Case ID: f-appx_113/html/0454-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "ROTH, Circuit Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert J. CELLA, Jr., Appellant, v. VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY; Aramark.
    No. 03-1749.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Argued on May 24, 2004.
    Decided Oct. 19, 2004.
    Jeanne M. Celia, (Argued), Black & Associates, Media, PA, for Appellant.
    Neil J. Hamburg, (Argued), JuHwon Lee, Michael E. Sacks, Hamburg & Golden, Philadelphia, PA, Hope A. Comisky, (Argued), Pepper Hamilton, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees.
    Before ROTH and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge.
    
      
       The Honorable William W Schwarzer, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
    
   OPINION

ROTH, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, Robert Celia claims that he suffered discrimination and a hostile work environment because of a physical impairment to his right elbow, diagnosed as lateral epicondylitis, or more colloquially, “tennis elbow.” After being fired from his custodial job, he sued his alleged employers, Villanova University and Aramark Facilities Services, Inc., under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA). The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that Celia had failed to prove that his impairment substantially limited one of his major life activities and that he had failed to present evidence showing Ara-mark to be his employer. On March, 14, 2003, Celia filed the present appeal.

We exercise plenary review over an order granting summary judgment. Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir.2003). Summary judgment is only granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F.R.C.P. 56(c). We must draw all factual inferences and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). We have jurisdiction in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Because we write only for the parties and the facts are familiar to them, we will not repeat the facts here.

To be covered under the ADA (or PHRA), Celia had to show that he was a “qualified individual with a disability” as defined by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Act defines a “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” Id. § 12102(2). There is no question in this case that Celia’s elbow problems qualify as a physical impairment. The only question for us, then, is whether his elbow problems “substantially” limited one of his “major life activities.”

The District Court held, and we agree, that Celia has failed to prove that his impairment substantially limited a major life activity. Major life activities include “those activities that are of central importance to daily life.” Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). This inquiry is directed not at an employee’s ability to perform a specific job but rather entails a review of many activities, such as “household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth.” Id. at 201-02. Furthermore, the limitation must be substantial; we do not consider “impairments that interfere in only a minor way.” Id. at 197. For example, in Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 202, the fact that the claimant avoided sweeping her house, stopped dancing, occasionally needed help dressing, and had to reduce the amount of time she spent playing with her children, gardening, or driving was not enough to establish as a matter of law that she was covered under the ADA.

Celia’s doctors put him on restriction from lifting over ten pounds for a period of time, but we have previously held that this kind of limitation alone does not establish that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir.2000). Furthermore, Celia had the burden to show that the impairment’s impact was “permanent or long-term.” Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii)(2001)).

Celia did not submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that his impairment substantially limited major life functions at the time during which he was employed by Villanova. As the District Judge noted, Celia could perform major life functions, albeit with some pain. He never put forth evidence to establish that his injury would be permanent or long term, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that his injury substantially limited any major life functions during the time that he was employed by Villanova.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court in favor of defendants. 
      
       As the District Court recognized, claims under the PHRA are generally subject to the same analysis as claims under the ADA. See Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 979 n.1 (3d Cir.1998) (noting that “Pennsylvania courts generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts, among them the ADA,” and that without objection by the parties, one analysis under the ADA suffices). Neither party contests this point.
     
      
       Although Celia is currently undergoing treatment for a mental impairment as well, he did not claim this as the basis of his discrimination before the District Court; thus, it is only the physical impairment that we are considering.