Case ID: f-appx_593/html/0736-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Dennis D. WILCOX, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HI-DESERT MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE DISTRICT, a California corporation, dba Hi-Desert Medical Center; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 13-55299.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Feb. 11, 2015.
    Filed Feb. 23, 2015.
    David M. Korrey, Esquire, Law Offices of David M. Korrey, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Shelley Ann Carder, Michael R. Popcke, Esquire, Counsel, Dicaro, Coppo & Popcke, Carlsbad, CA, for Defendants-Ap-pellees.
    
      Before: GRABER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MAHAN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable James C. Mahan, United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Dennis D. Wilcox, a physician, appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against Defendant Hi-Desert Medical Center, which terminated Plaintiffs hospital privileges. Reviewing de novo, Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir.2014), we affirm.

1. Plaintiffs argument that the district court erred when it stayed this action pending the resolution of state proceedings is moot, because the state proceedings have concluded. Therefore, we do not reach the merits of that argument.

2. Claim preclusion bars Plaintiffs federal claims. We follow California preclusion rules. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1888, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). We give preclusive effect to the decision of the Judicial Review Committee because (a) it acted in a judicial capacity; (b) it resolved disputed issues of fact that were properly before it; (c) Plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claims, including constitutional claims; and (d) the peer review proceeding and this action are between the same parties and involve the same primary right, specifically the right of Plaintiff to maintain staff privileges at Defendant hospital. See Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining the requirements for giving an administrative agency’s decision preclusive effect under California law); Takahashi v. Bd. of Trs. of Livingston Union Sch. Dist., 783 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that an administrative appeal and subsequent constitutional claim arising from the termination of the plaintiffs employment contract involved the “identical primary right”).

3. The district court correctly dismissed the state-law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Westlake Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.3d 465, 131 Cal.Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410, 411 (1976) (holding that, as a general rule, a physician must exhaust all remedies, including judicial review of an administrative decision, before bringing an action for reinstatement or damages). Plaintiff is not seeking relief under a statute as to which there is an “unequivocal ]” expression of legislative intent to abrogate the exhaustion requirement. Fahlen v. Sutter Cent. Valley Hosps., 58 Cal.4th 655, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 165, 318 P.3d 833, 841 (2014). Accordingly, even assuming that Plaintiff was a whistleblower, his state-law claims are barred because he abandoned the administrative proceeding voluntarily and failed to seek judicial review in state court.

4. We have examined Plaintiffs other arguments and find them unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.