Case ID: sw2d_7/html/0543-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "HAWKINS, J.\n     BATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SERNA v. STATE.
    (No. 11420.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 25, 1928.
    Rehearing Denied June 20, 1928.
    1. Criminal law &wkey;> 1092(14) — Objection to trial judge’s qualification on bill of exception must be authenticated by trial judge.
    Objection to trial judge’s qualification of bills of exception must be authenticated by trial judge, either over bis signature in connection with bill itself, or by separate bill, and objection to qualification, noted under such qualification, but not authenticated, is insufficient.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;662(6) — Permitting state to reproduce testimony of absent witness held not to deprive accused of right to be confronted by witnesses against him (Const, art. .1, § 10).
    Permitting reproduction by state of testimony of witness absent from state at time of trial did not violate Const, art. 1, § 10, guaranteeing that accused shall be confronted with witnesses against him.
    3. Criminal law &wkey;»547(3) — Absent witness’ testimony at examining trial, inadmissible because not certified as required by statute, could be reproduced by oral proof of stenographer after proper foundation (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 253, 750).
    Where testimony of absent state’s witness, taken at examining trial, was inadmissible, under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, arts. 253, 750, because stenographer’s notes thereof were not signed by witnesses, nor certified by magistrate, such testimony could be reproduced by permitting stenographer to read such testimony, after he stated under oath that he had taken the testimony in shorthand, and had correctly transcribed it, and that instrument from which he read was the exact testimony given.
    4. Criminal law <&wkey;547(2) — Notes of stenographer, stating under oath that evidence was correctly taken and transcribed, may be read In evidence, though stenographer has no present recollection thereof.
    Where shorthand notes have been taken by a stenographer, transcribed by him, and he under oath states that the evidence was correctly taken and transcribed, the testimony so taken may in a proper case be read in evidence, although the stenographer has no present or independent recollection of the evidence as originally given.
    5. Criminal law &wkey;>543(2) — Absence of state’s witness, imprisoned in federal penitentiary in another state, held “permanent,” as respects reproduction of his testimony (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 749).
    Absence of state’s witness, who at time of trial was confined in federal penitentiary in another state for one year and six months, five or six months of which had expired, was “permanent,” within decisions under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 749, providing that, before absent witness’ testimony may be used, it must be shown that he has removed beyond the limits of the state; “permanent,” as used by decisions in this connection, meaning the antithesis of “temporary” or “transient.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Permanency-Permanent.]
    6. Criminal law <&wkey;l 120(10) — Bill of exception to witness’ qualification as expert held insufficient, in not showing he was not qualified, or facts showing incompetency.
    Bill of exception complaining that witness was permitted to testify that deceased was shot in the back, and that bullet came out about an inch under the right nipple, without showing that witness was qualified to give such testimony, A eld insufficient, in absence of any certificate of fact that witness was not qualified, or of statement of facts disclosing his incompetency to speak on subject.
    7. Criminal law <&wkey;>l 120(3) — Bill of exception to refusal to permit defendant to answer witness on direct examination, not stating expected answer, held insufficient.
    Bill of exception to trial court’s refusal to permit defendant to answer question propounded to him by his attorney while being examined as a witness in his own behalf presents nothing for review, because of failure to state what answer was expected.
    8. Criminal law <&wkey;982 — Refusal to permit ap--plication for suspended sentence to be read to jury held not abuse of discretion, in absence of explanation why affidavit was not filed before trial (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 776).
    Trial court’s refusal to permit application for suspended sentence, filed after trial had commenced, to be read to the jury, or to submit the issue, will not be held to be abuse of discretion, in absence of anything in bill of exception showing why affidavit was not filed before beginning of trial, as required by Oode Or. Proc. 1925, art. 776.
    9. Homicide &wkey;>l69(l) — Refusal to permit proof that defendant’s father had been assassinated' and that assassin jiad never been apprehended held properly rejected in murder case.
    In prosecution for murder, refusal to permit defendant to prove that his father had never been at enmity with a certain family, and had killed a certain member thereof, for which he was convicted, and that thereafter his father had been assassinated, and no one had ever been arrested for such killing, and. that both defendant and his brother had been threatened with assassination, A eld not error, in absence of showing that deceased was related to or associated with any member of such family.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    10. Homicide <&wkey;158(I)— Rejection of testimony that accused asked witness if he heard deceased cursing, and answer thereto, held properly rejected.
    In prosecution for murder, evidence of defendant’s witness that defendant had asked witness if he heard deceased cursing, and witness’ answer thereto, A eld properly rejected.
    
      H. Criminal law <©=>449 (I) — Rejection of testimony that witness believed certain men desired to get defendant where they could have him shot held not error.
    In prosecution for murder, rejection of opinion testimony that,' from movements of group of men, it appeared to witness that they wanted to get defendant out where they could have him shot, held not error.
    12. Criminal law <&wkey;457 — Permitting witness, who saw defendant about hour after his arrest for ¡burder, to testify that he was drunk, held not error.
    In prosecution for murder, permitting witness, who saw accused about an hour after his arrest, to testify that defendant was drunk, held not error.
    13. Homicide <&wkey;l74(9) — Permitting testimony of statements by defense witness, immediately after shooting, out of defendant’s presence, held not error.
    In murder prosecution, permitting state to prove what defense witness stated, after shooting, out of defendant’s presence, held not error.
    14. Criminal law <&wkey;l 092(13)— Exceptions to trial court’s rulings are Ineffective, unless approved by trial court.
    Statement by defendant’s attorney that he had excepted to certain rulings of trial court have no force or effect before appellate court as an exception, unless fact that such exception was so taken was shown to have been approved by trial court.
    Appeal from Criminal District Court, Wil-lacy County; J. H. McLean, Judge.
    Francisco Serna was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    P. E. Dominy, of San Benito, and A. B. Crane, of Raymondville, for appellant.
    A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   HAWKINS, J.

Appellant was convicted for the murder of Hilario Moreno, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for 50 years.

The killing occurred at a dance given by one Jesus Serna. From the state’s evidence it is made to appear that the killing was inexcusable, and that it came about under the following circumstances: The custom seems to have been, at dances such as given on the night in question, for the men dancers to pay the party at whose house the dance was given 10 cents for each dance and to his female partner 5 cents. Jesus Serna testified that deceased, had in advance settled with him for the dances which he expected to engage in during the evening, and that he advised appellant, who was collecting for Jesus Serna, of this fact, and told him to collect from deceased only the 5 cents for his dancing partner. Some time during the evening a controversy came up between appellant and deceased, the former claiming that deceased owed him 40 cents. Deceased denied this, stating that he had settled or would settle with Jesus, whereupon appellant knocked deceased down, and as he was arising from the ground appellant drew his pistol and fired at deceased, who then turned and ran, and was shot in the back by appellant while he was retreating. This in substance is the state’s evidence, with the added proof that appellant was drunk at the time of the killing.

Appellant, through his own testimony and that of his witnesses, denied that he was intoxicated and presented his defense as follows: That deceased had been engaged in an effort during the progress of the dance to pick a fight with appellant, and had tried to induce him to leave the circle of light; had cursed him and threatened to kill him, and had said that he (appellant) would be killed as was his father; that when he undertook to collect from deceased for the dances he declined to pay, said he would settle with Jesus, and struck appellant on the back of the head; that, when deceased struck at him again, appellant grappled with him; that deceased drew a pistol, which appellant grabbed, and in the scuffle over the pistol several shots were fired; that the gun was discharged accidentallly during this scuffle; that appellant believed, if he did not take the pistol away from deceased, he would be shot with it.

Before discussing any questions of law we take note of the fact that many bills of exception found in the record bear the qualification of the trial judge. Immediately following the trial judge’s signature authenticating the bills, together with his qualification thereto, there appears a notation, over the signature of appellant’s attorney, stating that the court’s qualifications to the bills were objected to. Such objection is not in any way authenticated by the trial judge. We have held that objection to the qualification placed upon a bill by the trial judge cannot be brought forward as here attempted. The objection to the qualification must be authenticated by the trial judge, either over his signature, in connection with the bill itself or by a separatq bill. Nicholson v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 631, 298 S. W. 436. As presented in the record, the qualifications become part of the bills, and must be considered in connection therewith.

Bills of exception 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 31, and S3 all relate to objections urged by appellant to the reproduction by the state of the testimony of Raymond Teller, who was sheriff at the time of the homicide. It 'is impracticable to discuss these bills separately; as they relate to the same subject, they will be considered together. One objection urged to the receipt of this evidence was that it was in violation of section 10 of article-1 of tlie state Constitution, wliieli guarantees that accused shall be “confronted by the witnesses against him.” We think it profitless to reopen a discussion of the question raised by this objection. The effect of it is to ask this court to return to the doctrine announced in Cline v. State, 36 Tex: Cr. R. 320, 36 S. W. 1099, 37 S. W. 722, 61 Am. St. Rep. 850, and Kemper v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 138 S. W. 1025. From the beginning of Texas jurisprudence up to the time of the opinion in Cline’s Case it had been the holding of the court that under proper circumstances evidence of a witness could be reproduced. The holding to the contrary in Cline’s Case was overruled in Porch v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 8, 99 S. W. 1122, whereby return was had. to the doctrine which had 'obtained, originally. Thereafter Porch’s Case, on the point involved, was overruled in Kemper’s Case, which in turn was overruled by Robertson v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 216, 142 S. W. 533, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 440, thereby effecting once' again a return to the original doctrine announced in the early days of the Texas courts. One so desiring will find it interesting to review the cases mentioned, but this court has consistently followed Robertson’s Case, and we see no reason now to depart therefrom. (Many eases are collated under article 750, Vernon’s C. C. P., vol. 2.)

From the various bills of exception mentioned it is shown- that an examining trial of appellant was had, at which Teller was used as a "witness by the state. Upon that trial he was sworn by the magistrate, and appellant not only had the privilege of cross-examining him, but availed himself of it through his attorney. At the examining trial Mrs. Wiggins, who is shown to have been a competent stenographer, took shorthand notes of the questions asked and the answers given by the witnesses, including Teller, which shorthand notes she later transcribed. However, the testimony given on the examining trial was not signed by the witnesses, nor certified by the magistrate. Before the present trial Teller had been convicted in the federal court of some offense, and at the time of the trial was shown to be in the federal penitentiary in the state of Kansas. Upon the present trial the state placed Mrs. Wiggins upon the stand and proved by her that she had correctly taken (Shorthand notes of the evidence given by Teller at the examining trial, had correctly transcribed' them, and then had with her such transcription. Over many objections, interposed by appellant, she was permitted to read to the jury the evidence so given by Teller in the examining trial. Relating to the method of preserving the testimony given upon the examining trial, article 253, C. C. P., reads:

“The testimony of each witness shall be reduced to writing by or under the direction of the magistrate, and shall then be read over to the witness, or he may read it over himself. Such corrections shall-be made in the same as the witness may direct; and he shall then sign the same by affixing thereto his name or mark. All the testimony thus taken shall be certified to by the magistrate.”

Article 750 reads as follows:

“The. deposition of a witness taken before an examining court or a jury of inquest, and reduced to writing, and certified according to law, in cases where the defendant was present when such testimony was taken, and had the privilege afforded him of cross-examining the witness, may be read in- evidence as is provided in the preceding article for the reading in evidence of depositions.”

Among other objections urged to the reproduction of Teller’s evidence was that it had not been signed by the witness, and was not certified by the magistrate, as required by the articles quoted. The evidence given by the witness -at the examining trial could not have been received under articles 253 and 750, supra, because the formalities therein required had not been complied with. Unless we misapprehend the bills, it was not offered by the state under said articles. As w.e understand the statutes in question and the decisions thereunder, if the evidence of the witness had been reduced to writing, signed by the witness, and certified by the magistrate, a showing that these formalities had been complied with would authenticate the evidence in such way as would permit its introduction, upon laying the predicate that the witness had died or resided beyond the limits <5f the state. Where the evidence taken at the examining trial would not be admissible under the named statutes, because of irregularities, it has been held that such evidence may be reproduced by oral proof. Dunlap v. State, 9 Tex. App. 179, 35 Am. Rep. 736; Potts v. State, 26 Tex. App. 663, 14 S. W. 456; Stevens v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 167; Young v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. R. 257, 197 S. W. 479.

Evans v. State, 12 Tex. App. 370, does not present a contrary holding. It only announces the very correct rule that, whether the testimony is to be reproduced under the statute or by oral evidence, the same predicate is required- to be shown; that is, that the witness was dead or resided out of the state. Young’s Case, supra, is very similar to that found in the present record. In that case the assistant county attorney had taken down in writing the absent witness’ testimony, but it had not been signed by the witness nor certified by the magistrate, hence was not admissible under the statute. The assistant county attorney testified that he had taken the evidence correctly, but that to give the details he would have to read ttie written, statement, and was then permitted to read from the writing in his possession.

We find difficulty in drawing a distinction between what happened in that case and the one now under consideration. There would he little logic in holding that a witness who had heard Teller testify at the examining trial could reproduce his evidence by an oral statement of its substance, depending upon memory alone, yet exclude the reproduction, where a witness under oath said she had correctly taken the testimony in shorthand, had correctly transcribed it, and that the instrument from which she read was the exact testimony given. In principle the case is not unlike Gandy v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 334, 261 S. W. 145, where the jury had disagreed as to the evidence given by a certain witness. Article 678, C. C. P. (formerly article 755), reads as follows:

“If the jury disagree as to the statement of any witness, they may, upon applying to the court, have such witness recalled, and the judge shall direct him to repeat his testimony as to the point in dispute, and no other, and as nearly as he can in the language he used on the trial.”

In Gandy’s Case the witness had been excused after testifying, and therefore could not be recalled to restate his testimony. Over appellant’s objection the court directed the court reporter to read his shorthand notes of the witness’ testimony, both on direct and cross examination, upon the point regarding which the jury was in disagreement. In reviewing the matter this court said:

“ * * * Article 755, providing for the reproduction of the testimony of a witness by letting him repeat his former testimony, was enacted before the use of stenographers became general and before the court stenographer became an officer of the court. It is believed that the procedure followed was in substantial accord with article 755, C. C. P., supra. If, however, the procedure followed was not within the purview of the statute mentioned, it was within the inherent power of the cour.t to have the court reporter read, in the presence of the court, the appellant, and his counsel, the official record of the testimony in question. Moreover, there is no claim that in the stenographer’s reproduction of the testimony there was any inaccuracy or departure from the testimony of the witness given upon the stand, and which he would have given had he been called. Under the circumstances there is an absence of injury, and a reversal should not result from the action taken.”

Where shorthand notes have been taken by a stenographer, transcribed by him, and he under oath states that the evidence was correctly taken and transcribed, the testimony so taken may in a proper case be read in evidence, although the stenographer has no present or independent recollection of the evidence as originally given. 22 Corpus Juris, §§ 527,’ 530. The ruje has been applied in our own court, where accused’s evidence bn a former trial was proven against him oh a subsequent trial, Barber v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 142 S. W. 577; Cornelius v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 173, 112 S. W. 1060; Morawitz v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 366, 91 S. W. 227; Smith v. State [Tex. Cr. App.] 73 S. W. 401; also where the former evidence was introduced for impeachment purposes, Smith v. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 293, 131 S. W. 1081; Casey v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 392, 91 S. W. 496; likewise where a witness’ evidence on a former trial was reproduced in a subsequent trial by the stenographer who took his testimony, Arnwine v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 213, 114 S. W. 796; Roquemore v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 568, 129 S. W. 1120; Pace v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 27, 153 S. W. 132. We see no reason why the same rule should not apply where the state or the accused is undertaking to reproduce the testimony of the witness taken upon an examining trial, where the formalities of the statute were not complied with, and.therefore the evidence could not be reproduced under "article 750, C. C. P.

Another objection urged to the reproduction of Teller’s evidence was that his absence from the state was only temporary.' We glean from the record that Teller’s punishment had been assessed at confinement in the federal penitentiary for one year and six months; that he was at the time of the trial in the federal penitentiary in the state of Kansas, had been there some five or six months, and had about a year more to serve before the expiration of his sentence. His family lived in the county where the trial was had, and it may be assumed that Teller intended to return to Texas when released from prison. Appellant cites Whorton v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 152 S. W. 1082; Post v. State, 10 Tex. App. 579; Peddy v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 547, 21 S. W. 542; Anderson v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 621, 170 S. W. 142; Modello v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 291, 211 S. W. 944; Brent v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 546, 232 S. W. 845 — as supporting his proposition that, before former evidence of a witness who is out of the state may be reproduced, it is necessary that the predicate show his absence from the state to be “permanent.” Article 749, C. C. P., provides in substance that, before the evidence of an absent witness may be used, it must be shown that he has “removed beyond the limits of the state.” 22 Corpus Juris, § 519, states the rule which obtains in this state as follows:

“Some authorities consider that the absence of the witness must have a character of permanency, and a mere transient absence will not suffice. * * *”

We think, where our decisions use the word “permanent” removal or absence, it must be construed 'as the antithesis of “temporary” ■or “transient.” Such we understand to be the announcement in Brent’s Case, supra. If a witness should accept employment in another state for a definite term of two years, with the purpose of returning at the end of the two years, we think his absence would have a ■ character of “permanency” about it. So in the present case the removal of Teller, while involuntary on his part, had a very decided character of permanency for the duration of his absence. He could not return, however much he might desire to do so, and the fact that he intended to return to Texas when his sentence expired would, in our opinion, be no bar to the reproduction of his evidence.

In bill of exception number 16 appellant complains that in the reproduced evidence of the witness Teller he was permitted to testify that deceased was shot in the back, and that the bullet came out about an inch under the right nipple. The objection urged was that witness was not shown to be qualified to give such testimony. The objection mentioned appears in the bill as ground of objection only. There is an absence of any certificate of fact that the witness was not qualified, and no facts are stated in the bill from which incompetency of the witness to speak upon the subject appears. The bill is insufficient to present the objection urged. See cases collated under section 209, Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C., and note 40, art. 667, Vernon’s C. C. P., vol. 2. However, we note that, considering the testimony of the witness Teller as a whole, there seems to be no basis for the objection.

Bill of exception No. 22 brings forward complaint that the court refused to permit appellant to answer a question propounded to him by his attorney while being examined as a witness in his own behalf. The bill fails to advise us what answer was expected. Of course in such condition, the bill presents no matter for review.

Bill of exception 24 reflects the fact that, after the trial had commenced, appellant decided to file a request for suspended sentence; that affidavit for such purpose was prepared and filed, and complaint is lodged because the court would not permit the application to be read to the jury, nor submit the issue. We are not advised by the bill at what point in the trial the affidavit for suspended sentence was prepared, nor of any reason why it was not filed before the beginning of the trial, as required by article 776, C. C. P. See Trevinio v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. R. 439, 247 S. W. 872, and cases therein cited. Nothing appears in the bill which leads to the conclusion that the trial judge abused his discretion in declining consideration of the plea under the circumstances.

Appellant complains because he was not permitted to prove (bills 18 and 30) that his father had been at enmity with the Oav-azos family for years, had killed one Juan Cavazos, for which the father had been tried and convicted; that, while appeal was pending from such conviction, appellant’s father had been assassinated, and that no one had ever been arrested for such killing; and that both appellant and his brother had been threatened with assassination. From a qualification to one of these bills it appears that it did develop during the trial that appellant’s father had been assassinated and that the assassin had never been apprehended. We fail to see the relevancy of the evidence rejected. Moreno, the party killed by appellant, is not shown to have been related to or associated with any of the Cavazos family.

Bills of exception 10, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 have been examined together, with the qualifications of the court attached to some of them. In our opinion, none of them presents error, nor calls for an extended discussion.

We have carefully examined the charge given, the objections thereto, and the special charges, which were requested and refused. The objections to the charge are not tenable. The special charges pertinent under the evidence seem to have been fully covered in the main charge, which is admirable and appears to have protected appellant’s rights in all particulars.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

BATTIMORE, J.

Serious complaint is made of the fact that we listed various bills of exception as having been considered, but not deemed of merit, and therefore not discussed. We have again gone over each of Same, and are of opinion that we were correct. It would be of little aid to the profession for us to say, what has been often said, viz. that the district court has no power to compel witnesses in a criminal case, before taking the stand, to tell the attorneys what they are going to testify to. This is the complaint in bill of exceptions No. 10 so listed.

Bill No. 19 shows that the court rejected evidence of defense witness Salinas to the fact that appellant asked witness if he heard deceased cursing, but did not kpow who he was cursing, and to the answer of the witness that he guessed he was cursing Pan-cho. Bill No. 21 complains of the rejection of the opinion of a witness in substance that, from the movements of a group of men, it appeared to him they wanted to get appellant out'where they could have him shot. Bill No. 25 complains because a witness who'saw appellant, about an hour after his arrest, was allowed to testify that appellant was drunk. Bills Nos. 27 and 28 were in legal effect the same as bill No. 25. Bill No. 29 complains that by two witnesses the state was allowed to prove that defense witness Costly said, out of the presence of appellant, and after Costly came 'back to the scene of the shooting, “Where is the s-h of a b-h that went to get the officers ?” Bill No. SO complains of the overruling of the motion for new trial. We deem it unnecessary to analyze or further discuss any of these bills of exception. None of them present error.

It would seem plain that a statement made by appellant’s attorney, that he had excepted to this, that, or the other ruling of the trial court, could have no • force, .effect, or standing before this court as an exception, unless the fact that such exception was so taken, showed to have been approved by the court below. This is true of all exceptions to the qualification to appellant’s bills in this case.

> No error appearing, the motion for rehearing is overruled. 
      <&wkey;For other eases see same'topic and KEY-NÜMBER. in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     
      
      &wkey;For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes