Case ID: tex-crim_168/html/0348-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORRISON, Presiding Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rufus Alexander Lee v. State.
    No. 30,791.
    June 17, 1959.
    Motion for Rehearing Overruled October 14, 1959.
    
      C. O. McMillan, Stephenville, for appellant.
    
      
      Leon Douglas, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the state.
   MORRISON, Presiding Judge.

The offense is driving while intoxicated as a second offender; the punishment, six months in jail and a fine of §250.00.

The sole question presented for review is whether an indictment charging one with driving a pickup truck while intoxicated will be supported by the following proof: “Q. State whether or not you observed whether Mr. Lee was driving any kind of a motor vehicle? A. Yes, he was driving a yellow Dodge pick-up.”

We have concluded that we may take judicial knowledge of the fact that a Dodge pickup which is a motor vehicle is a pickup truck.

In Nichols v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 364, 242 S.W. 2d 396, we held that the term “automobile” was a “generic term which includes the motor vehicle commonly known as a ‘truck.’ ” By the same token, we have concluded that we should hold that when a question about a motor vehicle is answered in the affirmative by saying that the accused was driving a Dodge pickup such proof is sufficient to establish that it was a Dodge pickup truck which was in question.

Finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction and no reversible error appearing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.