Case ID: scl_42/html/0451-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JOHNSON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Thomas Sartor vs. B. McJunkin.
    The sheriff’s deed described the land with sufficient certainty by metes and bounds, but the entry of the levy was, as follows, “ Levied on the defendant’s land. May 9th, 1822 — Meld, that the entry of the levy was sufficiently certain.
    The Court might order the entry, if there were error in it, to be amended, according to the truth and justice of the case.
    The jury after they had agreed on their verdict, dispersed without permission of the Judge: — Meld, that the Judge might in his discretion receive and record the verdict.
    BEFORE EARLE, J., AT UNION, SPRING TERM, 1832.
    The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows :
    “This was an action of trespass to try titles. Both parties claimed under Major Joseph McJunkin, and it was admitted his title was perfect. The plaintiff claimed under a sheriff’s sale, by virtue of sundry executions against Major Joseph McJunkin as his property, purchased by Thomas Craven and conveyed to John Anderson, and by John Anderson to plaintiff. The sheriff’s deed to Craven is dated the 16th of March, 1824, for one thousand and ninety-three acres, recites the execution and describes the lands by metes and bounds which includes the same in dispute. The defendant claimed the land under a deed from Joseph McJunkin, Jr., to himself for one hundred and fifty acres, dated 16th October, 1824, and endeavored to establish a title in Joseph McJunkin, Jr., to the land in dispute, by a parol gift in 1809 or 1810, and actual and uninterrupted possession from that time forward. I have not the plat of re-survey before me, and shall find difficulty in making a satisfactory report. The land in dispute was fifty acres of the Landtrip Grant, which was for one hundred and fifty acres. It was conceded that the title of Joseph McJunkin, Jr., was good to xOne hundred acres of that tract under the gift and possession, and the question was whether his father, Major McJunkin, had given him the whole tract or only one hundred acres.— They were both sworn, and many other witnesses, the father insisting that he had given to his son the whole one hundred and fifty acres, and therefore, it did not belong to himself, and the son denying that he ever had any claim to it. The jury by their verdict decided against the title of Joseph McJunkin, Jr., and I thought correctly. If the land did not belong to him it formed part of the estate of Joseph McJunkin, Sen., and the questions raised are whether it was levied on and sold by the sheriff, and was there legal and competent evidence of such levy and sale ? The original executions were all lost, and of course there was no proof of the actual levy as entered and returned on them. The sheriff’s execution book was resorted to and the following entry read in evidence (made in several of the cases recited in the sheriff’s deed): “ Levied on the defendants land, May 9th, 1822,” and other entries to the same effect of a later date but prior to the sale.
    “Major McJunkin, at the time of the levy and sale, owned a large body of la.nd, as appears from the deed, composed of two or three adjoining tracts of which the Landtrip tract was one. The fifty acres, or that part in dispute, lies between the one hundred acres, admitted to belong to defendant, under the deed of Joseph McJunkin, Jr., and the tract on which Major McJunkin lived. His house and the appurtenances are on the adjoining tract, but his plantation on which he resided at the time of the levy and sale, extends over upon the Landtrip tract and includes a considerable portion of the fifty acres. — ■ The sheriff’s deed, as already stated, describes the land sold by metes and bounds which embrace the land in dispute; and it was proved that Major McJunkin was present when the deed was drawn, and assisted in the description, and afterwards under some arrangement with the purchaser at sheriff’s sale, by which he was permitted to sell the lands if he could, he offered for sale the fifty acres with tbe other lands. I thought it therefore sufficiently proved that the land in dispute was levied on and sold as the property of Major McJunkin.
    “ The jury, after the charge, had retired to their room and were in consultation when the Court withdrew without adjourning formally for dinner. I gave the jury no instructions on their retiring or when I left the court house. When I returned after an interval of an hour, I found the jury in their boxes ready to deliver their verdict. But it was objected by the defendant’s attorney, that the jury after agreeing on their verdict had dispersed. On inquiry of the jury I learned, that after they had agreed and left their room, some of the jury were under the necessity of withdrawing; that they had accordingly dispersed for a short time but had returned as soon as they could. I had the jury twice polled: first, they were asked severally if they had agreed on the verdict before they left their room and dispersed: they all replied that they had. The Verdict was then published and they were again severally asked if that was still their verdict, and they replied in the affirmative. I then ordered the verdict to be recorded. It was for the plaintiff.”
    The defendant appealed.
    
      Irby, for appellant.
    
      Thomson, contra.
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

JOHNSON, J.

VI do not understand that there is any want of certainty in the description of the land, in the deed made by the sheriff to the plaintiff; and the only question raised, as to the merits of the case, is whether the same degree of certainty was necessary to the entry of the levy, made in the sheriff’s books. These entries are usually copied from the sheriff’s return on the execution, and the object of them is to preserve a record of the manner in which the sheriff has discharged his duty; and whether the execution has or has not been satisfied ; and these objects are as fully attained by concise memoranda containing a general description of the thing levied on, the price and person to whom sold, as if they contained the most formal recital of the defendant’s title, and the precise distance and marks of the boundaries of the'land; and such is the general usage. The deed is the evidence of the contract, between the sheriff and the purchase!’, and it is enough if the lands are sufficiently described in that. If the sheriff take upon himself to sell lands or other property, not levied on, the sale would be void, and an inconsistency in the description of the land in the levy and the deed, might be evidence of that fact; but here, as I understand, the description in the levy is general, which is followed up by a particular description in the deed.— Thus one makes his bond to convey to another his lands in Black acre, and afterwards in pursuance of the bond, makes a deed in which the premises are described by metes and bounds: surely it would not be contended that the deed was void, because of the uncertainty of the description in the bond.

But there is a more conclusive view of this question. .It is not pretended that the land in dispute was not the land actually levied on, advertised and sold, and if there was any error in the entry, the Court would even now order it to be amended, according to the truth and justice of the case. See Sims vs. Campbell and Chambers, 1 McC. Ch. 53.

The propriety of keeping a jury together until they have rendered in their verdict, cannot be too strongly inculcated; but the object is to obtain an unbiased expression of their judgment ; and when, as in this case, it is obvious that their verdict was uninfluenced by any intervening cause, the Judge, in his discretion, was doubtless entitled to receive and record their verdict, although they had dispersed without his permission.— It is every day’s practice, to allow tbe jury to disperse before they render tbeir verdict, when it is necessary; and I cannot perceive tbe great difference in principle between tbis and that case. .

Motion dismissed.

HARPER, J., concurred.

O’Neall, J., having been of counsel in tbe case, gave no opinion.

Motion dismissed.