Case ID: f-appx_543/html/0117-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jose Rafael Rios CRUZ, Miguel Castro, Alejandro Figueroa, Defendants Luis Armando Pena Soltren, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 12-4755-cr.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 27, 2013.
    Amended Dec. 2, 2013.
    James E. Neuman, Law Office of James E. Neuman, New York, NY, for Appellant.
    Ryan P. Poscablo (with Jennifer G. Rodgers on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, for Appellees.
    PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNIS JACOBS, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Luis Armando Peña Soltren appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on January 14, 2011, following his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit air piracy and kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964), 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1964), and 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964); interfering with flight crew members in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472(j) (1964); and kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

On November 24, 1968, Peña Soltren— then age 25 — was one of three men who hijacked Pan American Airways Flight 281, en route from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York to Puerto Rico. Using guns and knives to gain control of the plane, they forced the pilots to land in Havana.

Peña Soltren remained in Cuba for more than forty years. In October 2009, he returned to the United States, where he was arrested and prosecuted for the 1968 sky-jacking. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Peña Soltren pled guilty to the offenses detailed above.

This is Peña Soltren’s second sentencing appeal. He was sentenced originally to fifteen years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, we vacated the sentence and remanded for resen-tencing on the ground that the district court erred in imposing a sentence that excluded the possibility of parole, a benefit that was available with respect to crimes committed in 1968. See United States v. Rios Cruz, 481 Fed.Appx. 650, 652 (2d Cir.2012).

In remanding for resentencing de novo, we declined to reassign the case. We noted that “[c]ontrary to Peña Soltren’s assertion, Judge Hellerstein did not rely on any inappropriate factors in imposing sentence. On the contrary, the record shows that Judge Hellerstein fully considered Peña Soltren’s mitigating arguments in determining his sentence and made no error casting a shadow on the court’s impartiality.” Id.

On remand, Judge Hellerstein sentenced Peña Soltren to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with the possibility of parole after five years.

Peña Soltren’s present appeal argues that the district court’s sentence was substantively and procedurally unreasonable. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The appellate review standard of Booker and its progeny is inapplicable here, however, because Peña Soltren’s offenses predated the Sentencing Guidelines. In a pre-Guidelines case, the sentencing court has “ ‘wide discretion in imposing sentence, and, ... if a sentence is within the permissible statutory limits and it does not appear that the court took into account any improper factor, the sentence may not be reviewed on appeal.’ ” United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1306 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.1987)). “In deciding what sentence to impose, ‘a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.’ ” McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915, 918 (2d Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)). A pre-Guidelines sentence will be “vacated ... if it is ‘founded at least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.’ ” Id. (quoting Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S.Ct. 589).

Like the district court, we are sensitive to Peña Soltren’s difficult personal history, both before and after his crime. There seems to be no reason to question his genuine remorse and his otherwise unblemished record of service to family and community. But we find no error — much less one of constitutional magnitude — in the district court’s sentencing. The record demonstrates that Judge Hellerstein carefully and seriously reflected on a wide range of relevant and permissible factors before imposing a sentence within the applicable statutory range. The judge’s lengthy discussion of appellant’s character and the nature of his crime leaves no doubt that Peña Soltren’s fate “caused [Judge Hellerstein] to do a lot of thinking and lose a lot of sleep.” Tr. of Second Sentencing Hrg., App’x 47. As in Peña Soltren’s prior appeal, the record demonstrates that “Judge Hellerstein fully considered Peña Soltren’s mitigating arguments in determining his sentence and made no error casting a shadow on the court’s impartiality.” Rios Cruz, 481 Fed.Appx. at 650.

Our review of this pre-Guidelines sentence is narrowly circumscribed. “Because it does not appear that the district court took into account any impermissible factor and because [Peña Soltren] was sentenced within the statutory maximum, we may not review the sentence.” United States v. Vogel, 54 F.3d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED.