Case ID: f-appx_605/html/0076-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Nathaniel C. LANGSTON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 14-3660-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 7, 2015.
    Nathaniel C. Langston, White Deer, PA, pro se.
    Emily Berger, Kevin M. Trowel, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
    Present: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit' Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant Nathaniel C. Langston, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s September 29, 2014 judgment revoking his term of supervised release and imposing a 24-month term of imprisonment and a new three-year term of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3588(e) and (h). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review sentences imposed for supervised release violations for substantive and procedural reasonableness. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2008). A district court commits procedural error where it, for example, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, does not consider the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous factual finding. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc). As to substantive reasonableness, we consider “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the factors outlined in ... § 3553(a).” United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir.2006).

Upon review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court’s revocation of Langston’s supervised release and imposition of a new term of imprisonment and supervised release was authorized by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h); United States v. Gibbs, 58 F.3d 36, 37-38 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1995) (explaining that the three-year maximum authorized by § 3583(b)(2) does not apply to supervised release imposed for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which provides for up to a life term of supervised release); see also Lopez v. Terrell, 654 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir.2011) (explaining that “credit” for time served under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) applies only if “presentence custody ‘has not been credited against another sentence’ ” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b))). Section 3584(c), which addresses the treatment of multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time, does not apply to Langston’s post-revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Langston on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s September 29, 2014 judgment.