Case ID: ny-st-rep_43/html/0824-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Hardin, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John D. Brunner, App’lt, v. Francis W. Downs et al., Resp’ts.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department,
    
    
      Filed February 13, 1892.)
    
    1. Municipal corporations—Binghamton—Ordinances—Fire limits.
    The ordinances of the city of Binghamton passed in 1867 in relation to- ■ the fire limits and regulating building therein, were fully legalized and. ' confirmed by the charter of 1888.
    3.' Same—.Recorder—False imprisonment.
    A violation of such ordinances is a misdemeanor of which the recorder of the city has jurisdiction, and upon complaint thereof being made tO' him he acts judicially in granting a warrant, and cannot be held liable for false imprisonment in so doing.
    3. Appeal—Hew trial.
    Where neither the motion for a new trial, nor the order denying the same, state the grounds on which it was made, the appellate court cannot review such order.
    Appear from a judgment entered upon a nonsuit granted at. the' Broome circuit; also, from an order denying a new trial on the m inn tea. Action for alleged false imprisonment; defense,. that the défendant Downs was recorder of the city of! Binghamton, and as -such issued a warrant upon the complaint, of defendant Newell for a violation of an ordinance of the city of Binghamton in respect to fire limits therein, in which warrant it was stated that Brunner, the plaintiff here, “ did violate-section three of an ordinance of the city of Binghamton, entitled! An ordinance providing for security against fires, passed May 22d, 1867, by building or -repairing a building within the limit, of said .city, which has been damaged to more than fifty per cent, of its value, without the permission of the common council ; ” which warrant was issued against Brunner, the plaintiff here, on the 12th of February, 1889, by Downs as recorder. In the affidavit or deposition presented to the recorder by Newell,, it was alleged that Brunner and others “did violate section three of an ordinance of said city, entitled An ordinan.ce providing for security against fires, passed May 22d, 1867, by building or repairing a building which was injured by fire to more than fifty per cent, of its value, without permission of the common council of the city of Binghamton; ” the affidavit was sworn to by Newell on the 12 th of February, 1889, before Downs as recorder. Brunner was taken into custody by an officer, and went to the recorder’s office, and proceedings were there had resulting in several adjournments, and finally in a trial before the recorder and a conviction, and a fine was imposed of $100, and an imprisonment not exceeding twenty days. After the termination of the proceedings before the recorder an appeal was taken to the court of sessions of Broome county, where the ■conviction and judgment were reversed for errors in rulings in respect to the admission and rejection of evidence. The deposition, warrant, evidence and proceedings before the recorder were offered in evidence". At the close of the evidence the court granted a nonsuit.
    Babcock, Sperry & Van Cleve, for app’lt; George B. Curtis, for resp’ts.
   Hardin, P. J.

By the evidence it appears that the common ■council adopted an ordinance May 22, 1867, which was amended September 20, 1875, relating to the fire limits; that ordinance provided “No building or part of any building, unless constructed with outside and party walls of brick or stone, and fire proof roof, shall, without the permission of the common council, given by a vote of two-thirds of all the members' elected thereto, hereafter be erected or placed or moved from one point to another within, or moved from another place into the following described' territory, which shall constitute the fire limits of the city of Binghamton, viz: The city limits of the city of Binghamton shall ■constitute the fire limits of said city.” The ordinance further provided as follows: “ No building within said limits which may hereafter be damaged by fire to the extent of more than fifty per ■cent, of the value thereof, shall be rebuilt, except in the manner, and of the materials hereinbefore authorized to be used, without the permission of the common council, given by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected thereto.” By chapter 214 of the Laws of 1888, the charter of the city was revised (Session Laws, 1888, p. 821) and in subdivision 23 of § 5 of title 3 the common ■council is given power “ To regulate the thickness and manner of construction of brick, stone or wooden walls for building; to prohibit the construction of any such building or wall as it may deem dangerous to life, and require the removal of any such so constructed; to prohibit the erection of sheds and fences in such a manner as unnecessarily to vex or annoy the adjoining proprietors and to require the removal of any such so erected, etc.;” and in subdivision 25, power was given to the common council “ to extend and define, 'from time to time, the ground to be included within the fire limits; to require, regulate or prohibit all such •other acts to be done as it may deem proper to prevent the occur* renee or to provide for the extinguishment of fires in the city.” Im § 25 of the revised charter (Session Laws, 1888, p. 380) it xvas; provided that “All' ordinances heretofore made by the common council of said city are hereby legalized and confirmed and declared legal and valid, provided they are such ordinances as said common council is authorized to pass under this act as hereby-amended, and whenever by said ordinances a .penalty is prescribed for their violation,, the word ‘penalty’ as therein used shall be construed to mean, and include penalty or fine, and either a penalty or a fine to the amount therein named may be imposed for the violation thereof, as the court or officer before whom complaint shall be made may determine.”

In § 8 of tit, 3 power was given to the common council to provide that imprisonment might be made in the Broome county jail, and discretion was given to the court to impose “ punishment im the discretion of the court, but no penalty or fine shall exceed one-hundred dollars (except in the case of constructing or repairing buildings within the fire limits as hereinafter directed), nor the; length of such imprisonment exceed one hundred days.” Hollowing this provision in the charter is one as follows: “ The violation of any such ordinance is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and may be punished as such when the mode of punishment shall not be prescribed in such ordinance. Violations of all ordinances- and resolutions may also be restrained by the injunction order of any court having jurisdiction, etc.” In tit. 4 of the revision- the-recorder is given jurisdiction to issue criminal process and to hold a court of special sessions; and by § 4 of tit. 4 he is authorized 'to “ hear, try and determine in a summary way any complaint for any violation of the laws of the state, * * * or of the ordinances of the city.” In § 3 the recorder is authorized “to hear and entertain complaints and conduct all examinations in criminal, cases; ” that section further provides that “ The court of special sessions held by said recorder shall also have jurisdiction of, and power to hear and determine charges for every other misdemeanor committed or charged to have been committed within said city,,, for which the accused shall elect to be tried before said court. Whenever a defendant tried before a court of special sessions held by said recorder shall be convicted, said court shall render judgment upon such conviction, and shall inflict such punishment, by fine or imprisonment, or both, as any other court having jurisdiction of the offense could inflict, and shall have the same jurisdiction to sentence and punish the persons so convicted as courts of sessions have for the same offense.”

We are of the opinion that the recorder had jurisdiction over offenses known as misdemeanors committed in the city of Binghamton in virtue of the provisions of the statute which we have-quoted.

We are further of the opinion that § 25 of the charter “legalized and confirmed ” the ordinances passed in respect to the fire-limits already referred to. We are also of the opinion that § 8 of title 3 declares every violation of an ordinance to be a misdemeanor; and it further provides that such violation “may b& punished as such when the mode of punishment shall not be prescribed in such ordinance.” Section 8 of title 3 seems to limit the fine to be imposed for the violation of the ordinance in question to a sum not exceeding $100 and to declare that the imprisonment shall not exceed 100 days.

We are inclined to think this limitation takes a violation of the •ordinance in question out of the general provision of § 15 of the Penal Code which applies to cases where punishment is not specifically prescribed in a statutory provision or in that Code. The penalty imposed by the recorder did not exceed that permitted in | 8 of title 3. We are of the opinion that when the affidavit or deposition of Newell was presented to the recorder on the 12th •of February, 1889, he was called upon to decide whether a misdemeanor had been committed within his jurisdiction, and that when he issued the warrant on that day for the arrest of the plaintiff he had jurisdiction of the subj'ect matter and of the person of the plaintiff who was accused of violating § 3 of an ordinance of the city by “ building or repairing a building which was injured by fire to more than fifty per cent of its value, without permission of the common council of the city of Binghamton.”

In Harman v. Brotherson, 1 Denio, 537, it was held that although an affidavit was insufficient to sustain an order to hold to bail against a motion to set it aside it protected the officer making it ■against an action for false imprisonment. In that case it was said : “ If Brotherson had moved the court the order to hold to bail would have been revoked. But it is a very different question whether the officer who made the order can be treated as a trespasser. It was a case where, upon proper proof, an order to hold to bail might be made. A copias and an affidavit were laid before the officer; the affidavit making out a fair case for the exercise of his judgment. The plaintiff might have been relieved •on motion from the effect of the order; but he cannot maintain an action against the officer.”

A similar doctrine was laid down in Landt v. Hilts, 19 Barb., 283, and many other cases bearing upon the question were referred to and commented upon in the opinion of Hardin, P. J., •delivered in Austin v. Vrooman and Chase, which opinion lias been approved by the court of appeals, as appears by the opinion •of Peckham, J., reported in 40 St Rep., 338.

Other questions are presented in the argument of the counsel for the appellant, but we find them quite satisfactorily discussed and disposed of in the opinion of Parker, J., delivered in denying the motion for a new trial upon the minutes. The motion for a hew trial on the minutes did not specify any grounds upon which it was made, nor does the order specify any grounds upon which the same was made; we therefore, may not review the same.

The appeal from the order should be dismissed and the judgment entered upon the nonsuit should be affirmed, with costs. Appeal from the order dismissed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

Martik and Merwik, JJ, concur.