Case ID: tex_68/html/0640-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Willie, Chief Justice.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 2298.
    Orr & Lindsey Shoe Company v. G. C. Ferrell.
    Assignment for Creditors.—A deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors which in the body of the instrument uses the partnership name, but which is signed with the names of the individual members who compose the firm, and which purports to convey all the property of the assignors of every description, conveys the property of the partnership as well as that of the individual members of the firm, and is not vitiated by a clause providing for releases by consenting creditors.
    Appeal from Upshur. Tried below before the Hon. Felix J. McCord.
    The deed of assignment which received construction in the opinion in this case was as follows:
    
      
    
    This indenture made this the 10th day of January, A. D. 1887, by and between R. L. Ferrell, and W. H. Shepperd, partners under the- firm name of Shepperd & Ferrell, parties of the first part, and G. C. Ferrell, party of the second part, all of the county of Upshur and State of Texas, witnesseth: That, whereas the said Shepperd & Ferrell are justly indebted in divers sums of money which they are unable to pay in full to different creditors whose names are stated in the annexed list, and they desire to make a fair distribution of their property and assets among such of their creditors as will consent to accept their proportional share of their estate, and discharge them from their respective claims in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and the sum of one dollar to them in hand paid by the said G. C. Ferrell, the said Shepperd & Ferrell do by these presents bargain, sell, release, convey and set over unto the said G. C. Ferrell all their real and personal estate, other than that which is by law exempt from execution. To have and to hold unto him, the said G. C. Ferrell, and his successors in trust for the benefit of creditors of said Shepperd & Ferrell aforesaid; and the said G. C. Ferrell on his part covenants and agrees faithfully to perform his duties as assignee in accordance With the statute concerning assignments for the benefit of creditors.
    “In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands.
    [Signed] “W. H. Shepperd,
    “R. L. Ferrell,
    “G-. C. Ferrell.”
    
      The Orr & Lindsey Shoe Company, for itself,
    suggested in a printed brief that the court erred in holding that the deed of assignment on its face purported and operated to convey both the partnership and individual property of assignors, Shepperd & Ferrell, to appellee for the benefit of the firm and individual creditors of said assignors, citing Donoho v. Fish Bros., 58 Texas, 164; Coffin v. Douglass, 61 Texas, 406; Still v. Focke, 2 Southwestern Reporter, 59; Cleveland v. Battle, 3 Southwestern Reporter, 682.
    
      T. M. Campbell, for appellee,
    cited Coffin v. Douglass, 61 Texas, 409, and the cases there discussed and reviewed.
   Willie, Chief Justice.

This case turns upon the construction of the deed of assignment made by W. H. Shepperd and R. L. Ferrell to Gr. C. Ferrell, for the benefit of their creditors. It is claimed by the appellant that the deed is void because it passes partnership property only, and provides for the discharge, of the assignors. The deed does provide for a discharge by consenting creditors, and, if it conveys partnership property only, is void under the decision in Donoho v. Fish Brothers, 58 Texas, 164.

The deed is in all material respects similar to the one passed upon in the case of Coffin v. Douglass, 61 Texas, 406, and which we upheld as conveying both partnership property and the separate estates of the individual partners. In that instrument the partnership name Was used, and the signatures of the individual partners were appended. The same is true as to the deed under consideration. That deed and this also purported to convey all the property of the assignors of all kinds, both real and personal. There were, however, some expressions in the deed passed upon in the Coffin v. Douglass case, which are not found in this, and these were there relied on to control the general language of the conveyance and restrict it to the partnership property. These expressions were held not to control the more general description of property given in the deed, this court not being disposed to give a narrow and technical construction to the language of such instruments. This deed has no such apparent restrictions upon the generality of the conveyance. It conveys all the real and personal estate of the grantors without limit, and unless we violate the well settled rules of construing such assignments, we must hold that individual, as well as partnership property, was assigned, and the clause providing for releases did not vitiate the instrument.

Opinion delivered October 18, 1887.

If the instrument were ambiguous, we should, under these rules, be compelled to give such construction, if consistent with the language, as would render it operative; we must certainly do so when nothing but a strained construction would make it render its validity in the least doubtful.

Some questions asked a witness during the trial by the appellant’s counsel were ruled out, and we are asked to revise the action of the court in this-respect. But no proper bills of exception were reserved to those rulings, those found in the record stating neither the objections raised to the questions, nor what the answers of the witness would have been if admitted. The objections raised may have been frivolous, and the answers, if received, may not have been of a character to benefit the appellant’s case. (Moss v. Cameron, 66 Texas, 412; Dunham v. Forbes, 25 Texas, 25.

There is no error in the judgment, and it is affirmed.

Affirmed.