Case ID: ohio-st_39/html/0268-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Okey, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State v. Schlatterbeck.
    Infants committed to a house of refuge and correction, under Eev. Stats. § 2050, for “incorrigible conduct,” are not committed “for offenses against a law of the state,” within the meaning of Eev.’ Stats. § 2071 ; and hence they must be supported as provided in Eev. Stats. § 2072, and not by the county.
    Motion for leave to file a petition in error to reverse the judgment of the District Court of Cuyahoga county.
    In 1881 an alternative writ of mandamus was issued from the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, on the relation of Rice and others, constituting the board of directors of the house of refuge and corrections, Cleveland, against Schlatterbeck and others, constituting the board of county commissioners of Cuyahoga county, and Bauder, auditor of the county. By the writ the commissioners were commanded to direct the county auditor to issue a warrant or warrants upon the treasurer of the county, in favor of the relators, for the sum, named in the petition for the mandamus, that is, $1,571.80 and $1,548. 20, and the auditor was commanded to draw such warrant or warrants accordingly, or that the commissioners and auditors show cause why they refuse to do so. The sums mentioned were the amounts claimed to be due from the county to the re- ] a tors “for boarding prisoners committed to the house of refuge and correction, state cases from police and probate courts, for the quarters ending December 31, 1880, and March 31, 1881.” The house of refuge and correction was established and organized under the municipal code of 1869, §§ 219-270, Rev. Stats. §§ 2031-2082. Fully one-half of the persons so committed, and for whose maintenance compensation is thus sought, were infants committed for “incorrigible conduct” alone; and this is true of both accounts. On issue joined it appeared that the commissioners offered to allow and pay the accounts if the directors would strike therefrom the amounts claimed for maintenance of infants committed for “ incorrigible conduct ” alone ; but the directors refused to strike out such portion of the accounts.
    The Revised Statutes provide as follows:
    “Sec. 2050. The Board may, at its discretion, receive into such institution infants under the age of sixteen years committed to their custody in either of the following modes, to wit.
    “ 1. Infants committed by the mayor of the corporation, or any judge or justice of the peace of the county, on complaint and due proof by the parent, guardian or next friend of such infant, that by reason of incorrigible or vicious conduct such infant has rendered his control beyond the power of such parent, guardian or next friend, and made it manifestly requisite that from regard to the future welfare of such infant and for the protection of society he should be placed under the guardianship of the board of directors of such house of correction.
    “ 2. Infants committed by the authorities aforesaid, where complaint and due proof have been made that such infant is a proper subject for the guardianship of the directors of such institution, in consequence of vagrancy, or of incorrigible or vicious conduct, and that from the moral depravity of the parent, guardian or next friend, in whose custody such infant may be, or other cause, such parent, guardian or next friend is incapable or unwilling to exercise the proper care and discipline over such incorigible or vicious infant.”
    “ Sec. 2071. The expense of maintaining infants committed to a house of refuge and correction by a court or magistrate of the county in which such institution is situated, or by the police, or other court of the corporation, for offenses against a law of the state, or for trial, or as a witness, shall be paid by the county; and the expense of infants committed by township trustees shall be paid by the township, and of those committed by parents and guardians shall be paid by them, except in cases when the board otherwise determine; all which expense shall be ascertained and fixed by the board.”
    “ Sec. 2072. The expense of maintaining and administering the affairs of houses of refuge and correction, above the receipts thereof, shall bo audited and paid, from time to time, by the council of the corporation; and a tax for such expense shall be levied and collected as a part of the ordinary expenses of the corporation.”
    The court of common pleas refused to award a peremptory writ and dismissed the petition, the district court affirmed the judgment, and this motion is filed for leave to file a petition in error to reverse as well such order of dismissal as also the judgment of affirmance.
    
      Kam, Sherwood ds Bunts, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Stone & Hadden, for defendants in error.
   Okey, J.

The question presented is whether infants committed to the house of refuge and correction, Cleveland, under Rev. Stats. § 3050, subdivisions 1 and 2, for “ incorrigible conduct,” are committed “for offenses against a law of the state,” as those words are employed in Rev. Stats. § 2071. And we are clear in the ojfinion that they are not. An offense against a law of the state is an act punishable as a crime under a statute.

In Ex parte Christmas, 10 West L. Jour. 541, there is an elaborate opinion to show that a prosecution by peace warrant, which is a proceeding to prevent the commission of crime, was, by a liberal construction of the act relating to the jurisdiction of the probate- court, embraced by the words “ crimes, offenses or misdemeanors;” but this court, on well settled principles, held otherwise. The State v. Brazier, 37 Ohio St. 78. It is not allowable to interpret that which has no need of interpretation ; and that rule should always be applied where, as here, the language of the statute is plain, its provisions in harmony, and the enforcement of the act, according to its terms, will not lead to absurd results. Hathamay’s Will, 4 Ohio St. 383; Scott v. Hickox, Lawler v. Burt, 7 Ohio St. 88, 340; Harbeck v. Toledo, 11 Ohio St. 219; Calkins v. The State, 14 Ohio St. 222.

If, as claimed, the statute operates unjustly on the city of Cleveland and others in like condition, the legisture should amend it.

Motion overruled.