Case ID: f-appx_530/html/0048-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ingrid Cotterell INGRAM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUST ENERGY, Defendant-Appellee, Rebecca MacDonald, Ken Hartwick, Scott Gahn, Darren Pritchett, Beth Summers, Humera Siddiqui, Wayne Morgan, Jason Herod, Defendants.
    
    No. 12-3882.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    July 18, 2013.
    
      Ingrid Cotterell Ingram, Corona, NY, pro se.
    Charles E. Dorkey III, Seth H. Borden, Rebecca Tingey, McKenna Long & Al-dridge LLP, New York, NY, for Appellee.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, and SUSAN L. CARNEY and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Ingrid Cotterell Ingram appeals pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.) dismissing her employment discrimination suit against her former employer, Just Energy. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, we are “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Upon such review, we conclude that Ingram’s appeal is without merit for the reasons articulated by the district court in its memorandum and order. See Ingram v. MacDonald, No. 10-cv-3859 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012, ECF No. 111). We have considered all of Ingram’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.