Case ID: f-appx_58/html/0047-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Carol L. ALDERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INMAR ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED; Carolina Coupon Clearing, Incorporated, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 02-1380.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Argued Jan. 23, 2003.
    Decided Feb. 27, 2003.
    ARGUED: David Christopher Pishko, Elliot Pishko Morgan, P.A., Winston Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Richard Lee Rainey, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees.
    Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and Morton I. GREENBERG, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Carol L. Alderman appeals from the district court’s order and judgment entered March 8, 2002, granting defendants Inmar Enterprises, Incorporated’s and Carolina Coupon Clearing, Incorporated’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Alderman’s complaint against defendants under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and under North Carolina state law for wrongful termination in violation of North Carolina public policy. Alderman v. Inmar Enter., Inc., 201 F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.N.C.2002). In addition, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over defendants’ counterclaim for conversion against Alderman which it thus dismissed without prejudice. We are not concerned, however, with the dismissal of the counterclaim as neither party appeals from that dismissal. We review the district court’s order de novo, see Higgins v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir.1988), and thus will affirm if we determine that there is no dispute as to any material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

After a careful review of this matter we are in agreement with the district court that defendants are entitled to summary judgment and we affirm essentially for the reasons the district court set forth. We emphasize only that even if Alderman satisfied the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), burden-shifting process to the extent that defendants were obliged to set forth legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment termination decision, she did not produce a basis for a court to conclude that defendants’ asserted reasons were pretextual. She cannot meet this burden simply by disagreeing with her employers’ assessment of her. As this court indicated in Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir.2000), “[W]e have repeatedly held that in a wrongful discharge action it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” (Internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.