Case ID: br_527/html/0680-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re Jerry GREENWOOD and Eugenia Greenwood, Debtors, Jerry Greenwood and Eugenia Greenwood, Appellants, v. Angelique L.M. Clark, Trustee and Onewest Bank, Appellees. In re Jerry Greenwood and Eugenia Greenwood, Debtors, Jerry Greenwood and Eugenia Greenwood, Appellants, v. Angelique L.M. Clark, Trustee and Onewest Bank, Appellees.
    Nos. 12-60063, 12-60064.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Feb. 10, 2015.
    
    Filed Feb. 13, 2015.
    Mark Adrian Goodman, Goodman Law Center,' P.C.,' Reno, NV, for Appellants.
    
      Jeffrey L. Hartman, Esquire, Bankruptcy Counsel, Hartman & Hartman, Christopher Jaime, Maupin, Cox, & Legoy, Reno, NV, for Appellees.
    Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TASHIMA and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jerry and Eugenia Greenwood appeal from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel’s order dismissing their appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada for lack of standing. We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it here. We review the issue of whether appellants have standing de novo. Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir.2008); see also Wiersma v. Bank of the West (In re Wiersma), 483 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir.2007). “Only persons who are directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order have standing to appeal the order.” Paine v. Dickey (In re Paine), 250 B.R. 99, 104 (9th Cir. BAP 2000).

The Greenwoods, Chapter 7 debtors, failed to establish an interest from which they could benefit in pursuing their appeal. Their claimed homestead exemption falls under 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1)’s prohibition on exemption of voluntarily transferred property. See Glass v. Hitt (In re Glass), 60 F.3d 565, 569 (9th Cir.1995) (trustee’s mere threat of seeking avoidance sufficed to meet the threshold level of action neees-sary to trigger § 522(g)); Hunter v. Snyder (In re Snyder), 108 B.R. 150, 153 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1989) (settlement of an adversary proceeding suffices to invoke § 522(g)).

In order to show that their homestead exemption might be preserved under § 522(g)(1) as against the lienholder, the Greenwoods were required to demonstrate that their grant of a security interest in excess of the property’s value was not voluntary. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g)(1); see also Rodriguez v. Dorine’s Bail Bonds, Inc. (In re Rodriguez), 361 B.R. 887, 892 (Bankr.D.Ariz.2007). There is no evidence in the record indicating that the transfer of the deed of trust encumbering the home was involuntary, and the Greenwoods offer none. As a result, the transfer is ineligible for exemption under § 522(g)(1), and the Greenwoods lack a personal stake in the challenged settlement order and related orders sufficient to establish standing.

The motion to dismiss is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.