Case ID: f-appx_141/html/0198-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. James Thurman DAUGHTIE, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 04-4785.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: Aug. 3, 2005.
    Decided: Aug. 23, 2005.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

James Thurman Daughtie pled guilty without a written plea agreement to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine and use of a firearm during a drug trafficking offense. He was sentenced to 101 months imprisonment (41 months on the drug count and 60 months on the firearms count, to run consecutively), followed by five years of supervised release. The court also announced an identical alternative sentence pursuant to United States v. Hammoud, 378 F.3d 426 (4th Cir.2004) (order), opinion issued by 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir.2004) (en banc), vacated, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 1051, 160 L.Ed.2d 997 (2005). Daughtie appeals his sentence on the drug count, contending that the judicially enhanced guidelines sentence was imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment under United States v. Booker, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We find that, because the alternative discretionary sentence was identical to the sentence imposed under the federal sentencing guidelines as they existed at the time, any error in the imposition of Daughtie’s sentence was harmless. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 769. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED