Case ID: us-ct-cl_6/html/0323-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Millig-an, J., Nott, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

D. AND T. HARRISON’S CASE. David and Thomas Harrison v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      An alien, resident in England, writes in September, 1361, to J3. iy Go., in Savannah, to purchase cotton and keep the same stored until the removal of the blockade and to draw on Mm for the purchase-money. B. Go. buy the cotton, and reimburse themselves by drawing on the alien in England, who accepts and pays the draft. The cotton is kept in Savannah till captured.
    
    It is not aid. or comfort to the rebellion for an alien, resident abroad, to purchase the products of the insurrectionary districts for ordinary business purposes through a commercial house within the rebel lines,.and to accept and pay drafts abroad drawn for the purchase-price of the products. Nor does such a transaction violate any statute of the United States, nor any rule of public law.
    
      Mr. C. P. Peek and Mr. JS. P. Norton for the claimants:
    The claimants in this case, are British subjects, and bring action to recover the proceeds of three hundred and nine bales of upland cotton, taken possession of by the United States after the occupation of Savannah by General Sherman.
    The proof of the ownership of the cotton is clear, and is se forth in the depositions. From these depositions it appears that the claimants, doing business in Staleybridge, England, under the name and style of T. Harrison & Sons, in the fall of 18(51, sent an order to their American correspondents, W. Battersby & Co., doing business in Savannah, to purchase for them one thousand bales of cotton, and to store the same in the interior until the removal of the blockade. Under this order Messrs. Battersby & Go. purchased, through their agent at Griffin, Georgia, three hundred and nine bales of cotton, the subject of this claim, and stored them at that place. The cotton remained there until the fall of Atlanta, in 1804, when, for greater security, as it was sujiposed, it was removed to Savannah.
    The cotton was paid for by W. Battersby, and a bill of exchange was drawn on the claimants for reimbursement. The testimony of Mr. Battersby, and Mr. Shuster, his clerk, together with Exhibits A and B, furnish a complete chain of evidence, and establish the ownership of the cotton by the claimants.
    Under the “cotton order,” issued -by General Sherman soon after the occupation of Savanuah, this cotton was reported to Colonel Hansom, United States quartermaster, by Mr; Bat-tersby, as held by the house of which he was a member, on account of the claimants. Mr. Battersby further testifies that it was taken possession of by the military authorities and shipped to New York, and without doubt it constitutes a portion of the 32,304 bales received from Savannah by Simeon Draper, according to the testimony of Francis Bobinson, United States special agent, in Padelford, & Mott v. The United States. See also transcript from Begistration Book, being-return from War Department in case of J. J. Waring and others.
    No allegation is made that the claimants ever violated their neutrality by giving aid or comfort in any way to the enemies of the United States.
    In view of the facts as stated above and proved by the evidence, a judgment is respectfully asked in accordance with the returns of sales of Savannah cotton by Simeon Draper, as appears from Exhibit D to deposition of Francis Bobinson, special agent, taken in case of Padelford & Mott v. The United States,. and agreed by stipulation with the solicitor for the United States to be used in this case.
    
      Mr. Joseph A. Ware (with whom was the Assistant Attorney General) for the defendants:
    •The claimants sue as aliens and subjects of Great Britain.. They file no allegation that the law of Great Britain accords to American citizens the right to sne that government in its own ■courts; consequently, the pleadings are defective, as a material issue is not raised.
    The claimants have given aid and comfort to the rebellion by sending sterling exchange, to the amount of several thousand pounds, into the confederacy, which inestimably valuable property was exchanged for cotton, which was of no value at that time and in that place.
    The order to Battersby to purchase was a violation of the blockade. There were no regular mails, and the difficulty of mail communication is shown by the evidence. The order was received May 22, 1862, and sent in December, 1861, both transactions being long after the blockade was established. It does not appear when the cotton was purchased; it may have been long after May 22, 1862. If this cotton had been captured when running the blockade out of Savannah, or if the coin represented by the bills of credit drawn by Battersby had been captured while running the blockade into the port of Savannah, either would have been confiscated or sold as prize. The claimant’s position is not improved because they waited until the blockade ceased by operation of war before they claimed to be the owners of the cotton.
   Millig-an, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimants are British subjects, and bring this action to recover the net proceeds of three hundred and nine bales of upland cotton, taken possession of by the United States after the •occupation of Savannah by General Sherman.

The facts found by the court are as follows :

1. The claimants are cotton-spinners in Staleybridge, England, and in the month of September, 1861, they wrote to Bat-tersby & Oo., at Savannah, Georgia, directing them to have one thousand bales of cotton purchased for them, to keep the same stored until the removal of the blockade, and to draw on them for the purchase-money. Upon this order, Battersby & Co. purchased seven hundred and fifty bales of cotton, of which the cotton claimed forms a part, and reimbursed themselves by drawing bills of exchange on the claimants in England.

j 2. The cotton claimed, viz: three hundred and nine bales upland, was stored for the account of the claimants in the city of Savannah. When the United States forces entered that city, they took possession of it by the agents of the government, shipped it to New York, there sold it, and paid the net proceeds, amounting to $54,176 97, into the Treasury of the United States.

3. The claimants are subjects and residents of Great Britain, and never gave any aid or comfort to the late rebellion, or persons engaged therein.

4. The British government accords .to citizen s of the United States the right to prosecute claims against that government in its courts, substantially as they are by law authorized to prosecute such claims against this government.

On the argument of this case the question was raised, but not vigorously pressed, that the transmission of the order to Battersby & Co., directing them to purchase the cotton in question, was a violation of the blockade. The order under which the purchases were made was dated the 10th of September, 1861, and whether it reached the purchasing agents at Savannah directly through the blockading squadron, or was received at some one of the ports in the loyal States and conveyed overland through the mails to Battersby & Co., does not appear. The reasonable inference, and perhaps the legal presumption, is that it came by the latter route. But be this as it may, it is not regarded of any importance. The transaction was purely of a private and commercial nature, and in no way connected with the war, or intended to have a hostile influence for or against either party to it. The order itself guarded the purchasing agents against all attempts to violate the blockade by sending the cotton out during its continuance. It was to be stored until the blockade was raised, and by no authority of which we are aware was the mere transmission of the order to-purchase a breach of the blockade, or a violation of any law of the United States.

Next, it is assumed-in argument that the transaction was aid and comfort to the enemy. The ground on which this argument seems to rest is, that it placed a fund in England on which an enemy of the United States might draw and apply to belligerent purposes. ' ■ .

This proposition may be admitted as a fact, but it would be a severe rule of law indeed, if such flowed from it, that would exclude the claimants from a standing in this court for what their agents might have done, but in fact did not d'o-. The-offences of Battersby & Co., whatever they may have been, independent of and outside of their connection with the claimants, can by no law of which we have any knowledge be imputed to the claimants.

But we do not place our decision of this question wholly on this ground. Battersby & Co. were authorized to draw on the claimants in England, to reimburse themselves for the purchase price of the cotton. They did so; but it nowhere appears in this record that any part of this-fund was ever employed in the service of the rebellion, or even brought within the limits of the rebel territory.

The question as made in the record then stands, was it aid and comfort to the rebellion for the claimants, being alien neutrals, to purchase the products of the insurrectionary States, for ordinary business purposes, through a commercial house in the rebel States, and to accept and pay their drafts in England for the purchase price of such products ? There is no law of the United States forbidding such a transaction in an alien neutral, and it contravenes no rule of the public law. The transaction was in itself legal, and the proof shows that it worked no aid or comfort, directly or indirectly, to the enemy. La Plante’s Case, (ante, ¶. 311.)

On the whole case we hold the claimants entitled to recover, and direct that judgment be entered iii their favor for $54,170 97.

Nott, J.,

dissenting:

I dissent from the judgment of the court upon the following grounds:

1. Non-resident aliens have no right to resort to the courts of a country, and come in only by treaty or through international comity. It is a controlling principle that courts will not aid a foreigner to accomplish that which the laws of the country forbid to its own citizens. These alien claimants are like smugglers : if they had acquired the fruit of their traffic, carried on in defiance of the municipal law and public policy of the United States, courts of the United States would not disturb them in their possession; conversely, if the forbidden traffic failed to reach a result, they cannot ask courts of the United States to collude wTith them in eluding the laws of the United States;

2. The government, in these abandoned or captured property cases, is a trustee. Tbe fund sought to be recovered is the fruit of the trust, with all the profits and advantages derived through the action of the government, and not the mere eight cents per pound that the claimants paid for their cotton. It would be contrary to the true intent of the statute to decree the government a trustee as to a transaction springing out of a traffic with the armed enemies of the United States, carried on by illicit means, in defiance of their laws, in violation of their blockade, and against their declared public policy. If the world could have anticipated the rule of law now insisted upon, there would have been no cotton owned in the insurgent districts, and the United States would now be the trustees of the persons who most completely placed ways and means at the disposal of the rebellion. If the claimants were entitled to recover, it would be merely the value of their cotton before capture; not a participation in the fruits of this trust.

3. The claimants, knowing that the interests and declared policy of the United States alike required that their insurgent citizens should be cut off from commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, voluntarily dealt with them, giving to persons engaged in the rebellion an available commercial credit in the manufacturing markets of the world. The act was aid and comfort to the rebellion, voluntary on the one hand, effective on the other.

4. The distinction between this case and La Plante’s is that there the claimant neither violated the blockade, nor sent money into the insurgent territory; nor placed an available credit in a foreign market at the disposal of those seeking to overthrow ■ this government; while here they substantially did all three of these things.