Case ID: f-appx_698/html/0522-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Demond Maurice MIMMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gail LEWIS; Oscar Pena, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-56868
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    Filed October 5, 2017
    Demond Maurice Mimms, Los Angeles, CA, Pro Se.
    Jay M. Goldman, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App, P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Demond Maurice Mimms, a former California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Mimms’s action because Mimms filed his action more than three years after he be-' gan serving his prison sentence for his 1998 criminal conviction. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (statute of limitations begins to run “when the alleged false imprisonment ends” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (in California, prior to 2003, one year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions; prisoners entitled to two years of statutory tolling).

Contrary to Mimms’s contentions, he is not entitled to equitable tolling because there would be substantial prejudice to defendants in gathering evidence to defend against Mimms’s claims and because Mimms failed to demonstrate good faith and reasonable conduct. See Fink v. She dler, 192 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1999) (three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.