Case ID: us-ct-cl_8/html/0457-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SCOTT’S CASE. Isaac Scott’s Executor v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      After the Amnesty proclamation May 29, 1865, a person, residing within the insurrectionary district, under a misapprehension talees the oath prescribed by the previous Proclamation December 8,1863. Se is in one of the classes excepted by the Proclamation May 29,1865. A special pardon is granted him conditional upon his talcing the oath prescribed by the Proclamation May 29, 1865. foipposing he has already tahen that oath, he neglects to comply ivith the condition, and he dies before the General amnesty proclamation December 25, 1868. The pardon recites, that by taking pari in the late rebellion he has made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties. Apart from it, the evidence indicates that he did not give aid or comfort to the rebellion.
    
    I. It is an inflexible rule tliat be wbo seeks to avail himself of tbe benefits of a pardon granted conditionally, must sbow a rigid compliance with tlie conditions which it imposes. Therefore, where one receives a pardon, conditional upon his taking and keeping the oath prescribed by the Amnesty proclamation May 29,1865, it is not a compliance to take the oath prescribed by the previous Proclamation December 8, 1863, and the pardon is inoperative, though the difference between the two oaths is slight.
    II. The Amnesty proclamation 8th December, 1863, was abrogated by the Proclamation May 29, 1865, so far as the excepted classes are concerned.
    III. The acceptance of a conditional pardon which never becomes operative is not evidence of guilt though it contain recitals that by taking part in the late rebellion the party has made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties. As an admission, it is vague, uncertain, and depends K upon obtruse legal conclusions. As an estoppel, it is inopierative, because the grant of the pardon is inoperative; and a man is only estopped where he accepts a grant, and not where he receives no benefit whatever from it.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The court found the following facts:
    I. The claimant, Isaac Scott, with his partners of the firm of George Parsons & Co., and one Edward Padelford, was the joint owner of two hundred and six bales of cotton captured at Savannah in December, 1864. The claimant’s interest therein was one undivided fourth part. The rights of the parties have been severed, and the other parties have recovered for their respective interests. The cotton was sold, and the net proceeds in the Treasury are $175.33 per bale, amounting in the aggregate to $9,029.49.
    II. The claimant, Isaac Scott, never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion. But in October, 1865, he accepted a pardon from the President in the words following:
    “Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, to all to whom these presents shall come, greeting :
    “Whereas Isaac Scott, of Macon, Georgia, by taking part in the late rebellion against the Government of the United States, has made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties ;
    “ And whereas the circumstances of his case render him a proper object of executive clemency:
    “Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, in consideration of the premises, divers other good and sufficient reasons me thereunto moving, do héreby grant to the said Isaac Scott a full pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed, arising from participation, direct or implied, in tbe said rebellion, conditioned as follows, viz: This pardon to begin and take effect from the day on which the said Isaac Scott shall take the oath prescribed in the proclamation of the President dated May 29th, 1865, and to be void and of no effect if the said Isaac Scott shall hereafter, at any time, acquire any property whatever in slaves, or make use of slave labor; and that he first pay all costs which may have accrued in any proceedings hitherto instituted against his person or property up to the date of the acceptance of this warrant.
    “ And upon the further condition that the said Isaac Scott shall notify the Secretary of State in writing that he has received and accepted the foregoing pardon.
    “ In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name and ■caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
    “Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-ninth
    [l. s.] day of August, A. D. 1865, and of the Independence of the United States the ninetieth.
    “ANDBEW JOHNSON.
    “By the President:
    “WilliAM H. Seward,
    “ Secretary of State.”
    
    The claimant did not comply with the condition of the pardon by subsequently taking “ the oath prescribed in the proclamation of the President dated May 29, 1865,” but he had previously taken, on the 24th June, 1865, under a misapprehension, the oath prescribed by the President’s proclamation, 8th December, 1863, and he was misled and induced to do so by receiving the blank form of such oath from the Attorney-General’s Office, accompanied by a circular of the Attorney-General bearing date the 7th June, 1865, which stated that “all persons belonging to the excepted classes enumerated in the President’s amnesty proclamation, May 29, 1865, who may make special applications to the President for pardon, are hereby notified that before their respective applications will be considered it must be shown that they have respectively taken and subscribed the oath in said proclamation prescribed.”
    The claimant was within one of the excepted classes of persons excluded from amnesty in the Proclamation 29th May, 1865, and he died in December, 1867, before the General amnesty proclamation, 25th December, 1868.
    
      
      Mr. John D. McPherson for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Alexander Johnston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

It was supposed, on the trial of this case, that the only question involved was whether the taking of the oath prescribed by the pardon, before the pardon was granted, was a sufficient compliance with its condition; and it was insisted, by the counsel for the claimant, that if the taking of the oath was contemporary, it was immaterial whether it was taken just before or just after the issuing of the pardon, especially as the Attorney-General, by a contemporary construction, and, doubtless under the direction of the President, had indicated by bis circular of, J une 7,1865, that the oath should be taken in advance. But on looking into the case, we find that the oath which was taken is the oath prescribed by the President’s proclamation 8th December, 1863. The difference between the two oaths is slight; but from such examination as we have been able to give to the subject, we find it to be an inflexible rule that be who seeks to avail himself of the benefits of a pardon, granted conditionally, must show a rigid compliance with the conditions which it imposes.

Laying aside the pardon, it remains to be inquired whether the deceased claimant was absolved by any proclamation. As to that of December, 1863, be took the oath which it prescribed, but the proclamation was abrogated by that of 29th May, 1865, certainly so far as the excepted classes were concerned. Mr. Scott belonged to one of those classes and be could not, therefore, avail himself of that proclamation.

As to the General amnesty proclamation December 25, 1868, Mr. Scott died a year before it was issued. The Supreme Court has held that it applies to persons and not to the general obliteration of treasonable offenses, (Gay’s Gold, 13 Wall. Rep., p. 358,) and this court has held that it does not extend to one who died previously, (Meldrim & Dogle’s Case, 7 C. Cls. Rep., p. 595.) We must, therefore, lay it aside as not reaching the claimant’s case.

But we are at the same time of the opinion that the acceptance of the pardon by Mr. Scott does not preclude the court from passing upon the other evidence of his loyalty which is in the case. The pardon recites that “ by talcing part in the late rebellion” he uhas made himself liable to heavy pains and penalties.” If this has any efficacy it must be either as an admission or by way of estoppel. The law regards admissions with jealousy, and this one is vague, uncertain, and dependent upon abstruse legal conclusions. Considered as an estoppel, there is nothing in it; for a man is only estopped where he accepts a grant and not where it is inoperative and he receives no benefit whatever from it. Upon the evidence we find that the claimant’s testator did not give aid or comfort to the rebellion.

The judgment of the court, is that the claimant recover the proceeds in the Treasury of fifty-one and a half bales of cotton captured at Savannah, being $175.33 per bale, amounting in the aggregate to $9,029.49.

And in the second ease of the claimant’s, (No. 2635,) judgment will be entered for the proceeds of one hundred and four bales of cotton, amounting to $18,234.32.

And in the third case of the claimant’s, (No. 2636,) judgment will be entered for the proceeds of three hundred and fifty-five bales of cotton, amounting to $62,242.15.