Case ID: so2d_812/html/1241-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "CRAWLEY, Judge. PITTMAN, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jacob Scott BAILEY v. Joann Price BEAN.
    2000377.
    Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.
    Aug. 3, 2001.
    
      R. Larry Bradford and Michelle K. Pier-oni of Bradford & Donahue, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
    Robert F. Lewis and Jon E. Lewis of Robert F. Lewis, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
   CRAWLEY, Judge.

In July 2000, Joann Price Bean sued Jacob Scott Bailey after the two had been involved in an automobile accident. Bean alleged that negligence or wantonness on the part of Bailey entitled her to recover for compensatory damages for her medical expenses, as well as damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish. Bailey denied all allegations. The jury found in favor of Bean and awarded her $1,675. Thereafter, Bean filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion for a new trial, and Bailey appeals from the new-trial order.

Our Supreme Court has written: “Where the basis for granting a new trial is that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, this Court will reverse the trial court’s new trial order if it is easily perceivable from the record that the jury verdict is supported by the evidence. In other words, if there is any evidence to support the jury’s verdict, this Court must conclude that the verdict is not plainly and palpably wrong or manifestly unjust and must reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion for a new trial. Jawad v. Granade, 497 So.2d 471 (Ala.1986); Ex parte Oliver, 532 So.2d 627 (Ala.1988); Northeast Alabama Reg. Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 548 So.2d 439 (Ala.1989).”

State v. Blackburn, 655 So.2d 948, 949 (Ala.1994).

“The assessment of damages is a matter within the jury’s discretion. Nemec v. Harris, 536 So.2d 93 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). Where liability is established, the assessment must include an amount at least as high as the uncontradicted special damages, as well as a reasonable amount as compensation for pain and suffering. Id. ‘[I]f there are special or compensatory damages and proof of some “pain and suffering,” then there must be an award in excess of the special damages.’ Benson v. Vick, 460 So.2d 1309 (Ala.Civ.App.1984).”

Posey v. McCray, 594 So.2d 152, 153 (Ala.Civ.App.1992).

The parties stipulated that Bean’s medical bills totaled $1,675.39. Bailey contends that this stipulation was only with respect to the medical costs Bean incurred following the date of the collision and that he was not stipulating that the total cost of the medical expenses resulted from the collision. Regardless of the stipulation, the fact that the jury awarded Bean the exact amount of medical costs leads us to believe that the jury determined that all of the medical costs were directly related to the collision. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the jury awarded only compensation for the medical expenses and that it mistakenly failed to award reasonable compensation for pain and suffering.

Undisputed evidence from Bean, her family, and Dr. Jon E. Lewis is that Bean’s medical costs were a result of the collision. The evidence showed that following the accident she complained of pain in her back and in one of her shoulders. Although Bean admitted she did have some back problems prior to the collision, caused by arthritis, she stated that the pain she was having after the collision was not the same as the pain she had experienced from the arthritis. Bean also stated that she did not receive the same kind of treatment before the accident as she received after the accident.

Dr. Lewis testified by deposition that, in his opinion, her pain and injuries were the proximate result of the collision with Bailey and that her injuries were consistent with the type of collision she was involved in. There was also evidence that Dr. Lewis predicted she would suffer a seven-percent impairment and that she would need to take medication on an intermittent basis throughout her lifetime. Bailey did not call an expert witness to refute this prognosis. The jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but the jury is not entitled to ignore undisputed evidence. Morgan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 So.2d 462 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Bean’s motion for a new trial, based on the jury’s failure to award damages for pain and suffering.

AFFIRMED.

YATES, P.J, and MURDOCK, J., concur.

THOMPSON, J., concurs in the result.

PITTMAN, J., dissents.

PITTMAN, Judge,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Although I hon- or what this Court stated in Morgan v. Allstate Insurance Co., 749 So.2d 462 (Ala.Civ.App.1999), in which it held that the jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but is not entitled to ignore undisputed evidence, I do not believe that particular statement has any application to the instant case. I believe the evidence in this instant case is indeed disputed. Although Bailey presented no expert witnesses to refute Bean’s allegations regarding the injuries to her lower back and neck she incurred in the automobile accident, one of Bean’s oum witnesses — Dr. Bacon, Bean’s treating physician — contradicted Bean’s testimony regarding her alleged pain and suffering when he testified by deposition, which was presented to the trial court, that Bean had suffered back problems related to arthritis prior to the occurrence of the automobile accident. Simply stated, the dispute in the evidence was presented to the trial court by one of Bean’s own witnesses.

In Brannon v. Webster, 562 So.2d 1337 (Ala.Civ.App.1990), this Court stated:

“Determining damages lies within the discretion of the jury, and jury verdicts are afforded a strong presumption of correctness. See Watts v. Pettway, 49 Ala.App. 324, 272 So.2d 251 (Ala.Civ.App.1972). A jury has the exclusive right to weigh evidence, give credibility to witnesses, and draw inferences from the evidence before it. Mitchell v. State, 450 So.2d 140 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), Smith v. Winkles, 49 Ala.App. 454, 273 So.2d 215 (Ala.Civ.App.1973)....”

562 So.2d at 1339. In Brannon, the plaintiff claimed no injuries at the time of the automobile accident that formed the basis of that case, but she subsequently complained of neck pain and sought medical attention. Her physician determined that she suffered from mild cervical strain that would resolve itself given time to heal, and he recommended rest. The plaintiff continued to suffer pain and was referred to other physicians for therapy and additional diagnostic tests, all of which gave normal results. The bills for her claimed medical expenses and lost wages were admitted into evidence, without objection, as reasonable charges. The jury returned its jury award in an amount far less than that claimed by the plaintiff, and it did not specify what amount was for special damages and what amount, if any, was for pain and suffering. Although the plaintiff in Brannon contended that her special damages were proven and undisputed, that she had also presented proof of some pain and suffering, and that' the defendant had presented no testimony disputing her special damages, this Court found it significant that while the defendant did not offer his own contradictory evidence, his counsel created conflicts and weaknesses in the plaintiffs case through cross-examination of her witnesses. See also Davis v. Copas, 455 So.2d 27 (Ala.Civ.App.1984). In fact, this Court concluded that “[cjlearly, here the jury, as trier of facts, apparently did not believe [the plaintiff] proved her claimed damages. Nemec v. Hams, 536 So.2d 93 (Ala.Civ.App.1988).” Brannon, 562 So.2d at 1339.

I believe this present case is like Bran-non. Although, like the defendant in Brannon, Bailey did not present any expert witnesses to refute Bean’s allegations of pain and suffering she claimed to have experienced as a result of the automobile accident, Bean’s own expert witness presented testimony as to her prior arthritic injuries; despite his opinion that her injuries appeared to be consistent with those she might have suffered in the automobile accident, his testimony is sufficient to create a dispute in the evidence. The evidence being before the jury, I believe that that body was in the best position to weigh the credibility of the various witnesses and adjudge their testimony, and I trust that that body considered the evidence and awarded damages relevant to the evidence presented, as it saw fit. See Brannon, supra, citing Mitchell and Smith, and quoting Nemec. I would reverse the trial court’s order granting Bean’s motion for a new trial based on the jury’s allegedly incomplete damages award. I respectfully dissent.