Case ID: so2d_90/html/0809-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "TERRELL, Justice. DREW, Chief Justice", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The STATE of Florida et al., Appellants, v. SOUTHEASTERN PALM BEACH COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT et al., Appellees.
    Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
    Nov. 21, 1956.
    Phillip D. O’Connell, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
    Neil E. MacMillan, .Delray Beach, for appellees.
   TERRELL, Justice.

In May, 1956, Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital District and the Board of Commissioners of Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital District, hereinafter referred to as the District, filed petition to validate bonds of said District for the purpose of erecting a hospital as authorized by Chapter 29387, Special Acts of 1953. The required notice was given and rule nisi was issued. Answer was.filed by the state; Cecil A. Young was permitted to intervene and file motion to dismiss and answer to the petition. At final hearing after testimony was taken, the. chancellor overruled all defenses to the petition and entered final decree validating the bonds. This appeal is from the final decree of validation in which the intervenor did not participate.

It is first contended that the legislature was without power to create a special taxing district from a portion of Palm Beach County for the purpose of erecting a hospital in said district, to issue bonds and impose taxes to pay interest on and retirement of said bonds.

It appears that this question was answered contrary to the contention of appellant by Langley v. South Broward Hospital District, Fla., 53 So.2d 781. This case had to do with the validity of Chapter 24415, Special Acts of 1947, creating South Broward Hospital District. Chapter 29387, Special Acts of 1953, except as to boundaries and location, was a duplicate of Chapter 24415, Special Acts of 1947, the validity of which was upheld in the last cited case. See also Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 145 Fla. 618, 200 So. 71; Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Indian River Mosquito Control Dist. v. Board of County Commissioners of Indian River County, 103 Fla. 946, 138 So. 625; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners, etc. v. Helseth, 104 Fla. 208, 140 So. 655; State ex rel. Robertson v. Gessner, 153 Fla. 865, 16 So.2d 51.

It is next contended that the requirements of Chapter 29387, Special Acts of 1953, were not met in that the published notice of the special election to ratify or reject said chapter did not show the polling places within the district where such election would be held and did not show the hours within which said election would be held but merely mentioned the polling places at which the election held the same day for election of school trustees would be conducted.

The notice of election complained of is as follows:

“Notice of Special Election to be held on November 8, 1955, Relating to Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital District.
“Notice is hereby given that a Special Election will be held in County Precincts Nos. 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 ('that part of said Precincts lying East of S.R. number 7) on November 8, 1955 for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting the terms and provisions of Chapter 29387, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1953, Creating and Incorporating a Special Tax District to be known as Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital District. Only qualified electors owning real property in the territory covered by said Hospital District shall be entitled to vote at said election.
“The territory covered by said District is as follows: * * * (particularly described).
“The polling places for said election, and the election officers who shall conduct the election are the same as those selected and appointed for the election of School Trustees on said date."

It is a fact that a special election was being held in the District for election of school trustees on the date designated for approving or rejecting Chapter 29387 creating the Hospital District. There was no legal reason why both said elections could not be held on the same date. We do not think the objection to the notice was material. Chapter 29387, Special Acts of 1953, required that it be submitted to the qualified electors who are freeholders for approval or rejection. In the final decree the chancellor found that such an election was duly called for November 8, 1955, as required by Chapter 29387, that a majority of the qualified electors owning real estate in said District ratified all the terms of said Chapter 29387, the vote being 2028 votes for ratification and 189 votes against ratification. The chancellor, further found that none of the irregularities complained of in any way affected the outcome of the election, that it was amply publicized and no one was misled in any way.

The chancellor further found that an election was held in the District March 27, 1956, to approve or disapprove issuance of the bonds for construction of the hospital; that said election was in all respects held as required by law and resulted in said bond issue being approved by a vote of 2782 for approval and 204 votes against approval and that a majority of the qualified electors of said District who were freeholders at the time of the election both participated in said election and voted to approve said bonds.

It is accordingly our view that ample necessity for the hospital was shown, that Chapter 29387, Special Acts of 1953, authorizing it was regularly and legally approved, and issuance of bonds was approved by the freeholders as required by Section 6, Article IX of the Constitution, F.S.A. so the validating decree is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur.

DREW, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, HOBSON, THORNAL and O’CON-NELL, JJ., concur specially.

ROBERTS, J., not participating.

DREW, Chief Justice

(concurring specially).

In this case, as in the case of Langley v. Southern Broward Hospital District, Fla. 1951, 53 So.2d 781, the appellants rely principally upon the decision of this Court - in the case of Crowder v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 440, 1 So.2d 629, and the Missouri case of Board of Commissioners of Tuberculosis Hospital District of Buchanan County v. Peter, 253 Mo. 520, 161 S.W. 1155. Langley v. Southern Broward Hospital District, supra, was affirmed by this Court per curiam upon the authority of State v. City of Port St. Joe, Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 584; Dixon v. City of Miami, 126 Fla. 249, 170 So. 845; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Indian River Mosquito Control District v. Board of County Commissioners of Indian River County, 103 Fla. 946, 138 So. 625; Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; Crowder v. Phillips, supra.

Crowder v. Phillips, supra [146 Fla. 440, 1 So.2d 630], concerned a hospital district “coextensive with Leon County.” Chapter 19939, Laws of Florida, Special Acts of 1939. There we held that such a district (a district co-extensive with the boundaries of a county) may not be created and vested with general taxing authority “and' that the general power of taxation can be exercised only by the county.” The rationale of that opinion was that only .the county- was authorized under Section 5 of Article IX of the Florida Constitution to levy a tax for a county purpose. Under Sec. 3 of Article XIII, of the Constitution, counties are authorized to provide for those of the inhabitants thereof who by reason of infirmity or misfortune may have claims -upon the aid and sympathy of society. That such is a county purpose for which the county may lawfully levy a general ad valorem tax is obvious. It was upon this theory that we held that it was beyond the power of the Legislature to authorize the creation of such a hospital district with territory co-extensive with that of a county and vest the authority created by that district with the power to levy a limited tax for such county purpose thereby violating the constitutional provision that such power was vested solely in the Board of County Commissioners.

In Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 145 Fla. 618, 200 So. 71, 76, this Court held:

“Section 1, Article IX of the constitution does not limit the taxing power of the legislature to State, county, and municipal taxation.' Taxing districts are now a part of the fiscal taxing system of the State. See Secs. 10, 11, 17, Article XII, and amended Sec. 6 and Sec. 10, Article IX, Florida constitution. Statutory taxing power is as potent as to taxing districts as it is to the State, counties, and municipalities, unless restrained by a paramount law.”

And again in Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839, 843, we said:

“In the exercise of its inherent sovereign powers,, -the state may impose taxes to be used for a governmental purpose, and the only limitations imposed are those contained in the federal and state Constitutions, designed to protect personal and property rights against arbitrary and oppressive exertions- of governmental power. The extent of the taxing unit may be confined to a designated district or subdivision that may be or whose inhabitants may be directly and peculiarly benefited by the application.of the tax money to the pürpose contemplated.”

See also State ex rel. Board of Commissioners of Indian River Mosquito Control District v. Board of County Commissioners of Indian River County, supra; State ex rel. Board of Commissioners, etc. v. Helseth, 104 Fla. 208, 140 So. 655; and State ex rel. Robertson v. Gessner, 153 Fla. 865, 16 So.2d 51.

The Missouri' case, Board of Commissioners of Tuberculosis Hospital District of Buchanan County v. Peter, supra, is hot authority 'for thie’proposition contended for by appellants. It is true as -argued by appellants that the constitutional provisions of the State of Missouri vest the taxing power in the general assembly for state purposes and in the counties and other municipal corporations, under authority granted them by the general assembly of Missouri, for county and other corporate purposes; .,but it is also true that in that case the district created embraced the whole of Buchanan County. The decision of that Court, however, did not rest primarily on the foundation that our decision in Crowder v. Phillips, supra, rested. The Missouri Constitution contained a specific provision limiting the rate of taxation in the various counties of the State of Missouri. So far as Buchanan County was concerned, such rate was limited in the Constitution of Missouri to 350 on the $100 valuation, subject to be increased in certain instances only upon a favorable vote of ^rds of the qualified voters of such county voting at an election for such purpose. The Missouri court [253 Mo. 520, 161 S.W. 1159], in view of this specific limitation in the Constitution, said “The case, then must stand or fall on the proposition that the proposed levy [for such hospital district comprising the territory embraced in the county] is in addition to the 350 allowed by the Constitution for ‘county purposes.’ ” Then, in referring to the hospital act under review, the Court observed “The law maker, then, must be held to have intended his act to permit a levy in addition to the 350 permitted by the Constitution * * It was on that basis that the Supreme Court of Missouri held such act to be unconstitutional. The case is, therefore, not even persuasive in this'instance.

In the matter now under consideration, the -hospital district comprises only a portion of Palm Beach County and the tax authorized is limited by the 'Act. It does not authorize the governing board to levy a general county - tax and,’ therefore, is clearly distinguishable from the holding of this Court in Crowder v. Phillips, supra, relating to Leon County. '

I, therefore, concur in the foregoing opinion and judgment of affirmance.

TERRELL, • THOMAS, HOBSON, TH.ORNAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., concur. ,.

ROBERTS, J., not participating.