Case ID: f-appx_95/html/0549-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Quincy V. GILFORD, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 03-41422.
    Conference Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    April 21, 2004.
    
      James Lee Turner, Assistant US Attorney, David Hill Peck, US Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Roland E. Dahlin, II, Federal Public Defender, H. Michael Sokolow, Christopher Atkinson Jenkins, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Quincy V. Gilford, Jr., appeals from his conviction of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Gilford contends that the district court erred by adjusting his offense level for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense; that the nexus between a firearm and a felony required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be the nexus required for an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5); and that the factual basis for his plea was inadequate because the mere fact that his firearm traveled from outside of Texas at some point in the past did not show a sufficient connection to interstate commerce to confer jurisdiction on the district court.

Gilford, who is represented by the Federal Public Defender, is correct that his contentions regarding 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and the interstate-commerce nexus are foreclosed. See United States v. Washington, 340 F.3d 222, 231-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 942, 157 L.Ed.2d 757 (2003); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150,122 S.Ct. 1113, 151 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2002). Gilford raises those arguments to preserve them for further review.

The district court’s finding that Gilford possessed his firearm in connection with the felony offense of possession of crack cocaine was not clearly erroneous. See Washington, 340 F.3d at 230. The district court could have concluded from the physical proximity of the firearm to a crack cocaine pipe and to crack cocaine that Gil-ford possessed the firearm to protect the crack cocaine. See United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190, 1198-99 (5th Cir.1994).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.