Case ID: nc_77/html/0079-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Faircloth, J.‘", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

T. J. MAGRUDER & CO. v. W. H. RANDOLPH & CO.
    
      Praetiee — Jurisdiction—Splitting Accounts.
    
    1. A creditor cannot “ split up ” an account so as to give a -Justice of the-Peace jurisdiction, when the dealing between himself and the debtor was continuous, and nothing appears on the face of it, or in the account rendered, indicating that either party intended that each item should constitute a separate transaction.
    2. An account for a bill of goods purchased on one day is to be taken as one entire transaction, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention between the parties.
    
      (Waldo v. Jolly, 4 Jones, 173 ; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 365, cited, dis--tinguished and approved.)
    Appeal from a Justice’s Court heard at Spring Term, 1877, of Halieax Superior Court, before Buxton, J.
    
    The plaintiffs are wholesale dealers and manufacturers of boots and shoes in the City of Baltimore. The defendants are merchants in Halifax County, and bought a bill of goods of plaintiffs amounting to $526.25 on four months’ time, said bill as rendered being composed of twenty items. Upon default of payment, the plaintiffs “ split up ” the account, (but not the items thereof,) and instituted actions before a Justice of the Peace for the recovery of the various amounts.. The defendants admitted the debt, but insisted that the Justice had no jurisdiction because the account was one continuous transaction, arid made at one time. The plaintiffs replied that each item was a separate ti’ansaction, and ■although on the same day, the dealings did not take place at the same time. Ilis Honor being of opinion with the de•fendants, dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed
    
      .Messrs. Conigland Burton, for plaintiffs.
    
      Messrs. Mullen Moore, for defendants.
   Faircloth, J.‘

One of the defendants went into the plaintiffs’ store and purchased goods, going through the building from floor to floor, selecting 'and agreeing on the price of each item as he went, for example, “26 pair of men’s brogans, $1.75 per pair, $45.50 ” and so on through the "whole purchase.

• He went through the building continuously, not leaving it until his purchases were completed, and not until the bill was made and furnished to him, consisting of twenty items ■similar to the one above given, aggregating $526.25. The bill was marked “Terms, 4 months, interest charged after maturity.”

After maturity and non-payment, the plaintiffs divided said account into three parts, taking the first ten items aggregating $196.80, as one part, on which the present action was commenced before a Justice of the Peace, and the defendants deny the jurisdiction of the Justice.

When an account consists of divers and separate dealings, and at different times, or is a running account from year to year, either for goods sold, work done or materials furnished, it is well settled that the creditors may “split.it up and proceed on each separate item -before a Justice. This was the class of cases considered in ‘ Waldo v. Jolly, 4 Jones, 173; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 365, and other similar cases. Hut we think the case before us is not embraced by thé principle of those cases.

Here the dealing was continuous and nothing appears on the face of it, or in the account rendered, indicating that .either party intended that each item should' constitute a separate transaction and cause of action which could have been easily done, and we are to presume would have been hone, if so intended. Suppose the parties at the time of -purchase had divided the account as the plaintiffs have now ■done, and promissory notes had been given for each part, maturing at two, four and six months respectively; no one-would doubt that they intended three separate causes of action, and that it would be so decided. And suppose on the ■.contrary that one promissory note had been given for the aggregate sum, $526.35, on four months time with interest niter maturity ; would this differ from the account rendered with an express oral promise to pay it, except in the kind of .evidence of the debt and of the promise to pay ? Again, suppose the time occupied in making the purchase was one Jiour and the defendants relied upon the statute of limitations, and upon a minute examination the fact should be disclosed that three years immediately preceding the precise moment when the summons issued would include the latter part of the account and exclude the first, part; or suppose the ■plaintiffs had brought suit for the aggregate amount in the .Superior Court and -had insisted that the first item became ■due one hour before the last and claimed interest on it accordingly, and so on with the other items. It is very clear that the Court would not entertain such propositions, and yet we do not see how it could avoid doing so, "if each item is a distinct cause of action contracted at different times, on the well understood principle that one portion of an open nccount may be barred by the statute, whilst the other is not.

The law does not allow fractions of a day, except to guard Against injustice, and for the purpose of determining the Actual priority of conflicting rights which have accrued on the same day. In controversies among creditors, it will regard the particular time .when a Sheriff levies on personal! property, and when a mortgage deed is registered; also when under our present system a judgment is docketed, and the-like.

Our conclusion therefore is, that in the absence of evidence-©f a contrary intention between the parties, the purchaser-ivas one entire transaction.

There is no error.

Pee Curiam. Judgment affirmed!-