Case ID: f-appx_668/html/0725-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Dale GORNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 14-16753
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted August 16, 2016 
    
    Filed August 25, 2016
    
      Dale Gorney, Tucson, AZ, Pro Se.
    Ann Ruth Hobart, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ.
    Before: O’SCANNLAIN, LEAVY, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Dale Gorney appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his employment action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his termination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

Dismissal of Gorney’s action was proper as precluded by Arizona’s doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because Gorney’s claims were already raised or could have been raised in his prior administrative proceeding, and the issue of whether Gorney was properly discharged was litigated during his agency appeal. See Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1999) (claims or defenses that were raised or could have been raised in administrative hearing were barred by res judicata in subsequent litigation); Gilbert v. Ben-Asher, 900 F.2d 1407, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1990) (collateral estoppel precluded party from relitigating whether physician’s license was properly revoked because issue was litigated in prior administrative proceeding).

We reject as meritless Gomey’s contentions regarding undue prejudice and delay caused by defendants’ removal to federal court.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.