Case ID: f-appx_457/html/0659-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert L. HAYNES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. R.W. SELBY CO. INC.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-55533.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Oct. 25, 2011.
    
    Filed Nov. 2, 2011.
    Robert L. Haynes, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.
    
      Jeffrey N. Garland, Esquire, Kimball, Tirey & St. John, San Diego, CA, Eli A. Gordon, Esquire, Karl Patrick Schlecht, Kimball Tirey & St. John, Irvine, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: TROTT, GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. 
        See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Robert L. Haynes appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging violations of the Fan* Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-8619. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haynes’s disparate treatment claim because Haynes failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for increasing his rent and evicting him were pretextual. See id. at 305.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Haynes’s request for further opportunity to conduct discovery. See Qualls By and Through Qualls v. Blue Cross of Cal., Inc., 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.1994) (“We will only find that the district court abused its discretion if the mov-ant diligently pursued its previous discovery opportunities, and if the movant can show how allowing additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Haynes’s motion for default judgment after Haynes failed to follow the proper two-step process required under Fed.R.Civ.P. 55. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.1986) (setting forth standard of review).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).

Haynes’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.