Case ID: nc_152/html/0383-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "House, I.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JAMES M. BAILEY v. J. C. BISHOP.
    (Filed 20 April, 1910.)
    Contracts — Principal and Agent — Ratification—Cities and Towns— Easement — Liability Imposed by Third Person.
    Defendant Laving a body of land north of Greensboro, desired the extension of a public street through his property, and, at his instance, plaintiff, who owned a lot between the town and defendant’s property, was induced to join in the application for such extension. When the matter came on for decision plaintiff was absent, but submitted a written proposition as to the terms upon which he would grant the city a right of way through his lot. The municipal board having rejected plaintiff’s proposition, defendant, who was present, without authority from plaintiff, agreed with the authorities for a right of way through both properties on payment.by the city to defendant of $1,500, defendant agreeing to pay all costs and charges against abutting owners. Later, defendant told plaintiff of his agreement, saying he had agreed to bear all the costs, and plaintiff thereupon ratified defendant’s action, conveyed the right of way: Held, that on the facts stated a primary liability was created against defendant for the costs lawfully imposed upon abutting owners, and plaintiff, having been compelled by the city to pay his pro rata oí the costs of paving the sidewalk through his property, was entitled to recover said sum of defendant.
    Appeal from W. G. Ward, J., at January Term, 1910, of • Guileord.
    Civil action, beard on appeal from a justice’s court. There was evidence on the part of plaintiff tending to show, in substance, that defendant owned a body of land lying north of the city of Greensboro-, or in the northern part of the city, and desired to have an extension of Elm Street through his property; tha't plaintiff owned a lot lying in front of defendant’s land, making it necessary for the proposed extension to- run through or take a part of plaintiff’s lot; that plaintiff, having .to be out of the city when the matter was considered, submitted bis proposition in writing to tbe city authorities, to the effect that he would give the right of way to the extent of eight feet through one side of his lot in consideration of $160, a conveyance of ten feet by the city in rear of plaintiff’s lot, and that the sidewalk and street of the proposed extension should be macadamized and paved along the entire length of plaintiff’s lot without any cost to him. Defendant attended the meeting in person, and the aldermen having declined to extend the street on the terms proposed, defendant thereupon, ignoring plaintiff’s proposition, for the sum of $1,500 agreed to deed the city a right of way for the entire length, including the portion through plaintiff’s lot. When plaintiff returned to the city defendant told him that he couldn’t get the street on the terms desired, and that he, defendant, had stipulated for the entire right of way, and to stand between plaintiff and' any and all cost, etc. This statement appears in different forms in plaintiff’s evidence, thus:
    “A. He said he would become responsible for the paving and macadamizing so that he could get the street, aiid says, 'You must help me out some.’
    “Q. Didn’t say, 'We will have to assume the paving just like the property-owners on the other streets’?
    “A. Said that the city would not agree to do the paving, and he had to agree to do it in order to get the street.
    “Q. That agreement to pave and macadamize should have been with the city. Mr. Bishop didn’t promise to pave your sidewalk ?
    “A. All he said was that he had agreed to do' the paving on all the street.”
    Plaintiff, in recognition of defendant’s agreement, conveyed to defendant the eight feet to enable defendant to comply" with his agreement to acquire for the city the entire right of way, etc., etc. The street was’ extended, and the city compelled plaintiff, under the terms and provisions of the charter, to pave the sidewalk at a cost of $141, for which sum the present suit was brought.
    Defendant admitted that he had contracted with the city for the entire right of way, in disregard of the proposition submitted by plaintiff, and had received $1,500 for said right of way, but denied that he had made any promise or agreement to save plaintiff harmless, etc.
    There was other testimony on the issue, but none relevant to the question presented on appeal.
    Verdict for plaintiff; judgment, and defendant excepted and appealed.
    
      
      Morehead '& Sapp for plaintiff.
    
      T. J. Murphy for defendant.
   House, I.,

after stating tbe case: On exceptions formally noted, defendant objects to tbe validity of tbis recovery, chiefly by reason of tbe statute of frauds, requiring contracts concerning land to be in writing; but, on tbe facts presented in tbe record, tbe position cannot be sustained. Tbis statute applies to contracts wben and to tbe extent that tbey are executory, and where it appears that every feature of tbe transaction coining within tbe purview of tbe statute has been executed, Its provisions no longer affect the matter. Hall v. Fisher, 126 N. C., 205. And so it is here. Tbe right of way has been conveyed to tbe city, tbe paving has been done, and tbe issue between these parties, so far as tbe statute of frauds is concerned, involves only a moneyed demand, coming within tbe doctrine as declared in Bourne v. Sherrill, 143 N. C., 381, and that class, of cases; and on tbe facts presented to be determined under the general principles of indebitatus assumpsit.

Tbe evidence of tbe defendant is not more fully set out, for tbe reason that tbe jury have accepted tbe plaintiff’s version of tbe occurrence, an excerpt from which is given in tbe statement of facts; and, considering tbe case in that aspect, when tbe defendant stipulated with tbe city authorities for the entire right of way, including the portion through plaintiff’s land, and agreed that if tbe street was opened, “be would stand between plaintiff and all costs; that be bad agreed to do tbe paving,” such agreement established a primary liability for such cost on tbe part of defendant, and tbe plaintiff, having been compelled by tbe authorities to pave and pay for tbe sidewalk, an obligation arose on tbe part of defendant to reimburse plaintiff; and tbis is tbe claim recovered in tbe present suit..

Tbe subsequent conveyance of tbe right of way by plaintiff and ratification of defendant’s action would create a privity between them in reference to tbis transaction, but on authority no such privity is required to tbe validity of plaintiff’s demand. In Keener on Quasi Contracts, at page 396, the doctrine is stated thus:

“Tbe question of allowing a plaintiff to recover from a defendant for tbe payment of a claim existing in fact against himself, may arise in a case where tbe plaintiff and tbe defendant sustained to each other tbe relationship of principal and surety, or that of cosureties, or it may arise where tbe parties are strangers to each other with reference to tbe transaction in question.-

“It may be stated as a general proposition, tbat a plaintiff can recover against a defendant as for money paid to his nse to the extent that the claim paid by the plaintiff should have been paid by the defendant. Thus, it was held in Brown v. Ilodgson that the plaintiffs, common carriers, who by mistake delivered to the defendant goods consigned to another, could recover from the defendant the amount of money which they were compelled to pay the consignee of the goods in consequence of the defendant having appropriated the goods to his own use. Mansfield, O. J., said: ‘The plaintiffs pay Payne on account of these goods being wrongfully detained by Hodgson. They paid the value to the person to whom both they and Payne were bound to pay; and this, therefore, is not the case of a man officiously and without reason paying money for another; and therefore the action may be supported.’ ”

And the statement is supported by many well-considered decisions of the courts. San Gabriel v. Whitmer Co., 96 Cal., 623; Nutter v. Sydenstuckher, 11 W. Ya., 535. In the California case it was held: “Where a plaintiff, either by compulsion of law, or to relieve himself from liability, or to save himself from damage, has paid money, not officiously, which the defendant ought to have paid, a count in assumpsit for money paid will be supported. In such case the law implies a request on the part of the defendant and a promise to repay, and the plaintiff has the same right of action as if he had paid the money at the defendant’s express request.”

And in Nutter v. Sydenstucher, supra: “In general, where the plaintiff shows that he either by compulsion of law, or to relieve himself from liability, or to save himself from damage, has paid money which the defendant ought to have paid, the' count for money paid will be supported.”

And the same general principle was declared and upheld by our own Court in R. R. v. R. R., 141 N. C., 368-386.

There is no error in the proceedings below, and the judgment in plaintiff’s favor must be affirmed.

No error.