Case ID: f-appx_425/html/0064-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shawn M. SNYDER, Appellant.
    No. 10-2624-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 1, 2011.
    
      Aaron J. Mango, Assistant United States Attorney (William J. Hochul, Jr., United States Attorney, Western District of New York, on the brief), Buffalo, N.Y., for Appellee.
    Kimberly A. Schechter, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of New York, Buffalo, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Shawn M. Snyder appeals from the judgment entered on June 23, 2010 in the Western District of New York (Skretny, C.J.) sentencing him to a 75-year term of imprisonment after he entered his plea of guilty to five counts of production of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). On appeal, Snyder argues his sentence is excessive, motivated by the district court’s anger at the crimes Snyder committed rather than on a reasoned consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

We review sentences for reasonableness, applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008). The district court is obligated to “consider all of the Section 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Snyder limits his challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, which we review by determining if the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in Section 3553(a). We “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s determination cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in the original).

On appeal, Snyder argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court sentenced in anger, and failed to take into consideration the Section 3553(a) factors, including Snyder’s mental impairment and family history. Snyder argues that the district court improperly emphasized the circumstances of the crime and the ability of the victims to recover.

While the district court did make reference to the circumstances of the crime and expressed anger and disgust, a reading of the record as a whole indicates the district court considered all of the Section 3553(a) factors, including Snyder’s arguments regarding his mental impairments. The district court simply did not accept Snyder’s arguments. The district court found that while Snyder tested with a below-normal IQ, it found he had manipulated the children and their parents, which “demonstrated significant sophistication.” The district court also stated:

Though your attorney argues in her papers that I should consider your mental impairment as grounds for a non-guidelines sentence, in my view you have demonstrated significant sophistication in your persuasion of the victims’ parents, adults, to permit their children, to stay with you, as well in your persuasion of the victims to participate in your production utilizing them of child pornography.

(Sentencing Tr. 16:5-13). Given the circumstances and the facts before the district court, and given that the trial court properly considered the Section 3553(a) factors, this case is not one of the “exceptional cases where the district court’s determination cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189.

We have considered the remainder of Snyder’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.