Case ID: scl_4/html/0148-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Brevard, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1807.
    The President and Directors of the Bank of Savannah v. William Garrett, and The President and Directors of the Bank of Savannah v. Charles Hammond.
    Where the plaintiffs sued by the name of “ The President and Directors Bank of Savannah,” and the defendant pleaded an informal plea in abatement, but amounting' substantially to a denial of the right of the plaintiffs to sue as a corporate body, or by the name they had assumed, to which the plaintiffs demurred generally, it was adjudged, that the action ought to abate ; it was further adjudged, that it is not a good objection, by way of demurrer, to allege, that the declaration does not state the plaintiffs to be a body politic, if they sue as such, but it shall bo intended that they are incorporated.
    Assumpsit. Demurrer to the declaration, decided by Treze-vant, J., in Edgefield district, in favor of the defendants, on the ground that the declaration did not state that the plaintiffs were a corporate body, nor set forth the names of the several plaintiffs, which was necessary, if they were not incorporated.
    Assumpsit, as indorsees of a promissory note against the maker. There was no allegation, or averment, in the declaration, or writ, that the plaintiffs were incorporated, or claimed, as a corporation. The defendaut pleaded, that there is no law of the land creating a corporation by the name of The President and Directors of the Bank of Savannah, and that no action ought to be maintained by that name, as there is no law establishing such a corporation.
    To this plea the plaintiff demurred; and it was contended in support of the demiirrer, in the District Court of Edgefield, before Trezevant, J., that the plaintiffs had not pretended to sue as a corporate body, nor was there any thing in the declaration to shew that the action was brought in a corporate right, and, therefore, the plea was irrelevant and vain. Also, that the plea was infor. mal and insufficient, in not shewing by what other name, or names, the plaintiffs might have sued ; and because it did not pray judgment of the writ.
    The presiding judge was of opinion, that it was necessary, on demurrer, to go back to the first fault in pleading, and he thought that the first fault was on the part of the plaintiffs, in not stating that they were incorporated, and entitled to sue by the name they bad assumed, as theif manner of suing imports; and for want of such averment, it must be taken that they are not a body corporate, but a private association, or company, who ought to have,sued by their proper names, and, therefore, gave judgment for the defendant,
    Egan,
    in support of the motions for reversing the judgments in the above cases, cited 2’Ld. Raym. 1535. 1 Sellon, 372. Moore, 309. 1 Bac. 29. 3 East. 311. 2 Str. 612. Hob. 211. 2 Raym. 1502.
    Dozier, E contra,
    
    cited D. and E. 488. Tidd’s Pract. 179.
   Brevard, J.,

delivered the opinion of the whole court, all the judges próseut, except Wilds, J. That in the case against Garrett, the judgment ought to be reversed, and in the case against Hammond, it ought to stand. In the first case the plaintiffs appear to sue as a corporation, and the court are to presume they are so. It is not necessary, in sueiug as a corporate body, to aver that the plaintiffs are legally incorporated, or shew how they were incorporated. If the defendant means to dispute the fact, he ought to deny it by his plea. By demurring, he admits whatever is woH'pleaded. . In this case, the name assumed by the plaintiffs, being proper for a corporation, it must be considered that the action is by a body corporate; and it cannot be presumed that it is the name of a private company, or unincorporated society, because no such society, or company, can sue ate a society, by an artificial name. ■ It would be ridiculous to suppose the name by which the pluiutiffs sue, is the name or names of a natural person, or persons.

As to the case against Hammond, it stands on a different ground. The plea, though informal and incorrect, in many respects, yet is, in substance, a good plea in abatemeut, and amounts to a denial, that there is any such corporation in existence known by the name of The President and Directors of the Bank of Savannah, and entitled to prosecute an action as such, and submits to the court, whether the defendant is bound further to answer. The defendant, by this plea, tenders an issue on the fact, which the plaintiffs ought to have accepted. By demurring, they have admitted the defendant’s plea to be true in substance, and submits the question of law arising thereon, to the court. If the plea be taken as containing a true statement of the fact, the plaintiffs must have judgment against them, because having no right to sue as an artificial person, or corporation, they cannot maintain this action as such. They ought to have sued by their proper names as individuals, or natural per.sons.

Judgment for the plaintiff in the case v. Garrett; and in the case v. Hammond, judgment for the defendant,-that the writ abate.

Note. See 1 Com. Dig. 9J. 1 Salk. 212. 4 Bac. 51. 1 Bac. Tit. Abatement. 1 Saund. 340, a. 3d ed., and the notes. It seems a corporation m declaring, ought to state that they are a body politic. 1 Bos. and P. 40. 3 Caines, 3.