Case ID: ny-st-rep_34/html/0551-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Potter, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William M. Macfarlane, App’lt., v. The City of Brooklyn, Resp’t.
    
      (Court of Appeals, Second Division,
    
    
      Filed December 9, 1890.)
    
    Taxes—Bbooklyn—Laws 1883, ch. 363; 1884, ch. 388—Purchases at sale. Chapter 363, Laws 1883, was an act providing for the payment of irregular taxes, in Brooklyn, upon certain conditions and validating the tax so-paid and the payment Chapter 388, Laws 1884, was an a t for the relief'of the holders of certificates and leases issued upon void assessments, who were under the law without a remedy. Held, that where plaintiff bought-under a tax sale which was afterwards declared void he must either accept the face of the certicates with the amount paid for taxes offered him under the above law, or get nothing. He is not entitled to interest.
    ■ Appeal from a judgment of the general term, second department, affirming a judgment at special term dismissing the complaint, with costs.
    The findings were signed by the trial judge as agreed upon by the parties. The findings among other matters embrace and set forth in full Chap. 363 of the Laws of 1882 and Chap. 388 of the Laws of 1884, which relate to the confirmation and payment of taxes in the city of Brooklyn'and to the redemption by the comptroller of that city of certain tax certificates.
    It appears from the findings of the trial court that the plaintiff had purchased several lots, sold for the non-payment of taxes assessed thereon by the authorities of the city of Brooklyn, and received the certificates therefor and purchased similar certificates for other lots sold and bid off by the city for unpaid taxes for some one or more years between 1867 and 1874, which certificates declared the holder to he entitled to a lease of the lot sold for the-number of years specified therein * * * for the term of 100 years, for which he has paid the sum of $117.28, and which said purchase'entitles him to a lease of the said.premises for the term aforesaid, after the expiration of two years from the date hereof, unless said premises be redeemed within that time or any irregularity shall be discovered in the proceedings prior to said sale, in which case said purchase money and all sums paid for taxes, water rates or assessments on said premises on account of the purchase hereinbefore stated shall be repaid to said purchaser or'his assigns provided this certificate shall be surrendered to the registrar of arrears and no further or other damage shall be claimed by said purchaser."
    That the taxes for which said lots were assessed were void-that said lots were also assessed for taxes for years prior and subsequent to the years for the taxes of the year or years for which they had been sold, and which assessments were also void, and were generally unpaid either by the holders of the certificates, the owners of the lots or by any one; that the assessed value of each of the lots for which plaintiff held said certificates exceeds the amount of all charges thereon for taxes, assessments and water-rates, with interest, assessed upon these lots prior to the 1st day of July, 1882; that the sums paid by plaintiff to purchase said lots and whatever tax he may have paid upon any of them was received into the treasury of the defendant, and such sums were also included in the assessment of arrearage of taxes and water-rates made with interest by the assessors under the act of 1883, chapter 114; that plaintiff and the authorities of the city of Brooklyn believed that the taxes upon these lots were valid, notwithstanding the defects which rendered them void appeared upon, the face of the assessment and tax roll, until a decision was made by the court of appeals in the year 1882, and that before bring-' ing this action the plaintiff tendered the said certificates to the collector of taxes and to the registrar of arrears, and also brought them into court and offered to cancel them, and at the same time the plaintiff tendered the certificates the comptroller was ready and willing to pay the plaintiff the face of said certificates with the amounts paid for taxes, etc., on account of the sales according to the act, chapter 388 of the Laws of 1884. As before stated, the findings were agreed to, and hence it is not worth while to refer to the allegations of the complaint or answer any further than to add that the answer set up the six years statute of limitations.
    
      James Stilceman with J. Hampden Dougherty, for app’lt; Almet F. Jenlcs, for resp’t.
    
      
       Affirming 1 N. Y. State Rep., 552.
    
   Potter, J.

The question presented upon this appeal is whether upon the facts as found by the trial court and the several acts of the legislature applicable to the assessment and collection of taxes, water rates, etc., in the city of Brooklyn, the plaintiff is entitled to any relief different or beyond that which the comptroller was ready and willing to pay the plaintiff when the latter tendered the certificates, viz.: the face of the certificates with the amount paid for taxes, and if so, wlrat that other or additional relief is ?

The complaint alleges that plaintiff is advised and believes “ that upon making the payments aforesaid he became equitably entitled to all claims which the defendant had or could have for the taxes, interest and charges advanced and paid by the plaintiff and entitled to all moneys afterwards paid to the defendant in payment thereof and to have the benefit of all taxes and charges levied and imposed in lieu thereof or substituted therefor and to have the proceeds thereof.”

The relief sought in this action in one or more of its aspects is somewhat novel and extraordinary, if not beyond the scope of judicial cognizance, but the alternative relief sought by the plaintiff is addressed to the practical consideration of the court and was the only point of view in which it was considered in the opinions of the court below, and that is whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest upon the sums he paid for the purchase and for taxes upon the surrender of the certificates he held. I do not perceive that there can be any other view taken by this court

The determination of this question depends upon the relations which existed between the taxpayer ana the authority imposing the tax and the remedies provided for enforcing and realizing the tax. These relations and remedies almost if not entirely are created by law. Hence the rules which exist in relation to the ordinary transactions of business between individuals, and between individuals and business corporations, are quite inapplicable to questions of this character.

It is essential to government that it possess the power to raise the means necessary for its support. It prescribes the mode of procedure for the accomplishment of that end.

The mode of procedure adopted by the defendant, and the one most common to municipal governments, is to assess upon taxable property within its jurisdiction the amount required in proportion to the value of the property owned by its citizens.

The owner must pay the tax imposed or its payment will be enforced. One mode of enforcement is to sell the property taxed in a manner that will yield the tax, either to an individual or to the municipal government. By these steps the object is accomplished. Whether any other steps having in view the relief of the owner by redemption or otherwise also depends upon "the statute. If such is the scheme, the law provides for the giving the purchaser a certificate which defines all bis rights and all the privileges of the delinquent taxpayer in respect to redemption. There are none other than those specified in the certificate. If redemption is made pursuant to the certificate, the purchaser at the tax sale will get his money back with such rate of increase, if any, as the certificate or the statute provides. If redemption is not made the purchaser will get such title to the property purchased as the proceedings to collect the tax conferred and no other. Nor will such purchaser get any covenants or obligations with such title than those prescribed by law and usually contained in the certificate. Cooley on Taxation, 329, 375, 572; Coffin v. The City of Brooklyn, 116 N. Y., 159-166; 26 N. Y. State Rep., 421; Brevoort v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y., 135; Lynde v. Melrose, 10 Allen, 49 ; White v. City of Brooklyn, decided in October, 1890, by this court, 33 N. Y. State Rep., 307, and to be reported in 122 N. Y., 53-64. The court, in the last case, speaking through Judge Bradley, used this language: “ They had no rights against the defendant, except such as were given by the contracts contained in the certificates, and those were to a conveyance unless irregularities were discovered in the proceedings prior to the sales, and in that ■case they.were entitled to repayment.of the amount of the purchase money as represented by the certificates of which they had the title.”

These and numerous other cases illustrate the principle that the rights of all parties connected with the purchase and sale of property to raise the taxes imposed upon it are created and defined by statute.

Now it appears from the case under consideration that in 1882 it was decided that a very large number of the taxes imposed upon lots by the authorities of the city of Brooklyn were illegal and many remained unpaid. And that the taxes imposed upon the lots described in the complaint in this action and for the non-payment of which some of them were sold, were illegal.' It also appeared that taxes for other years both before and after the year for which the lots were sold had been imposed upon these lots and that such other taxes were in most instances unpaid and in arrears. The general situation was that in some cases lots had been sold for the taxes for a single year or two and certificates issued to the purchaser; in other cases, lots had been bid off by the city for one or more years taxes and certificates of such sales had been assigned, and in more instances the taxes had not been paid for all the years they had been assessed and were in arrears.

In this condition of tax matters in the city of Brooklyn the legislature passed the acts of 1882 and 1884 set forth in the findings of the trial court.

The Act, chapter 363 of the Laws 1882, passed June 27th, 1882, may in a general way be characterized, especially as construed by-Judge Rapallo in Clementi v. Jackson, 92 N. Y., 591, as an act providing for the payment of irregular taxes upon certain conditions and validating the tax so paid and the payment.

The other Act, chapter 388 of the Laws of 1884, passed May 28, was an act for the relief of the holders of certificates and leases issued upon void assessments and who under the law, as before stated, were without a remedy. The benefit of this law was expressly reserved to the city by § 4 as against the holders of certificates and leases who should not avail themselves of the privileges ■offered by §§ 1, 2 and 3, of the last mentioned act. Section 4 is as follows: “Nothing in this act contained shall be held or construed to abrogate or in any way limit or affect any defense the city of Brooklyn may have against the said certificates of sale in case the holder or holders thereof shall refuse to accept the payments by this act authorized to be made, and to release the said •city from all claims thereunder; and all persons accepting any such payment shall as a condition of payment release said city of and from all claims against it upon the certificates held by them or growing out of the sales therein mentioned.”

The case then comes to this: that the certificate issued to plaintiff would give him back, if the premises were redeemed, the money he paid for it with a liberal interest. If the lot was not redeemed he could get the lot for the money he bid to pay the tax for which it was sold.

The lot was not redeemed and the taxes for which they were sold being void the plaintiff can get nothing by virtue of his certificate except the alternative therein provided, and that is, a nominal title that is void or a right not enforceable. The city, without legal obligation to do so, offer under the last named act to restore him the moneys he paid out. The plaintiff has refused to • accept the offer upon the terms proposed by the law. The defendant has no legal right to offer the plaintiff any different terms and the courts know of no other law to interpose for the relief of plaintiff.

The case is not so hard for the plaintiff as it may seem when it is viewed in a business or speculative light. He came forward of his own motion and bid off these lots for the tax, in some cases, of a single year. It was found by the trial court that such lot was worth more than the sum bid and all the other unpaid taxes thereon with interest for all the years in arrear from 1862 to 1882.

If the lot 'was redeemed he would receive his money back with a high rate of interest. If the taxes were legally assessed, the purchaser would get the title to the lot by paying the taxes upon it.

Looked at in these two lights it was a good business transaction. But if the taxes were void and the owners should find it out, and for that or any reason should not redeem, it would produce a loss to the plaintiff.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

All concur, except Haight, J., absent