Case ID: sw_240/html/0312-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

NEWMAN v. STATE.
    (No. 6472.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 26, 1922.)
    Criminal law &wkey;»M63(6) — Under Constitution and statute, outside communication of juror is presumed prejudicial to accused.
    Any outside communication of a juror, forbidden by Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proe. 1916, arts. 748, 837, subds. 7, 8, enacted under Const, art. .1, § 15, to preserve the integrity of jury trial, is therefore presumed to have injured the accused; and, where the state failed to rebut the presumption that the. uncensored receipt of mail by jurors injured the accused and a new trial was denied, reversal is imperative.
    Appeal from District Court, Atascosa County ; Covey C. Thomas, Judge.
    Joe Newman was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    J. R. Garnand, Nat L. Hardy and R. R. Smith, all of Jourdanton, for appellant.
    R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The appeal is from a conviction of manslaughter.

Certain conduct of the jury is urged as grounds for a new trial. One of the jurors failed to disclose on his voir dire that he was not a householder in the county. The members of the jury were taken to a restaurant, and thence to the post office. While at the post office they were permitted to scatter about the building, some of them going out on the street, and one of them crossing the street and entering into a conversation with a friend. It was shown, however, that this conversation was of a harmless nature. While in the post office several members received through the mail packages and communications, the nature and contents of which was not revealed.

Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 748, 837, are invoked. In article 748, it is said:

“ * * * Nor shall any person, he permitted to converse with a juror after'he has been impaneled, except in .the presence and by the permission of the court, * .* * and in no ease shall any person be permitted to converse with the juror about the case on trial.”

In article 837, subdivision 7, it is said:

“Where the jury, after having retired to deliberate upon a case, have received other testimony; or where a juror has conversed with any person in regard to the case,” a new trial shall be granted.

The purpose of the statutory provisions to which reference has been made is revealed by this language of the Constitution:

• “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws' as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency.” Article 1, § 15, Const. Tex.

The statute (article 748) forbids a juror to converse with an outsider, except with the sanction of the court and in his presence; and subdivision 7 of article 837 makes a new trial imperative where it is shown that a juror has conversed with an outsider. The construction placed upon these statutes is that, where they are violated — that is to say, where the juror holds unauthorized communication with any one — it is presumed that it was about a matter inhibited by the statute, and is therefore injurious to the accused. This presumption prevails unless rebutted by the state. Illustrative of this rule is Early v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 391, 103 S. W. 868, 123 Am. St. Rep. 889, where a conversation over the telephone was in question, and where the state did not show the harmless nature of the conversation. See, also, McDougal v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 179, 194 S. W. 944, L. R. A. 1917E, 930.

In addition to the statute mentioned, subdivision 8 of article 837, without defining the misconduct, requires that a new trial shall be granted for misconduct of the jury preventing a fair and impartial trial. See Vernon’s Tex. Crim. Stat. vol. 2, p. 792; Ruling Case Law, vol. 16, p. 312, §120—in both of which volumes illustrative cases will be found.

Adverting to the facts of the instant case, the jurors, without restraint and without inquiry as to its nature, were permitted to receive matters addressed to them coming through the post office. If the law sanctioned such practice, no better means can be conceived- of communicating injurious or corrupting matters to the members of the jury. The facts are not in dispute. That the jurors received their mail is not questioned. Obviously, they may have related to the case; they may have related to injurious matters, the receipt of which would prevent a fair and impartial trial. Knowing that the matters had been received, it was incumbent upon the state to rebut the presumption of injury. It having failed to do so, and the trial court having denied a new trial, obedience to the statutes passed to preserve the purity and efficiency of the right of trial by jury renders a reversal imperative.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. 
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