Case ID: f-appx_348/html/0431-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Carolyn B. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATLANTA INDEPENDENT PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, Atlanta Board of Education, Beverly L. Hall, individually and in her official capacity as Superintendent, Lisa R. Smith, individually and in her official capacity as School Principal, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-11094
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Sept. 14, 2009.
    
      Carolyn B. Jones, Atlanta, GA, pro se.
    Michael James Walker, Jarrard & Davis, LLP, Cumming, GA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Pro se plaintiff-appellant Carolyn B. Jones appeals the district court’s grant of defendants’ Atlanta Independent Public School District, Atlanta Board of Education, Beverly Hall, and Lisa Smith (collectively “Defendants”) motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

Jones, a 68-year-old female, was employed as a secretary, first with Anderson Park Elementary and then with Deerwood Academy Elementary. Between 2004 and 2006 there were various complaints from parents and co-workers regarding Jones’ behavior and unprofessional conduct. Jones received counseling and other disciplinary actions, and was placed on work improvement plans. When these actions failed to resolve the issues, Jones was notified that there would be a formal disciplinary hearing. Despite the notice, Jones failed to attend the hearing. Based on the recommendations of the hearing officer, the defendants terminated Jones on March 31, 2006. Following Jones’ termination, the secretary position at Deerwood Academy was filled by a younger female. Thereafter, Jones filed a complaint with the EEOC and the instant employment discrimination action in federal court, alleging age discrimination and a due process violation.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that (1) there was no direct evidence of discrimination; (2) the defendants proffered legitimate non-diseriminatory reasons for the termination, and Jones had failed to show these reasons were pretex-tual; (3) there could be no substantive due process claim for wrongful termination; and (4) the procedural due process claim failed because there was an adequate state remedy available. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Jones argues that (1) she had direct evidence of discrimination in the form of a statement from her supervisor that she “inherited old employees;” (2) she established a circumstantial case of discrimination because the defendants’s reasons for terminating her were pretextual; and (3) the hearing prior to her termination violated due process.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the record and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Fisher v. State Mut. Ins. Co., 290 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2002). We review constitutional issues de novo. Eagle Hasp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc., 561 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.2009).

After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm for the reasons given in the district court’s order dated February 3, 2009.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      . Jones claims that her absence was due to medical issues, but she did not request a postponement.
     
      
      . Jones also alleged claims for (1) a First Amendment violation, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing both of these claims, and because Jones does not challenge that dismissal on appeal, she has abandoned these claims. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2004).
     
      
      . The parties do not dispute that Jones established a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting analysis applicable to cases ixwolving circumstantial evidence. Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir.2002).