Case ID: f-appx_82/html/0848-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Michael Craig CLARK, Petitioner, v. Jonathan NIXON; Jeff Proctor; Mark Davis; State of North Carolina; Donald Hobbs; Kent Chappell; Cliff Hobbs; Paul Copeland; Chad Matthews; Alan Corprew; Scott Waff, Respondents.
    No. 03-318.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 11, 2003.
    Decided Dec. 19, 2003.
    Michael Craig Clark, Petitioner pro se.
    Donald Carpenter Prentiss, John David Leidy, Hornthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, Elizabeth City, North Carolina, for Respondents.
    Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM.

Michael Craig Clark petitions for permission to appeal the district court’s orders granting the Defendants’ motion to compel and denying his motion for a protective order. See Fed. R.App. P. 5. Because the district court’s orders do not contain the statement required by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) and by Fed. R.App. P. 5 that the order involves a controlling question of law on which substantial grounds for disagreement exist, we deny Clark’s petition for permission to appeal.

Moreover, to the extent that Clark’s petition could be construed as a notice of appeal from these orders, we find that we lack jurisdiction over these orders. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The orders that Clark seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor appeal-able interlocutory or collateral orders.

Accordingly, we deny the petition. We also deny Clark’s pending motion to stay the district court proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED