Case ID: f-appx_522/html/0634-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

George WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SELMA WATER WORKS AND SEWER BOARD, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-12812
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    June 24, 2013.
    George Wilson, Selma, AL, pro se.
    Prince Darius Chestnut, Selma, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.
    
      Before CARNES, BARKETT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

George Wilson appeals the dismissal of his civil rights action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We affirm.

In 2009, Wilson sued Selma Water Works and Sewer Board (Selma Board) in Alabama state court for allegedly damaging his building. The trial court awarded Selma Board summary judgment and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On August 5, 2011, the Alabama Supreme Court denied Wilson’s petition for writ of certiorari, thereby ending the state-court proceedings. On August 19, 2011, Wilson filed this case in federal district court alleging violations of his federal due process rights based on (1) Selma Board’s discovery and pleading tactics in state court, and (2) the state-court trial judge’s failure to recuse himself. According to Wilson’s Second Amended Complaint, he “seeks relief from summary judgment of Alabama Courts” notwithstanding the verdict of those courts. Wilson’s claims were subsequently dismissed by a federal magistrate judge after the parties consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction.

Wilson’s claims are jurisdictionally barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars state-court losers from seeking what would be, in substance, appellate review of state-court judgments in federal district court based on claims that the state-court judgment violated the losing parties’ federal rights. See Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2010); see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir.2009) (holding Rooker-Feldman also bars federal claims raised in state court as well as claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment). Because that is precisely what Wilson seeks to do in this case, his claims are jurisdictionally barred.

Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s dismissal is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923).
     
      
      . We review the magistrate judge's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case de novo. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.2009). Also, we deny Appellee’s motion to sanction Wilson under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and Fed. R.App. P. 38. See, e.g., Woods v. Internal Revenue Serv., 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir.1993) (noting this Court’s reluctance to sanction pro se litigants). those claims abandoned. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1066 (11th Cir.2012).