Case ID: f-appx_692/html/0706-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ronald Satish EMRIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Barbara CEGAVSKE; Secretary of State of Nevada; U.S. Department of Commerce; Small Business Administration, (SBA); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, (USPTO); Library of Congress, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 17-1474
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: June 20, 2017
    Decided: June 30, 2017
    Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se.
    Before MOTZ, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
   Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order dismissing his civil complaint for improper venue. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Even assuming, without deciding, that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint for improper venue, “we may affirm a district court’s ruling on any ground apparent in the record.” See U.S. ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015). As our review of Emrit’s complaint reveals that it is patently frivolous, we conclude the complaint was properly subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)© (2012). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989) (“[A] complaint ... is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED 
      
       Although Emrit’s notice of appeal was filed more than 60 days after the district court’s dismissal order, his appeal is timely because the court's order explains in full its reasons for dismissing the complaint and therefore is not a separate judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). See Hughes v. Halifax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 823 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1987). The order is deemed "entered,” for purposes of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a), when "150 days have run from entry of the order in the civil docket.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). As Emrit's notice of appeal was filed within that 150-day period, we have jurisdiction to consider his appeal. See Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 2000).