Case ID: scl_4/html/0480-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Grimke, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
    APRIL, 1811.
    J. Sturgenegger v. Walter Taylor.
    In slander, the declaration set forth a colloquium of and concerning the' plaintiff, in which the defendant, speaking of the plaintiff and his brother, said these words, “ those two rascals killed my hogs, and converted them to their own use these words Were held not actionable, the introductory part of the charge not containing any statement or averment, from which a conclusion was warranted that the defendant intended to impute a felony, or other crime, involving moral turpitude; or subjecting the plaintiff to infamous punishment; and the words, in themselves, not importing any such charge.
    Motion in arrest of judgment. After verdict for the plaintiff, in an action on the case for words, tried before Smith, J., in Edge, field District Court. The declaration contained two counts; but the verdict was found expressly on the second count. This count set forth, that in a conversation between the defendant and one Cox, concerning the defendant’s hogs, he falsely spoke the words following, of and concerning the plaintiff, viz: “ That those two rascals,” meaning the plaintiff and his brother, “ had killed his hogs, and converted them, to their own usemeaning that the plaintiff, and his brother W. S. had feloniously stolen the defendant’s hogs.
    The judge permitted the plaintiff to give evidence of words spoken after the action was commenced, expressly charging the plaintiff with hog-stealing, as amounting to no more than was before proven in substance. The proof of words spoken before the action brought, did not amount to an express imputation of hog-stealing, although they might bear, or be understood as conveying that meaning indirectly, or by way of insinuation.
    The jury found for the plaintiff.
    Stark, in support of the motion.
    The words as laid, are not actionable in themselves; and they are not made $o, by any intro, ductory matter. The inuendo that the defendant meant that the plaintiff feloniously stole the hogs of the defendant, will not make the words actionable, because words cannot be made actionable by inuendo. The office of an inuendo is to explain, and not enlarge the meaning of words. A witness, examined on the trial, who heard the words spoken by the defendant, which, however, were not the same words laid in the declaration, said, to be sure, that he was impressed with a belief that the defendant meant to convey thé idea of hog-stealing. But the impressions of a witness is not to stamp a meaning on words. They must be understood as man. kind in general understand them; and as the court understands them. Cited Esp. Dig. 498. 3 Wils. 188.' 6 D. and E. 694. [The opinion of this witness was not evidence.]
    Dozier, contra.
    
    The words may, or may not be actionable, according to the circumstances attending the speaking of them. In the present casé, they did medtf to impute stealing, or at any rate, á killing, contrary to the act disassembly of 1789. Courts of justice are more-liberal m modern times, than formerly, in the construction of words,'and in the application of the rules of law in relation to actions of slander. The words stated in the colloquium,, are indicative of malice, and warrants the meaning stated by way of inuendo. It was for the jury to say whether this was the meaning, and they have found that it was. The court ought not to strain to find an innocent meaning, where-the words import a slander.
    Goodwin, same side,
    argued to the same effect. Cited Esp. Ds 496, 611. 5 East 472, 463. Tidd’s PÍ. 424. Esp. 512. Bull. N. P. 4, 8. 3 Bos. and Pull. 372. 2 Bl. Rep. 752, 959.
   Grimke, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court 3d May, 1811. The words, as laid in the second co'unt of the declaration on which the verdict is found, do not import a slander. They are not actionable in themselves ; and they are not made so by the aid of any introductory matter, and proper inuendoes.

After verdict, the words are to be considered proved as laid in the declaration, where the motion is to arrest the judgment. The only question is, whether the words, as- laid in this count, author rize a judgment on them; and the court are all of opinion they do riot. They are to be taken in that sense in which they are coirimonly understood. They do not point at any particular crime; Perhaps they might have been made to do so by an introductory statement, or averments, explained by proper inuendoes, showing the cause and occasion of the speaking, and showing that they must iiecessarily import an imputation of some crime. The inuendo can; not serve this purpose, unless the introductory matter, connected with the words as laid, will justify the explanation given by the in-uendo. Iu this case, the meaning imputed by way of inuendo, is not the meaning which the words, as laid, naturally import. The court ought not to strain to find an innocent meaning i — Neither ought it to strain to find a criminal meaning. Tk.. words, as laid, must be taken to mean, that the plaintiff had toriiously killed the defendant’s hogs, and converted them to his own use, and had thereby committed a trespass; not a felony. In general, the words would not be understood as conveying a more offensive meaning, as they are laid to have been spoken.

Note. The words as laid are repugnant. They should have been laid as spoken in the first person — “ have killed my hogs,” &c. See 3 Bin, 515, and the cases cited. 1 Bin. 543. 2 Bin. 34.

Judgment arrested.