Case ID: f-appx_634/html/0059-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

In re CRM HOLDINGS, LTD SECURITIES LITIGATION. Beverly L. Munter, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Brett Brandes, BB Investors, LP, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Daniel G. Hickey, Jr., Martin D. Rakoff, James J. Scardino, Daniel G. Hickey, Sr., Defendants-Appellees, CRM Holdings, Ltd., Defendant.
    
    No. 15-1306-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Feb. 22, 2016.
    Ex Kano S. Sams II (Leonel Z. Glancy, Robert V. Prongay on the brief), Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Los Angeles, CA. NY, for Appellant.
    Arthur H. Aufses III, Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel, New York, NY, for Appellees.
    Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges.
    
      
      . The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official caption to conform with the caption above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiffs appeal from the March 30, 2016 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Preska, C.J.), awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys 20.3% of the settlement fund in fees and $30,000.00 in expenses, and the district court’s April 8, 2015 order adhering to its prior decision on reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.

“We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion, which occurs when (1) the court’s decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision—'though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 416 (2d Cir.2010) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

In common fund cases, such as this one, there are two accepted methods for calculating appropriate attorneys’ fees: the lodestar method and the percentage method. Under either method, the ultimate question is whether the fees awarded “exceed what is ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.” Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 47-48 (2d Cir.2000); see also McDaniel, 595 F.3d at 417-18. Whichever method it applies, the district court must consider the Goldberger factors in determining a reasonable fee award. See In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2008); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 121 (2d Cir.2005). “The Goldber-ger factors include: (1) counsel’s time and labor; (2) the litigation’s magnitude and complexity; (3) the risk of the litigation; (4) the quality of representation; (5) the requested fee in relation to the settlement; and (6) public policy considerations.” McDaniel, 595 F.3d at 423.

Here, plaintiffs’ attorneys requested 33% of the settlement fund in fees. The district court crossed that out and wrote in 20.3%, giving no explanation for this reduction, and merely stating that “[t]he Court finds that the amount oí fees awarded is fair and reasonable in light of the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the case, the skill required to prosecute the case, the experience and ability of the attorneys, awards in similar cases, the contingent nature of the representation and the result obtained for the Class.” Special App’x at 7. Further, the district court gave no explanation in response to plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration, merely stating that it had “reconsidered its order of March 30,2016, and, upon reconsideration, adheres to its prior holding.” Special App’x at 8.

We cannot assess whether this fee award is reasonable in the absence of any explanation by the district court. On remand, the district court must conduct a thorough analysis of the Goldberger factors, explain how it weighed the factors, and state the grounds on which it relied. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Stanger v. China Elec. Motor, Inc., 812 F.3d 734, 738-39, 2016 WL 191986, at *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 2016); Orchano v. Advanced Recovery, Inc., 107 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1997); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir.1989); Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir.1986). On remand, the district court may ñnd it useful to conduct a hearing, although it is not required to do so.

Next, plaintiffs’ counsel requested $48,696.69 in unreimbursed expenses. The district court instead awarded $30,000.00, with no explanation for the disparity between the amount requested and awarded. With respect to costs in common fund cases, “[c]ounsel are entitled to reimbursement only for those expenses incurred in the course of work that benefitted the class.” In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 238 (2d Cir.1987). We cannot assess whether the cost award was reasonable without further explanation from, the district court. On remand, the district court should , permit plaintiffs’ counsel to submit additional financial records demonstrating how the $48,696.69 amount was derived, and explain why those expenses benefited the class. Further, the district court shall explain the basis for its award of costs, if the amount awarded is less than that requested by plaintiffs’ counsel.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is VACATED, and we REMAND for reconsideration of the fee and cost award. 
      
      . Defendants do not take a position on this appeal.