Case ID: tenn_22/html/0177-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Reese, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Greenway & Marshall vs. Cannon.
    The lien of a judgment upon land commences at the rendition of the judgment, and continues under the circumstances stated in the statute for twelve months, and attaches to all land possessed by the debtor at the time of judgment, or acquired so as to be sold within the twelve months.
    This action of ejectment was instituted in the circuit court of Monroe county on the 6th of May, 1840, by Cannon against Marshall for the recovery of lot No. 9, in the town of Madison-ville. Greenway was permitted to defend jointly with Marshall. It was submitted to a jury, Scott, judge, presiding, at the January term, 1842.
    
      It appeared that on the 26th day of December, 1837, - Cannon recovered a judgment in the circuit court of Monroe county for the sum of $112 62£ against defendant Marshall. A ft.fa. issued on this judgment on the 22d January, 1838, and came to the hands of the sheriff of Monroe county — that the lot in controversy was granted to the commissioners of Madi-sonville, and was by them conveyed by deed registered, to one Griffith, on the 2d day of April, 1838, for the sum of $350, that on the same day Griffith sold and conveyed the same by deed registered to Marshall for $350, and Marshall sold and conveyed it by deed registered acknowledging the receipt of $450 to Greenway. It also appeared that the lot was enclosed and had been held by Marshall from 1828 up to the date of his deed to Greenway as his own property. On the 28th day of April 1838, Henderson, sheriff, sold it as the property of Marshall, by virtue of the ft. fa. above mentioned, Marshall having' no personal property. Cannon, plaintiff, became the purchaser for the sum of $130, and the sheriff executed to him a deed therefor.
    Scott, judge, charged the jury that Marshall could not dispute the title of the plaintiff, acquired by his purchase at execution sale and that the title he acquired, was attached by Cannon’s lien. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants moved the court for a new trial. The motion was overruled and judgment rendered on the verdict, from which the defendants appealed in error.
    
      Jarnagin, for the plaintiffs in error.
    Cannon, for the defendant in error.
   Reese, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

Various grounds for the affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court have been insisted on in argument. We shall not go into the consideration of any of these except one, and that is that conceding that Marshall had not at the time of the levy such an interest in the land sued for as was by law subject to execution sale; yet having acquired the legal title by deed after the judgment and prior to the sale, the lien of the judgment attached eo instamli the conveyance passed to him, and his subsequent conveyance to Greenway was subject to that lien, and left Greenway in no better condition than Marshall in this suit, that a judgment is a lien on after acquired lands. We think this ground well taken.

The lien expressly given by the act of 1831 commences by the very terms of the statute from the rendition of the judgment and continues under the circumstances stated in the statute for twelve months, and attaches, we think, to all lands possessed by the debtor at the time of the judgment or acquired so as to be sold within the time limited by the statute. We see no reason why the limited lien given by our statute should not be held to extend to the after acquired lands as well as to those ownéd at the time of the judgment. This is so held under the New York statute and is a rule of the English common law, 4 Kent’s Com. 435-6, and as with us, the lien is of very short continuance, the reason is strengthened for giving to it all proper scope and operation as to the subject matter to which it shall be attached. Such lands are embraced by the words, and we think the policy of the statute. Upon this ground we affirm the judgment.