Case ID: ny-2d_64/html/0033-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per Curiam.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In the Matter of Mortimer T. Burrows, Jr., et al., Respondents, v Board of Assessors for the Town of Chatham, Appellant, et al., Respondents, and Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Appellant. In the Matter of Walter C. Speanburg, Jr., et al., Respondents, v Susan F. McCarthy, as Assessor for the Town of Kinder-hook, Appellant, et al., Respondents, and Robert Abrams, as Attorney-General of the State of New York, IntervenorAppellant.
    Argued October 11, 1984;
    decided November 29, 1984
    
      POINTS OF COUNSEL
    
      Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Nancy A. Spiegel and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for intervenor-appellant; Keith G. Flint for appellant in the first above-entitled proceeding, and Richard L. Mott, Town Attorney, for appellant in the second above-entitled proceeding.
    I. Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law does not apply to tax districts, such as those in which petitioners reside, that were already assessing property at full value when the statute was enacted in 1979. Therefore, petitioners have no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the distinction made in section 458 (subd 5, pars [a], [b]) among tax districts changing to full value after 1979. (Syracuse Sav. Bank v Town of DeWitt, 56 NY2d 671; Matter of Dairylea Coop, v Walkley, 38 NY2d 6; Kelly v Yannotti, 4 NY2d 603; Matter of Slewett & Farber v Board of Assessors, 54 NY2d 547; Matter of Colt Inds. v Finance Administrator, 54 NY2d 533; Matter of Adams Co. v Nist, 72 AD2d 908; Matter of Grace v New York State Tax Comm., 37 NY2d 193; Matter of City of Lackawanna v State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 16 NY2d 222; Coffman v Coffman, 60 AD2d 181; Nicolette v Village of Clyde, 34 AD2d 202.) II. Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law does not violate petitioners’ constitutional right to equal protection under the law. (Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 NY2d 358; Matter of Long Is. Light. Co. v State Tax Comm., 45 NY2d 529; Matter of Catapano v New York City Fin. Admin., 40 NY2d 1074, 431 US 910; Matter of Ames Volkswagen v State Tax Comm., 47 NY2d 345; Matter of American Bible Soc. v Lewisohn, 48 AD2d 308, 40 NY2d 78; Matter of Association of Bar v Lewisohn, 34 NY2d 143; Matter of Hellerstein v Assessor of Town of Islip, 37 NY2d 1.) III. Assuming, 
      arguendo, that petitioners have standing and that the statute is defective, the court below directed the wrong remedy.
    
      Theodore Guterman II for respondents in the first and second above-entitled proceedings.
    I. Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law is applicable to tax districts in which petitioners reside, which voluntarily went to full value assessment prior to 1979. II. Section 458 (subd 5, par [b]) is unconstitutional in violation of the equal protection clauses of the New York State and the United States Constitutions. (Matter of Vanderbilt, 281 NY 297; Cass v State of New York, 109 Misc 2d 107, 88 AD2d 305; Vlandis v Kline, 412 US 441; Elkins v Moreno, 435 US 647; Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618; Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330; Weissman v Evans, 56 NY2d 458.) III. The Supreme Court directed the proper remedy in order to eliminate the constitutional objections herein. (Weissman v Evans, 56 NY2d 458.)
   OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

The order of the Appellate Division, in each case, should be modified, with costs to appellants, by declaring invalid not only section 458 (subd 5, par [b]) of the Real Property Tax Law, but also section 458 (subd 5, par [a]) of the Real Property Tax Law, and, as so modified, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law is unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clauses of the New York Constitution (NY Const, art I, § 11) and the United States Constitution (US Const, 14th Arndt). While recognizing that the Legislature is accorded broad latitude in the establishment of tax classifications (Madden v Kentucky, 309 US 83, 88; Shapiro v City of New York, 32 NY2d 96), and that a discriminatory tax classification will pass constitutional muster if any conceivable state of facts will support the classification (Matter of Catapano Co. v New York City Fin. Admin., 40 NY2d 1074,1075, app dsmd 431 US 910, citing Carmichael v Southern Coal Co., 301 US 495, 509), we conclude that a statute should nevertheless be declared unconstitutional if the difference in treatment constitutes invidious discrimination or is palpably arbitrary (Allied Stores v Bowers, 358 US 522, 530). For the reasons stated in the opinion by Justice Casey at the Appellate Division, we agree with the courts below that the disparate treatment of similarly situated veterans resulting from the classification created by subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law lacks a rational basis.

Subdivision 5 of section 458 of the Real Property Tax Law must be invalidated in its totality since paragraphs (a) and (b) together constitute a single expression of legislative policy regarding the increase of veterans’ real property tax exemptions. The unity of purpose which exists between paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) precludes the severance of paragraph (b) from the statute so as to grant all veterans, irrespective of local policy preference, mandatory increases in real property exemptions. (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, § 150, subd d.) The policy decision to grant or deny increases in veterans’ real property tax exemptions properly rests within the discretion of the local and State Legislatures.

Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Jones, Wachtler, Meyer, Simons and Kaye concur in Per Curiam opinion.

In each case: Order modified, with costs to appellants, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. 
      
       The enactment of chapter 525 of the Laws of 1984, which is not applicable to this proceeding, eliminates the form of disparate treatment accorded to veterans in the instant case. The availability of veterans’ real property tax exemptions is now clearly a policy matter for local governments.