Case ID: scl_34/html/0269-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Frost, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State v. James V. Thomas et al.
    
    As a general rule, it is sufficient in an indictment, to state an offence in the words' of the Statute which creates it.
    It is not a part of the description of the offence, in the Act of 1821, that the person charged should know the slave to be a runaway: the act of harboring and concealing imports a sense of criminality, which can only arise from a knowledge that the slave so kept is a runaway.
    In a trial for harboring a slave, described in the indictment as the property of the owner, it is necessary to identify him by the name by which he was known as the owner’s property, and not by that which the defendant had imposed on him, assumed for the purpose of concealment.
    When no design to misrepresent is charged against a witness, in consequence of his relation to the party or to the cause, evidence of similar statements made by him on former occasions, is not admissible to support the truth of what he may testify.
    Acts of 1821, p. 20.
    
      Before O’Neall, J. at Chester, Fall Term, 1848.
    The defendants, under the first sec. of the Act of 1821, were indicted for harboring a runaway slave, the property of George Kaigler. The slave was named Willis, he was purchased by the prosecutor, Geo. Kaigler of Lexington, from Mr. Cook, of Fairfield, last of November, or first of December, 1846. Mr. Kaigler had him in possession about three weeks; he left his wagon in Columbia; and his master found him in the Chester jail about May or June, 1847.
    James V. Thomas, and his two sons, the other defendants, a white man, Henry McCaslin, and a free negro, named Pri-sock, had descended the Broad river, in a boat laden with cotton. They had been in Columbia on the 27th of January, 1847. — They were on their way up the river, tvhen on the evening of the 28th, about sun down, a negro hailed the boat, and asked “ dont you want to hire a hand ?” The witness, McCaslin, said “ he is some runaway, let us go on.” The defendant Jas. Y., said, “ come to the Flaming Sword Landing,” then a mile above, “ and bring your master with you, and I’ll hire or buy.” This witness, McCaslin, said, after night, and after he had been asleep, the negro came with a white man, or boy, calling himself James Boyd, who said he was the negro’s master. The defendant, James Y., and he traded. James Y. was to keep the negro on hire, $45 — till Christmas — or if he and the negro liked one another, he was to pay $525, and keep the negro. (This witness, McCaslin, was the defendant’s witness.) He said the note for the hire, or for the price of the negro, was to be left with Lakin’s Tom, a negro slave, having charge of Mr. Lakin’s Mill on Broad river. The witness said that next morning, finding the negro man on the boat, he spoke to the defendant and his sons, and ^said, “it looked d — —d bad, and they would all look ' nice, if they were taken to Winnsboro to jail.” He said the negro was no koat hand, knew nothing about a boat. He said he would not have trusted James Y. for such a sum as the price of the negro. James Y. was pretty clearly shown to be insolvent; his son Christopher owned the land where they lived. He and his sons (the defendants,) lived together; they owned every thing on the place. The negro was known by the name of “ Joe,” while in their possession. He passed up in the boat, to the residence of the defendants, in Chester district, and there remained until the last of May or first of June, 1847, when Preston Worthy, Wyatt Worthy, and David Pinchback went to the house of the defendants, James Y. and his sous, and arrested the negro as a runaway and carried him to.Chester jail. They interposed no objection, indeed James Y. advised he should be taken to jail, when they claimed to take him as a runaway. The negro was kept publicly; worked openly, on the plantation; went to log-rollings and worked on the road. The defendant, Christopher, told one of the witnesses, John Worthy, that he bought the boy for $525 — he said he had thought it was James Boyd from whom he bought — afterwards he said he thought it was young Cook. It appeared from a conversation had with James Y., by Mr. Kaigler, and detailed by him, that in reply to a question put by Kaigler, why he, James Y. did not tell Kinsler he had such a boy in his possession, he, James Y., said he knew from Kinsler’s description, that he was the same negro : but as he had bought him he would not tell he had him in possession. He said too, that he knew the negro had passed up the trip before, on Smith’s boat, and that he passed as a freeman. He told Mr. Kaigler that he was to give $525 for the negro and to pay the money to Lakin’s Tom, or leave a note. He afterwards said he bought from Boyd, and then from Cook. He said he would pay to Kaigler the hire, to escape from attending Court. The witness said he himself wished to compromise the case, when this conversation took place. The defendant told him he kept the negro publicly : sent him to log rollings. The defendant James Y. Said, he found the boy on the bank of Broád river at night. He said, at first, Tom and Willis came: he refused to trade with them: he sent them for a pass and they returned with a white man, from whom he bought. He said the first he knew of the boy he hailed the boat and asked “ if he did’nt want to hire?” He said he told him he would rather purchase than hire, though he said he and his boys would hire.
    The defendants proposed, as their first ground states, to prove that Henry McCaslin had, before any controversy occurred, made the same statement out of Court, which he made then; in Court. The State did not impeach the witness, or in any shape question his veracity, further than inconsis-t tencies were apparent in his statement. Indeed he was a most important witness for the State, to fix the charge upon the defendants. The testimony offered was excluded. The case was fully and fairly submitted to the jury, who convicted all the defendants.
    The defendants appealed, and moved the Court of Appeals for a new trial, on the following grounds, viz:
    1st. Because the Court refused to permit the defendants to prove that Henry McCaslin had made the same statements, out of Court, before there was any contest, as made now by him in Court.
    2nd. Because the defendants were not guilty of harboring the slave, as he was kept publicly near wheie he was sold, by a man who called himself James Boyd, and there was no proof to show that he knew he belonged to George Kaigler, and where he resided at the time.
    .3rd. Because the defendants are indicted for harboring William, sometimes called Willis, when it should have been Joe.
    4th. Because all the defendants ought not to have been convicted, as appeared from the affidavit of the prosecutor, and the evidence in the case.
    5th. Because the indictment did not charge that the de • fendants knew the slave was a runaway.
    
      A. W. Thomson, for the motion.
    Dawkins, Solicitor, contra.
   Frost, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The indictment charges, in the words of the Act of 1821, that the defendants did “ harbour, conceal and entertain a fugitive or runaway slave,” named William, sometimes called Willis, the property of George Kaigler. As a general rule it is sufficient to state an offence in the words of the statute which creates it. It is not a part of the description of the of-fence, in the Act, that the person charged should know the slave to be a runaway. The act of harboring and concealing imports a sense of criminality, which can only arise from a knowledge that the person, so kept, is a runaway slave. The mere possession of a runaway slave would not complete the offence charged in the indictment, though unexplained it would raise the presumption of guilt. But the presumption may be repelled by proof of circumstances shewing an innocent possession. The offence of harboring must then be determined as a question of fact, depending on all the circumstances of the case.

It is very clear that evidence of similar statements, made by him on former occasions, is not admissible to support the truth of what a witness may testify. Nor can the evidence offered, be admitted under the exception to the rule, stated in 1 Greenleaf’s Ev. 549, that, when a design to misrepresent is ""charged against a witness, in consequence of his relation to the party or to the cause, it may be proper to shew that he made a similar statement before that relation existed. The Avi'tness had no relation whatever to the defendants, nor to the cause, more than every witness has, who testifies to facts within his own observation and hearing. Nor was the witness charged with misrepresentation on account of any such relation. The truth of his testimony was tried only by the consistency and probability of his statements.

The slave being described as the property of Kaigler, it was necessary to identify'him by thename by which he was known as Kaiglers property; and" not by that which the defendants imposed on the slave, assumed for the purpose of concealment. Kaigler’s runaway slave was not named .Toe. It only suited the purposes of the defendants to call him so.

The other grounds of appeal are answered by the evidence and verdict.

The motion is dismissed.

R.ICHARDSON, J.-O’NeALL, J. — EVANS, J. — and WITHERS, J. — concurred.

Motion refused.