Case ID: f-appx_325/html/0899-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James WALKER, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 08-15953
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    May 19, 2009.
    Stewart Glenn Abrams, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen M. Williams, Federal Public Defender, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Carol E. Herman, Jeanne Marie Mullen-hoff, Anne R. Schultz, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

James Walker, through counsel, appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Walker’s § 3582(c)(2) motion was based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels applicable to crack cocaine offenses. On appeal, Walker, who was sentenced based on his status as a career offender, acknowledges that, in United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.2008), cert. denied, McFadden v. United States, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 965, 173 L.Ed.2d 156 (2009), and cert. denied, — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 1601, 173 L.Ed.2d 689 (2009), we held that defendants whose sentencing ranges were based on their career offender status are not eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 706. Walker asserts, however, that Moore was wrongly decided, and, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court should have reevaluated the substantive reasonableness of his sentence.

“Under the well-established prior panel precedent rule of this Circuit, the holding of the first panel to address an issue is the law of this Circuit, thereby binding all subsequent panels unless and until the first panel’s holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n. 8 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, we affirm the denial of Walker’s § 3582(c)(2) motion in accordance with Moore. 541 F.3d at 1330.

AFFIRMED.