Case ID: tenn_35/html/0098-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McKinney, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William Myers, et. al., vs. The State.
    Criminal Xaw. Shooting Matches. When indictable as gaming. The betting or -wagering money or other thing of value upon the result of a shooting match, had within two hundred yards of a public road of the first or second class, is indictable as common gaming.
    EROM MORGAN.
    The plaintiffs in error were convicted in the Circuit Court of Jiorgan county, at the July Term, 1854, before Alexander Judge, upon a presentment for unlawful gaming. The gravamen as laid in the presentment, was the wagering of property upon the result of a shooting match, which was. had within two hundred yards of a public road of the second class. The 'usual motions in arrest of judgment and "for a new trial having “been made and overruled, judgment was rendered against them, from which they appealed in error to this Court.
    J. R. Cooke, for the plaintiff in error, said:
    The only question in this case is, 'whether betting on a contest of skill in shooting at a mark, the mark being within two hundred yards of a road of the first or second class, is an indictable ■offence2
    
    As no species of gaming was, by the common law, considered a crime against the public, the decision of this question depends entirely upon ,the construction of the statutes of Tennessee.
    The first statute upon the subject to be noticed, is the act of 1821, ch. 68, which provides, “That any person who shall shoot at a mark within the bounds of any town, or within two hundred yards of any public road of the first or second class, such person or persons so offending, shall be subject to a fine of ten dollars each, to -be recovered before any justice of the peace within the county, where such offence may be committed, for the benefit of the informer.” (0. & N., 672.) The statute forbids the doing -of an act, and prescribes a penalty, recoverable by .an action before a justice of the peace, and this excludes a resort to an indicjpient. State vs. Maze. (6 Hum., 1-2.) The general principle in all such cases «is, that where any act, not indictable at common law, is declared illegal -by statute, which prescribes ■ a punishment, and a mode of proceeding different -from that by indictment, the statute- must be followed strictly and exclusively. Whar, Am. Cr. L. p. 6. The conclusion is irresistible that for shooting at a mark under the circumstances mentioned in the statute, an indictment or presentment would not lie. But the question remains, would betting on such shooting be indictable ?
    The only statute upon the subject within our knowledge is that of 1817, ch. 61, (C. & N., 359,) which declares, in its seventeenth section, that nothing, therein contained shall be so construed as to prevent shooting matches. This act has always, as we understand it, been construed to exempt . the wager of money or other valuable thing upon a contest of skill of this kind, from punishment by presentment or indictment. It is general in its language — the exemption it creates is neither confined as to time or place— there is -no exception to the rule which it prescribes. It does not in terms except bets on matches, which come off within the limits of the town or within a certain distance of roads of the designated classes. How, then, are we to limit and curtail these general words of the statute? Even in civil cases, the rule is, that the general words of a statute must receive a general construction. Beckford vs. Wade. (17 Ves., 13, 87.) His Honor, (the Circuit Judge,) construed the act of 1817, with reference to the act of 1821. Now, by the rule of the common law, and the usage of the Courts founded upon it, this is allowed only where the acts are upon the same subject, or to use the Latin phrase employed in the books, where they are in pari materia. In such cases, it is admitted, two statutes may be read together not only to remove obscurities or to explain ambiguities contained in the one or the other, but to narrow and restrain the meaning of general words and phrases. But it is ■submitted whether there is any other case where this is allowed, and whether, if the two statutes are insulated, unconnected with, and independent of each other, they must not be construed separately and apart from each other, and full force and effect be given to their terms, unless a different intent appear upon the face of the statute itself. Are the acts of 1817, and 1821 in pari materia ? The one was enacted to repress the vice of gaming, which experience had shown to be most dangerous and pernicious in its consequences to the good morals and happiness of the community, — the other to secure the personal safety of passengers along the highway, who might be traveling in carriages or on horseback. They are wholly different in the subject of which they treat, and the objects they were intended to secure. And we earnestly insist, that the provisions of the act of 1821, cannot be ingrafted upon those of the act of 1817, so as to make it read, “ That nothing in this act contained, shall be so construed as to prevent shooting-matches, unless at a mark within two hundred yards of a road of the first or second class,” &c.
    The contrary conclusion seems to me to involve this absurdity. As was suggested by one of the counsel in the other eases which present this . same question, the object of tlie Lgeislature in passing the section referred to was, to encourage the people of this State to attain skill in marksmanship, which has been of signal service to the country on many a battlefield. To shoot at a mark within the prohibited distance is only penal, and not indictable; but according to the position of the- Attorney General, if you add to this, another act which is not only inno cent, but, in the view of the Legislature, commendable; you instantly convert it into an indictable offence.
    The case of Huff vs. The State, (2 Swan, 279-81,) does not, as it seems to us, support the conviction in the Court below, or conflict with the positions we have assumed. The act of 1833-, ch. 5, having excepted betting on turf racing from the penalties of gaming; and the act of 1833', ch. 10, §. 1, having defined turf racing to be “ all horse racing run upon a track, kept for that purpose,” the question in that case, what should be considered a turf kept for the purpose- of racing within- the meaning of the statute, the court very properly, as all will admit, derived a definition from another statute which taxed all tracks kept for such purpose, as privileges, and held, that only those tracks, which were kept under a license obtained after paying the license, were within the statute. These statutes are strictly in pari materia, and the propriety of constraing them together most evident.
    The Attorney General says, that the statutes on the subject of gaming are to be construed as remedial statutes, that is, so as to repress the evil and advance the remedy. But how can this apply to the case at bar ? Where is the evil intended to be remedied? Not betting on shooting, matches, for that, as we have seen, the Legislature designs to-encourage. Indeed it is impossible to find any statutory provision that would justify the conviction of the plaintiffs in error.
    
      Sneed, Attorney General, for the State.
    McAdoo. for the State, said:
    The excepting of shooting matches ont of the statutes for the suppression of gaming, is made by the 7th section of the act of 1817, ch. 61, in these words: “ Nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent shooting matches.” From -the act of 1803, ch. 12, up to this act of 1817, betting on “ cards, dice, billiards, horse racing, or any other species of gaming whatsoever,” Was indictable.
    But this general and unrestricted exception of shooting matches terminates with the act of 1821, ch. 68 — four years of experience having, (it is presumed,) satisfied the Legislature of the danger to the lives of the citizens, of shooting matches near public thoroughfares. By that act of 1821, § 1, “ Any person or persons who shall shoot at a mark within the bounds of any town, or within two hundred yards of any public road of the first or second class, such person or persons so offending shall be subject to a fine of ten dollars each, to be recovered before any justice of the peace within the county where such offence may be committed, for the benefit of the informer.” This act was intended to suppress all shooting within the prohibited distance, at a mark, and had no reference to any considerations of betting or not betting upon that shooting. It made the act of shooting at a mark, within two hundred yards of a road of the first or second class, unlaioful, although no money or other valuable thing be hazarded on the result of the shooting. The case of the State vs. Maze, 6 Humph., which decides that the act of 1842, ch. 141, § 4, does not make penal offences indictable, • and upon general principles, that when a statute forbids the doing of an act and prescribes a penalty recoverable by action, this excludes punishment by indictment, would apply to a case where a party had been indicted for the act of shooting at a mark within two hundred yards of a public road of the first or second class.
    But this case is totally different. It is a presentment for the act of betting upon that act of shooting; an act so thoroughly distinguishable and separable from the act of shooting, that the parties shooting might be ignorant that bystanders were wagering anything on their shooting, and thus the parties shooting would be liable to the penalty under the act of 1821, and those betting on it (we maintain) would be subject to indictment; because the shooting being unlawful, the protection of the law extended to those who might bet on lawful shooting matches, would be lost.
    To. support this view, ■ the case of Huff vs. The State, 2d Swan, p. 279, furnishes complete analogy. That case decides that the mere omission of the legalization of the act of horse racing by procuring license for the paths, renders all persons who bet on such horse racing indictable. Where the betting is upon lawful horse racing, it is not punishable; where it is on unlawful horse racing, it is gaming.
    
    Horse racing has been a greater favorite with our statutes than shooting matches. Betting on horse racing remained an indictable offence from the act of 1803, ch. 12, up to the act of 1820, ch. 5, which excepted it from the provisions of the act of 1817, ch. 61, in the following words: “ Nothing in the act of 1817, ch. 61, shall in any wise extend or be construed to extend to turf racing, and the same is hereby declared not to be indictable.” The act of 1833, ch. 10, gave a liberal signification to the words turf racing: “All horse racing without regard to the distance which may be run, where the same is run upon a track made or kept for the purpose of horse racing, shall be deeriied turf racing,” &c.
    By act of 1835, ch. 13, § 4, the owner, of race tracks is indictable for not taking out license for tracks kept for horse racing, (0. &. N., page 604,) and the act of 1848, ch. 161, merely changes- the amount of the tax on the privilege from $25 to $100. The punishment was provided for the owner of the track— not those who might run races on unlicensed tracks. The latter are not, and never have been punishable by law in any way, (except the racing be along a public road, which has no analogy to this case.) Yet, by the case of Huff vs. The State, the betting on horse racing is gaming where the tracks are unlicensed, where the unlawfulness of the proceeding consists merely in the failure to license the tracks, and no illegality attaches to those engaged in the racing, except they bet on it; whereas, shooting, under the circumstances of this case, is expressly declared unlawful.
   McKinney, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The substance of the charge in the indictment is, that the defendants “unlawfully did bet, wager and hazard one watch of the value of five dollars,” &c., at and upon “ a certain contest of skill and hazard, commonly called shooting; which was then and there unlawfully contested, had, and shot at a mark, nearer than two hundred yards of a certain public road, of the second class,” &c.

The defendants were convicted, and appealed in error. The error assigned is, that the indictment charges no criminal offence.

All the statutes upon the subject of Gaming, are to be taken together as one law. 5 Yerg., 184, 144, 150. The act of 1817, ch. 61, § 7, has this provision: “ Nothing, herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent shooting-matches.” Prior to this enactment, betting on a shooting-match was indictable, under the acts of 1799, and 1803. The act of 1821, ch. 68, § 1, declares that, “Any person or persons who shall shoot at a mark, within the bounds of any town, or within' two hundred yards of any public road, of the first or second class; such person or persons so offending, shall be subject to a fine of ten dollars each; to be recovered before any justice of the peace within the county where such offence may be committed, for the benefit of the informer.”

Taking the latter act, and the foregoing provision of the act of 1817, as “one law,” the shooting prohibited by the act of 1821, is not within the exemption of the act of 1817; the act of 1821 only gives a penalty, and is construed without reference to other acts upon the same subject: it is clear that the offence thereby created is not indictable; and whether indictable, when; taken in connection with previous enactments, is a question upon which we, at present, intimate no opinion. It is not necessary for the decision of the case before us, that, we should do so. For, it is conceded, that the shooting contemplated by the act of 1821 is unlawful; and being so, to wager or bet upon such unlawful act, is an indictable offence, under the general provisions of our statutory law against gaming. The principle of the case of Huff vs. The State, 2 Swan, 219, applies to this case. The conviction was therefore proper, and the judgment is affirmed.