Case ID: f-appx_688/html/0440-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruben GALVAN-SALAZAR, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 16-50112
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 19, 2017
    Helen H. Hong, Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee
    Sarah Rose Weinman, Attorney, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ruben Galvan-Salazar appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 30-month custodial sentence and 3-year term of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Galvan-Salazar contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to provide a reasoned basis for exercising its discretion under Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), to reject U.S.S.G. § 5Dl.l(c). His reliance on Kimbrough is misplaced. While section 5Dl.l(c) states that a district court should not ordinarily impose a term of supervised release if the defendant is a deportable alien, it also provides that supervised release may be appropriate in such cases if it will provide an added measure of deterrence. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 cmt. n.5. The district court’s decision to impose supervised release on the basis of its finding that doing so would provide an added measure of deterrence in Galvan-Salazar’s case was, therefore, consistent with the Guidelines.

Galvan-Salazar next contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to account for the mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Galvan-Salazar’s criminal history and the need for deterrence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.