Case ID: f-appx_668/html/0382-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ali Ihsan KIRANLIOGLU, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    15-2340-ag
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    August 30, 2016
    FOR PETITIONER: Glenn L. Formica (Elyssa N. Williams, on the brief), Formica Williams, P.C., New Haven, CT.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Daniel E. Goldman, Senior Litigation Counsel (Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Carl McIntyre, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Kevin J. Conway, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, on the brief), U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: John M. Walker, Jr., José A. Cabranes, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ali Ihasan Kiranlioglu (“Ki-ranlioglu”), a native and citizen of Turkey, seeks review of a June 29, 2015 order of the BIA, affirming the March 4, 2014 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering his removal. In re Ali Ihsan Kiranlioglu, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jun. 29, 2015), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. Hartford Mar. 4, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Kiranlioglu challenges the denial of his petition to waive the joint-filing requirement of his conditional permanent residence status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a. Kiran-lioglu argues that the IJ erroneously placed the burden of proof on him to establish a good-faith marriage, and that the IJ erred in his application of the law by misevaluating the strength of Kiranlioglu’s testimony and by overlooking and mischar-acterizing other evidence. The Government responds that these arguments are not subject to judicial review because Kiran-lioglu did not raise them before the BIA and there is no judicial review of an agency’s discretionary denial of a hardship waiver.

When, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without opinion, the Court reviews the IJ’s decision. See, e.g., Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court “defer[s] to the factual findings of the BIA and the IJ if they are supported by substantial evidence, and we review de novo legal conclusions and the application of legal principles to undisputed facts.” Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2012).

The Court may only review a final order of removal if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). “[W]e require petitioner to raise issues to the BIA in order to preserve them for judicial review.” Foster v. I.N.S., 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Although not jurisdictional, issue exhaustion is mandatory. Zhong v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 104, 121-22 (2d Cir. 2007). While the Court may not consider “bases for relief that were not raised below” or “general issues that were not raised below,” It is not barred from considering “specific, subsidiary legal arguments, or arguments by extension, that were not made below.” Gill v. I.N.S., 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005).

Kiranlioglu has only exhausted his adverse-credibility determination argument. His five-page brief to the BIA, prepared by counsel, focuses only on the credibility of the testimony before the IJ. The BIA brief was silent as to any error arising from an incorrectly applied burden of proof or the weight of other evidence in the record. Accordingly, those issues have not been preserved for judicial review.

We lack jurisdiction to review Kiranliog-lu’s remaining argument. The Secretary of Homeland Security may, in his or her discretion, remove the conditions on an alien’s status if the alien demonstrates that his qualifying marriage was entered in good faith but has since been terminated. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B). The Court generally lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of relief, including determinations that an alien is ineligible for a hardship waiver of the joint-filing requirement because he did not marry in good faith. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Contreras-Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713-14 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court, however, retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). The substance of Kiran-lioglu’s adverse credibility determination argument goes to the IJ’s factual findings, not to a question of law. We thus lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary denial of Kiranlioglu’s waiver petition based on Kiranlioglu’s remaining challenge.

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by the petitioner on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED.