Case ID: sc_5/html/0052-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Moses, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HEARD NOVEMBER TERM, 1873.
    Converse vs. Evins.
    An action cannot be maintained upon a sealed note given in 1863 for Confederate States bonds — the consideration being illegal, the note is void.
    Before MOSES, J., at Spartanburg, April Term, 1873.
    Action by D. E. Converse, plain tiff,'against John H. Evins, as administrator of S. IT. Evins, deceased, defendant, upon a sealed note as follows:
    “ Three years after a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States, or cessation of hostilities for the same time between the same, I promise to pay D. E. Converse, or order, the sam of three thousand dollars in specie or bills of then specie paying banks ; and I herein pledge myself to pay this when due, notwithstanding any Act of Congress or Legislature that might excuse me from so doing, either as to time or otherwise, for value received; as witness my hand and seal, this 17th day of October, 1863. “S. N. EVINS. [seal.]
    “ Witness:
    “ J. Bomar,
    “ A. H. Twichell.
    The defense was that the note was given for Confederate States eight per cent, bonds, sold or loaned by the plaintiff to the intestate; and the fact that such was the consideration of the note was proved at the trial on the part of the defendant.
    The counsel for the defense requested His Honor the presiding Judge to instruct the jury, inter alia, that
    
      “If, in point of fact, the note sued on was given for the purchase or loan of Confederate bonds, then, in law, the note was illegal and void.”
    His Honor declined so to charge, and the defendant excepted.
    Under the instructions of His Honor, the jury found for the plaintiff $4,001.56.
    A motion for a new trial was made and overruled, and defendant appealed on the ground of error in the refusal to charge as above stated.
    
      Duncan & develan, Simpson, for appellant,
    relied upon Hananer vs. Woodruff, 15 Wal., 437, as decisive of the point made by the . appeal.
    
      Bobo & Carlisle, contra :
    The contract was made by parties able to contract, was reduced to writing with care, and fully explains itself.
    In the defense it is contended that there was no consideration passed between the parties.
    Were Confederate bonds a consideration?
    The bonds were in circulation as money and for investment, bearing eight per cent, interest. The intestate had the use of them during the war, and for three years after. By that contract that difference, in his favor, was, in the judgment of the intestate, full compensation for him to risk the result of the war — had it been successful — then he would have got eight per cent, in the way of interest for five years and his. money back, and the plaintiff prefered to let him have it — hence the trade.
    This Court has recognized investments in these bonds. — Hinton vs. Eenneday, 3 S. C., 457, 490 ; 'Cureton vs. Watson, 3 S. C., 451.
    Confederate notes were given for the bonds without stint, and such investments were actually sought. It has not been denied but that they were a good consideration — both emanated from the same authority. The United States and Confederate States were at war. The latter, for the time being, were independent, and had a lawful right to do anything that they deemed necessary to carry on the war and to sustain their people. — Vattel, 425-7, §§ 293-5 ; Morgan vs. Keenan, 1 S. C., 327. The cases of Texas vs. White and Thorington vs. Smith sustained this view.
    
      Hananer vs. Woodruff decided that a State in rebellion could not issue bonds. The State never stood in an independent relation to the United States, and their bonds were issued expressly in aid of the war. Bills issued by the Bank of the State, during the war, are held good for payment of taxes.
    This, we insist, sustains the right of the Confederate States to issue the bonds. But suppose we should be mistaken in this, and that the bonds were illegally issued, does that prove that this contract was in aid of the war, and, therefore, void ? The bonds were in actual being. Neither of these parties issued them, they found them in circulation. It did not aid the war to change them out of the hands of Converse and put them in the hands of Evins; they were in circulation, and were the legitimate subjects of traffic.— Random vs. Toly, 11 How., 398; Naffa vs. Crawford, 3 Law Times, 301, and cases cited.
    The contract was entered into with care and precision, to be paid in specie, and with a pledge to pay, notwithstanding any Act of Congress or Legislature that would excuse him. There was no pretence that both powers should continue to exist; on the contrary, it provides for a treaty of peace or cessation of hostilities— had it stopped with “ treaty of peace,” the argument may have been worth something, but the other contingency was certain to happen, and did happen, and was, we contend, inserted to avoid any contingency.
    The paper sued on is sealed and payable in specie. The seal implies a consideration, and the word specie indicates what kind of dollars were meant. — Bobo vs. Goss, 1 S. C., 162; Browson vs. Rhodes, 7 Wallace, 229; Briten vs. Marwite, 7 Wallace, 258.
    Jan. 28, 1874.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Moses, C. J.

The decision in Hananer vs. Woodruff, 15 Wallace, 439, is so conclusive of the case before us that our own convictions must yield to its authority. It declares that a consideration formed on Confederate bonds is illegal and void under the Constitution and laws of the United States. On a question involving these, the authority of the Supreme Court is binding, not only on every Court, but on every department of the General Government and the several States. Our duty is to follow its judgment whenever rendered in cases which, in its view, are to be controlled and determined by that instrument, or the laws of Congress made in conformity with it. So holding, we have no alternative but to grant the motion, as the appeal proceeds upon the same principle which governed the Supreme Court of the United States in the case referred to.

Wright, A. J., and Willard, A. J., concurred.