Case ID: f-appx_622/html/0034-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Edwin COLON, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-4867-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 18, 2015.
    
      Amy Adelson, Dershowitz, Eiger & Adelson, P.C., New York, NY, For Defendant-Appellant.
    Paul D. Silver, Assistant United States Attorney, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY, for Appel-lee.
    Present: PIERRE N. LEVAL, PETER W. HALL, and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant Edwin Colon pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Athough the plea agreement contemplated a guidelines sentencing range of 41 to 51 months, the court determined that Colon was a Career Offender and sentenced him to 188 months imprisonment, at the bottom of the Career Offender Guideline range. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues presented on appeal.

“A sentencing judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual offender and a particular crime.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir.2008). We will “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Id. at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007)). “This degree of deference is only warranted, however, once we are satisfied that the district court complied with the Sentencing Reform Act’s procedural requirements.” Id.

We conclude that Colon’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. “[W]e presume that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to consider the statutory factors.” United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Athough Colon contends that the district court did not consider his argument for a variance based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court heard arguments at sentencing regarding Colon’s troubled upbringing, drug addiction issues, and his rehabilitation efforts. The court considered Colon’s “incessant” history of criminal behavior, beginning at age sixteen, to be significant, and elected to treat Colon as a Career Offender. Joint Appendix 114. The court noted that Colon had continued to engage in criminal conduct even while he was under court supervision. Based on these considerations, the court determined that the “appropriate sentence” was at the bottom of the Career Offender Guidelines range. JA 114. A-though the court could have elaborated further, “we do not require robotic incantations that the district court has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (internal quotation omitted), and its explanation was sufficient.

In addition, the sentence was substantively reasonable. In particular, the sentence reflected Colon’s prolonged criminal history since his teenage years which, the court determined, outweighed the evidence of his rehabilitation. Athough the sentence was severe, we cannot say that it “was shockingly high, ... or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir.2009).

For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . The parties dispute whether the proper standard of review is plain error or abuse of discretion. We need not address the parties' arguments because the outcome would be the same under either standard.
     
      
      . Although Colon contends that the Career Offender Guideline substantially overrepre-sents his criminal history, he has never disputed that his criminal history meets the criteria for career offender status. See USSG § 4B1.1.