Case ID: iowa_30/html/0302-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Miller, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Walker v. Sleight.
    1. Foreign judgment: rao tempore judge: evidence. Where it appears from the transcript of a foreign j udgment, upon which suit is brought, that the judgment was not rendered by the regularly commissioned judge of the court, but by an attorney thereof, acting under a temporary appointment from such judge, the statutes of the State where the judgment was rendered are admissible in evidence to show the authority of such appointment.
    2. -evidence of assignment. An assignment of a foreign judgment, entered upon the record and duly authenticated by the clerk, ‘ is at least prima facie evidence of the fact of assignment.
    3. - SIGNATURE TO ASSIGNMENT: DENIAL OF GENUINENESS. To require proof, on the part of the plaintiff, of the genuineness of a written instrument on which suit is brought, or of any writing which is referred to and set out or copied in the pleading, the denial under oath of the genuineness of the signature, required by the statute (chap. 28, Laws 1862; Rev. § 2967), must be made by the party whose signature it purports to be.
    
      
      4. -rule applied. It was accordingly held that proof of the genuineness of the signature of the judgment creditor to the assignment of a foreign judgment was not required by the sworn answer of the defendant (the judgment debtor), in an action on the judgment, denying the genuineness of the signature.
    5. -verity OP judgment : JURISDICTION. The record in the case of a foreign judgment is not admissible for the purpose of contradicting the judgment, by showing that the recovery was for an amount greater than claimed in the declaration. Error in a judgment, whether of law or fact, can only be taken advantage of by appeal, writ of error, or some step taken in the Court rendering it.
    6. -stamps. The certificate of the clerk and judge, authenticating the transcript of a foreign judgment, does not require a revenue stamp. Following Simons v. Cook, 29 Iowa, 324.
    
      Appeal from Marshall Circuit Court.
    
    Monday, December 19.
    This was an action on two foreign judgments, rendered in the circuit court of Laporte county, in the State of Indiana, one in favor of Edward H. Bunker and the other in favor of Edward H. Bunker and George H. Wheeler against the defendant, and purporting to be assigned to the plaintiff, Henry II. Walker.
    The cause was tried by a jury; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. The further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
    
      Boardman, Brown & Williams for the appellant.
    1. There was no evidence of any sufficient appointment of Thomas S. Stanfield, as judge, pro tempore.
    
    
      2. There was no sufficient evidence of an assignment of the judgment to plaintiff, and the court erred'in the admission of the evidence pertaining to the assignment.
    
      “ Judicial records of a sister State and papers and records authorized to be kept in a public office, may be proved by certified copy.” Rev. §§ 4047, 4058.
    
      “ As to matters which the clerk is not bound to record, his certificate, being extra official, is merely the statement of a private person, and must be rejected.” 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 498; O alces v. Hill, 14 Pick. 442,448; United States v. Buford, 3 Pet. 12-29; Wolfe v. Washburn, 6 Cow. 261.
    3. No stamp had ever been affixed to the said assignment, nor to ,the certificates annexed to the transcript marked “A.” This was directly in violation of the revenue act, and should have caused the exclusion of the whole transcript. Rev. Law, 1867, p. 127; Rev. Law, May 1, 1869, p. 5.
    4. The whole record of a foreign judgment should be produced, and not the finding alone, and appellant objected to any thing less. The importance of this is more manifest, when it is seen hereafter that appellant offered the remainder of the' record to prove that the judgment was palpably unjust, and was double the amount (through some clerical error) that plaintiff in the original suit claimed and was entitled to, but which complete record was excluded. Abell v. Gross, 17 Iowa, 173.
    
      “ A certificate that a certain fact appears of record is not sufficient. The officer must certify a transcript of the entire record relating to the matter.” 1 Greenl. on Ev. p. 623, note; Owen v. Boyle, 3 Shep. 147; Farr v. Swan, 2 Barr, 245.
    “ The whole record,” says Chief Baron Comyns, “ which concerns the matter in question, ought to be produced.” 4 Com. Dig. tit. Ev. A, 4; 2 Phill. Ev. 138, 139.
    5. The transcript marked “B” and the assignment therein copied, should also have been excluded.
    1. For the reasons assigned under the second and fourth paragraphs in division “ A ” which apply equally to this transcript as to. that.
    2. The clerk in his certificate does not refer to the assignment, nor give anywhere any official statement that paid assignment was a part of the record.
    
      3. The judgment plaintiffs in Indiana were, by the transcript, “ Edward EL. Bunker a/nd Geo. H. Wheeler •as individuals. The pretended assignment was signed simply, “ Wheeler <& B'imker.” This, we claim, in a court of law, was no assignment; it was a nullity on its face, and would not operate in law as an assignment of the interest of either party.
    
      “ Unless a contract is legally assigned, it is not assigned at all.” Slate v. Butterworth, 2 Iowa, 158; Scott v. Granger, 3 id. 447.
    Plaintiff sought to overcome this by proof that it was a partnership debt, but the proof signally failed to establish such fact. This is all the evidence on that point.
    Says plaintiff: “ They were partners and bankers in Chicago when the judgment was rendered. I do not know whether they were partners or not when the assignment was made.” Page 16.
    This court will perceive that this by no means justifies the inference that Wheeler & Bunker were partners at the time the debt was contracted, nor at the time of the assignment, nor that it was ever a partnership debt or asset, nor that “ Wheeler & Bunker ” was the name and style of the supposed firm, nor that they were the only members of the firm. The facts proved would not justify a court of equity in regarding this even as an equitable assignment, but' in a court of law it would be-the assignment of neither party, and would be void in toto.
    If some person — once a member of the firm of Jay, Cook & Co. — should assign a judgment standing in the individual names of John Jay and James Cook, by writing, “ Jay <& Cook,” it would be quite extraordinary for a court of law to presume that Jay, Cook & Co. owned the debt; that it was a partnership debt in the beginning and ever after; that Jay and Cook were the true members, and all the members of the firm, and that any one desiring to sign the name of the firm might write promiscuously, “ Cook dfc Jay” “ Jay & Cook” “ Cook, Jay & Co.” and that a court of law would take judicial notice of, and presume any number of questionable facts, in order to sustain, tbe assignment.
    6. The certified transcript offered by the appellant in evidence should have been admitted.
    This was offered in order to show that there was either fraud or a palpable error, in rendering judgment for $523.75, instead oí $279.62, the amount constantly claimed throughout the original papers, it being directly admitted (page 30) that $250 had been paid aftei\ protest. Now here was plain mistake or fraud.
    The objections made to the introduction of this transcript were, that the evidence was incompetent and irrelevant; that the court could not correct the error of the foreign tribunal, and that this was not identified as the same suit exhibited by plaintiff, which objections were sustained and excepted to.
    Now here was an error which, with interest, amounted to $600, yet defendant was not allowed to show the fact.
    As to the relevancy of the evidence, the issue had been made whether the said judgment was duly and legally rendered, which was the only issue admissible. Bev. § 2921.
    It was like offering the remainder of a letter or conversation, to explain or overturn that already admitted. Bev. §3992.
    It would be singular, if the plaintiff is not required, and the defendant is not permitted, to introduce the remainder of the record.
    As to identity, that was for the jury. Wilbur v. Hubbard, 35 Barb. 303; Howard v. Holbrook, 23 How. Pr. 64.
    If there was no similarity, then the court could exclude, but if there was a resemblance, the jury should judge. In fact, the two are precisely alike in every particular, verbatim et literatim.”
    
    
      The parties, the court, the date, the sum of money (in the final judgment) and the words are all the same. Either there was something miraculous, or the evidence established identity. Identity can only be proved by these external characteristics — an opinion of any person would not be admitted —prima facie it certainly was sufficient and shifted the onus probandi.
    
    The true reason for excluding this transcript was, no doubt, the opinion of the court, that it was not possible to correct the error or mistake of the Indiana court, and in this the court erred, as the following authorities clearly show:
    “Judgments are conclusive upon the defendant in every State, except for such causes as would be suificient to set aside the judgment in the courts oí the State in which it was rendered.” Melmogle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312.
    “ Where a party has been injured by any flagrant oversight, or injustice committed in the course of judicial proceedings relied on as the cause of action, he should have the right to dispute the judgment of another State, since it may be practically beyond his reach in the State where the judgment was rendered.” 2 Am. Law Cas. 723.
    “ The court can take cognizance of any legal defect which would deprive the judgment of faith and credit where it originated.” 2 Am. Law Cas. 728.
    “ Any facts -which would be a defense in Indiana to this judgment would be a defense here.” Rogers v. Guin, 21 Iowa, 58; Pearse v. Olney, 2 Conn. 544; Robson v. Pearce, 1 Duer, 144; 12 N. Y. 165.
    A foreign judgment may and should be impeached, if void on its face; or founded in palpable mistake or irregularity ; or if mistake is shown, or offered to be shown; oi if it can be proved to have been irregularly or unfairly procured. Lagier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 150 ; Monroe v. Rouglass, 4 Sandf. Ch. 126; Story on Conflict of Laws, § 607; Cummings v. Banks, 2 Barb. 601.
    
      “ Where in an action upon a judgment the defendant, by his answer, puts in issue the existence of a regular valid and legal judgment, any evidence tending to show the judgment illegal or void is competent.” 2 Am. Law Eeg. Ml; Kinsey v. Ford, 38 Barb.
    
      Henderson, Fro., c& Merriman for the appellee :
    A transcript of judgment is merely the proof of a judgment, not of the facts or the issues upon which the judgment was obtained.
    Facts sufficient to set aside the judgment cannot be shown in defense to an action on the transcript in a foreign court. 2 West. Jur. 364.
    2. In pleading a judgment it is sufficient to state that such judgment was rendered or made, without stating facts conferring jurisdiction. Eev. 1860, § 2921; 12 Iowa, 206, and eases cited.
    Besides, circuit courts of a foreign State are presumed to be courts of general jurisdiction. 1 West. Jur. 330.
    3. When rendered and properly certified every presumption is in famor of the validity of the proceedings of such courts. Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa, 77; 10 id. 517; 16 id. 552.
    
      (a) Therefore the fact that a pro tempore judge was appointed to act vice the judge, will be presumed to have been regular.
    (£) Besides, appellee pleads the law of Indiana authorizing it.
    (c) The circuit courts of Indiana are courts of legislative creation and not of constitutional. See Laws of Indiana.
    (d) The fact that the laws of Iowa provide for no such appointment cannot in any way affect the validity of the proceedings of courts of other States. Otherwise, section one, article four, Constitution IT. S., might be utterly defeated'by the acts of other State courts or legislatures.
    (e) Besides, it would not be in consonance with our laws and constitution, so to hold, which re-enact the provisions of the constitution 'of the United States on this point.
    4. The question of jurisdiction, so far as service of process is concerned, has been passed upon by the jury. Appellant cannot therefore avail himself of any defense on the merits, but is confined to such remedy as is afforded him by the laws of the State of Indiana. 7 Iowa, 86.
    
      (a) Furthermore, the return of the officer cannot be controverted collaterally. Appellant’s remedy is against the officer.
    This rule is too well known to require authorities. But see LaMeréll v. Coolc, 1 Iowa, 1.
    5. A judgment until reversed is conclusive of every issue that was or should be tried under the pleading. Our courts cannot, of course, reverse the judgments of courts of sister States. 4 Oreen, 551.
    
      (a) Appellant’s pretended amended or supplemental transcript was therefore properly rejected; that was not and is not a part of the judgment, and cannot be made such until done under the requirements,of the laws by the Indiana courts. Appellant may have the best grounds in the world for a new trial, but our courts are powerless to aid him.
    (3) This court will hardly say that, because appellant has been guilty of laches in allowing the time for appeal, or for motion for a new trial to pass by without using it, we shall be made to suffer for his disregard of the requirements of the law.
    6. Furthermore, the rule of law is well settled that the presumption is that the court in which judgment was rendered had conclusive proof of the facts upon which the judgment was based. 1 Iowa, 564, and authorities cited.
    
      (a) And to show the entire inconsistency which would have to be practiced to permit this supplemental transcript, or ex-official certificate of the Indiana clerk, it is but necessary to examine the certificate he appends, from which it appeal's that he does not pretend to certify that he has transmitted all the proofs in the case. "
    
      (b) If this transcript, sought to be introduced by appellant, amounts to any thing, it is evidence to' impeach this, judgment.
    “No evidence to impeach a judgment on the merits is admissible.” 6 Wend. 447; 4 Cow. 292; Hatcher v. liochelau, 18 N. Y. 86.
    This court cannot inquire into the facts nor the law applied to those facts. Hoco v. Hackett, 2 Bosw. 579.
    7. A judgment may be assigned by parol. Moore et al. v. Lowrey, 25 Iowa, 336.
    8. Judgment may (not must) be assigned on record, and assignee may maintain action in his own name. 2 B. S. Ind. 1852, p. 6.
    
      (a) In other words, the statute of Indiana provides that an assignment may become part of the record, and that being the case is properly shown by the transcript, and certified to, and has the same operation and effect as though the original record, hearing the assignment, had been introduced.
    
      (b) The witness (plaintiff below) merely proved the genuineness of the assignment, and his testimony on this point was not therefore open to the objections raised by defendant (below). But see 1 Pars, on Cont. 155, 173.
    9. But it is claimed that the assignment is void for want of a stamp.
    
      (a) Then, if so, the whole of plaintiff’s testimony in proof of the assignment was relevant and material, in view of the rule above referred to, that an assignment of a judgment may be by parol.
    A failure to affix a stamp will not vitiate a contract not within the statute of frauds, and this is not. McAfferty v. Hale, 24 Iowa, 355; Moore v. Lowrey et al., 25 id. 336; Sykes v. Bates, 26 id. 521.
    
      (5) Besides, it is not competent for congress to bind State courts in the exercise of their powers, by a declaration of what they'shall or not accept as evidence. Latham v. Smith, 45 111. 30; Ford v. Glinton, 25 Iowr, 157.
    10. Admitting the writing to be informal for want of stamp, the question as to the consideration paid for the transfer of the judgment and contract of assignment certainly becomes material and admissible, and the jury having passed upon the question as one of fact, this court will not disturb their verdict.
    11. The only objections raised to the testimony, and shown by the bill of exceptions, show their own fallacy, or, like an ill-proportioned bridge, break with their own weight, except such as we now mention.
    12. The only questions vital to the case in our mind are
    1st. As to whether the assignment is good as from the plaintiff to the action in Indiana ; and,
    2d. As to whether the certificate of the clerk certifying the transcript required a stamp.
    (N. B.) The certificates of the clerk of the Indiana court and judge to the transcript in case of Bunlcer <& Wheeler v. Sleight were stamvped; those to the transcript in Bxmlcer v. Sleight were not stamped.
    13. Ve think the presumption is, that where witness has testified to the fact that certain judgment creditors were partners, and the judgment was partnership assets, and the jury have passed upon the question and given in their verdict under instructions accordingly, this court will hardly sustain the objection of defendant’s counsel, that the judgment not being shown to be in favor of a partnership, the introduction of the transcripts in plaintiff’s favor was error.
    Because, first, the evidence did show the fact, and, second, because the presumption was in favor of a partner ship, and the defendant offered no evidence to rebut it.
    
      
      (a) A partnership being shown will not be presumed to have been dissolved until the dissolution is affirmatively shown. 2 Gt. 368; Pars, on Part. 380, and cases cited; 1 Greenl. on Ev., § 41. Insolvency,$>er se, does not dissolve. 1 Pars, on Cont. 171, note (y).
    And no attempt to show a dissolution prior _ to the assignment was made.
    14. The only remaining objection that we conceive deserves notice is, as to whether the clerk’s certificate, authenticating the judgment, required a stamp.
    
      (a) We contend that the act of congress requiring stamps upon the certificates of officers was repealed by section 154, act of March, 1867, which provided “ that all official instruments, documents and papers issued by * * * the officers of * ' * * county, etc., shall be exempt from taxation. Provided, that it is the intent hereby only to exempt from liability to taxation such * * * counties, and in the exercise only of functions strictly belonging to them in their ordinary governmental and municipal capacity.”
    .We believe that this act released from stamp duty the official documents issued by the officers named, in their capacity as such officers, and that this position will hardly be controverted.
    (5) The act of March, 1867, struck out of schedule' B, “ legal documents,” leaving them free from taxation.
    We can scarcely conceive a more legal document than a transcript of judgment.
    
      (c) But this question has been frequently passed upon by the courts of other States (and once in this State, though the court did not unite in expressing their opinion fully), and it has been uniformly held that the act of congress, requiring stamps upon documentary evidence, is an invasion of a right which the courts will not uphold.
    In the case of Latham v. Smith, 45 Ill. - 30, this very question arises, and is decided, as has been also done by the supreme courts of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and California, with which decisions we presume the court is perfectly familiar.
    The supreme court of Illinois, in the above case, says: “ That congress cannot prescribe rides of evidence governing State courts, and cannot take away from the States legitimate and long-established rights which they ever exercised, and which, for their own preservation, they must be allowed to exercise without question. The power of congress to tax these instruments can be effectually carried out by the imposition, etc., and the government fully protected, without any encroachment upon the rights of the States to make the instrument valid as evidence in. our own courts.” 4 Wheat. 416.
    We refer also again to the case of Ford v. Glvnton, 25 Iowa, 157; TT. 8. Ex. Go. v. Haynes, 48 Ill. 248; Graig v. Dinnock, 47 id. 313.
    The court, in that case, reiterated the above opinion, holding that it was not competent for congress to enact that an appeal not perfected in conformity with the laws, though in conformity to those of the State, was void.
   Miller, J.

I. The errors complained of arise upon the admission and exclusion of evidence, and giving and refusing instructions. The transcripts attached to the petition snow that the indgments were not w o rendered by the regularly commissioned judge of the circuit court, but by a practicing attorney of the court, under an appointment from the judge, as follows:

“South Bend, Ma/rch 20, 1857.
“To Thomas 8. Stamfield:
“I, Arthur G. Deavitt, judge of the Laporte circuit court, being sick and unable to hold said court at its present session, hereby appoint Thomas S. Stanfield judge therein, to hold the same until I may be able to preside therein.
“ Given under my hand at South Bend this 20th day of March, 1857.
“ A. G. Deavitt,
Judge of scdd oov/rtP

The petition alleges that this appointment was made pursuant to a statute of the State of Indiana, which is set out in the pleading as follows:

“If, from any cause, any judge of the circuit courts shall be unable to attend at any term thereof, such judge, or in his absence, or when he shall be unable to make such appointment, the clerk, auditor and sheriff of such county may appoint, in writing, any other judge of a court of record, or any attorney thereof, to preside at such term; such written appointment being entered of record on the order book of such court, and such appointee shall conduct the business of such court under the same regulations as provided by law, and. have the same authority as the judge elect.”

The transcripts show that the appointment was entered of record, and that the appointee was sworn as judge of the court.

One of appellant’s objections to the admission of the transcripts of the judgments in evidence was, that there was “no proof of a sufficient appointment of Thomas S. Stanfield as judge pro tempore. This objection being overruled, he excepted, and assigns this ruling as error.

The bill of exceptions shows that “the plaintiff introduced the statutes of Indiana and read in evidence therefrom the provision above quoted.” It is true that the defendant objected to this evidence on the grounds of irrelevancy' and immateriality. The objection on these grounds was very properly overruled, for it was a material part of the plaintiff’s case that he should prove that, under the statutes of Indiana, the person presiding as judge of the circuit court was authorized and empowered to do so, the record showing that he was not the regular judge of such court. These being the only grounds of the objection, that there was no sufficient proof of the appointment of the pro tempore judge, there was no error in overruling the objection.

II. The appellant assigns as error the overruling of his objections to the transcripts, on the ground that-there was no proof of the assignment of the judgments to the plaintiff.

The assignment of each judgment is of record duly authenticated by the clerk of the circuit court in which the judgments purport to have been rendered, with his seal attached, and no objection was made to the authentication of either judgment.

Whether an assignment of record of a judgment, duly authenticated, is entitled to the same degree of conclusiveness as the judgment, we are not called upon to decide, but we are of opinion that it was at least prima facie sufficient in this case.

III. The defendant in his answer denies that the signatures to the assignments are genuine, and the answer *s yerifie<l. These denials, it is claimed, put plaintiff upon proof of the signatures to the assignments. Section 2967 of the Revision of 1860 was repealed by chapter 28 of the laws of the Ninth General Assembly, and the following substituted: viz.: “When any action, defense, set-off, counterclaim or cross-demand is founded on a written instrument, which is referred to in any pleading, and the original, or a copy thereof, is annexed thereto (or copied therein), the signal-toe thereto, or to any indorsement thereon, shall be deemed genuine and admitted, unless the party whose signatm/re it purports to be shall deny the same under oath, in his pleading, or in a writing to be filed at the same time with, or before, Ms pleading, if there be one, and if not, then in the time allowed for a pleading, and when any other writing, purporting to have been signed by one of the parties is referred to in a pleading, and the original, or a copy thereof, is filed, the signature thereto shall be taken to be genuine, and the instrument may be read in evidence against such party, unless he demes the same in writing under oath before the trial is commenced.”

Under these provisions of the statute where the party, whose signature purports to he to the writing sued on, or pleaded, denies the same under oath, in the time and manner prescribed, the signat/wre must be proved by competent evidence. In this case the action is upon two judgments evidenced by authenticated copies — the assignments and . signatures are also copies — the originals being among the records of the court rendering the judgments, and the denial is not by a party whose signature purports to be affixed to the writings. We are therefore of opinion that under the issue it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the genuineness of the signatures to the assignments by the same Mnd of evidence as would be required in a case where the signature to a promissory note or to ail indorsement thereon is denied under oath by maker or indorser. The assignments being matters of record and properly authenticated as parts thereof, they were admissible in the first instance without further proof of the signature of the assignor.

IV. The defendant offered to introduce in evidence a complete record of the judgment rendered in favor of Edward H. Bunker to show a mistake in .. _ amount oi the judgment. Jb>y the copy offered by the defendant it appeared that the complaint showed only $279.62 due, and asked judgment for that amount, while judgment was actually rendered for $523.75. To this evidence the plaintiff objected, the court sustained

the objection, and the defendant excepted. This ruling is assigned as error.

The question presented in this assignment is, whether the amount for which a judgment is rendered, as shown by the duly authenticated transcript, can be contradicted or controlled by the declaration, complaint or petition, showing a different amount to be due the plaintiff. A judgment rendered for more than is claimed by the plaintiff is erroneous, and will be corrected or reversed, on writ of error or appeal. But an error in a judgment, whether in law or fact, which does not go to the jurisdiction of the court, can only be taken advantage of by writ of error or appeal. It was so held by this court in Milne v. Van Buskirk, 9 Iowa, 558.

That was an action on a foreign judgment, and the defendant answered that “ the judgment was void, because rendered while he was a minor, upon a contract not for necessaries; that he did not appear and defend the suit by guardian, but by attorney, whom he had no power to appoint; that upon coming of age he disavowed the judgment, the contract, and the appointment of said attorney.”

This answer was held bad on demurrer, and "Wright, C. J., says, that the defendant’s remedy was by writ of error coram nobis, or other similar process in the court where the judgment was rendered. If there was an error in fact in permitting defendant to appear by attorney, when a minor, it was an irregularity, and, as such, no more affected, the validity of the judgment than if it had been an error in law. In either case an error, whether of law or. fact, does not render a judgment void; but a party may have his remedy in the State where the judgment was rendered, either in the same or in an appellate tribunal. The defense cannot prevail here. The error does not go to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment.”

So in this case the rendition of the judgment for more than was claimed was an error but not such as affected the jurisdiction of the court rendering the same.

To the same effect see the following cases: Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481-487; Austin v. Charleston Female Seminary, 8 Met. 196; Hampton v. McConnell, 3 Wheat. 204; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Wernway v. Pauling, 5 Grill. & Johns. 500; Seed v. Ross, 1 Bald. 36; Greene v. Sarmiento, 1 Pet. C. C. 74; Spencer v. Brochway, 1 Ohio, 259; Goodrich v. Jenkins, 6 id. 43; Evans v. Justine, id. 117; Evans v. Tatem, 9 S. & R. 252; Benton v. Burgot, 10 id. 240; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 269; Davis v. Conélly's Ex'rs, 4 B. Monr. 136.

The exclusion of the certified transcript offered by the defendant to impeach the judgment sued on was therefore not erroneous.

Y. Appellant assigns as error the overruling of his objection to the admission of one of the authenticated 0. — stamps, transcripts on the ground that no revenue stamps were affixed to the certificates of the judge and clerk, authenticating them as judicial records.

We are of opinion that no stamps were required to be affixed to such certificates. It has been held that the certificate of an officer to a Reposition taken before him does not require a stamp. No tax being imposed upon depositions, and the certificate of the officer before whom they are taken being an essential act to their validity, in that sense forms a part of them. Prather v. Pritchard, 26 Ind. 65; Cordell v. Bridge, 9 All. 355, So, also, it has been held that the certificate of a justice of the peace to a copy of his record need not be stamped. Toledo, Logansport & Burlington R. R. Co. v. Nordyke, 27 Ind. 95; Commonwealth v. Hardiman, 9 All. 487. The appellant cites no case holding a contrary view, nor have we been able to find any. If, then, the certificate of a justice of the peace, to a copy of his record, requires no stamp, surely tbe certificates of tbe judge aud clerk of a court of record authenticating copies of records therein, require none.

In support of this view, see Simons v. Cook, 29 Iowa, 321.

YI. Tbe appellant urges in argument that tbe assignments of tbe judgments should have been stamped, and that there was error in admitting tbe transcripts for this reason. Tbe bill of exceptions fails to show that this objection was made below, or that any exception was taken on this ground. Tbe objection cannot therefore be urged or regarded on appeal.

Tbe ruling of the court • in giving and refusing instructions was in accord with tbe views herein expressed, and tbe verdict of the jury is fully sustained by tbe evidence.

Affirmed.