Case ID: mich-app_153/html/0551-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

ULERY v COY
    Docket No. 88870.
    Submitted June 11, 1986, at Grand Rapids.
    Decided July 22, 1986.
    Leave to appeal applied for.
    Plaintiff, Charlene C. Ulery, individually and as next friend of Heather L. Ulery, a minor, filed suit in the Calhoun Circuit Court against defendant, Franklin L. Coy. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered a serious impairment of body function, i.e., use of her left shoulder, as a result of injuries she sustained in an automobile accident involving defendant. The trial court, Paul Nicolich, J., granted summary disposition in favor of defendant only as to plaintiff’s claim for noneconomic losses under the no-fault act, ruling that plaintiff’s injuries did not meet the threshold for serious impairment of body function. Plaintiff, in her individual capacity only, appealed as of right from the trial court’s certified final order dismissing her claim for noneconomic losses. Held:
    
    1. Plaintiff’s injuries consisting of a bump on her collarbone, chronic grade two acromioclavicular separation of the left shoulder, and an atrophied drooping shoulder, and her allegations of lack of strength in her arm, limitation of movement, lack of ability to grip with her hand, and inability to return to work as a waitress, did not establish a serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act.
    2. Plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for lost wages not covered by the no-fault act was not encompassed by the certified final order from which plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals therefore did not address that issue for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
    References
    Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 657-667.
    Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 340 et seq.
    
    What constitutes sufficiently serious personal injury, disability, impairment, or the like to justify recovery of damages outside of no-fault automobile insurance coverage. 33 ALR4th 767.
    See also the annotations in the ALR3d/4th Quick Index under Appeal and Error; Rules of Court.
    
      1. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment op Body Function.
    A serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act is to be measured by an objective standard which looks to the effect of an injury on a person’s general ability to live a normal life; so viewed, an injury, to meet the threshold, must be objectively manifested and must impair an important body function (MCL 500.3135[1]; MSA 24.13135[1]).
    2. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment op Body Function.
    The seriousness of a plaintiffs injury under the no-fault act must be determined by an objective evaluation of its effect on the person’s body functions and the ability to perform common day-to-day activities, and not by extrinsic considerations such as the nature of the person’s employment (MCL 500.3135[1]; MSA 24.13135[1]).
    3. Appeal — Court op Appeals — Court Rules.
    The Court of Appeals, in an appeal as of right from a trial court’s certified final order on less than all the claims of all the parties, only has jurisdiction to entertain appeals as of right from such certified final order and lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any other order in the case or issues not related to the claims or issues disposed of in the final order (MCR 2.604[A], 7.203[A], 7.203[B]).
    
      James E. Gould, P.C. (by James E. Gould), for plaintiff.
    
      Allen & Letzring (by Daniel E. Brophy), for defendant.
    Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Gribbs and R. I. Cooper, JJ.
    
      
       Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
    
   Per Curiam.

This appeal arises out of a 1981 automobile accident in which defendant allegedly failed to heed a stop sign. Plaintiffs complained of various maladies arising from the accident. Following discovery, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The trial court granted the motion with respect to plaintiffs’ noneconomic injuries, concluding that there was no serious impairment of body function. Plaintiff Charlene Ulery, in her individual capacity only, now appeals and we affirm.

To recover, Ulery must establish that she has suffered a serious impairment of an important body function and that her injuries were objectively manifested. Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982); Routley v Dault, 140 Mich App 190; 363 NW2d 450 (1984), lv gtd 422 Mich 938 (1985); Wolkow v Eubank, 139 Mich App 1; 360 NW2d 320 (1984).

In this case, plaintiff was diagnosed as having an upward protrusion of the clavicle at the end near the shoulder joint as well as a chronic grade two acromioclavicular separation of the left shoulder. Additionally, there is apparently a droop to her left shoulder, which is atrophied. Examining physicians have noted some limitation in her shoulder movement.

While we have little difficulty in agreeing with plaintiff that the shoulder and its use involves an important body function and that her injuries were objectively manifested by x-ray and palpation, we cannot agree with her that she has a serious impairment of that body function. Our review of the record reveals allegations that plaintiff lacks strength in her arm, some limitation of movement and some loss of her ability to grip with her hand. Plaintiff also has indicated to an examining psychologist, Dr. Van Ostenberg, that she avoids lifting at shoulder level, does nbt pick up groceries or her granddaughter, avoids opening car doors, does not sleep on her left shoulder, has her husband run the sweeper, and has difficulty giving her husband back rubs. Finally, the examining physician and psychologist both indicated that plaintiff cannot return to work as a waitress unless she successfully undergoes corrective surgery.

While it appears that plaintiff has suffered some adverse impact as a result of the accident, her injuries do not rise to the level of serious impairment of body function. As this Court recently stated in Routley v Dault, supra, p 195:

Although plaintiff allegedly continues to experience some pain, he is not confined to bed and he is able to perform normal body functions, and to engage in normal day-to-day activities. There is nothing to indicate that plaintiff is incapacitated or that his discomfort interferes with his normal life style. See McDonald v Oberlin, 127 Mich App 73, 76; 338 NW2d 725 (1983); Braden v Lee, [133 Mich App 215; 348 NW2d 63 (1984)]. The fact that plaintiffs previous employment involved some heavy lifting does not change the intrinsic nature or extent of the injury. The seriousness of the injury must be determined by an objective evaluation of its effect on the person’s body functions and the ability to perform common day-to-day activities, and not by extrinsic considerations such as the nature of the person’s employment.

Similarly, in Guerrero v Schoolmeester, 135 Mich App 742, 751; 356 NW2d 251 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 881 (1985), we stated:

While there is testimony that plaintiff experienced difficulties in her daily life, i.e., dropping plates, inability to crochet, and difficulty in driving, we do not find that such difficulties interfered "in any significant manner” with plaintiffs normal life style, as required under this Court’s opinion in Braden. Further, nothing in the record suggests that plaintiff is unable to engage in gainful employment in an area which does not require lifting over the weight restrictions imposed by Dr. Campbell. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendants.

In the case at bar, we do not believe that the record before us establishes that plaintiffs difficulties have interfered in a significant manner with her ability to lead a normal life style. Similarly, while plaintiff apparently cannot return to work as a waitress, there is no indication that she cannot obtain gainful employment in a less physically demanding position.

We now turn to plaintiff’s claim that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim for lost wages not covered by the no-fault act. See MCL 500.3135(2)(c); MSA 24.13135(2)(c). However, as pointed out by defendant, the trial court granted summary disposition with respect to noneconomic damages only. The order reads in part as follows:

Now, THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said motion for summary disposition is granted in favor of defendant Franklin Lee Coy and against plaintiffs Charlene C. Ulery and Heather Ulery and said plaintiffs’ claims against said defendant for all noneconomic loss damage are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ordered and adjudged that there is no just reason for delay and that this is a final order and judgment and may be so entered. [Emphasis added.]

As the trial court’s order indicates, the summary disposition was a certified final order on less than all the claims of all the parties. MCR 2.604(A). The Court of Appeals only has jurisdiction to hear an appeal as of right from a final order. MCR 7.203(A). Nonfinal orders can only be appealed by leave granted. MCR 7.203(B). Where an order has been certified by the trial court as a final order for purposes of appeal under MCR 2.604(A), this Court only has jurisdiction to entertain appeals as of right from that certified final order. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider any other order in the case or issues unrelated to the claims or issues disposed of in the final order.

In this case, plaintiff has taken an appeal as of right from the above-quoted certified final order. As noted above, that order only disposed of plaintiffs noneconomic claims. We, therefore, lack jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s economic claims.

Affirmed. Costs to defendant. 
      
       That is, a bump on her clavicle, or collarbone.
     
      
       Indeed, it appears that plaintiff could return to work as a waitress following surgery.