Case ID: md_160/html/0674-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Sloan, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

WALTER M. WEBER v. ISAAC MEROWITZ.
    [No. 1,
    April Term, 1931.]
    
      Decided June 9th, 1931.
    
    The cause was submitted on briefs to Bond, C. L, Pattison, Urner, Adkins, Offutt, Digges, Parke, and Sloan, JJ.
    
      David Ash, for the appellant.
    
      William Lovitt, for the appellee.
   Sloan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, ratifying a mortgagee’s report of sale, to which exceptions had been taken by the appellant. The appellant, Walter M. Weber, had purchased from Robert Seff a lot of ground fronting 84 feet 11 inches on the north side of West Street in the City of Baltimore for $16,000. Seff had purchased the property from Isaac Merowitz, the appellee, without taking a conveyance for the same in his own name, and a deed was thereafter made directly by Merowitz to Weber. The lot was improved by seven dwelling houses, each of them subject to a ground rent of $18 a year. It appears that Merowitz was to- receive $14,000 for the property, so that the other $2,000 was to have gone to Seff. Seff and Weber gave Merowitz a mortgage for $10,000, on account of which $4,000 was paid, leaving a balance due, at the time of sale, of $6,000 on account of the principal, and six months’ interest, and taxes against the property amounting to about $2,000 had also accumulated. The sale, after three weeks.’ advertisement in the Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in Baltimore, was made on the premises-by William Lovitt, trustee, to the purchasers, David M. Schlossberg and wife, at $4,500. It appears that, according to. the advertisement and report of sale, the seven houses and lots were offered separately and as a whole, the aggregate of the bids, on the separate parcels being $2,405.

The grounds of exception were: First, because the property was sold at a grossly inadequate price and for so much less than its fair market value; second, because it was improperly, insufficiently, and illegally advertised; third, because the advertisement failed to> state that the parcel of land was subject to an original ground rent on a larger tract of land of which the mortgaged premises were a part, and the failure to state the exact amount, if any, of the original ground rent of said premises, thereby causing “vagueness, confusion, uncertainty and indefiniteness in the minds of prospective purchasers or bidders at the time of said sale and preventing free, unrestrained and normal bidding at tbe time of sale.”

The appellant produced one witness engaged in tbe real estate business, who testified that tbe mortgaged property ought to bring at private sale $6,350, which testimony was offset by tbe testimony of another real estate broker produced by tbe appellee, that be valued tbe property at $3,500, and that be attended the sale with tbe expectation of -buying if be could get it at a proper figure. Even on tbe appellant’s testimony, there is no such disparity between tbe estimated value and tbe price at which tbe property was sold as to lead one to infer that tbe inadequacy mounted up to- a fraud, or that tbe price was unfair. Tbe evidence is that tbe property was physically in bad shape and needed repairs, estimated at from three to four thousand dollars. Most of the bouses were unoccupied. It has been frequently decided in this state that ■mere'inadequacy is no reason for setting aside a sale, unless tbe inadequacy is gross and there is prospect of a better price being obtained on a resale, and tbe circumstances indicate there was no real competition. Shirk v. Soper, 144 Md. 269, 124 A. 911; Weinstein v. Boyd, 136 Md. 234, 110 A. 506; Boyd v. Smith, 127 Md. 359, 96 A. 526; Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396.

Tbe appellant was present at the sale, which appears to have been largely attended, and be did not there raise any question about tbe fairness of tbe advertisement or tbe manner in which tbe sale was being conducted, and stated no facts or circumstances from which it might be inferred that, if a resale were ordered, any better result could be obtained than at tbe first sale. In fact, tbe only inference to be drawn from tbe record is that another sale would amount to no more than a mere experiment, with tbe probabilities that tbe property might be sold for a less sum and tbe proceeds burdened with additional costs. As stated by Judge Alvey in Bank of Commerce v. Lanahan, 45 Md. 396: “With all tbe diversity of opinion upon this subject, no witness ventures to say that be will give more than tbe bid reported, if tbe property should go to re-sale. Indeed, they say they would not; and there is nothing in any portion of the evidence that gives any degree of assurance that, if the property were put up at re-sale, it would bring more than the price reported. Why then order a re-sale? The sale reported should not be set aside and a re-sale ordered as a mere experiment. That is forbidden both by reason and the well-established doctrine of the law upon the subject.” And, as stated by Judge Pattison in Cockey v. Hampson, 140 Md. 551, 118 A. 72, 74: “As the record discloses no facts from which it is shown that the mortgagors were injured in the sale of the property by reason of the said omission in the advertisement, or from which it is shown that upon, a re-sale of the property it is reasonably probable that a greater amount can be obtained therefor, the order appealed from will be affirmed.” Both of these quotations are illustrated by the facts in the present case.

The advertisement did state that the property was improved by seven three-story brick dwellings, each subject to an annual subrent of $18, payable half yearly on April 1st and October 1st, “and is a part of a larger tract subject to the original rent stated in Liber G-. R. 524, folio 328.” The testimony is that on this tract there are now twenty-two buildings. The only inference to' be drawn from the exceptions is that the failure to state the size of the tract, the amount of the ground rent, and the proportion to which the mortgaged premises is subject, is that the purchaser might have been hurt; but he is not complaining. He testifies that he paid for the property all that it is now in the present condition of the real estate market worth. Hobody present at the sale appears to have been interested in the ground rent on the whole tract, and the appellant himself testified that he raised no question about it at the sale. The auctioneer testified that, after reading the advertisement, he asked those present if there were any questions they wished to ask concerning the property. Though we do¡ not so decide, the only person who might have any reason to except to the ratification of the sale for the omissions of which the appellant complains is the appellee. Hej as stated, does not complain. It is hardly equitable that the appellant, who was present at the sale and made no objection to the terms and conditions of the advertiesment, should now be granted relief for his own negligence. 3 Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.), secs. 2139 and 2406. Inasmuch as we are of opinion that the sale was fairly made, the price not grossly inadequate, and the appellant not injured, the order appealed from will be affirmed.

Order affirmed, with costs.