Case ID: sw2d_76/html/1043-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DOUGLAS OIL CO. et al. v. STATE et al.
    No. 6761.
    Supreme Court of Texas.
    Nov. 28, 1934.
    See, also, 122 Tex. 369, 61 S.W.(2d) 804.
    Francis H. DeGroot, of Duluth, Minn., Chas. A. Holden, of Tulsa, Okl., Chas. Gibbs, of San Angelo, and I. S. Handy and A. D. Dyess, both of Houston, for appellants.
    James V. Allred, Atty. Gen., and Ralph W. Yarborough, Asst. Atty. Gen., Geo. T. Wilson, Sp. Counsel, and J. P. Hill, both of San Angelo, John A. Braly, of Fort Worth, A. M. Gee and R. C. Gwilliam, both of Tulsa, Okl., Hiner & Pannill, of Fort Worth, Smith & Neill, of San Angelo, Burney Braly and G. R. Pate, both of Ft. Worth, and G. B. Smedley and Edwin H. Yeiser, both of Austin, for ap-pellees.
   PER CURIAM.

This is a certified question from the honorable Court of Civil Appeals for the Third District, submitting the following questions: ^Ts the holding in the tentative draft of opinion hereto annexed, to the effect that the answer of the Supreme Court to the first question certified precludes consideration of the issues above stated under which an affirmance ■of the judgment of the trial court is now urged, correct?”

In describing the “tentative draft of opinion,” the certificate states: “We have prepared and attach hereto as Exhibit ‘A’ a tentative _ opinion in the case, drafted upon the hypothesis that the answer of the Supreme Court to the first question certified precludes consideration of the several grounds above enumerated, urged in behalf of those now seeking an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, and required reversal of the trial court’s judgment. In presenting the question in this form it is not to be understood that the holdings expressed in this tentative opinion represent conclusions which this court has reached. This form was used because it was thought that the question we are now certifying could be more clearly and accurately presented in this manner.”

We have reached the conclusion that this ■certificate must be dismissed, because:

First. It presents the entire case and comes within “the oft-declared rule against certifying a whole case to the Supreme Court,” and does not comply with article 1851, R. S. 1925, “requiring the Courts of Givil Appeals to formulate * * ⅜ the • specific question of law to be determined by the Supreme Court.” Owens v. Tedford, 114 Tex. 390, 269 S. W. 418. See, also, Wyatt C. Hedrick v. Ratcliff, 122 Tex. 313, 58 S.W.(2d) 41; Hollis v. Parkland Corporation (Tex. Com. App.) 29 S.W.(2d) 309; First National Bank of Port Arthur v. Zorn, 117 Tex. 180, 299 S. W. 847; Taylor v. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 117 Tex. 149, 298 S. W. 891; Falfurrias Immigration Company v. Spielhagen, 103 Tex. 144, 124 S. W. 616; Poole v. Burnet County, 97 Tex. 77, 76 S. W. 425.

Second. The certificate calls upon the Supreme Court to five an advisory opinion, which is not permitted. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.(2d) 641.