Case ID: monaghan_1/html/0056-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Uhlinger v. Kennedy.
    A deed by a father, for the consideration of natural love and affection and twenty dollars, conveying to his sons all bis estate, both real and personal, which he “ has or may have ” in or about a certain borough, will not include after-acquired property.
    
    Oct. 31, 1888.
    Error, No. 234, Oct. T. 1888, to O. P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., to review a judgment for plaintiff on a case stated at Jan. T. 1889, No. 75.
    The case stated agreed upon the following facts:
    On Sept. 8, 1859, John Dibel, by his certain indenture, under ■his hand and seal, duly acknowledged, a copy of winch is made a part of this case, conveyed to his sons, Wm. James Dibel and David Marshall Dibel, as follows : “All my estate, both real and personal, which I have or may have, in or about the borough of Tarentum, including lot No. 164 which was purchased from John Bell, in said boro’, . . . with all improvements which are or may be made on or about the aforesaid premises. And all my right, title, interest and property, claim or demand whatsoever, of, in and to the aforesaid property, etc., which, said instrument was recorded on February 10, 1866.
    On Sept. 29, 1861., Henry M. Brackenridge, Esq., by his deed of general warranty, duly acknowledged, granted and conveyed to John Dibel, plaintiff in this case, two certain lots of ground in Tarentum Borough, being lots Nos. 15 and 16 in Brackenridge plan of Tarentum Boro’ Extension, fronting on Brackenridge avenue and extending back two hundred and sixty-four feet to an alley. Said Deed was recorded Oct. 26, 1866, a copy of which is made a part of this case.
    On Oct. 1, 1888, John Dibel, by and through his trustee, Richard A. Kennedy, by articles of agreement, consented to sell to the defendant the said lots Nos. 15 and 16 described in last recited instrument, and to convey them in fee on or before Oct. 15 then next, in consideration of which said defendant agreed to pay said plaintiff the sum of fifteen hundred and fifty dollars on Oct. 15, 1888, and to secure which payment said defendant executed and delivered to said plaintiff his certain bond for the sum of fifteen hundred and fifty dollars. On Oct. 15, 1888, the plaintiff tendered' the defendant a deed for said lots and demanded the payment of said bond. The defendant refused to accept the deed and to pay the consideration money agreed upon, alleging as a reason therefor that the plaintiff, John Dibel, was not possessed of a title in fee simple to said lots; that the conveyance to ¥m. James and David Marshall Dibel, above recited, vested a title in fee simple to all real estate owned by plaintiff, John Dibel, whether acquired before or after the date of the first recited conveyance in the sons, ¥m. James and David M. Dibel.
    It is agreed by the parties that judgment is to be entered herein for the plaintiff for the sum of fifteen hundred and fifty dollars, with interest from October 15, 1888, and costs, if, upon the facts herein stated, the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff is seized of and can convey to defendant, his heirs and assigns, an estate in fee to the said lots of ground Nos. 15 and 16 above described; otherwise judgment to be entered for the defendant, with costs, either party reserving the right to sue out a writ of error.
    The opinion of the court was delivered by White, J.:
    “The conveyance by John Dibel to his sons, William James and David Marshall, of Sept. 8, 1859, does not cover after-acquired property. The conveyance was not for a substantial money consideration, but as a gift in consideration of natural love and affection, and the nominal sum of twenty dollars. The words are: ‘ For the natural affection which I boar my two sons, as well as for and in consideration of the sum of twenty dollars to me in hand paid by my two aforesaid sons, at or before the sealing of these presents, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have this day granted, bargained, assigned, transferred and set over, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over unto the said two sons, their executors, administrators or assigns, all my estate, both real and personal, which I have or may have, in or about the Borough of Tarentum, including lot No. 164, whicli was purchased from John Bell in said borough, with all my personal effects, with all interest due or to become due on the same, together with all improvements which are or may be made on or about the aforesaid premises, and all my right, title, interest and property, claim or demand whatsoever, of, in and to the aforesaid property and effects, and to have and to hold the aforesaid property and effects to themselves, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever.’
    “ There is no covenant of warranty or for future conveyance. The deed is simply a transfer of the grantor’s interest in all his real and personal estate in and about the borough of Tarentum. The expression ‘ which I have or may have ’ does not cover or include property which he might thereafter acquire. It properly refers to any doubtful or uncertain interest in the property then transferred, or which he might thereafter acquire in the same property.
    “A man cannot convey property which he does not own or have any interest in at the time. He may, for a valid consideration, covenant to convey certain property in which he has an expectancy, and be held liable on the covenant. In this case there is no such covenant.
    “ The principles and authorities on this subject are so fully discussed in the opinion of the supreme court in Bayler v. Com., 40 Pa. 37, that it is only necessary to refer to that case.
    [“And now, Oct. 20th, 1888, this case came on to be heard on the case stated, and therefore, upon consideration thereof, it is ordered and adjudged that judgment be entered on the case stated for the plaintiff against the defendant for fifteen hundred and fifty dollars, with interest thereon from Oct. 15th, 18S8, and costs of suit.”]
    
      The assignment of error specified the action of the court in entering judgment as above, quoting the decree as in brackets.
    
      Charles Uhlinger, for plaintiff in error.
    A mere possibility can be granted by release, devise or estoppel, and is directly assignable in equity and therefore at law in Pennsylvania. McClure v. McClure, 1 Phila. 119.
    Courts of equity will support assignments of things which have no present actual existence, but rest in possibility only; provided that agreements are fairly entered into, and it would not be against public policy to uphold them. Stover v. Egelsheimer, 46 Barb. 84.
    
      Richard A. Kennedy, for defendant in error.
    It is well settled that a mere possibility cannot be conveyed or released, and the reason given for it is that a release or conveyance supposes a. right in being. Bayler v. Com., 40 Pa. 42; Fullwood’s Case, 4 Rep. 66; Davis v. Hayden, 9 Mass. 519; Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johns. 261; Dart v. Dart, 9 Conn. 256; Washburn’s Real Property, 348.
    Jan. 7, 1889.
   Per Curiam,

The learned judge of the court below has, in his opinion, given us so clear a statement of the law governing this case as to render further comment on the proposition involved in it unnecessary.

Judgment affirmed. W. M. S., Jr.