Case ID: us-ct-cl_14/html/0148-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J., Davis, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Francis J. Lippitt v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      A military officer on duty with his regiment in California is ordered to report in person at the headquarters of the department, there to await further orders. He does so, hut is not assigned to duty, and is kept there unemployed more than a year. ITiihin six years he applies to the War Department for c om- • mutation of quarters. More than six-years after his claim first accrued the Secretary of War transmits -it to this court under the act 25th June, 1868. The defendants set up the statute of limitations.
    
    I. Where a claim was presented to the Secretary of War within six years after it fiist accrued, and, having leen held hy him without action until more than six years have elapsed, is then transmitted to this court because it involves controverted questions of law and tlie decision thereof will affect a class of cases, the statute of limitations does not bar the consideration of the case upon its merits. „
    II. The statute of limitations x>rescribed by the Amended Court of Claims Act (12 Stat. L., 765, § 10) does not extend to claims in the Executive Departments.
    III. The purpose of the Amended Court of Claims Act (12 Stat. L., 765) was to confer on a claimant a right of action ag'ainst the government. The puqiose of the Act 25th June, 1868 (15 Stat L., 75, § 7) was to confer on the Executive Departments a judicial means of investigation against claimants. The two statutes having been enacted for entirely different purposes, the statute of limitations, which is contained in and forms a condition attached to the earlier should not be used to defeat the purpose of the later act.
    IY. Where a military officer is ordered to the headquarters of a department to await further orders, and pursuant to the order remains there for a long period performing no duty, he is nevertheless entitled to quarters pr commutation of quarters.
    V. Where the headquarters of a military department are in a large city in which there are no qu arters assignable to officers on duty, it is not necessary for an officer ordered there to make a demand that quarters bo assigned to him. He will be entitled to recover commutation if it appear that there were no quarters which might have been assigned.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are tbe facts as found by the court:
    I. The claimant was colonel of the Second California Volunteers, a regiment in the military service of the United States from some day preceding the 2d July, 1863, to some day subsequent to the 1st August, 1864.
    II. On the 2d July, 1863, the claimant, then being in command of the district of Humboldt, California, where his regiment was stationed, was ordered by the commanding general of the Department of the Pacific to report in person at the headquarters of the department, there to await further orders. The headquarters of the department were at San Francisco during the war. The order referred to is that annexed to and forming part of the petition, being in the following terms:
    
      “ Headquarters Department oe the Pacific, San Francisco, California, July, 2, 1863.
    
      " Sir : The department commander instructs me to say that if the Second Infantry company, which arrived at Fort Humboldt from Fort G-aston, is still at the first-named fort, it will remain there until further orders. As soon as a sufficient number of companies are raised for the Mountaineer Battalion to garrison the post in the district of Humboldt abandoned by companies of your regiment, the general desires you to turn over the command of the district to Lieutenant Colonel Whipple. You will then report in person at these headquarters, where you will await further orders.
    “ Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
    “RICH’D 0. DUNN,
    “ Asst: Acljt. General.
    
    “ Colonel Francis J. Lippett,
    “ Second Infantry G. V.,
    
    
      Commanding District of Humboldt, California.”
    
    III. In compliance with these orders, the claimant, about the 25th July, 1863, left his regiment, and from about that day to the 1st August, 1864, was in San Francisco, absent from his regiment, awaiting orders.
    IV. There is no evidence that during the said period the
    claimant received quarters and fuel in hind. There is no evidence that they could have been furnished in kind. The records of the War Department show that most if not all the officers stationed in San Francisco received commutation of quarters and fuel. »
    V. The commuted value of quarters and fuel in San Francisco during the said period, for a colonel of infantry, was $1,742.
    VI. On the 19th July, 1864, the following order was issued, in pursuance of which the claimant returned to his regiment:
    “ Headquarters Department of the Pacific,
    “ San Draneiseo, Cal., July 19, 1864.
    “I. Colonel Francis J. Lippitt, Second Infantry California Volunteers, will repair to Fort Miller, and assume command of his regiment; headquarters at Fort Miller.
    “lhe Quartermaster’s Department will furnish the necessary transportation.
    * # » # # * *
    
    “ By command of Major-General McDowell.
    “ EICHAED C. DUNN,
    “ Assistant Adjutant-General.”
    
    VII. It does nob appear that the claimant was ordered to or performed any military duty during the time he was awaiting orders-; nor that he reported himself at headquarters, San Francisco, after his first report on his arrival there.
    
      YIII. It does not appear that claimant máde any demand on the proper officer at San Francisco that quarters and fuel be furnished him;
    IX. It does not appear that claimant received any military order after being placed on “ awaiting orders” until the order of July 19, 1864, to repair to his regiment.
    X. The claimant in I860 presented his claim to the proper department, and pressed its settlement from that day to the 9th January, 1878, when it was referred by the War Department to this court by virtue of the following order:
    “ To the honor (Me the judges of the Court of Claims :
    
    “ The undersigned, Secretary for the Department of War of the United States, hereby respectfully represents that a claim has been made against said department by Francis J. Lippitt, late colonel Second California Infantry, brevet brigadier-general United States Volunteers, for commutation of fuel and quarters while awaiting further orders at San Francisco, in 1863-64.
    “ Said claim involving controverted questions of law, and the decision affecting a class of cases, the undersigned hereby, and in accordance with the provisions of section 1063 Revised Statutes of the United States, causes said claim, with all the papers pertaining thereto, to be transmitted to the Court of Claims for trial and adjudication.
    “GEO. W. McCRARY,
    “ Secretary of War.
    
    “WAR Department, January 9, 1878.
    “Filed in the Court of Claims January 10, 1878.”
    
      Mr. James Loiondes for the claimant.
    
      Mr. A. D. Uobinson (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants.
   Nott, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

By the Amended Court of Claims Act 3d March, 1863 (12 Stat. L., 765, §§ 7,10; Rev. Stat., §§ 1089,069,11093), Congress for the first time attached the element of finality to thejudgments of this court, and provided that they should be satisfied at the Treasury, instead of going back, as before, to Congress for approval. At the same time and in the same statute Congress enacted the first statute of limitations applicable to demands against the government, and thereby attached to the claimant’s right of action ia this court the following condition: “ That every claim against the United States cognizable by the Court of Claims shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court [by tlie claimant] or transmitted to it under the provisions of this act [by eitlier of tlie bouses of Congress] within six years after the claim first accrues” (§ 10).

As the law then stood, tbe court could acquire jurisdiction of a claim in no other way than those alluded to in the statute of limitations ; that is to say, only by the voluntary filing of the claimant’s petition in this court or by his presenting it to Congress and its subsequent transmission to the court by the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House. (Act 1863, § 2; see, also, Court of Claims Act, 1855,10 Stat. L., 612, § 1.)

It has been supposed by the Executive Departments and by the public generally that this statute of limitations does not extend to the Executive Departments, and that no statute of limitations bars the consideration of claims beyond the limits of this court except, perhaps, a statute relating to the refund of taxes {Act 5th June, 1872; Eev. Stat., 3228). Since the Amended Court of Claims act in 1863, thousands of claims have been submitted to the Executive Departments and to Congress, and it is safe to say that no statute of limitations has ever been set up against one of them. In the monthly public-debt statement of the Treasury, bonds and coupons which have accrued more than six years are carried as a x>art of the present debt of the government; ex. gr., of the “old debt,” which matured prior to-January 1, 1837, there is stated to be due and owing, of principal $57,665, and of interest $61,174.81. It is certain that payment of a coupon has never yet been refused because it had accrued more than six years before presentation. In public estimation, and in the settled and uniform construction of the statutes by the heads of the Executive Departments, it was and is as much the duty of an Executive Department to examine, audit, adjust, and allow a claim which accrued more than six years before presentation as a claim that accrued during the current year. Sixteen years of uniform contemporaneous construction by both Congress and the Executive Departments is certainly entitled to grave consideration.

Five years after tbe enactment of tbe statute of limitations, Congress, by tbe Act 25th June, 1868 (15 Stat. L., 75, § 7), conferred on tbe Secretaries of tbe Executive Departments tbe power to trausmit to this court certain classes of claims “involving disputed facts or controverted questions of law,” “with all tbe vouchers, papers, proofs, and documents pertaining thereto.” Tbe claims so transmitted were to be “proceeded in as other cases pending in said court,” and to be “subject to tbe same rules and regulations.” Tbe only limitation set upon tbe discretion of tbe Secretaries was that no claim of tbe designated classes should be referred unless tbe court, hy reason of the subject-matter and character,” might have entertained jurisdiction of it by tbe voluntary action of the claimant.”

Under this statute, different Secretaries have transmitted to this court for investigation and determination claims which bad accrued more than six years before tbe date of their transmission ; and of such is tbe present case.

A resulting question is whether tbe comprehensive language of tbe earlier statute of limitations precludes, in effect, tbe Executive Departments from availing themselves in such cases o tbe power given to them by tbe later act, 1868 — whether, when a department has delayed the payment of a claim until more than six years have elapsed from tbe time it first accrued, tbe Secretary may order payment, but may not secure a judicial investigation of it in this court ?

The cases contemplated by tbe earlier statute are cases where a right of action is conferred upon tbe parties coupled with a limitation that they shall avail themselves of it within a reasonable time; where tbe action is voluntary upon their part; tbe delay exclusively attributable to their own neglect; and tbe bar directly tbe result of their own laches. Tbe cases coming up from tbe Excutive Departments are few; they involve tbe direct personal discretion of tbe Secretary; they occur only where be is in doubt as to what bis official action should be; they come entirely at bis will and often against tbe protest of the party; and, when tbe disputed fact or controverted question is judicially determined, they primarily go back to the department whence they came, to be satisfied out of appropriations made for it. The case is, in effect, as if a Secretary merely sent up an issue of law or of fact to be tried here.

In a word, the two statutes were enacted for entirely different purposes. The one conferred on the claimant a right of action against the government; the other conferred on the Executive Departments a judicial means of investig’ation against claimants. Under the former, the court acquires jurisdiction only by the filing of the claimant’s petition, either directly by himself or indirectly by one of the houses of Congress. Under the latter, it acquires jurisdiction exclusively by the transmission of the claim by a Secretary, the subsequent petition of the party performing merely the office of a pleading.

This case probably turns upon the latter proposition. If, after a claim has been presented to the proper dejiartment in due time, and after it has been examined and allowed by an Auditor and approved and certified by a Comptroller of the Treasury, a Secretary, against the protest of the party, can transmit it to the court, and the court by his action acquire jurisdiction, it seems impossible to ascribe to the legislative intent the inequitable purpose of barring the claim by reason of a lapse of time for which the department and not the party was responsible. (Cyrus C. Clarks Case, 96 U. S., 37.)

This proposition concerning the power of a Secretary to transmit a claim to this court for judicial determination has been in several instances and in various forms before the court, and there have been few questions more exhaustively discussed or carefully considered. In one of the earlier of these cases (Bright’s Case, 6 C. Cls. B., 118), two adverse parties claimed the rent of the same premises. The Secretary of War, being unable to determine which was the owner of the premises and entitled to receive the rent accrued, transmitted their conflicting claims to this court for determination under the statute. One of the contending parties refused to appear and prosecute his claim in this court. Without his appearance no final determination of the controversy could be reached, and the recovery of a judgment by the rival party would have left the demand of the other open, and the defendants liable over to him. It was, therefore, apparent that if jurisdiction could only be acquired by his voluntary appearance, the purpose of the statute would be defeated and the prudent action of the Secretary be utterly unavailing. A very serious question, consequently, was presented, and after mature deliberation it was lield tbat the court acquired jurisdiction of the claim by the transmission of the Secretary.

The last of these cases sets forth an.exhaustive statement of the matured views of the majority of the court on the construetion of the two statutes:

Upon the merits, the court entertains no doubt of the claimant’s right to recover. He was not ordered to his home to await orders, as was the officer in Phisterer’s Case (12 C. Cls. R., 98, 94 U. S. 219), nor to the city of San Francisco, but to the headquarters of the military department. If the headquarters had been moved, he would have been' bound to go with them j if he was kept at a military station constantly awaiting orders,, he was to that extent assigned to duty there, and the responsibility for his non-employment rested with his superior officer.

The judgment of the court is that the claimant recover of the defendants the sum of $1,742.

Davis, J.,

dissenting:

Being constrained to dissent from the judgment rendered by the court, I will briefly state why I cannot concur in it.

I. I hold that the barring clause of the act of March 3, 1863, bars every claim of the several classes cognizable by this court, unless within six years after the' claim first accrues it is put in suit after the manner provided by law.

By the act of March 3,1863, reorganizing the Court of Claims, Congress marked out a new policy for the government. It authorized this court to settle, judicially, disputed claims which might be brought before us through p roper channels, and it fixed a limit of time after which all claims cognizable here and not in suit should be barred.

In a recent case {KendalVs Case) we had occasion to con sider the character of this bar. Speaking through the Chief Justice, we all said:

“ There is a great difference between the terms of this act and those of any other statute of limitations that we have found. We are not aware of any such statute that declares a demand barred, if not sued on within the prescribed time; but the prescription always applies solely to the right of action thereon. The plea of the statute in a suit between individuals is a personal privilege, of which the defendant may or may not avail himself, as he pleases. If he does not interpose it he is deemed to waive it, and no court will set it up for him, no matter how plainly it appears on the face of the declaration or petition that the action is barred. * * * But the parties to a suit in this court have a very different relation to each other from that of individuals in other courts. * * When, therefore, the law declares that ‘ a claim shall be forever barred unless the petition setting forth a statement of the claim be filed in the court within six years after the claim first accrues,’ it is in effect a standing and ever-present plea of limitation, which the court is bound to take cognizance of in every case.”

In deciding the motion in that case, it was not pertinent to inquire why Congress adopted such unusual language in fixing the bar against government claims. My associates take views of the present case which render it necessary for me now to do so.

Before the passáge of the act of March, 1863, executive officers were in the habit of passing upon claims against the government without regard to their date or age, and claimants were accustomed to appeal to Congress from the decisions of the departments. It is not difficult to imagine that such a system might in time become mischievous and perilous.

At the time of the passage of that act the country was engaged in a gigantic war, which increased expenses twenty-fold, and taxed the resources of the Treasury, not only to pay, but even to audit the many claims which the Army and Navy threw upon it. Under these circumstances the legislature determined to convert this court, which before then had been little more than a Congressional commission, into a veritable judicial tribunal. We may assume that it did this with the object of affording a speedy remedy to claimants, as well as, to relieve itself and the Treasury. It incorporated in the act which was to effectuate its new policy the sound principle recognized in all systems of civilized law, and known by the name of “ prescription” in the systems derived from Borne, and when applied to personal property, by the name of “limitation” in the systems derived from the common law of England.

So far as this court is concerned the prescription was most effectual. We held in Kendall’s Case, as already stated, that we cannot permit the agents of the Government to waive it here, even if they should wish to do so. Although we sit with open cloors, and are armed with tbe power to compel t-lie attendance of witnesses and to force tbem to speak under oath., and although our proceedings are condnctedin the presence of scrutinizing attorneys and counsel, representing both sides, and are, asa rule, reviewable in the highest court, the law of 1863 does not intrust us with power to examine into the merits of a claim which is brought here more than sis years after it first accrues.

In my opinion, the same rule of policy applies with greater force to officers of Executive Departments, whose daily business is not watched by the same critical eye, and who have no power compel the attendance of witnesses, and can even in the ‘Treasury apply the test of an oath only to the statements of witnesses who voluntarily appear, but without subjecting them to ■cross-examination by hostile counsel. Only language of the plainest and most unmistakable character can convince me that Congress reposes in executive officers the discretion to pay claims of the classes cognizable by this court after it orders them to be barred here.

When I turn to the act of 1863,1 find not only that no intent to repose such power in an Executive Department appears there, but that, on the contrary, a purpose to take that power away is expressed in perspicuous terms. I find the statutory bar raised against every claim cognizable by the Court of Claims, not solely against such claims as maybe brought here for the court to take cognizance of. It reaches, as we pointed out in Ken-dalls Case, the claims as well as the remedy, whether they are brought here or are presented at the departments. Congress must have used this sweeping language designedly, in order to prohibit accounting officers from allowing and paying claims which we are prohibited from considering.

The argument that executive officers have frequently disregarded this statute has little weight with me. If its language were doubtful, executive construction would be entitled to consideration. Under the circumstances it simply amounts to this, that executive officers have been reluctant to surrender the power which they enjoyed before 1863. Instead of finding in the past disregard of the statute a reason why it should be set aside in the future, it strikes me as better law and sounder imlicy to bring its excellent provisions to the notice of those who are violating them (doubtless unintentionally), in order that they may observe them in future.

Equally unimportant is tbe consideration that the departments or the public creditors may be put to inconvenience by the enforcement of this act. If it bears harshly on any branch of public business or any class of public creditors, Congress will doubtless furnish a speedy remedy. It is better to await legislative relief rather than sacrifice a valuable safeguard to the Treasury by judicial construction.

A claimant who finds himself subjected to a delay in an Executive Department, which threatens to carry his claim unadjusted beyond the time fixed for barring it, has always Ms remedy open in this court. By commencing suit here within the proper time he may always arrest the bar, and thus procure through the machinery of the court the settlement after the lapse of six years which is denied him through departmental machinery. Judge Loring, in his dessenting opinion in the Winnisimmet Company’s Case, presents this view with perspicuity. He says:

“ I think that the statute of 18C8, by its words cited, submits the cases sent here by the head of a department to the same pleadings and evidence, defences and judgments, to which they would have been subject if brought here originally by the claimants or transmitted here by either house of Congress, and that all such cases thus within our jurisdiction are equally within it for all purposes, and are to be administered here in the same way. And I think this construction works injustice to none, but even-handed justice to all. * * ' And 1 do not see that the construction I have contended for subjects a claimant to any hardship at the department. He has ahoays at first his election to carry his claim there or to bring it here, and he can remove it from there and bring it here at any time at his pleasure.” (Winnisimmet Company’s Case, 12 0. 01s. R., 329.)

In the next place, this is the only construction of which the language is capable when tested by the rules of construction established by the Supreme Court.

In deciding that a statute invalidating an assignment of claims against the United States, made before -their allowance and before the issue of a warrant for their payment, rendered all such assignments void, notwithstanding the decisions of this court and the practice of the Treasury to the contrary, the Supreme Court said in a late case:

“We discover nothing in reason, nothing in the mischief the act was plainly intended to remedy, and nothing in the language employed tending to warrant the admission of any exceptions from the comprehensive provisions made; nothing that can justify our holding that, when Congress said all transfers or assignment, partial or entire, absolute or conditional, of claims against the United States, shall be null and'void, they meant they should be in operation only when presented to the accounting officers of the Treasury, but effective when presented everywhere else.” (Gillis’ Case, 95 U. S., 414).

In my judgment, a similar process of vigorous and commonsense reasoning leads to a similar result in the present case. To my mind it as difficult here as it was there to find anythin g in reason, anything in the mischief the act was plainly intended to remedy, anything in the language employed tending to warrant the admission of any exceptions from the comprehensive provisions made; and there is no more in this case than there was in that to justify a court in holding that Congress did not intend that the statutes should be in operation both in this court and in the departments. To complete the parallel, the result, which seems to me to be right, reverses a practice in the Treasury which is said to be uniform, and a decision of this court on a point in which the dissenting judge and the majority concurred. (Winnisimmet Case, dissent, opin., 12 O. Cls. B., 330.)

And, lastly, this construction is in harmony with the views of public policy entertained by the political departments of the Government. In the circular to accounting officers and others, which is quoted by Judge Bichabdson in his dissenting opinion in McKee’s Case, the present distinguished head of the Treasury says:

“ The Treasury Department is admirably organized to pass upon accruing demands upon the Goverment and upon the accounts of disbursing officers. All its machinery and checks are adapted to this duty, and no serious complaint has been, or is likely to be, made of the proper discharge of their duty. But when claims long past due are presented upon ex ¡parte evidence to officers who have no means of calling witnesses, no powers to cross-examine them, no modes of testing the sufficiency of testimony or its credibility, none of the safeguards of an open court of justice, the passage of fraudulent claims is unavoidable. Congress has by law provided a Court of Claims, where within a limited period all demands founded upon contracts may be presented and openly tried and decided. If this remedy in any case should be insufficient, claimants can appeal to Congress, which ma3 grant either a new trial in the courts, or a re-examination in the departments, or directly furnish such relief as it deems right and proper. The Treasury Department is not a court of claims, and tlie reason for withholding tbe ordinary powers of sncb a 'court became apparent to Congress by actual errors that bad occured.” (12 O. Ols. B., 557.)

Thus tbe act of 1863 placed tbe Government in tbe position wbicb. tbe private citizen bad long occupied before tbe law, and reserved to tbe legislature, as tbe political representative of tbe nation tbe right, wbicb tbe individual citizen can always exercise, of waiving tbe bar to tbe statute of limitations.

II. Tbe bar created by tbe act of March 3, 186.3, is, not repealed or affected by tbe act of June 25, 1868.

Tbe act of 1863 provided but two modes by wbicb this court could gain jurisdiction over a claim against tbe Government. A third mode .was created by tbe seventh section of tbe act of June 25, 1868. This authorized tbe bead of a department, in certain specified cases, to transmit claims hither for adjudication.

The act of 1868 did not in terms repeal tbe bar contained in tbe act of 1863, nor did it in terms enlarge tbe powers of this court as to tbe claims of wbicb it might take cognizance.' So far as tbe statute expressed tbe will of tbe legislature in words, it contained nothing to warrant tbe bead of a department in transmitting here a claim wbicb be could not himself lawfully pay, or to authorize this court to render judgment against tbe Government upon such a claim.

Tbe reasons wbicb induced Congress to enact this provision in tbe act of 1868 are stated with tbe usual clearness of tbe writer in tbe opinion of tbe court in tbe Winnisimmet Company’s Case:

"A long-pending dispute bad existed between some of those beads and tbe accounting officers of tbe Treasury as to tlieir respective powers over claims and accounts. The question was submitted successively to Attorneys-General Wirt, Berrien, Taney, Butler, Crittenden, Johnson, Cushing, Bates, and Stanbery, by all of whom it was held that tbe auditing and controlling of accounts were subject to tbe superior supervision of some appropriate bead of a department. * * * In view of these opinions, and to settle tbe dispute by legislation, tbe act of March 30, 1868, was passed, declaring that the act of March 3, 1817, ‘shall not be so construed as to authorize tbe beads of departments to change or modify tbe balances that may be certified to them by the Commissioner of Customs or tbe Comptroller of tbe Treasury; but that such balances, when stated by tbe Auditor and projierly certified by tbe Comptroller, as provided by that act, shall be taken as final and conclusive upon the executive branch of the Government, and be subject to revision only by Congress or the proper courts.’ * * * It will be observed that after its passage, though it provided that the decision of the Comptroller might be reviewed by the proper courts, there was no way prescribed for the head of a department, however firm his conviction that a claim ought not to be paid, to bring it under such review. -To meet this difficulty, as we suppose, the same Congress, in the seventh section of the act of June 25, 1868, authorized the heads of departments to transmit certain descriptions of claims here.”

This is undoubtedly the true and., the only motive which induced Congress to enact this provision in the act of 1868. To accomplish this simple purpose it was not necessary to disturb the bar which had been erected in 1883, and, in my judgment, it was not disturbed.

Had there been no previous or other legislation, the head of a department, being authorized to transmit claims here “ whenever”'one should be presented involving disputed facts or controverted law, would have been empowered to transmit any claim of that character, without reference to its age. But under the circumstances this power was to be exercised with reference to the restraints imposed by the previous legislation of 1883; especially as the act of 1868 itself required that he should only transmit claims belonging to one of the several classes of cases of which, by reason of their subject-matter or character, we could take cognizance under existing laws on the voluntary act of the claimant.

Being of the opinion that the head of a department can transmit here for our adjudication only claims which he is authorized to pay when there are no disputed facts or controverted law, and that we are authorized to render judgment against the government on a claim so transmitted only when we might have given judgment against it had the claim been brought here by the voluntary act of the claimant, I regard the claimant’s demand as barred by the statute of limitations, and I think the petition should be dismissed, 
      
      
         In Pugh’s Case (decided on the same day) the Supreme Court rests its-decision entirely upon the uniform construction given to a doubtful statute by the Executive Departments and the Court of Claims; and ia Mrs. Alex-
        
        cinder’s Case (7 C. Cls. R., 205, 12 Wall., 177), where the Pension Bureau had. given a certain construction to a statute for a long period of time and Congress apparently had acquiesced in it, that the construction which should he given by the court was not an open question as if the matter were res nova.
      
     
      
       The opinion here referred to is that of the Chief J ustice in the TFinnisim-mei Company’s Case (12 C. Cls. K., 319).