Case ID: ohio-st_8/html/0643-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Alexander McCombs v. The State of Ohio.
    1. On a trial for rape, or for assault with intent to commit a rape, the acts and declarations of the husband of the woman on whom the offense is alleged to have been committed, are not admissible to discredit the wife examined as a witness.
    2. Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, it is settled in Ohio, that in a prosecution for rape, or for assault with intent, etc., “ the substance of what the prosecutrix said,” or the “declarations” made by her immediately after the offense was committed, may be given in evidence, in the first instance, to corroborate her testimony.
    S. The character for chastity of the prosecutrix in this class of cases, cannot be impeached by evidence of particular acts of unchastity, but only by general evidence of her reputation in that respect. Nor can she be interrogated as to previous criminal intercourse with persons other than the accused himself; nor is such evidence of other instances admissible.
    In Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Tuscarawas county.
    
      . At the March term, 1858, of said court, McCombs was put upon his trial upon an indictment for an assault with intent to commit a rape upon the person of Maria Gertseh, and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary.
    To reverse this judgment this writ of error is prosecuted.
    It appears from the bill of exceptions taken on the trial, that Maria Gertseh, the prosecutrix, was sworn and examined on behalf of the state, whereupon, on cross-examination, the prisoner’s counsel asked her this question, “How many bastard children have you had?” To which question the counsel for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection,'and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    And upon further cross-examination the prisoner’s counsel asked said prosecutrix this question, “Have you ever had two bastard children ? ” To which question the counsel for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    And upon further cross-examination of said prosecutrix, the prisoner’s counsel asked her this question, “Hid you ever prostitute yourself for money ? ” To which question the counsel for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    And upon further cross-examination of said prosecutrix, and after it had been proved that she and Samuel Gertseh had been married four years prior to the commencement of the prosecution, counsel for the prisoner asked her this question, “ How long were you and your present husband, Samuel Gertseh, living together as man and wife before you were married ? ” To which question counsel for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    Christian Ring was next sworn and examined as a witness on behalf of the state, and was asked by the counsel for the state, for the purpose of corroborating the prosecutrix, and for no other purpose, and not to prove the commission of the act, (the prosecutrix having previously testified that she had made complaint to said King immediately after the commission of the alleged offense,) this question, “What did Maria Gertseh, the prosecutrix, say immediately after the alleged offense, concerning the alleged assault upon her?” The counsel for the prisoner objected to the witness King giving the declarations of the prosecutrix in detail, admitting that he might state the fact that she made complaint. The court overruled this objection, and permitted the witness to state what the prosecutrix said immediately after the act, about the alleged assault, for the purpose, only, of corroborating her, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    And the state having examined Samuel Gertseh, the husband of the prosecutrix, then called Jacob Mickle, who was sworn and examined for the state, whereupon, on cross-examination, counsel for the prisoner asked said Mickle this question, “ What did Samuel Gertseh say to his wife on the same day she told him the occurrence, about compromising this case, and what did she say?” To this question the counsel for the state objected, and the court sustained the objection, overruling the question as an entierty, but permitting the counsel for the prisoner to ask the witness concerning anything that the prosecutrix said, on that occasion, about compromising the case, or otherwise. To this ruling the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    And upon further cross-examination of said Mickle, the prisoner’s counsel asked this question, “Did not the witness Gertseh, husband of the prosecutrix, on same day of alleged offense, propose to compromise the matter for five dollars, to his wife ? ” To which question the counsel for the state objected, and the question was overruled, and the prisoner’s counsel excepted.
    
      ktambaugh § Beady, for plaintiff in error, insist that the court below erred in these several rulings.
    
      
      C. P. Wolcott, attorney general, for the state.
   By the Court:

On a trial for rape, or for assault with intent to commit a rape, the acts and declarations of the husband of the woman on whom the offense is alleged to have been committed, are not admissible to discredit the wife examined as a witness. Jefferson v. The State, 6 Ired. Rep. 305.

Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, it is settled in Ohio, that in a prosecution for rape, or for assault with intent, etc., the “ substance of what the prosecutrix said,” or the “declarations” made by her immediately after the offense was committed, may be given in evidence, in the first instance, to corroborate her testimony. Johnson v. The State, 17 Ohio Rep. 593; Laughlin v. The State, 18 Ohio Rep. 99.

3. The character for chastity of the prosecutrix, in this class of cases,"cannot be impeached by evidence of particular acts of unchastity, but only by general evidence of her reputation in that respect. Nor can she be interrogated as to previous criminal intercourse with persons other than the accused himself; nor is such evidence of other instances admissible. Pleasants v. The State, 15 Ark. Rep. 624; Camp v. The State, 3 Kel. (Ga.) Rep. 417; State v. Jefferson, 6 Ired. Rep. 308; Rex v. Clark, 2 Stark. Rep. 241; People v. Jackson, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 391; 1 Greenl. Ev. 596; 3 Greenl. Ev. 214; 3 Starkie Ev. 1270; 2 Phil. Ev. 419.

Judgment affirmed.