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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The United States versus Judge Lawrence.
    A MOTION was made by the Attorney General of the United States (Bradford) for a Rule to shew cause why a Mandamus should not be directed to John Lawrence, Judge of the District of New York, in order to compel him to issue a warrant, for apprehending Captain Barre, commander of the frigate Le Perdrix, belonging to the French Republic.
    The case was this :—Captain Barre, soon after, the dispersion of a French convoy on the American coast, voluntarily abandoned his ship, and became a resident in New York. The Vice Consul of the French Republic, there upon, made a demand, in writing, that Judge Lawrence would issue a warrant to apprehend Captain Barre, as a deserter from Le Perdrix, by virtue of the 9th Article of the Consular Convention between the United States and France, which is expressed in these words :
    “ Art; 9. The Consuls and Vice-Consuls may cause to be arrested the Captains, Officers, Mariners, Sailors, and all other persons, being part of the crews of the vessels of their respective nations, who shall have deserted from the said vessels, in order to send them back and transport them out of the country. For which purpose, the said Consuls and Vice-Consuls shall address themselves to the Courts, Judges, and Officers competent, and shall demand the said deserters in writing, proving by an exhibition of the register of the vessel, or ship’s roll, that those men were part of the said crews; and on this demand, so proved, (having, however, where the contrary is proved] the delivery shall not be refused; and there shall be given all aid and assistance to the said Consuls and Vice-Consuls for the search, seizure, and arrest, of the said deserters, who shall even be detained and kept in the prisons of the country, at their request and expence, until they shall have found an opportunity of sending them back; but if they be not sent back within three months, to be counted from the day of their arrest, they shall be set at liberty, and shall be no more arrested for the fame cause.” 2 Vo.392,
    To the Vice-Consul’s demand the Judge answered, “that it was, in his opinion, necessary, before a warrant could issue, that the applicant should prove by the register of the ship, or Role d’ Equipage, that Captain Barre was, in fact, one of the crew of Le Perdrix.” The Vice-Consul replied, “ that the ship’s register was not in his possession ; but, at the same time, stated various reasons why he should be admitted to produce collateral proof of the fact in question, instead of being obliged to exhibit the ship’s register itself; and declared, that in such case, he would give the judge all the proof that Could be desired.” The Judge persevering in his original opinion on the subject, that “ the mode of proof mentioned in the 9th article of the Convention was the only legitimate one, and that he could not dispense with it;” the Vice-Consul obtained a copy of the Role d' Equipage, certified by the French Vice-Consul at Boston, under the Consular seal; and transmitted it to the Judge, with another demand for a warrant to arrest Capt. Barre; contending that this copy was entitled to the same respect as the original instrument, by virtue of the 5th article of the Convention, which is in these words:
    “Art. 5. The Consuls and vice-Consuls respectively shall have the exclusive right of receiving in their chancery, or on Board of vessels, the declarations and all the other acts, which the Captains, Masters, Crews, Passengers, and Merchants of their nation may chuse to make there, even their testaments and her disposals by last will: And the copies of the said acts, duly authenticated by the said Consuls or Vice-Consuls, under the seal of their Consulate, shall receive faith in law, equally as their originals would, in all the tribunals of the dominions of the Most Christian King, and of the United States. They shall also have, and exclusively, in case of the absence of the testamentary executor, administrator, or legal heir, the right to inventory, liquidate and proceed to the sale of the personal estate left by subject or citizens of their nation, who shall die within the extent of their Consulate; they shall proceed therein with the assistance of two merchants of their said nation, or for want of them, of any other at their choice, and shall cause to be deposited in their chancery, the effects and papers of the said estates; and no officer, military, judiciary, or of the police of the country, shall disturb them or interfere therein, in any manner whatsoever : but the said Consuls, and Vice-Consuls shall not deliver up the said effects, nor the proceeds thereof, to the lawful heirs, or to their order, till they shall have caused to be paid all debts which the deceased shall have contracted in the country ; for which purpose the creditors shall have a right to attach the said effects in their hands, as they might in those of any other individual whatever, and proceed to obtain sale of them till payment of what shall be lawfully due to them. When the debts shall not have been contracted by judgment, deed, or note, the signature whereof shall be known, payment shall not be ordered but on the creditor’s giving sufficient surety, resident in the country, to refund the sums he shall have unduly received, principal, interest and costs which surety nevertheless shall stand duly discharged, after the term of one year in time of peace, and of two in time of war, if the demand in discharge cannot be formed before the end of this term against the heirs who shall present themselves. And in order that the heirs may not be unjustly kept out of the effects of the deceased, the Consuls and Vice-Consuls shall notify his death in some one of the gazettes published within their Consulate, and they shall retain the said effects in their hands four months to answer all demands which shall be presented ; and they shall be bound after this delay to deliver to the persons succeeding thereto, what shall be more than sufficient for the demands which shall have been formed.” 2 Vol. 384.
    The Judge, however, declared that “he did not consider the copy of the register, to be the kind of proof designated by the article of the Convention; and that till the proof specified by the express words of the article was exhibited, he could not deem himself authorised to issue a warrant for apprehending Captain Barre.'’
    
    Under these circumstances, the Minister of the French Republic applied to the Executive of the United States, complaining of the Judge’s refusal to issue a warrant against Captain Barre, as a manifest departure from the positive provisions of the Consular Convention ; and the present motion was made, in order to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court, upon the subject, for the satisfaction of the Minister.
    The rule was opposed by Ingerfoll and W. Tilghman, who contended, I. That the original register of the vessel, or ship’s Roll, was the only admissible evidence under the 9th article of the Convention; and II. That in the present case the Judge has, in fact, given a judgment ; and although a mandamus will lie to compel the Judge of an inferior Court, to proceed to give judgment, it will not lie to prescribe what judgment he shall give.
    4 I. The treaty has placed the subject in controversy upon a sooting different from the law of nations; for, independent of positive compact, no Government will surrender deserters, or fugitives, who make an asylum of its territory. This, then, is a new law introductory of a new remedy; and. whenever a new remedy is so introduced, (more especially in a case so highly penal) it must be stricftly pursued. 1 Wil. 164. 4 Bac. Abr. 647, 651. The 9th article of the Consular Convention, may therefore, be considered in a twofold point of view—1st. As to the true construction of the words:—and 2d. As to the competency of a copy of the register, or ship’s Roll, to be received in evidence; by any analogy to the common law rules of evidence.—1st. The words of the article are full and express, that.the Consul shall prove the deserters, whose arrest he demands, to be part of the ship’s crew, “ by an exhibition of the register of the vessel, or ship’s Roll.” If those, who drew the instrument, and appear throughout to have perfecftly understood the import of the words they used, had not intended to fix a specific mode of proof, a specific mode would not have been mentioned in this case; but the kind of evidence would have been left at large, as in the 14th article, where, in another case, proof of citizenship is to be made, ‘'by legal evidence.'’ But, in fact, the ship’s Roll is the best evidence which the nature of the case admits ; and, if any other, is allowed, it must depend upon the mere discretion of the Judge. The individuals of the French nation, as well as the Republic, are interested in the construction of the article ; since it deprives them of that protection within our territory, to which they would otherwise be entitled; and their interest becomes peculiarly important, when we consider the existing circumstances of the nation. Besides, whatever inconveniency might flow from this strict construction, if it is the genuine, fixed, meaning of the treaty, the court cannot change it on that account. 4 Bac. Abr.. 652, 10 Mod. 344. The inconveniences, however, are aggravated beyond their real force. The cases contemplated, were, obviously, cases of desertion before the vessel left the port, in which it would always be easy to exhibit the register, before a warrant was issued. The act of Congress, vesting this jurisdiction in the District Judges, may, indeed, be too restricted, in as much as it does not give each District Judge a power to issue his warrant to all parts of the United States, by which the necessity of applying to the Judge, of every District, into which a deserter might escape, and the consequent necessity of exhibiting the original Roll on every such application, would be avoided. The inconveniences suggested might therefore be obviated by Congress; and even the government of France might introduce a remedy, by directing the original Roll in cases of desertion, to be deposited with the Consul, and certified copies to be furnished to the Captains of the respective ships. But it is contended, that admitting the exhibition of the original Roll to be requisite, still it is sufficient to exhibit it before the person is delivered;—it need not be exhibited before the warrant issues to arrest him. This, however, cannot be the true construction of the article, upon a fair analysis of its different parts. In the first part the arrest of deserters only is mentioned, “ in order to send them back and transport them out of the country;"—then, it is said, " for which purpose (that is, for the purpose of the arrest) the Consuls and Vice-Consuls shall address themselves to the Courts, Judges, and Officers competent, and shall demand the said deserter in writing, proving by an exhibition of the register, or ship’s roll, that those men were part of the crew, &c. and the clause of delivery follows, providing, that “ on this demand, to proved, the delivery shall not be refused.” On what, then,is the Judge to ground his warrant, if not on the exhibition of the roll? There is no other proof mentioned in the article; and, certainly, proof of some kind must be made, before the warrant issues. “ No warrants shall issue (favs the 6th article of the amendment to the Federal Constitution) but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation:" And in this case, if previous proof has been made, there is nothing to prevent the warrant’s containing a clause of immediate delivery; since the deserter is only to be committed and imprisoned at the instance of the Consul.—2d. If, then, an exhibition of the ship’s roll is necessary, the second consideration, arising on the construction of the article, is, whether by analogy to the common law rules of evidence, a copy ought to be received, instead of the original. It is a general rule, that the copy of a deed, or other extraneous proof of its contents, cannot be given in evidence, unless it is first shewn that the original did once exist, and that it had been destroyed or lost, or is in the possession of the adverse party, i Vez. 389. Esp. Dig. 780. 782,.10 Co. 
      92. In the present case, the only requisite of the rule that is satisfied, establishes the existence of the roll; but proves, at the same time, that it has not been lost or destroyed, and that it is (or at least that it was when the warrant was applied for) in the possession of the Consul at Boston. So strictly has the rule been adhered to, that even the acknowledgment of the obligor will not be received as evidence that a bond was executed by him ; the subscribing witness must be produced. Doug. 205. 4 Burr. 2275. As to the inference drawn by the Consul, from the 5th article of the Convention, in support of a copy of the Roll as competent evidence, the article clearly relates to matters transacted by Consul in virtue of their specified consular powers, but not to the authentication of foreign instruments, deeds, or commission.
    II. But whatever may be the opinion of this court on the construction of the article in question, they cannot interpose by mandamus, to compel the District Judge to adopt their judgment, instead of his own, as the rule of decision, in a case judicially before him. The Supreme Court may, it is true, issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law; (1 Vol. p. 58. s. 14.) but there is no usage or principle of law to warrant the issuing of a mandamus in a case like the present. By the Act of Congress (2 Vol. p. 56. the District Judge is appointed the competent judge, for the purposes expressed in the 9th article of the Convention; the Consul applied to him as such; and the Judge refused to issue his warrant, because, in his opinion, the evidence required by the article was not produced. The act of issuing the warrant is judicial, and not ministerial; and the refusal to issue it for want of legal proof, was the exercise of a judicial authority. Where any other court has competent jurisdiction, the court will not interfere by mandamus to controul it. Esp. Dig. 668. 4 Burr. 2295. In a variety of cases the stress is laid on the act being ministerial, and not judicial. 1 Wils. 125. 283. Esp. Dig. 662. 663. 666. 669. 512. 552. 530. 1 Stra. 113. 392. 1 Vent, 187. T. Raym. 214; 1 Bl. Rep. 640. 3 Bac. Abr. 531. 1 Burr. 131. 4 Com. Dig 207.208. Carth. 450. 2 Stra. 835. Sayre’s Rep. 160. It is justly said, however, that a writ of mandamus ought in all cases to be granted, where the law has provided no specific remedy, though on the principles of justice and good government, there ought to be one. Esp. Dig. 661. 4 Com. Dig. 205. And, it has been generally said, that writs of mandamus are either to restore a person deprived of some corporate, or other franchise, or right; or to admit a person legally entitled. 3 Burr. 1267. 2 Burr. 1043. or (upon a more extensive basis) to prevent a failure of justice, to enforce the execution of the common law, and to effectuate some statute: but it has never been allowed as a private remedy for a party, except in cases arising on the 9 Ann. c. 20. Nor has it ever been granted to a person who has exercised a discretionary power. 3 Bac. Abr. 535. 2 Stra. 881. 892. Esp. Dig, 668. 2 T. Rep. 338. Esp. Dig. 667. 3 Bac. Abr. 536. Andr. 183. Thus, the writ was refused, where a visitor has exercised his jurisdiction, and deprived a person of his office in a college: 1 Wils. 206. 4 Com. Dig, 209. Andr. 176. Esp. Dig. 667: where commissioners have issued a certificate of bankrupts. 1 Atk. 82. 2. Vez. 250. 1 Cook. Bank. L. 499. And it should be shewn that the inferior court had made default, for the Superior Court will not presume it. Esp. Dig, 670. Bull. N. P. 199. Upon the whole of these authorities it appears, that a mandamus is founded on the idea of a default ; as where an inferior court will not proceed to judgment, or a ministerial officer will not do an act which he ought to do; but there is no instance of a mandamus being issued to a judge, who has proceeded to give judgment according to the best of his abilities. It ought, likewise to be observed, that where a fact is doubtful, a mandamus never issues till it is determined by a jury, either on a seigned issue, or on a traverse to the return under the statute: For, how can this court determine what the material fact of the present case is? And if a mandamus is issued, what will be the command?—to receive certain evidence, or, at all events, to issue a warrant for apprehending Capt. Barre? If, then, the Supreme Court take the matter up, in the way proposed, they must examine the proof of Capt. Barre’s being a deserter ; and to make themselves the Court competent for this business, contrary to the express meaning and language of the law.
    The Attorney General, in reply, premised, that the Executive of the United States had no inclination to press upon the Court, any particular construction of the article on which his motion was founded : but as it is the wish of our government to preserve the purest faith with all nations, the President could not avoid paying the highest respect, and the promptest attention, to the representation of the minister of France, who conceived that the decision of the District Judge involved an infraction of the Conventional rights of his Republic. In construing treaties, neither party can claim an exclusive jurisdiction. If either party supposes that there is in the conduct of the other, a departure from the meaning of a treaty, it is the established course in foreign countries, to apply to the government for immediate redress ; and, where that application, for any cause, proves ineffectual, the controversy is referred to a negotiation between the powers at variance. In the present case, however, from the nature of the subject, as well as from the spirit of our political Constitution, the Judiciary Department is, called upon to decide; for it is essential to the independence of that department, that judicial mistakes should only be corrected by judicial authority. The President, therefore, introduces the question for the consideration of the court, in order to insure a punctual execution of the laws; and, at the same time, to manifest to the world, the solicitude of our government to preserve its faith, and to cultivate the friendship and respect of other nations.
    I. The question is certainly an interesting and important one: but it ought not to be affected by any circumstances respecting the hardship of Captain Barre's fate, or the crisis of French affairs. If Captain Barre suffers any injury, he might, on a Habeas Corpus, be relieved; and no change or fluctuation in the interior policy of France, can release the obligation of our government to perform its public engagements. The case must, therefore, be considered as an abstract case, depending on the fair interpretation of an article in a public treaty. This article contemplates. 1st. the arrest of deserters from French vessels in our ports-and, 2d. the delivering of those deserters to the Consul, that they may be sent out of the country. The arrest may be made on any kind of proof, the oath of witnesses, the confession of the party, or authen-_ ticated papers, shewing prima facie, that the person against whom the warrant is demanded, belonged to the crew of a French ship. But the delivery is obviously a subsequent act, to be performed after the party has been brought before the Judge; when, not only the allegations against him, but his answers and defence, are heard, and the Judge has decided that he is an object of the article. Natural justice, and the safety of our citizens, require that such a hearing should take place; and it is, indeed, necessarily implied in those words of the article "saving where the contrary is proved ;" which point to a time distinct from that of issuing the warrant, when the party was not present, had not been heard, and could not therefore have proved the contrary, even if such proof were in his power; as by shewing that he never signed the ship's roll, or that he had been lawfully discharged. Neither principle nor analogy to ther cases, will justify a call for the original roll, merely to
    
      bring the party to a hearing, whatever strictness of proof may exacted to warrant his being delivered. In England the distinction is uniformly recognized: the grounds for issuing a warrant are not strong; for finding an indictment they must be stronger ; and for conviction and judgment they are always violent. The construction contended for, in support of the motion, involves no inconveniency; because the Judge must receive a reasonable satisfaction before he issues his warrant; and before he delivers the deserter, he may insist on the exhibition of the roll; but the adverse doctrine is attended with the most embarrassing consequences. Suppose a man deserts just as the vessel fails on a distant voyage, must she return to port ? According to the maritime regulations, her Register must remain on board; and, in such a case, a deserter could never be surrendered; Again:—Suppose a French vessel of war takes a prize, puts a part of her crew on board, and sends the prize to America, while she remains herself at sea: the mariners may desert from the prize with impunity, under the very eye of the minister or consul; as the original roll would continue on board the vessel of war. If there are several prizes sent in, the difficulty is proportionally encreased. But all those embarrassments are avoided by a different interpretation of the article :— by allowing the deserters to be arrested, even on a reasonable suspicion, and to be detained 'till proof of their desertion can be procured. The detention, however, could not, under such circumstances, exceed three months, agreeably to the terms of the treaty; and that part of the article seems strongly to presume the vessel to be absent at the time of the arrest, as it provides for his imprisonment until he can be sent out of the country. On the adverse construction, likewise, the article must be deemed to regard as one act, the inspection of the roll, the issuing of the warrant, and the surrender of the deserter; which would operate as a general press warrant, and might become dangerous in the extreme to the liberty of the citizens; for, every man bearing a name enrolled upon the ship’s register, would be liablé t0 be arrested and put on board a French vessel, if no hearing took place subsequent to the arrest. Still, however, it is clear, that when the article speaks of a consul’s addressing himself to our courts, it is in order to procure assistance “ to send the deserters back, and transport them out of the country;” and not merely to obtain an arrest: But the question then arises, whether, even for the purpose of obtaining a delivery of the deserter, there must be an actual production of the register, or ship’s roll? Is that the only proof which can be allowed, or is it merely the specification of one mode of proof, without excluding other modes? The article provides for a case in which there shall, peremptorily, be a delivery; but neither in its terms, nor in its nature; does it preclude a delivery in other cases, where the facts are satisfactorily ascertained by other evidence. The inconveniences of that doctrine would be insurmountable. There must be an original roll to produce in every District, into which a deserter should escape. If the roll were burnt, and all the crew desert, nay, if the deserters themselves were to seize upon and destroy the roll, the Judge is not only under no obligation to arrest and deliver them, but he is precluded from doing so. Such a construction, so destructive of the fair advantages of a public compact, ought not to be tolerated. “ All civil laws and all contracts in general, (says Rutherford, 2 Inst. B. 2. c. 7. s.8. p. 327.) are to be so construed as to make them produce no other effects, but what is confident with reason, or with the law of nature." It is inconsistent with reason, that a provision intended to guard the contracting parties from the inconveniency of the desertion of their mariners, should, in the very mode of expression, defeat itself; and that interpretation, which renders a treaty null and without effect, cannot be admitted. Vatt.B. 2. c. 17. s. 283. 287. 290. Nor is the common law without an analogy, competent to obviate the difficulty; for, wherever an original is either a record, or of a public nature, and would be evidence, if produced, an immediate sworn copy will avail. 5 Wood. p. 320. Espinasse. As, in the instance of the Cottonian Collection, whose papers are not allowed to be sent abroad, a copy is always received in evidence; and since a ship’s register must, from the nature of the instrument and the rules of the marine, be on board, the reason is, surely, equally cogent, for "receiving a copy of it in proof on any judicial enquiry, when the ship is necessarily at a distance. The opposite argument goes, indeed, to exclude stronger testimony than the roll ; for a deserter’s confession of the fact, before the Judge, would not be sufficient to dispense with the production of the instrument itself. The Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Pennsylvania, seem to have made no provision (except the former in the case of treason) for a conviction by the confession of the party; yet, the absurdity of proceeding to try a man for a crime, after he has pleaded guilty to the charge, has been too obvious to receive any sanction from the practice of our courts. But that absurdity is urged as law in the present case. Captain Barre had confessed the existence of the roll subscribed by him, and his desertion from the ship, still, it is contended, that the Judge must wait for the exhibition of the roll to prove the fact acknowledged to take a bond of fate; and make assurance doubly sure.” This, however, would be a mocking of justice—a palpable evasion of the treaty. It is said, that the surrender of deserters is an act odious on principles of humanity, as well as policy; but the remark is not uniformly just. In the case of one army giving encouragement to deserters from another, the surrender would be faithless and iniquitous; but that bears no analogy to the present case; and, in another case, which is analogous to the present, the United States have thought it so reasonable and right, that, they have directed any deserter, under contract for a voyage, to be apprehended, and delivered to the Captain of the ship— Act Congress, ch. 29. s. 7, passed 20th July, 1790. But the article of the treaty is affirmative, or directory, and not negative; and the distinction in construing laws so distinguised could never be more properly enforced. Thus, though the statute of Henry for holding the Quarter Sessions, prescribes a particular day, the court being held on another day, it was deemed valid, So, where a day was fixed by the act for appointing overseers of the poor, the appointment was good, tho’ made on another day. Upon the whole, the proof given and tendered in this case, was, 1st, the warrant of the District Judge of Pennsylvania, which, on common law principles, would be sufficient to procure the indorsement or warrant of any other Judge;—2d, the official letters and statement of Captain Barre, proving the fact, as conclusively to every purpose of truth and justice, as the exhibition of his signature to the ship’s roll; and being, in effect, a written confession, a species of proof which is admitted even in the case of treason : —and 3d, a copy of the ship's roll certified by the Vice-Consul. This ought not, perhaps, to be regarded as complete evidence under the 5th article of the Convention, which seems only to relate to acts made before, or taken in the presence of, the Consul. It is, however, entitled to, atleast, as much respect as a Notarial Certificate, which commands full faith in all commercial countries.
    • II, If, then, the Judge ought not to have refufed a, warrant for apprehending Captain Barre, this Court.ought to compel him to grant one, by iffuing a mandamus. The general principle of iffuing that writ,-is founded on'the neceffity of affording a competent remedy for every right ; and it conftrains all inferior' Courts to perform their duty, unlefs they are veiled with a diferetion. Éfp. 3 Bürr. 1267. The Treaty is the fupreme law of the land ; and if an abfolute diferetion is given to the Diftriél Judge, it is conceded, that this Court cannot -interpofe tó controuf and decide it. But much will depend on the nature of the diferetion given to the Judge ; fince a legal diferetion is fometimes as much implied in the exercife of h minifterial, as in the exercife of a judicial funilion. • In.the prefent cafe the' Treaty contemplates an arreft, and a delivery of the deferter : it may, therefore, be confiderecl as one thing to iflue the warrant, and as another, very different in nature and jurifdi¿tion, to decide upon a hearing of the parties. In Stra. 881, a mandamus was refufed, becaufe the granting of a licence was difcretionary in the Juftices: but- wherever an A£t of Parliament peremptorily dire£ts a thing to be done, though it ihould be of a Judicial nature, if no difcretion is veiled in the inferior officer or Court, a mandamus will lie. Thus, the a£ts of the Judge of Probates, &c. are judicial acts ; yet, as the Act of Parliament declares that adminiftration fhall be granted •to the next of kin, a mandamus will iflue directing the admini-ílfation tobe granted to the next of kin, and if it appears on the return that A. B.' is next of kin, a mandamus will iflue to grant it to him. 1 Stra. 42, 93, 211. If the Diftrict Judge had returned, that he was of opinion, that Captain Barre was not a deferter, it might have been fufficient; but he has returned that he would not examine the evidence, becaufe it was not evjdence. Suppofe the fliip’s Roll had been exhibited, and the Judge had refufed to iflue the warrant, becaufe it appeared that Capt. Barre had taken the oath of citizenfhip, would notaman-datnus iflue under fuch circumftances ? 4 Burr. 1991. 2 Stra. 992. But ifluing the v/arrant is merely a minijlerial act, and where words are fo ftrongly directory as in the article of the Treaty, without any exprefs inveftmentof difcretion, a mandamus has always been awarded. 1 Wilf. 283. Í Black. Rep.6op., I Stra. 553. 113. Doug. 182. Though the Cornmiffioners returned, that they had reafon to doubt (purfuing the words of the law of Pe7infylvania, 2 Vol. Dali. Edit. p. 494) the truth of the Bankrupt’s conformity, the Supreme Court at firil hefitated, whether a mandamus ought not to’ iflue, though it was eventually refufed, on the ground of the difcretion, which the law gave to the Comteiffioners. But one great ingredient in the exercife of this controuling jurifdiction, by mandamus, is, that there exifts no other fpecific remedy for the party, and that upon the principles of juftice and good government, he ought to have one. 2 Burr. 1045. 3 Burr. 1266,1659. 4 Burr. 2188. In the prefent cafe, the Diftrict Judge is the only competent Judge to' iflue thp warrant ; and a writ of Error cannot be brought merely upon his refufal to inftitute the pro-cefs.
    
      
       Wilson, Justice. Does it appear that any oath was taken in this safe?
      Bradford:-No: A warrant, which had been issued by the District Judge of Pennsylvania-various official letters,-and Captain Barre's own statement, were offered to be produced; but the point was put by the Judge on the necessity of producing the original roll, in exclusion of every other species of testimony. This, therefore, is the only question before The Court.
    
   BY THE COURT:

We are clearly and unanimously of opinion, that a mandamus ought not to issue. It is evident, that the District Judge was acting in a judicial capacity, when he determined, that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize his issuing a warrant for apprehending Captain Barre : and (whatever might be the difference of sentiment entertained by this Court) we have no power, to compel a Judge to decide to the dictates of any judgment, but his own. If is unnecessary, however, to declare, or to form, at this time, any conclusive opinion, on the question which has been so much agitated, respecting the evidence required by the 9th article of the Consular Convention.

The Rule discharged