Case ID: sw2d_6/html/0352-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SPEER, J. CURETON, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STEIN v. HAMMAN et al.
    (No. 904-4812.)
    Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.
    May 23, 1928.
    1.Limitation of actions <&wkey;>l48(2) — Written statement, signed by party to be charged, acknowledging existence ' of debt, carries implied promise to pay it.
    A statement in writing, signed by the party sought to be charged, which clearly acknowledges existence of a debt against him, carries with it an implied promise to pay the same.
    2. Limitation of actions &wkey;>l48(2) — Mere pledge within itself is not implied promise to pay.
    A mere pledge within itself will not arrest the statute of limitations, nor can it constitute an implied promise to pay sufficient to renew debt.
    3. Limitation of actions <&wkey;>l48(4) — A pledge, accompanied by written acknowledgment and promise to pay, will defeat plea of statute of limitations against original promise.
    A payment accompanied by written acknowledgment and promise to pay will defeat plea of statute of limitations against original promise, and likewise a sufficient writing accompanying a pledge will have the same effect.
    4. Limitation of actions <&wkey;!48(,2) — Debtor’s indorsement on note delivered to creditor held sufficient acknowledgment to support implied promise to pay overdrafts barred by statute of limitations.
    Where one indebted on certain overdrafts, barred by statute of limitations, delivered to creditor note in which debtor was payee, and on which he had indorsed “as collateral to secure my overdrafts,” held that such indorsement, considered with parol evidence identifying overdrafts, was a sufficient acknowledgment to support an implied promise to pay the debt, taking it out of statute of limitations.
    Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of First Supreme Judicial District.
    Action by George Hamman and others against Max Stein. On certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals.
    Question answfered in affirmative.
    Stevens & Stevens, of Houston, and C. L. Dutton, of Richmond, for appellant.
    D. R. Peareson and Peareson & Peareson, all of Richmond, for appellees.
   SPEER, J.

Max Stein was indebted to J. H. P. Davis & Co., bankers, in the sum of'$46,-229, due upon certain overdrafts with that company, which overdrafts as such were barred by the statutes of limitations. He delivered to the company a certain promissory note executed by C. H. Brown, payable to himself in the sum of $235, upon which there was a credit, and at the time indorsed on the Brown note, and signed such indorsement, the following: “As collateral to secure my overdrafts to J. H. P. Davis & Co.” The company sued Stein upon the indorsement as a new promise, and the plea of limitation interposed by the defendant raises the question certified to us whether or not the indorsement, when considered with the parol evidence identifying the overdrafts referred to, w'as sufficient acknowledgment to support an implied promise of defendant to pay the debt.

The trial court held that it was, and the Court of Civil Appeals wrote an opinion affirming that judgment, and later certified the question to the Supreme Court.

We have examined the opinion written by Justice Lane, and are of the opinion it announces a correct conclusion based upon proper reasoning.

It is well settled that a statement in writing, signed by the party sought to be charged, which clearly acknowledges the existence of a debt against him, carries with it an implied promise to pay the same.

Counsel for appellant has urged, both in his brief and in oral argument at the submission, that the transaction is no more than a pledge of the Brown note, and, that being in legal effect only a pledge, it is no more than a payment, and therefore will not support an implied promise to pay, and cites authorities to support the general proposition thus urged.

It is true a mere pledge within itself cannot meet the requirements of the statute for precisely the same reason that a mere payment will not renew the debt, but to hold with appellant in this case is to confuse the principles underlying the question. It must be conceded that mere payment or pledge, as such, will not arrest the-statute, but, if there be a writing duly signed accompanying the payment or pledge which meets the requirement of the statute as to renewal, a different question arises. A payment accompanied by the written acknowledgment and promise to pay required by law will defeat the plea against the original promise, and likewise a sufficient writing accompanying a pledge will have the same effect. It is well settled that a mortgage given to secure, a barred debt removes the bar, or rather renews the debt (Gray v. Powell [Tex. Civ. App.] 282 S. W. 631 [writ of error refused]), and this upon the ground that the mortgage recognizes the existence of the debt, and expressly or impliedly promises payment. A pledge is no different in this respect (the only difference being as to the matter of possession), and, where the pledge is accompanied by a sufficient writing, the statute of renewal has been met. Now, the writing signed by appellant expressly recognizes his indebtedness to the bank for his overdrafts. The existence of the indebtedness being thus recognized, in the absence of anything to the contrary in the writing, the law implies a promise to pay the same precisely as a written mortgage to secure a debt carries with it such implication. In truth, it can make no difference where the writing occurs, if it meets the requirements of the statute and is sufficiently specific as to the debt renewed. Such writing may be given for the express purpose, or it may be contained in a letter, deed, or other instrument whatsoever. There is no reason why a written transfer of collateral, if otherwise sufficient, should not meet the requirements of the statute. This is not a mere casual writing, but one which identifies (or uses language from which identification may be had) the debts secured, and is, in. our opinion, sufficient to support the judgment of the trial court as tentatively affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.

We therefore recommend that the question certified .be answered in the affirmative.

CURETON, C. J.

The opinion of the Commission of Appeals' answering the certified question is adopted, and ordered certified. 
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