Case ID: so3d_116/html/0620-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CASANUEVA, Judge. ALTENBERND, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Daren Anthony BUSCIGLIO, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Lindell Alonso BUSCIGLIO, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    No. 2D11-6481.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    July 3, 2013.
    
      Virginia R. Vetter, Tampa, for Appel-lanVCross-Appellee.
    Amy D. Singer of Allen Dell, P.A., Tampa, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
   CASANUEVA, Judge.

In this appeal from an amended final judgment that dissolved the marriage of Daren Anthony Busciglio and Lindell Al-onso Busciglio, resolved an alimony claim, and decided issues relating to the parties’ minor children, both parties raise claims of trial court error. We conclude that only two claims raised in the cross-appeal are meritorious. We find no reversible error in the remaining points raised and will not address them.

I. Private School

Paragraph 12 of the amended final judgment orders Ms. Busciglio to “pay private school expenses for the minor children until graduation from high school, unless and until the parties agree otherwise.” This is based upon the trial court’s finding that the children attended a private school before and during the pen-dency of these proceedings. The parties agree and the record supports their agreement that this finding is factually incorrect.

The children do not attend a private school; they attend a charter school that is considered a public school. This charter school suggests that parents make a voluntary yearly contribution, and Ms. Busciglio has consistently voluntarily donated a sum certain each year. On remand, the trial court shall correct the judgment to reflect that the children’s school is a public one but may continue to require, if it sees fit, that Ms. Busciglio pay all required expenses imposed by any school that the parents choose the children to attend. The voluntary nature of a parent’s yearly contribution should remain voluntary.

II. Life Insurance

During the marriage, Ms. Busciglio maintained a life insurance policy insuring her life in the face amount of one million dollars. The final judgment mandates merely that she maintain this policy and that Mr. Busciglio and the children continue as equal beneficiaries of the policy. The order is silent as to what purpose is served by maintaining this insurance: is it to secure the payment of alimony or child support or both? Both parties agree that this order requires clarification. We do not disagree.

Sections 61.08(3) and 61.13(1), Florida Statutes (2010), respectively, authorize a trial court to protect future payments of alimony and child support by ordering a party to maintain life insurance “to the extent necessary.” In this case, the trial court ordered that Ms. Busciglio pay alimony to Mr. Busciglio because she has a far greater income than he.

In Solomon v. Solomon, 861 So.2d 1218, 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), this court stated that “[i]n the absence of special circumstances, a spouse cannot be required to maintain life insurance for the purpose of securing an alimony obligation.” Without special circumstances it is error for a trial court to require the payor spouse to maintain life insurance to secure an award of alimony. This court in Kearley v. Kearley, 745 So.2d 987, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), concluded that “sufficient findings [must be] contained in the final judgment to justify a requirement for life insurance as alimony security.” The final judgment in Kearley was deficient in that it stated merely that “the husband shall provide life insurance on his life in the amount of $93,000 as security for his alimony obligations.” Id. In Kearley, this court could not ascertain whether Ms. Kearley would be paid the entire policy proceeds in the event of Mr. Kearley’s death or only so much as to compensate her for an alimony arrearage and noted that “[e]ither arrangement may be appropriate, but those terms must be certain.” Id. The Busciglios’ final judgment is even less specific than the language in the Kear-leys’ final judgment.

“Generally, permanent periodic alimony for support is limited to the traditional requirement of termination upon the obligor’s death.” Pipitone v. Pipitone, 23 So.3d 131, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). But as Kearley pointed out, this is not always the case. In any event, if the life insurance policy the trial court ordered Ms. Busciglio to maintain is for alimony, the specific circumstances justifying it must be provided in the final judgment. We also encourage the trial court on remand to further specify whether upon Ms. Busciglio’s death Mr. Busciglio shall receive only that portion of the proceeds required to compensate him for alimony payments due but not yet paid or otherwise.

III. Conclusion

The amended final judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings as noted above.

ALTENBERND, J., Concurs with opinion.

DAVIS, C.J., Concurs.

ALTENBERND, Judge,

Concurring.

I fully concur in the opinion but write to recognize that this is a difficult case in which to establish alimony. The parties were married in their early twenties. The husband earned an engineering degree and, undoubtedly, helped support his wife through medical school. Now in their mid-forties, she is a successful physician and he is working in a fire department attempting to become a paramedic. Although dura-tional alimony might now be a better option in such a context involving healthy, well-educated parties, it was not available when this action was resolved. The award of more than $47,000 per year in taxable permanent alimony to the husband seems high to me, but it is not an abuse of discretion under the applicable law and the facts of this case given the disparity of income.

Twenty years ago, I first suggested that the legislature consider statutes establishing the law applicable to life insurance in divorce proceedings. Kowalczyk v. Kowalczyk, 627 So.2d 591, 591 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (Altenbemd, J., concurring); see also Kearley v. Kearley, 745 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (Altenbernd, J., concurring). The situation remains much the same. See generally Jani Maurer, Use and Disposition of Life Insurance in Dissolution of Marriage, 16 Barry L.Rev. 57 (Spring 2011).

Term life insurance that has already been purchased during a marriage can rather easily be used to secure unpaid child support or alimony in the event of the death of the payor ex-spouse during the first decade following the divorce. Such a requirement, however, does create a complex designation of beneficiary because a portion of the proceeds may need to be payable as support, while the remainder of the proceeds are given to a beneficiary selected by the payor ex-spouse. Even in the context of this simple use of life insurance, the price of term life insurance can become prohibitive as parties age.

Life insurance benefits that are payable to adult children or an ex-spouse when no alimony or child support is due create more difficult issues. The annual premiums paid by the payor ex-spouse are arguably alimony payments used to create a savings component. See Mallard v. Mallard, 771 So.2d 1138, 1141 (Fla.2000) (barring alimony from including a savings component). In this case, for example, if the ex-wife dies at age sixty-five, under the language of the judgment, her adult children and their father will collectively receive a million dollars largely unrelated to their needs. These payments are a disincentive for the benefiting ex-spouses to remarry and can create what is known as a “moral hazard” affecting the insurability of the payor ex-spouse. The cash surrender value of whole life insurance creates additional issues.

It has proven virtually impossible for the appellate courts to create common law rules addressing the array of issues created by life insurance provisions in final judgments of dissolution. Family law attorneys and circuit court judges need some basic, default rules that they can consistently apply in all but the most complex cases. A fair and balanced statute written by experts in the field would benefit all involved. 
      
      . See § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. (2010). In the 2010 version of the statute, the purpose of durational alimony was to "provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration." § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. (2010) (emphasis added). The 2011 version added that the purpose of durational alimony was to provide such assistance "following a marriage of short or moderate duration or following a mairiage of long duration if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis." § 61.08(7), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). The changes made in the 2011 version of the statute "apply to all initial awards of alimony entered after July 1, 2011, and to all modifications of alimony of such awards made after July 1, 2011.” See ch. 2011-92, § 80, at 1704, Laws of Fla.