Case ID: f-appx_688/html/0450-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Alma Rosa NAVARRETE-PRADO, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 15-73180
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 19, 2017
    Thomas Damien Pamilla,. Attorney, Law Offices of Thomas D. Pamilla, APC, Fremont, CA, for Petitioner
    David H. Wetmore, Attorney, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R, App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Alma Rosa Navarrete-Prado, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her motion to reopen exclusion proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of á motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarrete-Prado’s motion as untimely, where the motion was filed more than 15 years after the applicable regulatory deadline of September 30,1996, and she did not establish any grounds for equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (“A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.”); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling is applied in cases where despite all due diligence, the party invoking equitable tolling is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim (citation omitted)). In addition, Navarrete-Prado has not established grounds for equitable estoppel based on alleged IJ misconduct. See Socop-Gonzalez, 272 F.3d at 1184 (equitable estoppel requires a showing of affirmative misconduct — a “deliberate lie” or “pattern of false promises” — by a government actor).

Navarrete-Prado’s contention that the agency erred in denying sua sponte reopening for failure to demonstrate exceptional circumstances does not raise a legal or constitutional error to invoke our jurisdiction. See Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

In light of these determinations, we do not reach Navarrete-Prado’s remaining contentions regarding her underlying 1993 exclusion proceedings and her eligibility for adjustment of status.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.