Case ID: f-appx_398/html/0266-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Tadaryl WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. H. SKOLNICK; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 09-16982.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Sept. 22, 2010.
    
    Filed Oct. 4, 2010.
    Tadaryl Williams, Lovelock, NV, pro se.
    William James Geddes, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, AGNV-Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: WALLACE, HAWKINS and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

The district court properly dismissed Tadaryl Williams’s (“Williams”) claims stemming from a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of 103 days of good-time credit because Williams did not allege that the punishment had been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (barring section 1983 claim for damages that implicated the invalidity of the revocation of good-time credits). Contrary to Williams’s contentions, the expiration of his applicable sentence does not provide him with an exception to the favorable termination rule. See Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir.2006).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion to compel discovery where his motion was filed prematurely. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.2002) (setting forth standard of review and noting that the trial court’s broad decision to deny discovery “will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that [the] denial of discovery resulted] in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s requests for appointment of counsel because Williams did not demonstrate that exceptional circumstances existed. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.1991) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

We deny Williams’s request for an en banc hearing. See Fed. R.App. P. 35.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.