Case ID: so2d_582/html/0649-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Joseph PILGRIM and Helen Pilgrim, his wife; Robert Addison and Pauline Addison, his wife; John L. Ayotte and Alberta Ayotte, his wife; Victor Baier and Ann T. Baier, his wife; Raymond Bailey and Helen Bailey, his wife; Rita Bannon; David Barnard and Jane Barnard, his wife; George Barry; Howard Beakman and Lena Beakman, his wife; Arthur Bennett and Jackie Bennett, his wife; Edith Berndt; Alice Besier; Walter Bishop and Agnes Bishop, his wife; Lyle Borgman and Ruth Borgman, his wife; Charles Brauer; Preston Brown and Mina Brown, his wife; Edford Campagna and Margaret Campagna, his wife; John Campagna and Evelyn Campagna, his wife; Ethel Campion; Luther Carl and Dorothy Carl, his wife; Ellen Cascadden; Stella Cates; Jean Charlotte; Lawrence Colgan and Mable Colgan, his wife; Genevieve Collins; Sally Conley; Norman Cummings and Gwen Cummings, his wife; Theodore Dahlke; Cliff Dashnaw; Claron Dashnaw and Dora Dashnaw, his wife; Louise Doney; Charlotte Downey; Lester Dowsett and Edith Dowsett, his wife; William Ebneter; Milton G. Eckman and Helen R. Eckman, his wife; Harry L. Epply and Miriam S. Epply, his wife; Henry Ford and Anna Ford, his wife; John Ganza; Peryle Grady; Erma Grose; Delphin Hamlin; Mark Hamlin and Audrey Hamlin, his wife; Everett Hammond and Opal Hammond, his wife; Marion Harris; John Hart and Ann Hart, his wife; Priscilla Hastings; Bertha Hickey; Elson Herrick and Katherine Herrick, his wife; Ester Hinman; Wesley Hunt and Frances Hunt, his wife; Helen Job; Howard Johnson and Mary Lou Johnson, his wife; Gerald Johnston; Benjamin Jones and Norma Jones, his wife; Tressa Jones; Bernard Kirkman and Betty Kirkman, his wife; Donald Landon and Myrlea Landon, his wife; William Lange and Bertie Lange, his wife; Frieda Lichenwald; Robert Luland and Agnes Luland, his wife; Albert Maass and Marie Maass, his wife; Mary Mandish; Marion MacDonald; James McCann and Marry A. McCann, his wife; Alfred McGuffey and Maxine McGuffey, his wife; Charles Millering; Charles Mullins and Sedalia Mullins, his wife; Franklin Myers and Marion Myers, his wife; Keith Norris and Gladys Norris, his wife; Gretchen Nuir and Inez Galbraith; Hubert Oldham and Nueva Oldham, his wife; Leila Osborne; Paul Oster and Mildred Oster, his wife; Wilfrid Owen; Wilfred E. Pasono; Clarence Payne and Maxine Payne, his wife; John Phaneuf and Mildred Phaneuf, his wife; Edward Poirier; Alice Proctor; Nellie Robe; Herbert Schultz; Arthur Schwartz; Merton Secor; Richard Sewell and Elva Sewell, his wife; Paul Shipman and Lois Shipman, his wife; Thomas Sloan and Loretta Sloan, his wife; Howard Small and Ruth Small, his wife; Robert Southern and Mary Southern, his wife; Wendell Spurgeon and Marsha Spurgeon, his wife; Jeanette Stevens; Richard Stevens and Joanne Stevens, his wife; Edward Strauss and Grace Strauss, his wife; Carlton Strieff and Barbara Strieff, his wife; Neal Sweatt and Betty Sweatt, his wife; Everett Townsend and Virginia Townsend, his wife; Theodore Twomey and Phyllis Twomey, his wife; Walter Underwood and Sherry Underwood, his wife; Margaret Weirich; Hazel Wene; Corine Wetherington; Marguerite Whitney; Dalton L. Wilkins; Lillian Wills; Mary Wood; Ruby Wynekoop; Barbara Zimmer; and Crescent Lake Mobile Homeowners Association, Inc., Appellants, v. CRESCENT LAKE MOBILE COLONY, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
    Nos. 90-01294, 90-02684.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    May 24, 1991.
    Rehearing Denied July 26, 1991.
    
      John T. Allen, Jr., and Christopher P. Jayson of John T. Allen, Jr., P.A., St. Pe-tersburg, for appellants.
    Michael S. Edenfield, Brandon, for appel-lee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this case, mobile home park tenants in the park owned and operated by the appel-lee appeal from orders of the trial court which (1) found that rental increases were not unconscionable; (2) found in favor of the appellee on the appellants’ claim for damages for the appellee’s violations of its statutory duties, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury; and (3) awarded attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the appellee. We reverse.

The appellants filed a two-count complaint alleging (1) rent increases above fair market rental value (FMV) which they claimed were unconscionable and (2) violations of the appellee’s statutory duty as defined in section 723.022, Florida Statutes (1989), to maintain the common areas and utility systems and to provide access to the facilities. Before the parties presented evidence on the issues in open court, the jury personally viewed the park to observe the allegedly deteriorated condition of the premises firsthand. At trial the jury heard evidence of the diminution of services. The jury then listened to expert testimony on what FMV for similar parks would be for the years in question. Under count one, the jury found fair market rental values for the lots in the park that were substantially lower than the rents actually charged. The differences between FMV as found by the jury and the higher rents actually charged for the years at issue ranged from a low of 15% to a high of 55% with the most recent year at 50% above FMV. Despite the jury’s finding of FMV, the trial court held as a matter of law that such increases were not unconscionable. The jury also determined that, under count two, the appellants suffered quantifiable damages as a result of the appellee’s violations of its statutory duties as set forth in section 723.022, Florida Statutes (1989). The trial court determined that these damages as found by the jury were grossly speculative and without factual or economic basis. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for the appellee on count one and judgment for the appellee notwithstanding the verdict of the jury on count two. In a separate order, the court awarded the appellee attorney’s fees and court costs.

We do not agree with the trial court that increases ranging from 15% to 55% above fair market value, coupled with deterioration of the premises and diminution of services, are not unconscionable as a matter of law. There are significant differences between the facts as found by the jury in this case, which we find were based on substantial competent evidence, and the circumstances of our recent case of Belcher v. Kier, 558 So.2d 1039 (Fla. 2d DCA), petition for review denied, 570 So.2d 1305 (Fla.1990). There we held that mobile home lot rental increases ranging from 6.6% to 15.9% above FMV with no evidence of decrease in amenities or services were not unconscionable as a matter of law. The facts of Belcher are materially different than those of the instant case. Unlike evidence of a premier park at issue in Belcher, at trial in the case before us, there was evidence before the jury of, among other things, cracked and gaping walls in the common buildings, unkempt premises and septic tanks overflowing to create cesspools in addition to locked-up recreational areas that needed 24-hours notice before use. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that the increases were unconscionable. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary finding of the trial court in its disposition of count one.

We must also reverse the judgment on count two which held that the damages as determined by the jury were too speculative and without factual or economic basis. Despite difficulty in assigning a numerical value to deterioration of common elements in the park and diminution of services and access, the jury viewed the park and had competent substantial evidence before it of such deterioration and diminution. Therefore, the values it assigned as damages should not have been set aside unless they “shocked the judicial conscience.” No such basis exists here.

We reverse and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants as to damages for the statutory violations and to fashion equitable relief for the unconscionable rents for the years in question guided by the criteria set out in section 723.033, Florida Statutes. As the appellee is no longer the prevailing party, the order awarding it fees and costs is also reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall award the appellants their fees and costs instead.

RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and CAMPBELL, JJ., concur.