Case ID: f-appx_688/html/0468-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Premalal RANASINGHE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    Nos. 15-15247 15-15780
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted April 11, 2017 
    
    Filed April 20, 2017
    
      Premalal Ranasinghe, Pro Se
    Patrick M. Kennell, Kaufman Dolowich & Voluck, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Great West Casualty Company
    James Ray Broening, Esquire, Attorney, Alicyn Marie Freeman, Broening. Oberg Woods & Wilson PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees Joseph J. Popolizio, Phillip H. Stanfield
    Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

In these consolidated appeals, Premalal Ranasinghe appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action alleging breach of contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1060 (9th Cir. 2011), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Ranasinghe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Ranasinghe and defendant Great West entered into a binding contract. See Schade v. Diethrich, 158 Ariz. 1, 760 P.2d 1050, 1058 (1988) (reasonable certainty of contractual terms is an important factor in determining whether the parties intended to make a binding offer and acceptance); Heywood v. Ziol, 91 Ariz. 309, 372 P.2d 200, 203 (1962) (“It is elementary that before there can be a binding contract there must be mutual consent of the parties to the terms thereof.”),

• The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ranasinghe’s motion for relief from judgment because Rana-singhe failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief from judgment based on fraud).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to defendant Great West after considering the relevant factors because its conclusions were supported by the evidence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (permitting an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the successful party in a contested action arising out of a contract); Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (1985) (setting forth standard of review and listing the factors for determining whether to award fees).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.