Case ID: sw2d_2/html/0265-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BAKER, J. MORROW, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FORD v. STATE.
    (No. 10550.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 19, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1928.
    I.Criminal law <&wkey;>!099(6) — Statement of facts, not filed until more than 90 days after notice of appeal was given, would not be considered by reviewing court (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 760). ' ■
    Under Code Cr. Proe. 1925, art. 760, limiting the time for filing statements of facts, statement of facts and bill of exceptions filed more than 90 days after notice of appeal was given held not timely and would not be considered by the reviewing court. -
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    2. Indictment and information <&wkey;93 — Facts constituting crime must be set forth so that conclusions of iaw may be arrived at from facts stated (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 396).
    In indictment or information, the facts constituting the crime must, because of Code Cr. Proe. 1925, art. 396, be set forth, so that the conclusions of law may be arrived at from the facts so stated.
    3. indictment and information <&wkey;7l — Elements of offense must be so averred as to apprise accused of charge against him (Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 396).
    Under Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 396, the elements of an offense must be so averred in an indictment or information as to apprise the accused of the charge against him and enable him to plead judgment in bar of another prosecution for the same act, but this does not necessitate minuteness of detail.
    4. Indictment and information <&wkey;l 10(3) — Indictment in statutory language is sufficient if ' language of statute is itself completely descriptive of offense.
    An indictment will be sufficient where it follows the Janguage of the statute, if the language of the statute itself is completely descriptive of the offense.
    5. Indictment and information &wkey;>l 10(31)— Indictment charging in statutory language that defendant possessed “equipment” for manufacturing liquor held, sufficient (Code Cr. Proc. 1925; art. 396; Const, art. I, § 10; Pen. Code 1925, art. 667).
    In prosecution for the possession of equipment for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, indictment in language of Pen. Code 1925, art. 667, prohibiting such offense and alleging that defendant “did then and there unlawfully 'possess equipment for the manufacture of liquor capable of producing intoxication, to wit, whisky,” held sufficient within Code Cr. Proc. 1925, art. 396, and Const, art. 1, § 10, as properly informing the defendant as to the nature and cause of the accusation against him; word “equipment” including articles comprised in an outfit.
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Equipment.]
    6. Indictment and information <&wkey;l25(20)— Where offense may be committed in several ways, indictment or information does not «become duplicitous by charging all in the conjunctive.
    Where an offense may be committed in sev■eral ways, an indictment or information does not become duplicitous by charging all of them in the conjunctive.
    Appeal from District Court, Nolan County ; W. P. Leslie, Judge.
    George Ford was convicted for the unlawful possession of equipment for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    ■ W. E. Ponder, of Sweetwater, for 'appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., and Robt. M. Lyles, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.
   BAKER, J.

The appellant was convicted in the district court of Nolan county for the unlawful possession of equipment for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and his punishment assessed at one year in the penitentiary.

The record discloses that the statement of facts and bills of exception were filed more than 90 days after notice of appeal was given, contrary to article 760, C. C. P. 1925, and for that reason we are unauthorized to consider same. Bailey v. State, 104 Tex. Or. R. 150, 282 S. W. 804.

The indictment being regular and no fundamental error appearing in the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM. The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. J.

The sufficiency of the indictment is attached upon the ground that it was indefinite. This is the language, used:

• “Did then and there unlawfully possess equipment for the manufacture of liquor capable of producing intoxication, to wit, whisky.”

Appellant, through his counsel, presents an interesting argument, showing thought and research, insisting that the indictment offends against the Bill of Rights embraced in article 1, § 10, of the Constitution, wherein it is said that:

“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have * * * the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; * * * and no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an indictment of a grand jury.”

The word “indictment” had a well-defined meaning at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. It required a statement of the essential acts or omissions which constitute the offense with which the party is accused. All that is essential to constitute the offense must be explicitly charged and cannot be aided by intendment. The mere statement of a legal result or a conclusion of law will not be sufficient. The facts constituting the crime must be set forth so that the conclusions of law may be arrived at from the facts so stated. See Rodriguez v. State, 12 Tex. App. 552; Hewitt v. State, 25 Tex. 722. Nine requisites of an indictment are set out in the statute, article 396, O. O. P. 1925. The seventh item reads thus: “The offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible words.” This means more than that the accused must be charged in general terms with the commission of some crime. The indictment must particularize the acts or omissions complained of so that the identity cannot be mistaken. Alexander v. State, 27 Tex. App. 95, 10 S. W. 764. The elements of the offense should be so averred as to apprise the accused of the charge against him and to enable him to plead a judgment in bar of another prosecution for the same act. Jennings v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R, 639, 229 S. W. 925. The law does not require minuteness of detail, but demands only that the particular offense be set out with such certainty that a presumptively innocent man seeking to know what he must meet may ascertain fully therefrom the matters charged against him. Harden v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 220, 211 S. W. 233, 4 A. L. R. 1308; Stanford v. State, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 111, 268 S. W. 161. Generally speaking, it is sufficient to describe the offense as it is described in the statute. Burch v. The Republic, 1 Tex. 608; Michie’s Encyc. “Digest of Tex. Rep. vol. 4, p. 311, and precedents collated. To this rule, however, there are many exceptions. Todd v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 99, 229 S. W. 515; Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C. § 494, and cases collated. If the language of the statute is itself completely descriptive of the offense, the indictment will he sufficient if it follows the statute. McFain v. State, 41 Tex. 3S5, and other cases collated in Branch’s Ann. Tex. P. C. § 494.

In the present instance, the statute (Pen. Code 1925, art. 667) is followed. The offense denounced is ‘the possession of “any equipment, still, mash, material, supplies, device, or other thing for manufacturing” intoxicating liquors. An indictment charging each of these things in the conjunctive would come within the approved rule declaring that where an offense may be committed in several ways, it does not become duplicitous by charging all of them. This has been held under this particular statute. See Todd v. State, supra. So, in the present ease, if the indictment had charged that the appellant possessed equipment, still, mash, materials, supplies, device, or other thing for the manufacture of intoxicating liquors, it would have ifeen obnoxious to no rule of which we are aware. If it had undertaken to use the language of the statute, “or other thing for manufacturing," etc., it would have been bad for failing to name the thing. In other words, to charge that he possessed a “thing,” without classifying it, would be indefinite, but to charge equipment — one of the words used in the statute — has heretofore been held not indefinite. See Adams v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. R. 175, 287 S. W. 499; Harrison v. State, 103 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 279 S. W. 455; Rhodes v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 36, 276 S. W. 1100. The word “equipment” would include “the articles comprised in an outfit.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, p. 742. As-used in the statute mentioned, we think it would embrace utensils usable for the manufacture of whisky, whether assembled or not. The real substance of the offense is the intent — the purpose — for which they are possessed.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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