Case ID: so2d_761/html/1288-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      PER CURIAM.\n     | T LEMMON, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Diana N. DEVILLE v. CITY OF VILLE PLATTE, and State of Louisiana, through Department of Transportation and Development. Scott A. Manuel, et ux. v. Diana N. Deville, et al.
    No. 99-C-3247.
    Supreme Court of Louisiana.
    July 6, 2000.
    Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, John Claiborne Young, Counsel for Applicant.
    Mark Gregory Murphey, Frederick Douglas Gatz, Jr., George . Edward Williams, Jr., Preis, Kraft & Roy, Lafayette; Barry Jamar Rozas, Mamou, Guy Olden Mitchell, III, Ville Platte, Counsel for Respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Upon DOTD’S application, we granted certiorari in this case. Deville v. City of Ville Platte c/w Manuel v. Deville, 99-3247 (La.2/11/00), 754 So.2d 921. After hearing oral argument and reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the judgment below does not require the exercise of our supervisory authority. Accordingly, we recall our order of February 11, 2000, as improvidently granted, and deny DOTD’s application.

| T LEMMON, J.,

Dissenting.

In Lochbaum v. Bowman, 358 So.2d 379 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977), I wrote a decision exonerating the Department of Transportation and Development under factual circumstances similar to those in the present case. Because the plaintiff in that case knew the traffic light was malfunctioning and failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, his contributory negligence barred his recovery.

In the present case, the advent of comparative fault dictates a different result under an appropriate duty-risk analysis, and I agree with the lower courts that DOTD bears some degree of overall fault.

I disagree, however, with recalling the grant of certiorari rather than examining the overall allocation of fault.

Each driver knew the light was malfunctioning and should have entered the essentially uncontrolled intersection by stopping and proceeding with caution. Under these circumstances, the degree of fault of each driver was much more than ten percent and was at least equal to the fault of DOTD. Despite the smallness of the ^amount of damages, I would reallocate a percentage of fault to DOTD at much less than sixty percent. 
      
       Johnson, J., not on panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3.