Case ID: so2d_477/html/0404-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BRADLEY, Judge. WRIGHT, Presiding Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BEAVER VALLEY CORPORATION v. Frank PRIOLA.
    Civ. 3922.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Feb. 1, 1984.
    Rehearing Denied March 7, 1984.
    
      William B. Fernambucq of Huie, Fernam-bucq & Stewart, Birmingham, for appellant.
    Joe R. Whatley, Jr. of Stewart, Falken-berry & Whatley, Birmingham, for appel-lee.
   BRADLEY, Judge.

This is a workmen’s compensation case.

Frank Priola sustained a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability in one arm and a thirty percent permanent partial disability in the other arm as the result of an on-the-job accident while employed by Beaver Valley Corporation. A settlement was reached with respect to the permanent partial disability and an order was entered giving Mr. Priola $14,652, which was the computed amount in view of the injuries. This amount has been paid by Beaver Valley Corporation to Priola.

Mr. Priola also claimed vocational rehabilitation benefits under section 25-5-77(c), Code 1975. Section 25-5-77(e), Code 1975, provides in pertinent part as follows:

“If an employee who is unable in the opinion of the treating physician to return to his former employment shall request vocational rehabilitation and if both a vocational rehabilitation specialist and a treating physician, the cost of whose service is the obligation of the employer under this section, shall express their opinions in writing that in the judgment of each of them vocational rehabilitation is reasonably calculated to restore the employee to gainful employment and is in the best interest of the employee, the cost of such rehabilitation shall be borne by the employer. Such cost, where rehabilitation requires residence at or near a facility or institution away from the employee’s customary residence, shall include reasonable charges for the employee’s necessary board, lodging and travel.”

Pursuant to this section of the compensation act, Mr. Priola sought to have Beaver Valley pay the cost of his obtaining both an undergraduate and masters degree in computer science at the University of Alabama in Birmingham. Following an ore tenus hearing, the trial court, sitting without a jury, entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Priola with respect to vocational rehabilitation.

The court awarded Mr. Priola three and one-fourth years of rehabilitation at the cost of $5,480 per year, to be paid by Beaver Valley, while Priola attended the University of Alabama in Birmingham. This figure consisted of $1,460 for tuition and fees, $3,780 for room and board, and $240 for books and supplies.

This award of $17,800 was primarily conditional upon Mr. Priola presenting evidence to Beaver Valley of his enrollment at the University. It is from the trial court’s judgment awarding the employee rehabilitation benefits that Beaver Valley is appealing.

Beaver Valley contends that Priola is already adequately trained in that he has a degree in business, and rehabilitation benefits should not have been granted. Further, Beaver Valley feels that Mr. Priola is not entitled to expenses for board and lodging.

It is well-settled law in Alabama that the workmen’s compensation statutes will be liberally construed to effect their beneficent purposes. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Williams, 389 So.2d 935 (Ala.Civ.App.1980). Moreover, it is also well settled in Alabama that where the findings of the trial court are supported by any legal evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom the trial court’s judgment will be upheld on appeal. Loggins v. Mallory Capacitor Co., 344 So.2d 522 (Ala.Civ.App.1977).

Although there are no Alabama cases addressing the specific issues presented in this case, there are cases from other jurisdictions with similar statutes that have dealt with these questions. In Le v. State, 330 N.W.2d 453 (Minn.1983), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that in order for an injured employee to receive retraining he must show he has suffered a reduction in employability. Mr. Priola, in the present case, produced evidence at trial that he had sought employment at a number of places but was unsuccessful. He contends that the demand for business degrees has substantially declined since his graduation, and since he can no longer perform manual labor he needs to be retrained in order to be employed.

Moreover, Mr. Priola also submitted evidence in the form of the expert testimony of Mr. Charles Wright, a vocational consultant, that it was his recommendation that Mr. Priola receive both an undergraduate and a master’s degree in computer science in order for Mr. Priola to become gainfully employed. Further, Mr. Wright, during a'consultation with Mr. Priola, also determined the costs of tuition, books, housing, and travel that would be incurred while receiving these degrees. These estimates were admitted into evidence as plaintiffs exhibit four. Mr. Thompson, another vocational rehabilitation specialist, testified in effect that Priola’s present education did not make him employable.

Another Minnesota case held that the purpose of the statute that governs retraining benefits for employees who have been determined disabled is to encourage these workers to increase their employability through retraining. Graves v. Glen Lake State Sanitorium, 211 N.W.2d 196 (Minn.1979). In Graves, supra, the court authorized reimbursement for tuition, books, and transportation expenses from an employer in addition to stated weekly retraining benefit amounts.

The Minnesota court stated this about a statute very similar to ours:

“If we misperceive the intent of the legislature, our misperception is subject to legislative re-examination. We must take the statute as we find it and give it a construction consistent with its purpose of encouraging injured workers to increase their employability through retraining.” (Citation omitted.)
Graves, supra.

In Alabama the intent of the legislature in enacting a law must be gleaned from the language of that statute. If the language is unambiguous and its meaning clear, there is no room for construction by a court and the statute must be enforced as written. Custred v. Jefferson County, 360 So.2d 285 (Ala.1978).

The Alabama statute clearly provides that an employee who, in the opinion of the treating physician, is unable to return to his former employment is entitled to vocational rehabilitation benefits if there is evidence from a treating physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist that vocational rehabilitation is reasonably calculated to restore the employee to gainful employment and is in the best interests of the employee. The statute also provides that such benefits where rehabilitation requires residence at or near an institution away from the employee’s customary residence shall include the employee’s necessary board, lodging, and travel.

There is competent evidence in the record that the employee is unable to return to his former employment. Also there is evidence in the record from a treating physician and a vocational rehabilitation specialist that the training in computer science was reasonably calculated to restore the employee to gainful employment and that such training was in the employee’s best interests. In addition, we note that this evidence is uncontradicted.

There also is evidence in the record supportive of the trial court’s award of the sums for tuition and fees, books and supplies, and room and board. Further, there is evidence in the record that the employee had been living with his parents but that he wanted to rent an apartment near the University of Alabama at Birmingham where he would be receiving his training.

We conclude, therefore, that the legislative intent of section 25-5-77(c), Code 1975, is clearly expressed by the language used therein and that we, as noted in Orkin, supra, must give a liberal interpretation to that language.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

HOLMES, J., concurs.

WRIGHT, P.J., dissents.

WRIGHT, Presiding Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

Recognizing the general principles routinely quoted in workmen’s compensation, i.e., that the law is to be liberally construed in favor of the employee, and our review of the trial court’s judgment is limited by statute to finding whether there is any evidence to support it, I nevertheless consider the result of the judgment in this case to be so far beyond the purpose of the act as to be totally unreasonable.

It has been said that this aspect of the Alabama Workmen’s Compensation Act has not previously been before our appellate courts. That is true; however, most other states have similar provisions in their acts. However, in most states the law is better defined, such as that of Florida. Florida Statutes § 440.49(1). Without clear indication in our statute of the meaning and extent of the term vocational rehabilitation, one can only look to other states or to the field from which the term is derived.

The word “vocation” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, (5th ed. 1979), as “one’s regular calling or business_ The activity ... out of which he makes his living.” “Rehabilitation” is there defined as, “Restoring to a former capacity, reinstating; qualifying again.” In line with these definitions, the Arkansas appellate court says it means training to restore to former or prior wage level. Owens Country Sausage v. Crane, 268 Ark. 732, 594 S.W.2d 872 (1980). It was said in the case of Viking Sprinkler Co. v. Thomas, 413 So.2d 816 (Fla.App.1982), “If claimant has the ability to obtain and perform employment providing an income equal to his pre-injury earnings rehabilitation would be unnecessary.” In the case of Walker v. New Fern Restorium, 409 So.2d 1201-1203 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982), the concern of the court was that the claimant be trained to return to her pre-injury, wage-earning capacity. The Florida statute explains rehabilitation as providing the injured employee with appropriate training and education for “suitable gainful employment." (Emphasis ours.) It then says, “For purposes of this section only, ‘suitable gainful employment’ means employment or self-employment which is reasonably attainable in light of the individual’s age, education, previous occupation, and injury and which offers an opportunity to restore the individual as soon as practical and as nearly as possible to his average weekly earnings at the time of injury.” Florida Statutes § 440-49(l)(a).

Though not as definitive as Florida’s, the Alabama statute in similar terms refers to vocational rehabilitation which is reasonably calculated to restore the employee to gainful employment. § 25-5-77(c), Code of Alabama 1975. To. me, the word “restore,” as used in the statute, refers to a former ability or capacity as in the definition of rehabilitation I have previously set out. The entire principle of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as shown by the compensation schedules, formulas for partial disabilities not scheduled, even compensation for death, is to remunerate for loss of earnings because of an injury. Therefore it can only reasonably follow that vocational rehabilitation is made available to restore lost earning capacity because of a disabling injury.

The law cannot be construed to apply to the extent that if a workman, earning $6.00 per hour as a laborer, suffers the partial loss of use of his hands or arms, his employer is required to provide him with a master’s degree in a science which will qualify him to earn several times more than he could have ever earned had he not been injured. That is not restoring; it is an outright gratuity. What are the limits? Why not a medical degree, or a Ph.D. in computer science. Such would surely cause him to be more employable and com-pensable.

I do not intend to contend that college training would not be required in some instances of rehabilitation after injury, but not in this case.

The majority’s response to my argument would be to say that there was undisputed evidence by experts that this education would rehabilitate the claimant and make him employable, therefore we must accept the trial court’s judgment under our standard of review. Such would be true unless it is determined that the law was unreasonably construed and applied to the evidence.

It is no answer to this case, and others that will quickly follow, that this requires a more definitive law. At best, the re-education should be limited to the undergraduate degree, which under the evidence would make claimant employable at a salary as much or more than his pre-injury earnings.

I further would find the trial court in error in providing the funds for an apartment for claimant to occupy, which he did not have before injury. Setting him up in separate housekeeping from what he had been previously enjoying is not rehabilitation. It is not necessary for him to be housed at the institution in order to attend the University of Alabama at Birmingham.

For these reasons I dissent.