Case ID: f-appx_11/html/0165-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harold Lee SMITH, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 00-4181.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted March 30, 2001.
    Decided April 26, 2001.
    
      William E. Loose, Asheville, NC, for appellant.
    Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, Jerry W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, NC, for appellee.
    Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Harold Lee Smith appeals the district court’s order on resentencing denying his motions for a downward departure and his objection to a prior sentencing enhancement. Smith also claims for the first time on appeal that his sentence is illegal in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Finding no error, we affirm.

Smith was convicted in 1993 of various drug offenses, and this court ultimately affirmed his convictions and sentence. In 1998, Smith filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2000), in which he sought relief under Amendment 505 to the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.1998). Smith also asked the district court to grant him a downward departure based on his minor role in the offense and his post-offense rehabilitation and to reconsider it’s decision during his original sentencing to enhance his base offense level for being a manager under USSG § 3B1.1.

The district court properly granted relief under Amendment 505, adjusted Smith’s offense level, and resentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. The court declined to consider Smith’s other sentencing issues, finding that it lacked the authority to do so under § 3582(c)(2).

A resentencing pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) is not a de novo proceeding, but merely a form of limited remand. United States v. Cothran, 106 F.3d 1560, 1562 (11th Cir.1997). The district court may only consider the effect of the retroactive amendment, not any other sentencing or guideline issues. USSG § IB 1.10, p.s., comment, (n.2). We therefore find that the district court properly declined to consider Smith’s motions for a downward departure. We further find no error in the district court’s decision not to reconsider its prior enhancement of Smith’s base offense level, as that issue was decided against Smith on direct appeal.

Finally, Smith argues in this appeal for the first time that his sentence violates Apprendi. Any argument that Smith’s sentence violates Apprendi “was a new issue, one not authorized by § 3582(c), for it is unrelated to any change in the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Smith, 241 F.3d 546, 548 (7th Cir.2001). As a result, Smith’s Apprendi argument is “the sort of contention usually raised by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and because the argument falls within the scope of § 2255 111 we treat it as a collateral attack under that statute.” Id. Because Smith did not raise this issue at trial or on direct appeal, Smith has procedurally defaulted his Apprendi claim. See United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Smith and holding that Apprendi claims raised for the first time under § 2255 are procedurally defaulted). Furthermore, because this Court has held that the rule announced in Apprendi “does not apply retroactively on collateral review, [Smith] cannot challenge his conviction on the basis of any such error.” Id.

Accordingly, we affirm Smith’s sentence. The Government’s unopposed motion to augment the record is granted. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED 
      
      . United States v. Smith, No. 93-5884, 1994 WL 706125 (4th Cir. Dec.20, 1994) (unpublished). Although we reversed two counts of conviction and merged them with two of the remaining counts, this part of the decision has no effect on the case before us today.
     
      
      . This amendment lowered the maximum base offense level dictated by the drug quantity table in USSG § 2D1.1. The amendment is retroactive under USSG § IB 1.10(c), p.s. For Smith, the result was a reduction in his sentencing range from mandatory life imprisonment to 360 months to life.