Case ID: dallam_1/html/0405-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "TERRELL, Justice.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. XIV.
    Thos. Cayce v. Horton and Clements.
    (See .)
    
      Appeal from Matagorda County.
    
    
      
      .—Cayce v. Horton and Clements, p. 405.
      At common law, the seal Is an absolute requisite to the validity of a bond. Cayce v. Curtis, Dal., 403; Sloo v. Powell, Dal., 467. It is unknown to the civil law and not essential to the validity of obligations and other instruments. Cayce v. Curtis, Dal., 403; Cayce v. Horton, Dal., 405; Sloo v. Powell, Dal., 467; Foster v. Champlin, 29 T., 22. The common law term “bond” has never been adopted in this State and it is not necessary for bonds to have private seals. Foster v. Champlin, 29 T., 22; Courand v. Vollmer, 31 T., 397. Under Act of February 5, 1840 (Gammel’s Laws of Texas, vol. 2, p. 327), providing that a scroll should take the place of a seal, provided it be recognized in the body of the instrument by the person making it, the recognition was not required to be in any specific terms. The use of any words in the body from which recognition could be fairly inferred, was sufficient. Flemming v. Powell, 2 T., 225; English v. Helms, 4 T., 228; Read v. Levy, 30 T., 738. The first section of Act of 1840 was restraining, and confined to instruments for conveyance of estates of inheritance or freehold or for a term of more than five years, and the intent to seal was sufficient, if expressed in any part of the instrument not within the purview of this section. English v. Helms 4 T., 228; Clayton v. Pridgen, 8 T., 308; Conner v. Autrey, 18 T., 427; Mucklel roy v. Bethany, 23 T., 163; Muckleroy v. Bethany, 27 T., 551; Richarz v. Wolcken, 34 T., 102. Under Act of 1840, contracts to transfer land certificates and headright claims, were not required to be under seal. Randon v. Barton, 4 T., 289; Bledsoe v. Cains, 10 T., 455. It was not necessary for an obligation to pay money, nor its assignment, to be under seal. Durst v. Swift, 11 T., 273; Jones v. Holliday, 11 T., 412; Holman v. Criswell, 13 T., 38. Nor was it necessary for a contract to sell land to be under seal. Miller v. Alexander, 8 T., 36; Holman v. Criswell, 13 T., 38; Fisk v. Miller, 13 T., 224; Eckhart v. Reidel, 16 T., 62; Martin v. Weyman, 26 T„ 460; Courand v. Vollmer, 31 T., 397; Wright v. Lancaster, 48 T., 250, 256; Downs v. Porter, 54 T., 59, 64. A deed without seal or scroll was admissible in evidence to show equitable title in vendee, and deed was entitled to record under section 7 of Act of 1840. though not under seal. Miller v. Alexander, 8 T., 36; Saunders v. Hartwell 61 T., 679, 686; Tom v. Sayers, 64 T., 339; Frost v. Wolf, 77 T., 455. Act of February 3, 1841 (Gammel’s Laws of Texas, vol. 2, p. 608), providing that “when a husband and his wife have sealed,” etc., was not applicable to sales of personal property. Stooksberry v. Swann, 12 T. C. A., 66, 73. Act of February 2, 1858 (Gammel’s Laws of Texas, vol. 4, p. 968), dispensed with the use of seals on all private instruments, except contracts of corporations. This statute, with the amendment of April 28, 1873 (Gammel’s Laws of Texas, vol. 7, p. 503), constitute Kev. Stats., 1895, art. 4862. Harris v. Cato, 26 T., 338; Wimbish v. Holt, 26 T., 673; Read v. Levy, 30 T., 738; Courand v. Vollmer, 31 T., 397; Bernhard v. De Forrest, 36 T., 518; Clayton v. Mooring, 42 T., 182. Under the statute of 1858 and the present law, the following instruments are valid without seal: (a) Appeal bonds. Russell v. McCampbell, 29 T., 31; Read v. Levy, 30 T., 738; Hart v. Kanady, 33 T., 720; Boney v. Waterhouse, 35 T., 178. (b) Attachment bonds. Bernhard v. De Forrest, 36 T., 518 (overruling Read v. Levy, 30 T., 738; Courand v. Vollmer, 31 T., 397; Hart v. Kanady, 33 T., 720); Gasquet v. Collins, 57' T., 340. (c) Certiorari and sequestration bonds. Courand v. Vollmer, 31 T., 397; Clayton v. Mooring, 42 T., 182; Tompkins v. Toland, 46 T„ 584. (d) Appointment of substitute trustee. Jacobs v. Mildred, 53 T., 72; Cheveral v. McCormick, 58 T., 440. (e) Official bond of county treasurer and county scrip. De Wees v. Colorado County, 32 T., 570; Parker County v. Courts, 2 U. C., 398. Written contracts of corporations should be under corporate seal, but the ancient and technical rule that a corporation could act and speak only by its corporate seal is obsolete with us. Shropshire v. Behrens, 77 T., 275; Gas Co. v. Harber, 1 App. C., sec. 1123. Where an agent makes a contract under seal, without disclosing his agency, the party with whom he contracts can not elect to hold 504; Wright v. Allen, 2 T., 158; State v. S. P. Ry. Co., 24 T., 80; Grand v. Chambers, 34 T., 573; Brennan v. Weatherford, 53 T., 330; State v. De Gress, 53 T., 387; Farmer v. State, 69 T., 561; Wallace v. Anderson, 5 Wheat., 291; Territory v. Lockwood, 3 Wall., 236. An individual may make the relation on which the State’s officer flies the information. In such cases the proceedings are in the exclusive control of the State’s officer, and can not be dismissed by the relator. Banton v. Wilson, 4 T., 400; Mathews v. State, 82 T., 577; McClesky v. State, 4 T. C. A., 322. If relator has no interest, court may refuse to allow the information to be filed, or dismiss it. Deaver v. State, ¿7 T. C. A., 453. Can not be used as a remedy by a stockholder of a corporation. State v. R. G. Ry., 41 T., 217. Quo warranto is a proper proceeding to try the undisclosed principal upon the contract. This principle is not changed by our statute. 'Rev. Stats., 1895, art. 4862; Sanger v. Warren, 91 T., 472. A contrary rule seems to be announced in Rutherford v. Montgomery, 14 T. C. A., 319, 323.
    
   TERRELL, Justice.

This cause being of similar character, turning upon the same points and governed by the same principles with that of Cayce v. Curtis, already decided, we refer to the opinion delivered in that case for the reasons upon which our decision is made.

We affirm the judgment of the District Court of Matagorda County, with all the costs accruing upon the appeal to this court.

Affirmed.