Case ID: nc_22/html/0147-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Rotíin, Chief Justice,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

MARY LOCKE v. JOHN ARMSTRONG, et uxor.
    Where an administrator purchased a female slave at his own sale and accounted with the distributees for the price, and was permitted to hold the slave and ' her increase for forty years and upwards without any claim or demand from them, it was held, that if the reception of the price of the slave did not amount to a confirmation of the sale, yet acquiescence for so long a time would have the same effect; that such laches must deprive a party of all right to open what „\vas apparently closed so long, whatever might be the subject of the transaction; and especially ought it to have that effect in the case of female slaves, from whom in the mean time a numerous progeny might spring.
    The bill was filed in July, 1835, for an account and distribution of the personal estate of William M’Lelland, who died intestate in the year 1781. The intestate left a widow and three infant children, of whom the plaintiff was one; and administration of his estate was granted to John M’Lel-land, William M’Lelland, and his widow Rebecca. He left a small-estate which was exposed to sale by the administrators in November, 1781, and including the price óf a negro girl owned by him, brought the sum of £311, 10s. 5d. The widow became the purchaser of the slave at £85, Is. 0 d.; and she and her second husband, Armstrong, or those claiming under them, have held the slave and her issue ever since, without any claim on the part of the plaintiff, or any other person, until the filing of the bill. John M’Lelland, one of the administrators, was afterwards appointed the guardian of the plaintiff; and in 1791, the account current of the administrators was returned and audited by a committee of the Court, and stated the balance of the estate to be distributed between the three children including the price of the slave, to be, after payment of debts, the sum of £248, 7s. 8d., of which the plaintiffs share was £28, 15s. lie?, principal, and then in the hands of her guardian. The plaintiff came of age in 1794; and in that year, and the years of 1796 and 1797 respectively, received a payment from her guardian, amounting altogether to the sum of £148, 10s. lii., and granted her several receipts therefor — the last being expressed to,be her “ legacy due from the estate of her father.” A few months after the last payment, the plaintiff married and remained covert until the death of her husband in 1820. The bill stated that the plaintiff was, at. the period of the payments to her, of opinion that she had not received all she was entitled to, and particularly, that a share of the slave’s heirs and increase belonged to her ; and that during her marriage, she repeatedly urged her husband to demand and prosecute her,claim at law for them, which, however, he declined or failed to do; and that his affairs were much embarrassed at his death, so that she was left in distressed circumstances and was unable to give security for the prosecution of a suit, before she brought the present suit.
    The bill was brought against the widow and her second husband, she having survived the two administrators many years, and also against the other two children; and it prayed that the purchase of the slave by the administrators might be declared void, and that she and her profits and issue might be declared to be parts of the estate, and an account taken, and distribution according to right.
    The answer of Armstrong and wife stated, that the price given for the slave was the full value, that it was included in the account of the estate on which the settlement was made, and the plaintiff’s share ascertained; that the plaintiff was fully informed thereof and never expressed any dissent, but received her share willingly ; and that during the three years that elapsed after the plaintiff’s arrival at full age, before her marriage, she set up no claim'for the slave, nor did her husband during his life-time, nor did the plaintiff for fifteen years after his death, nor until the filing of the bill; although during the whole time the parties lived in the same neighborhood. Upon the lapse of time and laches of the plaintiff and her husband, the answer insisted as a bar to the relief. The answer stated that the two administrators managed the estate and had the assets, and they had both been dead many years ; and that the widow never had in her hands any part of the estate, but what was considered her share, and she believed the whole estate was fully accounted for in the settlement.
    
      Cook and Hoyden, for the plaintiff.
    
      D. F. Caldwell, for the defendant.
   Rotíin, Chief Justice,

having stated the case as above, proceeded: The litigation begun by the plaintiff at this late day, must, we think, under the circumstances of this case, be fruitless to her. The Court is satisfied that the plaintiff received through her guardian, and in the payment from him after she came of full age, her share of her father’s personal estate, inclusive of the price of the slave. If shé knew the fact at the time, the acceptance of the price was an election to abide by the sale, as being more beneficial to her, and amounts to a confirmation' of it. Such the answer avers to be the truth. It is true there is no precise proof to the points that the plaintiff was fully informed of all the facts, or knew that she had a right to treat the- sale as void and claim the slaves specifically. But such proof is not now to be expected. The remote periods at which the events occurred, and the deaths of the principal parties to the transactions, render it impossible to ascertain the actual facts, whatever they may have been. The cause must therefore be decided upon such reasonable and legal presumptions as arise from the conduct of the parties. They remove every doubt as to what the decision ought to be, and if express confirmation be not established, yet acquiescence in what was done for fifty-five years after the transaction, and more than forty after the plaintiff could act for herself, ought to have the same effect. Such laches must deprive a party-of all right to open what was apparently closed so long ago, whatever might be the subject of the transaction. But it is peculiarly proper in reference rto the case before us. One ought not to stand by and see another raising slaves at great expense of money, and taking the risk of their lives, without saying any thing, until in the event there is a numerous progeny and a good profit, and then claim the privilege of returning the money and taking a share in the slaves. Had the negroes died, the plaintiff would willingly have kept the money. Having given no intimation to the contrary for half a century, she must retain the position she then took. Her laches deprives her of the right to invoke the aid of the Court for the correction of what she has so long acquiesced in, and what cannot be corrected without serious loss and gross injustice to the opposite party.

There is an attempt to account for and excuse the delay by the poverty and distress of the plaintiff since her widowhood. But it entirely fails. To say nothing of her being °f age three years before her marriage, and of the effect'upon this question of the power and absolute right of the husband to sue for, receive, or release a personal legacy or distributive share belonging to his wife, the proof of the distressed circumstances is unsatisfactory. It does not make out a case of such destitution as marks that to have been a real difficulty in the party’s way, and the true cause of the delay. The circumstances of the plaintiff were straitened ; but she had dower in a fertile tract of land, on which she brought up a large family of children. But had it been otherwise, it would not have altered the result. It might have accounted for the plaintiff’s not bringing suit, but it not be a reason whv she made no demand, nor made . - . . known her claim either to those agamst whom it was, or to any other person. It does not appear that the plaintiff or ber hns^and ever uttered one word of intimation to any person whatever of dissatisfaction with the settlement made by her, or of any interest in, or claim to the negroes up to the moment of filing the bill. Poverty may restrain one from eoincr to law, but it rather increases the disposition to com-_ . . . . „ , , - of injustice, especially at the hands or relations, trom whom it is to be least expected. Total silence for so long a dme, admits of but one explanation -that it grew out of ’ . 1 ° . the party’s assent at the tune or a subsequent approbation. must be dismissed with costs.

The ty of a party may suit^but il cannot why he demand0 nor made known claim against°Se whom it was, or to any other person.

Pee Cuexam. Bill dismissed.