Case ID: mass_2/html/0162-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker, J. Sedgwick, J. \n      * Parsons, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jonathan Hunt & Ux., Appellants, versus Oliver Holden.
    A testator, m case certain devises and bequests to his widow should prove insufficient for her comfortable support, directs his executor to sell certain land for that end. Supplies furnished to the widow by a stranger, after the death of the executor, create no legal demand on the testator’s estate in virtue of suck direction.
    [And there being no personal estate, or debts due from the estate to the value or amount of five pounds, unless this were such a debt within the meaning of the act, March, 1784, § 10, — held that letters of administration could not be granted.] '
    
    This was an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate for this county, granting to the appellee administration de bonis non, with the will annexed, of Seth Sweetser, deceased. The reasons of appeal filed in the Probate Court, pursuant to the statute, were,
    1. There is no personal estate of the deceased, not administered by the former executors, to the amount of five pounds.
    
    
      2. There are no debts due from the. said estate of the like or greater value.
    
      The testator, after sundry bequests of personal estate, and the devise of the use of certain parts of his real estate to his wife, adds the following clause: “ Further, if my wife remain my widow, and it should happen that, by reason of sickness or age, what I have given her should not be sufficient for her comfortable support, then, and in such case, my will is that my other executor dispose of so much of my estate as shall be necessary for that end.” And he made his wife, and Henry P. Sweetser, his executors.
    * It was agreed that the case provided for in the will [ * 169 | had happened, and that the appellee had supplied the widow with necessaries for her comfortable support, and that the other executor had died before, so that the power to sell the real estate for this object could not be executed. Upon this claim of the appellee, the administration was granted to him.
    The question was, whether the appellee, in virtue of his having furnished these supplies to the widow of the testator, is a creditor to the estate, and, as such, entitled to administration de bonis non
    
   Parker, J.

It is agreed that no debt exists against this estate, for which an administration should be granted, unless this claim of Mr. Holden is to be so considered. But it appears to me that the aids furnished the widow of the testator by Mr. H. can in - no way constitute a legal demand on the estate. The letter of administration, therefore, issued improvidently, and the decree must be reversed.

Sewall, J., concurred.

Sedgwick, J.

Two cases only are pointed out, in the statute, which authorize the granting of an administration de bonis non; viz., debts due from the estate to the amount of five pounds or upwards, and personal estate of like value not administered. In the case before us, it is not pretended there is any personal estate of the deceased remaining to be administered. Are there debts due from the estate to the amount required in the statute ? To show that there are, a clause in the will is. produced, which authorizes an executor to sell land, if necessary to the comfortable support of the testator’s widow. It is agreed that the case in the will really happened, i. e., that, through age or sickness, the specific provision made for her in the will became insufficient, and that the present appellee furnished her with the aids necessary to her comfortable support. Is this, then, a foundation of a legal claim on the estate of the testator ? I am clearly of opinion that it is not. No action would have laid against the executors. The clause in the will, which is relied upon, created a mere personal trust in the executor, which ceased at his death. I think the decree must be reversed.

* Parsons, C. J.

The decision of this question must turn on a single point, viz., whether there was personal estate of the value of five pounds, or debts due from the estate of a like amount. One of these must be true, or the statute forbids an administration de bonis non to be granted. No personal estate is pretended in this case ; but it is attempted to show a debt due under a clause in the will making provision for the testator’s widow, in the event that the provisions previously made should prove insufficient. It is agreed that she needed the aids intended her, and that the appellee furnished them. But it is very clear that the authority given by this clause to one of the executors to sell land for the particular purpose, cannot support an action at law, as for a debt due from the testator. It was a mere personal trust originating in the will. Had we a court of chancery, there might have been power to enforce the execution of the trust, and perhaps an action might have lain against the executor while living. But it is enough for the present purpose, that this can in no sense be considered as a legal demand on the estate of the testator as for a debt due from him.

The .statute authorizes an administration de bonis non on the oath of the party applying; but this is not conclusive evidence either with the judge of probate, or with this Court upon the appeal. The decree is reversed.

Costs for the appellants. 
      
      
         Vide Stat. March, 1784, § ]0, 1817, c. 190, § 17.
     
      
       The decree of the judge of probate was made August 6, and the appeal was claimed September 5. A question arose whether the claim was made within “ one month,” as the statute requires.
      The Chief Justice said it had been settled that, by month, in the statute, is intended a calendar month,  — Reporter.
      
     
      
      
        Avery vs. Pixley & Al. 4 Mass. Rep. 460.— Commonwealth vs. Chambre, 4 Dall. 144. — Moore vs. Houston, 3 S. & R. 169. — Kimball vs. Lamson, 2 Vern. R. 138. — Cooke vs. Shute, Cooke, 67. — Sed vide Co. Lit. 131.—2 Bl. Com. 141,— Leffingwell vs. Pierpont, 1 Johns. Cas. 99. — Loring vs. Halling, 15 Johns. 119. — Lacon vs. Hooper, 6 D. & E. 226. — 1 Esp. R. 249. — Jackson vs. Clark, 7 Johns. 217. — King vs. Adderly, Doug. 463. — Glassington vs. Rawlins, 3 East, 407.—Talbot vs. Linfield, Bl. R. 450. — 3 Burr. 1455. — Lang vs. Gale, 1 M. & S. 111. — Jocelyn vs. Hawkins, 1 Str. 446. — Thomas vs. Popham, Dyer, 2186. — Bishop of Peterborough vs. Catesby, Cro. Jac. 166. — Barsdale vs. Morgan, 4 mod. 185. — Hurd vs. Leach, 5 Esp. 167.— Crooke vs. M’Tavish, 1 Bingh. 307. — Dormer vs. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 835.—2 Rolle, Abr. Temps, (c) p. 521. — Litt. Rep. 19. — King vs. Packham, Carth. 406. — 2 Roll. R. 179. — Dixie's case, 1 Leon. 96. — Catesby's case, 6 Coke, 61, b. — Sharp vs. Hubbard, 2 Mod. 58. — Lutw. 461. — Cockell vs. Gray, 6 Moore, 483. — S. C. 3 Br. & B. 186. But in ecclesiastical and mercantile matters, calendar months shall be in tended.—2 Mod. 58.-6 Co. 71. — Cro. Jac. 141. —160 Jenk. 282.— Yeh. 100. — Skin. 313 — 1 Str. 652—3 Br. & Bing. 186. — Bayley on Bills, 113, ed. 1811.