Case ID: f-appx_478/html/0097-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM: \n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jerome Pete SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant v. MISSISSIPPI PAROLE BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 11-60544
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    May 10, 2012.
    
      Jerome P. Smith, Greenwood, MS, pro se.
    Before JONES, Chief Judge, and PRADO and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jerome Pete Smith, Mississippi prisoner # 82058, filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint to challenge, as a violation of due process, the Mississippi Parole Board’s (the Board’s) denying him parole and the procedures the Board followed in doing so. He also asserted an equal protection violation.

Smith’s notice of appeal was not timely to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). However, the notice of appeal was timely to appeal the district court’s denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration, in which he argued that Mississippi’s parole statute creates a liberty interest protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

“[T]he denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.” Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. S.A., 728 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1984). Therefore, this court’s review “is limited to whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.” Id.; Travelers Ins. Co. v. Liljeberg Enterprises, Inc., 38 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir.1994). “It is not enough that the granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted — denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir.1981).

Smith reurges his argument that the Mississippi parole statute creates a liberty interest protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and that he was denied due process in the Board’s proceedings leading to denial of parole. He also asserts an equal protection argument.

A prisoner’s liberty interest in parole is defined by state statute. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 371, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987). In Mississippi, the statutes creating parole confer absolute discretion on the Parole Board. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 47-7-3, 47-7-17; Scales v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565, 565-66 (5th Cir.1987). The Mississippi statutes do not create a liberty interest, and federal due process rights are not implicated by the denial of parole and the procedures by which parole is denied. See Miss.Code ANN. §§ 47-7-3, 47-7-17; Scales, 831 F.2d at 565-66; Irving v. Thigpen, 732 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir.1984). Smith’s challenges to the Board’s procedures and its decision are without merit.

Smith argues that his equal protection rights were violated when the Board revoked his classification status without affording him the same kind of hearing allegedly given to other participants. Smith did not raise his equal protection claim in his Rule 60(b) motion, and the district court’s rejection of that claim is thus not part of the instant appeal. See Matter of Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. S.A., 728 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1984).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the' limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.