Case ID: f-appx_650/html/0068-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Burim KARPUZI, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    14-4669
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 24, 2016
    
      FOR PETITIONER: Michael P. DiRaimondo, Melville, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Senior Litigation Counsel; Anthony J. Messuri, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, GERARD E. LYNCH, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR,, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Burim Karpuzi, a native of the former Yugoslavia and a citizen of Macedonia, seeks review of a November 19, 2014, decision of the BIA, affirming a June 11, 2012, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Karpuzi’s motion to reopen. In re Burim Karpuzi, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Nov. 19, 2014), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City June 11, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

The only issue before us is whether the agency abused its discretion in denying Karpuzi’s motion to reopen to present new evidence. We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).

It is undisputed that Karpuzi’s motion to reopen was untimely filed more than ten years after -the IJ’s removal order became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)®.

The agency reasonably concluded that Dr. Bernd Fischer’s declaration did not demonstrate a material change in Macedonia for ethnic Albanians such as Karpuzi. The declaration discusses the continuation of a volatile situation for ethnic Albanians, which began prior to Karpuzi’s 2001 removal proceedings. Accordingly, because the agency reasonably found that Karpuzi did not demonstrate material changed country conditions in Macedonia, it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); see also In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253, 257 (B.I.A. 2007).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. The pending request, for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).