Case ID: sc-eq_35/html/0150-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Wardlaw, A. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

J. C. Craig and Wife vs. C. G. Pervis and others.
    
      Scaling — Evidence— Confederate Money.
    
    Promissory note for $1,000, dated 30tli March, 1864, and payable “at the end of the war without interest.” Held that, under the ordinance of I860, it was competent to prove by parol, that the note was given for $1,000 in Confederate money, and that it was agreed that it should be paid at the end of the war in whatever money Was then current.
    
      Held, further, that the payee was entitled only to the value of the Confederate money at the time of the loan, hut that interest should he added from that time and not merely from the end of the war.
    BEFORE JOHNSON, OH. AT CHESTERFIELD, FEBRUARY, 1868.
    By a decree in this cause, the creditors of John C. Pervis, deceased, were called in to prove their claims, before a special referee — the Commissioner of the Court being a party complainant, James W. Steagall, one of the creditors, proved a note of which tbe following is a copy, viz.,
    $1,000. Cheraw, S. C., March 30th, 1864.
    One day after date, I promise to pay J. W. Steagall one thousand dollars. Payable at the end of tbe war without interest, for value received.
    J. 0. Pervis.
    The following extracts from the report of the special referee, of the testimony and tbe claims proved before bim, explains the character of the controversy between the parties.
    Extract from report of tbe testimony:
    
      “ J. W. Steagall, sworn: ‘The consideration of this note was Confederate money loaned. The full sum of $1,000 was to be paid at the end of the war, in whatever money was current at that time, and it was in consideration of this fact that no interest was claimed.’ This last statement was objected to by Mclver & Moore, solicitors for tbe estate, and its competency as evidence was insisted upon by Prince, solicitor for Steagall, on tbe ground that it merely explained, and did not vary the terms of tbe note.”
    Extract from report on claims:
    “It is claimed on behalf of the estate, that this note, being evidence of indebtedness arising out of a transaction which took place at a late period of the war, when the currency of the country was very much inflated, is liable to be reduced in its amount under tbe provisions of the ordinance of tbe convention of this State, and it being in evidence that tbe consideration of this note was Confederate mpney loaned, the ‘Augusta scale’ was agreed upon as tbe proper basis of reduction, if it be held to be liable to reduction at all. On behalf of Steagall, it is contended that this note does not come within the intention of tbe ordinance referred to, since the understanding of tbe parties at tbe time tbe note was given was, that tbe full amount of $1,000 was to be paid at tbe end of the war, in funds current at that time. The testimony of Steagall in reference to this point, is, that the full sum of $1,000 was to be paid at tbe end of the war in whatever money should be current at that time, and that it was in consideration of this fact that tbe words ‘ without interest,’ were inserted in the note. This testimony of Steagall was objected to by tbe counsel for tbe estate and was supported by tbe counsel for Steagall, on tbe ground that it merely explained tbe terms of tbe note and did not vary them. The evidence and tbe argument have however failed to convince tbe mind of the referee, that this is not a proper subject of reduction according to tbe provisions of the ordinance, and be has therefore, on the basis of the scale agreed upon between the parties, reduced the face of the note to $68.63. He therefore reports the amount proved on this claim as $81.63, being the reduced amount and interest thereon, from 15th May, 1865, to 1st February, 1868.”
    Stegall excepted to the report. Because the note on its face shows that it was the true meaning of the contract and the intention of the parties, that the full sum of $1,000 was to be paid at the end of the war, in whatever currency should be then in use, and the evidence proves the same.
    His Honor, the Chancellor, overruled the exceptions, and Steagall appealed and moved this Court, to reverse the ruling of his Honor on the following grounds, viz.:
    1. Because his Honor erred in ruling that the note for $1,000, made by John C. Pervis to the said Steagall, payable “at the end of the war,” “without interest,” fell within the operation of the ordinance of the convention, and was subject to reduction, when the said note upon its face bore conclusive evidence of the meaning of the contract, and the intention of the parties, without resorting to the provisions of the ordinance to ascertain them.
    2. Because his Honor erred in ruling that the said note ought to be reduced, when the evidence was that the parties themselves, taking into consideration the true value of the consideration and the circumstances of the transaction, fixed the amount and provided for the very exigencies which have since befallen, and to alter the amount under such circumstances, is to interfere with and impair, and not to explain the contract.
    Prime, for appellant.
    
      Mclver, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Wardlaw, A. J.

The appellant, Steagall, has had the advantage of his own testimony, notwithstanding the objections made to it, and perhaps the propriety of its admission might be safely rested on its consistency with the terms of the note, whilst it showed a reason for introduction of the words “ without interest.” But the ordinance of September, 1865, removes all doubt, for under that it tended to show the “ real character ” of the consideration of the contract, and the circumstances attending it. The case of Rutland vs. Copes, decided in the Court of Appeals, May, 1867, and in the Court of Errors, December, 1867, (ante p. 81,) held that the ordinance extended to all actions upon contracts made within the time therein mentioned, that it was not unconstitutional, and that under it, when evidence of the true value and real character of the consideration had been heard, the jury, Judge or Chancellor, as the case may be, having “regard to the particular circumstances of each case,” shall render such verdict or decree as will effect substantial justice between the parties.” The value of the consideration has in this case been established, and this Court perceives nothing in the character of the consideration or in the circumstances of the case, which should alter the report that has been confirmed by the Chancellor, except this, viz., according to the terms of the note all interest has been excluded, from it’s date until May 15, 1865, fixed for the “end of the war;" but when the sum in the note was reduced, to effect substantial justice, interest from the date of the note should have been allowed for the same purpose. With the slight modification here suggested, the report and the decree confirming the same are affirmed. Let the Commissioner amend his report as thus required.

Dun kin, C. J., and Inglis, A. J., concurred.

Decree modified.