Case ID: so2d_670/html/1168-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SHAHOOD, Judge. SPEISER, MARK A, Associate Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert GOELET, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 95-0764.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    April 3, 1996.
    John A Garcia of Vassallo, Garcia & Garcia, P.A, Lake Worth, for appellant.
    Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Aubin Wade Robinson, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   SHAHOOD, Judge.

The State of Florida charged Robert Goe-let, the appellant, by information with carrying a concealed firearm (CCF) in violation of section 790.01(2), Florida Statutes (1993). Goelet filed a timely motion to suppress tangible evidence seized from his automobile by the police, which the trial court denied. Appellant seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, alleging that he was denied his rights guaranteed him pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution. We affirm the ruling of the trial court.

Section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1991), customarily and statutorily referred to as “Florida Stop and Frisk Law,” provides in part as follows:

(2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.
(5) Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe that any person whom he has temporarily detained, or is about to detain temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat to the safety of the officer or any other person, he may search such person so temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized.

§ 901.151(2), (5), Fla.Stat. (1991).

This statute considered together with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), permits a law enforcement officer to conduct a protective search where the officer has an articulable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous and the officer has reason to believe that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. The United States Supreme Court extended Terry in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), to permit protective searches of the passenger compartment of an individual’s vehicle during a lawful investigatory stop provided that the search was reasonable under the principles set forth in Terry.

While subsection five of the “Florida Stop and Frisk Law” states that an officer must have “probable cause” before engaging in a “valid frisk,” the Florida Supreme Court has held that “what is required for a valid frisk is not probable cause but rather a reasonable belief on the part of the officer that a person temporarily detained is armed with a dangerous weapon.” State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla.1981).

In the instant case, we find that the officer had the requisite “reasonable belief’ that appellant was armed with a dangerous weapon; therefore, we hold that the search of appellant’s vehicle, was a valid and lawful protective search.

AFFIRMED.

POLEN, J., concurs.

SPEISER, MARK A, Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.

SPEISER, MARK A, Associate Judge

dissenting.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion. Although Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), extended a Terry protective search for weapons to the passenger compartment of a vehicle during a lawful investigatory stop based upon a “reasonable belief,” the circumstances below, including the sequential timing of the search and its purported justification, fail to sustain the action taken. See State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820 (Fla.1981).

Prior to the search of Goelet’s automobile, Officer Garcia patted Goelet’s person and found no weapons. By this time, Goelet had calmed down and fully cooperated with Garcia. Accordingly, the initial exigencies of the circumstances were no longer present. Thereafter, Garcia determined not to arrest or detain Goelet and allowed him to walk to his vehicle in order to leave the area. Therefore, there were no articulable suspicions that Goelet was armed that would have justified another pat down of his person or a search of his vehicle. See Shaw v. State, 611 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Premo v. State, 610 So.2d 72 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Thus, the only information available to Garcia that Goelet had a weapon was the bar owner’s statement that Goelet “probably” had a gun. However, the mere mention of a gun will not justify an otherwise impermissible stop or frisk. In the Interest of G.A.R., III, 387 So.2d 404, 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Moreover, Garcia’s own observations, prior to his decision to allow Goelet to leave, undermined rather than substantiated the credibility of the bar owner’s statement that Goelet might have a gun. Finally, the instant case does not present a situation wherein a limited protective search is permitted for an officer’s safety based upon furtive movements within a vehicle suggesting that a weapon is being secreted under a seat. Compare Morales v. State, 557 So.2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Hochstetler v. State, 400 So.2d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d 876 (Fla.1982). Accordingly, I find no legal justification for Garcia’s search of Goelet’s automobile. As such, I dissent. 
      
      . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).