Case ID: f-appx_529/html/0837-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Steven K. CASTELLO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal corporation; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-35027.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 9, 2013.
    Filed June 20, 2013.
    Gail M. Luhn, Seattle, WA, Sidney Charlotte Tribe, Talmadge/Fitzpatrick, Tu-kwila, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Amy Lowen, City of Seattle Law Department, Fritz E. Wollett, Seattle City Attorney’s Office, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: THOMAS and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and DEARIE, Senior District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Raymond J. Dearie, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Steven K. Castello appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Seattle and the Seattle Fire Department on his claims for retaliation against the exercise of his right to free speech under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Assuming without deciding that Castel-lo’s speech was on a matter of public concern, defendants have met their burden under Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), to show that their legitimate administrative interests outweighed Castello’s interest in this particular speech. Defendants have a legitimate interest in running the fire department efficiently without disruption or interference. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (“[T]he Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders efficient operation and to do so with dispatch.”). Their assessment that Castello’s survey caused disruption or, at a minimum, was potentially disruptive was reasonable, given the complaints they received from two of Cas-tello’s co-workers, both of whom had also complained just prior to the survey that one of them was being targeted by Castello. “When close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (“[Courts] have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption.”); Moran v. Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir.1998) (“[CJourts should not require government employers to demonstrate that an employee’s speech actually disrupted efficient office operation; rather, ‘reasonable predictions of disruption’ are sufficient.” (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673, 114 S.Ct. 1878)).

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, defendants have demonstrated under Pickering’s balancing test that their “interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of [their] responsibilities to the public” outweigh Castello’s speech. Con-nick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in granting defendants summary judgment.

For the same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castello’s motion for reconsideration.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
     
      
      . We do not consider defendants’ argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Castel-lo's conduct was motivated by personal animosity. We therefore grant defendants' motion to strike the appendix attached to the reply brief because it was not a part of the record before the district court.