Case ID: nc_34/html/0285-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Ruffin, Oh J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JOHN LEDFORD vs. VINCENT FERRELL’S AD’R. & AL.
    A parol agreement by 0., to execute at another timo a covenant to convey to D. title to a certain piece of land, is void under our Statute of Frauds.
    Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Cherokee County, Spring Term 1851, his Honor Judge Settle presiding. '
    This is assumpsit upon a special promise of Yincent Ferrell, to execute to the plaintiff a covenant to convey to the plaintiff in fee a certain tract of land. Upon non as-sumpsit, the evidencé was, that one Standridge purchased a tract of Cherokee land at the public sales in 1838, and paid the grantee part of the purchase money and gave his bond for the residue, and took a certificate from the Commissioners.- He afterwards agreed to sell a part of the tract to the plaintiff and received the price, and gave the plaintiff his covenant to pay the residue of the purchase money to the State, and obtain a grant, and then to convey to the plaintiff the part of the tract so sold to him. Subsequently, Standridge entered into a treaty with Ferrell for the sale of the residue of the tract upou the terms, that Ferrell should accept an assignment of the Commissioner’s certificate for the whole tract, and pay the residue of the purchase money to the State, and obtain the grant in his, Ferrell’s name, and then convey to the plaintiff the parcel he had purchased* Upon this arrangement being communicated to the plaintiff he assented thereto, and thereupon Standridge transferred and assigned his interest in the whole tract of land, and the plaintiff gave him up his covenant, an^ Ferrell promised the plaintiff to give him his covenant and obligation to obtain the grant from the State and to convey to the plaintiff in fee the part of the land which the plaintiffhad purchased and paid for; but he f;ii!ed to do so by reason of his sudden death a few days thereafter. A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for the value of the land, upon an agreement that, if the Court, should think tiie plaintiff was not entitled to recover upon those facts, the verdict should be set aside and anon suit entered. That was subsequently done, and the plaintiff appealed.
    
      J. Baxter, for the plaintiff.
    
      J. W. Woodjin, for the defendant.
   Ruffin, Oh J.

The plaintiff may iiave relief in another forum against the heirs of Ferrell upon the ground, that, by the written contract with Standridge, the plaintiff had a valid equitable title to the land, and that by Ferrell’s purchase, with notice of the plaintiff’s title, he became his trustee, and is liable as such, notwithstanding the plaintiff had cancelled Standridge’s covenant upon Ferrell’s promise to give his own, and his being prevented from doing so by the act of God. Rut, as an independent verbal promise from Ferrell to the plaintiff to execute a covenant or obligation to the plaintiff to »convey the land, the contract is within the statute of frauds, and the plaintiff cannot maintain an action at law on it. The'words are, that “ all contracts to sell or convey any lands, or any interest in or concerning them, shall be void, unless such contract be put in writing and signed by the parly to be charged therewith.” The plaintiff’s counsel admits, that, if Ferrell’s promise had been to convey the land to the plaintiff, no action would lie on it But a distinction is taken, that the promise is not of that kind, but is to execute a valid obligation, binding him thereafter to convey — which is supposed not to be within the statute. But the Court is clearly of the contrary opinion ; for both the obligation to convey the land and the promise to give the obligation are “concerning” land, and within the words of the act. Indeed, it would be absurd to say, that an oral promise to convey land is void, but that a promise, that the party will thereafter bind himself to convey the land, is valid. By the same reason, although the promise to pay the debt of another be void under the 10th section of the act, a promise to give a bond for the debt would be good — which cannot be. Such a construction would be a palpable evasion of the statute, and let in all the evils against which it is directed.

Pee Curiam. Judgment affirmed.