Case ID: so2d_745/html/0340-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William BRIMAGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 98-2393.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    June 16, 1999.
    
      Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Rosa C. Figarola, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mark Rosenblatt, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before NESBITT, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Appellant argues, and the state correctly concedes, that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender upon revocation of probation in case numbers 89-31657 and 88-45148A. The written sentencing orders do not reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement regarding case numbers 89-31657 and 88-45148A, where appellant was sentenced to one year and one day in state prison, not as a habitual offender, but rather concurrently with a habitual offender sentence imposed in another case. A written sentencing order must conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. See Tannehill v. State, 712 So.2d 438 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). Moreover, a trial court cannot habitualize a defendant on a case if it did not, at the time of the original sentencing, have the option of imposing a habitual offender sentence. See Snead v. State, 616 So.2d 964 (Fla.1993).

Reversed and remanded with directions to strike the habitual offender designation in the written sentences for case numbers 89-31657 and 88-45148A.