Case ID: ga_99/html/0747-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Lumpkin, Justice.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

MUTUAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION v. GLESSNER.
    Where hy consent a case involving questions both of law and fact was tried by the judge without a jury, and a judgment rendered in the plaintiff’s favor, to which (there being no motion for a new trial) direct exception was taken in the following words: "to which said decision and judgment of the court the defendants by their attorney then excepted, and now except and say that the same was error, and now assign the same as error”: Held, that under the decisions of this court in Mayor etc. of Brunswick v. Moore, executrix, and Hall et al. v. Huff et al., 74 Ga. 409, and the cases cited in the latter, such assignment of orror was too general. It ought at least to have stated whether the judgment was complained of as being contrary to law, or contrary to evidence, or to both.
    Argued November 17,
    Decided November 23, 1896.
    Practice in Supreme Court.
    
      E. A. Hawkins, for plaintiff in error.
    
      Allen Fond and G. L. Glessner, contra!
   Lumpkin, Justice.

Tlie writ of error in this case was dismissed because the bill of exceptions did not contain any clear and distinct assignment of error. The head-note does not- require elaboration. It cites the cases upon which our decision was based, and they support the conclusion announced. The difference between this case and those where general assignments of error are made upon the overruling of motions for new trials, is obvious. In such cases the grounds of the motion usually point out 'the errors which the movant claims were committed at the trial. When this is projrerly done, alleging error in denying the motion brings under review the correctness of the rulings or decisions of which the motion complains. But where a judge trying the case upon the law and the facts disposes of it in a single judgpient with which the losing party is dissatisfied, the latter in excepting to it ought certainly to give some intimation of what the error consisted. Simply saying, in effect, that such a judgment was wrong, vrithout stating aDy ground or reason why it was so, opens a broader field of investigation than our law, which requires all errors to be plainly and distinctly set forth, authorizes. It was never contemplated that this court should search around in a loose and general way to discover errors not brought to its attention with, at least, a reasonable degree of clearness and perspicuity. Writ of error dismissed.