Case ID: la-ann_42/html/0735-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Fenner, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

No. 10,536.
    Mrs. Clara C. Godwin vs. Frederick Neustadtl.
    1. The authentic act makes lull proof between the parties thereto, and in absence of fraud, error, violence or other matter affecting the consent, the parties to such acts can only assail their verity and i-eality in two inodes, viz: 1. By a counter letter. 2. By the answers of his adversary to interrogatories on facts a.nd articles.
    2. When the plaintiff, having no counter letter, proceeds imlimine to probe the conscience of the defendant by evoking his answers to interrogatories, such answers stand as part of the pleadings, and if they are destructive of plaintiff’s action, an exception of no cause of action will lie.
    3. Though answers to interrogatories on facts and articles may generally be contradicted; yet. when evoked in such a ease as a substitute for a counter letter, to prove what could otherwise be proved by nothing but a counter letter, such answers can not bo contradicted by anything but a counter letter.
    4.Plaintiff, liaving no counter letter, is bound to stand either on tlio authentic act or on defendant’s answers, and either of these being destructive of her action, it is to the interest of both parties that the litigation should be terminated at once without useless costs and delays.
    A PPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Monroe, «71
    
      Moise & Fitch for Plaintiff and Appellant:
    1. The allegation that a certain person is the universal legatee of one deceased, carries with it the right to prove the fact by the record of tlio succession of said deceased.
    
      2. Where a wife by a judgment of court is put in possession of her husband'3 estate as his universal legatee under the conditions stated in his last will and testament, and when said testament contains a statement of assets and liabilities, and a certain person claims to be a creditor of the testator, but is not so acknowledged in the statement of liabilities in the will, and where the wife accepted the succession, on the faith of a correct representation of assets and liabilities in the will, she can abandon the property of the succession to the said creditor, and be relieved from the personal liability attaching to unconditional heirs and universal legatees.
    3. A conveyance of real estate to protect property from the vexatious pursuit of one judicially declared not to be a creditor is not immoral, nor contrary to public policy. Maker vs. McGuire, 37 An. 623; Aubie vs. Gill, 2 An. 342; Gridin's Kxr. vs. Lopez, 5 Mart. 145; 40 An. 560.
    4. A suit in disaftlrmancc of an illegal contract will be onterl ainod by the courts. Thus, where an illegal agreement is still executory — not carried out — a parly may repudiate it and demand that the condition of things be reinstated as it was before the agreement. Spring Co.’vs. Knowlfcon, 105 r. N/58, and authorities therein cited; benjamin on Sales, rice. 503 a.
    
      Horace E. Upton and B. II. Lea for Defendanfc and Appellee :
    1. Courts of justice will not aid parties to enforce or relieve them from the effects of contracts made in violation of law. Xo action can bo maintained upon contracts made in violation of law. 12 An. 155,166; 10 An. 70. They who como into court with unclean hands ought to be told proculeslote profani, the temple of justice of your country is the house of God, it should not be made a den of thieves. Hood vs. krellsen, 31 An. 581; bernard vs. Auguste, l An. 69,70.
    2. The law gives no action to enforce, a contract without a cause, or for a false and immoral cause, whoever may demand it, unless in eases of the innocent holders of the evidences of such contracts in a commercial form. Gravicrvs. Oarraby, 17 La. 118.
    3. A simulation not fraudulent con not be proved by parol, as between the parties, and if fraudulent as to both parties, the law gives no action to enforce such contracts. 19 La. 409.
    4. A vendor without a counter letter can not set up his own fraud and simulation to annul the sale, nor can his heirs, who have no greater rights. Suitors who allege injury to themselves, or those they represent, can alone be heard in a court of justice. Cross on Pleadings, p. 84; 6?M* 524; 9 It. 280; 9 M. 352.
    5. A party can notvary or destroy his voluntary written agreements by other than written evidence, which includes answers to interrogatories on facts and articles. 12 An. 739; 5 An. 315; 22 An. 382; 11 An. 113; 17 An. 2.
    . The unbending jurisprudence of this State does not all'ow a party to vary or destroy his own voluntary declarations or written agreements by anything short of written evidence. Cary vs. Richardson, 35 An. 505; Anderson vs. benham, 40 An. 330.
    6. There is no rule of evidence bettor known and settled in our jurisprudence than this — that the fact of simulation admits of no other proof between the parties to a contract, or their representatives, than a counter letter, or something equivalent thereto. 2 X. S. 14; 6 X. S. 206; 8 X. S. 448; 3 L. 4; 19 L. 412; C. O. 2256; Merlin, Yerbo Simulation; Huranton, Yol. 13, pp. 338, 339;'Toullier, Yol. 9, p 233; 3 Rob. 452, 453.
    
      7. Interrogatories on facts and articles may bo propounded to the vendee, but his answers, uncontradicted by written evidence, showing the reality of the transaction will conclude the vendor. 85 An. 1052.
    Answers to interrogatories propounded to prove a transfer of real estate can not be contradicted by parol. 26 An. 252, 698; 10 An. 705, 706.
   The opinion of the court was delivered by

Fenner, J.

The plaintiff sues to recover title to certain innnovaable property which had been conveyed by her by an authentic act of sale to defendant, on the ground that said sale was a simulation, executed for the purpose of protecting the property from seizure under a judgment which might be rendered against her in a suit then pending.

No fraud, error, violence or other matter affecting the validity of plaintiff’s consent to the authentic act of sale is alleged; nor does she pretend that she has, or that there exists, or ever existed, any counter letter.

Plaintiff attached to her petition interrogatories on facts and -articles addressed to defendant and designed to probe his conscience as to the truth of the facts alleged. Defendant answered, setting up an entirely different state of facts from that propounded by plaintiff, denying the simulation of the transfer and averring that it was a real transaction, intended to secure the legitime of defendant’s wife as forced heir of her father and with the understanding that he, defendant, was ultimately either to convey the property to his said wife or to sell it and devote the proceeds to her benefit.

After the filing of these answers, defendant filed three exceptions, viz: first, that the petition discloses no legal cause of action; second, that the action can not be maintained because based on considerations illegal, immoral and contrary to public policy; third, that the action seeks to enforce an obligation founded on a false or unlawful cause.

After trial of these exceptions, the judge a quo rendered judgment maintaining the exception of “no cause of action,” from which this .appeal is taken.

Although the judgment on its face purports to maintain only the first of the exceptions above stated, it is treated here as maintaining all of the exceptions, and counsel on both sides devote their discussion mainly to the question whether or not plaintiff should be sent out of court, because the cause of action set forth in her petition discloses a fraudulent and immoral transaction, the purpose of which was to defeat her creditors, and subject to the rule that “courts of justice will not aid parties to enforce or relieve them from the effects, of contracts made in violation of law.”

Under the view We take of the case, we do not find it necessary to-decide this question.

The plaintiff makes part of her petition the authentic act of sale-which she seeks to contradict and destroy.

The Code declares that “ the authentic act is full proof of the agreement contained in it against the contracting parties and their heirs or assigns, unless it be declared and proved a forgery.” R. C. O. 2236.

It is horn-book law in our jurisprudence that the verity and reality of authentic sales can be assailed by the parties thereto only in two-ways, viz: first, by means of a counter-letter; second, by the answers of the other party to interrogatories on facts and articles. Forest vs. Shores, 11 La. 418; Hewlett vs. Henderson, 9 Rob. 379; Succession of Thomas, 12 Rob. 215; Semere vs. Semere, 10 An. 704;, Tesson vs. Guzman, 27 An. 266; Newman vs. Shelley, 36 An. 100; Crozier vs. Ragan, 38 An. 154. See also Rawle vs. Fannessey, 6 N.. S. 206,; Maignan vs. Gleises, 4 La. 1; Badon vs. Badon,. Id., 169; Brousseau vs. Indrique, Id., 351; Liantand vs. Baptiste, 3 Rob. 441; Bank vs. Tucker, 6 Rob. 443; Macarthy vs. Bank, 8 Rob. 102;, Macarty vs. Gasquet, 11 Rob. 270; Dabadie vs. Poydras, 3 An. 153; Gantier vs. Briault, 4 An. 487.

The same authorities show that the answers of a party to interrogatories stand in lieu and as the equivalent of a counter letter,, and are received on the same principle. See particularly 36 An. 100; 10 An. 704, and 9 Rob. 379.

Such answers, when made, stand as part of the pleadings. (Same cases last quoted.')

Although answers to interrogatories on facts ahd articles are generally subject to contradiction, yet when they are resorted to for the purpose of supplying the place of a counter letter, and to make proof’ which nothing else but a counter letter could make, they are evidently not subject to contradiction otherwise, at least than by a counter letter. This principle is, substantially announced in Semere vs. Semere, 10 An. 704, and is an evident corollary of the reasons on which such answers are admitted.

Now in the ease at bar, it is conceded that there exists no counter letter. Plaintiff, to supply its absence, appealed to the conscience of her adversary, and his answers stood in the record as part of the pleading’s at the time when the exception of no cause of action was filed. The case stands precisely as if plaintiff had attached to her petition a counter letter to the same effect as the answers of defendant.

It is obvious that if the latter had been the ease, the exception of no canse of action would have been good, because the counter letter so alleged would have been totally inconsistent with the relief sought in the action and destructive of it.

So the answers of defendant evoked by her, and standing as part of the pleadings, must be given the same effect. They destroy her cause of action and throw her out of court. It is for the interest of .plaintiff that the litigation, in its present shape, should be terminated, since it can have but one result. Unless plaintiff has a counter 'letter, which is not pretended, she must stand either on the authentic act or on the answers of defendant, and either of them is fatal to her action.

Had plaintiff, in her petition, simply propounded the simulation of the authentic act without declaring on any counter letter, and without appealing to the conscience of her adversary, the exception here raised would have found its place under objections to testimony. But when the plaintiff declares on a counter letter, or when, as in this case, having none, she resorts to interrogatories to defendant, the answers to which are given, the counter letter or the answers form then part of the pleadings, and if they are destructive of the cause of action, an exception to that ’effect properly lies in limine.

Judgment affirmed.