Case ID: ny-st-rep_43/html/0609-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Herrick, J.—This", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Almon H. Mussen, App’lt, v. The Ausable Granite Works, Impl’d, Resp’t.
    
      (Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
    
    
      Filed March 15, 1892.)
    
    Tenue—Constitutional law—Laws 1882, chap. 410, § 1103.
    Section 1103 of chap. 410," Laws 1882, providing that the supreme court in the first judicial district, the court of common pleas and the superior -court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of actions to which the city of New York is a party defendant, is unconstitutional so far as it confines the trial -of such actions to the county of New York and prevents the supreme court ■from exercising its power to change the place of trial. A suitor has the right to firing such action in the supreme court in any part of the state.
    Appeal from judgment and order sustaining demurrer to the complaint,
    
      A. W. Boynton, for app’lt; Corbin & Rowe (F. A. Rowe, of «counsel), forresp't.
   Herrick, J.—This

plaintiff and appellant brings this action to enforce a lien given by chap. 315 of the Laws of 1878 against ■certain funds in the treasury of the city of Hew York alleged to be due and belonging to the defendant and respondent, the Au-■sable Granite Works. The city of Hew York is made a party defendant, and is served with a summons and notice of the object •of the action. The venue of the action is laid in Essex county, in the fourth judicial district. The respondent, “The Ausable Granite Works,” demurred to the complaint, on the grounds that the supreme court in the fourth judicial district has no jurisdiction in this . action ; that the supreme court in the first judicial •district, the court of common pleas and the superior court in and for the city and county of Hew York have exclusive jurisdiction •of this action, and that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

The demurrer was sustained in the court below,, tin the ground that the supreme court has no jurisdiction.

The demurrer as to jurisdiction, and the decision in the court below, are based on § 1103, chap. 410, Laws of 1882, reading as follows: “ The supreme court in the first judicial district, the court of common pleas and the superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all actions or special proceedings where the- ’ mayor, aldermen and commonalty thereof are made a party defendant.”

The constitution, art 6, § 6, provides that “ There shall be the existing supreme court with general jurisdiction in law and equity.”

That is a provision as to the supreme court as a whole.

• Its jurisdiction is as wide as the boundaries of the state, and! every person, natural or artificial, within such boundaries is subject to that jurisdiction.

For convenience in the transaction of business the state has. been divided up into districts, but the court in each district is the-supreme court of the state, and each has the same power, no more- or less than the other; it is the power and jurisdiction of the supreme court, not the supreme court of the first judicial district, or the fourth judicial district, but the supreme court of the state.

The jurisdiction is given to each and every part of the supreme 'court, each possessing all the power granted to the court, and to confine jurisdiction in certain classes of cases to one part of the court is to deprive the rest of the court of its jurisdiction, or to> limit or to qualify it. The jurisdiction is general, unlimited and unqualified, and the legislature has no power to limit or qualify it. People v. Supervisors, 49 Hun, 481; 18 St. Rep., 898; People v. Nichols, 79 N. Y., 582. And any act of the legislature which deprives the court of the jurisdiction it had at the time of the adoption of the constitution, or limit or qualify it, is unconstitutional and void. Alexander v. Bennett, 60 N. Y., 204; Brooklyn v. New York, 25 Hun, 612; Popfinger v. Yutte, 102 N. Y., 42; 1 St. Rep., 34; Hutkoff v. Demorest, 103N. Y., 380; 3 St. Rep., 631. If the act in question is valid, the supreme court in each district,, or county, can be given exclusive jurisdiction in cases where the* defendant is a resident of • such district or county; if exclusive jurisdiction can be given in one class of cases it can in any, and. thus fhe court stripped largely of the powers heretofore exercised by it, and made a court of limited and special, instead of general jurisdiction.

The suitor also has rights under this section of the constitution,, that cannot be taken away from him.

He has a right to go in the supreme court anywhere for relief. To apply to the court, not to a particular member or territorial division of it. He cannot by legislative enactment be compelled to go before a particular member of it, or to a specific, county, although the court in the exercise of its power may in furtherance of justice subsequently send him there; but he has a. Tight to apply to it for relief wherever within the limit of the state he finds it exercising its functions.

Yet if this law is upheld there is nothing to prevent the legislature to compel any resident of the state, no matter where he lives,, "if he seeks relief against a resident of New York city, because of some transaction that took place upon the St. Lawrence, to go to the first judicial district in the county of New York for it, for if they can compel suits against a corporation located in the first judicial district to be brought there, they can also compel suits .against natural persons.

If the act in question is to be regarded simply as fixing the -venue in the kind of actions in question, it is open to the same •objection. The term “jurisdiction,” as used in the constitution, I think, means “jurisdiction ” of every kind that a court can possess,of the person, subject matter, territorial, and generally the power of the court in the discharge of its judicial duties. Among the ■powers that have been exercised by courts of general jurisdiction from time immemorial has been the power to change the place of trial of an action not involving real property, in furtherance of .justice.

It was one of the powers exercised by the then existing supreme •court at the time of the adoption of § 6, article 6 of the constitution.

The statute in question strips the court of that power, it confines the trial of actions to which the city of New York is made a party to the county of New York, and prevents the court from -exercising its power to change the place of trial, and is in that regard in derogation of the powers granted and confirmed to the ■■court by the constitution.

For these reasons I think the "court below erred and that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, with costs and printing disbursements in the court below and of this appeal.

■ "The defendant and respondent to have leave to answer upon the payment of such costs and disbursements.

Putnam, J., concurs.