Case ID: misc_46/html/0477-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Atwood Munnally, Appellant, v. The Board or Education of the City of New York, Respondent.
    (Supreme Court, Appellate Term,
    February, 1905.)
    New York city — Teacher of gymnastics in public school not an “officer” of the city—Appointment as attendance officer.
    A teacher of gymnastics in public schools of the city of New York, being a mere employee of the board of education, is not an officer of the city and therefore not disqualified from holding an appointment as attendance officer either Under the provision of the charter (section 1549) prohibiting the same person holding two city or county offices except as expressly provided by the charter, or under the provision (section 1533) forbidding city officers to become interested in the performance of a contract the expense, price or consideration-of which is payable from the city treasury.
    Arpead by the plaintiff from a judgment, rendered, in favor of the defendant in the Municipal Court of the city of New York, seventh district, borough of Manhattan.
    George H. D. Foster, for appellant.
    John J. Delany, corporation counsel (I. Townsend Burden, Jr., of counsel, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The position of teacher of gymnastics, which plaintiff’s assignor held at the time of his appointment as attendance officer, made him a mere employee of the hoard of education, and not an officer of the city (Steinson v. Board of Education, 165 N. Y. 431), and herein the ease at bar differs from McAdam v. Mayor, 36 Hun, 340, and Fitch v. Mayor, 40 id. 512. McAdam was a clerk of a bureau in the finance department and, therefore, directly within the language of section 59 of the Consolidation Act, and in the Bitch ease the learned justice writing the opinion is at much pains to demonstrate that the plaintiff was an officer and not merely an employee. If the plaintiff did not hold an office as teacher of gymnastics he did not fall within the prohibition of section 1549 of the Charter, which provides that “No person shall hold two city or county offices, except as expressly provided in this act.” For a like reason he is not one of those persons, who, by section 1533 of the Charter are forbidden to become interested in the performance of a contract, the expense, price, or consideration of which is payable from the city treasury, and, if he were, such a contract is not by the terms of the Charter made absolutely void, but only “ voidable at the option of the Comptroller ” (Matter of Clamp, 33 Misc. Rep. 250), who in the present case is not shown to have exercised such option. It is expressly stipulated that the duties and hours of the employment in the two positions do not conflict. No question arises as to the assignability of the claim because it is expressly stipulated that the defendant’s sole reason for withholding payment is the belief that the employment is prohibited by statute.

The judgment must he reversed, with costs, and as all the facts are stipulated there should be judgment absolute in favor of plaintiff, with costs.

Present: Scott, Giegerich and McCall, JJ.

Judgment reversed, and as all facts are stipulated there should he judgment absolute in favor of plaintiff, with costs: