Case ID: f-appx_200/html/0085-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America v. Ivan CONSTANT, Appellant.
    No. 05-4518.
    United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
    Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) Sept. 12, 2006.
    Filed: Sept. 20, 2006.
    Eric B. Henson, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for United States of America.
    David L. McColgin, Defender Association of Philadelphia Federal Court Division, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
    BEFORE: FUENTES, FISHER, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       Honorable Myron H. Bright, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation.
    
   OPINION

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

This case comes before us a third time. A jury convicted Ivan Constant of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), we affirmed, and the Supreme Court remanded the case to us for consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). See United States v. Constant, 117 Fed.Appx. 225 (3d Cir.2004) (unpublished), vacated by 544 U.S. 971, 125 S.Ct. 1873, 161 L.Ed.2d 719 (2005) (mem.). We remanded the case to the District Court. See United States v. Constant, No. 04-1025 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2005) (unpublished). The District Court resenten'ced Constant to seventy-two months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and imposed a fine of $400 and a special assessment of $100. Constant now appeals the judgment of conviction in order to challenge only the constitutionality of the felon in possession statute.

Constant challenged the constitutionality of the felon in possession statute in his first appeal before us, alleging it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). We rejected his challenge because it is foreclosed by our opinion in United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 205 (3d Cir.2001). See Constant, 117 Fed. Appx. at 226. Both the Supreme Court’s remand to us and our remand to the District Court directed reconsideration only of Constant’s sentence in light of Booker. See Constant v. United States, 544 U.S. 971, 125 S.Ct. 1873, 161 L.Ed.2d 719 (2005); No. 04-1025 (3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2005). The challenge Constant presents here to his conviction, rather than his sentence, is thus beyond the scope of remand and wé will not revisit the issue. See, e.g., In re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 158 F.3d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir.1998) (under law of the case doctrine appellate panel will generally not reconsider question already resolved by previous panel in same case); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 549 n. 22 (3d Cir.1994) (applying law of the case doctrine in criminal context); United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir.1991) (same).

Constant recognizes that he can obtain no relief in this Court, but raises the issue “to [attempt to] preserve the claim for review by the Supreme Court of the United States and/or for any subsequent collateral proceeding.”

Accordingly, we will affirm the conviction and sentence.