Case ID: md_136/html/0077-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Burke, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

THE HOLLAND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer, and THE NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY, Insurer, vs. LILLIE THOMAS, Claimant.
    
      Lack of Jit/risdiction in Lower Court — Appeal from Industrial Accident Commission.
    
    A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is coram non judice, and the question of jurisdiction may be raised by motion to quash, by motion in arrest of judgment, or in any other appropriate way, and the objection may be relied on in the Court of Appeals, though not made in the lower Court.
    Code, Article 101, Section 56, in relation to appeals from the State Industrial Accident Commission, declares that “no such appeal shall be entertained unless notice of appeal shall have been served personally upon some member of the Commission within thirty days following the rendition of the decision appealed from,” and consequently the Court to which an appeal is taken is without jurisdiction if the appeal was not taken until more than thirty days after the decision of the Commission.
    
      Decided, February 5th, 1920.
    
    Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Duffy, J.).
    The cause was argued before Boyd, C. J., Briscoe, Burke, Thomas, Urner and Stockbridge, JJ.
    
      J. Richard Wilkins and Aubrey Pearre, Jr., with whom were Stewart <&, Peafre on the brief, for the appellants.
    
      Lawrence S. Kaufman, with whom were Kaufman & Kaufman on the brief, for the appellee.
   Burke, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

James Thomas, an employee of the Holland Manufacturing Company, while engaged in the course of his employment with that company, was caught in a certain part of the machinery of the company and was instantly killed. His mother, Lillie Thomas, the appellee, filed a claim for compensation, upon the ground of dependency, with the State Industrial Accident Commission, and that body, on June 14th, 1918, after hearing, passed an order disallowing her claim. On July 15th, 1918 — thirty-one days after the decision — the claimant entered an appeal from the action of the Commission. The case was tried before a jury in the Baltimore City Court and resulted in a verdict for the claimant, and on August 4th, 1918, the Court entered a judgment' reversing the decision of the Commission and remanding the case to the end that compensation may be awarded to the claimant, Lillie Thomas, in accordance with the provisions of Article 101 of the Code of Public Laws of Maryland. The appeal before us was taken by the employer and the insurer from that judgment.

The question which arises upon the facts stated, and about which there is and can be no dispute, is this: Had the Baltimore City Court jurisdiction to hear and determine the case ? If it had no jurisdiction its judgment is a mere nullity and must be reversed. A judgment rendered without, jurisdiction is coram non judice, and the question of jurisdiction may be raised by motion to quash, by a motion in arrest of judgment, or in any other appropriate way, or, without making the objection in the Court below, which was not done in this case, it may be relied on in this Court upon appeal. This is the settled law of this State. U. S. Express Co. v. Hurlock, 120 Md. 107, and cases there cited.

Section 56 of Article 101 of the Code, relating to appeals from the decisions of the State Industrial Accident Commission, declares that: “No such appeal shall be entertained unless notice of appeal shall have been served personally upon some member of tbe Commission within thirty days following tbe rendition of tbe decision appealed from.” Tbis language is positive and mandatory, and we bave no power to disregard it. It was evidently intended to secure expedition in tbe review of tbe decisions of tbe Commission, and to forbid tbe bearing of sucb appeals unless taken witbin tbe time limited.

It follows that tbe judgment appealed from must be reversed, and tbe case remanded in order that tbe lower Court may dismiss tbe appeal taken by tbe claimant from tbe decision of tbe Commission.

Judgment reversed, with costs and ease remanded.