Case ID: ohio_20/html/0113-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Hitchcock, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Pierre Choteau, Jr., et al. v. Thomas G. Raitt.
    In the prosecution of a partnership claim, as a general rule, all the partners are necessary parties, and' if one of the partners has been omitted, he is not a competent witness for the plaintiffs, although the counsel for the defendant may have stipulated before the trial that the omission to make the proper party shall not defeat the action. 
    
    A notice given to produce a paper claimed to be in the possession of the party to whom the notice is given, is not, as a general rule, a reasonable notice, unless given before the trial of the cause in which said paper is wanted is commenced.
    Error to the Supreme Court of Huron county.
    The original action in this case was commenced by the plaintiffs in error against the defendants, in assumpsit, in the court of common pleas of Huron county.
    The first count in the declaration was special, upon a contract, of which the following is a copy:
    “Article of agreement, entered into at Detroit, State of Michigan, this Ocoto.ber 26, 1844, between Thomas Raitt, of Norwalk, State of Ohio, of one part, and P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., of New York, by William Brewster, of Detroit, aforesaid, of the other part: Witnesseth—
    “ 1. That the said Raitt does hereby agree to purchase all the furs and skins which he can obtain at safe and reasonable rates (said rates to be regulated, from time to time, by instructions from said Brewster), at Norwalk aforesaid, and the adjoining country, from the present time until the close of the season for purchasing the same next expiring, which furs and skins, so purchased by said Raitt, shall be and remain the property of the said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., and be held ^subject to the order and con trol of the said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., until all advances which shall be made by P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., or the said Raitt, with interest on same, shall be fully paid and canceled; and the said Raitt agrees to collect the furs and skins purchased by or for him, at Norwalk aforesaid, as fast as the same are purchased, and to keep them in safe and proper places, until he closes his purchases of the same next spring, at whieh time ho, the said Raitt, agrees to bring all of said furs and skins to Detroit, and to deliver the same to said Brewster, who shall pay the said Raitt the market price of Detroit for said furs and skins. The said Raitt shall also keep the said Brewster advised of the quantity of furs and skins which he has on hand from time to time, and the cost of the same.
    
      “ 2. The said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., by said Brewster, agree to advance to said Raitt funds for the purchase of furs and skins, as above stated, in such amounts as they shall deem proper, for which advances they shall charge interest at the rate of seven per cent, per annum; but in'no case shall the said Raitt use any of the funds so to be advanced him for any other purpose than purchasing furs and skins, under this agreement, nor shall he make any advances on account of the same.
    “P. Choteau, Jr. & 06.
    “ By William Brewster.
    
    “ Thomas G. Raitt.”
    “Signed, sealed, and delivered on the day and year above written.”
    It was alleged in this count of the declaration, that although the plaintiffs advanced large sums of money to Raitt on this contract, as by the terms of the contract they were bound to do, yet the said Raitt did not comply, on his part, in the purchase and delivery of furs and skins at Detroit, etc. The declaration also contained the common money counts.
    To this declaration the defendant pleaded the general issue, and gave notice of set-off.
    At the March term, 1850, of the court of common pleas. *the case was tried by a jury, and a verdict returned for the plaintiffs; whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial, which was overruled by the court, and judgment entered on the verdict.
    In the progress of the trial the defendant, by his counsel, excepted to the rulings of the court of common pleas in the admission of testimony, and also in the instructions given to the jury, and tendered two bills of exceptions, which were allowed, sealed, and made part of the record.
    
      To reverse the judgment, so as aforesaid rendered, a writ of error was sued out and prosecuted by the defendant in that case, and the case came before the Supreme Court of Huron county for hearing, at the August term, 1850.
    Tho errors assigned were—
    “ 1. That the court of common pleas erred in admitting the said Brewster as a witness, he being a partner and interested in said contract, and not competent as a witness for the plaintiffs.
    “ 2. That the court of common pleas erred in admitting to the jury the copy of the letter, mentioned in said bill of exceptions, of March 29, 1845.
    “3. That the court of common pleas erred in the instructions they gave to the jury, as contained in the second bill of exceptions, in respect to the construction to be put on said contract, and the effect of the testimony of said Brewster in respect'to said schedule of prices.
    “4. That judgment was given for the plaintiffs, whereas it should have been given for defendant.”
    In the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed for the first two errors assigned, the court expressing no opinion upon the last two.
    This writ of error is prosecuted to reverse the aforesaid judgment of reversal.
    The bill of exceptions is not inserted at length, because it is believed that enough of its contents appears in the opinion *of the court to show clearly the principles upon which the case was decided.
    James A. Yan Dtke and J. R. Osborn, for plaintiffs:
    Was Brewster a competent witness?
    I. The depositions of Doekstader and Hollister were not sufficient to establish the interest of Brewster.
    A witness may testify as to his “ impression,” but this testimony is to be weighed by the jury; and if the impression be “slight,” or an unwarranted deduction, then it should be rejected. 1 Greenl. Ev. 440; 1 C. & H. 154; 5 Pick. 244; Cutler v. Carpenter, 1 Cow. 81; Halliday v. McDougal, 20 Wend. 81; 2 Greenl. Ev. 456-465.
    But this question of interest, though involving facts, is for tho courWnot for the jury. 1 Greenl., 4 ed., 530, sec. 425; 7 Wood. 57; 2 Smith’s Leading Cases, note to page 65; Hart v. Hailun, 3 Rawle, 407; 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 1501.
    
      Competency of witness is always presumed. The burden of showing to the contrary lies on the objectors. Marsdell v. Stanfield, 7 Barn. & Cres. 815 ; 4 Cow. 427, 430 ; Milligan’s Lessee v. Dickson, 1 Pet. C. C. 434, note; see Starkie, (6 Amer. ed.) 121, 122.
    Was Brewster a competent witness as shown on his voir dire? See 1 Greenl. 527, 528, secs. 422, 423; also, Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 780, 1576.
    On cross-examination, he says he never was a partner of the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., the parties to said contract, and plaintiffs in the suit; that he was interested in the subject matter as stated with Pierre Choteau, Jr. & Co., but that, at the time of his being sworn, he had no interest—mutual releases had passed. It is interest at the time of examination which disqualifies. 2 Binn. 497. See 2 Wend. 527; Bayley v. Osborn, 1 Pet. C. C. 306; 1 Cow. & Hill, 266.
    *But we now proceed to show, that, in fact, Brewster was not a necessary, or even a proper party to the suit. See Cothey v. Fennel, 21 Eng. Com. Law. 7, 146.
    Brewster was, by a contract between himself and Pierre Choteau, Jr. & Co., placed in a relation with them which the law declares to be a partnership. Dejure, he was a partner; defacto, he was not. Bickerton v. Bonnell, 5 M. & Sel. 383; 2 Greenl. Ev., sec. 478; Comyn on Contracts; 4 Barnw. & Cresw. 666; Collyer on Partnership, secs. 653, 651; 2 Barr. 89; 21 Eng. Com. Law. 146.
    II. It is sufficient to give notice to produce the letter during the trial, if there be sufficient time to comply with it, without interrupting the trial, and where the paper is, or may be presumed to be, at place of trial. 2 Cow. & Hill, 1186.
    The showing; to admit the secondary evidence, was sufficient. See 6 Cow. 90, 100, 101; Thallburn v. B., 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 1203, 1204; Id. 1242. It does not appear that any exceptions were taken to the rulings of the court as to this letter.
    And we assume it to be the law, that, not only must objection be interposed, but exception taken, at the time of the ruling. See the doctrine aud ruling on this subject, well condensed, in 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 788, 990-993. As to vagueness in bills of exceptions, 1 Ohio, 212; 4 Ohio, 79, 388; 1 United States Dig. 412, No. 9; An. Dig. 1847, 96, No. 54; 2 United States Dig. 167, sec. 216; Clark v. Dubehn, 9 Cow. 674; Smith v. Carrington, 4 Cranch, 62 ; 1 United States Dig. 415, No. 92; 1 Sup. to same, 285, Nos. 188, 191, p. 287, No. 231; Wagers v. Dilly, 17 Ohio, 439; Armstrong v. Clark, 17 Ohio, 495; Hall v. Reed, Id. 498; Coil v. Williams, 18 Ohio, 28.
    See also 7 United States Dig. 96, see. 54; 8 United States Dig. 50, sec. 20; 9 United States Dig. 76, secs. 20, 21, 25, 28, 34; 6 How. U. S. 279; 3 Hill, 75; 9 Wend. 262; 2 Cow. & Hill’s Notes, 791; McDougal v. Fleming, 4 Ham. 81; 1 United States Dig. 415, secs. 91, 92.
    *111. If it was erroneous to have examined William Brewster, the error is cured by the statute. Laws 1849-50, p. 33.
    The statute “ to improve the law of evidence,” which has since ■gone into effect, cured the error. This statute by its terms applies to actions pending at the time it took effect—not merely to actions thereafter to be commenced. If it is not made expressly applicable to such actions, the rules.of law will so apply it, as it is a mere regulation of practice. People v. Livingston, 6 Wend. 526, n., 530, 531; 1 Morris, 238; 8 United States Dig. 336, sec. 2; 9 Ib. 405, sec. 8; 5 United States Dig. (Supplement, vol. 1,) p. 242, No. 555. “ The court refused to reverse a judgment where a statute had been passed since its rendition, which would obviate the •error upon a new trial. Lyons v. Jackson, 1 How. (Miss.) 474.”
    We have already cited cases to show that there can be no reversal after judgment, on account of erroi’, if the error was immaterial, because the party is not prejudiced by the verdict. 1 United States Dig. 419, sec. 207; 2 Ib. 162, sec. 64; 6 Mass. 445 ; 17 Conn. 288; 17 Vt. 499; 10 Vt. 520; 11 Mass. 417; 20 Pick. 471; 4 Pick. 25 ; 9 Pick. 46 ; 24 Pick. 181; 11 Pick. 322; 3 United States Dig. 567, sec. 475.; 11 Conn. 342; 4 Vt. 471; 6 Mass. 445.
    IY. The act requiring notice, etc., practice act, pages, 676 and 97, has no application to this case. Bronson v. Kensey, 3 McLean, 180; 1 Baily, 540 ; 2 A. H. Notes, 1182 ; 2 Cow. & H. Ootes, 1180; Graham’s Prac. 524; Townshend v. Lawrence, 9 Wend. 458; 20 Wend. 682; 2 Hill, (N. Y.) 320; 3 Wash. C. C. 381.
    Y. If, therefore, an error has occurred, which could not have influenced the final result, the court will not reverse the judgment for that error. The principle is well recognized in the adjudicated cases.
    Conover v. Welch, 15 Ohio, 156 ; Vollan v. Moses, 3 Barl. Sup. C. 31; 2 Comstock, (N. Y.) 198, 193; 7 Ham. O. 214; 3 Met. 19; 1 Taunt. 12 ; 19 Eng. C. L. 162 ; 4 Wend. 453 ; 12 Ib. 41.
    *See also Reynolds v. Ex’rs of Hughes, 5 Hammond, 169 (5 O. Cond. 104, 106); Miller v. Stone, 13 Johns. 417; United States Dig. 186, see. 749; 3 Scam. 427 ; 3 Shep. 67; 2 Shep. 275; 10 Ib. 453; 3 Ib. 67; Baily v. Campbell, Scam. 47; 7 Serg. & Rawle, 219 ; 1 United States Dig. 415, sec. 106; 2 C. & H. Notes, 786 ; 2 Pet. 625; Hamilton v. Russell, 1 United States Cond. 318 (1 Cranch, 309) ; 9 Cow. 680; 1 Cranch, 132; 3 Gill & Johns. 450; 2 Hulst, 357.
    Worcester & Pennewell, for defendant:
    I. Was Brewster a partner with P. Choteau, Jr. & Co ? If so, he was not a competent witness, for he was interested in the result. According to his own statement, “P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. were to furnish him money for the purpose of purchasing furs over a large extent of country, and the profits and losses of the transactions were to be divided between lvimself and them." How to be divided does not appear; the presumption would be equally.This being so, it is vain for Brewster to swear to a conclusion of law, “that he never was a partner." The question is, was he to participate in the “profits?" He says he was to do so, and in the “ losses” also. And he would remark that the contract itself, is, in all respects, consistent with the fact of Brewster’s partnership. His copartners were to lurnish the cash capital, and he was to put in his service as an equivalent. He does not describe himself in the contract as “ agent ” oven, but he does describe himself throughout as the acting and business member of the firm—the party through whom, and by whom, the money was to be received and disbursed—whose duty it was to give directions and instructions—to whom the furs, when purchased, should be delivered, and with whom the final settlement was to be made. The contract does not state who constitute the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., and the words “ & Co.,” may, with as much consistency, embrace Brewster as Sanford, or any one else of the persons admitted to be members of the firm.
    - *Wo think it will not be seriously urged, as it was not at the trial below, that Brewster’s participation in the “profits and losses,” as to those adventures, was a mere mode agreed upon between himself and his associates, for fixing the amount of “compensation” for his services, without making him liable to third parties as a partner. This construction of the arrangement would be carrying the doctrine of “ compensation ” to an extent for which we think no precedent can be found in the books, and which, under the circumstances, would be exceedingly dangerous.
    We know of no instance in which one of several parties to a contract, whether general partners or not, has been allowed, in the mode pursued in this suit, to settle his interest in the subject matter of the suit with his co-contractors, exchange mutual releases pending the suit, and then be offered and admitted as a witness for the plaintiffs. If any precedent can be found for such practice, or that looks toward sustaining it, in any common law court, it has yet to come under our notice. See Story on Partnership, 50-52; Id. 344, 345, and 356 in notes; Id. 54, and 57 in notes; 2 Greenl. Ev. 393, 394; Gow on Partnerships, 16-18, and 137-141.
    
      The letter of March 29, 1845.—The court permitted a copy of a letter to be read in evidence, upon notice to produce the original, never proved to have been received, served during trial. By law, ten days’ notice must be served. Sec. 113 of the Practice Act.
    
      
       After the death of an ostensible partner, a surviving dormant partner may sue alone upon a partnership contract. Beach v. Hayward, 10 Ohio, 455.
      The names of dormant partners, though interested, and an ostensible partner, if it can be clearly proved that he had no interest, may be omitted. I Swan’s Prac. 41.
    
   Hitchcock, C. J.

The record in this case shows that the original suit was commenced by Pierre Choteau, Jr., John B. Sarpy, John F. A. Sanford, and Joseph A. Sire, under the name of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. At the trial term of the court of common pleas, and before the trial was commenced, the counsel for the res]iective parties entered into a stipulation, which is as follows : “In this case it is matter of stipulation, that in event it appears that William Brewster should have ^joined as plaintiff, it shall not affect the suit or bar a recovery in the present form. Should Brewster be offered as a witness, and received, the defendant retains the right to except to any ruling admitting him.”

On the trial, the plaintiffs, to sustain the issue on their part, among other testimony, offered in evidence the contract declared upon in the first count of the declaration, and rested in chief.

After the plaintiffs had closed their testimony in chief, the defendant examined several witnesses, and read sundry depositions to sustain his defense.

To rebut the defense made, the plaintiffs offered William Brewster as a witness, to whose examination the-witness objected, on account of his incompetency; and to show this incompetency, read portions of the depositions of Nicholas Dockstader and Benjamin F. Hollister. Dockstader states that he is “acquainted with Raitt; that he is acquainted with P. Choteau, Jr., and John F. A. Sanford, of the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., and is also acquainted with William Brewster, of Detroit, but is not able to say whether said Brewster is a member of said firm or not; states that he has had dealings with said firm, and always did his business with said Brewster, and his impression always has been that Brewster was a member of said firm. Deponent resides in Cleveland, and has been engaged in the fur business there for twenty years.”

Hollister states that he “ resides at Perrysburg, in Wood county, Ohio; has been engaged in the fur business for thirty years ; that ho always understood that William Brewster was a partner with the plaintiffs.”

The defendant further read, to sustain his objection, the examination of William Brewster on his voir dire, when heretofore giving a deposition in the case; on which examination, he says, “that ho is not, and never was, a partner in the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., and that he has no interest in the event of this suit.” The question is then propounded to him, *“In what relation did you stand to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., between October 26, A. D. 1844, and May 16, a. d. 1845, or in what capacity did you act for them?” To which he replied, “The arrangement was, that the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. were to furnish money to this deponent, for the purpose of purchasing furs over a large extent of country, and the profits and loss of the transactions were to be divided between deponent and P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.” In reply to a question propounded by plaintiff’s counsel, witness states, “ Said arrangement has wholly ceased, and was closed some time in December, 1849; that he was released and discharged by said P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. from all liability therein, and has no longer any interest therein.”

Upon this evidence, the counsel for defendant contended that Brewster was a partner with plaintiffs in this transaction, and therefore interested in the event of the suit, and not competent as a witness. The court, however, overruled the objection, and held that Brewster would be competent, and might testify, provided he would execute a release to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. The release was executed, and he was examined as a witness.

This decision of the court was excepted to, and it was assigned for error in the Supreme Court, that therein the court of common pleas erred, and such was the opinion of the Supreme Court, and for this error, together with another which will hereafter be noted, the judgment of the court of common pleas was reversed.

Whether the court of common pleas erred in the decision above referred to, must depend upon the solution of two questions :

1. Whether Brewster, in making the contract with Eaitt, acted as the agent of Choteau, Jr. & Co., or, whether in this transaction, he was partner with them.

2. If a partner, is there anything in the stipulation of the counsel of the parties, as contained in the bill of exceptions, *whieh can bo so construed as to preclude the defendant from objecting to him as a witness.

Before proceeding to the consideration of these questions it may be proper to refer to an objection raised by counsel for plaintiff. It is said that whether Brewster was a partner, and interested in the case, depended, upon testimony bofor’e the court of common pleas, which must be considered and acted upon by that court; and that court having found, upon this evidence, that Brewster was not interested, this court is concluded by that finding. If the objection is well taken, it would rarely happen that this court would reverse a judgment because the court of common pleas had erred in the admission of testimony. When such questions are raised, the court, in which the trial is had, must, as a general thing, decide that question from the evidence before it. If an exception is taken, the whole evidence, relative to the point, is made part of the record, and the reviewing court is bound to look into that evidence, and, from the whole, to determine whether the inferior court did, or did not, properly admit or reject the witness.

Cóunsel have been led into an error, as I presume, from the action of this court in another class of cases. By our practice, an issue in fact may as well be submitted to the court as to the jury. This court hold, that if an issue is so submitted, no exception can be taken to the judgment of the court, upon its own finding. In such cases we hold that the court, in passing upon the issue, acts as a jury, and an exception can no more be taken to the finding of the one than the other. Whether the case is submitted to the court or to the jury, the party against whom the issue is found may move for a new trial; and if that motion is overruled, may except to the opinion of the court in overruling, and in that way get the whole evidence upon the record. If the case, under such circumstances, is removed by writ of error, the reviewing court must examine the whole ^evidence, and from that evidence determine whether the new trial should or should not* have been granted.

We will now proceed to examine the question, whether Brewster, in making the contract with Raitt, acted as the agent of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co., or whether, in this transaction, he was a •partner with them.

By the terms of the contract it might be difficult to ascertain the true character of Brewster. It purports to have boon made by Choteau & Co., by Brewster, with Raitt. Raitt, in purchasing furs and skins, is to be regulated by the instructions of Brewster. The furs and skins purchased by Raitt are to be and remain the propertj’' of Choteau & Co. until all the advances by them made shall be fully paid and canceled, with the interest. . The furs and skins purchased are to be delivered by Raitt to Brewster, at Detroit, who is to pay him therefor the market price at Detroit; and further, Raitt is to keep Brewster advised of the quantity of furs and skins he may have on hand, from time to time. Choteau, Jr. & Co., by Brewster, agree to advance to Raitt money with which to purchase, and for which he is to allow them interest at the rate of seven per cent. Throughout the whole contract Brewster seems to be the active man oq the one part. Choteau, Jr. & Co. have only to advance money through him, and through’ him receive the avails of such advancement. In all this, however, there is nothing inconsistent with the idea that in all this business he may have acted as the agent of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.

To show that ho was in fact a partner in this transaction, the depositions of Dochstader and Hollister were read. It is true neither of these witnesses undertake to state positively that he was a partner, though such had been their understanding, and the former had had dealings with the firm, and Brewster was the man with whom ho dealt. This was competent testimony to have gone to a jury in a ease where the question of partnership was involved, and had a jury, with this evidence before it, found that the partnership existed, a court would hardly have *granted a new trial, because the verdict was unsustained by proof.

But when we look into the examination of Brewster himself, it would seem that no doubt could remain upon the subject. He says that he was not a partner in the firm of P. Choteau, Jr. & Co.; and this was probably true, so far as concerned their general business. That was a firm doing business in the city of New York ; he was operating in the fur business, at Detroit, and in the surrounding country. He speaks of an arrangement between himself and that firm, which was in existence at the time this contract with Raitt was entered into, by which that firm was to furnish him money, and he was to purchase furs and skins over a large extent of country, and the profits and loss of the entire business were to be shared equally between himself and the company. Had the arrangement been that he was to share in the profits only, this share might well have been held to be in the nature of wages for services performed. But when he is to share in both profit and loss, he must be held as a partner. Aspinwall v. Williams, 1 Ohio, 84; Austin v. Williams, 2 Ohio, 61; 13 Ohio, 300; Channel v. Fassett, 16 Ohio, 166; Johnson v. Miller, 16 Ohio, 431.

It is not denied, by plaintiff’s counsel, that in these fur transactions Brewster was a partner with P. Chotean, Jr. & Co., but it is claimed that inasmuch as there had been a settlement between himself and his copartners of the whole business, he was not a necessary party to the suit. It will be seen that this settlement took place long after this suit was commenced. Had it been otherwise, it would have made no difference. Partners are liable for all demands against the firm, and by no arrangement among themselves can any one or more of them be relieved from this obligation. And where a suit is commenced to enforce a partnership demand, it must be in the name of all who were partners at the time the demand accrued. Such is the general rule; hut there are exceptions, as in the case of a dormant partner. This was not, however, the situation of Brewster. On the contrary, he was tho active business man *of the firm. We are clearly of the opinion that Brewster should have been a party plaintiff; that he was interested in the event of the suit. As he was not a party to the record, the plaintiffs would not have had judgment but for the stipulation of counsel, heretofore referred to.

The court of common pleas seem to have supposed that when Brewster was called to the stand, he was interested, and therefore ■ incompetent, and would not permit him to testify until he had executed a release to P. Choteau, Jr. & Co. Such release could not restore his competency. As a partner, he was liable to Raitt, in the event that in the investigation of the case it should bo found there was a balance due to him. A release from Raitt was the ■necessary release to render him competent as a witness.

The next inquiry is as to the force and effect of the stipulation •of counsel before referred to, and what was its true intent and meaning. The defendant, by his counsel, agrees that if it should appear in the trial of the case, that Brewster was a necessary party, he would not, on that account, object to a judgment. This is a favor which he confers upon the plaintiffs. But he expressly reserves the right to object to Brewster as a witness should he be ■offered. As we understand the stipulation, the defendant reserved to himself the same right to object to Brewster that he would have had, had Brewster been a party upon the record, as he should have been. Brewster was an incompetent witness, and his release to Choteau & Co. did not change his situation.

The Supreme Court did not err in holding the decision of the court of common pleas, permitting him to testify, to be erroneous.

The second error assigned in the Supreme Court was, that the court of common pleas erred in admitting to the jury the copy of the letter mentioned in the bill of exceptions of March 29,1848.

Tho facts relative to the admission of this copy, as shown by the record, wore, that during the progress of the trial, and *affcer tho plaintiffs had closed their testimony in chief, they gave notice to the defendant to produce the letter referred to, which he denied having in his possession or ever having received. There was no testimony that the letter ever had been in his possession. Tho only evidence upon the subject, was that such a letter had been deposited in the post-office of Detroit, directed to the defendant. Upon this evidence the copy was received.

The record of the Supreme Court shows that one of the grounds of the reversal of the judgment of the court of common pleas was, that this notice to produce the letter was not a reasonable notice.

In the opinion of this coui’t, there was no error in this. It must be an extraordinary case, where a motion to produce a paper, given during the progress of the trial, can be held to be reasonable. If it should be apparent that the paper was with a party in court, present at the trial, such a notice might be said to be reasonable. But surely where the paper is not in court, and no proof that it was ever in the possession of the party notified, such short notice can not be reasonable.

As to the question whether, by proving that a letter has been deposited in a post-office, directed to any particular person, a copy of that letter can be given in evidence to charge the person to whom it is directed, we do not deem it necessary to say anything further than this : that we should hesitate long before we should be willing to establish any such rule. In giving notice of the protest of a bill or note, all that is necessary is to establish the fact that a letter containing the notice was deposited in a post-office in due time, and properly directed. But the position assumed by plaintiffs’ counsel is, that in all cases where it can be shown that a letter was deposited in a post-office, the person to whom it is directed is to be charged with knowledge of the contents of that ■letter. We are not prepared to admit the correctness of this proposition.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, with costs. 
      
       Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio, 387.
     
      
       See Spafiord v. Bradley, in this volume of Reports.