Case ID: iowa_68/html/0016-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Beck, On. J.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Paddock et al., Trustees, v. Bartlett.
    1. Contract: erection of building by a specific person and associates: performance. Where the condition-of an obligation to pay money was that M. and his associates should erect at a certain place a pork-house of' a certain capacity, held that the condition was fulfilled by the erection of the required house by a corporation of which M. was a member, though he withdrew from the corporation before the house was completed.
    2. -: -: -: reasonable time: question for jury. In such case the law required that the building should be erected witbiu a reasonable time, depending upon tbe magnitude of the work and the necessity for its completion for the purpose for whichit was designed,— a question for the jury under tbe instructions of the court.
    3. Evidence: capacity of pork-house: competency of witnesses. Witnesses who based their testimony upon observation and experience in working in a pork-house were competent to testify as to the capacity of such a house.
    4. Practice in Supreme Co.urt: questions not considered. Objections not argued, and rulings on evidence not shown by the abstract, are not considered in this court.
    
      5. Contract: for. payment of money in consideration of public benefit: contemporaneous oral misrepresentations. A contract to pay money to trustees, for the use of M. and associates, in consideration of their erecting a pork-house at a certain place, cannot be varied or defeated by evidence of contemporaneous parol representations made by M. that men of great wealth would be connected with the enterprise, that it would result in other collateral improvements tending to enhance the value of real estate, etc.
    
      Appeal from Mills Circuit Court.
    
    Tuesday, December 16.
    Action at law to recover upon a written instrument executed by defendant and others. There was a judgment upon a verdict for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
    
      Watkins, Williams dc Wright, for appellant.
    
      W. S. Lewis and J. M. Stone, for appellees.
   Beck, On. J.

I. The instrument sued upon was signed by defendant and others, and is in the following language: “ We, the undersigned, believing it to be a great 7 07 ° fc> advantage to Mills county and vicinity to have ^ie pork-packing house established at Malvern, agree to pay the amount set opposite our names, upon the following conditions: That George E. Mellen and associates shall erect a brick pork-house at Malvern, with a capacity of killing and curing TO,000 hogs annually. Said amount shall become due on the completion of the pork-house, and payable to J. D. Paddock, G. W. Ourfman and A. L. Young, trustees.” The evidence tends to show that a com-. pany was incorporated with Mellen as a member, which commenced and completed the pork-house. The foregoing contract obligates defendant to pay money for a pork-house to be erected by Mellen and his associates. As the instrument contemplates the prosecution of the work by Mellen, and others associated with him, it was doubtless the purpose that the common way of men associating themselves by an incorporation was to be pursued. Surely, the stockholders in the corporation were associates of Mellen. But Mellen soon withdrew from the corporation, and the building was completed by the corporation afterwards. But the completion of the house, after Mellen’s withdrawal, by his associates was a compliance with the contract. These considerations are a sufficient answer to objections raised by defendant’s counsel in more than one form.

II. The law required the building to be erected within a reasonable time, and the court so instructed the jury. Of course, what would be regarded as a reasonable time depends upon the magnitude of the work . „ ..... ’ and the necessity tor completing it m all its parts in order to fit it for the business for which it was designed. These and other considerations were proper matters of inquiry under this instruction. We think the jury were authorized to find, as they evidently did find, that the building was conrpleted within a reasonable time. This conclusion disposes of the first objection made by defendant.

We think the verdict of the jury is supported by the evidence upon all branches of the case.

III. Certain witnesses testified as to the capacity of the house for packing pork. They based their opinion upon observation and experience in actual work in the house. Surely they were competent to express . . „'. , « . , . . †, , an opinion ot the amount oí work which couid be done in the house in a given time.

IY. Certain rulings upon evidence are objected to by counsel of defendant. Some of these rulings are not argued. The abstract fails to show the purport of the evidence excluded by others. We are not required, , ...... u ’ therefore, to consider the objections. But, so far as the evidence is shown in the abstract, these rulings appear to be correct.

V. The contract is payable to plaintiffs as trustees, who evidently are to receive the money for the benefit of the persons wbo built the packing-house. It provides that the house shall be built by Mellen and his associates. We have seen that the corporation and stockholders thereof are to be regarded as # ° Mellen’s associates, and that it clearly contemplates the formation of a corporation for doing the work. Defendant, as a defense to the action, sets up that Mellen made false representations as to various matters connected with his enterprise; as that parties of great wealth would be connected with it; that large sums of money would be expended in building dwellings; that the price of pork would be advanced, etc., in case the pork-liouse was built. The instrument sued upon is the expression ,of the contract between the parties, and it is not competent for defendant to change or modify it, or ingraft conditions upon it not expressed therein, by parol evidence of declaration or agreement of the parties made before or at the time of its execution. Besides, it surely cannot be that these representations will defeat the claim of Mellen’s associates, who did not make them nor authorize Mellen to make them. Mellen was simply one of many “ associates,” of which defendant had notice. Tie cannot charge them with the consequences of Mellen’s false representations. See Trustees of Oskaloosa College v. Stafford, 14 Iowa, 152. These conclusions dispose of several objections urged by defendant.

VI. The court in an instruction referred to a defense pleaded in a certain count of the answer. This is objected to, for the reason that it refers the jury to the pleadings. But the position is not correct. The court simply refers to the pleading in order to designate the defense, which is sufficiently stated in the charge of the court.

VII. We have examined with care the instructions given the jury, and think they are correct. Many of the assignments of error directed against the instructions fail in clearness, and in not being “ as specific as the case will allow.” Code, § 3207. They are not aided by the argument. Indeed, we can hardly imagine a manner of assigning and presenting errors which would be more unsatisfactory and more confusing than the one pursued by counsel for defendant.

The points of the case involving its real merits are sufficiently considered in the preceding discussion. All other points argued by counsel are involved in those we have ruled, or are statements-of the same points in a different form. It is our opinion that the judgment of the circuit court ought to be

Affirmed.