Case ID: f-appx_76/html/0551-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Luis SERRANO-SANTIAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 03-40222.
    Summary Calendar
    United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    Sept. 23, 2003.
    James Lee Turner, Assistant US Attorney, US Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, Mark Michael Dowd, US Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Brownsville, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Roland E Dahlin, II, Federal Public Defender, Jeffrey L. Wilde, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Laura Fletcher Leavitt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM.

Jose Luis Serrano-Santiago appeals his guilty-plea conviction and sentence for being an alien unlawfully found in the United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).

Serrano argues that his conviction and sentence are invalid because the Fed. R.Crim. P. 11 guilty plea colloquy was delegated to the magistrate judge. Serrano concedes that this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent, but raises it to preserve the issue for further review. We held in United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 266-69 (5th Cir.1997), that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) provides a magistrate judge with the statutory authority to conduct a Fed. R.Crim. P. 11 guilty plea proceeding and that this delegation of authority does not violate the Constitution. Therefore, Serrano’s argument is foreclosed.

Serrano also argues that his state conviction for aggravated assault, for which he received an imprisonment term of one year, was a misdemeanor that does not qualify as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and therefore the district court erred when it increased his base offense level by eight levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(C). He concedes that this argument is also foreclosed, but raises it to preserve it for further review.

We held in United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167-68 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 913, 122 S.Ct. 2377, 153 L.Ed.2d 196 (2002), that a crime deemed a misdemeanor under state law could fall within the definition of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) as a crime of violence punishable by at least one year of imprisonment and could thus be considered an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The court in Uñas-Escobar analyzed a pre-2001 version of the Guidelines. Although the 2001 Guidelines were amended to include a definition of a misdemeanor, and that definition is included in U.S.S.G. § § 2L1.2, comment. (n.3(A)), there was no change in the Sentencing Guidelines as to what constitutes an aggravated felony under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. See United States v. Posadas-Mendez, No. 02-41542, 67 Fed.Appx. 252, 2003 WL 21196167, **1-2 (5th Cir. May 13, 2003)(unpublished). Therefore, the reasoning of Uñas-Escobar forecloses Serrano’s argument, and his state conviction for aggravated assault for which he was sentenced to one year of imprisonment is an aggravated felony under the 2002 version of the Guidelines. See Posadas-Mendez, No. 02-41542, **1-2; Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d at 167-68.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.