Case ID: f-appx_697/html/0518-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jose VALDIVIA-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-72168
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted May 17, 2017  San Francisco, California
    Filed September 08, 2017
    Ray Anthony Ybarra Maldonado, Law Office of Ray A. Ybarra Maldonado, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner
    John Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel, OIL, Christina P. Greer, Stefanie A. Svo-ren-Jay, Trial Attorney, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent
    Before: KLEINFELD and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and PETERSON, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Valdivia-Rodriguez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order ruling that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was convicted of a crime of domestic violence. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) and deny the petition.

Valdivia-Rodriguez’s assault conviction was for a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) under the modified categorical approach. He pleaded guilty to subsection (A)(1) of the Arizona assault statute, which requires “causing any physical injury to another person.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203(A)(1). The Arizona Criminal Code defines “[pjhysical injury” to mean “the impairment of physical condition,” Id. § 13-105(33). His argument that the assault statute does not require physical force is therefore without merit. He relies on the hypothetical from In re Jeremiah T., 212 Ariz. 30, 126 P.3d 177, 180 (2006), used to explain the holding that (A)(3) is not a lesser-included offense within (A)(1), but does not demonstrate “a realistic probability” that the statute is applied in the manner of the hypothetical (charging someone who withheld medication under (A)(1)), see Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). The mens rea requirement was satisfied, because Valdivia-Rodriguez pleaded guilty to class 1 misdemeanor assault, which requires acting intentionally or knowingly. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004).

The domestic relationship requirement was also met here. In Arizona, the State may charge the defendant with domestic violence by including the letters “DV” in the charging document and need not charge the defendant specifically under section 13-3601, which is Arizona’s domestic violence statute. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(H). The signed plea states that Valdivia-Rodríguez was charged with and pleaded guilty to “Assault and Disorderly Conduct DV.” And the domestic relationships enumerated in section 13-3601(A) are coextensive with those listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i). Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1125 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.