Case ID: ohio-st_7/html/0345-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Brinkerhoff, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Steamboat Northern Indiana v. James Milliken.
    'The act of May 3, 1862, to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages,” conferring on mayors of cities of the second class “ all the jurisdiction and powers of a justice of the peace in all matters civil or criminal,” provided the same was passed by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house of the general assembly, is not in contra vention of the constitution of the state.
    In the absence of all showing in the record to the contrary, said act will, on error, be presumed to have been passed by such vote.
    In error to the court of common pleas of Lucas county.
    Reserved in the district court.
    On the 26th day ofScptember, 1853, James Milliken in stituted a proceeding before the mayor of the city of Toledo, against the steamboat Northern Indiana, by name, for the collection of a claim of less than one hundred dollars, against the boat, under the act of February 26,1840, “to provide for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts, and authorizing proceedings against the same by name.” Swan’s Rev. Stat. 185.
    The trial before the mayor resulted in a judgment for Milliken. Thereupon an appeal was taken on behalf of the boat, to the court
    *of common pleas of Lucas county, and the trial there re-suited in a judgment against the boat.
    The case was then taken, on error, to the district court of the county, and was by that court reserved for decision here.
    The only question raised on error, relates to the jurisdiction of the mayor.
    The plaintiff in error insists that the mayor had no jurisdiction in the case, and on that ground seeks to reverse the judgment of the court of common pleas.
    The defendant in error insists that the mayor had jurisdiction; and to establish it, relies on section 7 of the water-craft law, under which the proceeding was instituted ; and on section 62 of the act of May 3, 1852, “ to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages.”
    The 7th section of the water-craft law (Swan’s Rev. Stat. 186), reads as follows:
    “ J ustices of the peace within their townships shall have jurisdiction under this act, when the amount claimed shall not exceed one hundred dollars, and shall jwoceed as near as may be according to the rules prescribed herein for the other courts.”
    Section 62 of said act of May 3, 1852 (Swan’s Rev. Stat. 971), reads as follows:
    “ The mayors of cities of the second class shall have, within the limits of the same, all the jurisdiction and powers of a justice of the peace, in all matters, civil or criminal, ai’ising under the laws of this state, to all intents and purposes whatever.”
    Toledo is a city of the second class.
    Ou behalf of the plaintiff in error, it is claimed that this grant of jurisdiction to mayors is not authorized by the constitution of the state.
    Morton, Lee & Haynes, for plaintiff in error, cited The State, ex rel. City of Rockford, v. Maynard, 14 111. 419.
    
      Hill & Pratt, for defendant in error.
   Brinkerhoff, J.

The provisions of the act of February *26, 1840, “ to provide for the collection of claims against steamboats and other water-crafts,” etc., conferring jurisdiction under that act on justices of the peace, “when the amount claimed shall not exceed one hundred dollars,” and of the subsequent act of May 3, 1852, “ to provide for the organization of cities and incorporated villages,” giving to mayors of cities of the second class “all the jurisdiction and powers of a justice of the peace, in all matters, civil or criminal, arising under the laws of this state, to all intents and purposes whatever,” are too plain and explicit to admit of question or argument. And the exception taken by the plaintiff in error to the jurisdiction of the court must, therefore, be overruled, unless the provisions above quoted from the. latter act, ar.e void by reason of repugnancy to the constitution of the state.

The following are the only provisions of the constitution which-seem to have a bearing on this question:

Art. IY. — Sec. 1. “ The judicial power, of the. state shall be-vested in a Supreme Court, in district courts, courts of common pleas, courts of probate, justices of the peace, and in such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, in one or more counties, as. the general assembly may, from time to time, .establish.”

Sec. 9. “A competent number of justices of the peace shall be-elected, by the electors, in each township in the several counties. Their term of office shall be three years, and their powers and duties shall be -regulated by law. . .

Seo. 10. “All judges, other than those provided for in this constitution, shall be elected by the electors of the judicial district for which they may be created, but not for a longer term of office than five years.”

Seo. 15. “ The general assembly may . . . establish other courts, whenever two-thirds of the members elected to each house shall concur therein,” etc.

It is very clear that the mayor of a city is not one of the functionaries expressly enumerated in section 1, artion 4. He is not a judge-either of the Supreme Court, district court, common pleas, or probate court; nor is he a justice of' the peace, for he is not elected for the term of office prescribed by the constitution for ^justices of the peace. He could not lawfully, therefore, be commissioned as a justice of the peace, and, under the authority of such commission merely, exercise the functions and jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. And to this effect only is the case of City of Rockford v. Maynard, 14 111. 419, and 16 Id. 484, Beesman v. City of Peoria, cited by counsel for plaintiff in error. We find no difficulty, however, in holding that mayors of cities are within the number of such “other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, in one or more-counties, as the general assembly may from time to time establish.” They are courts established by the general assembly, by virtue of the fifty-first section of the act “to provide for the organization of cities,” etc, before referred to, which enacts that “ the corporate-authority of cities, organized or to be organized under this act, shall be vested in one principal officer, to be styled the mayor,”' -etc., taken in connection with the sixty-second section of the same •act, and above quoted, conferring on mayors “ all the jurisdiction .and powers of a justice of the peace,” etc. These acts of legislation do not designate mayors of cities as “courts,” nor specifically ■declare them to be “ established” as such, but they create the office, provide for the election of the officer, and confer on him judicial powers and functions; and if the act be passed in conformity with the provisions of the constitution authorizing the establishment of “ other courts,” it is enough.

But the language of the constitution is, “such other courts, inferior to the Supreme Court, in one or more counties,” etc.; and it •seems to be contended that “such other courts as the general assembly may from time to time establish,” must, in order to conform to,the constitution, have a jurisdiction co-extensive with at least a -county. The language of the constitution requires no such construction. The city of Toledo is “ in one or more counties.” The jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Cincinnati extends only over that pai't of Hamilton county embraced within the limits of the ■city of Cincinnati; and this court has recognized the jurisdiction .and constitutionality of that court, from the time of its organization until now, in the repeated affirmance of its judgments when ■under review before it on error.

*It is true, however, as contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, that in order to the validity of those portions of the act refered to, which establish and confer judicial powers on the mayors of cities, the act must have been passed by the concurring vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house of the general .assembly. This, however, in the absence of all showing in the reeod to the contrary, we will presume to have been done; and the .record is silent on the subject. It is not to be presumed that the .presiding officers of the two houses of the legislature would sign and •promulgate an act as duly passed into a law, unless it had received the vote which the constitution requires. Miller & Gibson v. The State, 3 Ohio St. 475.

The objection taken by the plaintiff in error on the ground of •multifariousness in the title of the act, is disposed of in Pim v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio St. 176.

Judgment affirmed.

Bartley, O. J., and Swan, Scott, and Sutliff, JJ., concurred. •