Case ID: f_185/html/0263-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re CURRIE et al. In re AUSTIN.
    (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    February 14, 1911.)
    No. 138.
    3. Bankruptcy (§ 143) — Assets—Stock Exchange Seat.
    Though a bankrupt’s seat in the New York Stock Exchange is property or assets passing to his trustee, it cannot become available until claims of other members of the association have been passed on by the sole tribunal entitled to do so according to the laws and rules of the exchange, under the rule that, where a person joins an organization his contractual engagements arising therefrom are binding on all those successors in interest who claim by, through, or under him.
    TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 143.*]
    2. Exchanges (SS 7*)— Claims — Presentation—'Injunction.
    Where a member of the New York Stock Exchange lias become a bankrupt, persons,having claims against him may be precluded by their own acts or omissions from submitting such claims'to the exchange committee on admissions, pursuant to its constitution and' by-laws, for allowance against the proceeds of the member’s seat, and may be enjoined from so doing by a court of competent jurisdiction having power over the person of the claimants.
    (Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Exchanges, Dec. Dig. § 7.*|
    3. Bankruptcy (§ 136*) — Ciaims—Securities—Stock Exchange Seat.
    Where bankruptcy proceedings were instituted in Michigan against a member of the Now York Stock Exchange, and the bankrupt was indebted to II. & Co. in an amount secured by pledged collaterals, IL & Co. were entitled to propound their demand to as much of the collateral as they could secure, and also to proceed concurrently before the Stock Exchange committee on admissions to subject the value of the bankrupt’s Slock Exchange seat to the payment of the debt, so that, in the absence of proof that either fund would be sufficient to satisfy the debt, the trustee could not compel payment of the amount received from the sale of such seat to him.
    |Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dee. Dig. § 136.*]
    Petition to Review Order of and Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.
    In the matter of bankruptcy proceedings of Cameron Currie and others, composing the firm of Cameron Currie & Co. On petition of Frederick G. Austin, trustee in bankruptcy, in proceedings in the Eastern district of Michigan to compel the New York Stock Exchange to pay over to him as trustee the proceeds of the sale of the Stock Exchange seat of Cameron Currie. An order was entered denying the motion, and the trustee appealed, and also filed a-petition to review.
    Affirmed, on the opinion of the trial judge, which is as follows:
    The proposition that a bankrupt’s seat in the New York Stock Exchange is property or assets passing to his trustee may be admitted. I think it must he admitted, but am unable to perceive how it advances the petitioner’s case. A seat in this Stock Exchange is property of such a nature that it can never become available to the assignee, legal representative, receiver or trustee of a Stock Exchange member, until the claims of other members of this unincorporated association have been settled by the sole tribunal entitled to pass upon the same according to the laws of the exchange, which are no more than the contractual engagements entered into by every person joining the organization, and therefore binding upon all those successors in interest who claim by, through, or under a Stock Exchange member.
    It is true that persons having claims against a member or ex-member of the exchange who might submit the, same to the Stock Exchange committee on admissions (pursuant to the constitution and by-laws) may be precluded from so doing by their own acts or omissions, and may be enjoined from so doing by the action of a court of competent jurisdiction having power over the person of the claimant. This was done in O’Dell v. Boydon, 150 Fed, 731, 80 C. C. A. 397, and it may be that Mr. Freer bas in effect done the same thing by taking the course he has with respect to proceedings in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting in bankruptcy.
    But this reasoning cannot apply to the claim of Hayden, Stone & Co. It does not appear that the bankruptcy court in Michigan has any jurisdiction over this firm, and there is nothing in the papers submitted to show that any effort has been made by that court to enjoin Hayden, Stone & Go. from prosecuting any and all remedies which they may have anywhere in the world against Cameron Currie. The circuit court for the county of Wayne in the state of Michigan has not enjoined Hayden, Stone & Co., and quite plainly could not, if it wished to, from pursuing any remedy which the firm may have against said Currie before the admissions committee of the Stock Exchange.
    The facts, therefore, seem to me quite plain, as follows: When Currie failed, he was indebted to Hayden, Stone & Co. in an easily ascertainable amount of money. For the repayment of that money the creditors had two securities: (a) The collateral furnished by Currie; ' (b) Currie’s Stock Exchange seat. How much of the Currie collateral would be available to Hayden, Stone & Co. was and still is doubtful, owing to the appearance of humerous parties claiming portions of the collateral by right superior to both pledg- or and pledgee. Therefore Hayden, Stone & Co. did what they had a right to do; i. e., propound their demand to as much of the collateral as they coulcl get in the circuit court for Wayne county and contemporaneously assert their right to the whole or any part of the proceeds of Currie’s Stock Exchange seat before the committee on admissions of the Stock Exchange. It was the usual case of a person having more than one security proceeding upon all his demands at once. ''
    If' it were possible to say that either fund would be sufficient to satisfy the demands of Hayden, Stone & Co., it might well be that that firm could by proper proceedings in a proper court be enjoined from harassing other creditors by -tying up more property than was required for their purposes. But that cannot be done. There is nothing to show how large a portion of the fund realized in Michigan will be required to satisfy the demands of the real owners of the collateral put up by Currie with Hayden, Stone & Co. So that the only question remaining is whether the admissions committee of the New York Stock Exchange has now pending before it a claim by Hayden, Stone & Co. undetermined, as to which the claimant is guilty of no laches, and from the prosecution of which it has not been enjoined. It is to me too plain for argument that such a claim is now pending before the admissions committee; and that that tribunal cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction, in accordance with the laws of the state of New York, is a point as to which 1 do nor. think it necessary to cite authorities.
    Owing, therefore, to the existence of the claim of Hayden, Stone & Co., the application is denied.
    Frederick Geller (Henry M. Campbell, of counsel), for petitioner.
    Carter, Ledyard & Milburn (W. F. Taylor, of counsel), for respondent New York Stock Exchange.
    K. R. Babbitt, for respondents Hayden, Stone & Co.
    Before LACOMBE, COXE, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PER CURIAM.

Order affirmed, on opinion below.