Case ID: wis_164/html/0421-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "ViNJE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Sedgwick, Respondent, vs. Blanchard, Executor, and others, Appellants.
    
      November 16
    
    December 5, 1916.
    
    
      Pleading: Exhibit made part of complaint: Sufficiency: Contract for benefit of third person: Agreement to convey land: Enforcement.
    
    1. Where a copy of a contract is annexed to a complaint which states that it is so annexed and is “made a part of this complaint,” such contract is a part of the pleading and may properly he resorted to in determining its sufficiency.
    2. When a person for a valuable consideration paid to him by another agrees to pay or cause to b,e paid a sum of money to a third person, a stranger to the transaction, the latter thereby becomes possessed of the absolute right to the benefit of the promise, and a right of action thereby accrues to him against the promisor.
    3. The fact that the payment was to be in land and not in money does not affect the rule above stated.
    4. Where, by a written contract between father and son, the father agreed, in consideration of future support, etc., to convey certain land to the son by deed to become effective at the father’s death, and also to convey certain other land to a daughter who was not a party to the contract, hut after performance for some years by the son the father conveyed to him both tracts of land upon condition that he pay a certain sum of money to the daughter, the latter was entitled, after her father’s death, to compel the son to convey to her the land which he secured through a breach of the original contract.
    Appeal from an order of tbe circuit court for Dunn county: Geokge ThompsoN, Circuit Judge.
    
      Affirmed.
    
    Action to compel tbe conveyance of certain real estate to plaintiff. Tbe complaint alleges in substance that plaintiff is tbe daughter of H. C. Blanchard, deceased; that E. B. Blanchard, her brother, is tbe executor of tbe last will of tbe deceased, and that they constitute tbe sole heirs at law of H. 0. Blanchard. Elizabeth Blanchard is tbe wife of E. B. Blanchard. It further alleges that in 1903 H. C. Blanchard entered into a contract with E. B. Blanchard, wherein, in consideration of future support, care, medical attendance, and payment of funeral expenses, be agreed to deed to said E. B. Blanchard certain real estate of which he was then the owner, the deed to become effective upon the death of H. 0. Blanchard, and also to turn over to him personal property therein described, and to deed to plaintiff a certain described piece of real estate which he then owned and to deliver possession of all the real estate to be deeded to both son and daughter to the son to be used during the lifetime of H. 0. Blanchard; with other provisions not material to this case. The agreement also provided that any failure on the part of E. B. Blanchard to keep or perform any of the conditions of the contract should render the same null and void, and E. B. Blanchard should surrender possession of the premises to H. 0. Blanchard and l’edeliver to him the remaining personal property. The complaint further alleges that E. B. Blanchard entered into possession of all the real estate and personal property and supported his father pursuant to the agreement until on or about the 10th day of March, 1911, when, in consideration of love and affection, one dollar, and future support, care, and burial, H. 0. Blanchard executed and delivered a deed of all tbe real estate heretofore mentioned to E. B. Blanchard upon the condition that the latter pay the sum of $1,000 to plaintiff within five years from the date of the deed; that E. B. Blanchard accepted said deed and placed it on record on March 25, 1915. It then alleges that H. C. Blanchard died testate on the 23d day of March, 1915, devising said real estate to E. B. Blanchard subject to the payment of $1,000 to plaintiff; that demand to convey has been made upon defendants and that they have refused to do so. The defendants E. B. Blanchard and Elizabeth Blanchard entered a general demurrer and there was a separate demurrer by E. B. Blanchard as executor. The court overruled the demurrers, and the defendants appealed.
    For the appellants there was a brief by Freeman & Freeman, and oral argument by Charles E. Freeman.
    
    Eor the respondent there was a brief by J. B. Mathews and B. E. Bundy, and oral argument by Mr. Bundy and Mr. John E. Foley.
    
   ViNJE, J.

A copy of the contract entered into between E. B. Blanchard and H. O. Blanchard was marked Exhibit A and annexed to the complaint, which contained this allegation relative thereto: “a copy of which contract is hereto annexed, marked Exhibit A, and made a part of this complaint.” We fail to appreciate the force of appellants’ ten-page argument to the effect that the contract is not a part of the complaint and cannot be resorted to for the purpose of determining its sufficiency, nor can we see the relevancy of the cases cited to sustain the argument. The method here pursued of making the contract a part of the complaint has been too long recognized by this court to be now open to question or to need citation of authorities in its support.

The complaint alleges the execution of a written contract for a valuable consideration for the benefit of plaintiff, a stranger thereto; that the contract was performed for about eight years, when tbe parties thereto sought to change it without the consent of the plaintiff; that demand for a conveyance has been made and refused. The facts alleged bring the case under the principle declared in Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. W. 440, namely, that when a person for a consideration paid to him by another agrees to pay or cause to be paid a sum of money to a third person, a stranger to the transaction, the latter thereby becomes possessed of the absolute right to the benefit of the promise and a right of action thereby accrues to him against the promisor. This principle has since been recognized and applied in Security Nat. Bank v. St. Croix P. Co. 117 Wis. 211, 94 N. W. 74; Peterson v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 119 Wis. 197, 96 N. W. 532; Gilbert P. Co. v. Whiting P. Co. 123 Wis. 472, 102 N. W. 20; Smith v. Pfluger, 126 Wis. 253, 105 N. W. 476; Whiting v. Hoglund, 127 Wis. 135, 106 N. W. 391; U. S. G. Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wis. 539, 116 N. W. 238; Mootz v. Petraschefski, 137 Wis. 315, 118 N. W. 865; Warren Webster & Co. v. Beaumont H. Co. 151 Wis. 1, 138 N. W. 102; Zwietusch v. Becker, 153 Wis. 213, 140 N. W. 1056; Wetutzke v. Wetutzke, 158 Wis. 305, 148 N. W. 1088; Roundy, Peckham & Dexter Co. v. Baldwin, 161 Wis. 342, 154 N. W. 364; Concrete S. Co. v. Ill. S. Co. 163 Wis. 41, 157 N. W. 543, and is now too firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of the state to be successfully questioned. In Gimbel Bros. v. McConnell, 159 Wis. 325, 150 N. W. 495, the principle was recognized, but held not applicable since no valid contract was made. The fact that the payment was to he in land and not in money does not affect the rule.

Since the promisor is dead and the defendants now have title to the land, secured through a breach of the original contract, no reason is perceived why they should not be compelled to convey to plaintiff if the facts alleged in her complaint are established.

By the Oourt. — Order affirmed.