Case ID: ill-app_191/html/0496-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Gridley", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Theofila Galewski, Appellee, v. Clover Leaf Casualty Company, Appellant.
    Gen. No. 20,335.
    (Not to be reported in full.)
    Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. David T. Smiuey, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1914.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Opinion filed February 24, 1915.
    Statement of the Case.
    Action by Theofila Galewski against Clover Leaf Casualty Company upon an accident insurance policy. From a judgment against defendant for one thousand dollars in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
    The insured died on October 21, 1912, and the suit was commenced on February 18, 1913. Paragraph “A” of the policy, entitled “Specific Losses,” was in part as follows:
    “If any of the following specific disabilities shall result solely from such injuries, within 60 days from date of accident, the Association will pay in lieu of all other indemnities under this policy.
    For Loss of Life....................Principal Sum, For Loss of Both Hands by Severance at or above the wrist.............'----Principal Sum, * * * ##### For Loss of Entire Sight of One Eye, if irrecoverably lost................1/5 Principal Sum.
    Abstract of the Decision.
    1. Insurance, § 110
      
      —effect of insurer’s failure to pay instalment accrued. In an action on an accident insurance policy, the failure or refusal of the insurer to pay the first instalment when it becomes due does not necessarily cause the entire principal sum to accrue.
    2. Insurance, § 502*—when policy not payable in lump sum. Accident policy construed as providing for payment of principal sum, in case of death due to certain causes, in monthly instalments and not in a lump sum.
    3. Insurance, § 667*—evidence insufficient to show death by accidental means. Where it appeared that the insured was driving in a buggy which was struck by a street car, the buggy apparently not being damaged nor the insured injured, and the insured subsequently drove away in the buggy, and after he had worked several days a physician was called who found him unconscious, the patient dying shortly thereafter, and the coroner’s verdict introduced in evidence stated he died from septic meningitis, by extension from septic otitis media, following injuries when his buggy was struck by a street car, the testimony conflicting as to whether his death was the result in whole or in part from the injuries claimed to be due to the collision, held that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict on the theory that the insured’s death was caused through external, violent and accidental means.
    
      The payment of all amounts for specific disability in Paragraph ‘A’ shall be made to the insured or to his Beneficiary, if surviving, or in the event of her prior death, to the legal heirs of the insured in installments of Twenty-five Dollars on the first day of each month until the full disability claim is paid, * * *”
    The words “such injuries,” as used in paragraph “A”, apparently had reference to the preceding paragraph of the policy where it appeared that the insurance was “against Bodily Injuries, effected directly and independently of all other causes and solely through external, violent and accidental means (suicide whether sane or insane is not covered).”
    Bradley, Harper & Eheim, for appellant; Samuel A. Harper, of counsel.
    S. P. Douthart and Fred C. Smith, for appellees; Guerin & Barrett, of counsel.
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
    
      
      See Illinois Notes Digest, Yols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
    
   Mr. Justice Gridley

delivered the opinion of the court.

4. Pusadotg, § 200 —operation of demurrer to admit facts only well pleaded. Where an accident insurance policy was set out in the declaration in haee verha, and from such policy it appeared that only a portion of the amount claimed could be due under its terms, a demurrer will not admit the amount claimed as a fact, since it does not appear to be a fact on the whole record, apart from the rule that a demurrer does not admit the amount claimed in the declaration.