Case ID: f-appx_523/html/0013-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Avrohom MARMULSZTEYN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Janet NAPOLITANO, Secretary, United States Department of Homeland Security, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 12-3750-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 19, 2013.
    
      Alan E. Wolin, Wolin & Wolin, Jericho, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Layaliza Soloveichik, Varuni Nelson, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, BARRINGTON D. PARKER and Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Avrohom Marmulsz-teyn appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Janet Napolitano, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. Marmulsz-teyn’s claims, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq., are based on alleged religious discrimination. In particular, Marmulszteyn alleges that his employer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), discriminated against him by not providing a reasonable religious accommodation, and by subjecting him to disparate treatment based on his religion. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo an order granting summary judgment and “resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[ ] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.2009)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Costello v. City of Burlington, 632 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.2011).

After reviewing the record de novo, we conclude that Marmulszteyn’s arguments are without merit. Although we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its August 22, 2012 Memorandum and Order, we briefly note the reasons underlying our decision.

A.

First, we agree with the District Court that Marmulszteyn failed to establish a prima facie case for his failure-to-accommodate claim because no evidence suggests that he suffered an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Joint App’x 183 (Marmulszteyn testifying that he had not been disciplined “for not showing up on Saturday”); id. at 270-71 (similar); see also Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541, 546 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that a failure-to-accommodate claim requires a plaintiff to show that he has suffered an adverse employment action).

Moreover, even assuming that Mar-mulszteyn could establish a prima facie case for his failure-to-accommodate claim, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment because Marmulszteyn was offered a reasonable accommodation: CBP’s “Accommodation Tour” eliminated Mar-mulszteyn’s religious conflict because, when he was assigned a Saturday morning shift, he was allowed to switch to a Saturday shift beginning at 10:00 p.m., after his Sabbath ends. See Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir.2002) (“In formulating ... a[ ] [reasonable] accommodation, both the employer and employee should remain flexible, with an eye toward achieving a mutually acceptable adjustment.... [T]o avoid Title VII liability, the employer need not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.”); see also Joint App’x 97, 197.

B.

Second, we agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Marmulszteyn’s disparate-treatment claim. This claim is governed by the familiar burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), under which a plaintiff must satisfy the minimal burden of making out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: “(1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place under circumstances giving rise to the inference of discrimination.” Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir.2010).

Not only did Marmulszteyn fail to show that he suffered an adverse employment action, see Part A, ante, but he also presented no evidence giving rise to an inference of discrimination, see Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000) (noting that in order to raise an inference of discrimination on the basis of being subjected to disparate treatment, “the plaintiff must show [ ]he was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom [ ]he seeks to compare h[im]self.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Marmulszteyn complains that certain CBP employees received “permanent exemptions” from working on Saturdays (“legacy employees”), he is not similarly situated to those legacy employees. Unlike the legacy employees — who “had worked for one of CBP’s predecessor agencies ... [and received the permanent] exemptions ... [because they] had already negotiated [those exemptions] with the predecessor agencies” — Marmulszteyn did not come from a predecessor agency and joined CBP “when CBP consistently denied employee requests for permanent religious exemptions from work.” Marmulszteyn v. Napolitano, No. 08-CV-4094, 2012 WL 3645776, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2012). In sum, we find no evidence in this record that gives rise to an inference of discrimination.

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Marmulsz-teyn’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are without merit. Accordingly, the August 24, 2012 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED. 
      
      . CBP is a component of the Department of Homeland Security.
     
      
      . Marmulszteyn is a Hasidic Orthodox Jew and informed CBP that his faith precluded him from working on Saturdays until an hour after sunset. Joint App’x 78.
     
      
      . Because we affirm the dismissal of Mar-mulszteyn’s disparate-treatment claim for the reasons stated by the District Court, we do not consider the government’s exhaustion arguments.
     
      
      . Indeed, the fact that some legacy employees are Orthodox Jews, like Marmulszteyn, further militates against an inference of discriminatory intent. See Joint App'x 204, 230-31; Austin v. Ford Models, Inc., 149 F.3d 148, 153-54 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that no inference of discrimination on the basis of sex existed “[bjecause Austin admits that two other similarly situated women employees ... received additional staffing, and because she has alleged no other fact raising an inference of sex discrimination”), abrogated on other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).