Case ID: so2d_592/html/0788-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ricky COLEMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 90-2218.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Feb. 4, 1992.
    Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and John H. Lipinski, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
    Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and GERSTEN, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

Rejecting the appellant’s primary point on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s determination that, because the state demonstrated that it had been “unable to procure [the child victim’s] attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means,” § 90.804(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1991), she was “unavailable as a witness,” within the meaning of § 90.803(23)(a)2.b., Fla.Stat. (1991), so as to permit the admission of her out of court statements under § 90.803(23). See Putnal v. State, 56 Fla. 86, 47 So. 864, 867 (1908); cf. Stano v. State, 473 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Fla.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1093, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 907 (1986). See generally Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 804.1, at 546-47 (2d ed. 1984).

The other points presented have no merit and require no discussion.

Affirmed.