Case ID: so2d_708/html/0323-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. WHATLEY, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael P. DUNN, Appellant, v. Susan M. DUNN, Appellee.
    No. 97-03242.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    March 27, 1998.
    David J. Mourick, Bonita Springs, for Appellant.
    William G. Morris, Marco Island, for Ap-pellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The husband, Michael P. Dunn, appeals the temporary support award in which he was ordered to make the mortgage payment of $978 per month and pay related household expenses and repairs. In addition, the husband was ordered to pay temporary alimony of $750 per month. On this limited record, it appears that the wife, Susan M. Dunn, has temporary sole possession of the marital residence.

The husband’s financial affidavit reflects gross annual income of $35,700 and the wife’s financial affidavit reflects annual earnings of $570. The parties had no children and were married 18 months when the husband filed the petition for dissolution of marriage.

We affirm the temporary award as to the mortgage payment and related expenses and repairs without discussion. As to the temporary alimony award, we find it to be excessive and, as such, remand this matter to the trial court to reconsider the amount of that award.

Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

THREADGILL, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT, J., concur.

WHATLEY, J., dissents with opinion.

WHATLEY, Judge,

dissenting.

I concur with the majority that the trial court’s temporary order directing the husband to pay the mortgage payment, repairs, and related household expenses should be affirmed. I further concur that if temporary alimony were appropriate, the amount of $750 per month is excessive.

I dissent because from my review of this record, which is admittedly sparse, a temporary alimony award was not appropriate in any amount. A temporary award should not be made when no avenue exists for a corresponding permanent award. Here we have a 1$ year marriage with no exceptional circumstances such that a permanent alimony award could be considered. See § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). This case is years short of even that category of alimony cases which fall within what has been termed a “gray area.” See Zeigler v. Zeigler, 635 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In Zeigler, a 13$ year marriage was referred to as being relatively short-term.

Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So.2d 214, 215-216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), addressed permanent alimony and short-term marriages and, quoting Spencer v. Spencer, 590 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), stated: ‘While a short marriage alone does not preclude an award of ... alimony, the record in the present case provides no support for the notion that the wife is without the means of self support, as a result of anything that has transpired during the marriage.”

Concurring in part, dissenting in part.