Case ID: f-appx_669/html/0006-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Janice MCCARTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA The Bank of New York as trustee for CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage PassThrough Trust 20060A5, Mortgage PassThrough Certificates, Series 20060A5, Recontrust Company N.A., Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellees, CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-OA5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OA5, The Certificateholders of CWMBS, Inc., CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2006-OA5, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-OA5, Roes, 1-10, Does, 1-10 inclusive, representing a class of unknown persons who claim or have the right to claim an interest in certain real property located in Venice, California, Defendants.
    15-3184
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    September 21, 2016
    For Appellant: Janice McCarty, pro se, Venice, CA.
    For Appellees: Scott Harris Kaiser, Esq., Suzanne M. Berger, Esq., Bryan Cave LLP, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, Chief Judge, ROBERT D. SACK, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to reflect the caption indicated here,
    
   Appellant Janice McCarty, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against various financial institutions. Her complaint sought, among other remedies, damages and a declaratory judgment invalidating an assignment that transferred ownérshíp of her residential mortgage loan to defendant Bank of New York Mellon as trustee for a securitized trust (the “Trust”). The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss McCarty’s amended complaint, reasoning primarily that McCarty lacked standing to challenge the assignment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s determination that a plaintiff lacked standing to sue. See Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 757 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 2014). “The question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues[,]” and it implicates both constitutional and prudential limits on the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 84 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Here, McCarty lacked both constitutional and prudential standing to challenge either the validity of the assignment of her mortgage loan or the assignment’s compliance with laws, regulations, and the Trust’s prospectus.

To have standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must have suffered “an injury in fact ... which is (a) concrete and particularized, ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. at 85 (citation omitted). Upon review, we agree with the district court that McCarty alleged only injuries that are “highly implausible” and “entirely hypothetical,” id. and therefore fail to meet the constitutional standing requirements. For example, McCarty’s claim that the improper transfer of her debt prevented her from “explor[ing] options with the time debt owner,” McCarty Br. at 4, relies on too speculative an injury to serve as a basis for Article III standing. Consequently, we find that McCarty lacked constitutional standing to bring a challenge to Bank of New York Mellon’s ownership of her debt based on the alleged invalidity of the assignment.

Moreover, even if McCarty had constitutional standing to challenge the validity of the assignment, she would have lacked prudential standing. The “prudential standing rule ... normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves.” Rajamin, 757 F.3d at 86 (citation omitted). To satisfy the prudential standing requirement, “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. (citation omitted). McCarty lacks prudential standing to assert her claims against defendants because her theories are largely premised on injuries to third parties, such as intended beneficiaries of the Trust.

McCarty also challenges the district court’s denial, with respect to the majority of her claims, of leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. We review such a denial for abuse of discretion. See In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 188 (2d Cir. 2011). Here, in light of the issues discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that repleading would have been futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). On appeal, McCarty adduces no arguments to the contrary.

We have considered McCarty’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . The district court, in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss McCarty’s amended complaint, referred to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). At the same time, much of the district court’s reasoning concerned McCarty’s lack of standing to sue, which, at least as it relates to Article III standing, is properly adjudicated under Fed. R, Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction). See All, For Envtl. Renewal, Inc. v. Pyramid Crossgates 
        Co., 436 F.3d 82, 88 n.6 (2d Cir. 2006), However, the issue of how the district court's dismissal is best characterized is not material to this Court’s decision to affirm.