Case ID: so2d_528/html/0490-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. ANSTEAD, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Clyde JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 87-2933.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
    July 13, 1988.
    Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1988.
    Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Marcy K. Allen, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Amy Lynn Diem, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We affirm on the authority of Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987).

GLICKSTEIN and GUNTHER, JJ., concur.

ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.

ANSTEAD, Judge,

concurring specially.

I write separately only to acknowledge that we are approving separate convictions for both aggravated battery and armed robbery growing out of a single incident. This holding may appear to conflict with the decision in Wright v. State, 519 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), that convictions for both aggravated assault and robbery with a firearm cannot stand under Cara-wan. In my view the aggravated battery statute and the armed robbery statute are intended to address two (2) separate evils: one, the infliction of physical violence on a person, and the other, the forcible taking of personal property from the person. Hence, in my view the legislature intended that separate convictions be allowed if physical violence is committed during the course of an armed robbery.