Case ID: f-appx_424/html/0063-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Sandra Maria MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-2741-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    June 16, 2011.
    
      Glenn L. Formica, New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Linda Wernery, Assistant Director; James E. Grimes, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: ROGER J. MINER, GUIDO CALABRESI and RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Sandra Maria Mendoza, a native and citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a June 10, 2010 order of the BIA affirming the July 25, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“LJ”) Michael W. Straus, which denied her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and cancellation of removal. In re Sandra Maria Mendoza, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. June 10, 2010), aff'g No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (Immig.Ct.Hartford, July 25, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA decision. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).

I. Asylum, Withholding of Removal and CAT Relief

The regulations require IJs to exercise the Attorney General’s discretion to deny asylum to applicants who establish eligibility based solely on past persecution when the government establishes a fundamental change in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of well-founded fear. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (2011). Here, the agency noted that the civil war in Guatemala between the government and the guerillas ended over ten years ago. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that there was a fundamental change in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution by Guatemalan guerillas. Moreover, after Mendoza was shot, she moved from her hometown of Jutiapa, Guatemala, to Guatemala City, where she lived for five years without incident. As a result, even if Mendoza had a well-founded fear of future persecution if she were to return to Guatemala, the record shows that she could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the country. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii) (2011). Consequently, substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Mendoza does not have a well-founded fear of persecution should she return to Guatemala. Furthermore, although Mendoza was shot in the leg, because the injuries she suffered did not limit her ability to earn a living or affect her psychologically to any great extent, the agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that she did not merit a humanitarian grant of asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)(upholding the denial of humanitarian asylum to a supporter of the Democratic Party in Albania who had been beaten and harassed on six occasions); Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir.2006).

Although Mendoza argues that she will likely be tortured if removed to Guatemala, she has presented no evidence other than general assertions of violent gang activity, which are insufficient to demonstrate her eligibility for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a) (2011); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir.2005) (concluding that particularized evidence showing the likelihood of torture is necessary to establish eligibility for CAT protection).

II. Cancellation of Removal

Mendoza’s petition for review of the agency’s denial of her application for cancellation of removal simply amounts to a challenge to the agency’s factual findings regarding “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” over which this court lacks jurisdiction. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1), 1252(a)(2)(B); see also Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir.2008). Although pursuant to the REAL ID Act we retain jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and questions of law, we “lack jurisdiction to review any legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006); Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 40 (citations omitted). Mendoza argues that agency erred as a matter of law by applying the wrong legal standard when considering whether her son would experience the requisite hardship if she were removed to Guatemala, because the IJ only considered the standard as set out in Matter of Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A.2001). This argument is specifically foreclosed by Barco-Sandoval as being “so insubstantial and frivolous as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” 516 F.3d at 40. Mendoza does not raise a colorable question of law, and, accordingly, we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction as to the challenge to the denial of cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2006); Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED in part and DISMISSED in part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).