Case ID: la-ann_49-2/html/1717-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nicholls, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 12,673.
    State ex rel. Joseph Alcide Babin vs. Hon. Felix Voorhies, Judge.
    When an inferior court, acting within what it claims to be its exclusive jurisdiction. in the enforcement and ascertainment of rights of litigants before it, finds itself paralyzed in its action by writs of certiorari or prohibition from a superior court based on a claim of the latter that its appellate jurisdiction extended over it touching the matters before it, and when such inferior court, through its judge, is alone made party defendant to the writs, the judge of such court is justified and authorized in calling to the judicial attention of the Supreme Court the facts and issues raised, to the end that the latter may take such action in the premises as will, while safeguarding the rights of private litigants, insure the performance of their respective duties by the different judicial tribunals of the State, and the observance by them of the limitations upon their respective powers.
    The Supreme Court has repeatedly exercised its powers over the manner of executing judgments which it had passed on upon appeal and of seeing that their provisions were carried out.
    District courts have power to send writs of certiorari and prohibition to justices of the peace in certain classes of cases, and when their jurisdiction to that end has been invoked In a particular case as being one of that character, they are entitled to issue tentative writs and to primarily determ ne whether their jurisdiction legally extends to the ultimate affording of the relief asked.
    Justices of the peace ordered by such writs to send up their records for examination should obey the order.
    QN APPLICATION for Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition.
    
      Foster & Broussard and J. L. Haase for Relator.
    
      Andrew Thorpe and T. H. Thorpe for Respondent.
    Submitted on briefs November 30, 1897.
    Opinion handed down December 28, 1897.
    Application fob Wbits of Oebtiobabi and Pbohibition.
    The relator is a justice of the peace in the parish of Iberia, in whose court R. F. and J. 0. Broussard instituted a suit against and obtained judgment against Adrien Gonsoulin for the sum of seventy-six dollars. Defendant having appealed to the District Court, that court rendered a judgment in the following words: *■ Reserving to plaintiffs their right of action in law, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the lower court be avoided, reversed and set aside at plaintiffs’ costs, and that the judgment be remanded to the lower court for execution.”
    On application for a new trial, or rehearing, this judgment was modified as follows: “The court is of the opinion that its former decree is too sweeping. While still adhering to its opinion, regarding the liability of Adrien Gonsoulin, the court is of the opinion that justice demands that this case be remanded to the lower court to allow plaintiffs to make the cane growers who refuse to pay the two per cent, parties to this suit, contradictorily with whom these proceedings must be carried on. The court, therefore, grants the new trial for the purpose merely of remanding the case to the lower court for further proceedings.
    On the return of the case to the justice’s court, the plaintiffs dismissed the suit, and immediately instituted one hundred and forty-three suits before the same justice of the peace, in each of which Adrien Gonsoulin was made a co-defendant with one of the “ cane growers ” ordered by the District Court to be made parties to the remanded suit.
    The amount in controversy in each of these suits was below the amount which was necessary to authorize any judgment which might be rendered therein to be appealed to the District Court. In each of the suits an absolute judgment for money was rendered against the defendants.
    Gonsoulin applied to the District Court for writs of certiorari and prohibition, which were ordered to be, and were, in fact, issued and served. In his petition for the writs, after reciting the facts above stated, he averred that disregarding the positive mandate of the District Court, R. F. & J. O. Broussard had sued and obtained judgments against him in the said one hundred and forty-three suits, involving the same matters passed upon by the District Court. That in one of these suits, viz.: Suit No. 90, on the docket of the justice of the peace, the plaintiff had in order to satisfy the judgment therein, which was for thirty-five cents, seized, under a writ of -fieri facias, a mule belonging to relator worth one hundred dollars.
    That to protect himself he enjoined such seizure, which injunction, upon trial before the said justice of the peace, was dissolved.
    That by the judgment of the District Court on appeal, it was. decreed “ that no personal judgment could be rendered against him” (Gonsoulin) and the ease was remanded to the justice’s court solely for the purpose of making sundry cane growers parties to plaintiffs’ demand, with whom the (plaintiffs) therein were ordered to try contradictorily the issue involved in their claim.
    That the suits, judgment, seizure and all the proceedings before the justice of the peace were null, void and of no effect and in defiance of a mandate issued out of a superior court. That the causes of action and demands made therein were res judicata, and a further “ instance ” would work to him irreparable injury.
    It was in view of these premises that writs of prohibition were applied for, to be directed to the justice of the peace, prohibiting, commanding and directing him to desist and refrain from interfering in any manner with his (G-onsoulin’s) property in matters growing out of the controversies above related, and commanding him to send up all the records pertaining to such suits and controversies, and to entertain no. further jurisdiction until so ordered by the District Court. He prayed for all such further orders and decrees as the nature of the case might require and for general relief.
    The justice of the peace filed an exception to the proceedings to the fr-ffect that the District Court was without power under the Constitution of the State to try the writs, and reserviug his right to file an answer and to appeal directly to the Supreme Court under the Constitution in the event of the overruling of the exception, he prayed that the writs be dismissed and he be allowed to proceed in the eases mentioned in the petition for the writs without further interference from that court.
    The respondent judge assigning as reason that the law authorized no such pleadings; that Art. 861 of the Code of Practice required that the inferior judge to whom this “ mandate” (of certiorari) was directed should send to the superior court a certified copy of the record called for, which copy should be sealed with the seal of the court if it had one; that Arts. 864 and 865, Code of.Practice, provided for the manner of proceedings in such eases, assigning as reason that it was on examinations of the papers ordered to be produced that the court could decide as to the legality or irregularity of the proceedings complained of, or whether it had jurisdiction of the question involved, or whether the writ, must be made absolute or vacated; that the questions raised in this exception could only be reviewed by the District Court, after the respondent should have complied with the order of court, ordered that respondent comply with the orders issued for the District Court, under the writs of cer-tiorari, and that the hearing of the same be fixed for the 16th of November, the second day of the next term of the District Court at New Iberia, Louisiana.
    On the day assigned the justice, through his counsel, alleged that, on the return day of the writs, he had offered in court and filed the books of his office appertaining in the cases referred to, and at the same time protested against any decision on the merits of the writs, pending the decision on exception, to the jurisdiction, which he had then filed, he averred that he again produced said books of his office, and again protested against any decision on the merits of the writs, until the matter was taken to the Supreme Court to have it pass upon the question of the jurisdiction of the District Court in the matter, because if he allowed the case to be proceeded with further, he would lose his rights in the premises; that the District Court would exceed its jurisdiction in the matter as defined by the Constitution of the State, if it proceeded to determine upon the merits of the writs herein.
    He renewed his protest against any further action in the proceedings by the District Court, and served notice that he would apply for writs of certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court to enforce his rights in the premises.
    Babin, the justice of the peace, followed up this protest by an application to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and prohibition on the grounds stated therein.
    The statement of facts set forth in this last application does not materially vary from the statement made by Gonsoulin in his petition to the District Court.
    Relator alleges that judgment was rendered against the defendants in solido in the one hundred and forty-three cases referred to, and that in none of the judgments was there a sufficient amount involved to justify an appeal to the District Court. That Gonsoulin had so alleged in his pleadings.
    Relator prayed that writs of prohibition and certiorari issue directed to the judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court “ prohibiting, commanding and directing him to desist and refrain from interfering in any manner with relator in enforcing the collection of the said judgments rendered in his court, and commanding him to send to the Supreme Oourb all the records pertaining to the writs, and to entertain no further jurisdiction until so ordered by that court.
    Upon the filing of relator’s petition alternative writs issued, and the District Judge made return as follows:
    That in obedience to the mandate of the Supreme Oourb the respondent filed and produced copies of the proceedings had before him in the matter of State ex rel. Gonsoulin vs. J. A. Babin, Justice of the Peace, et al., the petition of Gonsoulin for writs of eertiorari, etc., the order of the court — the exceptions filed by the respondent Babin, and the written reasons of respondent when overruling the exceptions in the judgments in case of Broussard vs. Gonsoulin.
    That these were the only proceedings which were had before him, inasmuch as the said relator, Babin, had nob complied with the order of court when he notified respondent of his intention to apply to this court for writs of eertiorari, etc.
    That in December, 1896, the case of Broussard vs. Gonsoulin came on appeal betore his court' from the Third Justice Oourb, relator, Babin, being the judge of that court.
    That the judgment in that case was reversed; that the District Court decreed that the appellant, Gonsoulin, was not personally, liable, being a mere stakeholder of funds belonging to a number of-cane growers of Iberia parish, who were, in fact and in reality, the only parties interested in the matters involved in said suit. That the case was remanded to the lower court in order that these cane growers alone be made parties to the suit, in order that the whole litigation might be settled by a single judgment.
    That on the third of May, 1897, Adrien Gonsoulin filed a complaint-in his court, in which he set forth that the relator in this case, J. A. Babin, disregarding the decree of the Nineteenth Judicial District Oourb had parceled out the case thus remanded to his court for specified purposes recited as above into one hundred and forty-three cases in order to divest the District Oourt of jurisdiction, and had rendered judgment against him personally in all these cases when the District Oourb had decreed (the decree being a finality) that he was not personally bound to Broussard et «is., and he prayed for writs of eertiorari, etc.
    That the writs were issued and made returnable on the first day of the September term. That on the return day thereof, respondent Babin, instead of complying with the order, filed exceptions, which were overruled.
    That up to that date he had not complied with the order.
    That respondent had been informed of these facts concerning the parceling out of the original suit of Broussard vs. Gonsoulin, into one hundred and forty-three eases, by the sworn petition of Adrien Gonsoulin.
    That he had not, even at that hour, assumed jurisdiction over this matter, as the ruling on the exceptions would clearly demonstrate.
    That while it was true that writs of certiorari and prohibition can issue only from the Supreme Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over inferior courts in cases when powers not granted have been usurped by those courts; or when they refuse to perform some duty plainly imposed by law, and which they have no discretion to withhold; or where there is an absence of other adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, it is also true that the District Court has the power to issue those writs in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and to enforce its decrees. C. P. 130, 131, 877.
    That Arts. 855 and 860 of the Code of Practice were not repealed by Art. 90 of the Constitution; nor did he think that this constitutional provision was meant to infringe on the right and powers of courts of justice to enforce obedience to their decrees and to elimi-uate the powers necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, even though the same should be not expressly given by law. O. P. 877.
    That if this power were denied to the court over which fie presided, as judge he would be unable to uphold his jurisdiction when interests of the highest magnitude were to be settled by his decisions. That the exercise of this power would be neutralized, unless respondent could (as in this instance) order the judge of the lower court, who is charged with treating with such contempt the mandates and decrees of respondent’s court, to produce his records that the matter be examined into and sifted. How (he asked) could this be done unless by rule for contempt or by writs of certiorari and prohibition?
    That the jurisdiction of the court of which he was the presiding judge had certainly attached in the case of Broussard vs. Gonsoulin.
    That a decree had been rendered in that case in favor of Gon-soulin, exonerating him from all personal liability toward Broussard. That it was unquestionable that that ease was remanded to the court presided over by relator, Babin, for the sole purpose of making parties to the suit the very same parties who had since been made defendants in the one hundred and forty-three suits into which the original suit was parceled out to divest the District Oourt of its jurisdiction.
    That if the sworn'allegations of Gonsoulin were true, and so far he stood uncontradieted, then the disregard of relator, Babin, to the mandate of the District Oourt; his contempt of the mandate of the court shown by doing the very reverse of which he was ordered to do; his rendering personal judgments against Gonsoulin when the District Oourt had decreed that he was not personally bound; all of' these illegal and arbitrary acts of the relator, Babin, could certainly not divest the District Oourt of its appellate jurisdiction.
    That he had overruled the exceptions of the relator, Babin, because Art. 861 of the Oode of Practice admitted of no exception, and because respondent could not pass on the question of jurisdiction without an inspection of. the records of the justice’s court. And because, if the averments of Gonsoulin were true, grave injustice had been done, not only to Gonsoulin, who would remain without redress (should the court make the writs absolute), but also to one hundred and forty-three parties who would be unnecessarily and wantonly mulcted in heavy costs, without being able to appeal; and because the decree of the court over which respondent presided would have been most flagrantly violated and spurned by the relator without the means left to the court to have its authority respected.
    That the relator disclosed in himself no interest to sue out the writs of certiorari and prohibition.
    That from the nature of the cause he could have no interest therein; he being neither plaintiff nor defendant in the suits before-him, and neither his right to his office, or the emoluments thereof' being involved.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Nicholls, C. J.

The question which meets us at the threshold is whether the relator occupies such a position and has such a legal interest in the matter submitted to us herein as to ask a decision upon the same at our hands and to call into exercise the supervisory powers conferred upon us by Article 90 of the Constitution.

It is claimed “that he had no legal personal interest in the original suit of R. F. & J. C. Broussard vs. Adrien Gonsoulin instituted in his court, and that he has none now in the one hundred and forty - three eases which were brought by those same plaintiffs [after the remanding of the original suit and its continuance] against Gonsoulin and the different cane growers interested in the funds in his hands.

“ That the effect of the writs of certiorari and prohibition which issued from the District Oourt though directed to the justice of the peace was to tie up the plaintiffs in the one hundred and forty-three suits in the enforcement of their rights — that they were the real parties in interest and it was for them and not the present relator to complain if their rights were illegally interfered with; that he is improperly championing their rights of third parties.” It is certainly a very unusual proceeding for the judge of a court whose jurisdiction and authority in certain proceedings before him have been called in question by writs of certiorari and prohibition issuing from a court claiming to have appellate jurisdiction over him in the matters complained of in the writs, to have recourse himself to the Supreme Oourt for relief from such writs by counter writs of certio-rari and prohibition from the latter court. Ordinarily the parties to the suit or suits in which the proceedings are stayed take action themselves.

The reasons assigned by the justice for his course is “ that he is interested officially as a State officer in having his legal jurisdiction, when illegally interfered with, maintained; that the method of proceeding resorted to will avoid the bringing of a multiplicity of suits, and that he has a personal interest in the matter of the costs in the various suits in his court.” Article 90 of the Constitution declares that “ the Supreme Oourt shall have control and general supervision over all inferior courts. They shall have power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and other remedial wrjts.”

The grant of power for the purposes indicated, could scarcely have been conveyed in broader or more sweeping language. Excluding the provisions of the Constitution relative to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Oourt, and those limiting its appellate jurisdiction, the right and power of supervision over other courts comes to this court untrameled by restrictions.

It is our province and duty under this delegation of authority to prevent the clashing of courts touching their respective jurisdiction by settling disputed questions in respect thereto, and to keep the different courts though acting inside of their general jurisdiction from acting outside or beyond the law.

The circumstances or conditions under which our powers in those matters should be called into exercise were not fixed by the Constitution, but left to be determined by this court in such manner as would best, in its opinion, subserve the object and purposes of the grant.

We are of the opinion that when an inferior court, acting within what it claims to be its exclusive jurisdiction in the enforcement and ascertainment of rights of litigants before it, finds itself paralyzed in its action by writs of certiorari or prohibition from a superior court based on the claim of the latter that it has appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over it touching the matters before it, and when as in this instance it through its judge is alone made a party defendant in the writs, itis justified and authorized in calling to the judicial attention of this court the facts and the issues raised, to the end that it take such action in the premises as will, while safeguarding the rights of private litigants, ensure the performance of their respective duties by the different judicial tribunals of the State and the observance by them of the limitations upon their respective powers. Had the relator in this case made answer to the writs of certiorari and prohibition which issued to him from the District Court, but none the less the writs had been made absolute, and had the matter been susceptible of an appeal [as seems in a qualified degree to be the practice in California (26 Pac.)], we are of the opinion that the present relator as the party and the sole party to the record would have had sufficient legal interest in the subject-matter to have taken such appeal. Having been called into court as a defendant the party who called him in could scarcely be heard to dispute or deny his power to defend. His interest ,to “ appeal ” would be neither greater nor less than his interest to have tested through the present proceeding the matter submitted to us. The issues before the court would be identical though presented in a different form. If the justice of the peace asserting his right of exclusive jurisdiction had ignored the writs (as it was intimated in the case of State ex rel. Hirsch vs. Judge, 39 An. 98, he would be authorized to do if his pretensions were well founded), had been declared in contempt for so doing by the superior court and sentenced to be punished he would have been authorized, in his own name, to have the issues raised tested by this court, though collaterally. Situated as is this court under the Constitution, we see no reason for forcing matters to take such a form to obtain a judicial decision.

The status of the courts with respect to writs of certiorari and prohibition is not identical with that which they occupy under writs of injunction.

The latter writ runs to the parties litigant, while the former are directed against the courts themselves.

We appreciate that the relator does not stand charged with representing directly, in his official capacity, the private rights of the plaintiffs in the one hundred and forty-three cases which were instituted in his court, and that he may not as fully and fairly present as they might do themselves their legal rights, and that any judgment we might render adverse to them might not in their absence ■conclude them, but the conclusions we have reached in this particular case obviate those objections on the present occasion. We think we have a sufficient basis on which to rest judicial notice of and on which take judicial action upon relator’s allegations and prayer.

We understand the contention of the District Judge to be that the matter in dispute in the original suit of R. F. and J. C. Broussard brought in relator’s court, being seventy-seven dollars, brought it within the appellate jurisdiction of the District Oourt. That when there on appeal it was Anally decided, so far as Gonsouiin was concerned, in his favor. That the latter was entitled in the justice’s court to the benefit of that judgment, and the plea of res judicata, whether set up in the original suit after it had been remanded, or in any new suit which might be subsequently instituted in that court on the same claim after the plaintiffs had on the remanding of the cause to .the justice’s court discontinued the first suit. That the District Oourt having rendered, on appeal, the final decision which it had in Gonsoulin’s favor, its appellate jurisdiction with respect thereto did not terminate with the rendition of the same, but continued over it for supervisory purposes until its final execution. That the justice of the peace, in view of that judgment, was not authorized nor justified in allowing the plaintiffs to split up the same claim from which Gonsouiin had been declared not liable by the judgment of the District Oourt into one hundred and forty-three different claims against him and to render itself that number of personal judgments against him aggregating precisely the original amount demanded of him. That this was by indirection to destroy the judgment of the District Oourt in Gonsoulin’s favor and to defy the authority of the District Oourt.

He maintains that under Arts. 130, 617 et seq. and 629 of the Code of Practice the “appellate” jurisdiction of the District Oourt remains in full force over the judgment rendered in favor of Gonsoulin so as to see that it is not violated or disregarded though the powers to be exerted in that respect might be “ supervisory ” as to form. He maintains that the District Oourt is vested with power and authority, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition to justices of the peace, and that his action in the premises was in aid of such jurisdiction.

He denies that he has ever passed upon the merits of Gonsoulin’s application for relief through the writs which had issued, and asserts that the writs had issued simply to examine into with a view of determining after examination and return what his powers in the particular case under its circumstances would be.

He charges that the justice of the peace though ordered to produce his records had failed to do so, and asserts that matters are still in abeyance in and undecided by the District Oourt as to whether the writs could and should be made absolute or not.

Relator asserts as a fact that he had obeyed the orders of the District Oourt and produced his records as directed — that he had excepted to the jurisdiction of the District Oourt in the premises — that his exception had been overruled, and that he had done everything on his part required by the court as a condition precedent to invoking its supervisory powers.

Relator may have taken the records which the District Court ordered to be produced to the court house, but it is evident, we think, that he never delivered them to the clerk of the court or submitted them for examination as required to do. On the contrary he met the proceedings directed against him by an exception calling into question the right and power of the District Court “ to try the writs.” He made no return or answer to the writs, but simply reserved his right to file an answer should his exception be overruled. Instead of doing so, when overruled, he instituted the present proceeding in this court, the very object of which, it seems to us, is to justify him in declining to submit his records to the District Court. His records come to us not from the District Court, but through certified copies attached to relator’s application. The District Court has not as yet made the writs absolute, as having been issued in a case legally calling for such action from it. It is true the pleadings filed here by the District Judge indicate what probably would have been its ruling had relator complied with the order to produce his records, but the fact remains that no final action has been taken by that court on Gonsoulin’s application for relief. Non constat that the District Court might not have reached (and may not yet reach) a different conclusion had matters been presented to the District Judge in a different manner, and with written reasons assigned and authorities cited. Relator has evidently construed the decisions of this court in the cases of State ex rel. Gas Light Company vs. Judge, 37 An. 287; State ex rel. Hirsch vs. Judge, 39 An. 98, and State ex rel. Sweeney vs. Judge, 39 An. 621, to mean that in no class of cases and under no circumstances are District Courts vested with authority to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition to justices of the peace, but that the Supreme Court had exclusive authority to pass upon all disputed questions between the District Courts and justices of the peace, for which such writs are to be availed of as the proper method for relief.

The decisions in question affirm the power of this court to issue such writs under its supervisory powers, whether cases be appealable or wow-appealable, and that that power is exclusive in a certain class of cases or under certain circumstances, but they did not intend to declare that the powers granted by Arts. 130, 617, et seq., and 629 of the Code of Practice did not refer to Districts Courts in their relations with the proceedings of justices in proper cases. Art. 130 of the Code of Practice declares that all judges possess the powers necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions though the same be not expressly given by law, while Arts. 617, 618, 629 are to the effect that the execution of judgments belongs to the courts by which the cases have been tried in the first instance, whether such judgments have been affirmed or reversed on appeal. Therefore the Court of Appeals whether it affirm or reverse the judgment, or whether it has rendered another definitive judgment in the cause, must send the same to the inferior court in order that it may be •executed. It is for the court, whether appellate or inferior, which has rendered the judgment to take cognizance of the manner of the execution when the proper 'manner of executing it is to be determined.”

This court has repeatedly exercised its powers over the manner of executing the judgments which it had passed on upon appeal and of seeing that the provisions were carried into effect. State ex rel. Construction Company vs. Tax Collector, 48 An. 32.

We are of the opinion that such action, though taken after a judgment has been rendered on appeal, may well be referred to as “matter connected with appellate jurisdiction having a tendency to aid it or make it effectual.” State of Louisiana vs. Judge of the First District, 19 La. 180.

In State ex rel. Hirsch vs. Judge, 39 An. 98, this court said:

“Article 90 of the present Constitution vests this court with control and general supervision over all inferior courts, and with power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and other remedial writs. The Constitution does not confer similar supervisory jurisdiction on any other court, whether it be a District Court or a Circuit Court, although it vests the other appellate courts with the power tó issue like writs in aid of their appellate jurisdiction. These courts have, therefore, no power to issue any of those writs when notin aid of their appellate jurisdiction.”

The District Court having the power to supervise its own judgments, and the case of F. F. & J. C. Broussard vs. Adrien Gonsoulin having been before it, and a judgment therein rendered, we think it was within the competency of that court on the application to it of the defendant Gonsoulin, declaring that the judgment in question was being executed in a manner different from its terms, or that it was being actively violated by the justice’s court, where it originated, and to which it was remanded, to order the justice of the court to send up his records for examination with a view of ascertaining what the legal situation was, to the end that such action should be taken as the law and the facts of the case authorized, and that it was the duty of the justice to comply with that order. Whether the District Court would be justified or warranted, after examination, in making writs of certiorari or prohibition, which it •caused to issue to the justice, peremptory in a particular case is a different question from whether it had the jurisdiction to simply make inquiry through such writs into the subject matters complained of. Jurisdiction is the power to judge — it includes the power to judge wrongly as well as rightly.

We do not think relator warranted in asking relief at our hands in the present situation of affairs. The District Oourt having power to-send writs of certiorari and prohibition to justices of the peace in a certain class of cases, when its jurisdiction to that end has been invoked in a particular case as being one of that character they are-entitled to issue tentative writs and to primarily determine whether that jurisdiction legally extends to the ultimate affording of the relief asked. Relator had the right to raise the issue he did as to the power of the District Oourt, and to have that court pass on that exception, but none the less he should have produced and submitted his records as ordered and made his return or answer, and enabled the issues raised to be determined.

Should the justice reach an illegal conclusion as to his powers and duties in the particular ease it will be time enough to have recourse to this court (State ex rel. Kirsch vs. Judge, 45 An. 1206). It may well be, as we have said, that the District Oourt, on examination, may reach the conclusion that though he may have intended on appeal to render a final judgment in favor of the defendant, Gon-soulin, that intention was not carried out in the decretal part of his-judgment; that the plaintiffs had the right to discontinue the suit after it was remanded, and that when afterward the one hundred and forty-three suits, to which reference has been made, were insti-ituted, matters were not then in such a condition as to authorize any other than the Supreme Oourt to take adverse action in the premises.

It has not been claimed on behalf of the cane growers made co-defendants with Gonsoulin in the different suits that the proceedings against them were illegal. The controversy is limited to the proceedings against Gonsoulin. In order that all parties concerned be heard, we think R. P. & J. C. Broussard, the plaintiffs in the suits, should be made parties to the proceedings in the District Oourt. After full consideration, we are of the opinion that the orders-heretofore given here should be set aside, and that relator’s application be denied, but without prejudice, and it is so ordered and decreed.

Mr. Justice Miller — I dissent.