Case ID: sc-eq_11/html/0466-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Harree, Chancellor.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John P. King v. Margaret Clarke.
    An administrator cannot set aside the gifts or contracts of his intestate, on the ground, that they were made in fraud of creditors. He has no other rights than his intestate had. [*6]3]
    A judgment against an administrator in Georgia, is not such evidence of indebtedness as will enable one claiming as a creditor, to sustain a bill here to set aside the gifts of the intestate as fraudulent. [*G14]
    Administrators of the same intestate in different States, are so far independent of each other, that a judgment against one furnishes no right of action against the other. There is no privity between them. [*614]
    A creditor seeking to set aside a voluntary conveyance for fraud, must show that his debt existed at the time of the conveyance by such evidence as would establish it in an action at law ; and that he cannot be paid unless the conveyance is set aside. [*617]
    Before Chancellor Johnston, Edgefield, June Term, 1836.
    
      The bill, (filed Sept. 1833) states that S and M. Allen brought their action of assumpsit in Richmond county, (Geo.) against Freeman W. Lacey and David Clarke : that pending the suit (on 1th of January, 1830,) Clarke died intestate. Wm. Magar administered on his estate in Georgia, and was made defendant to the suit; and judgment was recovered (12th of Jan., 1832) against Lacey in his own right, and against Magar as administrator of Clarke, for ten thousand dollars, and execution lodged on which nothing has been collected. That S. and M. Allen assigned the judgment, 12th of April, 1832, to the plaintiff. That Lacey resides without the State, and at the rendition of the judgment and ever.since, was totally insolvent. That* the judgment against Magar was taken, subject to the plea of plene administravitprceber. The amount of assets in the administrator’s hands undisputed, does not exceed $850, for which the plaintiff is willing to give credit on the judgment; and beyond this, he has, in money and property, to the value of perhaps eleven hundred dollars, claimed by defendant — the whole amount disputed and undisputed, not exceeding two thousand dollars. That, pending the said action against him, and in anticipation of the judgment, and to defeat it, David Clarke, on 4th of November, 1829, executed a deed of gift to the defendant, his mother, of several slaves and other property, but retained possession himself until shortly before his death, which took place in Florida, in 1830. That, when about to go there, he placed a large sum of money in defendant’s hands, on deposite, or as a gift. That ^shortly after his death, and before administration, the defendant took into her possession all his personal chattels which she could L seize, and removed to this State, and has since, with the funds of Clarke, as is alleged, purchased lands and negroes. The bill charges the deed of gift to be fraudulent and void as to creditors ; and prays that it may be set aside — the property sold and applied to plaintiff’s judgment; that defendant account for the money and effects which came into her hands ; and for the property purchased with Clarke’s funds, and for' the hire of the negroes — and for general relief.
    ' An amendment to the bill (filed 18th of January, 1834,) states that at the filing of the original bill, the Ordinary’s office for Edgefield was vacant ; and since filled, the plaintiff has, in that district, taken out letters of administration on the estate of David Clarke; and prays a general account from defendant.
    Defendant, in her answer, denies the plaintiff’s right to sue in his character of creditor, and insists that, if responsible, she is only so to an administrator. Requires proof of the facts to establish the plaintiff’s claim ; and insists that the Georgia judgment, being only evidence of debt, is examinable; and the alleged cause of action being for money won at play by David Clarke, from the clerk and agent of the Allens, it is questionable whether by the laws of this State, such action could have been sustained: and that the claim now made is by one who has purchased the judgment at one-fifth of its nominal value. She denies all fraud in the bill of sale : two of the negroes mentioned in it had been in her possession for many years before, when she advanced money to her son ; one is not, and has not been in her possession, and the remaining negro has been in her possession since the execution of the bill of sale. She received no money from her son on deposit. Lacey gave her $250 for a horse given her by her son ; and. his note for $2,000, which is worthless. As to the land and negroes purchased by her, they were bought from her own earnings hoarded up far many years, aided from time to time with small sums presented to her by her son. To the amended bill she answers that some articles of furniture were left with her by her son, which are not accounted for.
    On the trial, the plaintiff’s letters of administration, and an exemplification of the Georgia judgment against Lacey and David Clarke’s ad-q-i ministrator, was given in evidence; but no witness was ^called to 1 prove the assignment. Freeman W. Lacey examined by defendant on commission, proved that the Georgia action was brought to. recover money won by David Clarke and others from the clerk of S. and M. Allen. That Clarke and his partners won not more than five or six thousand dollars from the clerk, who, to the witness’ own knowledge, lost other large sums to persons not connected with Clarke. That, in 1831 or ’32, he paid to the plaintiff five or six thousand dollars, in notes and bonds of the deceased Clarke, some of which have been since collected; and that the plaintiff informed him he had purchased the judgment for two thousand dollars.
    Other evidence was given which is not stated in the brief: nor is it necessary to the points decided, that it should be detailed. The Chancellor in his report, states that he thought the fraud was fully made _put, and regrets that the plaintiff did not establish the indebtednes to the Allens, or the assignment to himself.
    The Chancellor pronounced the following decree :—
    Johnston, Chancellor. The plaintiff in his character of administrator of David Clark, is not entitled to avoid the gifts or contracts of his intestate, on the ground that they were made in fraud of creditors. An administrator is the mere representative of his intestate. Wherever the intestate would be bound, the administrator is bound. In this case, unless David Clarke could have set aside the gifts or contracts complained of, (which it will not be contended he could have done,) his administrator, as administrator, cannot do so.
    The argument is very frequently advanced, that an administrator represents the creditors of the intestate. But he does this to no greater extent than the intestate did. The intestate held his property in trust for his creditors. If he made a disposition of it in fraud of their rights, they could set it aside. But could he ?
    It is asked, if an administrator cannot set aside the fraudulent gifts of his intestate, for what reason is he made a party to all suits brought by the creditors against the fraudulent donee ? For the very same reason that the donor, if he were alive, would be made a party — in order that it may appear that there is an insufficiency of property to answer the creditors without resorting to that included in the gift; and that a judgment may be rendered against such as is accessible, in exoneration of the AT donee, whose gift, being *good as between himself and donor, must b be protected as far as can be done without injuring the creditors. Another reason is, that the funds be restored to the administrator for due administration.
    
      It is necessary then for the plaintiff to show himself to be a creditor, in order to avoid the gifts of which his bill complains. Has he done this ?
    If the judgment rendered in Georgia against Magar, the Georgia administrator, was evidence of the indebtedness of the estate, still he has not proved that that judgment was ever assigned to him. This would be fatal to his pretension that he is a creditor.
    But I am inclined to the opinion, that the judgment is not evidence that the estate is indebted to the Allens. I mean, that if the Allens had brought suit against the South Carolina administrator, they could not have oifered this judgment, rendered against the Georgia administrator, as evidence of their debt, but would have been obliged to substantiate their debt by original proof.
    Professor Story, in his commentary on the Conflict of Laws, Foreign and Domestic, chap. 13, sec. 522, says on the authority of Lightfoot v. Bickley, 2 Rawle, 431, that “where administrations are granted to different persons in different States, they are so far deemed independent of each other, that a judgment obtained against one will furnish no right of action against the other, to affect assets received by the latter in virtue of his own administration : for in contemplation of law there is no privity between him and the other administrator.”
    The United States’ Constitution, in declaring that full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of the other States, means only, I apprehend, that credit shall be given to them as against parties bound by the record, or their privies, not as against strangers. I take the South Carolina administrator to be a perfect stranger to the Georgia administrator. He is not even his successor, as administrator de bonis non.
    
    But the plaintiff, as administrator, is entitled to an account of the property of his intestate, received by the defendant without the gift of the intestate. Let an account be taken for so much of that kind of property as the plaintiff can prove the defendant to have received, and which the plaintiff has not alleged to have been given.
    If the defendant desires to set up her counter-right as distributee, to have back from the plaintiff so much as there may not be *debts to absorb, she must file a cross-bill. Let the defendant pay the <- costs of this suit.
    The plaintiff appealed and moves the Appeal Court to reverse so much of the decree of the Chancellor kas disallows plaintiff’s right as a creditor of his intestate, to an account for the property alleged by plaintiff to have been given by his intestate to the defendant, on the following grounds -
    1. The jndgment in Georgia, exemplified and exhibited here, is evidence of a debt due by the estate; and is no further questionable here in its present form and in this suit, than would be any other foreign judgment between the original parties to the suit.
    2. Because it was sufficiently admitted and proved that the plaintiff was the owner of the judgment.
    3. Because, admitting the judgment not to be conclusive upon the defendant, and the assignment to the plaintiff not to have been regularly proved, yet the judgment is prima facie evidence of the debt, and the onus lay with the defendant to impugn it — and that the plaintiff had bought and paid for the judgment was sufficiently admitted and proved to constitute him an equitable assignee,
    
      4. Because, in ordering an account to be taken of the estate of David Clarke, the intestate, the order should have been extended to ascertain the extent of the debts and to whom due.
    5. Because an administrator has a right in Equity to set aside the fraudulent gifts and contracts of his intestate, upon the allegation and proof that the property is necessary for the payment of debts which have a lien under the statute against fraudulent conveyances upon such property.
    
      Bauskett, for appellant.
    
      Wacldy Thompson, contra.
   Harree, Chancellor.

We concur with the Chancellor, that the transcript of the judgment recovered in Georgia would not have been admissible in evidence in an action against the administrator here. This is very fully sustained by the case of Lightfoot v. Bickley, referred to — as well as by expediency and- analogy. As said by the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, in that case, Did an administrator represent the person of the intestate without *qualification or restriction, the plaintiff’s -I argument would be incontrovertible ; but it is clear that his commission extends only to assets of which the Ordinary had jurisdiction.

It was surmised that the decision may have turned on the circumstance that the judgment was one of a jurisdiction altogether'foreign. But by common law, a foreign judgment is prima facie evidence, though its merits may be inquired into. It was not because the judgment was foreign, but because it was against a person with whom the defendant in Pennsylvania had no privity. The Chief Justice speaks of an unexampled spirit of comity exercised in Pennsylvania, by which the administrator of another State is allowed to meddle with the assets there, and which he supposes likely to be attended with much perplexity and confusion.— But no such comity has ever obtained in this State, and it is plain that it might be attended with very mischievous consequences. A person having a doubtful claim, even a citizen of this State, might resort to another State where the deceased person happened to have left goods, and procure administration to be granted to an instrument of his own; and avoiding appearances which would show and detect fraudulent collusion, such an administrator might betray the defence, so as to enable the claimant to recover. Even if the judgment were open to investigation, the bona fide administrator here, might find the greatest difficulty in impeaching it, and it would be a hardship that such burden should be imposed on him. But according to our decisions, under the Constitution of the United States, requiring full faith and credit to be given to the judicial proceedings of other States, the judgment, if admitted at all, must be conclusive.

Though not made specifically a ground of appeal, it was urged in argument that the debt on which the judgment was founded was sufficiently established by the admission of the answer and the testimony of a witness, and that the assignment of the judgment must, in equity, operate an assignment of the debt, But to this there are various objections. That case was not made by the bill; nothing was charged as to the original indebtedness, nor was the plaintiff called upon to meet that case. The part of the answer relied upon, was plainly intended to impugn the judgment, and not to admit any thing respecting the original indebtedness. The examination of the witness was directed to the same point — the consideration of the judgment. Something is incidentally ^brought out, which might seem to bear on the original indebted- pg-^ ness; but plaintiff’s examination was not directed to this: and L even if it had been, the witness states only his belief without the grounds of it, and plainly, his testimony is too vague to authorize any conclusion.

The plaintiff comes to set aside a voluntary conveyence for fraud. To sustain Ms bill, it was incumbent on him to show at the hearing, that a debt existed at the time of the conveyance, and that the creditor will be disappointed unless it be set aside. He must, coming into this Court, establish it by such evidence as would be sufficient to establish it in an action against an administrator here. It might not be necessary to show the entire extent of the indebtedness ; but the plaintiff has failed to show any indebtedness ; though he states himself, to have received about $2000. Having failed to make out his case, the Court cannot, upon an hypothesis, or surmise that perhaps he may have a sufficient case, direct a further inquiry on reference. The defendant has a right to require the dismissal of his bill, so far as respects this part of the case.

The decree is affirmed.

Chancellors De Sausstjre, Johnson, and Johnston, concurred.