Case ID: mich_49/html/0048-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Campbell, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

William Alderman v. Caleb Manchester.
    
      Replevin — General and special ownership.
    
    In replevin against a constable for goods levied on, a finding merely that plaintiff was the general owner and that defendant had a lien to the amount of his levy cannot be sustained where the interests of the parties are conflicting, as where the defendant levies on plaintiff’s-goods to satisfy an execution against a stranger.
    Comp. L. §- 6754 in providing that when either party in replevin has a lien on or special property in the goods taken, and is not the general owner, that fact may be shown and the finding shall be in accordance with it and the court shall render such judgment as shall bo just between the parties, means that the verdict shall be special and full enough to enable the trial court to render a proper judgment.
    Where a plaintiff in replevin is general owner of the goods, but defendant Ms a special lien thereon under a levy made by him upon them, the plaintiff must necessarily hold the title levied on; but if he is not the general owner, defendant is entitled to a return, and there is no propriety in determining the amount of his lien unless he waives return and asks to have the value determined.
    Where a jury finds that defendant in replevin has a special lien, but does not find what the property is worth, there is nothing on which to base a personal judgment against the plaintiff for the amount of the lien.
    Error to Ionia.
    Submitted June 22.
    Decided June 27.
    
    Beplevin. Plaintiff brings error.
    Beversed.
    
      A. B. Morse and A. A. Ellis for appellant.
    
      Mitehel, Bell and MoGarry fox* appellee.
   Campbell, J.

Alderman replevied a liorse which defendant bad levied on as tbe property of one Demck. The whole coiitrovei'sy before tbe jnry turned on tbe ownership of Alderman at tbe time of tbe alleged levy and taking. If be did not own the horse then, tbe animal belonged to Derrick, and it was not claimed or pi’etended that Aldennati got any new rights.

Tbe jury found that Alderman was general owner and that Manchester bad a lien to tbe amount of bis levy. Under tbe charge this verdict is insensible. One or the other of these findings must be wrong. There may perhaps be cases like Moore v. Vrooman 32 Mich. 526, where such a vei'dict can be sustained because no conflicting interests are shown to have appeared, but never where such a conflict of interest exists as appears here. Tbe verdict sets out no other facts which could throw light upon it. The statute provides that when either pai'ty has a lien on or special property íd the goods and chattels l’eplevied, and is not the general owner, tiiat mcc may be shown, and the finding shall be in accordance with such fact, “and the court shall thereuponT’ender such judgment as shall be just between the parties.”

This means that the verdict shall be special and full enough to enable the trial court to render a proper judgment. If Alderman was general owner, and defendant had nevertheless a special lien, it could only be because Aider-man held the same title which was levied on. If he was not the general owner, then defendant was entitled to a return, and there was no necessity or propriety in determining the amount of his lien, unless he should waive a return and have the value determined, which does not seem to have been done here. The jury have not found that the property was worth the amount of the Special lien or any other sum, and therefore there is nothing on which to base a personal judgment for that sum against Alderman, which was done here. They have not rendered such a verdict as enables the court to know what justices requires.

The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.