Case ID: f-appx_677/html/0429-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Douglas JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; Matrix Absence Management Administrator, agent of Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-35988
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 14, 2017
    
    Filed February 22, 2017
    Douglas Johnson, Pro Se
    Joshua Bachrach, Esquire, Wilson, El-ser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, Philadelphia, PA, Robert B. Miller, Esquire, Attorney, Kilmer Voorhees & Laurick, P.C., Portland, OR, for Defendants-Appel-lees
    Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Douglas Johnson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s action because Johnson failed to allege facts sufficient to show a plausible claim for relief under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C, §§ 1132(a)(1)(B), 1132(a)(3); Gabriel v. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund, 773 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2014) (requirements for a claim under § 1132(a)(3)); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1996) (requirements for equitable estoppel in an ERISA action).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson’s motion for default judgment because the clerk never entered a default. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review and factors for entry of default judgment).

We reject as unsupported by the record Johnson’s contention that the district court was biased against him, and deny Johnson’s request, set forth in his opening brief, for appointment of counsel on remand.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.