Case ID: nw2d_916/html/0844-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Talbot, C.J. Tukel, J. (concurring). Meter, J. (dissenting).", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jeremy DROUILLARD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 334977
    Court of Appeals of Michigan.
    Submitted February 6, 2018, at Detroit. Decided February 27, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.
    Mark Granzotto, PC (by Mark Granzotto ) and Fraser & Souweidane (by Stuart A. Fraser IV ) for plaintiff.
    kallas & henk, pc (by Contantine N. Kallas and Michele L. Riker-Semon ) for defendant.
    Before: Talbot, C.J., and Meter and Tukel, JJ.
   Talbot, C.J.

Defendant, American Alternative Insurance Corporation (AAIC), appeals by leave granted an order denying its motion for summary disposition in this dispute over uninsured motorist coverage. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of AAIC.

On the evening of October 13, 2014, plaintiff, Jeremy Drouillard, an emergency medical technician, was involved in a single-vehicle accident while riding as a passenger in an ambulance driven by his partner, Angelica Schoenberg. Schoenberg and Drouillard were traveling westbound on Griswold, in "lights and sirens mode," on their way to a service call near the intersection of Griswold and 14th Street. Schoenberg opined that she was driving less than 45 miles per hour when the ambulance suddenly struck something in the intersection of Griswold and 13th Street. She did not know what she struck until she exited the ambulance and saw drywall dust and debris scattered in the roadway. As a result of the accident, Drouillard suffered injuries to his lumbar spine and was eventually disabled from work.

The events surrounding the accident were witnessed by three bystanders, who resided in homes fronting Griswold near the intersection with 13th Street. According to these bystanders, a white pickup truck driving on 13th Street darted across Griswold in front of the ambulance. The rapid acceleration of the truck caused a large quantity of building materials to fall from the truck's bed or trailer into the roadway, blocking both traveling lanes on Griswold. Shortly thereafter, the ambulance entered the intersection and struck the building materials.

Drouillard's employer maintained insurance for the ambulance through a policy issued by AAIC, which included an endorsement for Michigan uninsured motorist coverage. The endorsement stated that AAIC would pay all amounts an insured individual was entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an "uninsured motor vehicle." Pertinent to this matter, the policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle" as follows:

"Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or "trailer":
* * *
d. That is a hit-and-run vehicle and neither the driver nor owner can be identified. The vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit, an "insured", a covered "auto" or a vehicle an "insured" is "occupying". If there is no direct physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the "accident" must be corroborated by competent evidence, other than the testimony of any person having a claim under this or any similar insurance as the result of such "accident".

Drouillard filed suit against AAIC on September 21, 2015, seeking uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to the stated policy terms. AAIC admitted that Drouillard was an "insured" who would qualify for uninsured motorist benefits if all other terms and conditions were satisfied, but AAIC maintained that benefits were not available to Drouillard because there was no "uninsured motor vehicle" involved in the accident. AAIC moved for summary disposition on this basis, arguing that the pickup truck did not qualify as a hit-and-run vehicle and that the pickup truck did not cause an object to hit the insured ambulance. The trial court rejected both arguments, and this appeal followed.

This Court reviews de novo rulings on summary disposition motions. AAIC did not identify the subrule under which it brought its motion for summary disposition. However, because AAIC challenged the factual sufficiency of Drouillard's claim and relied on evidence beyond the pleadings, we review the court's ruling under the standards applicable to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) only if "there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ."

"An insurance policy is similar to any other contractual agreement, and, thus, the court's role is to 'determine what the agreement was and effectuate the intent of the parties.' " The Court ascertains the intent of the parties by examining the language employed in the contract. The words and phrases used should be construed in context, and this Court may consult a dictionary in order to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined language. "Every word, phrase, and clause in a contract must be given effect, and [an] interpretation that would render any part of the contract surplusage or nugatory must be avoided." "If the contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the contract as written because an unambiguous contract reflects the parties' intent as a matter of law." "A contract is ambiguous when, after considering the entire contract, its words may reasonably be understood in different ways."

AAIC argues on appeal that it was entitled to summary disposition because there was no evidence that an "uninsured motor vehicle" was involved in the accident in light of the contractual definition of an uninsured motor vehicle as a vehicle that is a "hit-and-run vehicle." Specifically, AAIC argues that the common usage of the phrase "hit-and-run" denotes a knowledge element on the part of the driver, and AAIC calls our attention to various statutes establishing criminal penalties for a " 'driver of a vehicle who knows or who has reason to believe that he or she has been involved in an accident' " but fails to stop at the scene. Drouillard, on the other hand, contends that the phrase "hit-and-run" does not involve a knowledge component and suggests that a hit-and-run vehicle is involved in an accident whenever neither the driver nor the owner of the vehicle can be identified.

We find it unnecessary to determine whether the phrase "hit-and-run vehicle" requires knowledge of the accident on the part of the driver because assuming, without deciding, that knowledge is required, the trial court correctly concluded that questions of fact remained as to that issue. On appeal, AAIC argues that the only evidence of the truck driver's knowledge consisted of eyewitness speculation. Although it is true that "[s]peculation and conjecture are insufficient to create an issue of material fact," a fact-finder could infer from evidence other than eyewitness speculation that the driver was aware that the building materials he was hauling had fallen into the road. Although the eyewitnesses differed as to whether the building materials included lumber or consisted solely of drywall, they agreed that there was such a large amount of materials deposited in the road that the pile measured approximately two feet high. They also agreed that the accident occurred quickly after the materials landed in the roadway: one witness described the lapse of time as approximately three to five seconds; another witness estimated that it was "[m]aybe half a minute, if that"; and a third witness observed that the pickup truck had "barely cleared the intersection" before the ambulance arrived. Given the quantity of dropped materials and the immediacy of the ambulance's collision, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the driver knew about the loss of the building materials from the sudden absence of weight from the vehicle and, in turn, came to realize that the materials had caused an accident. The trial court did not err by reaching the same conclusion.

Next, AAIC argues that the plain language of the insurance policy only provides coverage in these circumstances if the pickup truck caused an object to hit the insured ambulance. Therefore, according to AAIC, it was entitled to summary disposition because the unrefuted evidence demonstrated that the ambulance struck the stationary pile of building materials-the building materials did not strike the ambulance.

As it relates to this issue, the trial court found that it was required by this Court's holding in Dancey , to deny AAIC's motion for summary disposition. In that case, this Court was called upon to interpret identical policy language to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits after she struck a ladder in the roadway when there was no direct evidence that the ladder had fallen from a vehicle. The Court examined a line of cases involving accidents in which a vehicle came into contact with some object cast off from another vehicle. It found the circumstances before it distinguishable from similar cases because there was no "objective and convincing evidence of another unidentified vehicle that could have been the source of the object that made contact with the insured vehicle." Nonetheless, it affirmed the trial court's denial of summary disposition because the accident had occurred on a raised overpass that was only accessible to vehicular traffic. The Court reasoned that even without evidence of an identified vehicle from which the ladder may have fallen, the unique location of the accident created a question of fact "with regard to whether a substantial physical nexus exists between the ladder and an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle."

Importantly, the issue before the Court in Dancey , and the reason for the Court's conclusion, was whether the plaintiff could establish a substantial physical nexus between the ladder and a hit-and-run vehicle. By contrast, as it did in the trial court, AAIC asks this Court to assume for purposes of its appeal that a substantial nexus existed between the pickup truck, the building materials, and the ambulance's impact with the materials. Therefore, we agree with AAIC's contention that the trial court erred by concluding that it was bound to follow the outcome in Dancey . Although Dancey involved the same policy language and substantially similar facts, it did not turn on the same issue-i.e., how to give effect to the language requiring that the hit-and-run vehicle "cause an object to hit" the insured, an insured vehicle, or a vehicle occupied by an insured. Therefore, Dancey was not dispositive of the issue raised by AAIC.

It is evident from the plain language of the policy that coverage is not limited to instances involving direct, physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle. Instead, the policy states that "[t]he vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit , an 'insured', a covered 'auto' or a vehicle an 'insured' is 'occupying[.]' " For that reason, coverage would be afforded in this case despite the absence of physical contact between the ambulance and the pickup truck as long as the pickup truck "cause[d] an object to hit" the ambulance. According to AAIC, this condition was not satisfied because the unrefuted testimony demonstrated that the pickup truck did not cause the building materials to hit the ambulance; rather, the ambulance hit the stationary building materials. We agree.

The construction of the relevant policy language reflects a clear distinction between the direct object and the indirect object. Coverage is available under the policy only if the subject of the sentence (the "vehicle," meaning the hit-and-run vehicle), caused the direct object ("an object") to hit the indirect object ("an 'insured', a covered 'auto' or a vehicle an 'insured' is 'occupying' "). The order of the words in this sentence is grammatically distinct from the language that would be used to describe circumstances in which the hit-and-run vehicle caused the insured to hit an object. Interpreting the language at issue in a manner that would include those circumstances would require a "forced or constrained construction," which should be avoided.

Drouillard relies on a dictionary definition of the verb "to hit" to refute this reading of the policy language. Specifically, Drouillard calls attention to a particular definition of the word "hit": "to come in contact with." However, it is worth noting that the quoted definition is followed by an illustration of the term and definition: "to come in contact with < the ball ~ the window>[.]" In that illustration, the swung dash replaces the word being illustrated. Therefore, the definition proffered by Drouillard is best illustrated by the following usage: "the ball hit the window." Even this definition suggests a distinction between the object doing the hitting-the ball-and the object being hit-the window. In that example, it is certainly true that the ball and window came in contact with each other, but, absent extraordinary circumstances, it is improbable that a window hit a stationary ball.

Accordingly, we must conclude that the plain language of the contract provides uninsured motorist coverage to Drouillard only if the unidentified pickup truck caused an object to hit the insured ambulance, and not vice versa. Reviewing the pertinent section as a whole, the language cannot reasonably be understood in any other way. Importantly, Drouillard and Schoenberg both admitted that the building materials were stationary at the time of the accident, and Schoenberg agreed that, as the driver of the ambulance, she struck the materials in the roadway. Therefore, this is not a situation in which a hit-and-run vehicle caused an object to hit the insured ambulance, and Drouillard is not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under the terms of the policy.

Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of AAIC. We do not retain jurisdiction.

TUKEL, J., concurred with TALBOT, C.J.

Tukel, J. (concurring).

I agree that summary disposition must be granted to defendant, and I join the majority opinion. There are two principal legal points at issue: (1) did the pickup truck hit, or cause an object to hit, the ambulance as required by the policy language for there to be coverage and (2) was the pickup truck a "hit-and-run vehicle" as required by the policy language for there to be coverage. The Chief Judge and I answer the first question in the negative, which is sufficient to mandate summary disposition in favor of defendant. The dissent answers the first question in the affirmative by relying on previous decisions of this Court that have ignored the second question and that have merely assumed that the vehicles at issue in those cases were hit-and-run vehicles. I write separately to identify the assumptions that have been and are being built into our jurisprudence-assumptions I believe merit review by our Supreme Court. Although this case likely does not present the issues clearly enough to warrant that review, I believe those assumptions would merit review in a future case..

I. POLICY LANGUAGE

The policy at issue here required that the pickup truck carrying the drywall "hit, or cause an object to hit , an 'insured', a covered 'auto' or a vehicle an 'insured' is 'occupying[.]' " (Emphasis added.) Rather than focusing on the critical "hit, or cause an object to hit" language, as does the majority, the dissent focuses on this Court's opinion in Dancey v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of America , 288 Mich. App. 1, 792 N.W.2d 372 (2010) :

The majority indicates that the Dancey Court focused on the possibility of a "substantial physical nexus" between the ladder and another vehicle and not on the "cause an object to hit" phrasing from the policy. Implicit in the Dancey Court's holding, however, was that the situation in Dancey satisfied the pertinent language of the policy. Therefore, Dancey provides supportive caselaw for plaintiff's position in the present case. [Post at 230.]

I respectfully disagree. "A point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative." United States v. Oleson , 44 F.3d 381, 387 (C.A. 6, 1995) (Nelson, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Reed , 77 F.3d 139 (C.A. 6, 1996) ; see also Webster v. Fall , 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925) ; Othi v. Holder , 734 F.3d 259, 265 n. 3 (CA 4, 2013) ; Nelson v. Monroe Regional Med. Ctr. , 925 F.2d 1555, 1576 (C.A. 7, 1991). Consequently, the dissent's reliance on Dancey's "[i]mplicit" holding of a point not raised or ruled on, but merely assumed, is misplaced. As the majority opinion properly holds, Dancey did not decide whether the facts of the present case satisfy the requirement in the policy that "[t]he vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit" the insured, and Dancey therefore does not support plaintiff's position regarding that requirement. The majority correctly construes those words, which plainly do not cover the situation here-in which the ambulance hit stationary objects that had been dropped by the pickup truck, rather than the pickup truck causing objects to hit the ambulance.

II. WHAT CONSTITUTES A "HIT-AND-RUN VEHICLE"?

The analysis in Dancey has another flaw-it fails to fully consider what is necessary for a vehicle to constitute a "hit-and-run vehicle," the threshold for coverage in the first instance. Defendant argues that there is no evidence that the driver of the pickup truck knew of an accident and then left the scene, the statutory definition of some hit-and-run offenses. Both the majority and the dissent agree that defendant's reliance on statutory definitions is misplaced; because the term itself is undefined in the policy, statutory definitions have no applicability, and the term must be given its ordinary meaning. See Citizens Ins. Co. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Group, Inc. , 477 Mich. 75, 83, 730 N.W.2d 682 (2007). The majority and dissent also agree that if the term "hit-and-run vehicle" encompasses a requirement that the driver had to have known of the accident, there was sufficient evidence of knowledge here to deny summary disposition on that point. That is so in this case because one fair reading of the record is that the drywall fell off the truck just seconds before the ambulance hit it, as the majority opinion recognizes. Under those circumstances, it is a fair inference that the driver would have felt the shift in weight of the truck, and would have looked up at the rearview mirror and seen the accident or its immediate aftermath. The driver likely would have heard the crash as well. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence in this case to conclude that the truck was a hit-and-run vehicle and that coverage was at least possible, which is sufficient to preclude summary disposition on that issue.

A. HIT AND RUN v RUN AND HIT

Dancey and Berry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 219 Mich. App. 340, 556 N.W.2d 207 (1996), the cases relied on by the dissent and by plaintiff, however, contain a flaw in the form of an assumption that is related to the knowledge issue. The requirement of a "hit-and-run vehicle" requires something basic-that a vehicle hits another vehicle and then runs. Regardless of whether the phrase "hit-and-run" imposes some requirement of knowledge on the part of the driver, its very phrasing imposes a temporal requirement-the "hit" must precede the "run." Dancey discussed only what constitutes the "hit" portion of the analysis; after finding that satisfied, it did not discuss the "run" component at all. Therefore, under Dancey , a vehicle that in some sense starts a chain of events that later causes an accident (thus, according to Dancey , satisfying the "hit, or cause an object to hit" language of the policy) is assumed to constitute a "hit-and-run vehicle." But that cannot be correct, as the facts of Dancey demonstrate.

In Dancey , a ladder fell or dropped off a truck some time before the plaintiff's vehicle struck the ladder on the highway. At least one vehicle in front of the plaintiff's, which had blocked her view, managed to avoid the ladder. Dancey , 288 Mich. App. at 18, 792 N.W.2d 372. Witnesses at the scene talked about a truck that may have dropped the ladder, but the plaintiff did not know whether anyone had seen a truck. Id .

Accordingly, even assuming that the "hit" portion of the hit-and-run requirement was met in Dancey , there was no evidence that the driver fled or "ran" from the accident, even if the driver knew that the ladder had fallen off. Unlike in the present case, there was no immediate accident in Dancey that followed the ladder coming to a stop on the roadway, and when the ladder fell it was not necessarily the case that an accident would ensue. One vehicle seemed to have avoided the ladder, and the plaintiff almost did as well. But in any event, all that the evidence showed was that after losing the ladder, the truck continued driving before an accident took place. Even if it could be proved that the driver of whatever vehicle lost the ladder knew that it had fallen off, at most it could be said that the driver had created a high likelihood of an accident by creating a very dangerous situation. Continuing one's driving under such circumstances, i.e., not stopping, is not flight or leaving the scene of an accident (as no accident has yet occurred) and thus does not fit the ordinary sense of running as used in the term "hit-and-run vehicle." By thereby putting the cart before the horse, Dancey converted the term "hit-and-run" into a new concept, "run-and-hit," because the later accident had the legal effect of turning the driving that preceded the accident into the running. Dancey labeled a truck that created a dangerous condition short of an accident and continued driving a "hit-and-run vehicle" after it was known with hindsight that an accident occurred. Dancey simply ignored or overlooked the fact that there must first be a "hit" and then a "run" in order for a vehicle to become a "hit-and-run vehicle." By ignoring the hit-and-run requirement, Dancey violated the rule that "[t]he language of insurance contracts should be read as a whole and must be construed to give effect to every word, clause, and phrase," Mich. Battery Equip., Inc. v. Emcasco Ins. Co. , 317 Mich. App. 282, 284, 892 N.W.2d 456 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted), by essentially reading the "run" requirement of "hit-and-run" out of the policy.

Berry , a case also cited by the dissent, demonstrates this point even more clearly. In Berry , a truck was hauling a load of scrap metal. At some point it stopped, and the driver got out and inspected the load. Between 5 and 15 minutes later, at a spot about a half-mile from where the driver had stopped to inspect the truck, a fallen piece of metal caused an accident. Berry , 219 Mich. App. at 350, 556 N.W.2d 207. By that time, the truck had long since driven away. The Berry Court examined the facts and determined that "a substantial physical nexus between the hit-and-run vehicle and the object struck by plaintiff was established." Id . The Berry Court did not discuss whether or how the truck had "run" from what it determined was the "hit." Even setting aside whether there was a basis for determining "a substantial physical nexus" between the truck and the plaintiff's vehicle, labeling the truck "the hit-and-run vehicle" simply because it continued driving and was gone from the scene of the subsequent accident ignores the temporal requirement of a hit followed by a run. It is not hard to imagine a scenario, such as in Berry , in which a sharp piece of metal could lie on a rural road for days undiscovered and then cause an accident. Under those circumstances, labeling someone a "hit-and-run" driver for having driven days before, even if the driver had known about a part falling off, simply strains the term "hit-and-run" beyond a reasonable reading. See Radenbaugh v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 240 Mich. App. 134, 138, 610 N.W.2d 272 (2000) (stating that courts should avoid strained constructions of insurance policies).

B. APPLICATION TO CURRENT CASE

In the present case, the policy language, properly construed, solves the problem. Its requirement that a vehicle "hit, or cause an object to hit" an insured vehicle (as opposed to the insured vehicle hitting a stationary object, as in this case) necessarily requires that an accident occur before whatever driving by the unidentified vehicle is labeled as running. However, if this Court continues to adopt the Dancey and Berry assumptions of what constitutes "hit and run" then our Supreme Court will have to address the issue in an appropriate case.

Meter, J. (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent because I believe the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for summary disposition. I would affirm.

As noted by the majority, plaintiff's insurance policy defined "uninsured motor vehicle" as follows:

3. "Uninsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle or "trailer":
* * *
d. That is a hit-and-run vehicle and neither the driver nor owner can be identified. The vehicle must hit, or cause an object to hit, an "insured", a covered "auto" or a vehicle an "insured" is "occupying". If there is no direct physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, the facts of the "accident" must be corroborated by competent evidence, other than the testimony of any person having a claim under this or any similar insurance as the result of such "accident".

In Dancey v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of America , 288 Mich. App. 1, 2-3, 11-12, 792 N.W.2d 372 (2010), this Court considered a situation analogous to that in the instant case: the insured's vehicle hit a ladder in a roadway, and the policy language at issue was identical to that at issue here. The Court stated:

Defendant claims that in order for the hit-and-run vehicle to "cause an object to hit" plaintiff's vehicle, there must be a physical nexus between the hit-and-run vehicle and the object. Defendant argues that because no one could affirmatively state that the ladder fell off another vehicle, only speculation would permit a jury to conclude that there was any nexus between the ladder and the hit-and-run vehicle, and speculation is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact. Plaintiff argues that there was no other logical explanation for how the ladder came to be in the roadway, given that the area was not under construction, was not open to pedestrian traffic, and was not beneath an overpass from which a ladder could have fallen. [ Id . at 12, 792 N.W.2d 372.]

This Court ultimately affirmed the denial of summary disposition to the insurer, concluding that sufficient evidence had been presented to establish a substantial physical nexus between the ladder and another vehicle. Id . at 21-22, 792 N.W.2d 372. The majority indicates that the Dancey Court focused on the possibility of a "substantial physical nexus" between the ladder and another vehicle and not on the "cause an object to hit" phrasing from the policy. Implicit in the Dancey Court's holding, however, was that the situation in Dancey satisfied the pertinent language of the policy.

Therefore, Dancey provides supportive caselaw for plaintiff's position in the present case.

In Berry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 219 Mich. App. 340, 342-343, 556 N.W.2d 207 (1996), the insured's vehicle struck an object in a roadway and she sought uninsured motorist benefits. The insurance policy in question defined an "uninsured motor vehicle," in part, as a hit-and-run vehicle that "strikes ... the vehicle the insured is occupying." Id . at 342, 556 N.W.2d 207. This Court stated:

[D]efendant takes issue with the [trial] court's legal conclusion that plaintiff was covered under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance policy. Defendant acknowledges, and we agree, that the policy's requirement that a hit-and-run vehicle must strike the insured's vehicle constitutes a requirement of physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured's vehicle. Defendant's arguments all concern whether physical contact between a hit-and-run vehicle and plaintiff's vehicle occurred in this case.
* * *
[T]his Court has construed the physical contact requirement broadly to include indirect physical contact, such as where a rock is thrown or an object is cast off by the hit-and-run vehicle, as long as a substantial physical nexus between the disappearing vehicle and the object cast off or struck is established by the proofs. In this case, defendant argues that an insufficient nexus existed between a hit-and-run vehicle and the metal piece lying in the road. [ Id . at 346-347, 556 N.W.2d 207 (citations omitted).]

The Berry Court ruled that "the legal requirement of a substantial physical nexus between the hit-and-run vehicle and the object struck by plaintiff was established." Id . at 350, 556 N.W.2d 207. The Court indicated that adequate evidence of contact between the insured and another vehicle had been presented because "the metal piece lying in the road that [the insured's] vehicle struck was deposited by the hit-and-run vehicle itself, i.e., the truck hauling a trailer of scrap metal." Id . at 352, 556 N.W.2d 207.

The policy in Berry defined the term "uninsured motor vehicle" as a "motor vehicle ... which strikes ... the vehicle the insured is occupying," and the Court found adequate evidence of coverage. Id . at 342, 352, 556 N.W.2d 207. The policy in the present case defines the same term as "vehicle [that] ... cause[s] an object to hit ... a vehicle an 'insured' is 'occupying'." Accordingly, the policy language in the present case is broader than that at issue in Berry .

Both Dancey and Berry suggest the existence of coverage in the present case. In addition, the plain language of the insurance policy supports the existence of coverage. Evidence demonstrated that the building materials in the road "hit" the ambulance when the ambulance proceeded over them. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) defines the word "hit," in part, as "to come against with an impact[.]" The building materials in this case "c[a]me against" the ambulance "with an impact[.]" Accordingly, the white pickup truck "cause[d] an object to hit" the ambulance.

In light of the policy language and existing caselaw, I would affirm the denial of summary disposition to defendant. 
      
      Drouillard v. American Alternative Ins. Corp. , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 23, 2017 (Docket No. 334977).
     
      
      Dancey v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of America , 288 Mich. App. 1, 7, 792 N.W.2d 372 (2010).
     
      
      See Nuculovic v. Hill , 287 Mich. App. 58, 61-62, 783 N.W.2d 124 (2010).
     
      
      Dancey , 288 Mich. App. at 7, 792 N.W.2d 372, quoting West v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).
     
      
      Dancey , 288 Mich. App. at 8, 792 N.W.2d 372, quoting West , 469 Mich. at 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (quotation marks omitted).
     
      
      Hunt v. Drielick , 496 Mich. 366, 372, 852 N.W.2d 562 (2014), quoting Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman , 440 Mich. 560, 566, 489 N.W.2d 431 (1992).
     
      
      McCoig Materials, LLC v. Galui Constr., Inc. , 295 Mich. App. 684, 694, 818 N.W.2d 410 (2012).
     
      
      Twichel v. MIC Gen. Ins. Corp. , 469 Mich. 524, 534, 676 N.W.2d 616 (2004) ; Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Seils , 310 Mich. App. 132, 145, 871 N.W.2d 530 (2015).
     
      
      McCoig Materials, LLC , 295 Mich. App. at 694, 818 N.W.2d 410.
     
      
      Hastings Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safety King, Inc. , 286 Mich. App. 287, 292, 778 N.W.2d 275 (2009).
     
      
      Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 310 Mich. App. at 146, 871 N.W.2d 530.
     
      
      See MCL 257.617 ; MCL 257.617a ; MCL 257.618 ; MCL 257.619.
     
      
      Presumably, AAIC is referring to eyewitness opinion testimony that the driver "had to feel that shift of weight," that the driver did not return because "he knew he was going to be in trouble," and that "if you lost that much weight, you could tell ...."
     
      
      Ghaffari v. Turner Constr. Co.(On Remand), 268 Mich. App. 460, 464, 708 N.W.2d 448 (2005).
     
      
      Dancey , 288 Mich. App. at 11-12, 792 N.W.2d 372.
     
      
      Id . at 13-18, 792 N.W.2d 372.
     
      
      Id . at 17, 792 N.W.2d 372.
     
      
      Id . at 19-22, 792 N.W.2d 372.
     
      
      Id . at 21, 792 N.W.2d 372.
     
      
      Emphasis added.
     
      
      Nesbitt v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co. , 236 Mich. App. 215, 222, 600 N.W.2d 427 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
     
      
      Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.).
     
      
      Id .
     
      
      Id . at p. 19a.
     
      
      Contrary to the suggestion made in the concurring opinion, I do not find that Dancey and Berry are strictly controlling in the present case. I find them suggestive of coverage, and reading them in conjunction with the plain language of the policy leads me to conclude that the trial court did not err by denying summary disposition to defendant.
     
      
      I agree with the majority that defendant was not entitled to summary disposition on the basis of the argument relating to the common definition of a "hit-and-run vehicle" because, contrary to defendant's argument, the trial court correctly concluded that there were genuine issues of fact regarding knowledge on the part of the driver. Whether this knowledge must ultimately be proved in order for plaintiff to recover is not a question currently before us because we are reviewing, simply, whether the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for summary disposition.
     
      
      The opinions of lower federal courts are not binding on this Court, but those opinions may be considered for their persuasive value. See Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 603, 606-607, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004).
     
      
      The temporal requirement of the term "hit and run" suggests that when this Court does consider whether the driver of a vehicle must have been aware of an accident for the accident to be labeled a hit-and-run, the answer will be yes. As this analysis has shown, absent a preceding accident there can be no hit and run. For the same reasons, absent knowledge of the accident, driving is simply driving, and it only becomes "running" if the driver is running from something, i.e., an accident.