Case ID: ga_212/html/0179-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Head, Justice.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

19207.
    HUNTER et al. v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.
    
    Submitted January 11, 1956
    Decided February 13, 1956.
    
      Willingham, Gortatowsky & Morrison, for plaintiff in error.
    
      J. C. Savage, J. C. Murphy, J. M. B. Bloodworth, Henry L. Bowden, Newell Edenfield, Robert S. Wiggins, contra.
   Head, Justice.

1. “Equity will take no part in the administration of the criminal law. It will neither aid criminal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction, nor will it restrain or obstruct them.” Code § 55-102.

The above Code section states the general rule. City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co., 178 Ga. 657 (174 S. E. 127); Jewel Tea Co. v. City Council of Augusta, 183 Ga. 817 (190 S. E. 1); Mather Brothers, Inc. v. City of Dawson, 188 Ga. 450 (4 S. E. 2d 165); Newman v. Aldredge, 210 Ga. 765 (82 S. E. 2d 823). The general rule does not apply where a criminal prosecution illegally threatens irreparable injury or destruction of private property, and where the petitioner has no adequate remedy at law. In such cases equity will restrain a criminal prosecution. Chaires v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755 (139 S. E. 559, 55 A. L. R. 230); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 (6 S. E. 2d 320); Moultrie Milk Shed v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 (57 S. E. 2d 199).

Equity will not enjoin the enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional law or ordinance where the petitioner fails to show that its enforcement would result in an infringement upon his rights. Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686 (30 S. E. 759, 42 L. R. A. 181); Associated Cab Co. v. City of Atlanta, 204 Ga. 591 (50 S. E. 2d 601). Whether or not the petitioners in the present case are entitled to relief in a court of equity depends upon the status of the billboards erected upon their property.

The City-of Atlanta -has5 constitutional-'-and statutory po'wer to enact zoning regulations. Constitution;’art. •-III, ?'sec; Nil, - p'ár. XXIII (Code, Anh:, '§ 2-T923) )■ GW L.-1946, -p'.' 191 (Codé/Aiih. Supp., Chapter 69-8); Ga. L. 1952, p. 2731; Orr v. Hapeville Realty Investments, 211 Ga. 235 (85 S. E. 2d 20).

Thespetitioners/all’ége that they have, (-‘.complied”-with the" applicable provisions of certain pleaded ordinances of the city, and they contend 'that, even'"'ifft be "found that'they have ^‘violated any of the provisions” of the applicable, ordinances, there is no authority for the city to stop the erection., of the. signs,, for. the petitioners have “substantially complied” .with, the applicable provisions of,the .pleaded, ordinances., ,The sufficiency -of these allegations tq show compliance .with -the,--,qrdinauc.es.,pf ;thq-,city.; on, gener.ai, .demurrer,, n.eqd not ■ b,e.determined.; The-. petitioners are. not- relying,upqn a.compliance;.with the, pleaded.ordinances: and,- with - the ..act. of-, the -General Assembly.; approved ¡March ¡7, 1955 (Ga. L. 1955, p. 3080), which requires in § 3-thereof; that “The- Building Official shall .receive- applications required 'by ¡the Building-Code, issue1 permits and furnish ¡the prescribed' certificates'.”- ; Under, the'-pleadfed'ordinancesAnd' the amendment to-the' charter- of-the? City': Of Atlanta5, the aüthó'rityv to'issue'‘building permits is-vested'solely 'in’'¿he Building Offieial'bf thC'City of Atlanta.' ' The' pétitiofiers show that they'do not h'áve á building pérmit' ftorii the'building'official'Of the City;'but on ¿hé''corití,ary, they Wé relying upon a resolution addpted by'th'e’¿bar'd'of'áldérmeii; approved May 17, 1955, and repealed on June 20, 1955.

In the present case the resolution adopted by the board of aider-men did not' have the' effect' of an ordinance in conflict' with the general ordinances of the city. The resolution adopted by the board of aldermen is not a special ordinance..

The jopwers ojfpublic officers ,are, defined by .law, and persons dealing with, public officers must take notice of, the extent of their powers. Code § 89-903; Morris Plan Bank of Georgia v. Simmons, 201 Ga. 157, 171 (39 S. .E. 2d 166). The illegal and unauthorized, attempt on, the-part of ,the,board¡ of; aldermen-to assume an authority, not vested in them by law; will-not-relieve the petitioners of the failure to comply - with 'the applicable charter amendment and ordinances of the city pertaining to procuring a permit from the building official of the city. Municipal corporations are not liable for errors in performing their legislative or judicial powers. Code § 69-301.

Having failed to comply with the applicable law, in that no permit was procured from the Building Official of the City of Atlanta, the petitioners had no property right in the billboards described that can be protected in a court of equity as against ordinances of the city prohibiting them.

2. Municipal ordinances can not be oppressive or unreasonable, and they can not unfairly discriminate in favor of one class against another. Toney v. Mayor &c. of Macon, 119 Ga. 83 (46 S. E. 80). In the present ease the ordinances set out in the petition, and the charter amendment (Ga. L. 1955, p. 3080), do not contain exceptions in favor of individuals or groups alleged in count two of the petition as being preferred. It is only in those instances where laws are applied differently to different persons under the same or similar circumstances that the equal protection of the law is denied. Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 81 (130 S. E. 69); Gardner v. City of Brunswick, 197 Ga. 167, 171 (28 S. E. 2d 135); Ashley v. City of Greensboro, 206 Ga. 800 (58 S. E. 2d 815).

In the present case it is alleged that persons maintaining signs or billboards similar in character to those of the petitioners have procured a permit from the Building Official of the City of Atlanta. It, therefore, is not made to appear that there is any discrimination against the petitioners and in favor of those named as ■ maintaining signs or billboards in count two of the petition, since the petitioners admit that they have not procured such permit.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.