Case ID: tenn_34/html/0152-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "TotteN, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Harrison Bennett vs. Benj. Avant.
    1. Attachment. Act of lt94, eh. 1, § 19, and 1843, ch. 29, §' 1. An attachment stating- that the- defendant is about to abscond, does not allege sufficient cause for the issuance of that writ.
    2. Interpretation. Abscond. To abscond in a legal sense, means to hide, conceal or absent oneself clandestinely, with the intent to avoid1 legal process.
    FROM- DBKALB.
    The plaintiff in error was defendant in an action of debt instituted by the defendant in error against hinr by attachment before a justice of the peace of the county of DeKalb. It was brought by appeal into the circuit court of said county. The attachment alleged that the defendant was “ about to abscond so that the ordinary process of law could not be served upon him.’1 In the circuit court, before Judge Goodall, a motion was made to quash the attachment, which was over*ruled, and on trial upon the merits- there was verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. He moved for a new-trial and in arrest of judgment, which were severally overruled, and he appealed in error to this court.
    Beiek and Waee, for- the plaintiff in error»
    Sava&e, for the defendant.
   TotteN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court-:

The action is debt, commenced by original attachment before a justice of DeHalb, who- rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Avant. The defendant, Benneftj, appealed, to the circuit court, where a motion to quash the attachment was overruled, and on a trial de novo, the same judgment was rendered, and defendant appealed in error to this court.

The question is: does the attachment state a sufficient cause for the issuance of that writ? We are of opinion that it does not.

It states for cause, “that jthe said Harrison Bennett is about to abscond, so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served on him.”

But the case provided for in the act of 1794, ch. 1, § 19, is, where the debtor “ so absconds or conceals himself, that the ordinary process of law cannot be served on him.” And in the act of 1843, ch. 29, § 1, it is stated to be where the debtor “shall be absconding or concealing himself.” These provisions in the two acts are of the same import.

To abscond in a legal sense, means to hide, conceal or absent oneself clandestinely, with the intent to avoid legal process.

How the case provided for in the statute implies the act done, and therefore the ordinary process cannot be served on the person.

But the case stated in this attachment, implies an act not done but about to be done. It states, not that the debtor absconds, or is absconding; but that he is “ about to abscond.” It is clear that the case is wholly different from that provided for, and that it assumes no legal ground for the process of attachment.

The judgment of the circuit court ’ will be reversed, and the motion to quash the attachment be sustained.

Judgment reversed.