Case ID: f-appx_177/html/0290-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Reshawn PEAY, a/k/a Anthony Chante Peay, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 05-4852.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: March 31, 2006.
    Decided: April 19, 2006.
    James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, John H. Chun, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Stephen M. Schenning, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Reshawn Peay pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a weapon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000) and was given a fifteen-year minimum sentence because he was found to be an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1) (West Supp.2005). On appeal, Peay argues that the district court erred by sentencing him as an armed career criminal in violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Peay’s argument is foreclosed by two of our recent decisions. See United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282-84 (4th Cir.2005) (holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under § 924(e) regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 1463, — L.Ed.2d — (2006); United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir.) (holding that the armed career criminal designation, based on prior convictions, does not violate the Sixth Amendment under Booker), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S.Ct. 640, 163 L.Ed.2d 518 (2005).

Accordingly, we affirm Peay’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED