Case ID: mich_35/html/0019-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Campbell, J.:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Isaac N. Jenness v. Marvil Shaw.
    
      Principal and agent: Undisclosed principal: Sale made by agent. An undisclosed principal may sue upon a sale made by his agent, where such principal is shown to be the only person entitled.
    
    
      Parol contracts: Conflicting evidence: Question of fact. Where the evidence of the contract between the parties is all parol and not harmonious, it is for the jury, and not the court, to determine what the contract was.
    
      Conl< acts: Conditions precedent: Non-performance: Might of action; Mescission. Where the jury by their verdict have found that certain payments provided by the contract to be made by defendant were conditions precedent, and failure to make such payments has been proved, the plaintiff’s right of action cannot be defeated on the claim that the contract, being an entirety, could not be sued upon until fully performed by plaintiff or rescinded by defendant or by mutual consent; one failing to perform on his part a condition precedent, thereby loses all right to require the further fulfillment of the contract on the part of the other party thereto.
    
      Submitted on brifs October 4.
    
    
      Decided October 13.
    
    Error to Lapeer Circuit.
    
      M. JE. Grofoot and GasJdll & Geer, for plaintiff in error.
    
      A. G. Baldwin, for defendant in error.
    
      
       An agent cannot make an “ agreement entirely on his principal’s behalf, yet entirely for his own benefit. Such agreement has no consideration. The price, if payable at all, must belong to the person who makes the contract, aud he only can sue for it Graham v. Taggart, 44 Mich,, 383,
    
   Campbell, J.:

Shaw recovered judgment for the value of certain logs furnished to Jenness. The ease tended to show that Jenness made a bargain verbally with one Phelps for the purchase of the logs to be cut from two parcels of Shaw’s land, and delivered one parcel in the winter of 1866-7, and the rest the next winter. The price was to be seven dollars a thousand, of which two dollars and fifty cents per thousand was to be paid when the logs were put afloat, and the remainder subsequently. It was claimed, and the jury must have found, that Jenness did not pay what he agreed. The declaration was on the common counts, and the recovery was for the contract price.

The errors alleged relate entirely to the charges of the court. Three of these related to the right of Shaw, as an ^undisclosed principal, to sue on his agent’s agreement. The court, on defendant’s request, charged that Shaw could not recover if he had sold the logs to Phelps before the Phelps’ sale to Jenness. This question being out of the way, and Shaw being the only person entitled, there can be no doubt of his right to sue upon a sale made by his agent, whether known to be such or not. The principle is well settled and elementary. It is, however, very questionable whether any such question really arises, inasmuch as upon the finding of the jury, coupled with the proof on both sides, it seems Jenness could not have been ignorant of the ownership. But in either case there was no error.

The remaining questions, put in different forms,- rest upon the assumption that the contract was an entirety and could not be sued upon until either fully performed by Shaw or rescinded by Jenness or by mutual consent.

The evidence of the contract was all parol, and not harmonious. It was for the jury, therefore, to determine what it was. The plaintiff claimed that certain payments to be made by Jenness were conditions precedent, and that failure to make them authorized Shaw to refuse any further performance. The court told the jury that Shaw’s right to do so depended on whether such payment was a condition precedent. The jury must have found that it was, and if so, Jenness, by failure to pay as agreed, necessarily lost all right to require the further fulfillment of the contract, and it needed no rescission by him.

The charge was as favorable as he could have asked. Plain. tiff below had, therefore, a right to sue for the contract price of logs furnished, if he did not care to prosecute for any other breach.

The judgment was correct, and must be affirmed, with costs.

The other justices concurred.