Case ID: so2d_467/html/1018-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BARKDULL, Judge. PER CURIAM. FERGUSON, Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UPPER KEYS CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, INC., a nonprofit Florida corporation, Appellant, v. MONROE COUNTY and City National Bank of Miami, as Trustee, Appellees.
    No. 84-293.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Jan. 8, 1985.
    Rehearing Denied April 30, 1985.
    Thomas G. Pelham and Deanna E. Boone, Tallahassee, Kay G. Finley, Sum-merland Key, for appellant.
    Lucien C. Proby, Jr., County Atty., and Sheri Smallwood, Asst. County Atty., Greenberg, Traurig, Askew, Hoffman, Li-poff, Rosen & Quentel and Alan S. Gold and Anthony J. O’Donnell, Jr., Miami, for appellees.
    Before BARKDULL, HUBBART and FERGUSON, JJ.
   BARKDULL, Judge.

Following our decision rendered in Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. v. Wedel, 341 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and upon the matter returning to the trial court, the parties reached an agreement as to certain limitations on the Planned Unit Development (PUD) referred to therein. Upon the agreement being implemented the proceedings, referred to in Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc., v. Wedel, supra., were voluntarily dismissed on August 27, 1980. Thereafter the property ultimately came into the possession of City National Bank, as trustee. It was then determined to make an application to alter the original PUD plans and such an application was made to the Monroe County Zoning Board for a deviation and an amended development order. At a hearing, the Zoning Board on October 23, 1982, adopted resolution number 006-1982 which determined that the changes requested were not major changes under the Monroe County PUD and recommended that the Board of County Commissioners find that the proposed 1982 amendment did not constitute a substantial deviation from the 1980 plan and recommended the adoption of the amended developmental order to such an effect.

Pursuant to the applicable local code an aggrieved party had 30 days to appeal this order of the zoning board to the Board of County Commissioners.

An appeal of the Zoning Board ruling was taken by Friends of the Everglades, Inc., on October 25, 1982. Later that same date the cause came on for hearing before the Board of County Commissioners for approval of the Zoning Board’s recommendation. Upon being informed of the pending appeal the Board noted in the record that it would not consider anything pertaining to whether there was a minor or major change in the PUD pending determination of Friends of the Everglades, Inc. appeal. Notwithstanding this, the Board approved the October 23rd amended development order. The appellant also filed a notice of appeal from the order of the Zoning Board within the 30 day period on November 22, 1982. A hearing on these appeals was conducted before the Monroe County Commission in late November, 1982. However, a written resolution affirming the action was not entered until January 7, 1983. Thereafter, within 30 days of this date the instant law suit was commenced in the trial court on January 27, 1983 alleging in counts I and III a direct action for declaratory and injunctive relief and in count II a right to a de novo hearing, or in the alternative certiorari review of the Board of County Commissioners’ order.

Both sides moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the developers and county’s motion and denied the plaintiff’s motion on the following grounds; first, that the resort to circuit court was untimely in that the 30 days began to run upon the oral pronouncement of affirmance and corresponding minute book entry of November 30th and second, that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action.

As to the first point, we reverse. This court has held in Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County v. Marks, 429 So.2d 793 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), construing the same section involved in this case, that the 30 days began to run from the recording of the “final written resolution” which occurred in the instant case January 7, 1983. As to the second point, this court in the earlier opinion, in Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc., v. Wedel, supra, found that the appellant has standing, initially, to contest the validity of the proposed PUD and certainly under the factual situation wherein they contend that the 1982 action of the Monroe County authorities is contrary to their settlement agreement of 1980, they have standing. Further the trial judge recognized under the third Renard test the association would have standing to urge any procedural invalidity. We find that they would also have standing under the second Renard test by the virtue of the peculiar circumstances relating to the settlement. However, they would have no right to test the “wisdom” of the Board’s action. Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla.1972); City of Miami v. Save Brickell Avenue, Inc., 426 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Save Brickell Avenue, Inc. v. City of Miami, 393 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

Therefore, for the reasons above stated, the final summary judgment under review be and the same is hereby reversed with directions to the trial court to require the plaintiff therein to determine whether it wishes to proceed under its allegations in count I and III of its complaint or to have certiorari review under its allegations of count II of the complaint.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

OPINION ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

The appellant has filed a Motion for Clarification and the appellee, City National Bank, as Trustee, joined by Monroe County, has filed a Motion for Rehearing and Clarification. We find no merit in either of these motions, except we do clarify our previous opinion to indicate that the appellant cannot attack the “wisdom” of the board’s action if its action is compatible with the previous settlement agreement and is not “unreasonable”.

FERGUSON, Judge

(concurring specially to denial of rehearing).

I write separately to expand upon the clarification of the original opinion and the question of standing under chapter 380, Florida Statutes (1983). The appellant, UKCA, relies upon the test for standing in zoning cases enunciated in Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla.1972). Specifically, UKCA argues that (1) it has standing to enforce the requirements of chapter 380 and the Monroe County Code under the first prong of the Renard test, and (2) it has standing to challenge violations of the procedural requirements of chapter 380 under the third prong of the Renard test. It does not contend that it has any standing under the second prong of the Renard test.

UKCA has no standing under chapter 380 to enforce the requirements of that chapter or to challenge any violations of the procedural requirements of that chapter. Under the provisions of section 380.-07(2), those with standing to challenge a local government development order are the landowner, the developer, an appropriate regional planning agency under certain circumstances, and the state land planning agency. An appeal must be taken, within 45 days after the order is rendered, to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC). Any decision issued by FLWAC is subject to judicial review pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1983). General Electric Credit Corp. of Georgia v. Metropolitan Dade County, 346 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

Several decisions of the district courts have held that no person or organization other than the four specifically named in section 380.07(2) have standing to appeal a development order issued under that chapter to FLWAC. See, e.g., Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Caloosa Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Board of County Commissioners, 429 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 438 So.2d 831 (Fla.1983). The Everglades court held, I think correctly, that chapter 380 does not replace traditional zoning and regulatory procedures where adjacent landowners or environmental groups may challenge the actions of local government, but merely imposes additional restraints on property use to meet broader concerns of the general public. Thus, aggrieved persons who are not specifically given standing under chapter 380 may not appeal an adverse development order issued under that chapter to FLWAC. Everglades, 456 So.2d at 908-09. The court recognized that:

[I]t is not the purpose of Chapter 380 to provide a forum for parties whose complaints focus on alleged detriment to activities they wish to conduct on adjoining land. “Regional impact” is concerned with matters affecting the public in general, not special interests of adjoining landowners.

Id. at 908 (quoting Suwannee River Area Council Boy Scouts of America v. State, Department of Community Affairs, 384 So.2d 1369, 1374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)).

UKCA attempts to avoid the implications of these decisions by relying on the three-pronged test for standing in zoning cases enunciated by the Florida Supreme Court in Renard. It contends that the foregoing decisions control only the right to appeal a development order to FLWAC, and that the Renard test governs the right to enforce the requirements of or challenge procedural violations of chapter 380 directly in circuit court. I disagree.

First, chapter 380 contemplates initial review only by FLWAC, and chapter 120 governs judicial review of FLWAC’s decision. The legislature clearly did not intend thát a challenge to a local government development order be made directly to the courts, or it would not have set up an elaborate administrative mechanism for review of such orders. Second, the legislature expressly described the parties with standing to appeal a development order to FLWAC. To engraft the Renard test for standing in zoning cases onto the specific standing scheme set up by chapter 380 would be inconsistent with the statutory intent. Cf. Citizens Growth Management Coalition of West Palm Beach, Inc. v. City of West Palm Beach, Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 207 (Fla.1984) (because legislature did not specifically address question of who has standing to enforce the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, §§ 163.3161-.3211, Fla.Stat. (1981), court finds applicable the Renard test for standing in zoning actions). The remedies available to a party adversely affected by a chapter 380 development order are to intervene in the administrative proceedings which follow a recommended development order, or to challenge a zoning decision or taking of property which forms a part of or is related to the development order, or to obtain any other relief permitted by law. Caloosa, 429 So.2d at 1264-65.

Next, because UKCA’s complaint in this case alleges some violations of zoning law at the local level, we must also decide whether UKCA has standing to challenge the alleged violations of zoning law under any prong of the Renard test. As a nonprofit citizens’ organization, UKCA clearly has standing under the third prong of Re-nard to challenge the enactment of a zoning ordinance on procedural grounds. See Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. v. Wedel, 341 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). UKCA does not, however, have standing under the first prong of the Renard test to enjoin the violation of an existing ordinance because it does not allege a special injury differing in kind and degree from that suffered by the general public. United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974). The fact that the cause of action is based in part on breach of a settlement agreement which purportedly resolved the land use controversy, in my view, creates no independent standing ground. The claim based on the prior settlement agreement should be pursued by a separate enforcement action. Finally, the law is clear, and appellant does not attempt to dispute, that UKCA has no standing under the second prong of Renard to challenge the wisdom of any zoning action. To the extent that the majority perceives the compatibility of the board’s action with the settlement agreement as an ingredient of standing under that prong, I disagree.

Insofar as we are upholding that portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on appellant’s claims under chapter 380 but reversing that part of the order which adversely disposes of appellant’s challenges to the zoning actions taken by the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners on procedural grounds, I concur in the denial of rehearing. 
      
      . Section 19 — 234(i) states:
      "Any change other than minor changes in the location of a structure and other minor details proposed for an approved PUD project shall be submitted and processed in the same manner as an original application for establishment of a PUD district. Minor changes involving the location of structures or similar details are permissible provided the general PUD project concept is not altered and such minor changes are reviewed and approved by the Zoning Board. If any minor changes are approved by the Zoning Board, such changes shall be indicated in writing and provided to the zoning official prior to any zoning or use clearance being issued which reflects such changes.”
     
      
      . Section 19-77(b) of the Monroe County Code provides:
      "Any person or persons claiming to be aggrieved on account of any ruling of the Zoning Board ... may appeal in writing to the Board of County Commissioners. Any such appeal must be filed within 30 days after the act or decision upon which any appeal is made and must specify the grounds thereof.”
     
      
      . An appeal of this order was attempted by Friends of the Everglades and Upper Keys to Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC). This appeal was dismissed and this dismissal came on for review before the 1st DCA and resulted in an opinion affirming the dismissal, which is found in Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, 456 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
      This opinion sets at rest the fact the Upper Keys had no right to appeal any alleged Chapter 380 FS violation to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, however, the opinion recognizes the right of a litigant to go into the circuit court pursuant to such rights which may flow from Section 21 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution (1968).
     
      
      .Zoning Department RESOLUTION NO. 007-1983
      Resolution affirming the decision of the zoning Board of Monroe County, Florida, and denying the request of the Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. to reverse the decision of the Zoning Board of Monroe County, Florida, approving an amended development order for an approved planned unit development (PUD) project known as Port Bougain-ville as requested by the City National Bank of Miami, as trustee.
      WHEREAS, the Zoning Board of Monroe Coun-' ty, Florida, on October 22-23, 1982, recommended to the County Commission of Monroe County the adoption of an amended Development Order on an approved Planned Unit Development (PUD) project known as Port Bougain-ville, on property described as:
      Port Bougainville — a resubdivision of "First Revised Plat of North Largo Yacht Club Plat No. 1,” as recorded in Plat Book 7, Page 21 and being further described as being a revised plat of “First Revised Plat of North Largo Yacht Club, Plat No. 1,” according to the plat thereof, as recorded in Plat Book 7, Page 14 and being located in Sections 31 and 32, Township 60 South, Range 40 East, Key Largo. and
      WHEREAS, the Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. having duly appealed said recommen-dátion to the Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, Florida, sitting as the Board of Appeals, and the Board having reviewed the transcript of the October 22-23, 1982 hearing, having considered the argument of all parties present wishing to speak on the matter, and all premises considered, now, therefore,
      BE IT RESOLVED BY THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA, sitting as the BOARD OF APPEALS, as follows:
      1. That the recommendation of the Zoning Board of Monroe County, Florida, on October 22-23, 1982 regarding approval of the request of the City National Bank of Miami, as Trustee, for an amended Development Order on an approved Planned Unit Development (PUD) project known as Port Bougainville, be and the same is hereby affirmed.
      2. That the Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. be and it is hereby denied a reversement (sic) of the decision of the Zoning Board of Monroe County, Florida approving the amended Major Development Order for Port Bougainville on the above described property.
      Passed and adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Monroe County, Florida, at a regular meeting of said Board held on the 7th day of January, A.D. 1983.
      BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF MONROE COUNTY, FLORIDA By/s/ Jerry Hernandez, Jr. Mayor/Chairman
     
      
      . In Renard v. Dade County, supra, at 838 the Supreme Court stated:
      "[7] Part (3) of the question certified deals with standing to attack a zoning ordinance which is void because not properly enacted, as where required notice was not given. Any affected resident, citizen or property owner of the governmental unit in question has standing to challenge such an ordinance."
     
      
      . The appellant is not entitled to standing under the first Renard test as the association cannot show special damage. See Renard v. Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla.1972).
     
      
      . In Renard, the supreme court delineated three separate categories of challenges to zoning ordinances and dictated the requirements for standing in each. In category 1 suits to enjoin a violation of an existing ordinance, one must allege and prove a “special injury" differing in kind from that suffered by other residents in the community. In category 2 suits to attack a zoning ordinance as arbitrary and unreasonable, one must have a “legally recognizable interest, which is adversely affected." Finally, to make a category 3 attack on a zoning ordinance as void because not enacted in accordance with proper procedures, one must be "[an] affected resident, citizen or property owner of the governmental unit in question.” Renard, 261 So.2d at 837-38.
      As to category 1 suits, a non-profit corporation will rarely meet the "special injury" requirements in order to enjoin zoning violations. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974). A citizens' group has no standing to challenge the substantive validity of a zoning ordinance in a category 2 suit. City of Miami v. Save Brickell Avenue, Inc., 426 So.2d 1100, 1103 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (dictum); Hemisphere Equity Realty Co. v. Key Biscayne Property Taxpayers Association, 369 So.2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Conversely, a citizens’ group does have standing to bring a category 3 suit to attack a zoning ordinance on the ground that it was illegally enacted due to the irregularity of the proceedings. Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. v. Wedel, 341 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). To differentiate further between category 2 and category 3 suits, this court has stated that a citizens’ association "may, in short, attack how the resolution was enacted, but not what was enacted.” [e.s.] Save Brickell Avenue, Inc. v. City of Miami, 395 So.2d 246, 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
     
      
      . Admittedly, the view that under chapter 380 standing in circuit court is limited to those enumerated in section 380.07(2) conflicts directly with the second district's holding in Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett Pines, 333 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), cert. dismissed, 352 So.2d 172 (Fla.1977) (person other than that named in section 380.07(2) has standing to enjoin violation of chapter 380 in circuit court where special injury satisfies first prong of Renard test).