Case ID: f-appx_511/html/0615-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kenneth Tyrone MURRAY, aka Kenny, aka Seal G, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-50045.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 6, 2013.
    
    Filed March 8, 2013.
    Xóchitl Arteaga, Assistant U.S., E. Martin Estrada, Assistant U.S., Peter A. Hernandez, Assistant U.S., Curtis A. Kin, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Kevin S. Rosenberg, Assistant U.S., Nancy Spiegel, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Jeffrey Backhus, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Phillip A. Trevino, Esquire, Law Offices of Phillip A. Trevino, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: PAEZ and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and CONLON, Senior District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Suzanne B. Conlon, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Kenneth Murray appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He does not challenge the existence of the charged drug-distribution conspiracy, but rather contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he was connected to it.

All the evidence in this case, taken together and viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Murray was connected with the conspiracy. See United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1117-18 (9th Cir.2007) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt of even a slight connection to the charged conspiracy is sufficient). For example, in wiretap recordings played at trial, a caller consistently identifying himself as “Kenny” used code words to order 'from co-conspirators what trial testimony indicated were substantial amounts of drugs. Those calls originated from a land line registered to the same address at which DMV records indicated Murray lived at the time. The jury heard these calls and compared the voice on it to an exemplar of Murray’s. And when the police searched the address from which the calls originated, they found two identification cards with Murray’s information on them, significant quantities of drugs packaged for distribution, and firearms and digital scales.

From this evidence, the jury could rationally have concluded that the “Kenny” on the calls was Murray, that Murray intended to distribute drugs he obtained from his co-conspirators, and that Murray was therefore connected with the conspiracy to distribute drugs. See id. Even if the evidence could also have supported the inference that Murray was a drug dealer independent from the established conspiracy, as Murray contends, the jury was entitled on these facts to resolve conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S.Ct. 2781.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.