Case ID: sc-eq_8/html/0107-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Colcock, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

James M'Clure and Wife v. William Miller and Wife, and Others.
    A gift by a woman, oil the eve of a second marriage, to her children by a former marriage, is no fraud upon the marital rights of the second husband, if he lmew of the gift before the marriage. Nor does it make any difference, that she was indebted, at the time, for the purchase money of the properly given, and that the children were interested in the debt, unless it appear that the fact was fraudulently concealed from the intended husband, vide Jones v. Cole, 2 Bailey, 331 S. P.
    Where property is delivered expressly as a gift, it cannot be presumed to be in satisfaction of a previously existing debt. Satisfaction is presumed only where the delivery is without explanation.
    An administratrix cannot avoid a purchase by herself at her own sale, if the distributees are satisfied with it. The rule that a trustee cannot purchase at his own sale, is intendedfor the protection of the cestuy que trust, only.
    
    Equity will not entertain jurisdiction of a matter which the party has had an opportunity of litigating in another Court,, and which has there been decided against him; unless it appear, that there existed circumstances, such as acci dent, or surprise, which prevented his making his defence, or trying the question.
    An administrator was cited, at a short notice, to account before the ordinary ^ and not appearing, a decree was made against him in his absence. Afterwards, in an action at law apon the decree, the administrator offered in discount an account for the maintenance of one of the distributees; which was rejected on the ground, that it ought to have been set up before the ordinary, and was concluded by the decree. Held, that he could not be relieved in Equity, as it did not appear, that there existed any circumstances which deprived him of the opportunity of setting up the discount before-the ordinary.
    Bill retained, where the defendant consented to an account to which the complainant was not intitled, as a set off against a judgment atlaw; but the injunction in the mean time dissolved, and the bill ordered, on payment of the sum 
      found by the account, or crediting it on the judgment, to stand dismissed with costs.
    v MTHure ] Bailey, 7.
    This was a bill to injoin a judgment at law, with various prayers f°r relief, which will sufficiently appear from the decree of the Chancellor. It was heard by Harper, Chancellor, at Chester, in June, 1827 : and the following decree was pronounced.
    Harper, Ch. The complainant, Mrs. Mary M’Clure, on the death of her former husband, James Clifton, administered on his estate. The whole of the personal estate was sold by permission of the ordinary, and several slaves, who are in question in this suit, purchased by the widow. Some time afterwards, she married the complainant, James M’Clure; but previously to her marriage, and with her intended husband’s knowledge, she conveyed the slaves by a deed of gift to her two children, the defendant Susannah, now the wife of William Miller, and Benjamin W. Clifton. On the 14th March, 1825, at the instance of defendant Susannah’s guardian, complainants were cited to appear before the ordinary, on the same day, to account for their administration of the estate of James Clifton. They did not appear, and the ordinary made a decree, which established that there was due to Mrs. Miller, six hundred and twenty-five dollars eighty-seven cents, for her distributive share of her father’s personal estate. An action at law was brought by the defendants, in the name of the ordinary, on the administration bond, and the amount of the decree recovered. On the trial at law, the complainants offered to prove as a set-off against Mrs. Miller, an account for her maintenance and education, and other charges. This set-off was rejected; the Circuit Court deciding, as it appears, that this account was properly cognizable before the ordinary, and should have been produced and proved before him, when the parties were cite<l t0 account, and that his decree was conclusive. On motion for anew trial, the decision was sustained on this express ground. The objects of die present bill are, to have the conveyance made by Mrs. M’Clure to her children, before the marriage, set aside as a fraud on the marital rights: or that the property conveyed should be decreed to have been in satisfaction, of what was due to the children from their mother, as administratrix: or, otherwise, that the purchase of the slaves at her own sale may be set aside, she having been incapable to purchase on account of her character of administratrix. The complainants also seek by their bill, to establish their account against Mrs. Miller for board, &c., either as a matter originally per-taming to the jurisdiction of this Court, or on the ground of the complainants having been surprised by the decree of the ordinary.
    It is hardly necessary to say, that the conveyance could be no fraud on the marital rights, when the husband knew it before the marriage. I will not say but that a case might arise, in which, if the wife, being indebted, should fraudulently conceal that fact, and make a voluntary conveyance of her whole property, or so much of it as to leave her unable to satisfy the debt, the husband, if he should be compelled to pay the debt, might be allowed to stand in the place of the creditors and avoid the conveyance, although he knew of it before the marriage. But in such a case, the actual fraudulent intention must be established, and I see no reason to impute any such here. Mr. M’Clure must have known that his intended wife was the administratrix ofher formerhushand; andindeed the bill doesnot charge ignorance of that fact, although it charges that M’Clure was ignorant of her having purchased these slave,s at the sale of her intestate’s estate. If he knew this, he must have known that she was indebted on account of her administration, as the children were minors, and could not have received their distributive shares. There was at least enough to put him upon inquiry. The ordinary’s office afforded him ready means of ascertaining the extent of the debt. At all events, I cannot say that there was a fraudulent concealment by MisM’Clure.
    Then as to the conveyance being a satisfaction. Ifithadbeenso intended, the children on coming of age'would have had an option, either to accept, or reject it. That which is given and accepted in satisfaction will be so considered by the Court. If a person indebted should pay money to his creditor, without specifying for what purpose, it would be natural enough to suppose that it was intended as payment. But this could not be supposed if the party paying expressly made it a gift. Where a father, being an executor, delivered property to his child, who was a residuary legatee, without explanation, this has been presumed to have been intended as in satisfaction of his legacy. But in this case I cannot presume against the express terms of the deed itself, which purports to make a gift. Certainly it was competent for the mother to make a gift to the children, although she was indebted to them; and she has done so.
    ^ t0 Pui’c^ase by the administratrix at her own sale, it has been said in some of the cases, that a purchase by a trustee at his °wn sale is void, at the option ofthe cestuy que trust. By this is meant, that the cestuy que trust is not bound to shew any fraud, or advantage, gained by the trustee. The chance of fraud, without the means of detection, is sufficient. But it would be singular indeed, that the trustee should avoid his own purchase, on the score of his possible fraud, when the cestuy que trust is satisfied. The trustee who has purchased may file a bill, calling on the cestuy que trust either to confirm, or avoid, the sale.
    I feel bound also to say, that the complainants come too late to establish their account for the maintenance of die defendant, Mrs. Miller, No doubt matters of account pertain to the original jurisdiction of this Court, and parties may come here to have an allowance for the maintenance of infants, past or future. But the decision of the Court of Appeals is conclusive, that I must regard this as a matter already adjudicated. But for this, the account would have been proper for the jurisdiction ofthe Court of Law. The opinion ofthe Courtis, that in the parties’ accounting before the ordinary, “the charge now made became a proper and indispensable matter of account; and from their acquiescence in the decree of the ordinary, it will be presumed, that all matters properly cognizable there, were fully adjusted, and settled.” That which has been once adjudicated, is final and conclusive between the same parties. The rule goes further. In the case of Le Guen v. Gouverneur and Kemble, 1 Johns. Cas. 436, a case which deserves much respect, from the great ability with which it was argued and determined, the rule was held to be, that what the parties have once had an opportunity of litigating, in the course of a judicial proceeding, they shall not bring into question again. In this doctrine I most fully concur. It' does not ajiply, of course, if there existed circumstances, such as give jurisdiction to this Court, to prevent the party’s making his defence, or trying the question. Such might be accident or surprise. Surprise is alleged in this case ; but I think not sustained. The citation to appear before the ordinary, to be sure, gave but a very short notice. But the evidence was, that the parties resided across the street, in the immediate vicinity ofthe ordinary’s office, and there was nothing to shew that they might not have attended. If they had attended, and asked for further time to make out their accounts, and it had been refused, this might have formed a different case.
    I should have dismissed the bill at once, had not the defendants, by their solicitor, submitted to credit any amount that the complainants may have expended for the education of Mrs. Miller; that is to say, actual disbursements for her expenses, exclusive of her board and maintenance at their own home. This must be matter of reference ; but as I order it only on the consent of the defendants, I cannot, against their wishes, continue the injunction. The complainants must run the risque of their forbearance to enforce these expenses, or of recovering it back after they shall have paid the judgment. The defendants also submit to credit the payment of $220.50 made on the judgment. Ineeed, this credit has been already given on the execution.
    It is ordered and decreed, that it be referred to the commissioner to report the amount expended by the complainants for the educacation of the defendant Mrs. Miller ; and that upon the defendants’ giving credit on their judgment at law, for the amount that shall be found due on the coming in of the said report, or refunding and paying to the complainants the said.amount, if their judgment shall have been previously satisfied, the bill stand dismissed with costs : otherwise to remain subject to the order of this Court.
    From this decree the complainants appealed.
    'Williams, for the appellants,
    contended, that if the gift were not void as a fraud upon the marital rights of the husband, it must be taken as a satisfaction of the claims of the distributees upon the wife, for their share of the purchase money of the property given. This was unquestionably the intention; and it is not pretended, but that the property was an adequate satisfaction, and more than adequate. Indeed, it is obvious, that the purpose of the donor was nothing more than to release to the distributees her interest in the estate of their father. If this were the intention, then it is clearly a satisfaction. The inclination of the Courts is, to regard gifts as a satisfaction of previously existing demands, even when they purport to be mere donations, unless the idea of satisfaction is expressly negatived. Wood v. B riant, 2 Atk. 522. Hinchcliffe v. Hinchcliffe, 3 Ves. 516. Myers v Myers, (ante p. 23.)
    
      Under any circumstances, the complainants have a strong equity ge(¡ asye t]ie sa¡e . an¿ ¡s a mistake to say, that an administrator cannot avoid his own sale. Teague v. Dunlap, Harp. Eq. 97,
    The decree of the ordinary is not conclusive as to the accounts . in this Court, although it was so at law. Equity will not enforce the judgment of a Court of Ordinary, but will simply decree an account. M'Culloughv. Daniel, Harp. Eq. 255.
    Mills, contra.
    
    There is no case where an express gift has been held a satisfaction. In all the cases of satisfaction, there was wanting a clear expression of the intention to make a mere gift; and the cases turn upon that point. In this case there is no room for doubt or construction.
    It would be exceedingly dangerous, if an administrator, or other trustee, were permitted to avoid his own sale. The rule that a trustee shall not purchase the trust property, is clearly intended for the benefit of the cestuy que trust: but it will be a very questionable benefit, if the trustee is also allowed to avoid the sale. In this case, however, the administratrix was under no disability to purchase. She was one of the distributees, and therefore had a right to purchase at the sale.
    As to the discount. If neither the decree of the ordinary, nor the judgment of the Court of Appeals, is to conclude the question, it is impossible to assign any limits to litigation. Interest reipublicm ut sit finis litium, is a sound maxim, and applies, if any where, to such a case as this.
    J. Johnston,in reply,
    citedBurges v. Mawbey, 10 Ves. 327, as to satisfaction. The complainants’ discount was a demand against one of the distributees, and therefore inadmissible in her account of the administration of the estate. Regularly, the ordinary could not have taken jurisdiction of it, and therefore his decree could not conclude it.
   Colcock, J.

This Court concurs with the Chancellor, in the very clear and correct view which he has taken of this case; and his decree is, therefore, affirmed.

Johnson, J. and Evans, J. concurred.

Decree affirmed.