Case ID: mass_16/html/0023-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Parker, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Samuel B. Angel versus Arthur McLellan.
    When a minor leaves nis father’s house voluntarily, for the purpose of seeking his fortune in the world, or to avoid domestic discipline and restraint, the father is under no obligation to pay for his support.
    This was an action of assumpsit for money paid for sundry articles of clothing, and for board, furnished the defendant’s minor son in the West Indies.
    
    
      The action was tried upon the general issue, October term, 1818, before Thatcher, J. It ivas in evidence that the defendant’s son had been indicted in this Court for a felony, that a warrant had issued for his apprehension, and that he had absconded to avoid the same, had gone to the West Indies, and that upon his application to the plaintiff, to whom the defendant was known, the plaintiff made the advances, for which the present action was brought. The judge instructed the jury, that if they were satisfied that the articles furnished were necessaries to the son, in the circumstances in which he was found by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was ignorant of the circumstances under which the son was absent from his father, and a fugitive from justice, they should find, their verdict for the plaintiff; and a verdict being so returned, the defendant filed his exceptions to the said opinion of the judge.
    
      Ware, for the plaintiff.
    As a general proposition, it will not be denied that the father is bound to support his children during the period of legal infancy. We contend that the proposition is not only generally, but universally true, if the parent is of sufficient ability. This principle, which is founded in the law of nature, has received the sanction of repeated judicial decisions; and the humanity of our municipal law is shown in extending its [ * 29 ] care of infants * somewhat further than is required by the law of nature. If an infant have a fortune, which comes aliunde, the law will not allow even the interest of this to be applied to the maintenance of the infant; not even though it be specifically ordered by the benefactor to be so applied, provided the father is of sufficient ability to maintain his child . The principles here stated are distinctly recognized as law by Parsons, C. J., in the cases of Whipple vs. Dow 
       and Dawes, J., vs. Howard 
      .
    If the father neglect to fulfil this obligation, a third person, who furnishes necessaries to the infant, is deemed to have conferred an obligation on the delinquent parent, for which the law raises an implied promise on the part of the parent to pay . The general doctrine of the case last referred to is clearly recognized in the cases of Simpson vs. Robinson 
      , and Crantz vs. Gill 
      . These authorities afford an ample confirmation of the doctrine we support. It is for the defendant, then, to take this case out of the rule.
    Two exceptions are mentioned in the cases cited; one1 where the parent has supplied a fund for the support of an absent child, which is regularly applied to that use ; another where the necessaries supplied were to an unreasonable amount. The defendant’s case falls within neither exception.
    But it is argued that the defendant ought not to be charged, because the son was profligate, had absconded, and was a fugitive from justice. If this is a bar to the plaintiff’s recovery, it is incumbent on the defendant to prove it clearly and explicitly. This was not done. All that is in proof is, that a warrant was issued to apprehend the son for a felony, and that the officer returned a non est inventus. This does not prove that he absconded from his father’s protection. He might have left the country before the warrant issued; or he might have left it with the knowledge and consent of his father.
    *But admitting the fact, it is no defence to the action, [ *30 ] which is founded on the obligation of the parent to support his child; and this obligation is not destroyed by an offence committed by the child against the community. There is not a dictum in the books authorizing such conclusion.
    - The other point, that the son was a spendthrift, is too vague to admit of the precision of legal reasoning. If the articles supplied were to minister to his prodigality, it would be an answer. But it was never supposed that, because the son was a prodigal, the father was thereby exempted from the obligation of supporting him with necessaries; and if so, this case is clearly within that of Van Valkinburgh vs. Watson.
    
    
      Whitman and Potter, for the defendant.
    
      
      
        Com. Dig. Chancery, 3 R. 6, cites 1 Brown, 387.
    
    
      
       2 Mass. Rep. 415.
    
    
      
       4 Mass. Rep. 97.
    
    
      
       13 Johns. 480. Van Valkinburgh vs. Watson
      
    
    
      
       1 Esp. Rep. 17.
      
    
    
      
       2 Esp. Rep. 471.
    
   Parker, C. J.

The circumstances of the plaintiff’s claim arc so favorable in an equitable point of view, and the grounds of defence, as they appear in the report of the trial, so rigid and illiberal, that, if regret was to be indulged in the performance of duty, we should certainly feel no small portion of it on the present occasion. We have indeed looked diligently for principles and authorities, upon which the plaintiff’s case might be sustained, but without success. There being no express promise, the question is, whether the facts proved raise an implied promise against the defendant.

The defendant’s son had fallen into distress in a foreign country, to which he had fled to avoid the consequences of a crime committed in his native country. He was a minor and without property. The plaintiff, knowing his father to be a reputable merchant, paid his board, and supplied him with such things as were necessary for his condition, relying upon the honor and gratitude of the father to reimburse him. The liability of the father must depend altogether upon the principles of law, which govern the relation of parent and child. The father is obliged to support his children, while they remain part of his family. • * Perhaps if he fail to fur- [ * 31 ] nish them with clothing and food necessary to the support of life, any one who furnishes such necessaries may maintain an action against the father, upon the presumption of an assent on his part. Perhaps, also, if he cruelly and causelessly turn them out of doors, they would carry with them a credit on the father for the means of support; although it may be questioned whether, in such a case, the support of such children should not be provided for pursuant to the statute, requiring the kindred of poor persons within certain degrees to support them . But upon these points, the case before us does not require an opinion.

However this may be, we think it clear that, when a child leaves his parent’s house voluntarily, for the purpose of seeking his fortune in the world, or to avoid the discipline and restraint so necessary for the due regulation of families, he carries with him no credit; and the parent is under no obligation to pay for his support.

The case is still stronger against such a claim, when the child, having arrived at years of discretion, but not of manhood, shall have violated the laws and become a fugitive from justice. For necessaries a minor under such circumstances, in countries where the common law prevails, and probably in all civilized countries, is personally liable; and when his personal liability begins, it should seem that the liability of his parents would cease. An infant, when at home under the care of his father, and supported by him, is not liable even for necessaries. If he were, the father would be deprived of the right of exercising his discretion, as to the manner and degree of his support . It would seem a just inference from the principles of the decision referred to, that, when the authority of the parent is abjured, without any necessity occasioned by the parent, all obligation to provide for him has ceased, and that those who choose to supply him, do it at the peril of the child’s ability, or the parent’s willingness to indemnify them..

[ * 32 ] * There are undoubtedly some cases, in which the application of this doctrine may appear, harsh ; but an attention to the consequences of a different doctrine will be a sufficient vindication of the principle. Could a refractory or vicious son leave his father’s house, without being exposed to want, carrying with him a credit on his father wherever he might wander, the motive for submitting to authority might be materially impaired, and a great diminution of parental influence might ensue. One of the greatest restraints upon the bad passions and vicious propensities would i.e removed, if young persons should feel that they could flee their parents’ presence, without suffering in any of the essentials of life.

The law, therefore, has wisely left individual cases of generous interference, to depend upon the honor of those connected with the object of it, rather than place in the hands of thoughtless or ill-disposed youth their parent’s purse, to supply their wants with, whenever they should incline to deny his authority, and withdraw themselves from his government.

In the argument for the plaintiff, we see many reasons to regret that he has been obliged to resort to a suit for money, which he had a right to expect would have been returned to him, with gratitude for his well-intended advances. But the law cannot be bent to his case; and we are persuaded, that public policy, and a due regard to parental authority, will sufficiently justify the law .

New trial granted.

Note. After the foregoing decision was pronounced, it was understood that the defendant satisfied the plaintiff^ demand; and that he had resisted payment only to have the principle, which he considered an important one, judicially settled. 
      
      
        Stat. 1793, c. 59, § 3.
     
      
       2 W. Black. Rep. 1325
     
      
       [By the common, law, parents are bound to maintain their children during minority 1 Blake. Comm. 447. —Waltham vs. Sparkes, Ld. Ray. 41. —Reeves Dom. Rel. 282.—And by the statute of 43 Elizabeth, Ch. 2, the parents, it" of sufficient ability, are bound to maintain their children at any age, if such children be poor and impotent. Ld. Ray. 699. —Roach vs. Garoon, 1 Ves. 160. —The obligation of parents to maintain their children is imposed by the law of nature. Puff. Book 4, Ch. 11.—The same obligation is recognized by the civil law. Dig. Lib. 25, Tit. 3. —5 Voct. Lib. 25, Tit. 3. —By the Scotch law, a child is entitled to maintenance in his father’s house (1 Ersk. 6, § 56), or elsewhere if his father’s conduct endanger his safety, or if the father choose to give him separate maintenance. The amount above bare subsistence is at the father’s discretion. The mere name of a profession is not enough to satisfy the obligation ; but an occupation in the lower ranks of life is sufficient. The obligation is not limited to any age, but ceases with forisfamiliation, unless the child shall fall into indigence and want. Bell. 445. —Moule vs. Maule, l Wils, & Shaw, 266. —Woolley vs. Maidment, 6 Dow. 259. —2 Darling Prac. 461—484.—By the French code, “ Les époux contractent ensemble par le fait seul du manage l’obligation de nourrir, entretenir et ¿lever leurs enfans.’’ Cod. Civ. Lib. 1. Tit. 5. Ch. 5. Art. 203. “ Le pere ne doit pas des alimens ¡1 son fils hors de- la maison paternelle; 11 ne lui en doit pas du tout, si ce fils a appris un ¿tat dans l’exercice duquel 11 pent trouver sa subsistance. Lorsque des enfans en état de gagner leur vie quittent le domicile paternel centre la volonté du pére, celui-ci n’est pas tenu de leur fournir des alimens encore qu’ils offrent de justifier ne l’avoir quitt¿ que par suite de mauvais traitemens. L’obligation de fournir des alimens a fils cesse lorsqu’il est au pouvoir de celui-ci de s’en procurer par son travail et son in dustrie, on lorsque celui-ci a des revenus assez considerable pour suffire h son exist ence.” Code Civil, annotée par Sirey. Art. 203. n. 10.11.15.16. By the act of 1793, c. 59, § 3-, parents, if they be of sufficient ability, are liable to support their poor chil dren according to their ability.—Ed.]