Case ID: misc_46/html/0157-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Blanchard, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Matter of the Application, etc., to Lay out Driveway in City of New York.
    (Supreme Court, New York Special Term,
    January, 1905.)
    Accretion — Title by — Acquiring land along Harlem river for driveway purposes — Riparian owners — No damages for taking land under water.
    Title by accretion can be acquired only when the accretion is due to a gradual and natural deposit of soil along the border of the •upland.
    In a proceeding to acquire land and prop'erty rights therein for the purposes of laying out, establishing and regulating a public speedway in the city of New York along the Harlem river, riparian owners, having no title thereto, are not entitled to an award for damages for the land under water and a contention that the land filled in by the city between the line of the speedway and high water mark should be regarded as an accretion to the upland, is without warrant in. law.
    Application by the corporation counsel to lay out, establish and regulate a public driveway in the city of Few York pursuant to Laws 1893, chapter 102.
    John J. Delany, Corporation Counsel; Edward H. Hawke, Jr., special counsel for city of New York.
    James A. Deering, Joseph A. Flannery, Clark Bell, Dutton & Kilsheimer, John G. Shaw, Alfred F. Beadleston, Clark B. Augustine, for claimants.
   Blanchard, J.

The owners of the upland were entitled to riparian easements (Matter of City of New York, 168 N. Y. 134), but had no title to the fee of the land under the water of Harlem river. Their ownership extended to high-water mark only. Sage v. Mayor, 154 id. 61. The commissioners, therefore, properly refused to award damages for land under water taken for the speedway or for land filled in by the city lying between the westerly line of the speedway and high-water mark. The contention of counsel for Bell and others that-this filled-in land should be regarded as an accretion to the upland has no warrant in law. Title by accretion can be acquired only when the accretion is due to a gradual and natural deposit of soil along the border of the upland. Steers v. City of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y. 51; Mulry v. Norton, 100 id. 424. The doctrine of accretion does not apply to land reclaimed by human agencies. Matter of State Reservation, 16 Abb. N. C. 176, note; Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y. 61, 63. For the purposes of estimating the damage to the riparian owners for injury to riparian easements due to the construction of the speedway this filled-in land may be considered as a part of the speedway improvement, and as the commissioners have awarded damages for this injury there is no reason why they should be required to reconsider or report upon the claims of riparian owners to the land under water. The order proposed by the attorney for Barney and others fully protects the legitimate interests of all concerned. Order referring the matter back to the commissioners for revisal and correction signed.

Ordered accordingly.