Case ID: ohio-st_10/html/0443-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Robert Bluff v. The State of Ohio.
    Upon the trial on an indictment for having possession of spurious banknotes with guilty intent, it is not competent for the state to prove that appliances and material for the manufacture of spurious coin were found in the possession of the accused, in order to show his knowledge of the “counterfeit character” of the notes, his “control and use” of the same, or his “ criminal intent as to their use.” The extent of the rule, in such case, is to admit in evidence, for the above purposes, the fact of possession by the accused of other counterfeits similar in kind to those mentioned in the indictment.
    Error to the court of common pleas of Portage county.
    The plaintiff in error was convicted of having possession of .•spurious bank-notes, with guilty intent. At the trial the state was .permitted to prove that appliances and material for the manufacture of spurious coin were found in possession of the accused, in order to show his knowledge of the “ counterfeit character ” of the notes, “ his control and use ” of the same, and his “ criminal intent .as to the use of them.”
    
      Wolcott, attorney-general: This seems to go beyond the utmost vei’ge. No case (to my knowledge) has gone further than to admit in evidence, for this purpose, the possession of other counterfeits similar in hind. I can see no principle warranting the reception of this species of testimony, which would not equally justify the admission of general proof that the accused was an habitual dealer in spurious money. But this evidence was not limited to the purpose of merely showing the scienter. It was held competent for the purpose of proving that the spurious notes mentioned in the indictment were in the possession and control of the accused. This seems manifest error.
    
      J. L. & H. G. Banney, for plaintiff in error.
   By the Court.

We concur with the attorney-general. The judgment of the common pleas must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings.