Case ID: ohio-misc_41/html/0041-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Miller, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Thompson, Appellant, v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, State of Ohio, Appellee.
    [Cite as Thompson v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles (1974), 41 Ohio Misc. 41.]
    (No. 73-CI-258
    Decided July 3, 1974.)
    Court of Common Pleas, Wayne County, Ohio.
    
      Messrs. Logee, Lehman & Veney and Mr. F. Emerson Logee, for appellant.
    
      Mr. William J. Brown, attorney general, and Mr. Robert G. Paxton, II, for appellee.
   Miller, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff, appellant, herein, under R. C. 119.12 from an order of the defendant-appellee herein, dated December 13, 1973, suspending the driver’s privileges and right of registration of a motor vehicle of the appellant, Jeffrey C. Thompson. The appeal was timely filed, and by agreement of counsel for both .parties is submitted to the court upon the briefs and the facts found in the record herein which includes certain factual statements sot forth in the notice of appeal, the transcript supplied by the appellee, and two affidavits submitted by appellant and attached to his brief herein.

The court, upon consideration of the evidence and the briefs of counsel, finds the facts herein to be as follows. On the night of October 26, 1973, appellant, Jeffrey C. Thompson, age 19, drove off the road in a heavy fog into a farmer’s pasture field. Appellant was driving his father’s car at the time of the accident. He walked to a friend’s house and called his father for help, and his father came and pulled the car out of the field with a pick-up truck. Appellant was not aware of the extent of any property damage to the fence and pasture, but three days later his father contacted the farmer whose fence was damaged and settled the matter amicably with the farmer for $25. No personal injuries were involved in the accident, no other person or car was involved, and the damage was solely to a fence in the amount of $25, which was paid by the appellant’s father. On November 5,1973, appellant was charged in the Wooster Municipal Court with leaving the scene of a property damage accident without reporting the same, in violation of R. C. 4549.021, to which charge he entered a plea of no contest. He was convicted by the court on that date and fined $25 and costs on a nonmoving violation and his driver ’s license suspended for 30 days and confiscated and held by the court during that 30-day period which ended December 5, 1973. A certified report of this action in the Municipal Court was made to the appellee, and was received by its drivers license division on November 23, 1973. On December 17, 1973, appellant received a notice of suspension, dated December 13, 1973, from the appellee, effective November 5, 1973, for failure to stop and disclose identity at the scene of an accident and requiring him to comply with the Ohio financial responsibility law (R. C. 4509.01 to 4509.99), and to submit proof of financial responsibility as required by R. C. 4509.45. The suspension notice further advised him that failure to submit such proof Suspended his operator’s license and all license plate registrations for a period of three years from November 5, 1973, and required him to immediately forward his license plates and operator’s license to appellee’s safety responsibility division. He was also advised in the notice of suspension that he had 15 days to appeal this order under R. C. 119.12. This appeal was filed on December 21, 1973, and thereby within the 15 days of receipt of said notice of suspension. The court, upon motion, stayed execution of the order of suspension pending final disposition of the appeal.

Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal with prejudice as a matter of law upon the ground that the suspension was supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence pursuant to R. C. 119.12, to wit, that appellant had been convicted in a court of record on one of the violations of R. C. 4507.16, to wit, subsection (E), which reads:

“Failing to stop and disclose identity at the scene of an accident when required by law to do so.”

Appellee contends further that R. C. 4509.31 requires the appellee to suspend the driver’s license and vehicle plates registration of any person convicted of this offense and cites the applicable part of said section as follows:

“* * * the registrar shall suspend the license of such person and the registration of all motor vehicles registered in the name of such person as the owner except that the registrar shall not suspend such license and registration unless otherwise required by law in the event such person has given or immediately gives and thereafter maintains, for a period of three years, proof of financial responsibility with respect to all motor vehicles registered by such person as the owner.”

Appellee therefore contends that unless appellant complies with the financial responsibility law requirements with a certificate of insurance, validly in force as required by the financial responsibility sections, or by the deposit of other security as provided in said section, the suspension cannot be lifted and must remain in full force and effect and be complied with by appellant until the financial responsibility provisions are fully met and submitted to appellee.

It is the contention of appellant that the facts in this case do not show an accident within the meaning of R. C. 4509.01 (J), and therefore R. C. 4509.31 cannot and should not be applied in this case; that his appeal should be sustained; and that the order of the bureau suspending his driver’s license and right to motor vehicle license plates should be dismissed and the bureau prohibited from suspending his rights under the motor vehicle law until he complies with the financial responsibility law.

There is no question that the appellee, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, had before it reliable, probative and substantial evidence that the appellant had been convicted of leaving the scene of a property damage accident without reporting the same, in violation of B. C. 4549.021, and that he had been fined by the Wooster Municipal Court and had his driver’s license suspended by that court for 30 days. The bureau had no further evidence than the certified copy of the action of the Municipal Court submitted to it, as required by B. C. 4507.15. Appellee acted specifically upon that information submitted to it pursuant to the provisions of B. C. 4509.31, which incorporates by reference the offenses stated in B. C. 4507.16. B. C. 4509.31 reads as fol- ■ lows:

“Whenever the Begistrar of Motor Vehicles receives notice from a court of record that a person has been convicted of, pleads guilty, or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to secure an appearance for trial for any of the crimes listed in Section 4507.16 of the Bevised Code, the registrar shall suspend the license of such person and the registration of all motor vehicles registered in the name of such person as the owner except that the registrar shall not suspend such license and registration unless otherwise required by law in the event such person has given or immediately gives and thereafter maintains, for a period of three years, proof of financial responsibility with respect to all the motor vehicles registerd by such person as the owner.”

The question in this appeal is whether an appellant, convicted of the offense of failing to stop and disclose identity at the scene of an accident when required by law to do so, set forth in B. C. 4507.16(E), can be relieved of the provisions of B. C. 4509.31 because the accident on which the conviction is based does not in fact fall within the meaning of the word “accident” as defined in B. C. 4509.01 (J). B. C. 4509.01, as in effect on the date of the occurrence herein, in its applicable parts, reads as follows:

“As used in Sections 4509.01 to 4509.78, inclusive, of the Revised Code:
< < * # %
(J) “ ‘Accident’ or ‘motor vehicle accident’ means any accident involving a motor vehicle which results in bodily injury to or death of any person or damage to the property of any person in excess of one hundred dollars.”

The essential issue in this appeal is whether this order of an administrative bureau of the state of Ohio is in accordance with law. On the face of the information submitted to the bureau, it is required to take the action it took in this case. Under R. C. 4509.31, is the bureau required to determine whether or not an accident occurred within the meaning of the financial responsibility law before it applies a report of a court of record that a person has been convicted of leaving the scene of an accident and failing to report said accident as required by law? The statute requires the bureau to act according to the record received by it from the court which convicted the appellant. No reference is made to what kind of accident occurred, or how much damage was involved. The court has determined what offense occurred, and the bureau must apply the provisions of R. C. 4507.16. The bureau is neither required, nor permitted, to determine whether the accident falls within the definition of R. C. 4509.01 (J) when the court has already convicted appellant of such an offense. Its obligation is-to comply with the statute of suspension unless financial responsibility is shown as required by other provisions of R. C. 4509.01 to 4509.78. The remedy of the appellant in this case had to be in the Municipal Court, or by appeal from that court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, not by appeal from the action mandated on the Bureau of Motor Vehicles by R. C. 4509.31. This case is analogous in principal to the decision of the Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. Munzberg, 5 Ohio App. 2d 275. That case involved the failure of a motorist to satisfy a civil judgment against him arising out of a property damage accident and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles applied the provisions of the financial responsibility law to the unsatisfied judgment. The judgment in that ease was for less than $100. The Court of Appeals held, at page 277:

“In all those sections, either in defining judgment or designating what shall be done if a judgment is not satisfied, no reference is made to a judgment arising out of ‘accident’ as that term is defined in Section 4509.01 (J), Revised Code. We may not read into Sections 4509.35 and 4509.37, Revised Code, a limitation on the word ‘judgment’ when Section 4509.02(A), Revised Code, says that ‘judgment’ as used in Sections 4509.35 and 4509.37, Revised Code, means.‘any judgment’ not just a judgment arising out of ‘accident’ as defined in this chapter of the Revised Code.”

This court holds in the case at bar that the same reasoning applies. Nowhere does R. C. 4509.31 refer to “accident,” as defined in R. C. 4509.01 (J). It refers solely to R. C. 4507.16 based upon a court determination that one of the offenses therein named has been committed and a conviction of such offense has occurred. The administrative bureau can look no further. It must apply the provisions of R. C. 4509.31. This court may not read the definition of “accident” in R. C. 4509.01 (J) into R. C. 4509.31. This court finds that the action of appellee herein was in accordance with law and is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence.

The court therefore finds and holds that appellant’s appeal is not well taken, and the motion of appellee to dismiss the appeal must be and therefore will be sustained.' The appeal herein will be dismissed and the stay of execution of the order of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles dated December 13, 1973, will be put in force and effect upon the filing of the journal entry pursuant to this decision.

Counsel for appellee shall prepare and submit said entry to counsel for appellant and this court within fourteen (14) days. Costs herein shall be paid by Appellant.

Appellant is granted exceptions.

Appeal dismissed.