Case ID: scl_4/html/0459-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, CHARLESTON,
    JAN. 1811.
    
      Ex parte Marie Romaine Dauthereau.
    Where the State of South Carolina was indebted to the intestate, it was held that any judge of a Court of Ordinary within the State might grant administration, if there be within the State no other property of the intestate, whereon to administer; and that that administration, which is first granted in such case, shall hold good.
    ■ Motion to reverse a decision of Bay, J., in' Charleston district. The case was this: The prince of Luxembourg died intestate in Switzerland in the year 1790, being indebted to sundry creditors, particularly the French Republic, for the ship sold to Commodore Gillon ; and his heirs renounced all claim to his estate in favor of his creditors. The State of South Carolina was indebted to his estate, in virtue of the contract made with Gillon. The Ordinary of Charleston district granted administration on his estate first to Mr. Cutting, who was agent for the creditors- Mr. Crafts, being security for Cutting, afterwards for good reasons shown to the Ordinary, induced him to repeal the first letters of administration, and grant administration to himself. Afterwards Dauthereau, consul of the French Republic, applied to the Ordinary to repeal the administration granted to Craits, and grant administration to him as agent of the French nation, who stood in the quality of principal creditor. The Ordinary refused to comply ; whereupon he appealed, and the appeal was dismissed by Bay, J., — and this motion was to reverse judge Bay’s decision.
    Parker, in support of the motion,
    contended, 1. That the Ordinary could not grant administration to any one, as the deceased died in a foreign country, having no domicil in this State, nor any estate except a chose in action, (a debt due to him by the State,) which was not due in any part of the State more than another. The Ordinary of Charleston district, therefore, had no jurisdiction, and the legislature only was competent to grant administration, or dispose of the assets, 2. But if the Ordinary had jurisdiction, he was bound to repeal the grant of administration to Crafts, as granted by mistake, he not being a creditor.
    Crafts, contra.
    
    The ubiquity of the State no objection. Any of the Ordinaries had jurisdiction. Cutting was a creditor, and Crafts stood in his place. The Ordinary revolted the first letters for good cause, and granted administration to Crafts, with the assent of the creditors. Dauthereau, at that time, was unknown, and had no right to claim administration. Toll. 66. 6 Com. Dig. 137. 1 Ventr. 219; and the acts of assembly.
   Nott, J.,

declared the opinion of the whole court, that the decision was correct; A. A. 1787. The Ordinaries in a case like the present, have concurrent jurisdiction. It is so-declared by a former act of assembly. The granting administration by any one, concludes the other. As to the right of revocation, in was pro. perly exercised in the first instance, and the second grant of administration was legal and proper. No ground has been shewn why the last grant should be repealed.

Motion rejected.