Case ID: scl_10/html/0129-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*James Hogg ads. James Wilson.
    In a declaration for slander, where some of the counts are good, and others bad, a general verdict thereon is good,  _
    Words are to he understood according to their usual import, 
    
    This was an action of slander,'tried before Mr. Justice Nott, at York, Spring Term, 1818.
    The plaintiff alleged in his declaration that the defendant had called him a hog thief.
    
    The first witness called was Sarah Moore. She said she heard that defendant had accused plaintiff of stealing his hog, and had made him pay for it. She was speaking to him about taking his money from him in such a way, and he replied “ he had taken it, and he would take it from any such hog thief as he was.”
    Daniel Sturges said he heard the defendant say, when speaking of plaintiff, that he thought it right to make any hog thief pay for stealing a hog. There was other evidence to the same effect, going to prove the malice of the defendant, and the extensive circulation of the report. It was also proved that plaintiff was a man of good character.
    The jury found a verdict for plaintiff, and $400 damages.
    This was a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the words in some of the counts of the declaration were not actionable, and the jury have found a general verdict.
    There was also a motion for a new trial, on the grounds :
    1, That the words proved did not support the allegation in the declaration.
    2. That the damages were excessive.
    
      White, for the motion. Clendinen, contra.
    
      
      
        Neal v. Lewis, 2 Bay’s Reports, 204. Taylor v. Sturgineger, 2 M. Const. Reports, 367. Lord Mansfield, in Peake v. Oldham, Cowper, 276, says, “It is much lamerLted that in any sort of action, the mere inattention or *slip of counsel, who are not always sufiiciently attentive upon what count the verdict is taken, should he fatal to the party; contrary to the truth and justice of'the case, the opinion of the judge upon the merits, who tried the cause, and the meaning of the jury who pronounced the verdict. However, in civil cases, the rule most certainly is settled, that where a verdict is taken generally, and any one count is had, it vitiates the whole. It has always struck me, that the rule would have been much more proper to have said, that if there is any one count to support the verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all the rest are had. In criminal cases the rule is so, and one cannot therefore but lament, that the reverse is adopted in civil cases; because it is, as it were, catching justice in a net of form;” and in Grant v. Astle, Doug. Reports, 729, Lord Mansfield expresses the same sentiments, in still more forcible terms ; see also the observations of the Chancellor, in Bayard v. Malcolm, 2 John. Rep. 556. R. See 6 Rich. 433.
    
    
      
      
        King v. Watson, 2 T. R. 206; Woolmoth v. Meadows, 5 East. Reports, 463; Starkie on Slander, 56; Bac. Abr. Wilson’s Edition, Title Slander, D. R.
      10 Rich. 417; 6 Rich. 432; 2 Rich. 399, 582: 2 McM. 468: 2 Bail. 115. 519: Post, 291; 2 N. & McC. 83, 511.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Nott, J.

The ground taken in this case in arrest of judgment,* has been so often ruled to be untenable, that the law may now be considered as settled, and is not again to be called into question. The decision of our Courts have, in that .respect, been different from those of the English Courts ; but they are not the less to be regarded on that account. They are the decisions of our Gourts, and we must be governed by them.

The motion for a new trial does hot appear to be better supported than in arrest of judgment. Formerly great strictness was required in actions of slander. The words were required to be proved precisely as laid in the declaration; but that rule has been laid aside, and one, more consonant with common sense, substituted in its place. Words are to be construed according to their most obvious meaning and import; and courts and juries cannot understand them differently from all the world besides, That they should be substantially proved, as charged, is all that can or ought to be required. Could any person understand the -words proved in this case in any other sense than as conveying a direct charge of hog stealing ? And if the words were proved, the damages were not excessive. Four hundred dollars cannot surely be too high a price for a good character. In another district, on the same circuit, the jury gave a verdict of a thousand dollars, in a similar action, and I do not think it excessive.

Exemplary damages are the only meaus of bridling licentious tongues. It is to be regretted that we have not more such examples.

The motion must be refused.

Grimke, Coicock, Cheves, Gantt and Johnson, JJ., concurred.