Case ID: us-ct-cl_36/html/0131-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Howky, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Departmental, 51.
    Decided March 25, 1901.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The State presents a claim for reimbursement under the Act 27th July, 1861 (12 Stat. L., p. 276), on account of expenses incurred in raising troops for the United States during the civil war. The claim is transmitted to the court by the Secretary of the Treasury under the Bowman and Tucker acts. The claimant now insists that it is entitled to judgment under section 13 of the latter act. It appears that the money paid by the State was for damage done to grounds and buildings used as camps, and these payments were made under proceedings against the State, which it is claimed were in the nature of judgments.
    I.The Act 27th July, 1861 (12 Stat. L., p. 276), was intended to indemnify the States which raised troops for the General Government during the civil war, but it is expressly limited to “ expenses properly incurred” in “enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting” troops.
    II.Money expended by a State “for damage done grounds and buildings used as camps” while State troops were being enrolled, is not covered by the act. Such damage would not be a basis for an action on contract or a subject for reimbursement under the statute.
    III. The accounting officers of the Treasury have no jurisdiction to settle claims for unliquidated damages.
    IV. The United States are not bound by judgments against a State in State courts for moneys expended by the State for the benefit of the United States.
    V.Final judgment under section 13 of the Tucker Act can be rendered only where a claimant could recover if the suit had been brought under the general jurisdiction of the court.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The State of Pennsylvania paid to various persons and corporations the sum of $47,129.47 for damages done grounds and buildings used as camps of rendezvous recruiting State troops (while the same were being enrolled, subsisted, clothed, supplied, armed, and equipped to suppress the insurrection against the United States, which troops were afterwards mustered into the service of the United States), ascertained under the following act of the legislature of that State, approved April 16, 1862 (Sess. Laws, 587), to wit:
    Sec. 8. “That in all counties of the State where lands or tenements were occupied by troops the owner or owners thereof may apply by petition, setting forth the facts and the amount claimed with affidavit of claimant as to the'truth of the petition, to the court of common pleas of the county in which the lands or tenements are situated, and upon such application the court shall appoint three disinterested appraisers, who shall within twenty days after their appointment, having first been duly sworn or affirmed to make a just and true valuation of the alleged damages, proceed to view the premises and hear any testimony presented or desired by said appraisers, and shall report the sum they find to be due,, if any, with all the testimony, to said court; the said court may confirm said report or refer it back to the same appraisers, as best in the opinion of the court subserves the ends of justice, and upon the confirmation-of such report the amount therein stated to be due shall be certified with all the testimony by the prothonotary of said court to the board appointed by the first section of this act, to be examined and reported upon to the legislature.”
    The first section of the act which creates the above board provides as follows:
    “That the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general, and the commissary-general shall form a board, any two of whom shall form a quorum, to whom all claims contracted for the subsistence, clothing, transporting, or organizing' of volunteers under orders of an authorized officer of the State shall be submitted, with power to take testimony, whose report, accompanied by the evidence, shall be returned by them to' the auditor-general for his approval or disapproval, whose decision shall be final and conclusive, and the auditor-general is hereby authorized and directed to draw his warrant on the State treasurer for the amount allowed in each case.”
    The following is a copy of an act of the legislature under which some of the items of the claim were paid:
    “That the auditor-general and State treasurer are authorized and required to examine whether any portion or all of the damages adjudicated in favor of the ‘ Allegheny, Chester, and Lebanon agricultural societies ’ arising out of the occupation of their fair grounds by State troops during the late war under the eighth section of the act of April 16, 1862, entitled 4 An act to provide for the adjudication and payment of certain military claims,’ is properly chargeable to the State of Pennsylvania, and to certify the amount due, if any, to the auditor-general, who is hereby authorized and required to draw his warrant upon the Sta,te treasurer in favor of said ‘ Allegheny, Chester, and Lebanon County agricultural societies ’ for the sum so certified, which shall be paid out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated.”
    Approved March IT, 1869, Laws of Penn., 3T7.
    II. The several sums of money shown by the items were paid upon the certificates of the military board after the same had been examined by the auditor-general of Pennsylvania, but in no case except one were judgments rendered confirming the reports of the appraisers appointed under the foregoing act of the legislature.
    III. One item of the' claim was paid upon a certificate emanating from the court of common pleas of Philadelphia confirming a report of the appraisers under a special act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, approved May 23, 1871, page 1316-1367, Laws of Pennsylvania, as follows:
    “ That the attorney-general of the State is hereby authorized to enter into an agreement with the surviving heirs of Catherine Yohe that an amicable action may be entered in the common pleas of Philadelphia County between the said heirs and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Commonwealth is liable to the said heirs for an}*- damages done to the ‘Jones Hotel’ in Philadelphia by Pennsylvania troops during the late rebellion, and for what sum; either party to have the right of appeal to the supreme court as in other cases. And the State treasurer is hereby authorized and required to pay any judgment that may be found in favor of said heirs: Provided, That no more than the sum of $17,000 shall be paid by the State treasurer in satisfaction of said claim.”
    IY. That the aforesaid sum of money so paid by the State is composed of thirtjr-two items, all of which, except the last item for the sum of 11,054.48, was paid within a period of six years from the time when the same were presented by the State to the Treasuiy Department for reimbursement.
    Y. That the last item of said claim for $1,054.48 was not presented to the Treasury Department for reimbursement by the State within six years from the date when the same was paid by the State.
    VI. That the said claim was transmitted to this court by the Secretary of the Treasury January 4, 1897, under the provisions of the second section of an act of Congress approved March 3, 1883'(22 Stat. L., 485).
    YU. Following is a copj^ of rule 7 governing the settlement of State war claims under the act of July 27, 1861, adopted by the Treasury Department early after the passage of said act, to wit:
    “Claims growing out of the impressment of property or services, and for damages done to individuals or their property, are not authorized to be paid. Provision for such claims must be made by special act of Congress when not already provided for by general laws.”
    
      Mr.. II. M. Foote for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Assistant Attorney- General Pradt for the defendants.
   Howky, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The State of Pennsylvania, on June 30, 1874, presented to the Secretary of the Treasury the ninth installment of certain war claims amounting to $100,780.45, for reimbursement under the act of July 27, 1861 (12 Stat. L., 276), on account of expenses alleged to have been incurred by the State in raising troops. Of this claim $46,074.69 were sums claimed to have been paid to various persons for the use and occupation of property by troops enrolled during the war for the service of the United States. As to these sums, payment was suspended for proof more clearly showing when the property was used and the length of time occupied and by what regiments and by what authority, and whether for State troops or for troops who were afterward mustered into the service of the United States, and also whether any part thereof was for damages to buildings or grounds.

On final presentation of the matter, additional evidence was offered showing that, in September, 1861, the Secretary of W ar had by letter conferred upon the governor of Pennsylvania discretionary power to do whatever in his judgment seemed best in preparing troops for the service of the United States. It was further stated that the vouchers on file were sustained by certain judgments rendered in various counties of Pennsylvania by which contract relations between the State and the owners whose property was alleged to have been used or damaged was established for the rental value of the property.

The claim was rejected December 22, 1896, on the interpretation given by the Treasury Department to the statutes providing for the reimbursement of the States, it being held that the accounting officers could not entertain claims for damages under a rule (adopted under the act of 1861) which provided that claims growing out of the impressment of prop-ertj'- or services, and for damages done to individuals or their property, were not authorized to be paid, but that such claims must be paid, if at all, by special act of Congress if not already provided for by general laws.

The accounting officers of the Treasury have no jurisdiction to settle claims for unliquidated damages. By waj" of answer to this suggestion plaintiff in submitting the cause relied upon the proposition that the various sums of money mentioned in the vouchers were paid in satisfaction of judgments of the courts .of common pleas of Pennsylvania, rendered under the provisions of the act of the legislature of that State set forth in the findings.

Transcripts of the judgments not having been filed, and the attention of counsel being directed to the omission, it is now contended that, though the use of the term ‘ ‘ judgments ” in referring to the proceedings was’ language too broad (except as to one item, to sustain which the transcript is now filed), yet the money was paid in satisfaction of amounts certified under the provisions of an act of the legislature, and the payments should be recognized as proper, because the amount of the certificate in each item was examined by the auditor-general of Pennsylvania with the view of only making such allowances as fairly compensated the owners.

The proceedings and orders of the courts on the items were interlocutory in character and were not even binding on the accounting officers of the State. While it is conceded that the steps taken and the orders issued in the courts were not intended to bind the State’s accounting officers, yet it is further argued that when the entire proceedings were submitted to the military board for a report, the action of the State auditor-general approving the findings of the board (and upon which payments of the items resulted) was judicial action, and the conclusions of that officer must be accepted as final. But this contention ignores the fact that the defendants were not parties to the proceedings in the courts of Pennsylvania. Even if those proceeding's had resulted in final judgment against Pennsylvania, the United States would not be bound by the action of the officer whose duty it was to authorize the payments.

Looking to the acts of the legislature under which the legal proceedings were instituted, the claim is for damages done to the owners of buildings and grounds, and being unliquidated damages, so far as the United States are concerned, the claim can not be adjusted in the Treasury. To the extent that the claim is for rent under an express agreement, or for use and occupation of premises under an implied contract, reimbursement would follow could the findings establish with any certainty that the items or parts of the items are within this rule. As the findings do not establish that any items of the claim are for rent or other expenses properly incurred, the accounting officers have no jurisdiction to pay.

The eighth section of the act of the Pennsylvania legislature provided for the appointment of three appraisers by the courts who, after being sworn, were required to view the premises, and after hearing evidence, to make a just and true valuation of the alleged damages for the occupation of the buildings and grounds used b3r the troops and report the sum found to be due, if any, with all the testimony to the court. The presumption is that the amounts due by way of rent for the use of the property had already been paid and that the passage of the act was intended to enable the owners of the property to have compensation for damages sustained by them during the use. There is no reason to believe that the act was intended to compensate owners for rental claims, but to do what its language purports should be done — that is, to compensate the owners of property for damages done by the troops while they were being prepared for service.

One item of the claim is founded upon the report of the appraisers for the sum of $17,000, and this report was confirmed by the court and duty certified as required by the act of the legislature. But an examination of the act upon -which the judgment is founded shows that the item is for damages done to a hotel in Philadelphia. The language of the act excludes the idea that any contract, express or implied, existed for the payment of rent, or that the claim was for the rental value of the property at all.

The act of Congress of July 27, 1861, provides that — ■

“The Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, directed, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay to the governor of any State, or to his duly authorized agents, the costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred by such State for enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and. transporting its troops employed in aiding to suppress the present insurrection against the United States, to be settled upon proper vouchers to be filed and passed upon by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury.”

Bjr joint resolution of Congress, approved March 8, 1862, it was declared that the above act should be construed to apply to expenses incurred as well after as before the date of the approval thereon.

It is plain that this statute authorized the governors of States to act as agents of the General Government in doing-certain specified things, viz, in “ enrolling, subsisting, clothing, supplying, arming, equipping, paying, and transporting” troops; and it is equally plain that the agency did not extend beyond the authority expressly given. It is likewise plain that the liability created by the statute goes no further. An action ex contractu could not be maintained if the enlistment of the troops had been carried out by officers of the United States; and under any interpretation given to the act of July 27,1861, the indemnity promised did not include the payment of damages to property by the wrongful act of State troops. Th'e question is not whether the expenses mentioned in the vouchers were incurred in raising troops which were subsequently mustered into the service of the United States, but whether such payments were for expenses properrl/y 'mmrred by the State. In a claim like this, originating from a violation of the State’s agreement to take care of property used by its troops, payment was properly withheld by the Treasury officials of the United States.

The motion for judgment on the claim in this court in favor of the claimant under the provisions of the thirteenth section of the act of Congress approved March 3, 1881 (1 Supp. Rev. Stat., 559), is denied, and a copy of this opinion will be certified to the Secretary of the Treasury.