Case ID: f-appx_707/html/0934-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Balbir SINGH, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 16-73683
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 21, 2017
    
      Balbir Singh, Pro Se
    OIL, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, DOJ; — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Alexander Jacob Lutz, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      
         The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P, 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Balbir Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions pro se for review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and thus is not entitled to relief from his administrative removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the IJ’s factual findings. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of persecution on account of a protected ground. See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 2011) (mistreatment motivated purely by personal retribution does not bear a nexus to a protected ground); Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir. 2011) (testimony of petitioner’s belief that relocation would not be safe or reasonable was, by itself, insufficient to meet petitioner’s burden of proof).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that Singh failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government. See Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836-37.

We reject, as unsupported by the record, Singh’s contentions that the IJ violated his due process rights. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due process claim),

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED, 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.