Case ID: f-appx_127/html/0318-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jose SANABRIA-SOTELO, Petitioner, v. Alberto GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 04-71451.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 23, 2005.
    
    Decided April 4, 2005.
    
      Gary D. Olive, Esq., Law Office of Gary D. Olive, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.
    Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of The District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, James E. Grimes, Esq., Stephen J. Flynn, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.
    Before: B. FLETCHER, TROTT and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The court sua sponte changes the docket to reflect that Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, is the proper respondent. The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the above caption.
    
    
      
      The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jose Sanabria-Sotelo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) summary affirmance of an immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C § 1252. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

To the extent Sanabria-Sotelo challenges the IJ’s finding that he failed to demonstrate the requisite “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” for cancellation of removal, we lack jurisdiction to review that contention. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 891 (9th Cir.2003).

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Sanabria-Sotelo failed to establish the requisite ten-years continuous physical presence due to a break in physical presence pursuant to an administrative voluntary departure. See Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 973-74 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (holding that a departure pursuant to an administrative voluntary departure constitutes a break in continuous physical presence).

The voluntary departure period is stayed pursuant to Salvador-Calleros v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 959 (9th Cir.2004).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.