Case ID: miss_12/html/0349-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Thachee", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Virgil A. Randal vs. The State.
    It is a settled principle of law, that if one lose his goods and another find them and convert them to Ms own use, not knowing the owner, it is not larceny. But if the latter knew the owner, or had the means of knowing Mm, it would be larceny.
    The laws of this state presume a negro, prima facie, to be a slave, arid make it the duty of every citizen who finds a slave at large, without a permit from his owner, to deliver him to the nearest justice of the peace for commitment. A runaway slave may, therefore, be the subject of larceny.
    R. was indicted for stealing a slave, the property of B. It was proved that the slave named in the indictment was the property of B. That he ran off, and was absent about five months, when he was found in the woods, up in a tree; that during the time of his absence, R. was seen travelling along the road with a slave which very much resembled the slave of B., and which the witness believed, though he was not sure, was the slave of B. Witness did not know the slave, and had only seen him once. R., when seen with the slave, was going in the direction of B.’s residence. The jury found R. guilty. He moved for a new trial, and the court overruled his motion. lie Id, that a new trial should have been granted ; that the evidence did not warrant a conviction, nor was it sufficient to put the accused on proof in explanation.
    This was an indictment found at the November term, 1844, of the circuit court of Jasper county, against Virgil A. Randal, for stealing a negro man named Sam, a slave for life, the property of William Bridges. The defendant plead not guilty. On the trial, William Bridges was called as a witness on the part of the state, and testified that the negro man Sam, named in the indictment, is his property, and a slave for life; that Sam ran away from his overseer in February or March, 1844, in the county of Jasper, and was absent about five months, when he caught him in the woods, up in a tree. Martin W alker, who was called by the state, testified, that some time in the month of June, 1844, he met Virgil A. Randal, the defendant, in the public road, seven or eight miles the other side of Raleigh, in Smith county, near the residence of Mrs. Campbell, about nine o’clock in the morning. He spoke to the defendant. When he met the defendant there was a negro with him riding a mule, and carrying a gun in his hand. The defendant was on foot. The negro passed on without stopping. From his general appearance witness believed that Sam, then in court, was the same negro, though he was not certain. He believed the negro had on a black hat and blue pantaloons, but was not sure. Could not say whether he wore a dress or frock coat, nor the color of it. ■ The negro was travelling openly in the public highway in the direction of Mr. William Bridges’ residence, from which he was then about twenty-seven miles distant. Witness never saw the negro before he met him on the road, nor afterwards but once, until he saw him in court. Another witness was introduced by the state, who proved that in June, 1844, the defendant came to his house after night, and brought with him a negro, but what negro the witness did not know. The negro stood out in the lane while the defendant came into the house. And when they started away the negro mounted a mule. Witness did not see the negro have a gun ; he did not know him, and could not say the defendant ever had Sam in his possession. Witness lives in Jasper county, about twenty-seven miles from Mrs. Campbell’s, and about fifteen miles from Mr. Bridges, the owner of Sam. This was all the evidence adduced. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant then moved for a new trial, because the verdict of the jury was against the law and evidence. The court overruled the motion for a new trial. And he then moved in arrest of judgment, which motion was also overruled. The court then gave judgment against the defendant, and sentenced him to ten years imprisonment in the penitentiary. To reverse which judgment the defendant has brought the case to this court by writ of error.
    
      Marshall and McDougald, for plaintiff in error.
   Mr. Justice Thachee

delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an indictment in Jasper county circuit court for the larceny of a slave.

The plaintiff here claims as error, that the court below refused a new trial, though the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction by the jury.

It is insisted that there is no evidence of the corpus delicti. The testimony of the owner of the slave, charged to have been stolen, shows that'the slave had run away from his possession, and after having been absent several months, was discovered and captured by him in the woods. ,

It is a settled principle of law that if one lose his goods, and another find them and convert them to his own use,,not knowing the owner, this is no larceny. But if the latter knew the owner, or had the means of knowing him, it would be larceny. 2 Leach, 952; 17 Wend. 460. The laws of this state presume a negro prima facie to be a Slave, and if a slave be found in the possession of one, other than his owner, and under suspicious circumstances, it will be sufficient evidence to compel that person to explain the circumstance of his possession. It is the duty of every good citizen, who finds a slave at large, without a permit from his owner, &c., to deliver him to the nearest justice of the peace, for commitment. A runaway slave, therefore, may be a subject of larceny.

In this case, however, neither of the two witnesses who testify to the fact of seeing the plaintiff in error in company with a negro, at a period during the absence of the runaway above-mentioned, speak positively as to the identity of that negro with the slave charged to have been stolen; and it also appeared that the accused, when thus seen, was travelling in the direction of the house of the owner of the slave. All the circumstances of the case, as described in the bill of exceptions, fail to make out a sufficient case for the state to warrant a conviction, or, indeed, to put the accused upon proof in explanation.

Our statute properly affixes an exemplary punishment to the offence of slave stealing; it may extend to the confinement of the'convicted in the penitentiary for the term of his life, and it therefore especially should remind us to require proof to a reasonable certainty that the party accused has been guilty of the offence charged.

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.