Case ID: so2d_310/html/0380-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. McNULTY, Chief Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re the MARRIAGE OF Leo J. GOLUB, husband, and Rebecca N. Golub, wife.
    No. 74-1056.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Feb. 7, 1975.
    Rehearing Denied April 11, 1975.
    Gerald C. Surf us, Nelson, Stinnett, Sur-fus, Payne, Hesse & Cyril, Sarasota, for Husband.
    C. Eugene Jones, Ginsburg, Ross, Dent & Byrd, Sarasota, for Wife.
   PER CURIAM.

The Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota County, has certified the following question to this court:

UPON THE ENTRY OF A JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION IN THIS CAUSE WOULD THE TRIAL JUDGE THEREAFTER LACK THE AUTHORITY TO THEREAFTER AWARD THE WIFE-RESPONDENT HEREIN ALIMONY, SPECIAL EQUITIES IN THE HUSBAND-PETITIONER’S ASSETS OR DECLARE HER TO BE THE OWNER OF CERTAIN ASSETS PRESENTLY HELD BY THE HUSBAND-PETITIONER EVEN THOUGH THE JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION SPECIFICALLY RESERVED THE RIGHT TO THEREAFTER DETERMINE THE CLAIMS OF ALIMONY, SPECIAL EQUITIES AND OWNERSHIP?

Hyman v. Hyman, (Fla.App.2d, 1975) 310 So.2d 378, makes it clear that the trial judge has the authority upon entry of a judgment of dissolution to reserve jurisdiction to thereafter determine property rights. Therefore, the above-stated' certified question is hereby answered in the negative.

HOBSON and GRIMES, JJ., concur.

McNULTY, C. J., dissents with opinion.

McNULTY, Chief Judge

(dissenting).

I fear such a departure from precedent in permitting interlocutory judgments of dissolution will open the floodgates to untold, unforeseeable vices. I must, accordingly, dissent, and would answer the question in the affirmative.