Case ID: f-appx_138/html/0561-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner—Appellee, v. Mark Earl JONES, Respondent—Appellant.
    No. 04-7781.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted June 30, 2005.
    Decided July 11, 2005.
    
      Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Jane E. Pearce, Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Michelle T. Fuseyamore, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM.

Mark Earl Jones was sentenced to nine years of imprisonment in 1990 for bank robbery and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. Jones was released in 1998 but thereafter had his supervised release revoked and was sentenced to twenty-four months of incarceration. (J.A. 21, 23). Jones was diagnosed with schizophrenia and upon motion of the Government was committed to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). In 2002, Jones was conditionally released from his civil commitment under § 4246(e). Jones’ conditional release was revoked in April 2003.

In December of 2003, Jones sought a hearing to again review whether he could be discharged from the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (2000). Following a hearing on the motion, the district court found that Jones continued to meet the criteria for commitment under § 4246. Jones appeals, arguing that he has met the requirements for release from his civil commitment.

We do not find that the district court clearly erred in its factual determination that Jones failed to meet the requirements for release from custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e) (2000); United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir.1992) (stating general review standard for factual findings under § 4246). Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED