Case ID: f-appx_145/html/0085-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM: \n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Savuth MOA; Paov Kong, Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 03-61035
    Summary Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Oct. 3, 2005.
    Brian K. Bates, Quan, Burdette & Perez, Houston, TX, for Petitioner.
    
      Thomas Ward Hussey, Director, U.S. Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation, John Ashcroft, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Hipólito Acosta, U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, Houston, TX, for Respondent.
    Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Savuth Moa and Paov Kong petition this court for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying their motion for reconsideration of its order denying a motion to reopen the removal proceedings. The petitioners argue that the BIA committed “legal error” by denying their motions.

Motions to reopen are disfavored. Lara v. Trominski, 216 F.3d 487, 496 (5th Cir.2000). This court reviews a denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir.2003). Under the abuse of discretion standard, this court will let a decision stand “so long as it is not capricious, racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so aberrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible rational approach.” Pritchett v. INS, 993 F.2d 80, 83 (5th Cir.1993) (quotation and citation omitted). Where the denial of a motion to reopen rests upon a finding of statutory ineligibility, this court also reviews for errors of law. Ghassan v. INS, 972 F.2d 631, 637 (5th Cir.1992). Although this court gives great weight to the INS’s interpretation of its own regulations, this interpretation may be discounted if it is plainly unreasonable. Id.

“In order to warrant reopening, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing that he is eligible for the relief sought.” Id. Congress eliminated the exceptional-circumstances justification for failing to depart when it amended the immigration statutes. Compare INA § 240B(d)(8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)) with INA § 244(e)(8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2)(A)(1995))(repealed 1996). The petitioners thus were statutorily ineligible from obtaining an adjustment of their status. The BIA thus did not commit “legal error” in denying the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to reopen. See Ghassan, 972 F.2d at 637. Further, the petitioners have not shown that equitable considerations warrant a determination that the BIA abused its discretion in denying their motions. See Soadjede, 324 F.3d at 832-33. This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petitioners’ contentions regarding the reinstatement of voluntary departure. See Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir.2001).

The petition for review is DENIED. The motion for summary affirmance is DENIED as moot. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.