Case ID: so2d_436/html/0265-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. SHIVERS, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Peter VIVIANO, Appellant, v. HURRY KANE INN, INC., and South Carolina Insurance Co., Appellees.
    No. AP-282.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    July 22, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1983.
    Bill McCabe, of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, and J. David Parrish, of Hurt & Parrish, Orlando, for appellant.
    Janet R. DeLaura, of Smalbein, Eubank, Johnson, Rosier & Bussey, P.A., Rockledge, for appellees.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

MILLS and BOOTH, JJ., concur.

SHIVERS, J., dissents, with opinion.

SHIVERS, Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The sole medical testimony clearly establishes that claimant’s heart condition was the result of claimant’s spreading mulch on the premises. The treating physician, a cardiologist, testified that, in his opinion, within reasonable medical probability, the heart attack resulted from the activity of spreading mulch on the parking lot. I am also convinced that although claimant had regularly done what work was necessary in the business, his mulch pitching and spreading activity was a strain or exertion not routine to the work the claimant was accustomed to performing. Since the claimant has shown both medical and legal causation, I would find the heart attack compensable and reverse.