Case ID: so2d_463/html/0237-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. BARFIELD, Judge, PER CURIAM. WENTWORTH, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Troy ROWLS, Petitioner, v. The Honorable John E. CRUSOE, As Acting Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida, Respondent.
    No. AX-184.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Aug. 22, 1984.
    On Rehearing Nov. 16, 1984.
    Armando Garcia, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
    Susan Thompson, of Boyd, Thompson & Williams, P.A., Tallahassee, for amicus curiae.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Kent A. Zaiser, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from proceeding in a child support enforcement action. Petitioner contends that respondent county judge does not have jurisdiction to hear the case because Administrative Order 84-7 is invalid. The order directs that certain child support enforcement proceedings “shall be brought before County Judges Richard L. Hood ... Charles D. McClure, Hal S. McClamma and John E. Crusoe ...” and provides that “[t]he County Judges shall enter such orders and directives for the enforcement of the orders of the Circuit Court ... which shall be deemed by the County Judges to be lawful and proper

Petitioner contends that the administrative order is not a valid assignment of county judges to the circuit court bench, as authorized by Article V, Section 2(b), Florida Constitution, and Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4). Article V, Section 2(b) provides:

[The chief justice] shall have the power to ... delegate to a chief judge of a judicial circuit the power to assign judges for duty in his respective circuit.

Rule 2.050(b)(4) provides in part:

The chief judge may assign any judge to temporary service for which the judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.

Petitioner contends that the administrative order does not assign county judges to the circuit court, but rather assigns a class of cases to the county court, and thus violates Article V, Section 6(b), Florida Constitution, which states that the jurisdiction of the county court shall be as provided by general law. Respondent and the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), which appeared as amicus curiae, contend that the administrative order is a valid assignment of the named county judges to the circuit court pursuant to Rule 2.050(b)(4). HRS contends that there is no difference in practical effect between the assigning of county court judges to hear circuit court cases and the assigning of circuit court cases to county judges.

Although perhaps not a model to be followed, we think that the administrative order, in effect, assigns the named county judges to serve as circuit judges in certain child support enforcement cases. Martinez v. Demers, 412 So.2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), cited by petitioner in support of his argument, is distinguishable. In that case, an administrative order was entered by the chief judge which provided that “all petitions for sanity inquisitions in misdemeanor cases shall be brought before the Criminal Administrator for determination.” The criminal administrator was a circuit court judge. The Second District held that the order was invalid, stating:

[W]e do not agree that Rule 2.050(b)(4) is authority for giving a portion of all misdemeanor cases (such as motions for sanity inquisitions) to a circuit judge. The rule contemplates assignment for “temporary service”. The administrative order does not assign a particular judge for a limited amount of time.

We find that the administrative order in the instant case does not contain the weaknesses of the administrative order under review in Martinez. In Martinez, the order was not considered a valid assignment of a circuit judge to the county court because: (1) the order did not assign any particular judge, and (2) the order was not for a limited period of time. These deficiencies do not exist in Administrative Order 84-7. The four specific county judges assigned to the circuit court are named, and the order is of limited duration; it automatically expires on September 1, 1984.

Petitioner argues that the order is not “temporary” because the assignments are for a six-month period. Petitioner asserts that the word “temporary” has meaning only when considered in relation to or in regard to a larger time. In relation to the “temporary” assignment of county judges to the circuit court, petitioner contends that the larger time period is the four-year term of office for county judges. He thus concludes that a six-month assignment cannot be temporary because it is equal to one-eighth of a county judge’s term. Further, petitioner suggests that this administrative order should be considered together with the prior administrative order, which assigned the same judges to act on the same type of cases, and the “temporary” assignment becomes a two-year assignment, one-half of a county judge’s term.

Although we agree with petitioner that an order of assignment could provide for a termination date and yet not be temporary, we believe that a six-month assignment falls within the term temporary as contemplated by Rule 2.050(b)(4). Further, because . there is nothing in the rule that prohibits successive orders of appointment, we do not think that the duration of prior assignments should be considered in determining whether the current assignment is temporary.

Therefore, we hold that Administrative Order 84-7 constitutes a valid assignment of the named county judges to the circuit court for the purposes mentioned, and we deny the petition for writ of prohibition. However,, we find that the issues presented by this petition are of great public importance, and therefore certify the following question:

Does Administrative Order 84-7 constitute a valid assignment of the named county judges to temporary service in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 2.050(b)(4), Fla.R.Jud.Admin.?

MILLS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.

BARFIELD, J., dissents with opinion.

APPENDIX

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 84-7

RE: Enforcement of Court-Ordered Child Support Cases

From the date of entry hereof, all hearings for enforcement of child support court orders, which have been entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida and which have directed support payments to be made to and through the Child Support Section of the Office of the Sheriff of Leon County, Florida, shall be brought before County Judges Richard L. Hood of Gadsden County, Florida, and Charles D. McClure, Hal S. McClamma and John E. Crusoe of Leon County, Florida. Said County Judges shall furnish to the Child Support Section the days and hours when they shall be available for such hearings, and the personnel of the Child Support Section shall schedule the cases before the several judges and shall give appropriate notice thereof. The County Judges shall enter such orders and directives for the enforcement of the orders of the Circuit Court concerning child support, which shall be deemed by the County Judges to be lawful and proper and which shall be enforced accordingly. This order shall supersede Administrative Order No. 82-12 on the effective date hereof and shall expire without further order of this court on September 1, 1984.

Done and ordered in chambers at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of February, 1984.

Ben C. Willis

BEN C. WILLIS, CHIEF JUDGE

cc: The Honorable Richard L. Hood

The Honorable Charles D. McClure

The Honorable Hal S. McClamma

The Honorable John E. Crusoe

The Honorable Dozier Allen

BARFIELD, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent. The administrative order is an abdication of circuit court jurisdiction over child support enforcement. It is not a temporary assignment of a county judge to a circuit court position, but a conferring of jurisdiction on the county court. It is not “temporary”. The six-month provision of the current order must be coupled with the record evidence of the previous year-and-a-half continuous assignment, which leads to the inescapable conclusion that this is nothing more than a circumvention of the rules and jurisdiction of the court.

The writ should issue. The county judges should be prohibited from proceeding under the invalid rule.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING GRANTED

PER CURIAM.

By way of a motion for rehearing, petitioner has brought to our attention the fact that Administrative Order 84-7, which was upheld in our original opinion, has been superseded by Administrative Order 84-20, a copy of which is attached as an appendix to this opinion. The new order is substantively identical to the two previous orders, although it adds an additional county court judge to the list of those authorized to enforce child support orders, and adds six months to the authorized time period. Since the substance of the new rule remains unchanged, we deem the pleadings in this cause amended, pursuant to Rule 9.040(d), Fla.R.App.P., to include a challenge to Administrative Order 84-20.

The promulgation of 84-20 has made evident the correctness of Judge Barfield’s dissent to the original opinion. By issuing successive orders, the provisions contained therein have been, and will be, in effect for two-and-a-half years if the most recent order is upheld. Thus, we now find that the orders are an abdication of circuit court jurisdiction over child support enforcement, not a temporary assignment of a county judge to a circuit court position. As such, the orders are an attempt to confer jurisdiction on the county courts over matters which they have no constitutional authority to decide. Therefore, the petition for writ of prohibition is granted and the county judges are prohibited from proceeding under order 84-20 which we find to be invalid. However, we certify the following question as being one of great public importance:

Does Administrative Order 84-20 constitute a valid assignment of the named county judges to temporary service in the circuit court pursuant to Rule 2.050(b)(4), Fla.R.Jud.Admin.

MILLS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.

WENTWORTH, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.

APPENDIX

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 84-20

IN RE: Enforcement of Court-Ordered Child Support Cases

From the date of entry hereof, all hearings for enforcement of child support court orders, which have been entered by the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit of Florida and which have directed support payments to be made to and through the Child Support Section of the Office of the Sheriff of Leon County, Florida, shall be brought before County Judges Richard L. Hood of Gadsden County, Florida, and Felix A. Johnston, Jr. of Jefferson County, Florida, and Charles D. McClure, Hal S. McClamma and John E. Crusoe of Leon County, Florida. Said County Judges shall furnish to the Child Support Section the days and hours when they shall be available for such hearings, and the personnel of the Child Support Section shall schedule the eases before the several judges and shall give appropriate notice thereof. The County Judges shall enter such orders and directives for the enforcement of the orders of the Circuit Court concerning child support, which shall be deemed by the County Judges to be lawful and proper and

which shall be enforced accordingly. This order shall supersede Administrative Order No. 84-7 effective September 1, 1984 and shall expire without further order of this court on February 28, 1985.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of August, 1984.

/s/ Ben C. Willis

BEN C. WILLIS,

CHIEF JUDGE

cc: The Honorable Richard L. Hood

The Honorable Felix A. Johnston, Jr.

The Honorable Charles D. McClure

The Honorable Hal S. McClamma

The Honorable John E. Crusoe

Sheriff of Leon County, Child Support Unit

Court Administrator

WENTWORTH, Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I agree with the decision to amend the pleadings to include a challenge to order 84-20. However, I would adhere to the original opinion particularly in that it (1) characterized the six month assignment as falling within the term “temporary” in Rule 3.050(b)(4), and (2) noted that there is nothing in the rule that prohibits successive orders of appointment. In my opinion, the promulgation of the new order should have no impact on our original holding. 
      
      . A copy of Administrative Order 84-7 is attached to this opinion as an appendix.