Case ID: f-appx_584/html/0401-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

B. Benedict WATERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Juan Carlos CASAS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 12-56464.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted July 22, 2014.
    
    Filed July 31, 2014.
    B. Benedict Waters, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.
    Juan Carlos Casas, Morgan Hill, CA, pro se.
    Gabriel Dermer, Esquire, Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, Angela M. Taylor, Jones Day, Irvine, CA, Nathaniel Garrett, Esquire, Jones Day, San Francisco, CA, Matthew J. Liedle, Esquire, Eric John Larson, Liedle Louns-bery Larson & Lidl LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

B. Benedict Waters appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), and other claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Guatay Christian Fellowship v. County of San Diego, 670 F.3d 957, 970 (9th Cir.2011), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Waters’s FCRA and California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act claims because Waters failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether there were inaccuracies in his credit report or that the collection accounts were improperly reported. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890-91 (9th Cir.2010) (requiring prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting); see also Cal. Civ.Code § 1785.25(a) (prohibiting reporting of information that is known to be incomplete or inaccurate).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Waters’s conspiracy claim because Waters failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether there was an agreement or meeting of the minds among supposed conspirators. See Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.1983).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Waters’s FDCPA claims because Waters failed to raising a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the collection account was a “debt” under the FDCPA. See Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226-28 (9th Cir.2004) (FDCPA “debt” is incurred only when a consumer engages in a consensual transaction).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Waters’s remaining state law claims, expanding the vexatious litigant order, denying Waters’s motions for sanctions, and granting relief from an entry of default after finding good cause. See Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir.2009) (standard of review for denial of sanctions); Tritchler v. County of Lake, 358 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir.2004) (standard of review for declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction); Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir.2000) (a district court’s discretion is especially broad when setting aside entry of default); De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.1990) (standard of review and requirements for vexatious litigant orders).

We reject as unsupported by the record Waters’s contentions concerning the district court’s sua sponte grant of summary judgment, denial of judgment on the pleadings, and award of costs.

We do hot consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.