Case ID: f-appx_542/html/0065-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Nery Orlando DUARTE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 12-4236.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Nov. 18, 2013.
    Bruno J. Bembi, Hempstead, New York, for Petitioner.
    Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; Remi Da Rocha-Afodu, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: JON 0. NEWMAN, JOSÉ A. CABRANES and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Nery Orlando Duarte, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a September 26, 2012, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Nery Orlando Duarte, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Sept. 26, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). While we lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of cancellation, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)®, including in the motion to reopen context, see Durant v. INS, 393 F.3d 113, 115 (2d Cir.2004), we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In this ease, Duarte’s argument that he was held to an inappropriately stringent standard for reopening is a question of law over which the Court retains jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Barco-Sandoval v. Gon zales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.2008) (“the argument that a discretionary decision was based on a legally erroneous standard raises a question of law”).

Here, Duarte alleged only that he had a qualifying relative for cancellation, his daughter, without specifying any exceptional or extremely unusual hardship, beyond the fact that he provided financial support for her. The BIA acknowledged these factors, and there is no indication that it used too stringent a standard in its determination that they did not demonstrate a prima facie case of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988); Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 65 (BIA 2001) (holding that an applicant for cancellation must demonstrate hardship to a qualifying family member that is “substantially different from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close family members here”). Additionally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration, as Duarte failed to identify any error in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2001).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).