Case ID: sw_250/html/0165-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

WHITTEN v. STATE.
    (No. 7455.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 4, 1923.)
    Criminal law <&wkey;200(4) — After conviction state precluded from carving second offense from same transaction.
    In a prosecution for unlawfully selling liq-, uor, where from the state’s evidence it appeared that defendant possessed a quart of whisky and sold it to a state witness, the state, having carved from this transaction the offense of unlawful sale, and having secured conviction therefor, is precluded from carving another offense from the same transaction.
    Appeal from District Court, Red River County; George Morrison, Special Judge.
    Jess Whitten was eonvicted of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Travis T. Thompson, bf Clarksville, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The conviction is for the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.

From the state’s testimony, it is made to appear that the appellant possessed one quart of whisky and sold it to the state witness Jacobs. Appellant testified and denied the transaction, but said that he had been indicted and convicted for the sale of the same liquor to the witness Jacobs.

Appellant entered ¾ plea of former conviction, which the court refused to submit to the jury. As we understand the plea and the evidence, there was but one transaction. The state, having carved out of this transaction the offense of the unlawful sale of the liquor and having secured a conviction for that offense, is precluded by that judgment, from carving another offense out of the same transaction. This prmciple is stated by Presiding Judge White of this court in the case of Simco v. State, 9 Tex. App. 348, and again in Wright’s Case, 17 Tex. App. 158, with the utmost clearness. In the cases mentioned the distinction between the plea of former acquittal and former conviction and the facts upon which they must each rest is thus stated:

“Autrefois acquit is only available in cases where the transaction is the same and the two indictments are susceptible of, and must be sustained by, t;he same proof. These two elements must combine, and are both sine qua non to the sufficiency of the plea. Autrefois convict only requires that the transaction, or the facts constituting it, be the same.”

Because of the error pointed out, the judgment is reversed,’ and the cause remanded. 
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