Case ID: va_13/html/0651-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JUDGE TUCKER. JUDGE ROANE. JUDGE FLEMING.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Wingfield v. Crenshaw.
    Wednesday, November 9, 1808.
    Supersedeas — Who May Apply for.* — A supersedeas, toa judgment of a County Court granting leave to erect a mill, will not lie in behalf of a person, who may be interested, but whose name does not appear, as a party, in the record of the County Court.
    Same — Same.—Such person should make himself a party to the contest before the iinal decision in the County Court, and then it is competent for him to carry the case to a superior tribunal.
    Same — When Proper. — A supersedeas is the proper remedy, only where the error is apparent on the face of the proceedings, and where the person seeking to reverse the judgment is a party in the Court below.
    This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Richmond, reversing an order of the County Court of Hanover, by which leave was given to the appellant to erect a water grist-mill.
    Thomas Crenshaw presented a petition to the District Court of Richmond, stating that on the 25th of May, 1803, William Wingfield made application to the Court of Hanover County for leave to erect a gristmill, on the south branch of Pamunky river, which after the usual proceedings was granted, accordingly, at the August session of the said Court, in 1803; Charles Crenshaw, who owned the acre of land on which Wingfield wished to abut his dam, personally appearing in Court and consenting thereto. That the petitioner was materially interested in preventing such order, being the owner of an ancient mill lower down the stream, and had, long before the said Wingfield’s application, applied to the Court for leave to raise his dam ; which motion was not granted; not because it was deemed unreasonable, but because the Court were of opinion, that the mill having been erected before the year 1748, he might raise his dam without any order of Court. In consequence of this opinion, the petitioner had incurred great expense in raising the works of his mill, and was about to complete the same; but being advised that it was doubtful whether he ought not to obtain leave of the Court for that purpose, he again applied, on the 25th of May, 1803, being the same day on which Wingfield made his first application, but previous thereto. That the Deputy-Sheriff of the County, executed the inquest in Wing-field’s case; but could not be prevailed on to do it in the case of the petitioner, who was prepared to oppose the granting of leave to Wingfield to build his mill; but Charles Crenshaw, the person summoned to contest the building of the said mill, having consented thereto, leave was immediately given without the knowledge of the petitioner. That if the said Wing-field’s mill ^should be built, the water from the petitioner’s mill will flow back upon it, unless his dam should be lowered; that the machinery of his mill must be rendered useless; or that Wingfield ■will not be able to work his mill to advantage; and that, as the petitioner conceives himself entitled to a prior and preferable right, he ought not to be compelled to reduce his dam. The prayer of the petition was for a supersedeas, and a reversal of the order of Hanover County Court.
    The affidavits of Thomas Crenshaw and Joel Crenshaw were annexed to the petition, verifying, more in detail, the facts therein stated.
    A supersedeas and certiorari were awarded by the District Court, on the 3d of May, 1806; and on the return of the latter, the proceedings of the County Court were brought up, shewing the application of Wingfield, to erect his mill, and the consent of Charles Crenshaw to the order made in relation thereto. But in the proceedings for the erection of this mill, the name of Thomas Crenshaw nowhere appears. There were, however, filed in the cause, sundry papers which proved the application of Thomas Crenshaw, on the 25th of May, 1803, for leave to raise his dam, and the proceedings thereon; but neither the writ of ad quod damnum awarded at his instance, nor any inquest, was returned by the Sheriff; also copies of the proceedings in a suit, then depending in the County Court of Hanover, brought by William Wingfield, against Thomas Crenshaw, for having raised his dam so as to overflow the mill-seat of the plaintiff.
    The District Court reversed the order of the County Court, granting leave to Wing-'field to erect his mill; from which judgment an appeal was taken to this Court.
    Hay, for the appellant, contended that the supersedeas had been improperly awarded by the District Court, in this case, being to a person who was not a party or privy to the controversy. The act of Assembly clearly shews that the Legislature never contemplated the granting of a supersedeas *to any person but the party aggrieved by the judgment of the Court below.
    In England, the usual way of correcting the errors of inferior Courts, is by writ of error: appeals and writs of supersedeas are unknown there as practised under our laws: and in 2 Bac. Abr. Gwil. edit. 456, it is held that none but parties or privies can bring a writ of error. But if appeal, writ of error, and supersedeas, be all the same thing, under our laws, then Thomas Cren-shaw might have taken an appeal from the judgment of the County Court, if he had made himself a party ; and not having done so, he has no other remedy than that pointed out by'the 7th section of the mill-law,  by which a person injured may recover damages, toties quoties, for any injuries not foreseen by the Jury.
    In this case, Charles Crenshaw, the party to the record, consented to the erection of the mill. It would be attended with serious inconveniences, if any other person not a party should be permitted to interpose. Thus a person might be put to the expense of erecting a mill; and even against the consent of the only interested person, it might be rendered nugatory. If Thomas Crenshaw had a right to obtain a super-sedeas, any other citizen might do it, within the limitation allowed by law.
    A case may be supposed by the counsel on the other side, whether the Jury might find that the water would overflow the mansion-house, garden, &c. of another, (which is not authorised by law,) and still the Court might give leave to build the mill. In such a case, it may be asked,, what can be done? The answer is; the party injured should apply to the Court, and move to rescind the order, on the ground of a violation of the law; and if the Court refused to do it, an appeal might be taken. Or, he might apply to the Court of Chancery, as was done in the late case of Shepherd v. Austin; and the Chancellor would appoint commissioners to pull the dam down.
    *JSTone of the cases heretofore decided on the subject of mills, have any application to the case now before the Court. The case of Lee v. Turberville,  affords no argument to either party. The same objection was made in that case as in this; but the Court suspended their opinion on the point of law, till the evidence was gone through, and then decided, on the evidence, without entering into an inquiry as to the question of law. The next case, that of Mayo v. Clarke,  is still less entitled to consideration; it decides nothing. In the case originally depending in the County Court they were both parties.
    But the case of Sayre v. Grymes is a leading case, and decisive of the present question. The Court there decided that Grymes should not have a supersedeas, because he was not a party to the order which he sought to reverse.
    Wickham, for the appellee.
    There are two classes of cases which may be brought to this Court, by appeal, writ of error, and supersedeas. First. Actions at common law; in all which there are parties plaintiffs and defendants; and in which it is admitted, that an appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas, can only lie for a person who is a party. Another class depends on the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law, given by our own statutes, and of which the decisions in England furnish a prototype. These relate to mills, wills, roads and letters of administration. In all those cases any person, concerned in interest, thoug'h not a party to the first proceedings, may obtain an appeal, writ of error, or supersedeas. This is the general position laid down by the act of Assembly. In all such cases, too, no parties are named in the commencement of the proceedings: it is sufficient to make a party, for a person to come in at any time and shew his interest. Can there be any doubt, but that in England a person concerned in interest may appeal from a decision of the Ecclesiastical Court, though not a party in the first instance? So with respect to mills, roads, &c. there is no other criterion *than interest. On that point alone the decision of Sayre v. Grymes turned.
    
      Again, a man may erect a mill on his own land, and may not want an acre the property of another, condemned: still he must have an inquest, and no party would appear in opposition. The uniform practice of this country has been to consider every person as entitled to appeal, or to obtain a writ of error, or supersedeas, who had an interest in question concerning mills, wills, &c.
    It may be said, that a supersedeas will only lie where there is error apparent on the face of the record; and some plausibility is given to the argument by the consideration that an attorney must subscribe a petition, stating the error in the proceedings, and that the supersedeas may be granted or not, at the discretion of the Court or Judge. This mode of removing a cause by a substantive writ of supersedeas, is peculiar to the laws of our own country ; but it surely will not be said that it excludes other writs of error, authorised by common law. Suppose the plaintiff be dead before judgment; or any other error in fact shall have occurred; will it be said that a writ of error coram nobis, will not lie? The Court, or Judge may doubt the fact, but is there any thing more easy than to establish it, in the first instance, by affidavit?
    In looking into the authorities, we find that there are writs of error in fact, as well as law.  All the books lay it down that, in England, a writ of error is granted of course. A scire facias ad audiendum errores is awarded, and the parties plead. This is intended not only to satisfy the Judge but the party. There is nothing in our law which binds the party down to errors in law. The first law of Virginia on this subject is to be found in Purvis’s Collection, page 32, where nothing more was necessary than for the party to make it prooably appear that there was error; and on giving security he was entitled to the writ.
    In such cases as this, it is not necessary to spread the facts upon the record, because they are examinable in the ^appellate Court. On the same principle, a bill of exceptions will not lie; because the Judge is to decide upon the fact as well as the law.
    If the doctrine contended for on the other side be correct, how easy would it be for persons to combine, and erect a mill, to the injury of another person interested, but not a party before the Court, and who would be barred of all redress.
    But, it is said, a party' interested may have an action for damages. Cases may occur, in which no action would lie. Suppose two persons contending for a mill-seat, and one should slip into Court, and get permission from a third person to build. Eor what would an action lie? Would the person thus taken by surprise be entitled to an action, because the other was perferred by the Court? Even in cases where an action might be sustained, as for erecting a mill to the annoyance of the neighbourhood, a man may have his garden overflowed, the air poisoned, &c. and he is to wait the slow process of the Court for damages; when, perhaps, after a recovery, the defendant may not be able to pay a cent I
    The cases of Lee v. Turberville, Mayo v. Clarke, and Sayre v. Grymes, are relied upon as direct authorities in our favour. In Lee v. Turberville, it appears from the record that the name of one of the parties is not mentioned till after a judgment. Turberville never came into Court, till leave had been given to Bushrod to build his mill. An appeal was denied to Turberville on the ground of his being no party; but he obtained a supersedeas, and the first appearance of his interest was in the petition. The case of Mayo v. Clarke, was a super-sedeas to an order of the County Court appointing a surveyor of a road as an existing one. The parties had been in controversy, whether a road should be stopped or not; the Court, without making any decision on that question, appointed a surveyor. Mayo, not being able to find any order of Court establishing the road, changed his battery and applied to this Court for a supersedeas to an order of the County Court appointing a surveyor to a road which never did exist. The ^matter of error, in this case, must have arisen from the facts stated in the petition; for the record is silent as to the facts. The case of Sayre v. Grymes was decided, not on the ground that Grymes was no party but that he had no interest
    The interest of the appellee, in this case, as stated in the petition and supported by affidavits, is apparent. 1. The dam of Wingfield will overflow the road leading to Crenshaw’s mill. 2. Both the mills cannot exist; and the question is, who shall have the preference. This is to be decided upon a great variety of circumstances. Our order for an inquest was first in point of time, and the Court ought to have made no> decision till both inquests were returned. According to principle and practice both, we have a right to be heard.
    Tuesday, November 22. The Judges delivered their opinions.
    
      
      5upersedeas — Who May Apply for. — A supersedeas toa judgment of the county court will not lie in behalf of a person, who may be interested, when such x>erson’s name does not appear as a party in record of the county court. Wingfield v. Crenshaw, 3 Hen. & M. 245. Nor this proposition, the principal case is cited in the following-; foot-note, to Sayre v. G-rymes. 1 Hen. & M. 404; Triplett v. Jameson, 2 Munf. 243; French v. Com., 5 Leigh 518; Board of Sup. of Culpeper v. Gorrell, 20 Gratt. 519; Leigton v. Maury, 76 Va. 875; Ex parte Lester. 77 Va. 678; Conrad v. County of Lewis. 10 W. Va. 786; Williamson v. Hays, 25 W. Va. 616,618; Poteet v. County of Cabell, 30 W. Va. 81, 3 S. E. Rep. 111; County Court y. Armstrong, 34 W. Va. 232, 12 S. E. Rep. 490.
      See monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
    
    
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. p. 82.
    
    
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. p. 198.
    
    
      
       2 Waste 162.
    
    
      
       2 Call, 276.
    
    
      
       1 Hen. & Munf. 404.
    
    
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. p. 82, s. 54.
    
    
      
       2 Bac. Abr. Gwil. edit. 478, tit. Error, Let. (P.)
    
   JUDGE TUCKER.

Wingfield had obtained an order for erecting a mill; to which Crenshaw, upon a petition preferred to the Richmond District Court, obtained a writ of supersedeas; and the same was reversed by the District Court. Crenshaw’s name does not appear in any part of the record of' the proceedings of the County Court: and the sole question now before this Court is, whether the writ of supersedeas, was. rightly awarded by the District Court.

The District Court law expressly allows an appeal from the judgment or sentence of a County Court, in all contests, concerning mills;. — the SSth section of the act also allows a writ of error or super-sedeas, to a judgment of the County Court, where the same is of the value of ten pounds, or one thousand pounds of tobacco;. the party praying and obtaining the same, entering into bond with security, as the law directs.

By the common law a writ of error is grantable in all cases, ex debito justitiae, except in treason and felony; so resolved by ten Judges in Paty’s case, Our law limits the writ to such personal ao-tions, as are of the value *of ten pounds, leaving the right as at common law, in real and mixed actions. A supersedeas in England is more by an auxiliary process, and so it is in some instances in this country, as was said by the late President of this Court in the case of White v. Jones, But, in practice it seems to be a substitute for the writ of error of which there are few or no instances in Virginia, None but parties or privies to the record can maintain a writ of error, in general, though a reversioner, or remainder-man may in some cases.' The same rule seems applicable to the writ of supersedeas from the general analogy between them.

Appeals in civil cases are altogether unknown at common law. There is therefore not the same analogy between an appeal and a supersedeas, that there is between a writ of error and a supersedeas. The object of the appeal is indeed the correction of error, as well as it is the object of the writ of error; but the one being a mode of proceeding at common law, and the other by the civil law, or by statute, there exists not such a relation between them, as that the one may be regulated according to the mode to be observed in prosecuting the other. One of the most prominent differences between an appeal and a writ of error is, that the former must be prayed and allowed in the court, whose sentence or decree is sought to be corrected; unless where by some special provision in a statute, further time is allowed the party. The latter being a writ of right, and grantable ex debito justitise, may by the common law, be sued out without leave of the Court, unless barred by the statute of limitation. This distinction will be found to run through the cases which arise under our statutes allowing an appeal or writ of error. If in a common law case, the party prays an appeal in Court, but not being able to give security within the time required by law, he loses the benefit of his appeal; still he may have recourse to his writ of error or supersedeas: because the former is the common law remedy in all cases where it is not expressly taken away by statute; and the latter is in ordinary cases a substitute for it in this country, under the laws of the Commonwealth, *and the practice of Courts. But if, in a case not at common law, an appeal be allowed by the terms of a statute, and the appeal be prayed and refused, it would seem to me that the proper course would be to apply for a mandamus to the Court to allow the appeal; because, in such a case, no writ of error lies; or, if the appeal be not prayed at the time, that the party grieved may, upon application to a Superior Court of general jurisdiction at common law, (or to the Court of Chancery,) according to the nature of the case, obtain a writ of certiorari, according to the distinction taken by Lord Ch. J. Holt, in 1 Salk. 144, and 263, that wherever a new jurisdiction is created by act of Parlia-meni, and the Court or Judge that exercises this jurisdiction, acts as a Court of Record, according to the course of the common law, a writ of error lies on their judgments: but where they act in a summary method, or in a new course different from the common law, a writ of error does not lie, but a certiorari, In addition to this authority, which appears to me to be expressly in point, I shall beg leave to refer to 1 Lord Raym. 580, 1 Burr. 377, 2 Burr. 1040, 3 Burr. 1458, 4 Burr. 2244, 1 Black. Rep. 231, Cowper, 458, 7 Term Rep. 373, and 2 Saund. 101, a., as also, to what I have had occasion to say in this Court on a former occasion, in the case of Coopers v. Saunders, 1 Hen. & Munf. 420. Long’s case, cited by Lord Ch. J. Holt, 12 Mod. 390, deserves notice. He was found guilty of felony, in the Court of the City of Norwich, and burnt in the hand; and held a writ of error would not lie, because no judgment of attainder, but that it might be removed by certiorari; and so it was: and, for faults in the conviction, quashed, and the party restored to his goods and chattels. In the present case I do not mean to give any opinion whether the party obtaining the writ of supersedeas, would have obtained a certiorari, inasmuch as his name is not in the record; nor do I mean to point out any other remedy (though I think he certainly was not without a proper one) adapted to the nature of his case.

*But it is proper to consider this subject in relation to several cases which have occurred in this Court.

In the case of Lee v. Turberville, an appeal from the sentence of the County Court was prayed but refused. The District Court granted a supersedeas, and the objection to that mode of removing the cause was taken in this Court: it does not appear that any opinion was given by the Court upon that point; they reversed the judgment of the District Court, which they ought to have done, if the supersedeas was not properly awarded, according to the decision of this Court in Coopers v..Saunders ; but, instead of dismissing the writ of su-persedeas, as was done in the last mentioned case, as to the appeal, they affirmed the judgment of the County Court upon the evidence. This certainly appears very like an approbation of the conduct of the District Court in awarding the writ of super-sedeas; though it erred upon the merits.

In the case of Mayo v. Clarke, Mayo had petitioned the District Court of Richmond, for a writ of supersedeas to an order of Powhatan County Court for altering a road, which the District Court refused. Mr. Randolph moved for a mandamus to the District Court to compel them to grant the supersedeas. The Court informed him that a mandamus was not a proper remedy. I think it might have been added that this Court has no power to grant a writ of mandamus, that power being expressly reserved to the General Court. Rev. Code, 1 vol. c. 65, s. 4. Mr. Randolph then moved for a supersedeas, which was granted, and the judgment of the District Court reversed, November 18, 1803.

Another case, Noel v. Sale, was where an appeal had been prayed and allowed from the sentence of the County Court of Essex, to the District Court, where the same was affirmed. To that judgment Noel obtained a writ of supersedeas from this Court, and the judgment was affirmed here. All these cases are in principle expressly contrary to the conclusions which would seem inevitably to follow, from the distinction taken by Eord Ch. J. Holt, in the cases before cited, and uniformly acted upon in England, from ^whence our rules of jurisprudence in cases not provided for by statute are uniformly supposed to be borrowed. B'or in the first case, the writ of supersedeas was g'ranted to the judgment of a new Court not proceeding in that instance, according to the rules of the common law; and in the two last the same writs were awarded from this Court to the District Court. But this Court can only grant writs of error and super-sedeas upon the same principles as the District Courts can grant them to the Counts* Courts. Consequently, if the District Court could not award a supersedeas in a mill-case to the County Courts, neither could this Court to the District Court. After the case of Eee v. Turberville had been solemnly argued upon that very point, it seems difficult to suppose the Court did not recollect it, when the case of Noel v. Sale occurred, not four years after, and without any change of the Judges.

But a more apposite case to the present, may, I think, be found in 1 Hen. & Munf. Rep. 404. In that case Mr. Grymes had obtained a writ of supersedeas from the District Court of K. and Q. to an order of Middlesex Court, granting administration of the estate of P. E. Grymes, Esq. with the will annexed, to Mr. Sayre. Mr. Grymes’s name did not appear, in any part of the record’. So that it did not appear to this Court, that he was either a party, privy, or in any wise interested in the grant of administration : and for that reason, this Court was of opinion that the writ of su-persedeas should be quashed as improvidently granted. The two cases are perfectly alike upon this point. And therefore, without giving any opinion upon the general question, I am of opinion that the writ of supersedeas ought to be quashed as improvidently granted.

JUDGE ROANE.

Two questions occur in the case before us: 1st. Whether the ap-pellee is a party competent to obtain a su-persedeas in this case; and 2dly. Whether a supersedeas is a proper remedy, there being no error apparent on the record; whatever error may exist being dehors thereto, and arising out of the testimony upon which the judgment was ^'founded. As to the first question, it is provided that the “party” praying a supersedeas, shall petition the District Court, &c. This term party is far more specific than the word person used in the preceding section. The words of that section are, “where any person or persons, &c. shall think themselves aggrieved, &c. or where the contest shall be concerning mills, roads, &c. such person may enter an appeal from the judgment or sentence,” &c. Now this word person has been always construed to mean a person party to the contest or the judgment; and that construction is rendered more proper as to the case in question by the use of the word party: but the word “contest” puts it beyond controversy, that there can only be an appeal in the case of mills, &c. where there has been a contest; and that in favour of one of the parties to the controversy. On his ground the opinion of this Court went, in the case of Sayre v. Grymes, and in several other cases. In the case before us it was competent to any person interested in defeating the application for the mill, (and not those only who are returned by the inquisition as interested, ) to contest the motion in the Court below; which having done, he was thereby made competent to carry the case to a superior tribunal. I infer this because it is provided that if it appears by the inquest, or other evidence, that the mansion-house, &c. of any person will be taken from him, leave shall not be given; or if, all circumstances weighed, it be not deemed reasonable to give the leave, such leave shall be withheld; but this provision would be a dead letter, if those whose interests and situation enable them to know and exhibit the facts were not permitted to come forward and establish them.

The case before us (as made by the affidavits) exhibits a strong ground of objection to the mill in controversy; but, on this point, this case must stand or fall by the general principle; and, however competent it may be for a party obtaining leave to build a mill, to hold himself in readiness to defend his judgment against the attacks of those who are parties to the proceeding, it would be productive *of vast injury and inconvenience to hold him so liable in relation to, perhaps, hundreds of citizens, who may think themselves even slightly or collaterally interested. Such a construction would place the applicants for mills on a very uncertain footing; whereas a contrary construction would generally be productive of no inconvenience, as the proceedings in the case of mills are of public notoriety, and all persons interested have consequently an early opportunity to come forward and make known their objections; or, if this be not done, their action for damages for injuries is expressly reserved to them.

As to the 2d question, if the foregoing idea be correct, there is no absolute necessity for deciding it: but, as this subject has several times presented itself to the Court, it may be useful now to say something concerning it. I cannot find that this question has ever been decided by this Court. In the case of Eee v. Turberviile the point was (expressly) left undecided: and in Mayo v. Clarke, the Court said there were sufficient grounds, upon the record, for the District Court to award the writ of supersedeas. The case of Noel v. Sale exhibits no decision upon the subject, as that case was carried to the District Court by way of appeal, (and not supersedeas,) and this Court, on a supersedeas, affirmed the judgment of the District Court affirming that of the County Court, because non constat but that it appeared to the District Court, by the evidence properly introduced on the appeal, that there was irregularity or misconduct sufficient to warrant the judgment quashing the inquisition.

Taking up this, then, as an undecided question, the construction of the act in respect to writs of supersedeas, seems to be properly restricted by the requisition contained in it relative to the certificates of counsel; i. e. to errors apparent “in the proceedings.” With respect to these, the counsel learned in the law are competent to pass their judgment: but the act could never have meant to assign to them the function of weighing testimony, and estimating Credibility. This construction is also very reasonable. Where an appeal is taken, in such cases, and tried immediately, (as is the practice in the appellate Courts,) no injury can accrue to parties from the death or removal of witnesses: but, asa supersedeas may be had at any time within five years, it is evident that, if this remedy be construed to extend to cases involving testimony, the lapse of several years since the rendition of the judgment would produce great injuries arising from the causes aforesaid. I say nothing on the point whether a writ of error would lie in such case: while, on one hand, it would be equally liable to this last objection; on the other, there is no expression in any statute restricting it to errors apparent in the proceedings only.

According to this construction, the parties have at least one mode by which the whole testimony may be re-examined by the Superior Court: but, in such case, the appeal must be taken at once, and speedily decided; thereby steering clear of injuries arising from the loss of evidence: and, on the other hand, when a mode of appealing' is to be resorted to, after the lapse of several years, and, perhaps, after deaths of the adverse witnesses, it is just that the only permissible ground of exception should permanently appear in the record.

On this ground, therefore, (without giving any opinion as to the competency of a writ of error in point of fact in the present case,) X conclude that a supersedeas is a proper mode of appealing in cases only where, on the face of the record, it appears that the proceedings are erroneous.

JUDGE FLEMING.

It appearing that the appellant, William Wingfield, and Charles Crenshaw were the only parties before the County Court of Hanover, in the proceedings stated in the record, brought up by virtue of a certiorari issued from the Clerk’s office of the District Court of Richmond, by order of the said Court, in which the name of Thomas Crenshaw is not mentioned; it appears to me that a supersedeas *could not lie in his name, to the order of Hanover Court, giving Wingfield leave to build a mill according to the prayer of his petition. If the appellee is aggrieved by the order he may seek redress by another remedy.

I am therefore of opinion that the super-sedeas ought to be quashed, and the judgment of the District Court reversed. 
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. c. 63, s. 53.
     
      
       2 Salk. 504.
     
      
       1 wash. 118.
     
      
       2 wash. 163, Lee v. Turberville.
     
      
       2 Saund. 46, note 6.
     
      
       Greenwelt v. Burwell.
     
      
      e) Comyns Rep. 80, S. P.
     
      
      f) 3 Cro. or Cro. Bliz. 489.
     
      
       In the case of Doctor Greenville v. The College of Physicians.
     
      
       2 Wash. 162.
     
      
       2 Call, 27 6.
     
      
       1 Call, 495.
     
      
       Sayre v. G-rymes.
     
      
       Rev. Code, 1 vol. p. 82, s. 54.
     
      
       3 Call, 389.
     
      
       1 Call, 495.