Case ID: f-appx_544/html/0024-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jennifer HEWITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Jennifer Childs, Detective, Shield 2022, Christopher Cooke, Detective, Shield 1569, John Doe, Police Officers 1-15, Undercover Officer No. 55, aka Undercover Officer No. 2570, Undercover Officer No. 54, Vincent Dauge, Detective, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-407-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 13, 2013.
    Adewale Akim Mosaku, Law Office of Wale Mosaku, Brooklyn, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Susan Paulson, Francis F. Caputo, and Max McCann, Assistant Corporation Counsels, for Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York.
    PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Hewitt (“Hewitt”) appeals from the district court’s September 28, 2012 judgment dismissing her section 1983 claims arising out of her arrest and indictment as part of a wide-ranging narcotics investigation involving some fifty alleged participants. In its September 27, 2012 memorandum and order, the district court granted defendants-ap-pellees’ motion for summary judgment in its entirety. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment under Rule 56(a) de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir.2009). Summary judgment must be denied if there is a genuine issue of disputed fact “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). After an independent review of the record, we affirm the grant of summary judgment for substantially the reasons set forth by the district court in its thorough opinion.

On appeal, Hewitt principally argues that the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. Specifically, she alleges that there is evidence that individual defendants lied about: (1) a September 13, 2006 photo array in which an undercover officer identified Hewitt as the female suspect known as “JD Altima”; and (2) the presence of JD Altima during the attempted narcotics purchase on April 6, 2006. Had the district court correctly inferred that these events were fabricated, she argues, it could not have concluded that the officers and prosecutors had probable cause to arrest and charge her with participation in a narcotics conspiracy. For the following reasons, we conclude that no reasonable jury could draw the inferences that Hewitt proposes.

First, Hewitt points out that Detective Christopher Cooke conducted the photo array and prepared the follow-up report documenting the identification, and contends that there is a genuine dispute as to Cooke’s veracity. But this argument ignores the deposition testimony of undercover agent UC-0055, who confirmed that he positively identified Hewitt in the September 2006 photo array. Even if we assume Cooke was not credible, Hewitt has pointed to no evidence suggesting that UC0055 lied about making this identification.

Second, with regard to JD Altima’s presence at the April 6, 2006 purchase, Hewitt points out: (1) the “Buy Report” of undercover officer UC-0055 did not mention that primary suspect Carl Hewitt (“Carl”) was in a vehicle or that a female suspect was in the vehicle with him; (2) Cooke’s report documenting the photo array is the only documentary evidence indicating that UC-0055 claimed JD Altima was present on April 6; and (3) when UC-0055 first testified to the grand jury on March 15, 2007, he did not mention that JD Altima was present on April 6, and he made that assertion only when he testified before the grand jury again on April 27, 2007, after Hewitt’s arrest.

Contrary to Hewitt’s assertions, however, the April 6 Buy Report does not contradict UC-0055’s claim that JD Altima was present at that time. While it does not mention a vehicle or a female suspect, it also does not state that Carl was on foot or alone. UC-0055 testified in his deposition that the Buy Report was only a “summary” of the important details. At that time, Carl was the primary subject of UC-0055’s investigation. UC-0055 testified that he had never seen JD Altima before April 6 and was not sure she was involved in the drug conspiracy until he saw her again on April 20, doing the same thing. He also testified that at some point he told Cooke that JD Altima was present on April 6, which corroborates the statement in Cooke’s September 13, 2006 photo array. Hewitt has not pointed to any evidence in the record that either contradicts UC-0055’s reasonable explanation for the omission from the April 6 Buy Report, or supports a reasonable inference that he lied about this event in September 2006, some seven months before Hewitt’s arrest, when he identified her as JD Altima.

We conclude that no reasonable jury could draw the inferences for which Hewitt argues.

We have considered Hewitt’s remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.