Case ID: johns_15/html/0119-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per Curiam.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Loring against Halling.
    The word month, when used ln a stathin^ appear r>-, to be'1 unnor, and not a calendar month.
    The public notice required to be given in cases of sales under powers in mortgages, (sess. 3k o, 32. s. 6.1IY, h, 374 ) is sufficient, if published for six successive lunar months previous to thetfone of Side,
    IN error on certiorari to a justice’s court.
    The defendant in error brought an action in the court he-low against the plaintiff in error, and declared on a note or memorandum given for 24 dollars, on the sale of certain mortgaged premises, pursuant to a notice under the statute.
    
      By this note the defendant below promised to pay that sum wjjen j-jle jeej was given, provided the proceedings and sale had been regular, pursuant to the statute, and the only question made upon the trial was, as to the sufficiency of the notice, which vga» dated on the 17th of February, 1817, and inserted in a public newspaper the next day, and the sale was on the 7th of August. The justice considered the notice sufficient, and, accordingly, gave judgment for the plaintiff below, the defendant in error.
   Per Curiam.

A month in law is a lunar month, or 28 days, unless otherwise expressed ; (2 Bl. Com. 141.;) and this, as a general rule, is recognised by this court in Leffingwell v. Pierpont; (1 Johns. Cas. 100.) although it is there decided, that it does not apply to bills of exchange, and promissory notes ; but that in the computation of time, in relation to-those instruments, a month is construed to mean a calendar month. In Lacon v. Hooper, (6 Term. Rep. 226.) it is laid down as a general rule, that when the word month is used in a statute, without the addition of calendar, or any other words to show that the legislature intended calendar months, it is understoodto mean a lunar month. Lord Kenyon there expressed a wish, that when the rule was first established, it had been decided that months should be understood to mean calendar, and not lunar months; but observed, that the contrary had been so long, and so frequently . determined, that it ought not again to be brought in question. By an act, (1 N. R. L. 374.) the notice is required to be inserted and continued, at least once a week, for six successive months previous to the sale, in one of the newspapers, &c. There are no words here to take it out of the general rule, that month means lunar month; and this seems to have been the construction given to this statute, in Jackson v. Clark. (7 Johns. Rep. 217.) The sale in that case was decided to be irregular, but no intimation was given that the time was too short; and the notice there was, like the present, computed by lunar months : it was dated on the 17th of February, and the sale was on the 12th of August. From these considerations it is very clear that the mode of computing the time of notice, required by the statute, must

4 be by lunar, and not by calendar months; and this being the only question raised on the return, the judgment must bé affirméd.

Judgment affirmed.