Case ID: f-appx_531/html/0101-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. John Raymond Anthony WHITE, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-3866-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Aug. 23, 2013.
    Alvin Bragg, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney (Brent S. Wible, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, for Appellee.
    Lawrence Ruggiero, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    
      PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, RICHARD C. WESLEY and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendant-appellant John White appeals from a September 20, 2012 judgment of conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Stein, J. ) following a jury trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case.

White was convicted on five counts associated with making false statements in connection with applications for government contracts set aside for veterans and one count of witness tampering. He argues primarily that the district court’s admission of certain evidence was improper under Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 404(b). “We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir.2009). “To find such abuse, we must conclude that the trial judge’s evidentiary rulings were arbitrary and irrational.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may, however, be admitted for other purposes, such as proving intent or knowledge. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2); see also Mercado, 573 F.3d at 141.

After careful review, we conclude that the disputed evidence was properly admitted. Although White had stipulated that he was not a veteran, he did not stipulate as to his knowledge or intent in making the statements associated with the contracts or contract applications that formed the basis for the indictment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that statements by White in other contexts regarding his supposed veteran status were relevant to the issues of knowledge and intent, particularly where the evidence was admitted with limiting instructions to the jury.

White also asserts that various statements made by the Government in summation were improper. Particularly where, as here, no contemporaneous objection was made to statements in summation, we remand for a new trial only where such statements “amount to flagrant abuse” which “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 227 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no such abuse here. Indeed, White does not identify any specific remark by the Government that ostensibly meets this standard. Instead, his arguments regarding summation amount to a generalized attack on the Government’s case, and on the fact that the summation included references to the evidence he contends was improperly admitted in the first place. We find no misconduct in the prosecution’s summation.

We have considered all of White’s arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.