Case ID: f-appx_616/html/0223-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Richard Max FLEMING, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 13-17230.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Sept. 21, 2015.
    
    Sept. 28, 2015.
    Richard Max Fleming, M.D., Studio City, CA, pro se.
    Gregory William Addington, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Reno, NV, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: REINHARDT, LEAVY, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Richard Max Fleming, M.D., appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) seeking damages for the loss of his medical license as a result of his felony conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir.2010). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2013). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Fleming’s action because the ICCPR does not create enforceable obligations in federal courts. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir.2010) (concluding that the ICCPR “was ratified on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fleming’s motions for entry of default and for default judgment. The United States responded timely to Fleming’s complaint, and Fleming cannot “establish a claim or right to relief.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 55(d); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)-(2) (explaining that the United States must file a responsive pleading within 60 days of “being served with the summons and complaint”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a), (b); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir.1986) (setting forth the standard of review and factors for determining whether to enter default judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55).

We reject Fleming’s contention that the United States consented to the granting of his motion for . summary judgment and that the United States acted in bad faith.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

Fleming’s requests for default judgment and disciplinary action against defense counsel and defendant, set forth in his reply brief, are denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir, R. 36-3.