Case ID: so2d_600/html/1311-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. FERGUSON, Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Farouk KAMAREDDINE, on behalf of ATLAS MARINE SERVICES, INC., and Atlas Metal Fabricators, Inc. and Farouk Kamareddine, individually, Appellants, v. Frank D. DEMERY, Zodiac Enterprises, Inc., and Charles L. Gomes, Appellees.
    No. 91-1630.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    July 7, 1992.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 1992.
    Brian R. Hersh, Miami, for appellants.
    Deborah Marks, North Miami, for appel-lee Frank D. Demery.
    Touby Smith DeMahy & Drake, and Kenneth R. Drake, Miami, for appellee Charles L. Gomes.
    Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and GERSTEN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the main appeal on the authority of Hochstadt v. Orange Broadcast, 588 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). However, we reverse and remand the cross-appeal.

Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.170(f) provides that:

When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim ... through oversight, inadvertence or excusable neglect or when justice requires, the pleader may set up the counterclaim ... by amendment with leave of the court.

This rule is to be interpreted broadly when, as in this case, a compulsory counterclaim is involved. Bill Williams Air Condition ing & Heating, Inc. v. Haymarket Cooperative Bank, 592 So.2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Denial of leave to file a compulsory counterclaim will generally be an abuse of discretion. Bill Williams, 592 So.2d at 306. Here, there was an abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a compulsory counterclaim.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, except for its denial of leave to file the counterclaim. That portion of the judgment we reverse and remand.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

BARKDULL and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.

FERGUSON, Judge

(dissenting).

The question presented in this appeal is whether a chapter 11 bankruptcy determination has a res judicata effect on pending state court claims and counterclaims between a former officer/shareholder and other shareholders for breach of fiduciary duties, where the bankruptcy judge finds, on the pertinent issue, that a corporation’s stock is worthless, and that the departure of the officer/shareholder from the corporation caused the stock’s decline in value. In my opinion, the bankruptcy judgment has no preclusive effect because the breach of fiduciary duty issue was not presented to and was not actually litigated by the bankruptcy court, nor was a resolution of the fiduciary issue essential to the bankruptcy determination. See Argerenon v. St. Andrews Cove I Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 507 So.2d 709, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

Hochstadt v. Orange Broadcast, 588 So.2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), is distinguishable. Hochstadt sued Siegel and Orange Broadcast in state court claiming fraud and that part of a 1984 loan had not been repaid. The state action was stayed by Siegel’s bankruptcy action. In the bankruptcy action, Hochstadt claimed again that the 1984 loan remained unpaid and that he had been defrauded by Siegel. Following a two-day trial, the bankruptcy court found, specifically, that the debt had been paid and that no fraud had been shown. Ho-chstadt’s pending state claim was dismissed as precluded by the bankruptcy determinations. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the issues presented in the state court action had actually been litigated in a prior proceeding where the stakes were identical, and that the determination of those issues was a critical and necessary part of the first litigation. The same has not, and cannot, be said of this case.