Case ID: sw2d_4/html/0073-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MARTIN, J. HAWKINS, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

WIMBERLY v. STATE.
    (No. 11056.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 2, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied March 21, 1928.
    I. Libel and slander <⅞=>144 — Indictment alleging statement that certain person was pimping for his mother held to charge slander as imputing unchastity to the mother.
    Indictment for slander alleging that defendant stated that son was doing nothing but pimping for his mother, meaning that mother was having intercourse with men other than her husband, and that the son was soliciting such intercourse, held sufficient as a whole to charge offens,e, since clearly imputing to the mother a want of chastity.
    2. Libel and-slander <⅜=>152(5) — Indictment for slander alleging name of person held not at variance with proof that defendant used pro-: noun “he.”
    In prosecution for slander, fact that indictment alleged name used by defendant held not to constitute variance with proof showing that defendant had used pronoun “he,” instead of proper name; it being clearly shown of whom he was speaking; all that was necessary being that words must be substantially proved as alleged.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Libel and slander <3=3 152(5) — Failure to prove meaning of expression “pimping” held immaterial, in view of generally accepted meaning.
    In prosecution for slander, failure to prove allegation of indictment as to meaning of expression “pimping” held immaterial; term having generally accepted meaning, as one who provides gratification for the lust of others.
    [Ed. Note. — Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Pimp.]
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Gillespie County; J. H. McLean, Judge.
    Joe Wimberly was convicted of slander, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    W. C. Linden, of San Antonio, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   MARTIN, J.

The offense is slander and the punishment a fine of $500 and six months’ imprisonment in the county jail.

The indictment is attacked, principally upon the ground that the language charged to have been used by appellant was not spoken of nor concerning the female Emma Klearner, but was spoken of and concerning Eugene Klearner, and that such language does no't impute a want of chastity to the female Emma Klearner. Three slanderous statements appear in the indictment, two of which we are inclined to think are abusive epithets rather than imputations of a lack of chastity. The third statement is:

“That one Eugene Klearner was doing nothing else but pimping for his mother, by which was meant that the said Emma Klearner was having carnal intercourse with other m,en, other than her husband, and that the said Eugene Klear-ner was soliciting other men to have carnal intercourse with the said Emma Klearner.”

It was also alleged that “Eugene Klearner is the son of Emma Klearner.” We think this language clearly imputes to the female Emma Klearner a want of chastity, and that the indictment as a whole is sufficient to charge' the offense of slander.

Nor do we think there is any merit to appellant’s contention that there was a variance between the indictment and evidence, in that the testimony shows the names of Emma Klearner and Eugene Klearner were not used by appellant. It was shown that the slanderous language occurred in a restaurant, and that said Eugene Klearner left about the time appellant and his companion entered, and that appellant immediately began applying vile epithets towards him, which continued until the language above mentioned was used. The testimony fairly considered shows that the pronoun “he” was used by appellant instead of the words “Eugene Klearner,” as charged in the indictment. It was clearly shown of whom appellant was speaking and was proved without controversy that, his mother was Emma Klearner. It is only required that the words must be substantially proved as alleged. Oonlee v. State, 14 Tex. App. 222. This proof could have in no wise misled appellant.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J.

Appellant renews insistence that the state failed to make out its case in omitting to prove the allegation in the indictment averring what was meant by the expression “pimping for his mother.” The term “pimp” seems to have received judicial interpretation which is in line with its generally accepted meaning:

“Pimp. One who provides for others the means of gratifying lust; a pander; one who provides gratification for the lust of others; a procurer, a panderer.” 30 Cyc. Law & Proc. p. 1624, where citation to cases may be found.

See, also, Webster’s International Dictionary for precisely the same definition.

It would seem that the words used by appellant are well understood without the state resorting to proof of their meaning.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
      €=>For otter casen see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes