Case ID: misc_15/html/0058-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Cullen, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The Yellow Pine Co., Plaintiff, v. The Board of Education of the City of Brooklyn et al., Defendants.
    (Supreme Court—Kings Special Term,
    December, 1895.)
    1. Brooklyn — Board of education is -a .separate municipal corporation. '
    The board of education of the city of Brooklyn is ,a separate municipal corporation and the city treasurer is its sole financial officer.
    3. Same— Mechanics’ liens.
    Notice .of lien under a contract made with the board of education of the city of Brooklyn must be served upon the city treasurer, not upon the comptroller.
    This action was brought for the foreclosure of mechanics’ liens filed, or intended to be filed, under the provisions of chapter 315 of the Laws of 1878, as amended by chapter 629 of the Laws of 1892, against funds in the hands of a municipal corporation, namely, the board of education of the city of Brooklyn, being ¡balances unpaid on contracts for the erection of two school houses.
    The plaintiff and the defendants T. B. Willis & Brother and D. P. Gardner were creditors of Martin & Lee for building material furnished them in the performance of the contracts of Martin & Lee with the board of education: There was no dispute as to these facts. Plaintiff served duplicate notices of lien, drawn in express accordance with the provisions-of the act above referred to, upon the city treasurer of the city of Brooklyn and the president- of the board of education of the city of Brooklyn ; defendants Willis and Gardner filed duplicate notices of lien with the secretary of'' the board of education and with the comptroller of the city of Brooklyn, and the notices of lien served by the defendants were drawn upon the blank forms commonly used in compliance with the ordinary Mechanics’ Lien Law (Chap. 342,. Laws of 1885), and the filing, of the defendants’ notices was-completed before that of the plaintiff’s.
    The plaintiff proceeded upon the theory that the board of education of the city of Brooklyn is a separate municipal corporation, and that-the city treasurer of the city of Brooklyn was, under the charter, the financial officer contemplated by the statute. The defendants regarded the city of Brooklyn as the corporation making thq contract under which the funds arose, and hence deemed the comptroller of the city of Brooklyn the financial officer with whom the notice should, be filed.
    
      Burr & Coombs, for plaintiff.
    
      Hirsh & Rasquin, for defendant Gardner.
    
      John F. Nelson, for defendants Willis.
    
      Michael Furst, for board of education.
   Cullen, J.

I am of opinion that the notices of lien filed by the defendants Gardner and Willis are defective and insufficient, in failing to state the various matters required by the statute; this would render their liens invalid apart from the question what officer is the financial officer upon whom a notice of lien shoiild be served. But this would not entitle the plaintiff to recover unless it has acquired a valid lien.

No criticism is made on the form of the notice of its lien. This notice the. plaintiff served upon the city treasurer of the city of Brooklyn; it is contended that the notice should have been served upon the comptroller, who, by the charter, is made the financial officer of the city-

I am inclined to hold that the board of education is now a separate municipal corporation, though doubtless a department of the city government.. It possesses the .powers and is subject to the duties of trustees of common schools ; for the' purpose of taxation and the erection and repair of school houses and the support of the schools the city, is a school district. ■The title to all school property is vested in the boardiof education. Charter, tit. 17, §§ 56, 59. Formerly, trustees of an ordinary school district were only a quasi corporation of very limited powers. Bassett v. Fish, 75 N. Y. 303. But by the General Revision Act of 1892 (Chap. 687, Laws of 1892,. § 3) school districts are constituted municipal corpora- • tions. Since that act, whatever may have been the case before, the board of education would seem to be a corporation. This in fact seems to be the view of all the parties to this action, for the city . of Brooklyn is not a party to this action and none of .the defendants has raised any question to its absence. If the municipal corporation with whom the contract was made was "the board of education, then the only financial officer of that ■corporation is the city treasurer, not the comptroller, for. the latter officer kasmo supervision or control of the funds of the board.

In this respect the case is to be distinguished from that of Bell v. Mayor, 105 N. Y. 136.

Judgment for plaintiff, with costs out of fund.