Case ID: f-appx_517/html/0847-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Maryla MADURA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Antonio Marciante, Tony Sanchez, Defendants-Appellees, Michael J. Mundy, John Does, et al., Defendants.
    No. 11-14322.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    April 24, 2013.
    
      Charles M. Baron, Charles M. Baron, PA, Aventura, FL, Donald William Edwards, Plantation, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Maria Dejesus Santovenia, Darcee S. Siegel, Office of the City Attorney, North Miami Beach, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-Appellant Dr. Maryla Madura (“Madura”) appeals: (1) the grant of summary judgment as to Defendants-Appel-lees Antonio Marciente (“Marciente”) and Tony Sanchez (“Sanchez”) on Madura’s § 1983 false arrest and excessive force claims and to Defendant-Appellee City of North Miami Beach (“the City”) on Madu-ra’s state law false arrest / false imprisonment claim; (2) the directed verdict for Sanchez on Madura’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; (3) the grant of the City’s post-verdict motion for a judgment as a matter of law on Madura’s assault and battery claims; and (4) the exclusion and allowance of certain evidence and testimony at trial.

I.

On June 25, 2002, around 7:30 p.m. and before dark, several of the City’s police officers including Sanchez and Marciante confronted and arrested a purchaser of 100 MDMA ecstasy pills, Lazaro Martinez (“Martinez”), at a Taco Bell in North Miami Beach. At the same time that Martinez was confronted, Madura, a white female, stopped at the Taco Bell for dinner. In the parking lot, Madura saw several unidentified, armed police officers dressed in black “taking down” Martinez. Madura mistook the officers for terrorists or gang members, was alarmed, and left the parking lot. The police, at Sanchez’s direction, followed Madura, believing her to be connected to Martinez. They stopped Madu-ra’s car by physically blocking her passage with an SUV, arrested her, searched her car, and later released her after realizing that she had no connection to Martinez. According to Madura, Sanchez also threatened her not to report their mistake. Ma-dura suffered physical and emotional injuries and received medical treatment as well as ongoing psychological treatment.

The more specific details about the events differ substantially, however, according to the parties’ testimony. Attached to this opinion as “Appendix I” is a side-by-side comparison of their accounts.

II.

The issues presented on appeal are:

1. Whether the district court erroneously granted summary judgment to:

(a) Marciante and Sanchez on Madu-ra’s § 1988 false arrest claims;
(b) the City on Madura’s state law false arrest / false imprisonment claim;
(c) Sanchez on Madura’s § 1988 excessive force claim.

2. Whether the district court erroneously directed a verdict for Sanchez on Madura’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

3. Whether the district court erroneously granted the City’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the assault and battery claims.

4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by:

(a) excluding Madura’s medical records as evidence;
(b) allowing defense counsel to ask leading questions of Marciante on cross-examination;
(c) allowing testimony from a defense witness not identified prior to trial.

III.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, drawing all inferences and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.2012). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the mov-ant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

We review de novo the grant of a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and affirming only if “reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We review de novo the grant of a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1149 (11th Cir.2005). “Judgment as a matter of law for the defendant is due when there is insufficient evidence to prove an element of the claim, which means that no jury reasonably could have reached a verdict for the plaintiff on that claim.” Id.

We review the district court’s evidentia-ry rulings for an abuse of discretion and will reverse “only if the complaining party establishes that the evidentiary ruling resulted in a substantial prejudicial effect, thus warranting reversal of the jury’s verdict.” Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 563 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Salter v. Westra, 904 F.2d 1517, 1519 n. 1 (11th Cir.1990) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s overruling an objection to leading questions); Fabrica Italiana Lavorazione Materie Organiche, S.A.S. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 684 F.2d 776, 780 (11th Cir.1982) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s allowance of a witness not identified prior to trial).

IY.

After reviewing the extensive record in this case, reading the parties’ briefs and having the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the § 1983 false arrest claims against Marciante and Sanchez and the excessive force claim against Sanchez and in granting summary judgment on the false arrest/false imprisonment tort claim against the City. The district court also erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Sanchez and the assault and battery tort claims against the City. At each of these stages of the proceedings, the district court failed to view the facts in the light most favorable to Madura and to draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Instead, the district court improperly gave greater weight to the officers’ testimony. Because, this case will be remanded and tried again, we need not determine whether the district court abused its discretion in allowing or refusing certain evidence or testimony.

We therefore vacate: (1) the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Madura’s § 1983 false arrest claims against Marciante and Sanchez, state law false arrest/false imprisonment claim against the City, and § 1983 excessive force claim against Sanchez; (2) the directed verdict for Sanchez on Madura’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim; and (3) the grant of the City’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on Madura’s assault and battery claims. We also set aside the jury’s verdict in favor of Marciante on Madura’s § 1983 excessive force claim, as well as the jury’s verdict against the City on Madura’s state law assault and battery claims. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

APPENDIX I 
      
      . We must vacate the verdicts in favor of Marciante and against the City because it is now possible, on remand, that the jury will decide that the officers unlawfully pursued and arrested Madura. If the jury determines that Madura was falsely arrested, then the jury will necessarily be instructed differently concerning Officer Marciante’s use of force. See Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2006) ("Under this Circuit's law ... a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim” because "if an arresting officer does not have the right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use any degree of force in making that arrest.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).