Case ID: f-appx_579/html/0571-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark Robert STEFFEN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 13-50286.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted June 12, 2014.
    
    Filed June 17, 2014.
    Jean-Claude Andre, Jamie Lang, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Paul Edward Potter, Esquire, Potter & Cohen, Pasadena, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Mark Robert Steffen appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 24-month sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Steffen contends that the district court erred by relying on improper factors in making its sentencing decision. We review for plain error, see United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir.2009), and find none. The record reflects that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and did not impose the sentence on the basis of any improper factor. See United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1181-82 (9th Cir.2006).

Steffen also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Steffen’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The 24-month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including Steffen’s breach of trust and the need to deter. See id.; Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1182.

Finally, we reject Steffen’s contention that the district court breached a promise made at a previous sentencing hearing.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.