Case ID: so3d_142/html/0009-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JOHNSON, C.J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Louisiana v. Albert LANDRY.
    No. 2013-KD-1171.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    June 20, 2014.
   In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 256-545, Keva Land-rum-Johnson, J.; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit.

|T Granted. The district court erred in failing to grant the state’s motion to stay the re-sentencing hearing. The decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) does not apply retroactively in the defendant’s case. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13); 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, No. 13-8915, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214, 2014 WL 834279 (May 27, 2014). We recall our previous per curiam opinion in this matter, which remanded to the district court to reconsider the sentence in this case after conducting a new sentencing hearing in accordance with the principles enunciated in Miller v. Alabama, supra. See State ex rel. Landry v. State, 2011-0796 (La.1/18/13); 106 So.3d 106. The district court did not err when it denied relator’s Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence.

JOHNSON, C.J., dissents and would deny the writ with reasons.

JOHNSON, C.J.

dissents and would deny the writ.

|,1 respectfully dissent. On June 25, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Miller v. Alabama, which held “that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). In State v. Tate, 2012-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, this court held that Miller does not retroactively apply to juvenile offenders whose life sentences were handed down before the Supreme Court issued its opinion. I dissented from this court’s ruling in Tate, finding that Miller announced a new rule of criminal procedure that is substantive and consequently should apply retroactively. For the same reasons expressed in my dissent in Tate, I must dissent in this case.