Case ID: f-appx_462/html/0724-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Pedro ROSALES-MARTINEZ, a.k.a. Pete M. Rosales, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 07-10524.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 19, 2011.
    
    Filed Dec. 21, 2011.
    As Amended April 9, 2012.
    George Ferko, Jonathan Baghdassarian Granoff, Esquire, USTU-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appel-lee.
    David Taylor Shannon, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Pedro Rosales-Martinez appeals from the 65-month sentence imposed following his bench-trial conviction for attempted illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm without prejudice to an application by Rosales-Martinez to the district court to vacate his sentence and resentence him consistent with this decision.

Rosales-Martinez contends that the district court committed plain error when it imposed a 16-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) based on his conviction for attempted second-degree burglary in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-1507.

Rosales-Martinez’s conviction is not categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See United States v. Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir.1997) (“Arizona courts have expanded the [burglary] statute beyond generic burglary because they have interpreted the statute to allow a conviction even if the intent to commit the crime was formed after entering the structure and/or the entry was privileged.”).

The district court plainly erred in applying the 16-level enhancement, because the conviction records relating to Rosales-Martinez’s burglary conviction are insufficient under the modified categorical approach to demonstrate that his conviction necessarily rested on facts satisfying the elements of generic burglary. See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 945-46 (9th Cir.2011) (en banc). At sentencing, the government introduced the complaint, the information, verdict forms and sentencing papers. These documents, as well as the jury instructions, simply repeat the elements of Arizona burglary and do not establish that Rosales-Martinez formed the intent to commit the burglary before entering the structure, or that his entry was unlawful or unprivileged, or that he burgled an immovable structure. See United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084, 1092 (9th Cir.2010); see also AguilasMontes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 946 (“[Conviction records for [Arizona] burglary cannot demonstrate that a defendant was convicted of generic burglary unless they do something more than simply repeat the elements of [Arizona] burglary.”).

Erroneous application of a sentencing enhancement affects the defendant’s substantial rights and “affect[s] both the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” United States v. Portillo-Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.2001). Accordingly, Rosales-Martinez is entitled to resen-tencing. However, the district court cannot sentence Rosales-Martinez at this time because he has been released and deported. We accordingly affirm the sentence imposed by the district court, but do so without prejudice to an application by Rosales-Martinez to the district court to vacate his sentence and resentence him consistent with this decision at such time, if ever, that he is in this country and available for resentencing. See United States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, 366 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir.2004).

We grant Rosales-Martinez’s requests for judicial notice, and deny as moot his motion to lift the stay.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.