Case ID: f-appx_386/html/0619-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ponciano Adonis RANGEL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 06-71829.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 29, 2010.
    
    Filed July 6, 2010.
    Frank P. Sprouls, Esquire, Law Office of Ricci and Sprouls, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
    Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Margaret Anne O’Donnell, Trial, Don George Scroggin, Esquire, Trial, Linda S. Wendtland, Esquire, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Ponciano Adonis Rangel, a native and citizen of the Philippines, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order summarily affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law, Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.2010), and we grant the petition for review.

Because Rangel’s plea and conviction were entered before the Attorney General issued Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, & R-S-R, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 276 (BIA 2002), the IJ improperly applied the presumption that drug trafficking offenses are particularly serious crimes. See Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 953 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, & R-S-R particularly serious crime presumption cannot be applied retroactively). In analyzing whether Rangel’s offense is a particularly serious crime, the IJ instead must apply the case-by-case analysis set out in Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), superseded by statute in part, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1991), as later modified by the BIA. See Anaya-Ortiz, 594 F.3d at 679-80 (discussing the Fren-tescu case-by-case analysis).

Contrary to the government’s contention, the IJ did not, in her decision, make an alternative finding that Rangel failed to establish the clear probability of persecution necessary to qualify for withholding of removal.

We remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (per curiam).

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.