Case ID: ill-app_195/html/0418-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Holdom", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Louis Friedman, Defendant in Error, v. Schreiber Brothers Company, Plaintiff in Error.
    Gen. No. 20,538.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John J. Rooney, Judge, presiding.
    Heard in this court at the March term, 1915.
    Affirmed.
    Opinion filed December 6, 1915.
    
      Statement of the Case.
    Action by Louis Friedman, plaintiff, against the Schreiber Brothers Company, a corporation, defendant, in the Municipal Court of Chicago, to recover on a contract of employment, executed by both parties to the action, which was in the following words:
    “Memorandum of agreement made this 21st day of August, 1912? by and between Louis Friedman, of the City of Chicago, County of Cook and State of Illinois, party of the first part, and Schreiber Brothers Co., a corporation, duly organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, party of the second part, witnesseth:
    “That the said party of the second part hereby employs the said party of the first part in the capacity of Foreman, Bectifyer and Supervisor of the business of said corporation, for which said corporation agrees to pay said party of the first part for such services the sum of Twenty-seven Dollars and, Fifty Cents ($27.50) every week, said payments to begin on September 1st, 1912, and every week thereafter to September 1st, 1913; and the sum of Thirty Dollars ($30.00) every week beginning from September 1st, 1913, to September 1st, 1914; all of above mentioned payments are to be made on Friday of each week.
    “The said party of the first part agrees during the time of this contract not to engage in any other line of business, and shall receive two weeks vacation each year with full pay.”
    Plaintiff was discharged by defendant December 10, 1913, without cause, and received, substantially, payment at the rate fixed by the contract to the time of such discharge. He was again employed February 14, 1914.
    Defendant tendered to the court propositions of law to the effect that the contract was void for want of mutuality and indefiniteness, and that it was terminable at defendant’s pleasure, and that therefore plaintiff could recover only for the time he actually worked.
    
      Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Master and servant, § 3
      
      —when contract not void. In an action to recover on a written contract of employment, contract construed and propositions of law to the effect the contract was void for want of mutuality and indefiniteness held properly rejected by the trial court as not correctly stating the law of the case.
    2. Master and servant, § 14
      
      —when contract not determinable at will. In an action to recover on a written contract of employment, contract construed and held that a proposition of law to the effect that the contract was terminable at the pleasure of defendant, and that plaintiff could recover only for the time he worked thereunder, was properly rejected as not correctly stating the law of the case.
    3. Master and servant, § 14
      
      —when contract construed as for definite period. A contract providing that plaintiff shall be employed by defendant and requiring defendant to pay to plaintiff for his services a stated sum each week, commencing at a named date and continuing thereafter until a named date, is susceptible only of the construction that the term of such contract is intended to be two years, where it appears that the mutual covenants of the contract continue over a period of two years, although such period is nowhere therein stated as the term thereof, since equivalent words are found in such contract.
    4. Master and servant, § 14
      
      —when terms employed, indicate contract for definite period. Where a contract of employment does not in express words state the term during which the contract is to operate, but provides for a series of payments to be made each week without interruption during a period which is in fact two years, and which also provides that plaintiff “is to have two weeks vacation in each year with full pay,” held that there was no ambiguity in the contract; “each year,” as used therein meaning “each year” of a two years’ contract.
    
      To reverse a judgment for plaintiff for $500, defendant prosecutes this writ of error.
    Harry G. Wexler, for plaintiff in error; Hyman Soboroff, of counsel.
    Dulsky & Dulsky, for defendant in error; Edward H. Taylor, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Justice Holdom

delivered the opinion of the court.