Case ID: ad_223/html/0199-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Raymond L. Clark, Respondent, v. Marie L. Berlureau, Appellant.
    Fourth Department,
    March 21, 1928.
    Words and phrases —• “ until ” is ambiguous.
    The word “ until ” as used in an option in which it is stated that “ this offer good until July 27th, 1927,” is ambiguous. It cannot be said as a matter of law whether the date mentioned is included or excluded. The true meaning of the word may be ascertained at the trial according to the intent of the parties.
    
      Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Steuben on the 30th day of November, 1927.
    
      Cole & Knapp [Wilbur F. Knapp of counsel], for the appellant.
    
      Isaac Joffe, for the respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The meaning of the word until ” is often ambiguous. It sometimes includes, sometimes excludes, a mentioned date. (People v. Fitzgerald, 180 N. Y. 269, 275; Clarke v. Mayor, etc., 111 id. 621; Henderson v. Edwards, 191 Iowa, 871; 183 N. W. 583; 16 A. L. R. 1090, 1094, note.) This appeal involves simply the construction of a pleading in the main body of which a contract is alleged. The meaning of the word “ until ” as used in the exhibit attached to the complaint in the sentence this offer good until July 27, 1927,” is not clear. We cannot say as matter of law that it is used with the intention of excluding the mentioned date and to render an acceptance on that date unavailing. At the trial the true meaning of the word, as intended by the parties to the action, may be elucidated through proof of the surrounding facts and circumstances.

All concur. Present — Hubbs, P. J., Sears, Crouch, Taylor and Sawyer, JJ.

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.