Case ID: ga-app_214/html/0891-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McMurray, Presiding Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

A94A1261.
    EARL v. THE STATE.
    (449 SE2d 361)
   McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant Earl appeals his conviction of two counts of the of-mse of armed robbery, five counts of the offense of aggravated as-lult, and one count of the offense of possession of a sawed-off shot-un. Held:

1. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to author-:e his conviction and maintains that no evidence was presented hich corroborates the testimony of an accomplice concerning de-mdant’s participation in the crimes of which he was convicted, inhere an accomplice is the sole witness upon whose testimony the tate relies, a felony conviction is not to be had unless the testimony f the accomplice is corroborated by some slight evidence from an xtraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the riminal act. Kesler v. State, 249 Ga. 462, 465 (2) (291 SE2d 497); Morris v. State, 204 Ga. App. 437, 438 (2) (419 SE2d 733); Williams State, 198 Ga. App. 725 (1), 726 (402 SE2d 796).

All of the offenses arise from two incidents which occurred min-tes apart during the early morning hours of August 23, 1992. The rst incident occurred when four victims leaving a nightclub in Mari-tta were approached outside the club by three armed black males ho threatened and ordered the victims to get down on the ground, ad took the wallet of one victim. A short time later the second indent occurred in the City of Smyrna when a single victim walking ome from a party was robbed at gunpoint and beaten by five black tales who emerged from a passing car. Defendant was indicted along ith four alleged accomplices. Two of the accomplices pled guilty rior to trial and one of these individuals testified for the State at ial. The accomplice stated that during the Marietta robbery, de-mdant and one other accomplice waited in the car, that the car was sfendant’s, and that after the Marietta robbery they went to Smyrna where the second robbery occurred. The accomplice's description o the events suggested that defendant was an active participant in th< robberies. None of the victims was able to identify any of the perpe trators.

On the same day as the robberies, while being questioned on ai unrelated charge, defendant volunteered that he had knowledge o both robberies in this case and told police where to find the gun use< in the robberies. He also admitted to an investigator that he drov the car to the scene of the first robbery, stayed in the car during tb robbery, and heard the discharge of the shotgun during the robbery The victim of the second or Smyrna robbery provided a description o the car driven by the robbers which corresponded with defendant' car, in which defendant and a co-defendant were stopped by polic later during the day of the robberies.

“ ‘On appeal of a criminal conviction, the appellant is no longe indulged with the presumption of innocence, for the jury has ren dered its verdict; (this court does) not weigh the evidence or deter mine the witness’ credibility but construe(s) the evidence to uphoL the verdict. (Cit.)’ Clark v. State, 197 Ga. App. 318, 320 (1) (398 SE2 377) (1990). ‘In Georgia, the testimony of an accomplice used to con vict the accused of a crime must be supported by independent coi roborating evidence as to the identity and participation of the accused tending to connect him to the crime or leading to the inferenc that he is guilty. (Cit.) Slight evidence of a defendant’s identity an participation from an extraneous source is all that is required to coi robórate the accomplice’s testimony and thus support the verdic (Cit.) The necessary corroboration may be by circumstantial evidenci (Cit.)’ Harris v. State, 180 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) (348 SE2d 476) (1986 Also, ‘ “(guilty) knowledge or scienter may be proved, like any othe fact, by circumstantial evidence.” ’ Garrett v. State, 160 Ga. App. 877, 878 (1) (288 SE2d 592) (1982). See also Cobb v. State, 125 Ga. App. 556 (1) (188 SE2d 260) (1972). ‘ “While mere presence at the scene < the commission of a crime is not sufficient evidence to convict one < being a party thereto, ‘ “presence, companionship, and conduct befoi and after the offense are circumstances from which one’s particip; tion in the criminal intent may be inferred.” ’ (Cit.)” (Cits.)’ Butler State, 194 Ga. App. 208, 209 (2) (390 SE2d 278) (1990).” Bennett State, 202 Ga. App. 699 (415 SE2d 310). The evidence adduced ; trial authorized a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reason; ble doubt of defendant’s guilt of the offenses of which he was coi victed. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 Tucker v. State, 205 Ga. App. 683, 684 (423 SE2d 422).

2. Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jui regarding the State’s burden of proof in that the charge given did n< accurately convey to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt becaui it included this language: “Moral and reasonable certainty is all that san be expected in a legal investigation.” However, while the Supreme Dourt of Georgia has stated that the better practice is to omit this phrase from a jury charge, it has also held that it is not reversible srror when considered in the context of a correct charge on reasonable ioubt. Marion v. State, 263 Ga. 358, 359 (2) (434 SE2d 463). The trial jourt having given a full and accurate charge on reasonable doubt, we find no reversible error.

Decided October 19, 1994.

Edwin J. Wilson, for appellant.

Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, D. Victor Reynolds, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for tppellee.

3. Defendant contends the trial court erred in conditioning the probated portions of his sentence upon the payment of restitution for ;he fee of his court-appointed attorney without conducting a hearing ;o determine his ability to pay. “ ‘OCGA §§ 17-14-8 through 17-14-10 contemplate a hearing and specific written findings by the court in ietermining whether it will order restitution and, if so, the amount ;hereof.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bridges v. State, 208 Ga. App. 555, 556 (1) (431 SE2d 164) (1993). Section 17-14-10 sets forth the factors to be considered by the court in determining the lature and amount of restitution, including the offender’s present fi-íancial condition and future earning capacity and the amount of lamages suffered by the victim. The trial court did not hold a restitu-;ion hearing, and the only mention of restitution at the sentencing rearing was the order itself. The court further did not enter specific vritten findings under OCGA § 17-14-[8].” Fonseca v. State, 212 Ga. App. 463, 464 (2) (441 SE2d 912). Accordingly, the case is remanded ’or a hearing and specific written findings pursuant to OCGA § 17-.4-10. Fonseca, supra at 465.

Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and case remanded.

Dope, C. J., and Smith, J., concur.