Case ID: f-appx_629/html/0050-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Stephanie BELTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, John Mattingly, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-4008.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Oct. 22, 2015.
    Stephanie Belton, pro se, Cambria Heights, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Elizabeth S. Natrella, Pamela Sieder Dolgow, New York City Law Department, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
    PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges, SIDNEY H. STEIN, District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable Sidney H. Stein, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Belton (“Belton”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the September 29, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Oetken, J.), granting the motion for summary judgment of Defendant-Appellee City of New York Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”) and John Mattingly (“Mat-tingly”), Commissioner of ACS at all relevant times. Plaintiff-Appellant brought a number of federal and state law claims against ACS, her former employer, and Mattingly. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case, and with the issues on appeal, which we describe here only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Here, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants. Except as noted below, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough and well-reasoned September 26, 2014 opinion and order.

The district court did not take into account some of Belton’s allegations in support of her hostile work environment claim. In particular, Belton alleges that she was punched, fondled, and spied on in the restroom while employed by ACS. These allegations, however, lack detail with respect to timing. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 370, 379-81 (2d Cir.2002) (declining to find a “hostile work environment” absent “pervasive” misconduct). Belton therefore failed to marshal record evidence of episodes with “the nature, severity, and frequency” necessary to defeat summary judgment. Alfano, 294 F.3d at 376.

We have considered Belton’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . The district court determined that ACS was an improper defendant, construed the complaint to assert claims against the City of New York, and directed the Clerk of Court to amend the caption accordingly. See Belton v. City of New York, No. 12-Civ.-6436, 2014 WL 4798919, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2014). On appeal, we direct the Clerk of the Court to amend the official caption in the same way, by substituting the “City of New York” for the “City of New York Administration for Children's Services.”