Case ID: sw_260/html/0580-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "HAWKINS, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

MEADORS v. STATE.
    (No. 7856.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 30, 1924.
    Rehearing Denied April 9, 1924.)
    1. Criminal law &wkey;>1086(13)— Appeal dismissed where record showed no sentence.
    An allegation in the transcript on appeal that defendant had been duly and legally convicted of the offense of violating the prohibition laws of the state, with a recital of the punishment assessed and of his sentence in accordance with said conviction, ‘held insufficient to show a final judgment or that sentence was ever passed on defendant, and the appeal was accordingly dismissed, in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proe. 1916, art. 856.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    2. Criminal law &wkey;>99l(/2), 10)7 — Sentence held a nullity and appellate court without jurisdiction of appeal.
    The appellate court was without jurisdiction of an appeal from a sentence in a liquor prosecution for “violating the prohibition laws of the state,” there being no such offense known to the law, and the purported sentence being in fact no sentence at all, and the appellate court being without authority, under Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 938, to make an order which'would, in effect, be pronouncing the sentence itself.
    ^=3 For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
    Appeal from District Court, Robertson County; W. C. Davis, Judge.
    George Meadors was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Henry A. Bush, of Franklin, for appellant.
    Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Appellant was convicted upon an indictment containing two counts, one charging the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, and one the possession of intoxicating liquor for the purpose of sale, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

It will be necessary to order a dismissal of this appeal because no final judgment is shown. The sentence is the final judgment, and no appeal will lie to this court from a conviction for a felony, save where the death penalty may have been assessed, until after sentence has been pronounced. See article 856, C. C. P., and many cases collated thereunder in Vernon’s Crim. Stat. vol. 2, p. 851; also, notes under the same article in Vernon’s Civil & Crim. Stat., 1922 Supplement.

There appears in the transcript and immediately following the judgment a recital that appellant “had been duly and legally convicted of the offense of violating the prohibition laws of the state of Texas, and his punishment therefor having been assessed and adjudged at confinement in the penitentiary for one year, and he having, on the 2d day of February, A. D. 1923, by said court, been sentenced in due form of law in accordance with said conviction.” The foregoing recital is upon its face an incomplete statement and will not suffice for the sentence if, in fact, sentence was ever pronounced.

For the reason stated, the appeal must be dismissed and it is so ordered.

On Motion for Rehearing.

At a former day of this term the appeal was dismissed because the record showed no sentence. A supplemental transcript has been filed which includes what purports to be a sentence, and we are now asked to consider the case on its merits. In our opinion the record is not aided in any way by bringing forward the purported sentence.

The indictment contained two counts, one alleging the sale of intoxicating liquor, the other possession thereof for the purpose of sale; both counts were submitted to the jury, and a general verdict of guilty was returned. There was no formal request for an election by the state, but appellant objected to the submission of the second count. It is doubtful if it would have been proper under the facts to require the state to elect upon which count it would seek a conviction, because the evidence shows only a single transaction. In developing the alleged sale of the liquor the possession thereof for that purpose was of necessity shown. However, there could be a conviction of only one offense, and the court having failed to instruct the jury to state under which count, if any, they convicted, should have applied the judgment to one or the other of the counts, the evidence supporting both; instead of this, the judgment condemns appellant to be •'guilty of the offense charged in the indictment.”

The chief difficulty we encounter is in the sentence (?). After formal recitals it reads:

“It is the order of the court that the defendant, George Meadors,1 who has been adjudged to be guilty of violating the prohibition laws of the state of Texas and whose punishment has been assessed by the verdict of the jury at confinement in the penitentiary for one year, be. delivered by the sheriff of Robertson county, Tex., immediately to the superintendent of the1 penitentiaries of the state of Texas, or other person legally authorized to receive such convicts, and. the said George Meadors shall be confined in said penitentiaries for one year, in accordance with the provisions of the law governing the penitentiaries of said state, and the said George Meadors is remanded to jail until said sheriff can obey the directions of this sentence.”

It will be seen that appellant is sentenced to the penitentiary for one year for “violating the prohibition laws of the state of Texas.” There is no such offense known to our laws, and the purported sentence is in fact no sentence at all. This court is given authority under certain circumstances to reform judgments and even sentences (see article 938, C. C. P.; Pearson v. State [Tex. Cr. App.] 257 S. W. 895; Robinson v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 550, 126 S. W. 276); but we know of no right conferred upon us under the guise of reforming a sentence to make an order which would, in effect, be pronouncing the sentence itself.

Believing no jurisdiction to have been conferred upon this court by what now appears in the record as a sentence, and that under the - circumstances we have no authority to reform it, the motion to reinstate the appeal is overruled.