Case ID: so2d_429/html/1247-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "SHARP, Judge. FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FLORIDA NATIONAL BANK AT ORLANDO, Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC CREDIT CORPORATION, etc., Semoran Associates, Ltd., etc., et al. and Donald Boehme, et al., Appellees.
    No. 82-768.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    March 30, 1983.
    Rehearing Denied April 20, 1983.
    William L. Eagan, of Arnold, Matheny & Eagan, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
    James R. Lavigne, of Lavigne & Wash-burn, P.A., Winter Park, for appellees Donald Boehme, Viola E. Lauck, Lillian Lowe and David Berlowitz.
   SHARP, Judge.

The Florida National Bank at Orlando appeals from the lower court’s entry of a temporary injunction which enjoined and restrained it from disposing of funds in a certain savings account under the name of Semoran Associates, Ltd. We reverse because the record fails to establish any basis for the lower court’s conclusion, essential to support injunctive relief, that the appellees were likely to be irreparably injured unless the court maintained the status quo pending litigation, and that they lacked an adequate remedy at law. Florida East Coast Railway Company v. City of Miami, 299 So.2d 152 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 304 So.2d 126 (Fla.1974); Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 212 So.2d 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968).

The appellees filed a third party complaint against the Bank claiming that some of the funds in the disputed account were their deposits on purchase contracts for condominium units being converted from apartments by Semoran. They claimed and offered proof that some Bank officers knew the identity of the funds in the account. Therefore, they argued, the Bank has no right to seize or set off the funds in the account in partial satisfaction of liabilities owed to it by Semoran because the funds were special deposits. Bank of West Orange v. Associates Discount Corporation, 197 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967). The applicability of the Bank of West Orange case can only be determined after a trial, and our action here does not reflect in any way on the substantive issues.

Bank accounts are primarily debtor-creditor, bookkeeping relationships, which can be wiped out or restored by a simple entry or direction to a computer. A bank does not have specific cash in a special pot for each of its customers. It is their debtor. Even if specific bills were segregated in a vault for a specific account (and clearly no bank operates this way), money is normally fungible and replaceable. Because there is nothing unique about funds in an account, an award of damages is generally deemed an adequate remedy. For these reasons, injunctive relief in suits against the entity with whom funds were deposited is generally denied. Cf. Goldberger v. Regency Highland Condominium Association, Inc., 383 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Oxford International Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So.2d 1199 (Fla.1980). Accordingly, the injunction is quashed and this cause is remanded.

ORDER QUASHED AND CASE REMANDED.

COWART, J., concurs.

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, J., dissents with opinion.

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The order appealed states, “[T]he court finds solely for the allegations of the Motion that the Interve-nors’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is well taken since various funds of the Intervenors or members of the class are alleged to be in an account with Florida National Bank in the name of Semoran Associates, Ltd., and irreparable injury may result without this Order, and the court having authority to enter this Order under section 658.61 of the Florida Statutes (1981)....”

The majority opinion makes short shrift of section 658.61, Florida Statutes. That section contemplates that the claimant to funds on deposit at a bank obtain a restraining order or injunction against the bank in order to require the bank to recognize the claim. That is exactly what appel-lees sought here. The only difference is that the bank also claims a right to the funds in the account. However, the order restrains not only the bank, but also Semo-ran Associates from withdrawing the money from the account.

While it is true that the Third District Court of Appeal, in Oxford International Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 374 So.2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), did reverse a temporary injunction granted in favor of Merrill Lynch which had prohibited Oxford Bank, against whom the brokerage firm had filed suit for monetary damages, from withdrawing certain funds deposited in its account at another bank, the court’s rationale was based on the contingent, unproven and disputed nature of the claim which was insufficient to satisfy the clear legal right prerequisite to injunctive relief. The court emphasized that Merrill Lynch “neither alleged that it had title or a lien against the proceeds of the account. ... ” 374 So.2d at 56. Here appellees have alleged they have title to the funds in question since these funds represent earnest money deposits paid by ap-pellees as prospective purchasers of condominium units owned by Semoran.

In my opinion, the trial judge was clearly within his discretion in granting the restraining order. The bank has the deposit. While it is true that the “bank does not have specific cash in a special pot for each of its customers”, the effect of the court’s order merely is to prevent the bank from making an entry on its books reflecting its ownership until the court determines who owns the funds in the account. The advisability of maintaining the status quo pending final determination by the court was recognized by the legislature in enacting the section 658.61, Florida Statutes, and this court should respect it.

I would AFFIRM. 
      
      . The dissent takes the view that section 658.-61, Florida Statutes (1981), abolished the traditional requirements necessary to make injunc-tive relief appropriate regarding bank accounts. We do not agree. The statute does not indicate whether or when injunctive relief should be granted, which is the issue here. Its main purpose is to protect banks and trust companies from having to recognize adverse claims to accounts until appropriate court action is taken.
     
      
      . Section 658.61, Florida Statutes (1981), provides, in part:
      Notice to any bank or trust company of an adverse claim to a deposit or fiduciary account standing on its books to the credit of any person shall not be effectual to cause the bank or trust company to recognize the adverse claimant unless the adverse claimant shall also either:
      (1) Procure a restraining order, injunction, or other appropriate process against the bank or trust company from a court in a cause therein instituted by him wherein the person to whose credit the deposit or fiduciary account stands is made a party and served with process.