Case ID: so2d_687/html/0004-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. B & C FOODS, INC., a Florida Corporation d/b/a McDonald’s #5117 and McDonald’s Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, n/k/a McDonald’s Corporation, Appellees/Cross-Appellants, and The City of Fort Lauderdale, a Municipality in the State of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 96-0159.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    Nov. 6, 1996.
    Rehearing and Clarification Granted Feb. 6, 1997.
    
      Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel, and Marianne A. Trussell, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, for appellant/cross-appellee.
    W. Craig Eakin of Forman, Krehl & Montgomery; and H. Collins Forman, Jr. of H. Collins Forman, Jr., P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee/Cross-Appellanb-B & C Foods, Inc.
    Edward L. Artau of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn, LLP, Boca Raton, for AppeUee/Cross-Appellant-McDonald’s Corporation.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm the declaratory judgment requiring the City of Fort Lauderdale to reeonvey the easement at issue to McDonald’s Corporation pursuant to section 255.22, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Even though McDonald’s is not the “grantor’s successor” within the meaning of section 255.22(5), it is still entitled to rely on subsection (3), which is made applicable by the last sentence of subsection (5). We hold that the language in the 1979 easement agreement that the easement was for “right of way purposes” was a “specified purpose or use” as contemplated by subsection (3). Fort Lauderdale neither used the easement for right of way purposes nor identified the proposed use of the easement in a comprehensive plan within ten years of the date of the conveyance. We construe a portion of subsection (3) to require the transferee municipality to identify a proposed use of transferred property in its own comprehensive plan. For this reason, the Department may not rely on Broward County’s comprehensive plan to avoid the application of subsection (3). We find no merit to the issues raised in the cross appeal.

AFFIRMED.

KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., and GERSTEN, CAROL R., Associate Judge, concur.