Case ID: cal-app-3d_164/html/Supp. 1-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "REESE, P. J. SHABO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles
    [Crim. A. No. 20836.
    Dec. 21, 1984.]
    THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. B & I NEWS, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents.
    [And ten other cases.]
    
    
      Counsel
    Gary R. Netzer, Acting City Attorney, and Jack L. Brown, Deputy City Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
    
      Brown, Weston & Samo, B. Randall Garrou, Abelson & Brunon, Jeffrey J. Douglas, Elliot J. Abelson, Hecht, Diamond & Greenfield, Roger Jon Diamond and W. Michael May cock for Defendants and Respondents.
    
      
      
        People v. NFM Corporation (Crim. A. No. 20837); People v. Demott (Crim. A. No. 20838); People v. Marler (Crim. A. No. 20839); People v. Louis (Crim. A. No. 20840); People v. Footlik (Crim. A. No. 20841); People v. Whitehead (Crim. A. No. 20842); People v. Wyszomirski (Crim. A. No. 20843); People v. Blank (Crim. A. No. 20844); People v. Parr (Crim. A. No. 20845); People v. Shoreboggs (Crim. A. No. 20846).
    
   Opinion

REESE, P. J.

On May 4, 1982, misdemeanor complaints were filed against the defendants alleging a violation of section 103.101(i) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which offense was alleged to have occurred on March 15, 1982. Following a hearing the court sustained defendants’ demurrers in which the constitutionality of the ordinance was challenged. The People have appealed.

Section 103.101(i) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code provides: “Visibility of Interior. The permittee shall not maintain any picture arcade unless the entire interior of such premises wherein the pictures are viewed is visible upon entering into such premises. No partially or fully enclosed booths or partially or fully concealed booths shall be maintained.” The trial court sustained the demurrers based upon three grounds: (1) that the ordinance affects an individual’s right to privacy in that a person is foreclosed from viewing sexually explicit movies in the privacy of an enclosed booth and, in addition, no rational basis exists for regulating masturbation in the privacy of an enclosed booth since such conduct is no longer illegal; (2) that the economic impact of the ordinance will be to reduce the number of booths that a given location could operate to an unconstitutional degree; and (3) that the words of the ordinance were vague in that it was uncertain what type of a booth and what place for the booths is required by the ordinance.

On appeal the prosecution contends that the ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of the police power to regulate the interior visibility of arcade booths and that the possibility of some adverse impact upon the economic operation of an arcade or upon the right of privacy does not foreclose exercise of the police power in the manner attempted under section 103.101 (i); and that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague. We agree.

In DeMott v. Board of Police Commissioners (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 296 [175 Cal.Rptr. 879], and EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 179, 188 [158 Cal.Rptr. 579], the Courts of Appeal upheld on First Amendment challenges section 103.101(i) as a content-neutral reasonable regulation of the time, place and manner of protected speech. In EWAP, supra, the court observed that the regulation was sufficiently justified if it was within the constitutional power of the state, if it furthered an important or substantial governmental interest, if the governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms was no greater than was essential to the furtherance of that interest. The court held: “The prohibition of enclosed or concealed booths in picture arcades easily passes this test. The city has the constitutional power to reasonably regulate and license arcades for purposes of health, safety and public welfare.” (Id., at p. 189.) The court further observed: “The city has a substantial interest in preventing the kind of dangerous or unlawful conduct, as well as the health and safety problems, which may be anticipated in a picture arcade where the booths are concealed or enclosed. The prohibition of such booths furthers the city’s interest in deterring and detecting the use of the premises for such unlawful activity.

“That governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and the requirement that the interior of the booths be visible does not restrict First Amendment freedoms. There is no restriction on either the content of the pictures or their dissemination.” (EWAP, supra, at p. 190.) Thus the court held that the ordinance constituted a reasonable exercise of the city’s police power. (Ibid.) In DeMott, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 296, while recognizing that operation of a motion picture arcade is an activity protected by the First Amendment, the Court of Appeal stated: “No restriction is imposed upon access to the arcade, nor the content of the film. The ordinance merely requires conformity to its provisions for a visible interi- or.” (Id., at p. 302.) Since EWAP had already approved the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the police power, the court in DeMott held that the ordinance as applied to respondents’ business was unobjectionable.

The court further observed: “Even if respondents are engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment, they are not ‘immune to regulations which do not impair his exercise of his constitutionally protected rights [citation].’ (People v. Perinne, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d 252, 257 [120 Cal.Rptr. 640].)” (Ibid.)

Relying on Weaver v. Jordan (1966) 64 Cal.2d 235 [49 Cal.Rptr. 537, 411 P.2d 289], in which the California Supreme Court invalidated a law enacted by referendum prohibiting pay television on the basis that the state and federal constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press protected the means for their expression, defendants urge that the ordinance “enacts a medium ban without the requisite establishment of a ‘clear and present danger.’ ” They argue that the ordinance’s requirement of visibility from a single entrance to such premises eliminates the availability of many film titles to the viewing audience by reducing the number of display machines, makes arcades “economically infeasible, thus directly impairing distribution of materials protected by the First Amendment” because of the necessity of installing fewer arcades with fewer titles and because “far fewer persons will patronize arcades if the privacy of the customers is made illegal.” Defendants argue that not only is there absent a compelling state interest but that the ordinance furthers no “important or substantial governmental interest.” In this connection, relying upon Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636], they argue that no lewd or offensive conduct could occur in enclosed booths because “there could be no one to be oifended.” We deem these arguments to be foreclosed by the decisions in EWAP, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 179 and DeMott, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 296 which are binding upon us. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) We farther note that the ordinance on its face does not ban movie arcades. Thus, Jordan, supra, 64 Cal.2d 235, does not require us to disregard as binding EWAP or DeMott. Finally, on its face the ordinance does not require the use of fewer display machines, limit the number of persons viewing the films, nor reduce the number of film titles that may be shown.

Defendants claim that the development of a factual record in the case at bench distinguishes the present case from the Court of Appeal decision in EWAP, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 179. Defendants overlook the well-established rule that a demurrer lies to challenge only the pleadings on their face; evidentiary matters are therefore not properly presented in support of, or in opposition to, a demurrer. (People v. Williams (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 382, 387-388, 391 [158 Cal.Rptr. 778].) Accordingly, the trial court erred in considering the evidentiary showing made by the defendants and the People in ruling upon the demurrer, which presented only an issue of law. (Id., at p. 391.)

At. oral argument defendants urged us to construe their demurrer as a motion to dismiss and to consider the evidence presented below as supportive of such motion; the People did not stipulate that their appeal be determined on this basis. In the absence of a stipulation, we believe that it would be inappropriate to regard the order appealed from as one granting a motion to dismiss.

Defendants also urge that to be valid under the First Amendment the incidental restriction on free expression must be no greater than that essential to further the important or substantial governmental interest and that the ordinance fails to satisfy this requirement. On this point they urge that the point of visibility need not be at the entrance of the arcade but could be established from any aisle space, or in the center of the room, thereby apparently making many more viewing machines available; they further urge that the purported need for visibility conflicts with the use of multiple viewing rooms on the same or different floors so that an arcade could maximize the number of titles available to the viewing public in the available space, and that visibility could be maintained by means of a surveillance system of mirrors or cameras which would reveal the interior of booths without exposing customers to the unwanted scrutiny of other customers or passersby.

We question whether such alternative procedures would be any less intrusive than that which the city council chose. In any event, these contentions are properly addressed, not to this court, but to the city council which enacted the ordinance in question. Under the police power a municipality may impose regulations upon the construction and maintenance of business premises reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety and general welfare of the business’ patrons and other members of the public. “Every presumption favors the reasonableness of a legislative enactment.” (Brix v. City of San Rafael (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 47, 50 [154 Cal.Rptr. 647].) Courts should not set aside or disregard the legislative body’s determination of a need for the exercise of a police power regulation and the type of regulation necessary to meet the need “ ‘unless the legislative decision is clearly and palpably wrong and the error appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice.’” (Antonello v. City of San Diego (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 161, 167 [93 Cal.Rptr. 820]; see also Brix v. City of San Rafael, supra, at pp. 50-51.)

Unlike section 103.101(g), prohibiting the showing of pictures between 2 a.m. and 9 a.m., held by our Supreme Court to be violative of the free speech provisions of the federal and state Constitutions (People v. Glaze (1980) 27 Cal.3d 841 [166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291]), the ordinance before us does not prevent customers and others from exercising the right to view motion pictures in arcades and thus does not involve even the incidental infringement of First Amendment rights. That the ordinance may impose an economic burden upon arcade operators, as defendants argue, does not in itself constitute a basis for finding First Amendment invalidity. (Antonello v. City of San Diego, supra, at p. 167.) Furthermore, defendants have not shown that the means selected were “palpably erroneous” nor the ordinance’s long-term impact, if any, upon those who may wish to view the films. (Cf. People v. Glaze, supra, at p. 847.) Finally, even assuming arguendo that the ordinance does incidentally infringe First Amendment rights, we hold that the ordinance meets the constitutional criteria applicable to regulation of commercial speech: The ordinance implements a substantial governmental interest in deterring offensive and potentially criminal conduct, directly advances that interest, and reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the government’s objectives. (Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490, 507 [69 L.Ed.2d 800, 815, 101 S.Ct. 2882].)

Defendants assert that People v. Glaze, supra, 27 Cal.3d 841, EWAP, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d 179, DeMott, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 296, and People v. Adult World Book Store (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 404 [166 Cal.Rptr. 519] are not controlling because the ordinance violates the California right of privacy under article I, section 1 of the state Constitution. They argue that if under Pryor v. Municipal Court, supra, 25 Cal.3d 238, a person cannot be prosecuted for conduct which is not offensive to another, then one may with impunity engage in such conduct in an enclosed movie arcade booth and that the government “may not prevent the right from being exercised by prohibiting businesses from establishing and providing enclosed booths for this purpose.” None of the authorities which have thus far construed the privacy protection of article I, section 1 has suggested that government may not in the exercise of its police power protect public health and safety by regulating the time, place, and manner of specified conduct. Indeed, the contrary appears true. In People v. Privitera (1979) 23 Cal.3d 697 [153 Cal.Rptr. 431, 591 P.2d 919, 5 A.L.R.4th 178], the California Supreme Court held that, despite the claim of privacy under the California Constitution, a person may not prescribe laetrile as a cure for cancer. In People v. Davis (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 250, 260 [154 Cal.Rptr. 817], the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s argument that the state constitutional right of privacy immunized him from criminal prosecution for his use of cocaine. Both cases relied upon White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222], which had concluded that the state constitutional right in question was designed primarily to guard against unnecessary governmental surveillance and collection of records. (But see City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130, fn. 3 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219].) This predominant purpose is not affected by recognizing the legitimate exercise of the police power as manifested in Los Angeles Municipal Code section 103.101 (i). Carried to its logical extreme, defendants’ argument would leave little room for governmental regulation of individual conduct in the exercise of the police power. We do not believe that the voters in enacting article I, section 1 intended such a drastic result.

Finally, contrary to defendants’ argument, it does not follow from Pryor’s immunity from criminal prosecution of those who engage privately in otherwise prosecutable conduct that government is impotent to impede or prevent such conduct from occurring on business premises operated pursuant to permit. Indeed, a legitimate purpose underlying enactment of section 103.101 (i) was to protect the peace, welfare and privacy of persons viewing motion pictures in adult motion picture arcades by deterring the offensive, dangerous or inflammatory conduct of others. (See EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 189-190.) Thus, defendants cannot avail themselves of the right of privacy in their attempt to invalidate the ordinance. (See Ellwest Stereo Theaters, Inc. v. Wenner (9th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1243; cf. People v. Privitera, supra, 23 Cal.3d 697; People v. Davis, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 250.) As the Court of Appeal noted in People v. Adult World Book Store, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 404, 410: “Not everyone who enters a dirty bookstore (fn.) (euphemistically adjectived ‘adult’), expects to be molested, propositioned, or subjected to an open view of live homosexual acts of others. Indeed, in entering such a store, a member of the public exercises his or her own right of privacy and the First Amendment right to see, read, and observe on film sexually explicit, even sordid activities. This is what the store purports to offer. To attribute to each incoming customer the concurrent expectation inter alia that he or she will be solicited to perform sexual acts . . . would have a chilling effect upon such fundamental rights. It follows that those who perform sexual acts within view of neutral customers of the stores, or who expose themselves to them or solicit them to perform or participate in sexual activity, undeniably do so in a place open to the public with the reasonable expectation that the customers (at least certain of them) are likely to be offended. (Fn. omitted.)”

Defendants argue that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. Whenever possible courts are to uphold the constitutionality of statutes (In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942 [83 Cal.Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142]), and are to give statutes a commonsense interpretation. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) As we have noted, the intent of the city council in enacting section 103.101 (i) was to prohibit the enclosure of booths so as to discourage violations of law and to protect patrons of movie arcade establishments from offensive, dangerous, and unlawful conduct. (See EWAP, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 191; DeMott v. Board of Police Commissioners, supra, at p. 301.) To this end the section establishes two requirements: First, that the interior of the booth used for viewing must be open to view so that the occupant’s conduct while watching the film can be observed; second, that the entire interior of the premises be visible from its entrance. It is well established that precision of regulation must be the touchstone in determining the constitutionality of ordinances which affect First Amendment rights. (Interstate Circuit v. Dallas (1968) 390 U.S. 676, 682 [20 L.Ed.2d 225, 231, 88 S.Ct. 1298]; N. A. A. C. P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 421, 83 S.Ct. 328]; People v. Glaze, supra, 27 Cal.3d 841-849; Burton v. Municipal Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 684, 690-691 [68 Cal.Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281].) Judged by this standard, we conclude that the section in question provides precise standards capable of objective measurement and that the ordinance gives fair notice as to the conduct required and prohibited. (Cf. Winters v. New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507, 515-516 [92 L.Ed.2d 840, 849-850, 68 S.Ct. 665]; Welton v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 18 Cal.3d 497, 504-505 [134 Cal.Rptr. 668, 556 P.2d 1119]; In re Kay, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 941-947.) For this reason defendants’ argument that the ordinance is capable of arbitrary or capricious enforcement is without merit. (Cf. Burton v. Municipal Court, supra.)

Defendants’ contention that the ordinance is preempted by state law is likewise without merit. The statute does not create a new standard of sexual conduct nor does it purport to criminalize sexual activity which is not criminal under state law. (EWAP, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at p. 191.) Nothing in Brix v. City of San Rafael, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d 47 nor People v. Glaze, supra, 27 Cal.3d 84 prohibits the city council from enforcing by criminal sanctions the licensing provisions with respect to motion picture arcades. As indicated, nothing in the statutory scheme of which section 103.101(i) is a part, creates new violations for sexual conduct not criminal under state law or any new standard for sexual conduct. (EWAP, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra.)

The order of dismissal is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrers and to proceed according to law.

Cooperman, J., concurred.

SHABO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

Although I am in general accord with the majority’s disposition with regard to the issues of freedom of speech and statutory vagueness, I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s holding that Los Angeles Municipal Code section 103.101 (i) does not violate article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.

Article I, section 1 provides: “All people are by nature free and independent, and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” In White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222] and in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219] the California Supreme Court broadly interpreted the language of article I, section 1 consistent with the provision’s underlying purpose of protecting “ ‘an enormously broad and diverse field of personal action and belief.’” (27 Cal.3d at p. 129; 13 Cal.3d at pp. 773-774.) Although in White, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757, the court noted that the focus of the privacy concern expressed in article I, section 1 related to “the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society . . . [and that t]he new provision’s primary purpose is to afford individuals some measure of protection against this modern threat to personal privacy,” in Adamson the court invalidated on right of privacy grounds a zoning ordinance which had nothing at all to do with surveillance and data collection. In reaching its result the Adamson court quoted the following from White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757: “The court in White v. Davis quoted these words from ‘a statement drafted by the proponents of the provision [that added “privacy” to the California Constitution] and included in the state’s election brochure’ (13 Cal.3d at pp. 774-775): ‘ “The right of privacy is a right to be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we choose . . . . [f] The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when there is a compelling public need ....’” (Italics added.)” (27 Cal.3d at p. 130.)

The court in both White and Adamson, based upon ballot arguments in favor of adoption of article I, section 1, held that an incursion into the right of privacy “must be justified by a compelling interest.” (27 Cal.3d at p. 131; 13 Cal.3d at p. 775.) In light of the expansive interpretation afforded article I, section 1 by the California Supreme Court and that court’s insistence that a compelling interest be established in order to justify any incursion into the right of privacy, one must inquire what the interest of the City of Los Angeles is in requiring that movie arcade booths not be “partially or fully enclosed” nor “partially or fully concealed” and that the interior of arcade premises be “visible upon entering into such premises.” At the hearing on the demurrer the prosecution argued that the ordinance served the following purposes: First, the ordinance discouraged violations of state law, including masturbation, theft and assaults; second, the ordinance facilitated “ready ingress and egress” in case of emergency; third, the ordinance deterred conduct which, though not criminal, “certainly remains offensive and certainly may be offensive to other patrons . . .”; and fourth, the ordinance prevented a sanitary problem. In light of the fundamental nature of the right of privacy as broadly defined by our Supreme Court, I do not believe that any of these interests may properly be described as “compelling” in light of the ordinance’s obvious impact upon the privacy right of arcade patrons. In my view, the city’s legitimate concerns may properly be addressed through specific enforcement of the law against public masturbation and indecent exposure (Pen. Code, §§ 314, 647, subd. (a)) as well as the other penal laws designed to prevent theft, assaults and like crimes which may occur in enclosed arcade booths or arcade premises; the city’s safety interests can be better protected by providing building code requirements designed to ensure ready ingress and egress from arcade premises in case of emergency; the sanitary problem can be remedied by requiring management, as a condition of its license to operate motion picture arcades, to keep arcade booths in a clean and sanitary condition. Indeed, the city has not contended otherwise.

On this point I find persuasive the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Glaze (1980) 27 Cal.3d 841 [166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291]. In that case the court invalidated another subsection of the ordinance before this court which required the closing of movie arcades between 2 a.m. and 9 a.m. and prohibited customers and other visitors from being present during those hours even if the movie arcade machines were not being operated. The court held that the subsection involved more than the incidental infringement of freedom of expression and could be upheld only if the city were able to prove that the ordinance was “narrowly drawn and necessary to a legitimate governmental interest.” (27 Cal.3d at pp. 846-847.) As in the instant case, the city contended that the closing of picture arcades between the hours specified was a constitutional exercise of the city’s police powers because “the closing helps prevent masturbation during those hours when law enforcement problems are greatest.” The court rejected this argument and noted that, although this governmental purpose may be laudable, the means selected for its accomplishment “fail to meet the strict standards required by the Constitution. Rather than dealing directly with the objectionable conduct, the ordinance curtails the protected interests of persons engaged in First Amendment activity .... Arguably, crime in the streets could be reduced by prohibiting all persons from going out in public. However, when fundamental liberties are at stake, the test in a free society is whether there are ‘less drastic means’ available to accomplish the government’s purpose.” (Id., at p. 847.)

The court noted that the government may deal directly with persons who violate Penal Code section 647, subdivision (a) and observed that the city had conceded that this alternative would be less restrictive of First Amendment rights but argued that the closing-hours requirement was “necessary because of the limited number of police available during the early morning hours.” The court rejected that argument. Noting that the record failed to show “either that the criminal activity is particularly acute at picture arcades or that it is prevalent between the hours of 2 a.m. and 9 a.m., the court declared: “If merely stating a laudable purpose were sufficient to justify a restriction on free expression, the government could justify closing picture arcades or other establishments at any hour of the day . . . .” (Id., at p. 848.) The court emphasized that the government could establish valid alternatives to accomplish its purpose directly, including the requirement that a licensed manager be present to supervise the premises. The court then stated: “In short the government has not shown that the closing-hours requirement is necessary or that it is the least restrictive means available to curb anticipated masturbation.” (Ibid.)

Holding that the closing-hours requirement of the subsection was over-broad, the court rejected the city’s assumption that because “masturbation has occurred at some picture arcades in the past, it is necessary to restrict the hours of all such businesses in the future. ” People v. Glaze, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 849.) (Italics in original.) The court noted that the ordinance “fails to regulate only those arcades that have been or are likely to be havens for masturbation” and that “no distinction is made for those picture arcades which provide a manager to supervise and patrol the premises or have well lighted booths open to public view. Such an undifferentiated approach is not sufficient to limit the right of free expression.” Finally, the court observed: “Even if the First Amendment activity which the government seeks to regulate is of little value, the regulation must be necessary and it must focus narrowly on the abuse sought to be remedied.” (Ibid.)

My reading of People v. Glaze, supra, leads me to conclude that, just as the closing-hours requirement deprived all persons of their right to exercise their First Amendment rights without sufficient justification, so the subsection before us curtails every citizen’s right of privacy in exercising their First Amendment right to view motion pictures exhibited in motion picture arcades by means of an ordinance which fails to provide less drastic available means to accomplish the governmental purposes ostensibly underlying section 103.101 (i). By requiring patrons of arcades to be observable from the point of entry of the arcade and to require that patrons view such motion pictures in public, or not at all, the subsection not only chills the exercise of First Amendment rights but provides a means for surveillance and data collection which article I, section 1 was specifically intended to prevent. In view of the fundamental nature of the right at stake, I would hold that section 103.101(i) of the Los Angeles Municipal Code is overly broad and therefore impermissibly violates the right of privacy under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.

Petitions for a rehearing were denied January 8, 1985. Shabo, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should be granted. 
      
      In asserting the California constitutional right of privacy defendants correctly concede that the privacy protection of the United States Constitution is less broad. (See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130, fn. 3 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219]; People v. Privitera (1979) 23 Cal.3d 697, 702, fn. 2 [153 Cal.Rptr. 431, 591 P.2d 919, 5 A.L.R.4th 178].)
     
      
      In Privitera, supra, the Supreme Court applied a rational basis test in resolving the privacy versus police power issue before it. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court applied the same test in resolving privacy claims under the federal Constitution and recognized the broad police powers of the states in the area of health and safety regulation. (23 Cal.3d at pp. 702-705.) We note, however, that in City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pages 130, 131, the court applied a compelling interest test in adjudicating the right of privacy claim of article I, section 1 claim before it. (See also White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 775.)