Case ID: ny_52/html/0550-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Chuboh, Ch. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

John N. Kein et al., Appellants, v. William V. Tupper et al., Respondents.
    (Argued March 28, 1873;
    decided May 6, 1873.)
    Plaintiffs contracted to sell defendants 119 bales of cotton, to conform to samples, at a specified price per pound, payable in cash on delivery. The cotton was to be weighed and samples taken and compared with original samples before delivery. Plaintiffs delivered to defendants an order upon the warehouses where the cotton was stored, for the same, and defendants indorsed upon the order a direction to restore for them, and delivered it to the warehousemen. Upon a day thereafter seventy bales of the cotton were weighed, samples taken out and the bales put back in the warehouse. That night forty-two of these bales, together with those not weighed, were destroyed by fire. In an action to recover the contractprice therefor,—Held, that there was no delivery and acceptance so as to pass the title; that the compliance, which was to precede delivery, was not complete until the samples taken out had been compared with the original samples; that if the acceptance of the seventy bales should be assumed, it must be construed as conditional upon delivery of the balance contracted for. Also, that if there was a delivery the action could not be maintained, as the contract was entire, and until the delivery of the whole quantity no action accrued.
    "While a destruction of the subject-matter of the contract without fault of plaintiffs relieved them from an action for damages for non-performance, it could not enable them to enforce a part performance,
    Appeal from order of the General Term of the Superior Court of the city of New York, reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict.
    This action was brought to recover the purchase price of seventy bales of cotton alleged to have been sold by plaintiffs to defendants.
    On the 8d July, 1868, plaintiffs contracted to sell and defendants to purchase 119 bales of A. cotton, described by marks, at thirty-one and a quarter cents per pound, payable in cash on delivery. The sale was negotiated by cotton brokers, who acted for both parties, bought and sold notes were delivered. The sale was to be by sample, the cotton to be weighed, samples taken and compared with the original samples in the hands of the brokers. Plaintiffs delivered to defendants an order upon the warehouses where the cotton was stored for the 119 bales. The brokers’ clerk indorsed upon the order a direction to re-store on account of defendants. On the 15th July seventy bales of the cotton were taken out of the warehouse, weighed and samples taken therefrom, and returned to the warehouse. On account of the lateness of the hour the weighing and sampling of the residue was deferred until the next day. That night the warehouse was burned and its contents damaged or destroyed. Seventy-eight of the bales which had been weighed were saved in a damaged condition, and subsequently sold by plaintiffs at auction for account of defendants upon notice to them. The forty-nine bales not weighed were injured so that they could not be made merchantable. Further facts appear in the opinion.
    The jury rendered a verdict for the value of the forty-two bales destroyed at the contract price.
    
      Wm. Henry Anthon for the appellants.
    The broker is the agent of both parties, and the memorandum of the terms of sale made by him in writing and delivered 'to the parties is the best evidence of the contract. (Merritt v. Clason, 12 J. R., 102; Allan v. Aguire, 5 N. Y. Leg. Obs., 380; Grant v. Fletcher, 5 B. & C., 436; Groom v. Affalo, 6 id., 117.) When no time for delivery is specified in the contract of sale it is for the jury to judge what time is reasonable. (Terwilleger v. Knapp, 2 E. D. S., 86.) When an act is done importing a surrender of goods by the vendor and an acceptance of them by the vendee, there is a sufficient delivery. (Brewer v. Salisbury, 9 Barb., 182; Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines, 182; McCready v. Wright, 5 Duer, 571; 1 East, 192; 5 J. R., 335 ; Story on Sales, 311; 12 Mass., 33; Stanton v. Small, 3 Sandf., 230; Shindles v. Houston, 1 N. Y., 261; Outwater v. Dodge, 7 Cow., 85.) The cotton being out of plaintiffs’ control and fully in the possession of the defendants, their acceptance was complete. (Broom’s Com., 414; Meredith v. Meigh, 2 R. & B., 374; Caine v. Anderson, L. J. [Q. B.], 87; Bushel v. Wheeler, 15 Q. B., 442.) A full performance of the contract, being rendered impossible by unavoidable accident, plaintiffs may recover for the part performed. (Gilbert v. Roberts, 19 L. J., Exch., 410; Smith v. Hudson, 8 L. J. [N. S.], Exch.; Wither v. Dison, 9 B. & C., 386, 387; Owensdale v. Witherel, 4 M. & R., 429.)
    
      R. C. Benedict for the respondents.
    There was no sale between the parties, but an executory contract of sale. (Joyce v. Adams, 8 N. Y., 297.) The contract being an entire one, plaintiffs could not recover except on proving performance. (Russell v. Nicoll, 3 Wend., 119; Barker v. Higgins, 21 N. Y., 397; Tompkinson v. Dudley, 25 id., 272; Mead v. Degogter, 16 Wend., 632; Solomon v. Needeg, 1 Daly, 200; Champlin v. Rowley, 13 Wend., 258; Paige v. Ott, 8 Denio, 406; Knight v. Dunlop, 4 Barb., 36.) Where the seller is to do something to ascertain the quantity of the article sold, the title does not pass. (1 Pars, on Cont., 441; Sagury v. Furnell, 2 Camp., 240; Rugg v. Merritt, 11 East, 215; Fitch v. Beach, 15 Wend., 221; Barly v. Ogden, 3 J. R., 408; Guard v. Prouty, 34 Barb., 456; Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y., 524; Joyce v. Adams, 8 id., 297.) Defendants not having authorized their agent to re-store a less quantity than 119 bales, if he exceeded their authority they are not bound. (Davenport v. Buckland, Hill & Den. Supp., 75; 1 Pars, on Cont., 40; Oliphant v. Mackey, 41 Barb., 446.) Plaintiffs and their agents are chargeable with knowledge of the powers of defendants’ agent. (Dows v. Perrin, 16 N. Y., 330; Smith v. Tracy, 36 id., 86.)
   Chuboh, Ch. J.

It is conceded that the loss occasioned by the fire must fall upon the party who, at the time, had the legal title to the cotton; and such is the well settled rule. (8 N. Y., 291.)

The contract of sale and purchase did not pass the title. When anything remains to be done by the seller to ascertain the identity, quantity or quality of the property, no title passes. (5 Den., 379; 25 N. Y., 525, and cases there cited.)

Assuming that this was a sale of a quantity of specific cotton, which I think we may do, and which is the most favorable view for the plaintiffs, yet, as the cotton was to be weighed by the vendors, to ascertain the quantity, and sampled by both parties to ascertain the quality, no title would pass until these acts were done.

The contract was for the sale of 119 bales of cotton, specifically marked at 31J cents a pound, payable in cash on delivery. The cotton was to be weighed, and samples taken and compared with the original samples before it was ready for delivery. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that seventy of the 119 bales were delivered to and accepted by the defendants, forty-two of which were binned, for which the plaintiffs recovered at the circuit; and this presents the important question in the case. The order upon the warehouse for the cotton contained a direction to re-store the cotton for the defendants. This indorsement was made by the broker’s clerk, and there was some conflict in the evidence whether the defendants authorized it; but we must assume that the jury found that they did, and also that the broker, who acted for both parties, had authority to accept a delivery for the defendants.

On the fifteenth of July seventy bales of the cotton were weighed, and samples taken out, and the balés put back in the warehouse; the order, with the indorsement containing the direction to re-store, having been delivered to the warehouseman. Further progress was suspended until next day for want of time, and on that night the fire occurred.

The question was presented on the trial, in various forms, that the delivery was not complete as to any part of the cotton ; but the court held and ruled that if the jury found that .the direction to re-store was given by the defendants, and the broker was authorized to receive a delivery of the cotton for the defendants, then, that, as a matter of law, what took place in weighing and sampling the seventy bales amounted to a delivery of that quantity. In this I think the learned judge erred. If the broker had full authority, and that authority was conferred upon Bolton, the sampler, it was an authority to receive one hundred and nineteen bales, and not seventy, or forty-two, or any other number. Neither of them had power .to accept a less number, or waive the delivery of any part of the cotton purchased. (41 Barb., 446; Hill & Denio,.supl’t, 75.) But neither of them assumed to accept, unconditionally, seventy bales of the cotton. .The acceptance, as far as it went, must be construed as conditional upon the delivery of the balance. The bales weighed were pronounced satisfactory, but were received subject to the delivery of the remainder. Besides, the sampling of the seventy bales was not complete until the samples taken out were compared with the original samples, which were at the broker’s office. This was the business of the broker, who passed upon the quality upon such comparison. The sampler exercised his judgment as to the quality; but the final decision, it seems, was to be made by the broker.

"Until this was done, the seventy bales were not ready for delivery even, much less delivered and accepted. The direction to re-store for the defendants, on the back of the order, must be construed to mean a direction to re-store when the cotton was all delivered. It did not apply to each bale as it was weighed, and in fact there was nothing done by the warehouseman to change the storage. All that can be predicated of the transaction, of the fifteenth of July is, that the parties had commenced the performance of acts, as to some of the. cot ton, •necessary to enable a delivery to be made, but had not completed them, and as to the balance of the cotton nothing had been done. I think the court should have held that there was no delivery of any part of the cotton.

But if there was a delivery of seventy bales, the action could not be sustained. The contract was entire, and the plaintiffs must prove performance to entitle them to recover. The defendants purchased one hundred and nineteen bales, to be paid for when delivered. Until the delivery of the whole quantity no action accrued to the plaintiffs.

While the destruction of the subject-matter of the contract, without fault of the plaintiffs, would relieve them from an action for damages for not performing the contract, yet it would not enable them to enforce a part performance against the defendants. (47 N. Y., 62.) The rule is well settled in this State that upon a contract for the delivery of a specified quantity of property, payment to be made on delivery, no action will lie until the whole is delivered. (13 Wend., 259 ; 16 id., 632; 3 id., 112; 21 N. Y., 397; 2 id., 153.)

The English rule, that a recovery may be had for the portion delivered, if retained until after the time for full performance (as held in 7 B. & C., 387, and other cases), has never been adopted, but expressly repudiated by the courts of this State. (Id.) That rule rests upon no solid foundation, and in effect enables courts to alter the terms of contracts as made by parties.

The right of a vendor to demand the portion delivered in a case of the destruction of the remainder, so that full performance by the vendor is impossible, need not be considered, because in this case the plaintiffs had all the cotton claimed to have been delivered, which was not destroyed.

A vendee may accept a delivery of a part of the property, and waive the delivery of the remainder, and this may be shown by circumstances, but in this case there is not the slightest circumstance tending to establish such acceptance and waiver. Both parties expected to perform the contract in full. The unfortunate accident prevented it before the title had passed from the vendors, and the misfortune is theirs.

The order granting a new trial must he affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered for the defendants.

All concur.

Order affirmed and judgment accordingly.