Case ID: f-appx_689/html/0539-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Paul HUPP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Terrance R. HUBBS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-55266
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 21, 2017
    Paul Hupp, Pro Se
    Daniel W. Doyle, Esquire, Attorney, Doyle Schafer McMahon LLP, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Terrance R. Hubbs
    Arthur K. Cunningham, Esquire, Attorney, Wai Hung Wong, Attorney, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Ber-nardino, CA, for Defendant-Appellee City of Beaumont
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Paul Hupp appeals pro se from district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging Fourth Amendment and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Naffe v. Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hupp’s Fourth Amendment claim arising out of defendant Hubbs’ alleged license plate check because Hubbs’ act of running a license plate check to access Hupp’s home address did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and thus did not require probable cause. See United States v. Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (a police officer does not conduct a search under the Fourth Amendment when he sees a license plate in plain view and uses it to access non-private information about the car and its owner).

We reject as without merit Hupp’s various contentions about the district court’s bias, its assignment of cases to particular judges, and its failure to provide an 'opportunity for oral argument.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.