Case ID: la-ann_19/html/0377-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Taliaferro, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 1204.
    Zenon Gremillon, Administrator, v. Cadet Crousillac, et al.
    Tbe act of the sovereign power of the nation abolishing slavery annulled all contracts made in rola» , tion to the traffio in slaves, and the Courts are without power to enforce them. * '
    The doctrine in the case of Wainwright, Administrator, v, Bridges, (ante page 234) reaffirmed.
    A PPEAL from the District Court, Parish of Pointe Coupée, Cooley, J,
    
      Lebeau & Beatty, for plaintiff and appellant.
    
      A. Provdsty, for defendant and appellee.
    
      Brief of Lebeau é Beatty, for-plaintiff and appellant.
    —This case presents but one question, namely: Were the slaves of Louisiana emancipated by the proclamation of- President Lincoln,'in January, 1863, or did they not ■in' the eye of the law, continue to be slaves until the last Louisiana-Convention in 1861, abolished slavery within our borders.
    -. It must be admitted, that if the proclamation of the President of the United States produced the effect contended for by the defendant, the subsequent action of Congress,'in its efforts to obtaiii the Constitutional majority of the States, in its opinion, necessary to abolition ; as also, the provision of our present State Constitution, tending to the same result, were supererogatory and delusive. Must we not rather conclude, that the proclamation was issued, as intended, to strike terror than to have any legal effect; and such, indeed, was the avowed intention of its author.
    We deny, then, the constitutional power of the President to abolish slavery in the different States of the Union. The act was an arbitrary one, and produced no legal effect on the status of the slave.
    In the argument of the lower Court this point is not conceded; was not strongly contested. The defendants mainly relied on the liberation of the slaves as effected by the first article of the constitution of 1861, by which they pretend they suffered eviction of the slaves for whom they gave the notes sued on.
    They contend, that by the terms -of the act of sale, with which the notes are identified, they had a special warranty against this very kind of eviction; and that, consequently, they are not bound to pay for property which has been wrested from them by the government.
    In reply to this, we say that the warranty in the act of sale is couched in the usual notarial phraseology; prolix and verbose as it is, it adds nothing to the warranty which the purchasers would have had under the law.
    
      Now, ever since there have been slaves in Louisian, it has been known that it was within the range of probabilities, that the slaves therein might-one clay bo freed; bnt who ever thought until now, that the vendors of slaves guaranteed against such an eventuality. The idea is preposterous: As vendors, we are not answerable for tho action of'the government; certainly not without a special warranty to that effect. The slaves we sold, ceased to bo the property of the vendees by no fault of ours; not that they had not belonged to us in full property; nob because' they were not legally slaves for life, but by an act, in which defendant, as one of the people of Louisiana, is supposed to have participated, to wit: the emancipation élausé in the present constitution.
    We then contend, that when the defendant gave his notes, he had a valuable consideration for them. That he was fully aware when he made the purchase, that the slaves he bought might become free by the events of the war which was raging; that he exacted no special guaranty on this account; that.uptó the moment O'f the liberation, in 186á, he was their master; that they weré lost to. him as property by vis major, for which', we aré fipt responsible; and, finally, that according tó the leading maximj re's peril dornino, he,- as their owner, at the moment they had ¿eaSód to exist as slaves, must bear the loss of their services in the same manner as if they had perished in an epidemic or earthquake.
    , Brief of Á, Provosty, for defendant and'appellee'.
    
    * The defenéó is, that the said negroés were warranted to defendant as slavei for life, and that ón or before .the s'aid sale; the Southern. States of this 'ijjniop,. including ..the' State, of Louisiana,'having rebelled against the authority of the (3-etíérál Ó-óver-tímCnt,. as a means of' repression, and. under the authority vested in him, the President of the United States had issued his .proclamation, declaring free all the slaves in the State ; and that since by the first article of the Constitution of the State, slavery was forever abolished throughout the State, thereby depriving respondent of all authority in, possession of, and title to said negroes sold as slaves; and that, therefore, the consideration for which said notes were given, has failed, etc.
    It is admitted by the parties that tho proclamations of the President of the United States, abolishing slavery, were issued before tho sale of said negroes to defendant, and that the notes sued on were given for negroes described in the act's of sale marked A and B.
    The Case was submitted to a jury, who returned a verdict for the defendant; and judgment was rendered accordingly.
    From the judgment, plaintiff has appealed.
    This case involves the following questions;
    1. Had the proclamations of President Lincoln the effect of abolishing slavery? or of so modifying the status of tho negro, as to render him an unfit object of commerce; or at all events of depriving in fact the defendant of the use and possession of the property, for which he had given tho notes sued on?
    2. If the said slaves became free only under the new Constitution of Louisiana, is not the defendant entitled to judgment under the clause of warranty?
    
      The defendant will rest the first question on the able charge given to the jury, by the Judge of the lower Court.
    It is clear, that the Southern States claiming the rights of belligerents, subjected themselves to all the consequences of that position, and exposed to all the chances of the conflict, their possessions and their property, and everything that could augment their strength, and enable them to prolong the contest; and it did not belong to them as belligerents,' to subject the acts of President Lincoln to the test of the Constitution and laws of the country; his proclamations, abolishing slavery, were therefore, so far as the Confederate States were concerned, tho acts of the United States, and had all the effect which power could produce; and being ratified by Congress; and since the cessation of hostilities, confirmed by the people of this State, in convention, have now the sanction of the law, and must be held to be binding.
    By said proclamations, therefore, the negroes sold as slaves became in fact free, and the obligations or notes of defendant given subsequently, were given without a cause, and can have no effect. C. C., Art. 1887, 1889, 1891; Toullier, vol. 6, p. 171, No. 167, No. 170.
    The second is equally fatal to plaintiff.
    The clause of warranty in the act of sale is ample: “ Lequel a par ees presentes, déclaré vendro, eéder transporter et abandonner des a présent, et pour toujours, avec garantie de tous troubles, dons, dettes, evictions, hvpothfeques, alienations et antees empéchements généralement quelconques et avec substitutions,” etc.
    It is admitted, that defendant has been evicted, therefore, he can refuse the payment of the price. C. C., 2535. ’ And he would recover the price if he had paid it, (0. C., 2481,) even if he knew of the issuing of the proclamation, and of its effect, (3d A. B., 327,) for the right of claiming the return of the price, after the eviction has taken place, exists in all cases, unless tho party evicted, knowing the danger of eviction, took the property without warranty, and at his'peril and risk. 5th A. K., 814; Troplong vente 480, 482, 483.
    Le vendeur est déehargé de tous dommages et intéréts, mais en restant débiteur du prix—lo. Quand il y a stipulation de non garantie; 2o. Quand l’acte de vente étant muet sur la garantie, l’acheteur comíais? ait' lors de la vente le danger de l’éviction. Marcadé, vol. 6, p. 259.
    As in this case there is an express stipulation of warranty, defendant is not only entitled to retain tho pricp, but might recover it with damages if he had paid.
   Taliaferro, J.

This action is predicated upon three several promissory notes, executed by the defendants in solido, in favor of the plaintiff, in his capacity of administrator. The notes are, dated 17th January, 1863, and made payable consecutively in one, two and three years after date, with eight per cent, interest, from their respective maturities, tho amount of each note being §2,336 66.

The defence is, a failure of consideration, the notes having been given for the price of slaves, which it is alleged have been emancipated by tho Government, and which, as property, have proved a total loss to the purchaser.

•The cáse was tried in the Court below by a jury, which found in favor of the defendant.

■Judgment was rendered accordingly, and the plain tiff prosecutes this appeal. ...

'It is argued, in behalf of the plaintiff, that ever since there have been slaves in Louisiana, it has been known that it was within the range of probabilities that the slaves therein might some day be freed, and that this eventuality was never warranted against by any vendor, and that the happening of such an event was at the risk of the buyer.

On the part of the defence, the question is raised to what extent did the proclamations of President Lincoln go in effecting emancipation, or at least in depriving the defendant of the use and possession of the property for which he had given the note sued on ? It is also noted, on the part of the defendant, that the proclamations adverted to were issued prior to the sale of the slaves in this case.

¥e do not consider it necessary to go into the consideration of these points. By the act of the sovereign power of the nation slavery was abolished; and that act, we have held, annuls contracts made in relation to the traffic in slaves, leaving the Courts without power to enforce contracts of that kind. See the recent decision in the case of Wainwright, Administrator, v. Bridges.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed, with costs in both Courts.

Justices Labauve and Ilsley dissenting.

For the reasons assigned in our dissenting opinion, in the case of Wainwright v. Bridges, lately decided, we dissent in this case.

John. H Ilsley, Associate Justice.

Zenon Labauve, Associate Justice.