Case ID: so2d_720/html/0746-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "| ] BYRNES, Judge. | iPLOTKIN, Judge, _J_iMURRAY, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Louisiana v. Robin STALLWORTH.
    No. 98-K-2356.
    Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
    Oct. 21, 1998.
    
      Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, John Jerry Glas, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, for the State.
    Kerry J. Miller, McGlinchey Stafford, New Orleans, for the defendant.
    Before BYRNES, PLOTKIN and MURRAY, JJ.
   | ] BYRNES, Judge.

The state requests a review of the tidal court’s ruling which ordered the state to produce the confidential informant so that the defense has an opportunity to question the confidential informant prior to the trial in this matter.

Generally, the state is permitted to withhold the identity of the informant; only when the defendant’s right to prepare the defense is prejudiced, should the informer be identified. La.C.Cr.P. art. 723; State v. Fefie, 96-605 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/97), 692 So.2d 1236. The state’s privilege of withholding the identity of an informant protects the public interest and also law enforcement by encouraging persons to supply information to the police without a fear of reprisal. Id. at 1237. Discovery rules (La.C.Cr.P. art. 716 et seq.) are intended to eliminate unwarranted prejudice which could arise from surprise evidence. State v. White, 430 So.2d 171 (La.App. 2 Cir.1983), writ denied, 433 So.2d 1055 (La.1983). Unless contrary to law, rulings of the trial court in pretrial matters are generally shown great deference absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Walters, 408 So.2d 1337 (La.1982).

Although the defendant does not have the right to the names and addresses of state witnesses, discovery of this information is not prohibited where there has been |2a determination that there exists exceptional circumstances and peculiar, distinctive reasons why fundamental fairness dictates discovery. State v. Ondek, 584 So.2d 282 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991), writ denied, 586 So.2d 539, reconsideration denied, 588 So.2d 1107 (La. 1991). If the government informant is the sole participant in the transaction charged, the confidential informant’s identity must be disclosed. State v. Clark, 553 So.2d 1020 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989); State v. Degruy, 96-1463 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/14/97), 696 So.2d 580.

Because the informant participated in the drug transaction for which the defendant is charged in the present case, the state divulged the name of the confidential informant; however, the state did not supply the informant’s address. The defendant asserts that the informant is the only witness with direct evidence so that the defense’s adequate trial preparation includes having the opportunity to interview the state’s witness. The state does not have a duty to produce the confidential informant prior to trial for the sole reason to give the defendant access to him. The informant is no longer confidential because the state supplied the defendant with his identity in the present case. The informant should be treated as any other witness subject to the same discovery rules where the state could be ordered to furnish information, including a witness’s criminal record.

In the present ease the hearing transcript dated October 5, 1998 shows that the trial court ordered the state “to provide [the defense] with the conviction record of that witness [the informant].” There is no showing that the state is unwilling to provide this information. The state does not oppose the trial court’s additional order which was expressed by the defendant “that the State provide [the defense] Rwith information regarding any compensation or deal or anything along those lines that the confidential informant has or will receive from the State or any other law enforcement agency in exchange for his testimony at this trial.” The state supplied the facts that the informant had been compensated by payment of $200 for the first incident and $300 for the second incident when the informant provided information. Other disclosures concerning any other type of compensation for the informant’s testimony, as well as the informant’s conviction record were forthcoming. The state disclosed the fact that the informant was equipped with a concealed transmitter and provided with $350 to purchase the heroin during the transaction for which the defendant is charged. The state provided information that the defendant sold the confidential informant twelve tin foil packets. Considering the information which is available to the defense, access to the informant prior to trial is not essential to the defense’s trial preparation. Under the circumstances the defendant is not deprived of the opportunity to prepare adequately.

The trial court’s ruling ordering the state to produce the confidential informant for questioning by the defense prior to trial is unprecedented. Considering the parties’ interests, public policy protects the informant from reprisal or retaliation where the defense can adequately prepare for trial. Therefore, where as in the present case the defendant is able to adequately prepare for trial, to require the state to present the confidential informant prior to trial would be an unwarranted extension of the defendant’s right to the informant’s name and address.

Furthermore, if it were the intention of the trial court to use this order to ^produce the confidential informant as a means of sanctioning the district attorney for what the trial court may have viewed as conduct less than totally forthcoming, then the end does not justify the means. It is inappropriate to risk endangering the confidential informant for such purposes. In other words, we should not punish the confidential informant for whatever shortcoming we may perceive in the actions of the district attorney.

As previously pointed out, in the present case the state is providing the defendant with substantial information about the confidential informant. With this information, the defendant is not deprived of the right to prepare adequately for trial.

Accordingly, the ruling of trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PLOTKIN, J., concurs.

MURRAY, J., dissents with reasons.

| iPLOTKIN, Judge,

concurring.

I concur in the resolution of this matter, but I write separately because I do not agree with the dicta in the opinion.

The defendant does not allege any specific and particularized need to meet with the confidential informant before trial; it can be assumed the only purpose would be identification. Moreover, the State has agreed to furnish the defendant with the confidential informant’s criminal history -and a record of any compensation, tangible or intangible, awarded to the confidential informant for his/her participation in this crime and prosecution. This will provide the defendant with a means of impeaching the credibility of the confidential informant. To require the State to physically present the confidential informant to the defendant pre-trial is unprecedented and without legal authority. The defendant is not entitled to the testimony of the confidential informant before trial which is essentially what would be discovered if he/ she were brought to court pre-trial.

If the purpose of the court’s order is to punish the State for not being forthcoming with properly discoverable information regarding the confidential informant, the court can alter its order and provide appropriate sanctions in compliance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 729.5.

_J_iMURRAY, Judge,

dissenting.

The majority acknowledges that a trial court’s pretrial rulings are entitled to great deference unless contrary to law, and that under these facts, the confidential informant’s identity must be disclosed. Without pointing to anything that prohibits the district court’s discovery order, however, that ruling is reversed as “unwarranted.” Because I find that the trial court properly balanced the defendant’s fundamental rights with the State’s interest in protecting informants, as required under Article 514 of the Code of Evidence, I must respectfully dissent.

Ms. Stallworth faces life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, under La.R.S. 40:966 B(l). The State concedes that the sole basis for the pending charge is a transaction between the defendant and the informant, unaccompanied by any other government agent. Despite prior orders by the court, the only information the State provided before October 5, 1998 was the Cl’s name. While the majority acknowledges that the defense is entitled to the informant’s name and address prior to trial, its reversal of the district court’s order renders such disclosure meaningless. Ms. Stallworth’s counsel has detailed his efforts to locate the witness on his own before he learned that the informant was apparently in federal custody, causing the State’s need for several continuances of the scheduled trial. In my view, there was no abuse of ^discretion in the district court’s determination that these facts warranted a departure from precedent.

Additionally, I find that the discovery order at issue was carefully crafted to balance the competing interests of the parties. By specifying that the State’s sole witness against the defendant should be produced for an interview in the courthouse or at the prosecutor’s office, the informant’s whereabouts will remain unknown to anyone who might present a threat prior to trial. Thus, both the defendant’s constitutional rights as well as the State’s interest in protecting its informant are served. State v. Walters, 408 So.2d 1337 (La.1982).