Case ID: ohio-st_95/html/0052-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The City of Cleveland, by etc., v. Davis, Mayor, et al.
    
      Constitutional law — Limitation of tax levies — Section 1259-1, General Code (106 O. L., 461) — ■Exempting interest and sinking fund levies — Bonds authorised to comply with orders of state ■ board of health — Section 1259, General Code — Section 26, Article II, Constitution.
    
    (No. 15414
    Decided October 13, 1916.)
    Error to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county.
    The city of Cleveland, by W. S. FitzGerald, its director of law, filed its petition in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county against the defendants in error, praying for an injunction against the issue and sale of bonds referred to in the petition.
    After setting out the incorporation of the city and the official positions of the defendants, the petition alleges that on or about July 22, 1912, the board of health of the state of Ohio made an order requiring the city of Cleveland to cease the pollution of Cuyahoga river, and to install such works or means for purifying or otherwise disposing of its sewage or other wastes now being discharged into said river, as will remove pollution from the river; that the order was made pursuant to Sections 1249 to 1261, General Code; that the order required the city to comply with its terms on or before July 1, 1915; that on July 12, 1915, the state board of health amended the order by extending to July 1, 1917, the time within which its order should be complied with; that at the general election held in the city of Cleveland, November 2, 1915, the question of levying a tax of one-quarter of one mill upon the taxable property of the city of Cleveland, in excess of the levies authorized by Sections 5649-2, 5649-3a and 5649-5&, General Code, for. the purpose of paying the interest upon and providing for a sinking fund for the redemption of bonds in the sum of $2,000,000, thereafter to be issued to comply with the order of the state board, was submitted to the qualified electors of the said city, at which election a majority of the voters voting at such election on the question voted in favor thereof; that on July 17, 1916, the council of the city duly passed an ordinance to issue bonds in the sum of $1,200,000 for the construction of sewage disposal plants and sewers leading thereto, to prevent the pollution of Cuyahoga river, and on the same date the council also passed an ordinance to issue bonds in the sum of $800,000'for the same general purpose; that both of the ordinances were passed by the council for the purpose of providing funds to enable the city to comply with the order of the state board; that both of said ordinances were duly approved by the mayor and published as required by law; that defendants are about to advertise said bonds for sale and to incur large expenses in the publication of said advertisements and will do so unless restrained by the court; and that the defendant mayor and defendant director of finance will sign and issue said bonds on the sale thereof.
    Plaintiff avers that the tax to be levied in accordance with the vote of the electors aforesaid will cause the combined maximum rate for all taxes levied in any one year hereafter in the city of Cleveland to exceed the 15 mills allowed by law, but that defendants are claiming a right and authority to issue said bonds, and provide the interest and sinking fund levies on account thereof, under the terms of an act of the general assembly passed May 27, 1915,106 Ohio Laws, 461 (Section 1259-1, General Code).
    Plaintiff says that the last-mentioned act is unconstitutional and void in that it is a law of general nature and has not uniform operation throughout the state of Ohio, and is, therefore, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the Constitution of Ohio; that the interest and sinking fund levies to provide for the payment of interest on and the redemption of bonds about to be issued, as aforesaid, are in excess of the amount provided by valid statutes of the state; and that the bonds so referred to cannot be lawful obligations of the city of Cleveland.
    A general demurrer filed by the defendants was sustained by,the court of common pleas and the petition dismissed. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals, and this proceeding is brought to reverse the judgments of the courts below.
    
      Mr. W. S. FitzGerald, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Mr. Ben B. Wickham, for defendants in error.
   By the Court.

The only question presented concerns the validity of this statute. The objection urged against it is that it is limited in its effect to bonds issued after June 1, 1915, in compliance with the orders of the state board of health issued and approved prior to June 1, 1915.

It is insisted that by this limitation the act violates the constitutional requirement of uniformity of operation. It would not be denied that the original statute, of which this is an amendment, was one of a general nature. It relates to the public health, and the provisions with reference to the duties of the state board of health apply throughout the state.

The authorities agree that a statute is general and uniform if it operates equally upon every person and locality within the circumstances covered by the act, and when a classification has a reasonable basis it is not invalid merely because it is not made with exactness. It is not necessary that the law should operate in every locality. It is sufficient if it operates equally in every locality where the conditions concerning which the legislation was enacted exist. It must be kept in mind that the legislation concerned the public health. There is nothing in the limitation contained in the amendment which confines its operation to any particular locality or localities, and nothing appears in the statute or the pleadings from which the inference can be drawn that it was intended to be so confined.

By the provisions of the law, the state board is entitled to issue mandatory orders requiring certain things to be done to prevent the spread of disease. The legislature will be presumed to have had this situation in mind when it passed the amendment, and to have had any essential facts before it which made it advisable to insert the limitation which it did. .

Where any doubt exists with reference to a method of classification by the legislature, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the legislation, if questioned. As stated by Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations (7 ed.), 257: “If evidence was required, it must be supposed that it was before the legislature when the act was passed; and if any special finding was required to warrant the passage of the particular act, it would seem that the passage of the act itself might be held equivalent to such finding.”

We have no disposition to relax in any degree the application of the principles declared by this court touching the enforcement of the constitutional requirement of uniformity in the operation of legislation, but there is not sufficient in the terms of this act to enable the court to say that it was the intention of the legislature to confine its operation to any particular locality or municipality and it is not alleged or shown that in fact or law it has such result.

The judgments will be affirmed.

Judgments affirmed.

Nichols, C. J., Johnson, Donahue, Newman, Jones and Matthias, JJ., concur.