Case ID: f-appx_426/html/0018-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Carlos Felipe PELAEZ SALDARRIAGA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-1720-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 11, 2011.
    
      Daniel B. Lundy, Barst Mukamal & Kleiner, LLP, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Richard M. Evans, Assistant Director; Margaret A. O’Donnell, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, JOSÉ A. CABRANES and ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Carlos Felipe Pelaez Saldarriaga, a native and citizen of Colombia, seeks review of an April 2, 2010, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. In re Carlos Felipe Pelaez Saldarriaga, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Apr. 2, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). The BIA denied Pelaez Saldarriaga’s motion to reopen finding that the police report submitted by his father did not constitute material new evidence establishing his prima facie eligibility for relief, because it would not have changed the result of the new proceedings. The BIA has explained that it will not grant a motion to reopen based on evidence that is largely cumulative of evidence previously submitted, because evidence is not material unless “the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.” Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears to the BIA that the new evidence to be offered is material). Here, contrary to Pelaez Saldarriaga’s argument, the BIA did not summarily discount his new evidence as unauthenticated as the BIA addressed the substance of the new evidence. When addressing the substance of the new evidence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Pelaez Saldarriaga’s father’s 2009 report to the Colombian police, was not material new evidence because it largely repeated similar evidence that the IJ and BIA had previously considered, including a previous report filed in 2001. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 473.

In addition to being cumulative, the police report was not material because it did not give any indication as to the motives of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (“AUC”) in pursuing Pelaez Saldarriaga, and thus did not affect the agency’s previous determination that he did not establish that he would be targeted by the AUC on account of a protected ground. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir.2004) (explaining that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal must show a nexus between their persecution and the grounds protected under the Immigration and Nationality Act). Contrary to Pelaez Saldarriaga’s argument, the agency explicitly addressed his assertion that he had shown a nexus to a protected ground, as it explicitly found that he did not demonstrate such a nexus. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pelaez Saldarriaga’s motion to reopen because he failed to provide material new evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).