Case ID: dc_15/html/0391-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Charles C. Meads vs. William B. Hartley.
    Equity. No. 9690.
    Decided February 5, 1886.
    The Chief Justice and Justices Cox and Mebbick sitting.
    1. The equity side of this court has jurisdiction under the Maryland act of 1785 to confirm a contract made by a guardian for the sale of an infant’s realty where, under a bill filed for such purpose, proof has been taken showing that the proposed sale would be for the advantage both of the infant and others interested in the land.
    2. When filed, such a bill may be amended after answers put in and proof taken by adding parties and a prayer for alternative relief by a sale and division of the proceeds.
    Hearing in General Term in the first instance.
    STATEMENT 0E THE CASE.
    This was a proceeding to require the defendant to comply with his contract of purchase of a lot in square 811 of this city by paying $1,000, the balance of the purchase money, therefor. The only objection on the part of the defendant was, that he was advised that the proceedings in equity suit No. 9395 in this court were not based on authority of law; that the court had no jurisdiction therein so as to divest the title of the infant defendants, who had an interest in the lot in common with adults.
    The bill in the last-mentioned cause — No. 9395 — avers the interest of said infants, who alone are made defendants thereto; and that the complainant, the mother and guardian of said wards, had. made a contract for the sale of the infants’ interest, which she asks may be confirmed by the court.
    Process was issued and served on said infants and they came into court, and a guardian ad litem was appointed.
    Answer and replication were filed and testimony taken and the cause was submitted for a decree.
    On inspection of the record, it was suggested by the court that the adult co-owners should be made parties.
    Thereupon they voluntarily appeared, filed a petition, and, by consent of complainant and the guardian ad litem 
      for defendants, were admitted as additional parties complainant. An amendment was then made to the hill, whereby the alternative relief was sought of a sale and division of proceeds, under the first part of the act hereinafter quoted. This amendment was also consented to hy the guardian ad litem, and thereupon the cause was again submitted and a decree made for a sale, under which the trustee reported a sale (the same mentioned in original hill), which was, after order nisi and due publication, finally confirmed, and a deed of conveyance duly executed by the trustee to the purchaser, who is the complainant in this suit.
    The purchaser thereupon made a subdivision of said lot 5 and built three dwelling houses thereon, one of which he contracted to sell to the defendant herein for $5,000.
    The suit was based on section 12, ch. 72, Act of Md., 1785 (Thompson’s Digest, 131), which provides (omitting unnecessary words) as follows :
    “That in case any infant, &c., hath or shall hereafter have a joint interest, or interest in common, with any other person or persons, &c., in any lands, &c., and it shall appear to the chancellor, upon application of any of the parties concerned, and upon appearance of the infant, &c., and hearing and examination of all the circumstances, that it will he for the interest and advantage both of the infant, &c., and of the other person or persons concerned, to sell such lands, &c., the chancellor may order and direct such lands, &c., to be sold,” &c.
    “And if any contract hath been made for any lands, &c„ held as aforesaid, for or on behalf of any infant, &c., which the chancellor, upon hearing as aforesaid, and examination into all the circumstances, shall think for the interest and advantage, both of such infant, &c., and of the other person or persons interested therein, to be confirmed, the chancellor may confirm such contract and order a deed to be executed, &c., and all sales and deeds made in pursuance of and agreeably to an order of the chancellor, in consequence of the above power, shall be good and sufficient in law to transfer tie estate and interest of such infant, &c., in such lands,” &c.
    The case was ordered to be heard in General Term in the first instance.
    Edwards & Barnard for complainant:
    The act of 1*785 is not repealed or affected by any subsequent act of Maryland, prior to the creation of the District of Columbia, or by any act of Congress since.
    The act of Congress of March 3, 1843 (R. S. D. C., Sec. 957, et seq.), provides a general method for sale of infants’ real estate, but does not, expressly or by implication, take away or change the power of the chancellor under the act of 1785.
    The amendment of the bill,-adding new parties and asking alternative relief, took nothing away from the case, and in no way affected the interests of the infants. It was but a step in the cause, to which the’ guardian ad litem had authority to consent with the sanction of the court; and the decree following such amendment is as binding on the infants as it would have been if new process had been issued and served on them after the amendment, a new guardian ad litem appointed and the testimony retaken. 1 Daniels Chancery Practice, 152, 153; Freeman on Judg’ts, secs. 126, 142, 151; Neale vs. Neale, 9 Wall., 1. The Tremolo Patent, 23 Wall., 527.
    The court of equity, by its inherent power, acts as the guardian of the rights and interests of infants;.and the jurisdiction in these cases is one so eminently proper and inexpensive that it has been upheld and favored whenever the case has shown it ’to be for the interests of the parties. Long vs. Long, 62 Md., 80; Dorsey vs. Gilbert, 11 Gill & J., 87. If a partition suit were necessary in all such cases, it would greatly militate against adults who might be interested with infants, and who could readily agree to an advantageous sale; and, on the other hand, infants are not apt to be the sufferers if they get as much for their interests as adults do; and costs of partition are saved to both.
    
      The rights of all the joint owners, or tenants in common, are fully protected by this statute; and after all, it is only another mode of making a chancery sale tobest advantage. Private bids might be received after a decree for sale; and in this proceeding a bid is made before suitis filed, or a so-called contract which is nothing but an offer, and cannot ripen into a sale without the approval of the court. It is only a different way of bringing the same matter before the court, and in every way the infant is fully protected.
    The infants and their interests are all before the court by the original bill and proceedings, and if the court deems it best to bring other parties before it, by amendment or otherwise, before final decree is passed, it is a matter of no consequence to them.
    Neither is it a matter of any moment by whom the so-called contract of sale, on behalf of the infants, is made, so it appears to be agreed to by the adult owners, and is for the advantage of all parties.
    A different ruling than that now contended for by complainant would disturb titles to valuable property in this District, which have long passed as perfect; and ought not to be made without the clearest authority.
    J. T. Cull for defendant contended:
    That the act in question so far as it related to the confirmation of contracts made on behalf of infants, applied only to contracts for sale which had been made before the passage of the act; and that this construction was consistent with the language of the act. The words “held as aforesaid” in the second clause of said section referring only to the manner in which the property was held, and not to the time when held; and the word “hath” in said clause confined it to property “held as aforesaid” prior to the passage of the act, whereas in thefirst clause of said section the remedy there provided for was as to property so held, not only at the passage of the act, but that should be so held in the future — after the passage of the act. And that being its scope, the court had no jurisdiction by and under the original bill and proceedings, and not having jurisdiction to the original bill could acquire none by the amended bill, which also was in effect rather an entirely new bill and not an amended bill, it being for different relief and under an entirely different state of facts. And that to this new bill there had been no new proceeding; but that by a nunc pro tunc order of the court the proceedings under the original bill had been made to apply to this new or amended bill.
   Opinion of the court:

The court is of the opinion that the Special Term had jurisdiction over tbe persons of the infant defendants by the proceedings under the original bill, and thaAthe amendments did not make a new bill, but were consistent with the relief prayed for in the original bill, and that the objections to the title made by defendant are unfounded.

The words in the statute “if any contract hath been made for any lands,” &c., does not, in our judgment, refer to contracts made before the passage of the act, but refer to contracts which have been made at the time the remedy given by the act is applied for. "W hen such contract has been made, and the matter brought to the attention of the court regularly, and proof taken showing that such proposed sale would be for the interest and advantage both of the infants and the others interested in the land, the court has authority under this act to confirm and complete the sale, and to order and decree a deed therefor.

The decree will be that the defendant accept the title tendered by the complainant, and that he pay the balance of the purchase money therefor in compliance with his contract.