Case ID: cal_214/html/0791-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "THE COURT.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

[S. F. No. 13343.
    In Bank.
    October 17, 1931.]
    EDITH S. RITTER, Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY INDEMNITY EXCHANGE (an Association), Appellant.
    B. P. Gibbs, Barry J. Golding and Theodore Hale for Appellant.
    Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Barry for Respondent.
   THE COURT.

The sole question presented on this appeal is whether or not plaintiff has a cause of action directly against the defendant insurance carrier for personal injuries received by her while riding as a passenger in the jitney bus of one Sam Euphrat, under the terms of an insurance policy carried by Euphrat and under the provisions of a certain ordinance of the city and county of San Francisco. Euphrat died as a result of injuries received in the accident, so that any cause of action against him abated with his death.

The very question here presented, involving the same insurance policy and growing out of the same accident, has recently been decided by the District Court of Appeal. (Severns v. California Highway Indemnity Exch., 100 Cal. App. 384 [280 Pac. 213].)

In that case it was held that the insurance policy carried by Euphrat was simply an undertaking to pay any final judgment which the injured person might obtain against the assured, and that the obtaining of such final judgment constituted a condition precedent to any action which the injured person might have against the insurance carrier.

We are in entire accord with this conclusion and the by which it was reached. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat in this opinion what was said by the Court of Appeal in the Sevcrns case.

On the authority and reasoning found in Sevens v. Highway Indemnity Exch., supra, the judgment from is reversed.