Case ID: f-appx_708/html/0339-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Svetlana TYSHKEVICH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee ON BEHALF OF HARBOR VIEW MORTGAGE LOAN PASS-THROUGH TRUST CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-12; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-16592
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted December 18, 2017 
    
    Filed December 21, 2017
    Svetlana Tyshkevieh, Pro Se
    Ruby J. Chavez, Gwen Heather Ribar, Esquire, Attorney, Jonathan D. Fink, Attorney, Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., National Default Servicing Corporation
    Ruby J. Chavez, Gwen Heather Ribar, Esquire, Attorney, Wright, Finlay & Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
    William Guy Malcolm, Brian S. Thomley, Malcolm & Cisneros, A Law Corporation, Irvine, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of New York Mellon
    Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Svetlana Tyshkevieh appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging federal and state law claims related to her mortgage loans. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion a denial of leave to amend. Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 2016). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because amendment of Tyshkevich’s claims would have been futile. See AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist W., Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that leave to amend can be denied if amendment would be futile); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting judicial notice because the documents were matters of public record. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public record).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.