Case ID: scl_11/html/0418-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Johnson, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Needham Davis v. James Davis.
    
    In actions of slander a new trial will never He granted on tlie ground of excessive damages, unless they so far exceed all proportion to the injury, as necessarily to strike every one, at once, with the conviction that the jury were led away hy public prejudice or private feeling.
    Tried before Mr. Justice Johnson, at Columbia, October Term, 1819.
    This was an action of slander, in which the plaintiff obtained a verdict for §500 damages.
    The declaration charged that the plaintiff was a merchant, and that the defendant, intending- to injure him in that behalf, said, &c., “ you are a damned rogue, and have got my money on your shelves (innuendo.) That the plaintiff was dishonest and unfair in his dealings, &c. There were several counts in the declaration, charging the same words substantially, with the necessary innuendos.
    
    The proof was, that the defendant, in passing the plaintiff’s store in Columbia, without any provocation immediately preceding, stopped at the plaintiff’s door, and looking in, said, “ you are a damned rogue, and have got my money, or money's worth, on your shelveswhich he repeated several times. The plaintiff said nothing- to him, and the defendant gave, at the time, no explanation as to *821 ^at particular transaction *the words referred to, and went away. There J were several persons present, and some customers were then in the store, dealing. There was no proof of the words having been spoken at any other time.
    On the part of the defendant, it was proved that the plaintiff was indebted to him at the time, in the sum of §1,000 or §1,200 as the security of John B. Thomas, who had failed and gone off, leaving the plaintiff to pay the debt. That the defendant had applied to the plaintiff to get a small quantity of sugar and salt, on account of this debt, but the plaintiff declined it. And on another occasion, the plaintiff said, as the defendant had sued him for this debt, he would not pay it until he was compelled by a course of law. The defendant was proved to be wealthy. The defendant now moved for a new trial, on the grounds:
    1. Because the damages were outrageously excessive.
    2. Because the words proved had relation to the nonpayment of the debt due by the plaintiff to the defendant, as the security of John B. Thomas, and the jury ought therefore to have found for the defendant.
    
      
       S. C. 1 vol. 290.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Johnson, J.

There are cases, in which excessive damages alone have been made the basis of a new trial; but they are rare, and I trust that this Court will never add to the number, except in cases of the most imperious necessity. They are always a subject for the exercise of the sound discretion of a jury ; and this Court will never interfere unless they so far exceed all proportion to the injury as necessarily to strike every person at once with the conviction, that the jury have been led away, either by public prejudice or private feeling; and notwithstanding I am disposed to think, under all the circumstances, all the purposes 'of justice would have been attained by a verdict for a less amount than that found by the jury, I am not prepared to say that the verdict is of that character. An honest fame *is of vast importance to every member of the commu- „ nity, and more so to the merchant than almost any other. The L basis of his business is his credit and the confidence reposed in him. And, in considering the wealth of defendant, the verdict does not strike me as bearing so great a disproportion to the injury, as to establish the conviction, that it was given under an improper influence.

2. If words are spoken of a merchant, charging him with dishonesty or unfairness in dealing, no one will doubt they are actionable ; 2 Esp. Dig. Q-ould’s Ed. 86 ; and if the words, spoken by the defendant, in this case, had relation to the plaintiff’s conduct, as a merchant, the harsh term rogue, would necessarily imply fraudulent practices.

Now, if we separate the evidence of the plaintiff from that adduced by the defendant, in relation to facts of which the bystanders could have no knowledge, and to which the defendant did not allude, so as to direct their attention to them, the case would be settled; for it seems to me impossible to infer any thing else from them, than that the plaintiff had, by unfair practices, as a merchant, added to his stock at the expense of the defendant. The rule that words .are to be construed in mitiori, sensu, has long been exploded, and it is now well settled that they are to be taken in that sense in which they would be understood by those who hear them. 2 Esp. Dig. 98. That it is the province of a jury to decide on the construction of words, which may apply to different subjects, I need only cite the opinion of this Court in this very case, when before it on a motion to set aside a nonsuit. Indeed, the position is, I think, self-evident, that whenever there is evidence on both sides, the jury must weight it, and strike the balance. If, then, the defendant, at the time of speaking the words charged, disclosed the facts to which he now pretends they alluded, I agree they would have explained away the slanderous character of the words ; and the introduction of them on the *84.1 tr*a* oi? case oug^ to, an<^ probably* did, have their influence, in mitigation of the damages ; but surely a defendant ought not to be permitted to publish to the world a gross slander, in relation to one subject, which is predicated on facts connected with another, which, if disclosed, would wholly explain away the slander. And'I do think, that the keeping of them back furnishes a strong circumstance to show the malevolent motives with which they were uttered.

Stark, Solicitor, for the motion. Gregg, contra.

The motion, I think, ought to be dismissed.

Nott, Gantt and Bjoi-iaRDSon, JJ., concurred.

Colcock, J., dissented.

See 1 vol. 290, and notes. 
      
       6 Ricli. 436 ; 2 Rich. 357.
     
      
       1 N. & McC. 290.
     
      
       Post. 511; 1 N. & McC. 216.