Case ID: ky_67/html/0388-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JUDGE ROBERTSON", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CASE 18 — PETITION ORDINARY
    DECEMBER 23.
    Cason vs. Wallace.
    APPEAL EH0M GRANT CIRCUIT COURT. ■
    1. It is impossible for the same person to be obligor and obligee in the same note.
    2. The obligee in a note, long after it was executed to him, assigned it to a third party, and wrote his name under the name of the obligor. The circumstances conduce to show that the assignor intended to sign the note as guarantor. The inadvertent mislocation of his name did not make the note legally void, and the assignee might maintain his action on it against the sole obligor.
    3. An assignee of a note has a right to sue the obligor, only on the note; but he has no- cause of action against him on the original consideration.
    
      George C. Duane, For Appellant,
    CITED—
    3 Met., 285; Muhling vs. Sattler, &,-c.
    
    
      2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, p. 124, n. p.
    
    
      Sloj-y on Promissory Notes, sec. 467.
    Craddock & Trabue, For Appellee,
    CITED—
    
      Myers’ Supplement, p. 741.
    3 Met., 285 ; Muhling vs. Sattler.
    
    
      MSS. Opin., June, 1858; Taylor vs. Taylor.
    
    
      Revised Statutes, 1 Stanton, 267.
    3 Mon., 252; Roberts vs. Finnell.
    
    
      2 Marshall, 138; Morton vs. Fletcher.
    
    
      2 Met., 228; 1 Bush, 381.
    1 Mar., 24; Keith vs. Patton.
    
   JUDGE ROBERTSON

delivered the opinion op the court:

The impossibility of being both obligor and obligee on the same note ; the absurdity of making the note of Nichols legally void by the subsequent signature of Cason’s name as apparent co-obligor to himself as obligee; the date of his signature, long after the execution of the note by Nichols to him and after his assignment of it to Car-den, the assignor, to the appellee, conduce to the conclusion that Cason’s name under that of Nichols was, an inadvertent mislocation of it, and that he thus signed the note as mere guarantor; and Carden’s statement might tend to show, that, as he was willing to take the note as a mere assignee, the superadded guaranty was gratuitous. On this construction, the suit ought to have been brought, and might have been maintained, against Nichols as sole obligor; and there was no cause of action on the original consideration. But if a suit could be maintained on the original consideration, Carden’s assignment to Wallace gave him only a right to sue on the note, but no cause of action to sue on the original consideration. Carden alone could do that; he has not done it.

Wherefore, on these grounds, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to dismiss the petitions.