Case ID: sw_286/html/0234-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BEERY, J. PER CURIAM. DATTIMORE, J. MORROW, P. ,T.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

EUBANK v. STATE.
    (No. 9829.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 20, 1926.
    Rehearing Denied April 28, 1926.
    Application to Pile Second Motion for Rehearing Denied June 25, 1926.)
    1. Criminal law €=>787(1) — That court charged jury on defendant’s failure to testify held not error.
    That court instructed jury as to the effect of defendant’s failure to testify in his own behalf in prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors held not error.
    On Application to Pile Second Motion for Rehearing.
    2. Intoxicating liquors €=>236(11) — Evidence held to support conviction for selling (Pen. Code 1925, art. 667).
    Evidence as to defendant's sale of “beer,” and its analysis, held to support conviction under Pen. Code 1925, art. 667, for selling liquor containing more than 1 per cent, of alcohol by volume.
    3. Criminal law €=>304(20).
    Courts have judicial knowledge that “beer” is a “malt liquor.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Malt Liquor.]
    4. Criminal law €=>304(20).
    Courts have no judicial knowledge of contents of “choc beer” or “tequila.”
    5. Criminal law €=>1158(3) — Decision on motion for new trial for misconduct of jury on conflicting evidence not disturbed unless clearly wrong.
    Decision of trial judge on conflicting evidence on motion for new trial for misconduct of jury is given same weight as verdict, and if supported by sufficient evidence, will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong.
    
      Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Ellis County; W. L. Harding, Judge.
    L. J. Eubank was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and lie appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Tom Whipple, of Waxahachie, for appellant.
    Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.
   BEERY, J.

The offense is selling intoxicating liquor, and the punishment is one year in the penitentiary. The indictment charges that the appellant did unlawfully sell “spirituous, vinous, and malt liquor containing in-excess of 1 per cent, of alcohol by volume.” The state’s testimony shows that the prosecuting witness bought 18 bottles of beer from the appellant and paid him $5 therefor; that the officers recovered part of this beer from the purchaser and turned it over to a chemist to be analyzed, and the chemist who analyzed it testified that it contained more than 5 per cent, of alcohol.

The offense charged in the indictment is denounced by article 667 of the 1925 Penal Code. Beer is a malt liquor. Bouvier’s Daw Dictionary, p. 334; Tolar v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 145, 260 S. W. 1044. From the foregoing it follows that, in our opinion, the appellant’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict is without merit.

Appellant complains because the court instructed the jury as to the effect of the defendant’s failure to testify' in his own behalf. The criticism is not leveled at the form of the charge given, but the complaint is at the fact that the court charged on this issue at all. Many, authorities will be found under paragraph 4, § 377, Branch’s Ann. Texas P. G., holding that it is not error for the court to charge on the defendant’s failure to testify.

Complaint is made with reference to the misconduct of the jury. Appellant contends that the jury, discussed his failure to testify, and also referred to the fact that he had once before been tried for violating the liquor laws. The statement of facts heard on this motion for new trial is preserved in the record. We have carefully examined this statement of facts, and have reached the conclusion that the court did not abuse his discretion in refusing a new trial. We think it clear from the testimony of the jurors that they did not discuss his failure to testify, but it was merely casually mentioned, and the testimony of each juror negatives the idea that there was any discussion of the matter. The same is true with reference to a former trial of the appellant. The most that the testimony shows is that some one merely mentioned the fact that he had been tried before. The identical questions raised with reference to the misconduct of the jury were decided adversely to the appellant’s contention in the case of Gutierrez v. State, 100 Tex. Cr. R. 364, 272 S. W. 780, and on the authority of that case and the case therein cited appellant’s complaint herein is overruled.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

DATTIMORE, J.

Appellant urges at length, in a jnotion which shows research and investigation of the authorities, that we erred in holding that the testimony made out the state’s case. Irrespective of whether the witnesses called the liquor sold by appellant beer, stuff, bottles, or what not, it is perfectly plain from the record that a number of bottles of the “stuff” or “beer” sold by appellant were submitted to a chemist and by him analyzed and its alcoholic content found to be considerably more than 1 per cent, by volume. As stated in the original opinion, the offense charged was the sale of liquor containing more than 1 per cent, of alcohol by-volume. It would be immaterial in any case, where this was the charge, what the liquor sold might be called or named. The test would be the presence of two elements, viz., the sale of such liquor and the amount of its alcoholic content by volume. These two elements being proven, the state’s case was abundantly made.

Appellant also renews his complaint directed at our ruling on the proposition of misconduct of the jury, and the testimony given by the jurors introduced upon the hearing of the motion for’new trial has been carefully sifted. Setting it forth at length would but demonstrate the correctness of our holding that it was in a condition of conflict. No testimony appears which supports appellant’s contention, but that it is combated by other testimony to the contrary. 'A reconsideration of same leaves us in no doubt of the correctness of our decision in this regard. While there was apparently a reference to appellant’s failure to testify, it was promptly checked and not again referred to. While there was an inquiry as to whether appellant had been previously convicted, it was after the verdict had been agreed upon ánd before the jury had returned same.

A juror said it seemed to him as though some one said appellant ought to be given five years on general principles, but this juror was not corroborated, and the juror to whom this remark was attributed testified positively that he made no such statemént. The case is brought well within the general rule that the determination of issues of this character upon which the testimony appears contradictory, is primarily for the trial court, whose conclusion will not be. disturbed by" this court unless it is believed to be an abuse of his discretion.

Believing the former opinion correct, the motion for rehearing is overruled.

On Application to File Second Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, P. ,T.

George Torbett, the purchaser named in the indictment, testified that, desiring something to drink, he went to the appellant’s home, knocked at the door, “got seven bottles of beer, and gave $2 for it.” The witness said that he and his companions drank four bottles of beer and decided that they wanted more of it. The witness returned to the appellant’s house. The appellant got up and turned on the light, and “I got 11 more bottles an'd gave him $3 for them.” The witness further said that while in possession of the 11 bottles they were taken by oificers.

The contents of some of the 11 bot- ' ties mentioned was analysed and found to .contain an excess of 5 per cent, of alcohol. It occurs to us that this testimony warranted the jury in concluding that the appellant sold to Torbett a beverage called “beer.” The courts have judicial knowledge that “beer” Js a malt liquor. See Webster’s New International Dictionary, p. 202; Moreno v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 660, 143 S. W. 156, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 863; Words and Phrases, Second ’ Series, p. 417; Ann. Cas. 1914C, p. 863; Black ,on Intoxicating Liquors, § 17, p. 18; Henson et al. v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 280 S. W. 592. The courts have no judicial knowledge of the ■ contents or character of “choc beer” pr “tequila.” See Briggs v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 280 S. W. 775; Henson et al. v. State, supra; Chaves v. State, 101 Tex. Civ. App. 367, 275 S. W. 1006.

The cases of Revilla v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 280 S. W. 1064, and Tolar v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 145, 200 S. W. 1043, are not in . conflict with the conclusion reached on the original hearing.

The fact that the evidence is sufficient to show that the appellant sold to the purchaser named in the indictment a beverage known as “beer” is sufficient, under the precedents named, to characterize the liquid as malt liquor. The evidence also disclosed that the liquor contained more than 1 per cent, of alcohol by volume and was usable for beverage purposes. By this means the state met .the measure of.proof demanded by the law in, charging the offense under article 667, P. C. ÍÓ25, so far as pertains to the character of the liquor is concerned. The .other evidence is sufficient to connect the appellant with the sale.

The evidence adduced upon the motion for new trial has been carefully read. Such parts of it as tend to support the appellant’s theory that there was misconduct of the jury in alluding to the appellant’s failure to testify and to his previous trial is conflicting to a degree that rendered the decision of the trial court against the accused on the hearing of the motion binding upon this court. See Shaw v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 155, 22 S. W. 588; Adams v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 452, 93 S. W. 116, and numerous other cases collated by Mr. Branch in his Ann. Tex. P. C. § 574, p. 295, to the point that the decision of the trial judge upon conflicting evidence given in the motion for new trial ig, on appeal, to be given the same weight as the verdict of the jury upon any other question of fact, and if the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s decision, it is not to be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong.

The permission to file a second motion for rehearing is denied. 
      €=>For other cas'es see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes