Case ID: f-appx_437/html/0026-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

YONG XIU LIAN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2121-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 13, 2011.
    Lee Ratner, Michael Brown, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    
      Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; Judith R. O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Yong Xiu Lian, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a May 13, 2010, decision of the BIA denying her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. In re Yong Xiu Lian, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 13, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lian’s motion to reopen as untimely. See id. A motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C). There is no dispute that Lian’s motion to reopen, filed in August 2009, more than four years after the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of her asylum application, was untimely. See id.

Furthermore, the BIA did not err in concluding that Lian failed to submit material evidence of changed country conditions as required to warrant consideration of her untimely motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Lian argues that the 2007 U.S. Department of State Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions (“2007 Profile”) shows changed country conditions, pointing to the 2005 implementation of regulations in China which gave certain legal rights to registered religious groups, but not to unregistered religious groups. However, the 2007 Profile indicates that this regulation is not a change in China’s policy, stating while “[s]ome argue that the new regulations foster a more tolerant atmosphere ... others point out that the new regulations merely codify past practice.” In addition, although the 2007 Profile acknowledges China’s repression of unsanctioned churches, as the BIA found, similar conditions existed prior to Lian’s 2003 hearing, as reflected in evidence she submitted before the immigration judge (“IJ”).

Lian further argues that the BIA erred in discounting a village committee notice she submitted with her motion to reopen. However, the BIA did not err in according the village notice minimal weight because it was unsigned and unauthenticated. See Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2007); Matter of H-L-H-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 214-15 (B.I.A.2010). Lian argues that Qin Wen Zheng does not support the BIA’s decision not to credit the notice because, unlike the petitioner in that case, the IJ found her testimony credible. Contrary to Lian’s contention, however, the IJ did not find her credible, but rather found significant reasons to doubt her credibility before denying her claim on alternative grounds. Accordingly, the BIA reasonably found that Lian failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions, and did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).