Case ID: f-appx_509/html/0090-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Emmanuel ST. JEAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE GENERAL SERVICE CO., United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-544-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Jan. 30, 2013.
    Sandra D. Parker, Law Office of Sandra D. Parker, New York, N.Y., for Appellant.
    Daniel L. Schwartz, Day Pitney LLP, Stamford, C.T., for Appellees.
    Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, PETER W. HALL, DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Emmanuel St. Jean appeals from a judgment entered on January 11, 2012, granting summary judgment and dismissing the complaint in its entirety. By order issued on January 10, 2012, the district court granted summary judgment for defendants-appellees United Parcel Service General Service Co., and United Parcel Service Inc. (collectively “UPS”), dismissing plaintiffs claims of employment discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, state law, and the' New York City Human Rights Law (“City HRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107 & 8-130. The district court analyzed the City HRL claims under the same standards applicable to Title VII claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

St. Jean is correct that the district court erred to the extent it found that federal standards for recovery are applied in determining employment discrimination claims under the City HRL, and in failing to conduct an independent analysis under that law. “[I]t is beyond dispute that the City HRL now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all circumstances, an analysis that must be targeted to understanding and fulfilling what the statute characterizes as the City HRL’s uniquely broad and remedial purposes, which go beyond those of counterpart state or federal civil rights laws.” Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 92 A.D.3d 29, 34, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1st Dep’t 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 477-78, 922 N.Y.S.2d 244, 947 N.E.2d 135 (2011). In prior federal cases where a district court has dismissed a plaintiff’s City HRL claims “for the same reasons [as] the equivalent federal claims,” we have held that the City HRL, as amended in N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-130, prohibits “parallelism” or “equivalence” between the City HRL and federal law and that such employment discrimination claims are no longer “co-extensive with federal law” given that “claims under the City HRL must be given ‘an independent liberal construction.’ ” Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 277-79 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2009)); see also Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir.2010) (the same). Thus, the district court in this case clearly erred when it held in its order that St. Jean’s City HRL claims “are analyzed under the same standards as those for Title VII claims” and “because Defendants are entitled to summary judgment with respect to all of Plaintiffs claims under Title VII, [the City HRL] claim[] also must be dismissed.”

Although the district court erred in assuming the City HRL claims were coextensive with federal law and erred in dismissing them under a parallel to or equivalent of Title VII standard, summary judgment was nonetheless warranted because we may affirm the judgment below on any basis appearing in the record. Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776, 781 n. 6 (2d Cir.2010) (stating that this Court may affirm the judgment below on any basis apparent from the record).

With respect to the claim of racial discrimination, defendants’ evidence of having a legitimate need for a 15-minute-rule and its even application of that rule to employees of all races was sufficient to establish a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for plaintiffs one-day suspension, which was negotiated by plaintiffs Union and employer, and agreed upon by plaintiff. Given that plaintiff did not offer sufficient evidence in rebuttal to raise an issue of fact that defendants’ actions in this regard were false, contrived or pretextual, we affirm the judgment in favor of defendants. See Melman v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 A.D.3d 107, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27, 40-41 (1st Dep’t 2012); Bennett, 92 A.D.3d at 30-31, 936 N.Y.S.2d 112 (affirming summary judgment); Cuttler v. Fried, No. 10-civ-296, 2012 WL 1003511, at *8-*9, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41906, *25-*26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2012).

The claim of the retaliatory one-day suspension based on plaintiffs EEOC complaint, which failed to allege racial discrimination as a basis, was properly dismissed, as plaintiff failed to raise an issue that defendants’ showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory work policy was pretextual, and to raise an issue as to the causal connection between the suspension and complaint. Melman, 98 A.D.3d at 128-29, 131-32, 946 N.Y.S.2d 27; Williams v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d at 70-72, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27.

Plaintiffs hostile work environment claim was properly dismissed because plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact that the defendant failed to take remedial action. See Williams v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d at 62, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27; Williams v. City of New York, No. 11-3456-cv, 2012 U.S. Dist LEXIS 92197, *18-*20 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012).

Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.