Case ID: f-appx_657/html/0681-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Lance REBERGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Renee BAKER; Adam Watson; Michael Byrne, Administrative Law Judge; Robert Legrand, Warden; Baze; Dwight Neven, Warden; Cole Morrow; Rex Reed; Quintin Byrne; Offender Management Division (OMD); James G. Cox; Robert Bannister; Nevada Board of Prison Commissioners, Defendants-Appellees. Lance Reberger, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James G. Cox, NDOC Director; Renee Baker; NDOC, Central Transportation; ESP Law Library Supervisor; N. Young, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-17135, No. 14-15142
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted April 4, 2016 Pasadena, California
    Filed August 09, 2016
    
      Lance Reberger, Pro Se
    Joseph Friedman Tartakovsky, Esquire, Deputy Solicitor General, Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Carson City, NV, D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees Renee Baker, Adam Watson, Michael Byrne, Robert Le-grand, Cole Morrow, Rex Reed, Quintín Byrne, James G. Cox
    Joseph Friedman Tartakovsky, Esquire, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City, NV, D. Randall Gilmer, Deputy Attorney General, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendants-Appellees Baze, Dwight Neven, Robert Bannister
    Joseph Friedman Tartakovsky, Esquire, Deputy Solicitor General, Carson City, NV, for Defendant-Appellee Offender Management Division
    Joseph Friedman Tartakovsky, Esquire, Deputy Solicitor General, Clark G. Leslie, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendant-Ap-pellee Nevada Board of Prison Commissioners
    Before: FARRIS, BEA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Lance Reberger is a prisoner incarcerated in Nevada who has been placed in administrative segregation. In 2013, Re-berger submitted two complaints pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in conjunction with applications to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court denied both applications on the basis that Reberger had violated the “three-strikes” rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under the PLRA, prisoners are ineligible for IFP status if they have brought three or more civil actions or appeals while incarcerated or detained that were dismissed on the grounds that they were “frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Id. In this consolidated appeal, Reberger disputes the validity of two of the three strikes relied upon by the district court, as well as the conclusion that he has not satisfactorily alleged that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.

1. The district court properly counted Reberger v. Offender Management Division, No. 3:12-cv-00293 as a strike, notwithstanding the fact that Reberger’s appeal of Offender Management was still pending at the time the district court denied him IFP status. See Coleman v. Tollefson, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1769, 1763, 191 L.Ed.2d 803 (2015) (holding that a “prior dismissal on a statutorily enumerated ground counts as a strike even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal”).

2. The district court properly counted Reberger v. Suter, No. 3:ll-ev-00073 as a strike, because Suter was dismissed on the grounds that Reberger had failed to state a claim. “A complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007). Such a dismissal is appropriate when an affirmative defense barring relief appears on the face of the complaint. Id. In Suter, it was clear from the face of the complaint that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity barred any relief for Reberger, and the court dismissed the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that the phrase “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” in the PLRA “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)” (citation omitted)).

3. Section 1915(g) provides an exception to the three-strikes rule “if the complaint makes a plausible allegation, that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury1 at the time of filing.” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).

Reberger failed to make such an allegation in the first of the complaints that was consolidated on appeal, Reberger v. Cox. There, Reberger’s conclusory allegation that he is suffering joint pain and arthritis as a result of his smaller exercise yard in administrative segregation does not constitute a plausible allegation of imminent danger.

The suggestion in his complaint that administrative segregation may cause him to be “denied [an] H[IV] medication[ ] ‘dose’ that could lead to medication[ ] resistance” is more serious, and comes closer to making such a showing. See id. at 1055 (plausible allegations showing that prison conditions may cause or worsen a chronic condition such as hepatitis C or HIV/AIDS meet the “imminent danger” standard). However, Reberger’s allegations on this score are too vague and speculative to invoke the exception to the three-strikes rule. He does not explain how administrative segregation would impact his medication or doses, other than to suggest that he is transferred often while in segregation. However, he also indicates that his transfers are to see a “so-called H[IV] specialist,” and not related to his status as a segregated inmate.

In the second complaint in this consolidated appeal, Reberger v. Baker, Re-berger makes no allegation at all that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

The district court correctly concluded that Reberger has incurred three strikes under the PLRA and has not alleged that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. He is therefore ineligible to proceed IFP. We AFFIRM. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . Reberger does not dispute that the third dismissal identified by the district court, Reberger v. Cox, No. 2:10 cv-02022, counts as a strike.