Case ID: scl_29/html/0065-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Richardson, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

C. P. Stribling ads. Martin & Walker.
    
    1. A defendant being arrested under a ca. sa. filed a schedule, and at the expiration of the rule, demanded his discharge, which was opposed by the plaintiffs on the ground, that certain effects embraced in it, and stated to be in another State, should be delivered previous to his discharge j but the Commissioner of Special Bail being of opinion that the prisoner had assigned and surrendered to plaintiffs as far as was in his power, the effects of his schedule, and there was no proof that the property in question had been removed with a fraudulent intent, made an order directing his discharge. Motion to reverse the order refused.
    2. There is no statute giving to this Court appellate jurisdiction from the decision of the Commissioner of Special Bail, except in certain cases, in which a jury has been impannelled and verdicts rendered, to which its jurisdiction is expressly extended by the Act of 1833, (6 Stat. 491.)
    3. Appeals from inferior tribunals do not follow of course ; although relief may be found in the supervisory powers of a Circuit Court. Vide Carmand vs. Wall, 1 Bailey, 209.
    This was an application made before a Commissioner of Special Bail, for Union district, for a discharge under the Prison Bounds Act.
    In this case the defendant was delivered up by his bail to the sheriff, after judgment was obtained, but before an execution was issued, filed his schedule with his petition, claiming the benefit of the Prison Bounds Act. The usual notice was given, at the expiration of which, he demanded his discharge, which was opposed by plaintiff’s attorney, who had put him upon his oath, and nothing appearing from the admissions of the defendant to exclude him from his discharge, the commissioner ordered him to be discharged, having assigned the contents of his schedule, and delivered the same, so far as it was in his power, to the plaintiffs, upon which the plaintiffs issued a ca. sa. and had the defendant re-arrested. He filed the same schedule, and at the expiration of the rule demanded his discharge, which was opposed by the plaintiffs upon the ground that he had not delivered the contents of his schedule fully, as there was certain property, which the defendant had filed as being in Mississippi, and the plaintiffs contended that the defendant should deliver it before he be discharged. It seems to be a matter left to the discretion of the commissioner, how far it is in the power of a prisoner applying for a discharge under the Prison Bounds Act, to deliver his property, and as the defendant w7as confined to the limits of the district, the commissioner thought he could not require him to deliver the property which he had filed in his schedule as being in the State of Mississippi, unless there had been some evidence of the defendant’s having removed it with a fraudulent intention — of this there was no evidence ; the only ground taken by the plaintiffs was, that the defendant had not delivered the said effects. It is very true that this action wras pending at the time he removed the property ; but at the October term, of 1842, there had been a verdict rendered in favor of the defendant. In a very short time after this he removed, taking one note with him of the amount of $68, on a man who it seems had run away. Under the above circumstances, the commissioner ordered the defendant to be discharged, he having previously assigned and surrendered, so far as he thought it in his power, the effects of his schedule to these plaintiffs.
    From which order the plaintiffs appealed, and moved for a new trial, upon the following ground :
    Because the property embraced in the schedule which has been removed to Mississippi,- since the commencement of this action, should have been delivered previous to his being discharged, a part of which consists of notes and accounts.
    Dawkins, for the motion,
    cited 3 Hill, 294.
    
      Herndon, contra,
    contended that under the Act of 1833, the Commissioner of Special Bail had the discretion which he had exercised in this case.
    Who is to determine, under the last section of this Act, whether, since the party’s arrest, it has been in his power to deliver the property contained in his schedule ?
    This case was not before a jury. No appeal is given under the last section of the Act, and otherwise, none lies from a court of this kind.
   Curia, per

Richardson, J.

The appellant is met in limine, by the question, why does he appeal to this court1?

The constitutional jurisdiction of this court, is confined to motions for new trials, motions in arrest of judgment, and such points of law, as have been decided by a circuit Judge’s jurisdiction in any other case, must have been first conferred by legislative Act; as, for instance, in cases decided by the Inferior City Court of Charleston, from certain decisions of a Judge, in vacation, (fee. But the appeals in all these and many such cases, are conferred by statutes ; and appeals from inferior tribunals do not follow of course. Although relief may be found in the supervising powers of a Circuit Court. See the case of Carmand vs. Wall, 1 Bailey, 209.

It is, therefore, enough, to say, that there is no statute giving to this court appellate jurisdiction, from the decision of the Commissioner of Special Bail. But in certain cases, in which a jury has been impannelled, and verdicts rendered, and to which the jurisdiction of this court is expressly extended by the Act of 1833. But we cannot extend its provisions by implication. The motion is therefore dismissed.

O’Neall, Evans, Butler and Wardlaw, JJ. concurred.