Case ID: so2d_403/html/1121-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. COWART, Judge, DAUKSCH, Chief Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

George Henry BAKER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 80-1344.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Sept. 23, 1981.
    Richard S. Rhodes, Orlando, for appellant.
    Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Shawn L. Briese, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

ORFINGER, J., concurs.

COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.

DAUKSCH, C. J., dissents with opinion.

COWART, Judge,

concurring specially:

I am for affirming the trial court, not because it was harmless error for the trial judge to not give the requested jury instruction regarding impeachment and not because the instruction which was given related to the specific evidence offered for impeachment purposes, but because I do not consider any instruction on impeachment essential or its omission error. Impeachment as a legal concept relates only to the legal reason or purpose for the admissibility of a certain class of evidence. Obviously if such evidence is not admitted the jury cannot consider it and, just as obviously, if it is admitted they can. The jury need not be told that they can consider matters admitted in evidence; that is the very reason all evidence is admitted and is self-evident. The jury innately understands this. The trial judge in instructing the jury should not be required to illustrate the obvious, explain the evident, or expatiate the commonplace.

Neither does the trial judge need to explain the specific purpose for which the proponent offered and the court permitted the introduction of particular evidence, except in a few instances where evidence is received for a limited purpose and a cautionary or limiting instruction is proper. Substantive law does not require that the jury give any particular weight to evidence admitted for the purpose of impeachment. If such evidence genuinely detracts from the credibility of a witness then the jurors will naturally give it that effect; if they do not, then it had no value for that purpose anyway. Either way no instruction is needed. Counsel can argue to the jury the weight that admitted evidence should be given and the reasons. There should not be a standard jury instruction on impeachment evidence. Requiring the trial court to explain to the jury the purpose for which the various items of impeaching evidence was offered and to instruct them that they “should consider such evidence” gives it undue emphasis and weight for that purpose. This should not be done.

DAUKSCH, Chief Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

In my opinion the trial judge erred in refusing to give the requested standard jury instruction regarding impeachment generally, Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 2.13(e)-l:

A witness may be discredited or the weight of his testimony weakened or destroyed by proof that:
1.The witness has at another time made statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony;
2. The witness has been convicted of a crime.
3. The general reputation of the witness for truth, veracity, honesty or integrity is bad; or
4. The statement of the witness is inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses or established facts.
The weight to be given evidence tending to discredit a witness and the weight to be given the testimony of a witness whose reliability has been attacked are matters for you to determine in the light of all the evidence in the case.

The trial judge refused to give that instruction saying it was unnecessary because he was giving Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 2.13(e)-3:

When an attempt is made to discredit a witness by showing a bad reputation for truth and veracity, or honesty and integrity) you should consider such evidence along with any evidence of good reputation as to those traits of character.

By its affirmance the majority seems to be saying either the error was harmless or the failure to give the instruction was not error because that instruction which was given covered the evidence in this case. The latter is not correct because there was no evidence regarding the witness’ reputation as contemplated by the given instruction but there was evidence regarding his inconsistent statements, his conviction of a crime (and revocation of probation), and his testimony was inconsistent with another witness (the appellant). All of these emphasized portions are covered in the general instruction which should have been given and are not covered by the reputation instruction which was unnecessarily given. See United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976). It was reversible error to fail to give the instruction because the jury should be advised on all the law applicable to the case before it. See Bunn v. State, 363 So.2d 16 (Fla.3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1373 (1979). 
      
      . As in similar fact evidence. See § 90.404(2), Fla.Stat. (1979).