Case ID: f-appx_460/html/0649-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Janice M. OHMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE, a Municipal Corporation; Israel Claustro, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-55231.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Nov. 10, 2011.
    Filed Nov. 30, 2011.
    Erikson M. Davis, Law Offices of Erik-son M. Davis, Los Angeles, CA, Leo James Terrell, Law Office Of Leo James Terrell, Beverly Hills, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Shannon Lin Gustafson, Norman J. Watkins, Esquire, Lynberg and Watkins A Professional Corporation, Orange, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SCHROEDER and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and HUDSON, District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Henry E. Hudson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Janice Ohman appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the County of Orange and Deputy District Attorney Israel Claustro in his individual capacity. She has not pursued an appeal from the district court’s order dismissing Ohman’s claim against the County.

Ohman’s claim is based upon Claustro’s conduct in prosecuting a case against her. Ohman alleges that the state charged her with forgery, and supported its case using inadmissible evidence obtained illegally by the Tustin Police Department. State courts suppressed that evidence in 2008, then dismissed the charges. She further alleges that at some point after Claustro took over control of the prosecution, he instructed the Tustin Police Department not to find additional evidence to support forgery charges, reintroduced charges based on the original inadmissible evidence, and produced it in response to discovery requests, knowing it had been seized illegally. That second criminal action eventually was also terminated in Oh-man’s favor.

The district court dismissed the federal action on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. Ohman argues that Claustro was performing administrative or investigative functions by collecting and evaluating evidence, since prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for them advocacy functions, but not for investigative or administrative functions. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636-37 (9th Cir.2005). While a prosecutor who participates in obtaining evidence may be acting in an investigative capacity, see id. at 641, the complaint reflects that Claustro was not involved in investigative work, such as participating in the illegal search itself. Rather, the complaint reflects that Claustro was, at all relevant times, engaged in conduct related to his role as an advocate for the state. This included the filing of charges on the basis of evidence in the file, and responding to defense discovery requests. The challenged conduct is therefore subject to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecuting charges maliciously); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir.1984) (absolute immunity for evaluating “whether the prosecutor needs [certain] evidence to prosecute,” since that decision “goes to the heart of the advocate’s role”); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir.2003) (absolute immunity for prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in regulating flow of information to defense, including for “deliberate withholding of exculpatory information”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431-32, 96 S.Ct. 984).

It therefore makes no difference that Claustro allegedly knew the evidence had been suppressed previously and thus intended to prosecute on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.1986) (en banc) (“Intent should play no role in the immunity analysis.”).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.