Case ID: f-appx_444/html/0380-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra Lorena ARANGO, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 11-10480
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Oct. 13, 2011.
    
      Anne R. Schultz, Madeleine R. Shirley, John D. Couriel, Wifredo A. Ferrer, U.S. Attorney, Kathleen M. Salyer, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.
    Beatriz Galbe Bronis, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Aimee Ferrer, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, Patrick Michael Hunt, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before PRYOR, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Sandra Lorena Arango appeals her convictions for importing and conspiring to import cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963, and her sentence of 45 months of imprisonment. Arango challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the reasonableness of her sentence. We affirm.

Arango argues that the United States failed to prove that she knowingly imported cocaine into the United States, but ample evidence supports her convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to the United States, the evidence presented at trial “ ‘evidenced] a consciousness of guilt’ ” by Arango. United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719, 721 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Stanley, 24 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir.1994)). When a customs officer at the Miami International Airport questioned Arango and her former mother-in-law, Deisy Marrero, Arango spoke only when spoken to, appeared uncomfortable, avoided eye contact with the officer, and attempted to hide behind Mar-rero. See United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 978 (11th Cir.2008). Later, when another customs officer asked Arango to remove her sneakers, Arango hesitated, hung her head, and exhaled loudly before complying with the instruction. The sneakers were oddly stiff, heavy, noticeably newer than Arango’s clothes, and identical to those worn by Marrero. When examined by hand, the sneakers expelled a white, powdery substance that tested positive for the presence of cocaine, and an x-ray examination revealed that a package of cocaine had been concealed in the heel of each shoe. When a customs officer asked Arango about the cocaine, she stared at the floor and later cried. Although Marre-ro testified that Arango innocently had accompanied Marrero to Ecuador to visit the daughter of Arango’s former husband, the jury reasonably discredited Marrero’s testimony as implausible. See United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 829 (11th Cir.2006). Marrero testified that she paid for the airline tickets and hotel using $2,500 that she won gambling with $60 at a casino, but Marrero had told a customs officer that Arango’s former husband bought the tickets. Marrero also testified incredibly that she met with her granddaughter only once and later, while sightseeing, she agreed, without Arango’s knowledge, to transport cocaine for a taxi driver. The jury reasonably could infer that Marrero would not have trusted Aran-go to smuggle 367 grams of cocaine into the United States without her knowledge. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d at 722.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Arango to a term of imprisonment within the advisory guidelines range. Arango argues that her sentence did not account for her “compelling mitigating circumstances,” but the district court weighed the seriousness of Arango’s offenses against her lack of criminal history, her reputation as a “kind and generous person,” and her “minimal amount of education.” The district court considered the sentencing factors and reasonably determined that a term of 45 months of imprisonment would adequately punish Arango, “reflect the seriousness of [her] offense,” “promote respect for the law,” and “afford adequate deterrence not only to [her], but to other Defendants who [might] be considering the importation of cocaine.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Arango’s sentence is reasonable.

We AFFIRM Arango’s convictions and sentence.