Case ID: so2d_590/html/0505-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "POLEN, Judge. ANSTEAD, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Oscar DURAND and Pablo Salgato, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    Nos. 90-0590, 90-0702.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Dec. 4, 1991.
    Daniel S. Carusi, Daniel S. Carusi, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Melvina Racey Flaherty, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   POLEN, Judge.

Appellants, along with a man named Rúales, went to the home of Alcides Cara-ballo, whom they all knew, although their purpose was in dispute. A serious brawl ensued at the victim’s house, and the appellants were charged with armed burglary and aggravated battery. After a jury trial, the appellants were convicted of the lesser included offense of trespass of a structure with a human being inside and found not guilty on the aggravated battery charges. The appellants were placed on probation and ordered to pay restitution to the victim for medical expenses. The appellants contested their judgments of conviction and their sentences, arguing that the trial court should have granted a judgment of acquittal and that there was no basis for the trial court’s orders of restitution. We disagree with the appellants and affirm the judgments of conviction and sentences.

First, we find no merit in the appellants’ arguments concerning the trial court’s denial of their motion for judgment of acquittal. Although the facts were very much in dispute, there was plenty of evidence presented by the state to overcome the appellants’ motion, especially when viewed in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla.1989).

The appellants argued that since they were only convicted of trespass of a dwelling with a human being inside, they cannot be held responsible for the victim’s medical expenses under the restitution statute, section 775.089, Florida Statutes (1989). We find that, under the facts of this case, there was a sufficient nexus between the crime for which the appellants were convicted and the damages to the victim. We rely on State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988), and Watson v. State, 579 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991,) in reaching our conclusion.

The judgments of conviction and sentences of the appellants are affirmed.

DOWNEY, J., concurs.

ANSTEAD, J., dissents in part with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Judge,

dissenting in part.

I disagree that appellants could properly be ordered to pay restitution for medical expenses related to the charge of aggravated battery for which they were acquitted. See State v. Williams, 520 So.2d 276 (Fla.1988) (restitution could not be ordered for injuries sustained in an accident where defendant was convicted only of leaving the scene of the accident). Here, appellants were actually acquitted of both aggravated battery and armed burglary. There is no basis in the record for concluding that the injuries involved were caused by a trespass to the structure, arguably a conviction based upon the jury’s assessment of appellants’ failure to leave the premises before the fighting began.

In Barkley v. State, 585 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the First District faced a similar situation and refused to allow restitution for damages caused by an offense for which the defendant was acquitted. In my opinion, the same sound logic should apply here. See also Small v. State, 587 So.2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).