Case ID: ohio-st-3d_65/html/0302-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Per Curiam.\n     Herbert R. Brown, J., Alice Robie Resnick, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker.
    [Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Baker (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 302.]
    
      (No. 92-1348 —
    Submitted October 21, 1992 —
    Decided December 14, 1992.)
    
      
      J. Warren Bettis, Disciplinary Counsel, and Harald F. Craig III, for relator.
    
      Gerald S. Gold and Robert A. Ranallo, for respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This court concurs with the board that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(6). We also agree that respondent willfully failed to file his 1987 tax return and that our precedent in such cases requires a one-year suspension from the practice of law. Further, the testimony offered in mitigation is insufficient to warrant a lesser sanction, particularly when the record shows that respondent’s disability ended with his return to work in 1987. Accordingly, we order that respondent be suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for a period of one year. Costs taxed to respondent.

Judgment accordingly.

Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Holmes and Wright, JJ., concur.

Douglas, H. Brown and Resnick, JJ., separately dissent.

Herbert R. Brown, J.,

dissenting. I would suspend respondent from the practice of law for a period of six months.

Alice Robie Resnick, J.,

dissenting. I have no disagreement with the findings of fact or conclusions of law reached in this case. Rather, my disagreement is over this court’s decision to adopt the board’s recommended sanction of a one-year suspension. I would instead adopt the recommendation of the panel that respondent be publicly reprimanded. The panel considered all relevant mitigating factors and reached the appropriate conclusion. Specifically, the panel recognized that respondent’s medical and psychological illnesses placed him under an enormous strain during the time in question, and that those illnesses directly prevented him from filing tax returns.

I find the majority’s reliance on precedent in its resolution of this, a disciplinary case, to be inappropriate. I particularly cannot agree with the majority that our precedent “requires” a one-year suspension. It has been our practice in disciplinary cases not to be bound by our previous decisions, but instead to resolve each on a case-by-case basis. Because I believe the mitigating factors present here warrant a public reprimand, I respectfully dissent.

Douglas, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.