Case ID: us-ct-cl_174/html/0780-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      ■ Davis, Judge,\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

(357 F. 2d 683)
    
    WALDEMAR P. THOMSON v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. 206-61.
    Decided March 18, 1966]
    
      
      Wdldemar P. Thomson, pro se.
    
    
      Herbert Pittle, with whom was Assistant Attorney General Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., for defendant.
    Before CoweN, Chief Judge, Laramore, Durfee, Davis and ColliNS, Judges.
    
   Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court :

Plaintiff claims $7,125 for land appraisal services he asserts were ordered by the United States under an alleged contract. The basic issue is whether the Government, at any time, contracted for these services, and bound itself to pay the plaintiff.

In 1959, the United States Attorney’s Office in Los Ange-les was charged with litigating two condemnation cases (C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904 — ND) brought to acquire land for the United States Naval Air Station at Lemoore, California. An expert was needed to appraise certain of the land and property rights. Plaintiff, an experienced real estate appraiser, was recommended to the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the land work of the Office, Mr. Albert Minton. As a result, plaintiff contacted Mr. Minton and, on January 6,1959, met with him and another Assistant United States Attorney (Mr. H. M. Weiser), who was under Mr. Minton’s supervision, to discuss the possibility of employing plaintiff to make certain appraisals and to appear as an expert in the pending condemnation proceedings. At this meeting, these men engaged in a general discussion of the appraisals, including the details of the problems to be handled by the plaintiff.

At the time of this meeting (and at all times important to this action), the authority of United States Attorneys with respect to the services of real estate appraisers (like plaintiff) was circumscribed by Department of Justice Memorandum No. 162, dated June 1, 1955. It provided that “the Lands Division appropriation will * * * be charged for services of expert witnesses, appraisers, * * *, etc. Specific authority must be obtained prior to incurring this type of expense and the vouchers forwarded to Washington as heretofore.” Because of this restriction, Mr. Minton told plaintiff that no one in the United States Attorney’s Office was authorized to enter into any contract for the employment of an appraiser without authority from the Department of Justice in Washington; that it would be necessary for the United States Attorney to seek, and obtain, authorization from the Attorney General before plaintiff could be employed as an appraiser; that plaintiff would have to submit a Bid for Services which would be forwarded to the Department by the United States Attorney’s Office; and that plaintiff could not be notified to proceed unless his bid wasaccepted and authorization was issued by the Attorney General, or his delegated officer.

After this January 6th meeting the plaintiff and representatives, of. the United States Attorney’s Office undertook to effect a contract for the needed appraisals. On J anuary 9, Mr. Weiser, the assistant handling the two condemnation cases, wrote to Mr. Thomson that, in connection with- C.A. No. 1836-ND,.“I desire to obtain your opinion of fair market value as of the date .of taking of said [enumerated] parcels, January 9, 1958.. The parcels I should like to have you ap^ praise, are *. * r [those listed below].” He also cautioned that “before I can authorize you to commence work on this project, I shall require the submission of your bid for .services, which must be approved’by the Attorney General.” On J anuary 16, plaintiff submitted to-the United States Attorney a Bid for Services. He offered to appraise the property referred to in Mr. Weiser’s letter; estimated that it would take him 60 days to complete the .work; and agreed to perform at the rate of $75 per day, for a total of $4,500. The bid form provided, in part, that “The Department of Justice expects, the appraisal to be completed within the. estimated time”, and that “* * * The estimated.time must not be exceeded without, prior approval of the Department of Justice, and full justification for-the additional time required must be submitted.” In a letter accompanying this.bid, plaintiff stated that he intended to try to complete the work in 60 days and clearly indicated that he was aware of the fact that it was necessary for his “employment” to be authorized by the Department of Justice. Plaintiff’s bid was forwarded to the Department, and authorization was given on February 19. The United States Attorney was notified to that effect. On March 8,.Mr. Weiser .informed plaintiff of such authorization by telephone and directed him to proceed with the appraisal. Plaintiff commenced his appraisal work under this bid on March 4, 1959, and completed it by June 1.' He lias been paid for that work.

Contract negotiations relating to the appraisal work for which the plaintiff now seeks to recover commenced in earnest on February 3,1959. At that time, Mr. Weiser sent to plaintiff a second Bid for Services form and suggested that he sufficiently inform himself with respect to certain lands and property interests involved in the other suit, C.A. No. 190b-ND, to enable him to submit a bid for appraising those properties. By a letter of May 2, 1959, plaintiff returned to the United States Attorney’s Office a second, completed Bid for Services. In that bid, plaintiff offered to appraise property involved in C.A. No. 1904-ND, and estimated that it would require him 95 days to complete the work. The bid provided that plaintiff would submit his appraisal within 150 days after he had been directed to proceed. While plaintiff’s bid referred solely to property in case No. 1904 — ND, it is apparent that plaintiff contemplated going forward and completing appraisals involved in both that case and No. 1836-ND within the estimated additional 95 days, and that defendant so interpreted plaintiff’s letter.

Plaintiff’s bid, which- the United States Attorney considered reasonable, was forwarded to the Department of Justice on June 10,1959. It was authorized on July 10, and the United States Attorney was thereafter notified that authorization had been given to incur the expense. However, plaintiff was never informed of such authorization, either by the United States Attorney or any member of his staff, or by the Department of Justice, or by any employee of the defendant.

Both before and after July 10, plaintiff proceeded, without word whether Washington had authorized his second bid, to perform the appraisal services called for by that proposal. He was not specifically asked to proceed nor was he told not to do the work. But, as will appear, the fair inference is that Assistant United States Attorneys did indicate the desirability of going forward and did encourage him, tacitly, to proceed. From time to time between May 2 (when he submitted his second bid) and the middle of July, he communicated with several Assistant United States Attorneys, and discussed with them appraisal matters relating to the condemnation proceedings. During that period, plaintiff also acknowledged in a letter to the Office that he had not received notice of authorization of his second bid, and stated that he was at a loss as to what to do. Following a meeting on July 16 with an Assistant United States Attorney, plaintiff wrote suggesting that efforts be made to have the Department of Justice expedite authorization of the second bid. Although the Department had already sanctioned the arrangement, plaintiff was not so told.

On July 28,1959, Mr. Thomson transmitted to the United States Attorney a statement of appraisal “Services rendered in connection with” the two pending condemnation cases, and a bill for $4,200 (covering 56 days’ work). Plaintiff did not, however, submit a formal report covering the 56 days for which he claimed compensation. On August 4, an Assistant United States Attorney wrote telling plaintiff not to render further services until directed in writing to do so. He was never given any such direction, and his claim has not been paid. On these facts we must decide whether he is entitled to recover any part of the sum of $7,125 for which he now sues.

Plaintiff argues strongly — on the basis of (a) his discussions with various Assistant United States Attorneys, (b) certain correspondence between plaintiff and defendant, and (c) all of the circumstances surrounding the negotiations carried on by the parties — that he was justified in proceeding with the appraisal in C.A. 1836-ND immediately after his initial meeting with Mr. Minton and Mr. Weiser on Jan-nary 6,1959, and in continuing with a total appraisal in both condemnation cases, until specifically directed not to do so in August 1959. This contention is predicated primarily on Mr. Thomson’s version of the January 6th meeting. He takes the position that at that conference he agreed to make the appraisal in C.A. No. 1836-ND with the clear understanding between Mr. Minton and himself that such action simply would be the initial step in a total appraisal in both cases; that after he had performed sufficient exploratory work to enable him to give an estimate of the total time required to make the appraisals in both cases, he would do so; that he would be given sufficient additional time to complete a total appraisal; and that Mr. Minton told him that the matter of obtaining authorization of his bid from Washington was merely a formality that would be granted as a matter of course.

Trial Commissioner Stone explicitly rejected this depiction of the J anuary 6th meeting, and we certainly cannot say that he was wrong. In addition to the commissioner’s opportunity to evaluate credibility, we are persuaded by the following factors. Plaintiff was an experienced real estate appraiser who had previously dealt with the United States. His first bid, submitted in January 1959, referred only to C.A. 1836-ND. In his letter of January 16, 1959, submitting that bid, plaintiff clearly acknowledged his awareness that it was necessary for his employment to be sanctioned by the Department of Justice. In fact, he did not commence his appraisal under this bid until after March 3, 1959, the date he was notified that the bid had been authorized and that he was to proceed. Plaintiff’s second bid, submitted early in May 1959, contains a detailed justification for the 95 days, in addition to the 60 days specified in his first bid, that he estimated would be required for him to complete the appraisals in both cases. Mr. Thomson’s contention that he would have been justified in proceeding with all the appraisals immediately after the J anuary 6th meeting is clearly inconsistent with these undisputed facts. Since his actual course of action deviated so markedly from his present understanding of the January 6th conference, we cannot accept his version.

Plaintiff’s other position is that in his dealings with various Assistant United States Attorneys binding assurances were given and commitments made which justified his proceeding with appraisal work beyond that authorized by the first bid. The Government’s two-step answer is (i) that the United States Attorney was not authorized to contract for appraisal services unless proposed bids were approved by the Attorney General; and (ii) that, even when bids were approved, it was necessary for bidders to be given explicit notice in writing and to be ordered to commence work. The defendant claims that, although communication of the Attorney General’s authorization (shortly after July 10) to the United States Attorney vested him with the power to notify the plaintiff to proceed, the United States Attorney could opt (as he did) to withhold such notice — and that no contract would be made unless this notice was explicitly given.

We agree that authorization by the Department of Justice to incur the expense was a necessary precondition to payment, but we cannot agree that the defendant escapes liability simply because the United States Attorney failed (even though Washington countenanced the arrangement) to tell the plaintiff — in terms — to proceed. In our view, (a) the United States Attorney was empowered to deal with the plaintiff and could accept the bid, subject to the Department’s authorization to incur expenses; (b) the United States Attorney’s acceptance could be disclosed by conduct and suggestion, as well as by specific words; and (c) in this case there was such implied acceptance through inducement and encouragement of the plaintiff to do the work.

First, the United States Attorney was authorized to deal with plaintiff, not merely to act as an automatic conduit for Washington. The federal district attorney’s duty is to “prosecute or defend, for the government, all civil actions, suits or proceedings in which the United States is concerned” (28 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2), 62 Stat. 910 (1948), as well as to render “all legal services connected with the procurement of titles to sites for public buildings”, with immaterial exceptions. 40 U.S.C. § 256,25 Stat. 941 (1889). Under these provisions, he prosecutes suits for the condemnation of lands to be used for military installations. United States v. Johnson, 173 U.S. 363, 371-77, 381 (1899); United States v. Hall, 145 F. 2d 781, 784 (C.A. 9, 1944, cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945); see Perry v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 483, 491 (1893).

Of course, the Attorney General has power to supervise “all litigation to which the United States or any agency thereof is a party and shall direct all United States attorneys, [and] Assistant United States attorneys * * * in the discharge of their respective duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 507 (b), 62 Stat. 910 (1948). General power is vested with him as head of the Department of Justice, (see 5 U.S.C. § 291 et seq. (1964), to “sign all requisitions for the advance or payment of moneys appropriated for the Department of Justice, out of the Treasury”, subject to certain limitations. 5 U.S.C. § 319, 42 Stat. 24 (1921). Moreover, he has special power to “fix the annual salaries of United States attorneys” and their assistants (28 U.S.C. § 508), to promulgate regulations governing allowance of their “necessary travel and subsistence expenses”, and to authorize them to incur “necessary office expenses.” 28 U.S.C. § 509; see O’Leary v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 237, 239 (1942). But, so far as we can tell, the Attorney General has not deprived the district attorneys of general authority to deal with potential expert condemnation witnesses like plaintiff — authority which would be inferred from the breadth of the United States Attorneys’ status and responsibilities. It seems plain from the statutory scheme that these local officials can bind the United States, to the extent that the Attorney General does not limit their authority, for incidental services which “facilitate the transaction of the public business” in their offices. United States v. Denison, 80 Fed. 370, 372 (C.A. 8, 1897); United States v. Harmon, 147 U.S. 268, 277-78 (1893).

A Department of Justice directive (Memo No. 162, June 1, 1955, supra) says that expenses for appraisers (among others) cannot be incurred without obtaining specific authorization from Washington. This order, as we read it, provides that expenses cannot be incurred and a contract cannot be finally consummated without such authorization from the central office. The United States Attorney is left, however, with authority to deal with the appraiser as to all the aspects of the contract. The terms of the agreement can be negotiated, subject always to the Department’s veto over the incurring of the expense. The same is true of the work schedule and plans. We see no reason why the district attorney cannot give the potential contractor leave to proceed with the work, prior to action by the Department, if the contractor is willing to undergo the risk that he will never get paid because authorization is withheld in Washington. There are many instances in federal procurement in which a lower echelon official is the authorized contracting officer •even though the contract may be subject to approval or veto by a higher echelon. Cf. Congress Constr. Corp. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 50, 314 F. 2d 527 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 817; Cathell v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 368 (1911).

In such cases the contracting officer can deal with the contractor, although all may go for naught if the response of the higher level is negative. Here, that response was affirmative ,and finally validated the United States Attorney’s actions.

Tbe next question is whether the Los Angeles Office ever accepted plaintiff’s bid. The defendant.denies this because Mr. Thomson was never specifically told to. proceed with the work (even though Washington gave its authorization). It is fundamental, however, that acceptance of an offer may be manifested either expressly (as by words) or impliedly.by conduct indicating assent to the proposed bargain.- Restatement 2d, Contracts, §§ 5, 21, 21A,- 52 (Comment c) (Tent, ed. 1,1964.); I Williston, Contracts §§ 90; 91A (3d.ed. 1957). The notion that assent to the terms of an agreement (i.e., acceptance) may be evinced by action or conduct underlies the rule, repeatédly recognized by. the courts, that contracts may be “implied in fact”. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923); Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F. 2d 127, 130 (C.A. 2,1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 759. It has long been accepted that “there may be a state of facts from which an implied contract or promise to pay for services rendered may be justly.inferred, and we do not doubt that, in such a case, where the United States are parties defendant, the Court of Claims * * * [has] jurisdiction * * * to entertain a suit and render judgment.” Coleman v. United States, 152 U.S. 96, 99 (1894); cf. Ralston Steel Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 119, 126-27, 340 F. 2d 663, 668-69 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950. We have held that the requisite assent by the, offeree to a contract’s terms may be overtly manifested by a course of action, and that after assent is so evidenced the United States may not assert that it is not bound (on the ground that it did not intend to contract). Goltra v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 217, 251-52, 254-57, 96 F. Supp. 618, 623, 625-26 (1951). If assent is thus conveyed by an authorized officer, a binding arrangement springs to life. Just as this fundamental notion supports agreements “implied in fact”, so too may it be invoked to sustain express contracts grounded on implied acceptances. Cf. Himfar v. United States, ante, p. 209, Padbloc Co. v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 369 (1963). In this proceeding, we think that resort may properly be had to this latter principle.

Mr. Thomson’s second Bid for Services, submitted by letter on May 2, 1959, was an offer. Where an offeree knows or has reason to know that his conduct (viewed in the circumstances of the contract negotiations, including the purpose for which an agreement is sought) may reasonably and in good faith be seen as constituting assent to the terms of the offer, an acceptance may be implied. See Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, supra, 261 U.S. at 597-99; Restatement 2d, Contracts, supra, at § 21 (Comment b). That is what occurred here. The attorneys in the Los Angeles Office accepted the bid through their actions, and Mr. Thomson reasonably regarded that conduct as acceptance.

Eepresentatives of the United States Attorney made it plain in connection with both offers that plaintiff’s bids were subject to the need to obtain the -authorization of the Attorney General in order to incur the expense. But they did not point out that, after such authorization had been obtained, the United States Attorney in Los Angeles might still decide against employing the plaintiff or that a requirement of explicit notice of the Attorney General’s authorization conditioned the conclusion of any binding arrangement. On the contrary, some of the most obvious assumptions laced through all the negotiations between the parties seem plainly to have been that the United States Attorney definitely needed plaintiff’s services, that as far as his office was concerned the job of appraising the properties in question was the plaintiff’s, and that he would take the steps necessary to insure (to the extent possible) that plaintiff’s services would be authorized. The United States Attorney sought out the plaintiff; Mr. Weiser’s initial letter (of January 9,1959) discussed both the evaluations then needed and future evaluation problems which would be referred to the plaintiff; he later expressed hope that Mr. Thomson would “be able to undertake the appraisal shortly, so that we may have your reports by spring”; and, finally, he informed plaintiff that his second bid “appears reasonable, and this office will request authorization from the Department of Justice to employ you in accordance with the bid.”

Similarly, tbe United States Attorney’s transmittal of June 10, 1959 to tbe Department of Justice (requesting authorization to engage plaintiff on the second bid) indicates that the local official was concerned with speedily hiring a land appraiser (as the “District Judge, to whom these matters are presently assigned, has been pressing this office for trial dates within the near future”), and that the plaintiff was his man for the task. Since this was so, there was little reason to emphasize to plaintiff that anything more than the Attorney General’s authorization was critical. There is evidence reflecting Mr. Thomson’s impression that that authorization was the only substantial prerequisite to the full existence of his contract. On January 16, 1959, he had assured the United States Attorney that he would “work diligently”, “if the enclosed bid is acceptable to your people in Washington * * On June 10, he wrote that “I have not received notice that Washington has approved your request for the additional days I require * * And on July 23 he added, “I shall be much obliged to you if you will contact Washington and see if it is not possible to expedite the approval of the additional time as has "been approved by yoicr office” (emphasis added). Significantly, the trial commissioner has found that “from time to time during the interim period” between May 2 and July 16, the “plaintiff communicated with several Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to the office of the United States Attorney in Los An-geles, and discussed with them appraisal matters relating to the two condemnation proceedings involved herein.” The commissioner concluded that “a reasonable inference can be made that one or more of these Assistant United States Attorneys indicated to plaintiff the desirability of going forward with the appraisal work in order that it might be completed as soon as possible. It appears that during such discussions, plaintiff probably was tacitly encouraged to proceed with certain phases of his appraisal work.” The defendant does not except to these crucial findings.

That the plaintiff proceeded with his appraisal work in these circumstances cannot be labeled unreasonable or in bad faith, even though, until the Attorney General’s authorization actually issued, the work was -undertaken at Mr. Thomson’s own risk. Since plaintiff was reasonably sure that the Department’s approval was forthcoming (he was correct on this score), he commenced work, taking the conduct of the United States Attorney’s representatives as an indication of their assent to this arrangement. On the record before us, we cannot fault him for having so relied. The persons with whom he dealt surely knew that he, a businessman, was not gratuitously rendering services to the Government; they knew he expected to be paid if Washington gave its authorization; yet they did not tell him to stop working (perhaps because they, too, expected, up until the end, that he would be paid, once their office was authorized to do so). On the contrary, the unchallenged findings show that the Los An-geles Office “indicated to plaintiff the desirability of going forward with the appraisal work in order that it might be completed as soon as possible” and “tacitly encouraged [plaintiff] to proceed with certain phases of the appraisal work.”

We hold, therefore, that the direction to proceed with the work, which the Government argues was never given to Mr. Thomson, was communicated by the course of conduct of the defendant’s agents, and that that direction, without more, operated to consummate a binding contract once the United States Attorney was authorized on July 10, 1959, to incur expenses and to bind the Government. There w,as no requirement that plaintiff be informed of Washington’s authorization; the giving of the authorization was enough. After the negotiations which resulted in the second Bid for Services, only two factors remained to create a valid obligation. One was the Attorney General’s sanction .and the other was a direction to proceed by the United States Attorney. Both were forthcoming.

To be sure, some findings suggest that Mr. Thomson may have known that, should he commence work without some express and formal notification of acceptance and direction to proceed (after the Attorney General’s approval had issued) , it would be at his own risk. See findings 3(d, e), 7. But these findings relate mainly to the initial conversations with the Los Angeles Office in January 1959 before the first bid was made. In the light of the later course of conduct, these indications lose much of their significance. On balance, we think that the conduct of the parties working .together in a common enterprise is here the most accurate measure of the defendant’s assent, and of the plaintiff’s reasonableness in viewing that conduct as acceptance.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages for the defendant’s breach of contract the amount stipulated in his second Bid for Services, less any appropriate reductions. See Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., 136 F. 2d 981, 983 (C.A. 10, 1943); Gould v. McCormick, 75 Wash. 61, 134 Pac. 676, 679 (1913); 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1095 at 515 (1964). Judgment is entered to that effect. The amount of recovery will be determined under Pule 47 (c). We cannot now tell from the record, but appropriate offsets might include incidental costs of performance which Mr. Thomson may have saved, as well as sums which he may have earned or with reasonable diligence could have earned from other employment after his discharge. These and other offsets, if proven by the defendant (Taylor v. Tulsa Tribune Co., supra; see 5 Corbin, Contracts § 1095 at 516-19), should be taken into consideration in determining the proper amount of recovery.

findings of fact

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Franklin M. Stone, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. Plaintiff is a resident of the City of Los Angeles, State of California. He has been a real estate appraiser since 1928 and a real estate broker since 1934. He also is a mining engineer and a member of the American Society of Mining Engineers. His appraisal experience includes, among other things, the appraisal of about three thousand (3,000) parcels of land for the City of Los Angeles, considerable work for the Division of Highways and Department of Public Works, of the State of California. In 1958, plaintiff was employed by the United States Treasury Department to appraise 22,000 acres of land in the Tulare Lake Basin. On many occasions he has performed appraisal services for oil companies and private individuals involving oil and other mineral rights in various parts of the country.

2. Prior to January 6,1959, Mr. Albert Minton, Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the Lands Division in the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, California, asked Mr. Holloway Jones, Assistant Chief of the Department of Public Works of the State of California, to recommend someone for employment by defendant to appraise land and property rights involved in condemnation proceedings then pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District, Northern Division, of the State of California, relating to acquisitions for the United States Naval Air Station, Lemoore, California. Appraisals of certain property and rights therein, relating to the same condemnation proceedings, Civil Actions (C.A.) 1836-ND and 190T-ND, previously had been made by a Mr. James A. Miles, under a contract with the Department of Justice which authorized employment of Mr. Miles for a total of 165 days to make appraisals in the two said civil actions. The record is not entirely clear; but it appears that the above-mentioned contract with Mr. Miles was completed, or at least terminated, and that Mr. Minton was seeking the services of another appraiser to complete, or make supplementary, appraisals of certain lands and property interests involved in one or both of the same condemnation cases.

3. (a) Pursuant to a suggestion made by Mr. Jones (mentioned in finding 2, supra), plaintiff contacted Mr. Minton and arranged for a meeting with him which was held in his office in Los Angeles on January 6, 1959. In addition to plaintiff and Mr. Minton, the meeting was attended by Mr. Herbert M. Weiser, an Assistant United States Attorney in the Lands Division, who was employed under Mr. Minton’s supervision and was the attorney to whom said condemnation cases, i.e., C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND, were then assigned.

(b) The testimony of the plaintiff and Mr, Minton at the trial, as to what was discussed and the statements respectively made by them during the January 6, 1959, meeting, is conflicting. It is reasonably clear that all present engaged in a general discussion of the appraisals under consideration in both condemnation proceedings, i.e., C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND, including the problems involved in appraising the land and property interests, the location, the number of parcels of real estate, the types of estates desired, the time required to make the appraisals, the procedure required in order to obtain authority to employ an appraiser, and the compensation that could be paid for approved appraisal services.

(c) The weight of the testimony and documentary evidence of record does not support the disputed contention of plaintiff that he advised Mr. Minton it would not be possible to give an estimate of the time required to make the appraisals without knowing more about the property, and that he agreed to a suggestion made by Mr. Minton that plaintiff take an “interim” or “exploratory” appointment of sixty days at the rate of $75 per day in C.A. No. 1836-ND to enable him to arrive at an estimate of the time required to make the appraisals in both that action and C.A. No. 1904-ND, with the understanding that plaintiff would advise the entire time needed as soon as he had performed sufficient exploratory work to enable him to do so. It is found that no such oral agreement was entered into by and between plaintiff and Mr. Minton, or any other authorized representative of defendant.

(d) Mr. Minton advised plaintiff that no one in the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles was authorized to enter into any contract for the employment of an appraiser, without authorization from the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. Plaintiff was informed by Mr. Minton that it would be necessary for his office to seek, and obtain, authority from the Attorney General of the United States before plaintiff could be employed as an appraiser. Mr. Min-ton explained that established procedure for obtaining such authority required that the applicant for employment complete and submit a Bid for Service which, together with a request and authorization to incur expense (Department of Justice Form 25B), would be forwarded to the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C.; that plaintiff could not be employed until approval of the Attorney General, or his delegated officer, had been obtained; and that plaintiff would not be employed, unless and until approval was given and plaintiff was notified of such approval and directed to proceed with the work.

(e) The evidence does not support the disputed contention of plaintiff that he was advised by Mr. Minton that the matter of obtaining authorization from Washington to employ plaintiff as an appraiser was merely a “formality”, that would be granted as a “matter of course”. In connection with the foregoing, it should be noted that plaintiff admits that he was advised by Mr. Minton that all contracts for appraisal services were made in Washington, D.C. Despite that fact, it is plaintiff’s position that he was expected to commence his appraisal work immediately after the meeting on January 6, without prior authorization of the Attorney General and formal notification of approval to proceed, and that he had the right to assume that he could do so. In support of plaintiff’s aforesaid position, he refers to statements allegedly made by Mr. Minton and Mr. Weiser during the meeting on January 6, 1959, and to the contents of letters directed to him by Mr. Weiser under dates of February 3 and May 5, 1959. The weight of the testimony and documentary evidence of record fails to support plaintiff’s position. On the contrary, while it is reasonable to conclude that plaintiff was expected to make sufficient preliminary inquiries, studies and investigation to enable him to prepare his bid for services for submission and approval, it is clear that plaintiff not only should have known, but actually knew, that he could not be employed until authorization had been obtained from the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., and that he should not proceed until be was notified of tbe approval of his employment and directed to commence work.

4. (a) In a letter directed to plaintiff under date of January 9, 1959, Mr. Weiser specifically referred to C.A. No. 1836-ND and stated in pertinent part:

The above-referenced case, filed by this office earlier this year, condemned considerable acreage for a Naval Air Station in the vicinity of Lemoore, California. With regard to certain of the parcels in this acquisition, I desire to obtain your opinion of fair market value as of the date of taking of said parcels, January 9, 1958. The parcels I should like to have you appraise are Parcels 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, .27, 41, 69, 70, 71, 111, 112, 132, 135, 141, 147, 169, 170, 177, 181, 187, 188, 189, 190, 217, 219, 220, 223, 259, 288, and 293.
* * * As you know, before I can authorize you to commence work on this project, I shall require the submission of your bid for services, which must be approved by the Attorney General. Enclosed is our standard form of Bid for Services for your use. * * *
H* ❖ # # #
As you know, there has also been condemned a safety easement over additional adjoining property, for which I shall require an appraisal. However, it has not yet been determined which properties in this acquisition for safety easement will have to be appraised, as a number of settlements are now in process. As soon as I have ascertained the properties concerning which I desire an appraisal, I shall send for your bid estimates in a separate letter.
*****

(b) In response to the above letter, plaintiff directed a letter, dated January 16,1959, to Messrs. Minton and Weiser, which letter reads in pertinent part:

% Hs #
Considering the size of the undertaking and the number of variables to be resolved it can be said that it is impossible to predict the amount of time that will be required to properly appraise the subject property. * * *
I intend to try to complete the appraisal in 60 days and my bid is attached hereto in accordance.
I want to thank you both for this invitation to work for the Department of Justice and assure you both that if the enclosed bid is acceptable to your people in Washington, I shall work diligently to make a sustainable appraisal of the subject property.

(c) The Bid for Services form to which reference is made in the above-mentioned letter was dated January 16, 1959, signed by plaintiff and reads in pertinent part:

1. Property to be appraised * * *: Civil No. 1836-ND, Parcels 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 27, 41, 69, 70, 71, 111, 112, 132, 135, 141, 147, 169, 170, 177, 181, 187, 188, 189, 190, 217, 219, 220, 223, 259, 288, and 293.
2 * * *
The Department of Justice expects the appraisal to be completed within the estimated time.
g * * *
Estimated 60 days at $75.00 per day.
* * * The estimated time must not be exceeded without prior approval of the Department of Justice, and full justification for the additional time required must be submitted.
# # ‡ $ #

5. (a) Subsequent to the receipt of plaintiff’s Bid for Services, dated January 16,1959, Mr. Minton prepared and sent to the Assistant Attorney General of the Lands Division of the United States Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., a completed Department of Justice Form 25B, dated January 26, 1959, requesting authority to incur expense for the purpose “of employing the services of plaintiff for an estimated sixty days at $75.00 per day,” totaling $4,500, to make the appraisal described in the bid submitted by plaintiff relating to the condemnation case identified as C.A. No. 1836-ND.

(b) The Form 25B, mentioned above, was approved by, or on behalf of, the Attorney General, in the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on February 19, 1959, and, Mr. Weiser was notified to that effect by a memorandum, dated March 2, 1959, issued in the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles. Thereafter, on March 3,1959, Mr. Weiser telephoned plaintiff, notified him of such approval, and directed him to proceed with the appraisal.

6. Under date of February 3, 1959, Mr. Weiser, acting on behalf of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, sent a letter to plaintiff relating to C.A. No. 1904-ND, which letter reads in pertinent part;

Enclosed herein is standard form of Bid for Services, together with a description of the properties and the estate taken in Civil Action No. 1904-ND. As yon know, this action is the. easement acquisition in connection with the establishment of the Naval Air Station at Lémoore, California. It would be greatly appreciated if you will peruse the .material I have sent and sufficiently inform yourself of-the surrounding circumstances so that you may submit a bid for appraisal of these properties. * * *
* * * # *
I assume that much of your basic investigative work concerning market data will- have been completed with reference to the fee acquisition in Civil No. 1836-ND, for which this office is. still awaiting authority from the Department of Justice in Washington. * * *
* * * I am hoping that you will be able to undertake this appraisal shortly, so that we may have your reports by spring.
‡ $ ^ . $ ‡

7. By letter dated May 2, 1959, plaintiff returned to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, for the attention of Mi'. Weiser, completed Bid for Services form dated May 1, 1959, that was attached to Mr. Weiser’s letter of February 3, 1959, (partially quoted in finding-6, supra), which bid related to appraisal of property involved in C.A. No. 1904-ND. Plaintiff’s bid contained, among other things, a statement that he would submit his appraisal within 150 days “after notification to proceed” and he estimated it would require him 95 days to complete the appraisal work which he offered to perform at the rate of $75 per day. In explanation and justification of his bid for authorization to perform 95 additional days of work, plaintiff outlined in his letter of May 2, the investigations and actions that he had already taken, considered necessary in order to fix a supportable value of the lands being appraised, and contemplated by him. In this connection, plaintiff stated that a proper appraisal would require the verification of approximately 400 sales of other lands in certain townships during the years from 1953 to 1958 and that he had 336 of such sales to verify. While, as noted above, plaintiff’s bid for 95 additional days specifies the work relates only to C.A. No. 1904-ND, the only reasonable interpretation of plaintiff’s letter of May 2, considering the record as a whole, is that he would complete required appraisals in C.A. No. 1836-ND, as well as in C.A. No. 1904-ND, within the 95 additional days set forth in said bid of May 1, 1959. In any event, it is clear that defendant interpreted plaintiff’s bid to mean that he would require 95 additional days to complete the appraisal work in both of said actions and that defendant communicated such interpretation to plaintiff who did not express disagreement therewith. (See findings 8 (a) and 10, infra.)

8. (a) By letter dated May 5, 1959, Mr. Weiser, on behalf of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, advised plaintiff, in pertinent part:

Deference is made to your letter of May 2,1959. The justification you have submitted for additional time of 95 days, which is to include the appraisal of the easement area in Civil No. 1904-ND, appears reasonable, and this office will request authorization from the Department of Justice to employ you in accordance with the bid. Before we,request this authorization, however, it would be appreciated if you would kindly respond to our inquiries in our letter to you of March 24,1959. As you will recall, this letter requested certain information concerning your qualifications in greater detail than had previously been supplied. Your immediate attention to this request for information will be greatly appreciated.
It is requested that you attempt to complete and submit your appraisal reports on the fee area in 1836-ND before you undertake to appraise the properties in the easement area in Civil No. 1904-ND.
* * * * *

(b) In a letter dated June 3, 1959, directed to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, for the attention of Mr. Weiser, plaintiff set forth supplementary information concerning his qualifications and experience as a real estate appraiser.

9. In a letter dated June 10, 1959, directed to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, for the attention of Mr. Weiser, plaintiff stated in pertinent part:

I have not yet received notice that Washington has approved your request for the additional days I require •to complete the appraisal of the lands desired for the Naval Air Station at Lemoore. Accordingly I am at a loss as to what to do in this matter.
Time is beginning to run against having the trial of this case this fall.
* ’ * * * *

10. (a) By letter dated June 10, 1959, the United States Attorney in Los Angeles transmitted to the Lands Division of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., a completed Department of Justice Form 25B, dated June 11,1959, and signed by Mr. Minton, requesting authority to incur expense for the purpose of employing plaintiff for an estimated additional ninety-five days at the rate of $75 per day, estimated total expense amounting to $7,125, to perform services stated to be “* * * in completion of appraisal of fee parcels in 1836-ND, and in appraisal of easement and restrictions in 190L-ND.” The above-mentioned transmittal letter reads in pertinent part:

Enclosed is Form 25 B requesting authority to incur expenses in employing Mr. Waldemar P. Thompson [sic] to appraise certain properties in the above-referenced civil actions. Although Mr. Thompson [sic] was hired by this office pursuant to authorization granted February 19, 1959, the request herewith submitted is for 95 days, at the rate of $75.00 per day, in addition to the 60 days already approved by the Department. The 95 days requested herein will include the time required to complete the reports for the fee acquisition in 1836-ND, and to commence and complete an appraisal .of the easement and restrictions imposed in Civil No. 1904-ND. The total authorization requested covers a period of 155 days for the appraisals in both civil actions. This request is in line with the expenses authorized in employing Mr. James A. Miles, who has completed his appraisals in 1836-ND, and who is now completing his appraisals in 190L-ND. The authorization for Mr. Miles in 1836-ND was 127 days, and the authorization for Mr. Miles in 1904-ND was 38 days, or a total of 165 days. Mr. Harry L. Andrews, Jr., who had been employed to appraise only the properties in 1836-ND, was authorized 132 days within which to complete his appraisals, although Mr. Andrews’ employment had to be terminated as was explained in our letter to you dated January 26,1959. _ It is felt, therefore, that Mr. Thompson’s, [sic] requirements are well in line with the authorizations heretofore granted in these civil actions.
•Jí , ^ ‡ ^
Judge Peirson M. Hall, U.S. District Judge, to whom these matters are presently assigned, has been pressing this office for trial dates within the near future and it is, therefore, requested that the Department expedite the matter of authorizing expenditures in connection with Mr. Thompson’s [sicj employment so that this expenditure may be authorized as'soon after July 1,1959, as is possible. * * *

(b) The Department of Justice Form 25B, supra, was finally approved in the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., on July 10, 1959. However, plaintiff was never informed of such approval, nor specifically notified and directed, pursuant to such approved authorization, to proceed with his appraisal work and perform appraisal services that would require more than the sixty days specified in plaintiff’s original approved bid of January 16, 1959; by the United States Attorney in Los Angeles or anyone in his office, by any official of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., nor by any employee of the defendant.

11. (a) From time to time during the interim period between the date plaintiff submitted his second bid of May 1, 1959, and as late as July 16,1959, plaintiff communicated with several Assistant United States attorneys assigned to the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, and discussed with them appraisal matters relating to the two condemnation proceedings involved herein. A reasonable inference can be made that one or more of these Assistant United States Attorneys indicated to plaintiff the desirability of going forward with the appraisal work in order that it might be completed as soon as possible. It appears that during such discussions, plaintiff probably was tacitly encouraged to proceed with certain phases of his appraisal work; but there is no evidence that any of the Government attorneys having actual knowledge of plaintiff’s- contract status specifically directed him to proceed.

(b) Plaintiff reasonably regarded the actions of the Assistant United States Attorneys (referred to and summarized in finding 11 (a)) as telling, inducing, and encouraging him to proceed with the work. This course of conduct by the Assistant United States Attorneys amounted to an implied direction to plaintiff to proceed and likewise amounted to an acceptance of his bid — subject to authorization from the Attorney General to incur the expense.

12. It appears that on or about July 1, 1959, Mr. Weiser left his position in the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, and that the two condemnation proceedings, i.e., C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND, involved herein, were reassigned to Mr. George R. Hurley, an Assistant United States Attorney in the office of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles. On July 16, 1959, plaintiff had a conversation concerning said condemnation proceedings with Mr. Hurley to whom plaintiff directed a letter under date of July 23,1959, in which he stated, in pertinent part:

Pursuant to our conversation in your office on July 16th, please be advised that the Chief Administrators Officer of the Soil Conservation Service is Mr. William J. Page at 2020 Milvia Street, Berkeley 4, Calif.
As I explained to you in our conversation, I have written a number of letters to Mr. Herbert E. Weiser, formerly of your office, pointing out to him certain things that I feel should be done in connection with the LeMoore Naval Air Base case. It is suggested that you read these letters and if you have any questions. concerning them you can get in touch with me at the above address.
Off hand, the most important matters that I can think of at this time are the questions of interrogatories or depositions of some of Boswell’s people in connection with the purchase of the Boston Land Company and similar questioning of Schofield the CPA Accountant for the Boston Land Company prior to the sale to the Boswell interests.
The second thing of importance seems to me to run down this sale from the Boston Ranch Co. to Cariberry. I have questioned this sale from the start and am suspicious of it. I believe these people should be put in position to where they show definite proof that this was a bona fide sale at arms length and not for the purpose of establishing value for this particular litigation. The price and timing appear to me to indicate such questioning.
I shall be much obliged to you if you will contact Washington and see if it is not possible to expedite the approval of the additional time as has been approved by your office. I cannot work on this particular job all the time as I have other work to do and, taking this into consideration, it is obvious that time is running out; because the Commissioners are not going to continue this case forever.
H: Hí ‡ %

13. Sometime early in July 1959, Mr. Minton talked with plaintiff on the telephone and requested him. to submit a bill for all appraisal services rendered by him up to, and including, June 30,1959, the end of the fiscal year. Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a statement, dated July 23, 1959, for “Services Eendered in preparation to make an appraisal of the lands required for the TJ.S. Naval Air Station at LeMoore, California Case No. 1826 ND,” from March 4, 1959, to June 1, 1959, inclusive, totaling sixty days, at the rate of $75 per day, amounting to $4,500. That statement was approved for payment, a pay voucher dated August 21, 1959, was issued, and on August 27,1959, plaintiff was paid the sum of $4,500 for the appraisal services performed by him on the dates set forth in his statement of July 23,1959. Plaintiff never submitted a formal appraisal report covering the services for which he was paid.

• 14. (a) By letter dated July 28,1959, plaintiff transmitted to the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, a statement of “Services rendered in connection with Case #1836 ND and Case #1904 ND in preparation to make an appraisal of lands. For the U.S. Naval Air Station at Lemoore,” from June 1, 1959, to July 27, 1959, inclusive, totaling 56 days, at the rate of $75 per day, amounting to $4,200. Plaintiff was never paid said amount of $4,200. Plaintiff did not submit a formal appraisal report covering the services for which he claimed compensation from defendant.

(b) In plaintiff’s letter of July 28, 1959, he called attention to the fact that in his letter of May 2, 1959 (see finding 7, supra), he had pointed out that the only defense to the valuations placed by certain individuals on land owned by them, which property plaintiff had undertaken to appraise, was to show the sales price of other property in the area. In this connection, plaintiff’s letter of July 28, reads in pertinent part as follows:

# #
* * * in this respect, I have dug up some 400 sales. At the time I wrote my letter of May 2 to you I had 336 of these sales still to verify.
;Ji ^ # jJj
At the time that I wrote the letter I had made numerous appointments with people to continue the interviews in connection with these sales and, since it was evident that the case would come to trial in the early Fall, there was nothing for me to do but to continue my investigation of these sales, which I have done. Up to the present date I have verified two hundred ninety one of these sales and have 45 still to go. In confirming these sales I have spent 56 days, for which I have enclosed a bill herewith.
íf* »f» sjí

15. In a letter dated August 4,1959, Assistant U.S. Attorney Bichard J. Dauber, on behalf of the United States Attorney in Los Angeles, referred to plaintiff’s letter of July 28, 1959, and statement for services rendered attached thereto, and specifically admonished plaintiff not to render any further services in connection with C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND until he was given written authorization to do so. It appears that for some period of time prior to the date of the above letter, the office of the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles, for various reasons which are irrelevant here, had some reservations and doubts as to the advisability of employing plaintiff to perform additional appraisal services, despite the fact that the Department of Justice in Washington had authorized his employment for an additional 95 days. (See finding 10 (b), supra).

16. By letter dated August 22,1959, plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the letter sent to him under date of August 4, 1959, by Mr. Dauber, denied that at any time after March. 8, 1959, be bad been cautioned not to proceed witli appraisals that required more time than originally approved until authority bad been obtained from Washington and be bad been notified to that effect in writing, and stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

* * * when I undertook the appraisal of 1836 ND I was assured that I would be granted additional and ample time to do the job as it should be done to prove the values to a jury and that I would also be given additional and adequate time to do the appraisal of 1904 ND and the minerals.
* * * * *
Acting in good faith and in pursuance of my employment, I had necessarily made advance appointments to visit and interview numerous parties to transactions pertinent to the appraisals, and there was no alternative but to keep these appointments once made.
I have, therefore, billed your office for a total of 116 days and feel that I have every right to expect to be paid for the time.
^ # %i Hí ❖

.17. Department of Justice, Memo. No. 162, dated June 1, 1955, which was in force at all times pertinent to this action, provides:

Effective July 1, 1955, all general expenses incurred in collection with Lands Division cases, (except appraisers, engineers and other expert witnesses) heretofore paid by the Lands Division in Washington, will become charges against the United States Attorney’s general expense authorization. Payment of such expenses will be made by the United States Marshals from the appropriation “Salaries and Expenses, United States Attorneys and Marshals.”
Vouchers covering expense incurred prior to July 1, 1955, will be directed to the Lands Division in Washington for payment.
The Lands Division appropriation will continue to be charged for services of expert witnesses, appraisers, engineers, geologists, etc. Specific authority must be obtained prior to incurring this type of expense and the vouchers forwarded to Washington as heretofore.
United States Attorneys, when necessary, should include this added expense in their requests for authority for tbe period commencing July 1, 1955 through. September 30,1955.

18. (a) On or about December 20,1959, plaintiff submitted to the Comptroller General of the United States, a claim in the amount of $7,125, for appraisal services allegedly performed by plaintiff subsequent to June 1,1959, at the request .of defendant in connection with the acquisition of land and property -interests for the U.S. Naval Air Station, Lemoore, 'California, which acquisitions were the subject of condemnation procedings in C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND. That ■claim is the one which constitutes the claim in this action. By Settlement Certificate dated March 14, 1960, the Comptroller General disallowed plaintiff’s claim and informed him to the effect that he had never been properly authorized to continue with his appraisal work beyond the time originally approved, or advised that his bid of May 1, 1959, to render 95 additional days of appraisal services had been accepted by the Department of Justice.

(b) By letter dated April 13, 1960, plaintiff requested review and reconsideration of his said claim. In a letter ■dated May 17,1960, the Comptroller General advised plaintiff that his claim had been reconsidered and a decision made .•sustaining the settlement action disallowing the claim.

19. On May 26, 1961, plaintiff filed his petition herein, •seeking judgment for $7,125, allegedly representing the ¡amount due for appraisal services rendered by him under the Bid for 'Services relating to C.A. No. 1904r-ND. On July 11,1961, defendant filed its answer herein, denying that plaintiff was ever authorized to perform the services for which he claims compensation.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

Upon the foregoing findings of fact which are made a part «of the judgment herein, the court concludes as a matter of law that plaintiff is entitled to recover and judgment is ^entered to that effect. The amount of recovery will be «determined pursuant to Buie 47(c). 
      
      The court acknowledges tlie helpfulness of the findings (which we accept with minor changes) and the opinion of Trial Commissioner Franklin M. Stone. However, our conclusion with respect to plaintiff’s second bid for services is at variance with the Commissioner’s.
     
      
       References to the “united States Attorney’s Office”, the “Office”, the “United States Attorney”, and “Assistant United States Attorneys” are to the Los Angeles Office (i.ethe Office of the United States ■ Attorney for the Southern District of California).
     
      
       Following a request made of him early in July 1959 to submit a bill for services rendered through June 30, 1959, plaintiff submitted a statement, dated July 23, 1959, to the united States Attorney’s Office, for 60 days’ appraisal services performed during the period from March 4, 1959, to June 1, 1959, inclusive,' in case No. 1836 — ND, totaling $4,500. This .sum was paid on August 27, 1959.
     
      
       In December 1959, plaintiff sent the United States Attorney a statement in the amount of $7,125 for appraisal services allegedly rendered subsequent to June 1, 1959, which bill was not paid. Thereafter, plaintiff submitted a claim in that amount to the Comptroller General who, by Settlement Certificate (dated March 4, 1960), disallowed it. Upon review and recommendation, the Comptroller General made a decision on May 17, 1960, sustaining the settlement action disallowing plaintiff’s claim. On May 26, 1961, plaintiff filed his petition here.
     
      
      
         At the trial, the Government asserted that it would attempt to show that “although there may he a conflict in the testimony, that the Plaintiff was informed specifically that he was to do no further work [after completion of the first bidj until he was notified in writing by the united States Attorney that authority had been obtained from Washington for the additional work.” Tr. 23-4. The record does not support any requirement of a written notification to proceed. Plaintiff’s first bid was accepted by a telephone call. Rinding 5(b).
     
      
      
         Johnson, supra, is based on Revised Stat. §771. This is now 28 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2), 62 Stat. 910 (1918), originally sec. 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
     
      
       There is much in the record to indicate that both the Department (in Washington) and the Los Angeles Office considered the latter as empowered to “hire” plaintiff, rather than the Department itself as being the “employer” or contracting agency. Mr. Thomson’s Bid for Services was addressed to the united States Attorney. The form request by the Office to Washington (Form 25B) is headed “Request and Authorization to Incur Expense”, and requests authority from the Assistant Attorney General “to incur the expense described below.” The authorization on the same form provides: “You .are authorized to incur the above-mentioned expense.” The letter of June 10, '1959 transmitting the bid to Washington (finding 10(a)) refers to Mr. ‘Thomson as being “hired by this office’’ under the earlier authorization (emphasis added). The Los Angeles Office’s earlier letter of January 26, 1959 (Deft. Ex. 4), requesting authorization for Mr. Thomson’s services, likewise referred to appraisers as being “hired by this office”, and asked “authority tto employ Mr. W. P. Thomson.”
      The only really contrary indication is the finding (finding 3(e)) that plaintiff admits that he was advised by Mr. Minton that all contracts for appraisal services “were made in Washington, D.C.” This bit of testimony, which may merely reflect a difference in verbiage, does not persuade that the only contracting agency was the Department in Washington.
     
      
       It is also essential that the agents acting on behalf of the united States have authority (Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947)), but, as we have already pointed out, the Los Angeles Office had that power— subject to the Attorney General’s authorization to incur the expense.
     
      
       Of course, if plaintiff had been expressly and unmistakably told not to rely on anyone’s conduct, the case 'would be different. See Coleman v. United States, supra, 152 U.S. at 99-100.
     
      
      
        The fact that the Attorney General, in approving- plaintiff’s bid on July 10, may not have known that the united States Attorney’s representatives had earlier begun to manifest assent to plaintiff’s offer does not vitiate the contract. Such knowledge is needed for “ratification”. United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 354 (1901). However, “ratification” effects a contract between the third person and the principal (here, the Attorney General) (Clews V. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 481-88 (1901); First Nat. Bank v. Alton Mercantile Co., 18 F. 2d 213, 215-16 (C.A. 8, 1927) ; II Williston, Contráete § 278 (3d ed. 1959)), while we hold that the plaintiff contracted with the united States Attorney.
     
      
       See finding 6, infra.
      
     
      
       See' finding 8, infra.
      
     
      
       A notation relating to the date “June 1” appears on this statement which reads “already billed”. (See Defendant’s Exhibit 20.) As noted in finding 13, supra, defendant was billed and it paid plaintiff for 60 days of work performed by him which included services rendered on June 1, 1959, per his statement dated July 23, 1959.