Case ID: nc_364/html/0319-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. Justices BRADY and NEWBY Justices TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FAYE B. BROWN, Petitioner v. THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; ALVIN KELLER, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Correction; and KENNETH ROYSTER, in his capacity as Superintendent of Raleigh Correctional Center for Women, Respondents
    No. 517PA09
    (Filed 27 August 2010)
    On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an opinion and order entered 14 December 2009 by Judge Ripley E. Rand in Superior Court, Wake County, allowing petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus and ordering her unconditional release from prison. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 February 2010.
    
      Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, and Katherine Jane Allen, Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Daniel R. Pollitt, and Daniel K. Shatz, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for petitionerappellee.
    
    
      Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Tiare B. Smiley and Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for respondent-appellants State of North Carolina and North Carolina Department of Correction.
    
    
      Elliot Pishko Morgan, P.A., by David Pishko, and Abrams & Abrams, P.A., by Margaret Abrams, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.
    
   PER CURIAM.

For the reasons stated in Jones v. Keller, — N.C.—, —, S.E.2d —(2010) (518PA09), we reverse the trial court’s 14 December 2009 order allowing petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

REVERSED.

Justices BRADY and NEWBY

concur in the result for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in Jones v. Keller, — N.C. —, —, S.E.2d (2010) (518PA09).

Justices TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUDSON

dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion in Jones v. Keller, — N.C. —, —, S.E.2d — (2010) (518PA09).

MORRIS COMMUNICATIONS CORE D/B/A FAIRWAY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING v. CITY OF BESSEMER CITY ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

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ORDER

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No. 150A10

The Court allows petitioner’s petition for discretionary review of issue Number 1:

(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that the Respondent Zoning Board’s interpretation of the City of Bessemer City’s Zoning Ordinance is entitled to some deference when the matter of the interpretation of an ordinance and/or statute is reviewed de novo on appeal and the reviewing court is entitled to freely substitute its judgment for that of the local zoning board?

Petitioner’s petition for discretionary review as to the remaining issues is denied.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 26th day of August, 2010.

Hudson, J.

For the Court

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILBUR WILLIAM FOLSTON, JR.

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ORDER

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No. 317PA09

The state’s petition for writ of certiorari is allowed for the limited purpose of entering the following order:

For the reasons stated in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. —, — S.E.2d — (2010) (518PA09), we reverse the trial court’s 27 April 2009 order granting defendant’s motion for appropriate relief and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Jones opinion.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 26th day of August, 2010.

Hudson, J.

For the Court

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DERRICK ROCHELL FOREMAN

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ORDER

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No. 270PA10

The state’s petition for writ of certiorari is allowed for the limited purpose of entering the following order:

Rule of Appellate Procedure 21(c) mandates that petitions for writ of certiorari “shall be filed without unreasonable delay.” See, e.g., State v. Rush, 158 N.C. App. 738, 741 (2003) (finding that “four-year delay in challenging a judgment constitutes ‘unreasonable delay’” under Rule 21(c)); Huebner v. Triangle Research Collaborative, 193 N.C. App. 420, 426 (2008) (holding that defendant’s three-year delay in requesting certiorari review constituted “unreasonable delay” under Rule 21(c)). Defendant’s thirteen-year delay in filing his petition for writ of certiorari in the Court of Appeals constituted unreasonable delay. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ order allowing defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari is reversed and defendant’s appeal is dismissed.

By order of the Court in Conference, this 26th day of August, 2010.

Hudson, J.

For the Court