Case ID: f-appx_465/html/0016-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John W. LEVERMORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ananda DeSILVA, The Estate of Macio Jackson, Karla M. Scott, Executrix, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-4900-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 16, 2012.
    Walter Theodore Charlton, Woodsboro, MD, for Appellant.
    Pro se, for Appellees.
    Samantha B. Lansky, Milber, Makris, Plousadis & Seiden, LLP, Woodbury, NY, for Amicus Curiae.
    PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges and MIRIAM GOLDMAN CEDARBAUM, District Judge.
    
    
      
       Judge Miriam Goldman Cedarbaum, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant John W. Levermore appeals from the district court’s October 2010 grant of summary judgment in favor of Ananda DeSilva and the Estate of Ma-cio Jackson and denial of joinder of Joseph Albano and the Internal Revenue Service. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

The district court did not err in finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact relating to the timeliness of Lever-more’s fraud claims. Under New York’s statute of limitations, a fraud claim is time-barred if it is brought more than six years after the commission of the fraud unless it is brought within two years from the time the plaintiff “discovered the fraud, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.” NY CPLR § 213(8). Levermore’s fraud claims relate to events in 1999 and 2000, but he did not file suit until 2008. He argues that the district court should have tolled the limitations period because defendants’ actions prevented him from discovering defendants’ fraud. Cf. SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 59-60 (2d Cir.2011).

Equitable tolling, however, is not appropriate where a plaintiff does not act with reasonable diligence. Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 478, 490-92, 836 N.Y.S.2d 509, 517-18, 868 N.E.2d 189 (2007); see also Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 11-12 (2d Cir.1996); Dodds v. Cigna Secs., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir.1993).

The district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact because Levermore was aware of the basic facts — the transactions he now argues are fraudulent — between 2000 and 2003. Because Levermore could have investigated at that time but did not do so, he failed to act with the diligence necessary for equitable tolling. See Johnson, 86 F.3d at 12. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Levermore’s fraud claims as time-barred.

Levermore does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his contract claims for failure to meet the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.