Case ID: misc_11/html/0430-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Bischoff, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Lydia A. Strong, Respondent, v. The Union Transfer & Storage Co., Appellant.
    (New York Common Pleas—Additional General Term,
    February, 1895.)
    Testimony of an expressman that he left a trunk at defendant’s warehouse, but was unable to. say at what door or that he had not left it in the street, or that he called the attention of defendant’s employees to it, where no receipt was taken or contract made for its storage, is insufficient to prove a delivery for the purpose of charging defendant for a failure to return the trunk on demand.
    Statements of an agent made long after the transaction in question, and forming no part of the res gestes, are not admissible to. bind his principal.
    Appeal from a judgment of the District Court in the city of New York for the eighth judicial district, rendered by the justice, without a jury, in favor of the plaintiff.
    ■ E. O. Duvall, for respondent.
    
      Henry O. Andrews, for appellant.
   Bischoff, J.

This action was brought to recover for the loss of a trunk alleged to have been intrusted to the custody of the defendant by the plaintiff.

To prove delivery of the property to the defendant, plaintiff called one MacMichael, an expressman, who testified to its receipt by him and that he forwarded it to the defendant’s warerooms by his servant Collins. Collins testified that he left the trunk at defendant’s warehouse, but was unable to say that he had' delivered it at any particular door or had not actually left it on the street; further, he did not recollect ■whether he had called the attention of any of the defendant’s •employees to the property.

No receipt was taken upon this alleged delivery, and no contract with regard to the storage of the trunk was proven.

This evidence was certainly insufficient to prove a delivery for the purpose of charging defendant upon its failure to return the chattel at plaintiff’s demand (Story Bailm. [9th ed.] § 297; Grosvenor v. R. R. Co., 39 N. Y. 34), but it was .sought, further, to prove an admission upon the part of ■defendant’s agent Jones that a delivery had in fact been made by introducing the testimony of the plaintiff with regard to statements made to her by Jones in the course of a conversation had between them nine months after the delivery was •claimed to have taken place.

This testimony was received under objection to its competency as hearsay and exception.

The statements alleged to have been made were that “ a ■trunk had been brought by MacMiehael,” no doubt the trunk was mine, but it had been given to another party,” and she further testified, his description led me to believe that it was my trunk.”

Whatever value as proof of an admission by the individual making them may have been attributable to these statements, they were improperly admitted for the purpose of binding the defendant, being in no way connected with the res gestae, and •the objection to the testimony as hearsay was well taken. Green v. R. R. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 473; Thallhimer v. Brinkerhoff, 4 Wend. 394; Anderson v. R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 334, 340.

Failing sufficient evidence of a delivery of the chattel, and for the errors noted, a new trial of the cause should result.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide -event.

Bookstaver, J., concurs.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide -event.