Case ID: misc_10/html/0746-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Bischoff, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John Thomas et al., as Executors, Respondents, v. Societa Italiana di Mutuo Soccorso, Appellant.
    (New York Common Pleas
    Additional General Term,
    January, 1895.)
    The by-laws of the defendant association provide that its aim is “mutual aid, protection and moral and material support among its members,” and grant to each member “financial relief in case of sickness; legal protection in case of wrongs; relief in case of death of legitimate wife and funeral in case of the event of death,” and also provide for a “tax for funerals.” Held, that the provision as to a ‘-‘funeral’’' involved a pecuniary benefit to the member’s estate and not the mere furnishing of an escort by the.other members.
    Where the by-laws of an association are susceptible of definite construction without extraneous proof, the opinions of officers of the association as to their meaning are inadmissible.
    Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the city of New York for the sixth judicial district, rendered by the justice, without a jury, in favor of the plaintiffs.
    
      Joel M. Marx, for respondents.
    
      J. S. GaTland, for appellant.
   Bischoff, J.

The plaintiffs, as personal representatives of one Di Miceli, a deceased member of the defendant society, sued for and recovered the sum of forty-nine dollars and ninety cents by them expended for the funeral. expenses of the decedent, it being claimed that by the terms of the defendant’s by-laws it had agreed to provide a funeral' for such deceased member, and which upon demand it had refused to do.

The sole question litigated upon the trial and now presented relates to the construction of the by-laws with regard to the defendant’s undertaking to defray the expenses of a funeral for a deceased member in good standing, which this decedent was admitted to be.

According to the terms of these by-laws the aim of the society was “ mutual aid, protection and moral and material support among its members. * * * To this end the society grants to each member :

“ 1. Financial relief in case of sickness.
2. Legal protection in case of wrongs.
3. Belief in case of death of legitimate wife.
“ 4. Funeral in case of the event of death.”

It is claimed by the appellant that the provision for a funeral intended merely that the members of the society should be called upon to attend the deceased member’s burial, and that the society could be in no way called upon to defray the expenses of such funeral.

This contention cannot prevail. The natural and accepted meaning, of the phrase noted, and" the sense in which only it pould have reasonably been understood by the member (Nib-lack Mut. Ben. Soc. § 15), would intend a promise to pay the expenses of his decent burial. The terms of the other by-laws, and of a certain receipt in evidence, admits only of an interpretation that the funeral ” to be provided involved a pecuniary benefit to the member’s estate. Provision is made for a “ tax for funerals,” and the funeral is classed among the other substantial benefits to be derived from membership, and which, in case of certain defaults in payment of assessments, should be withheld.

The fact that the by-laws also provide that notice be given to the members of the society upon the death of one of their number, in order that their attendance should be secured at the funeral of the deceased member, in no way presents any inconsistency with the other provisions noted; the terms of the agreement are clear, and no construction that the party accepting them as consideration for the payments required did so merely with the expectation of finally securing an impressive escort to'possibly a pauper’s grave could reasonably obtain.

While in some cases the opinions of officers of an association may be given for the purpose of construing technical, ambiguous or uncertain terms of a by-law, the evidence offered in that regard in the present case was properly excluded, the by-laws being susceptible of definite construction without extraneous proof. Brendon v. Worley, 8 Misc. Rep. 253.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

Bookstaveb, J., concurs.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.