to be applied according to the stipulations of the contract of sale and mortgage herein sued on. Defendant and appellee to pay costs in both courts.

Rehearing refused.