Case ID: va_29/html/0290-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CARR, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*King William Justices v. Munday.
    May, 1830.
    (Absent Coauter, J.)
    nandamus — Never Lies if There Is Another Remedy.— Mandamus does not lie for the undertaker of a public bridge, to compel the county court to levy the stipulated reward in the county levy, because a specific remedy is given him l>y statute, to recover the same hy action of debt against the justices refusing to levy it.
    Same — Same.—Mandamus never lies if there is another specific legal remedy for the party complaining.
    An order was made by the county court of King William, appointing three commissioners “to meet and confer with commissioner appointed by the county court of King & Queen, and agree on the manner and condition of executing a bridge, to be erected across the Mattapony river from the land of J. K. in King & Queen to the Land of J. H. in King William. ” But, when this order was made, there were only five justices on the bench, out of seventeen who were in the commission of the peace for the county; and no order had been made or entered of record, at a previous term, signifying the intention of making the above or any other order on the subject, and directing the sheriff to summon the justices of the county to attend at the next term for the purpose.
    The commissioners reported to the county court of King William, that in conformity with the orders of the two county courts, they had let the building of a bridge across the Mattapony, to be kept in repair for seven years, to B. H. Munday, for the sum of 50 dollars; and that the undertaker had built the bridge, according to the contract returned to the clerk of the county court of King & Queen, and had given bond with surety for keeping the same in repair for the term aforesaid.
    Munday, the undertaker, applied to the county court of King William (then sitting to make the county levy, and fifteen of the justices being on the bench) to levy the proportion of the price of the bridge, properly chargeable on *that count}', and to order the same to be paid to him: which the county court refused to do, by a vote of ten to five of the justices present.
    Upon this, Munday applied to the circuit court of King William for a mandamus to the justices of the county court, which was allowed, commanding them to levy the money for him, or shew cause to the contrary.
    The county court made return, in which, after reciting the provision of the statute, 2 Rev. Code, ch. 236, 'i 9, p. 237, that “no order for the erection of any bridge or bridges, shall be made by the court of any county, unless a majority of the acting justices of such county shall be present at the making of such order, or unless the court of such county shall have signified their intention of making such order, at least one month previous thereto, and shall have caused the same to be entered of record, with directions to the sheriff of the county to summon the justices thereof to attend at the next term for the purpose aforesaid;” the court shewed, that a majority of the justices of King William were not present at the time of making the order appointing commissioners on the part of that county, to meet ana confer with those of King & Queen as to the building of the bridge in question, and that no prévious order had been made signifying the intention of making such order, and directing the justices of the county to be summoned to attend for the purpose: and that the court refused to levy any portion of the money claimed by the undertaker on the county of King William, 1. because the order, and the whole proceedings, were irregular and contrary to law; and 2. because no evidence jvas adduced to convince the court, that the bridge was or would be of public utility and convenience.
    Munday demurred generally to the return, and the justices joined in the demurrer.
    The circuit court sustained the demurrer, and ordered a peremptory mandamus. And to that judgment, this court, at the instance of the justices of the county court, awarded a supersedeas.
    *Claiborne and Leigh, for the plaintiffs in error,
    objected, 1. That the mandamus did not lie: that that remedy lies only where there is no other specific remedy; and where the writ lies from a su-periour to an inferiour court, it only lies to compel the inferiour court to exercise a jurisdiction, without the exercise of which the party would be deprived of remedy; it never lies where the party has a specific remedy, independent of any exercise of jurisdiction by the inferiour court. 4 Bac. Abr. Mandamus C. D. pp. 506, 7. Here, they said, the same section of the statute, which authorises the county courts to build bridges, makes all contracts for the purpose, duly and regularly made, “binding on the justices and their successors so as to entitle the undertaker to his stipulated reward in the county levy, or to a recovery thereof, with costs, by action of debt against the justices refusing to levy the same.” The following section gives a mandamus, indeed, but only to the justices of one county against the justices of another, when these being duly required by the others, fail to appoint commissioners to act on their behalf, or to do what on their part ought to be done, towards executing and paying for such works. 2 Rev. Code, ch. 236, | 9, 10. But, 2. Upon the merits they insisted, that the county court was plainly right. They had, in truth, no power to levy money upon the people, to discharge a debt contracted for them without any just authority; Id. ch. 191, $ 6, p. 63. The provision of the statute set forth in the return of the justices, interdicted the court which appointed the commissioners who made the contract, from making any such order; in effect, it deprived them of jurisdiction to do the act. And it was remarkable, that the order itself did not authorise the coin-missioners to let the building1 of the bridge to an undertaker, but only to agree on the manner and condition of executing the work.
    Stanard contra,
    argued, that the 9th section of the statute, which required that the majority of the justices should be present at the making of orders for building bridges, or *that the intention of making such orders should be signified by an entry made of record, and the justices summoned to attend for the purpose, would be found, on examination, to apply only to the county court which originated the proceeding, not to a case like the present, where one county court is required by another county court, to concur in a work of the kind. This case, he said, was provided for by the 10th section of the statute: the county court of King & Queen originated the proceeding: and the effect of the 10th section was to oblige the county court of King William to meet the requisition without delay, and either comply or refuse compliance with it. And as. to the objection, that the order of the county court of King William did not in terms authorise the commissioners to let the building of the bridge to an undertaker; that objection was refuted by the words of the 10th section, for the order was precisely in the form therein prescribed, for cases in which the proceeding originates in one county court and is to be concurred in by another. Then, in respect to the remedy by mandamus; surely, if the contract was legally made, binding on the county court, and thus binding on the people of the county, this was the only method of compelling the county, which really owed the debt, to pay it. An action of debt, indeed, was given against the justices who fail to do their duty; but the creditor might not know, or have any means of knowing, which of the justices were chargeable for the omission; which of them to sue. The statute gives the action of debt against the delinquent justices. But the party wants a remedy against the county court and the county; and there is no remedy but mandamus.
    
      
      Handamus — Function of the Writ. — The office of the writ of mandamus is to compel corporations, inferior courts and offices to perform some particular duty incumbent upon them, and which is imperative in its nature, and to the performance of which the relator has a clear legal right, without any other adequate specific legal remedy to enforce it: and even though he may have another specific legal remedy, if such "remedy be obsolete or imperative, the mandamus will be granted. Page v. Clopton, 30 Gratt. 417, 418, citing principal case.
      In relation to courts and j udicial officers, the writ of mandamus cannot be made to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal, or other legal proceedings to review or correct errors or to anticipate and forestall judicial action. It may be appropriately used and is often used to compe] courts to act where they refuse to act and ong'ht to act, but not to direct and control the judicial discretion to be exercised in the performance of the act to be done; to compel courts to hear and decide whether they have jurisdiction, but not to pre-determine the decision to be made; to reciuire them to proceed to judgment, but not to ñx and prescribe the judgment to be rendered. Page v. Clopton, 30 Gratt. 418; Richardson v. Farrar, 88 Va. 773, 15 S. E. Rep. 117, both citing principal case.
      To the point that mandamus is an extraordinary writ, and lies only in cases where the party has no other specific or adequate remedy, the principal case is cited in Lowther v. Davis, 33 W. Va. 134, 10 S. E. Rep. 21. See principal case also cited in Mitchell v. Witt, 98 Va. 461. 36 S. E. Rep. 528.
      See farther. Ex parte Goolsby. 2 Gratt. 575. and foot-note; foot-note to Morris, Ex parte, 11 Gratt. 292; foot-note to Cowan v. Pulton, 23 Gratt. 579.
    
   CARR, J.

The counsel for the appellants took two objections to the proceedings: 1. that a mandamus was not the proper remedy ; 2. that there should have been a majority of the justices of King William on the bench, or proof that thej had been summoned to attend, when the order was made appointing commissioners to meet those of King & *Queen. It will only be necessary to notice the first of these points, if it shall be found decisively settled, that where there is another specific legal remedy, the mandamus will not lie. A brief examination of some of the cases will abundantly shew this. In Rex v. Barker, 3 Burr. 1267, lord Mansfield said, “A mandamus in a prerogative writ. — It ought to be used upon all occasions, where the law has established no specific remedy, and where, in justice and good government, there ought to be one.” “The value of the matter, or the degree of its importance to the public police, is-not scrupulously weighed: if there be a right, and no other specific remedy, this should not be denied.” And, in Rex v. The Bank of England, 2 Doug. 526, he said, “ Where there is no specific remedy, the court will grant a mandamus, that justice may be done.” In the case of The King v. Marquis of Stafford, 3 T. R. 651, on an application for a rule to shew cause why a mandamus should not issue to-command the defendant, as lord of the-manor, to present to the ordinary, one Moreton, nominated by the inhabitants off Willenhall, to be curate of that chapel, lord Kenyon said, “it seems as if the inhabitants have only an equitable right. If so, this court cannot interfere at all; or iff they have a legal right, such right may be asserted in a quare impedit. Therefore,-quacunque via data, this rule must be discharged.” The King v. Bishop of Chester, 1 T. R. 404; The King v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 8 East. 213; Rex v. Commissioners of Dean, 2 Mau. & Sel. 80. In 4 Bac. Abr. Mandamus, C. p. 506, it is laid down, that it is, in general, sufficient reason with the court to refuse a mandamus, that the party applying for it has another specific remedy; and many cases are quoted in support. It seems an exception to this general rule, that the remedy is obsolete, or inconvenient, or incomplete: in such cases, the court exercises sound discretion in granting or refusing the writ. In our legislation, I find nothing to change this settled course of the law. The statute, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 121, p. 471, merely regulates the mode of proceeding on. writs of mandamus, without prescribing when *they shall be granted or refused. In Dew v. The Judges of the Sweet Springs &c., 3 Hen. & Munf. 1, the subject is touched upon, but only incidentally, the case there being evidently a proper one for the writ. The law being thus settled, we are only to inquire, whether the petitioner for this mandamus, had a specific legal remedy? And this is answered by the passage cited from the 9th section of the statute, 2 Rev. Code, ch. 236, “and all such contracts made by county courts, or others appointed by them, shall be available and binding upon the justices and their successors, so as to entitle the undertaker to his stipulated reward in the county levy, or to a recovery thereof with costs, by action of debt against the justices refusing to levy the same.

The other judges concurred, and the judgment was reversed, and the mandamus dismissed.