Case ID: f-appx_616/html/0299-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rob LEAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEATTLE HOUSING AUTHORITY; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-35276.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Aug. 25, 2015.
    
    Filed Sept. 8, 2015.
    Rob Lear, Seattle, WA, pro se.
    
      Donald S. Means, Deputy General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Jeffrey Co-wan, Assistant City, Seattle City Attorney’s Office, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: McKEOWN, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Rob Lear appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants conspired to harm him and deprive him of his property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 436 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lear’s conspiracy claims because Lear failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants had an agreement to violate his constitutional rights. See id. at 441 (elements of § 1983 conspiracy); see also Caf-asso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics Ck Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir.2011) (“To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must set forth non-speculative evidence of specific facts, not sweeping con-clusory allegations.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s request for an injunction in his state eviction proceedings because the proceedings were unrelated to the instant action. See Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir.2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors for evaluating an injunction request).

The district court did. not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s discovery requests because they were untimely. See Childress v. Darby Lumber, Inc., 357 F.3d 1000, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2004) (setting forth standard of review for discovery issues).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lear’s motion for recu-sal because the judge’s impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir.2010) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for recusal).

We reject Lear’s arguments that the district court held Lear’s pleadings to a heightened standard, and failed to address his motion for summary judgment.

We do not consider issues or. arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

All pending motions are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is. not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.