Case ID: f-appx_354/html/0516-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Bernard JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.T. SMITH, Superintendent, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 08-4752-pr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 30, 2009.
    Robin C. Smith, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant.
    Martin A. Hotvet, Assistant Solicitor General (Andrew M. Cuomo, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, on the brief) for Albany, NY, for Appellee.
    
      Present: JON 0. NEWMAN, ROSEMARY S. POOLER and ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Bernard Johnson seeks review of the judgment and order of the district court (Strom, J.) dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim following a bench trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of the issues for review.

Appellee Joseph T. Smith has served as Superintendent of Shawangunk Correctional Facility (“Shawangunk”) since 2002. Johnson, an inmate at Shawangunk, sprained his ankle while playing on the facility’s basketball court on January 29, 2003. The parties stipulated that there “were defects in certain areas of the gym floor where bubbles had formed in the vinyl overlay to the cement base.” Johnson attributed his injury to this defect. Johnson alleges that Smith’s failure to address this defect, either through repair or by closing that portion of the gym floor, violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Following a bench trial, the district court dismissed Johnson’s claim, finding that (1) Johnson failed to establish Smith acted with deliberate indifference; and, alternatively, (2) Smith was entitled to qualified immunity. On appeal, Johnson primarily argues that Smith’s acts or omissions violated Johnson’s Eighth Amendment rights.

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, Johnson first needed to show that the alleged deprivation is, objectively, “sufficiently serious, ... resulting] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (internal citations omitted). Second, Johnson needed to prove Smith possessed “a sufficiently culpable state of mind, one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The district court found, and neither party disputes, that Smith’s failure to repair or restrict access to the defective basketball court was “sufficiently serious.” Instead, Johnson argues that the district court committed clear error, and incorrectly applied the Farmer standard for deliberate indifference.

“Following a bench trial, we set aside findings of fact only when they are clearly erroneous, and we give due regard to the trial court’s credibility determinations.” Zerega Avenue Realty Carp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir.2009) (internal citations omitted). Johnson argues the district court committed clear error when it held that Smith knew of only one other injury attributed to the gym floor defect prior to Johnson’s injury. The record supports the district court’s findings of fact. The parties stipulated that Smith knew of two injuries “[i]n or around January 2003.” The second grievance appeal-the one upon which the parties relied on to establish Smith’s knowledge of the second incident, was dated January 30, 2003, such that the second injury could not have been brought to Smith’s attention until after Johnson’s injury-

Further, the district court correctly applied the law. Under Farmer, there is no Eighth Amendment deprivation where the official knew of the defect but failed to draw the inference of substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (“That a trier of fact may infer knowledge from the obvious ... does not mean that it must do so”). Johnson failed to satisfy the subjective component of the Farmer framework, requiring that his complaint be dismissed.

We have examined the remainder of Johnson’s arguments and we find them without merit.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.