Case ID: f-appx_700/html/0587-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Candace P. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Todd H. MASTER; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-17305
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted October 23, 2017 
    
    November 8, 2017
    Candace P. Lee, Sugar Land, TX, Pro Se.
    Richard W. Osman, Bertrand, Fox, Elliot, Osman & Wenzel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Lee’s request for oral argument, set forth in her opening brief, is denied,
    
   MEMORANDUM

Candace P. Lee appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and breach of a settlement agreement. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Lee’s excessive force claim because it was barred by the statute of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury claims, including state law regarding tolling).

The district court properly dismissed Lee’s claim alleging a breach of a settlement agreement because Lee failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants breached the terms of the agreement with her. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lee’s motion for reconsideration because Lee demonstrated no grounds for relief. See School Dist. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review).

We reject as unsupported by the record Lee’s contentions regarding alleged judicial bias.

Appellees Todd H. Master, Joseph C. Howard, Jr., Howard Rome Martin & Rid-ley LLP, and Peggy Sue Doyle’s request for sanctions, set forth in their answering brief, is denied without prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 38 (requiring separately filed motion for damages and costs on appeal); Wilcox v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1988) (an appeal is frivolous if the results are obvious, or the arguments of error are wholly without merit).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.