Case ID: so2d_776/html/0339-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. MINER, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

W.L. and S.L., Parents of M.L., a child, Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Appellee.
    No. 1D00-878.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Jan. 22, 2001.
    Timothy H. Wells, Bonifay, for Appellants.
    Catherine A. Healey, of Child Welfare Legal Services, Department of Children and Families, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

In this dependency action, the trial judge declared M.L. a dependent child based in part on the holding of In the Interest of M.F. and M.F. v. Florida Department of Children and Families, 742 So.2d 490, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which states that a court can adjudicate a father’s natural children dependent based solely upon the father’s conviction for sexual abuse of another child. Because the supreme court has recently disapproved of this reasoning, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. See In the Interest of M.F. and M.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 770 So.2d 1189, 1194 (Fla.2000) (“A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child’s sibling, as required by statute. While the commission of such an act may be highly relevant, it is not automatically dispositive of the issue of dependency. A court instead should focus on all the circumstances surrounding the petition in each case.”) (citation and footnote omitted).

On remand, the trial court must follow the dictate of M.F. by focusing on all circumstances relevant to the welfare of the minor. We do not pass on the evidence concerning such circumstances, because the order before us is limited to the father’s prior sex acts involving other children.

VACATED and REMANDED.

ERVIN and KAHN, JJ., concur. MINER, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.

MINER, J.,

concurring and dissenting.

While I agree with the majority’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in In the Interest of M.F. and M.F. v. Florida Department of Children and Families (citation omitted), and its observation that the trial court framed its dependency order somewhat narrowly, my review of the relatively short record before us persuades me that the evidence adduced at the dependency hearing is more than sufficient to support the trial court’s dependency order as to both parents. Accordingly, I do not believe that remand for further proceedings is required and would affirm the order on appeal.

Section 39.507(6), Florida Statutes (1999) requires the trial court to briefly state the facts upon which the finding of dependency is made . Such requirement in a dependency.adjudication order serves to aid an appellate court in its review of that order. However, even though such facts are scant or may be omitted, a dependency order can be affirmed when there is sufficient evidence in the record to support it. See In the Interest of K.S., 558 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). See also C.F. v. Department of HRS, 649 So.2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“[E]ven though the order was deficient in failing to set forth supporting facts, we affirm the order of dependency”).

While the statement of supporting facts in the dependency order in the instant case could and perhaps should have been more extensive, I would not disturb the trial court’s finding of dependency. 
      
      . This requirement has remained unchanged since it was first enacted in 1989. See § 39.409(3), Fla.Stat. (1989).