Case ID: scl_33/html/0156-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "O’Neall, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William Foy v. Hugh Neal.
    
    In trespass to try title, where the jury, in locating the land, under a deed, have made no use of extrinsic facts, inconsistent with its terms, nor violated any of the rules for the construction of deeds, their verdict will not be disturbed.
    The rule of construction of a deed is, that all the parts of a description contained therein should be taken together, and no part suffered to control absolutely the others.
    When there is doubt in the construction of a deed, the rule is, that the words should be more strongly construed against die grantor.
    
      Facts, outside of a deed, not inconsistent with its terms, may have a powerful effect in aid of its construction.
    
      Before Mr. Justice O’Neall, at Edgefield, Fall Term, 1847.
    The Presiding Judge. This was an action of trespass to try title. The defendant claimed, under the plaintiff, by two deeds of conveyance. Upon the location of the last deed, 29th Dec. 1819, depended the plaintiff’s title to recover. The description in the deed was as follows: — “a tract of land, supposed to contain one hundred and fifty acres, lying, &c. bounded on the south by a part of the said tract conveyed by William Foy to Hugh Neal, the 20th day of Aug. 1817, and on the west by land granted to David Richardsoa, and on the north by part of the same tract designated by a line beginning on the west line near the road leading from Mrs. Culpepper’s to Mrs. Strother’s, and running from thence nearly parallel with the said road, till it intersects the east line or land of Hugh Neal, it being fart of a tract of land granted to Daniel Brown, and conveyed,” &c. The plaintiff when he conveyed was not only the owner of the Daniel Brown grant, but also of a junior grant to himself, of the 6th of Sept. 1813, containing 610 acres — and not only covering the Daniel Brown grant, but also several acres of vacant land on the west.
    If the defendant’s deed were located according to the Brown grant, then the plaintiff was entitled to recover: but in that event, the defendant would have much less than the quantity mentioned in his deed, and the land of William Foy would be a boundary on the west.
    The corner of the west line, near the road, from Mrs. Cul-pepper’s to Mrs. Strother’s, was found and ascertained to be on the line of the junior grant to the plaintiff, and running thence, and following its lines, the boundaries of the deed would be preserved, and the defendant would have (149 acres) within one acre of the quantity mentioned in the deed. The grant to David Richardson was for a large quantity of land, junior to the plaintiff’s grant to himself, and its lines would run into the Brown grant. Running out the plaintiff’s junior grant would cut off the land in dispute from it (the Richardson grant); still the boundary of the defendant’s deed, uwest by land granted to David Richardson,” would be true; for a large part of the tract would remain as the western boundary.
    I am not aware that the plaintiff was entitled to recover any of the land in dispute, on which there was a trespass 
      
      proved, according to the construction of the defendant’s deed, contended for by the defendant.
    The case was submitted to the jury, and they, as I think, .properly found for the defendant.
    The plaintiff moved the Court of Appeals for a new trial, on the grounds following, viz:
    1. That by the proper construction of the deed of 1819, from the plaintiff to the defendant, the latter is restricted to the line of the Brown grant.
    2. Because the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict for a part of the land in dispute, upon the construction of the said deed, contended for by the defendant, and because the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence of the case.
    Pope, for the motion,
    cited Gibson ads. Chappel, Harp. 28.
    Carroll, contra,
    cited Dyson v. Leake, 2 Rich. 554.
   O’Neall, J.

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, were it not for the words “it being a part of a tract of land granted to Daniel Brown,” the last part of the description contained in the deed from the plaintiff to the defendant, no one, not even the intelligent and zealous counsel for the plaintiff, would contend that the plaintiff could recover. The rule of construction of a deed is, that all the parts of a description contained in a deed should be taken together, and no part suffered to control absolutely the others. So too, when there is doubt, the rule is, that the words should be more strongly construed against the grantor. So it often happens, that facts outside of the deed, not inconsistent with its terms, may have a powerful effect. Having stated these rules, it will be necessary to look to the description, and apply it in subordination to them. The southern boundary is plain. It is the line A. B. on the plat of Mr. White, filed with this opinion. The difficulty is about the boundary — “west by land granted to David Richardson.” Before considering that, it will be important to fix' the northern boundary, which is described “by part of the same tract, beginning on the west line, near the road leading from Mrs. Culpepper’s to Mrs. Strother’s, and running from thence nearly parallel with the said road till it intersects the east line, or land of Hugh Neal.” The corner C. on the west line of the new grant to Foy is found, and was, up to this dispute, the acknowledged corner of the land bought by the defendant from the plaintiff. It answers the description contained in the deed, it is near the road from Mrs. Culpepper’s to Mrs. Strother’s, is on the west line; from it, several line trees on the land in dispute were found by the surveyor, (Abies) although the son of the plaintiff swore there were none. It was near this point, and on the land in dispute, that Hill’s slaves were cutting timber, when the plaintiff asked Hill if he was aware he was on defendant’s land. The question as to this comer was distinctly submitted to the jury, and they were told upon it very much depended the location of the deed. Their verdict must be taken to have established it. Taking that as settled, the northern boundary C. D. is established. This being so, it is now only necessary to connect it and the southern boundary on the west.- For about the eastern boundary there is no dispute. The grant to David Richardson not only included his grant to Savage, the line of which is represented by G. H. and from C. to L. and from N. to G. is identical with the line of the plaintiff’s junior grant, but also ran into the Daniel Brown grant by the line L. F. the prolongation of which from F. to I. was identical with the line of the Brown grant. To preserve the entire grant to Richardson as a boundary, it would be necessary to begin at I. the intersection of the Brown line with the northern boundary — but that cannot be, for two reasons. 1st. There is no corner at that point; it is found at G. 2d. Run from I. and it cuts off part (the angles B. P. F.) of the Daniel Brown grant. But the words, “ land granted to David Richardson,” do not necessarily mean the grant in its exact boundary. -Cut off from that grant I. E. L. E. and still the balance of the tract is “ land granted to David Richardson.” Taking the corner G. as established, and finding that Foy, the plaintiff, owned, by a junior grant, the land I. O. L. E. at the date of his deed, and that the line on which we find the corner was then his west line, we are justified in following it to L. where we strike the line of the Daniel Brown grant, and turning on it to M. and N. we here resume the line of the David Richardson grant as a boundary, which carries us to G. and O. From O. to A. is the line of the Daniel Brown grant. This gives a very satisfactory location of the deed. But when to this is added that if it be not adopted we lose David Richardson as a boundary, in fact on the whole line, except at L. M. N. the location receives much strength. For if it were true that the plaintiff did not convey the land in dispute, then he ought to have described the western boundary thus: — “by lands granted to William Foy and David Richardson.” For O. G. N. and I. C. L. E. are within the plaintiff’s junior grant. But it is said the words “it being part of a tract of land granted to Daniel Brown,” confine the location to that grant; that, however, would be to give to one part of the description a controlling effect over all the others, and make it destroy the legal effect of the terminus of the northern boundary, the comer at C. This is in violation of the rules stated, and cannot be allowed: but considered as part of a general description, it is in the main complied with. For the bulk of the land was granted to Daniel Brown. Reading the whole deed together, and giving to the description a fair and reasonable construction, aided by the marks upon the ground, and regarding the words of the deed as those of the plaintiff, and giving them all the effect which their import will allow against him, there can be no difficulty in saying that the jury might adopt, as they have done, the lines C. L. M. N: and G. as the western boundary of the plaintiff’s deed.

The motion is dismissed.

Richardson, J. Evans, J. and Withers, J. concurred.

Motion refused.