Case ID: scl_5/html/0204-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per curiam.\n     Brevard, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JAN. 1815.
    (Present — Judges John Fatjchereaud Grimke, Elihu Hall Bay, Joseph Brevard, William Smith, Abraham Nott, and Charles JowES Co:lcook> Esquires.)
    Isaac Barrineau v. James M’Murray, and James G. M’Gill.
    By the stat. 27 Eliz. voluntary conveyances are to he regarded, as against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration, as fraudulent and void, and that notice of a prior voluntary conveyance is not material.
    Motion for a new trial.
    The action was trespass to try titles to land, tried before Judge Smith, in the Circuit Court of Common Pleas, held for Georgetown district.
    The plaintiff gave in evidence a deed of conveyance of the land in question, from John Brown to Robert Hamilton, Jr., and a conveyance from Hamilton to himself. The defendant, M’Murray, claimed in right of his wife, Betsey Margaret Brown, daughter of the said John Brown, and by virtue of a deed of conveyance to her, from her father, dated the 2d September, 1798. The deed to Hamilton was dated 16th December, 1798. It was contended, that the deed to B. M. Brown was fraudulent, as being a voluntary deed, and void as to subsequent purchasers, for valuable cQnsideration, and also as to creditors. A witness swore that he was present when the deed was made to Hamilton. That Hamilton had an instrument of writing in his hand, and offered Brown, if he would sign it, to give him £10 sterling. Brown said he had no land to sell. Hamilton replied, “I do not care, only sign the writing, and here is the money.” Brown signed the paper, and took the money. The next day after, Brown tendered back the money to Hamilton, and wished to get back the writing he had signed, or have it cancelled ; but Hamilton refused the money, told Brown he might keep it, and that he had got what he wanted. The witness further stated, that Brown did not appear to be sober, but in liquor, when hé signed the deed. He was addicted to drink; but it did not appear that he was so much intoxicated as to bo deprived of his reason and judgment. The witness told Hamilton, that if Betsey M. Brown should marry a smart man he would .lose the land. Hamilton answered, that he was not afraid, for they were poor people, and could not go to law with him. The land was worth $000, and Miss Brown was under legal age when the deeds were made. Another witness proved, that Hamilton said that Brown and his daughter were poor, people, and’ could not go ■to law with him. Another witness heard Hamilton say, that he had got something fixed, when he did not expect it, but could not say what was meant. Another witness was present when Hamilton refused to cancel the deed from Brown. Another witness proved, that Hamilton endeavored to prevail with Betsey Margaret Brown to sign the deed, which she refused, and that he threatened to-turn her out of doors, and all she had. Another witness proved, that Brown owed him a small sum when the deeds were made, which he afterwards paid. The plaintiff gave in evidence the testimony of Mr. Potts, who drew the deed to Betsey M. Brown. Brow'n told this witness, that he wished to secure the land from an execution against him for costs, and that he owed £30 to Hamilton. There was no other evidence that he owed Hamilton any thing, nor that Hamilton ever pretended that he did owe him. It appeared that he had other property sufficient to pay any debt he might owe.
    The counsel for the defendants contended, that the deed to Bet. sey M. Brown was not fraudulent, as against creditors, nor against a subsequent purchaser, having knowledge of the prior deed. That Hamilton was guilty of fraud in compassing the deed from Brown. That Hamilton was not a purchaser for a valuable consideration.
    Verdict for the plaintiff.
    Jan. 6th, 1815.
    Argued by Simons, for the defendants, and Richardson, for plaintiff.
   Per curiam.

The case was fairly submitted to the jury, and the presiding judge is satisfied with the verdict. It does not appear that any rule of law has been infringed, nor that the verdict is contrary to evidence. Therefore a new trial is denied.

Brevard, J.

The rights of creditors are not in question. There is no sufficient evidence of imposition, or undue advantage taken of a drunken man. There is no sufficient evidence that Hamilton had any certain knowledge of the prior existing deed to Betsey M. Brown. There was no evidence of the concealment of material facts, or false allegations, to overreach and defraud Brown. How far the deed is to be considered valid, or sufficient, to transfer the estate, in opposition to the prior deed to Betsey M. Brown, must depend on the true construction of the stat. 27 Eliz. c. 4. The doctrine appears to be established in England, that voluntary conveyances by this statute, are to be regarded as against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration, as fraudulent and void, and that notice of a prior voluntary conveyance is not material. This doctrine has been sometimes doubted, in conse-cluence ceriain expressions of Lord Mansfield, in the cases of Cadogan v. Kennet, and Doe v. Routledge. 1 Cowp. 432, 705. It seems to me, that in those cases, Lord Mansfield has confounded the rights of creditors with those of subsequent purchasers; whereas, the stat. 13 and 27 Eliz., appear to have distinct objects in view. He says, truly, that voluntary conveyances may be good against creditors; but it does not follow that they are so against purchasers. Voluntary conveyances are not void merely, because they are voluntary, but because, from the circumstance of their being voluntary, coupled with the circumstance of a subsequent sale and conveyance, for a valuable consideration, by the same person who made the voluntary conveyance, it is to be collected and legally inferred, pursuant to the statute of 27 Eliz., that the voluntary conveyance was fraudulent; and because the statute declares such voluntary conveyances void, as against such purchaser. See 8 T. R. 521. Nunn v. Wilsmore. 9 East. 59. Cowp. 280. 5 Co. 60. Gooch’s case. Cro. J. 158, 455. Hard. 395, 2 Bro. Ch. R. 148. 2 Ves. jr. 10. Roberts on Fraudulent Conveyances, passim. Fon. Bl. Eq. The word voluntary is not in the statute. It has rather an ambiguous meaning. Whenever a conveyance is made, without a plain consideration of value, it may be considered as voluntary, or gratuitous, and a presumption of fraud arises upon the stat. 27 Eliz. But this presumption may be repelled, by shew, ing that the deed was really made upon a valuable consideration, and was not merely voluntary. The total want of consideration is a conclusive argument of fraud, under the statute. The word voluntary must be limited to cases wherein no inducement of in. terest appears. Where it may be naturally presumed that one act was the consideration of another, the consideration must be deemed valuable.