Case ID: sc-eq_3/html/0514-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

TEBIUTAR? 1813.
    C4si5 iiXu.
    A promise ther*5 to him °on6 his marriage, by theg-iftofcer-tain property, is binding'.— And though the father «es Veil* ÜCj’ÍOl'lTl» ¿d tiie prom-tim" hlS made other AsposUnoM] the son is titled to reco ver from his father’s exe-enters.
    George Caborne vs. Wm. Godfrey and others, executors and legatees of Robert Caborne.
    [Tried beforé Chancellor Desaussiire,
    February 1813.]
    
    THIS cause was argued very fully in the Circuit Court of Equity, but as the argument was repeated and enlarged in the hearing on the Court of Appeals, it will bo stated hereafter.
    The Court took time to deliberate, and afterwards des-livered the following decree :
    This is a suit brought to recover a certain number of llI1der a letter written to the complainant by his a short time before his marriage 5 and also to re-hover the property bequeathed to him by his father's will, unless the same should be set aside, as far as it ope- . . . . * rated agamst the complainants I he letter is in these —, ^ 01 uS .
    
      a Great Swamp, 15th Nov. 1796.
    
    
      “ Hear George, — I am informed you are going to be $ if so, I sincerely wish you and the lady happy, whoever may. be your wife, and hope you will do all in. y0ul. p0wer to render her life so. Whether you marry not, I shall leave you in a deed of gift, eleven or , , , , ° twelve negroes, and half my stock; tins you will be cer¿ain 0f and perhaps more.- I am now about having the writings drawn by a lawyer. Why don't you write a few lines this way and let me know the truth of the report. I am your affectionate father.
    “ Robert Caborne.
    To Mr. George Caborne.”
    In less than two months after the date of this letter, to wit, on the 12th January, 1797? the son, George Ca-borne, intermarried with Mrs. Catharine Cain, who brought him some property, whereon they have principally subsisted during the marriage. Mr. Caborpe, the father, neither delivered his son any negroes or a deed for any in his life time, nor did the son institute any subí íbera during his father’s life time, which it is said his jrespert for his father prevented. They lived at a dis-tanee from each other, nevertheless the harmony was not broken. In June, 1808, Mr. Robert Caborne, the father, made his last will and testament, wherein and Whereby he made the following dispositions : That after the payment of his just debts and funeral expenses, he gave and bequeathed to his dear wife, Mary Caborne, one moiety of his ready money, and the other moiety of his ready money he bequeathed to his dear son, George Caborne. He also bequeathed his negro slaves and his stock of cattle to his son George and William Godfrey, as trustees, to permit and suffer his said wife to have the use and labor of nine slaves, (whom he named), with the: increase of the females, and half of his stock of cattle for and during the term of her natural life and no longer, and from and immediately after her- decease,, then in„ trust for the use of his. son, G. Caborne, during his. natural life and no longer. And upon the further trust to permit an,d. suffer.his son George to have the use of seven negroes, (whom he names) with the increase of the females, and the other half of his stock of cattle during the term of his natural life and no longer $ and from and immediately after the decease of his said wife, Mary, and of his son George, the testator bequeathed all the aforesaid negro., slaves (excepting Sam.) unto William Godfrey, Sarah. Griggs and William C. Pinckney, to them and their heirs and assigns forever., To William Godfrey he bequeaths Sam. above mentioned. He desires proper measures to be taken to emancipate the gir;l Bella. All the rest and residue of his estate the testator bequeathed to his wife Mary and his son George to bo equally divided between them. Mr. Robert Caborne, the testator, died in April,. 1809, leaving his will in full force j whereupon William Godfrey proved the same in the Court of Ordinary and qualified thereon as cxecuior, The testator left no other family than his wife and his ,son George, and he left little or no estate but what is mentioned in the will. The inventory of his estate men - lions nineteen negroes, and it is agreed that the l’eady money left by him amounted to about three thousand dollars. The legatees to whom the negroes are devised over at the death of his wife and son are not related to the testator. The son George is dissatisfied with the will, and there is an expression in the bill praying that the will may be set aside, and declared void. It does not appear however that he contested the will in the Court of Ordinary, which was the proper tribunal for its discussion in the first instance. I must therefore consider the will to have been properly proved and established. And I presume the expression in the bill meant no more than that the will should not be allowed to operate to the prejudice of the complainant’s rights founded on the letter promising him eleven or twelve negroes, to whom he insists that he is entitled as well as to the bequests in the will 5 for no testimony was adduced, and no argument was used against the due execution of the will.
    On'the argument of the cause the claims of the complainant were resisted on the following grounds. 1st. That the letter of the 15th Nov, 1796, from Robert Ca-borne to his son George, contains no positive promise at all | and that if there was any positive promise it was without any valuable or good consideration, and therefore is nudum pactum and void. 2d. That if it were not nudum pactum, the promise has been performed and satisfied, and that by the will. 3d. That if not satisfied it is a case of election, and that the complainant must choose between the promise and the will. See 2d Yes, 67.
    
    In considering the first question I admit that the pro-, mise must be positive, in order to be binding. On examining the letter carefully it does appear to me to contain a distinct and positive promise to give the son eleven or twelve negroes and half his stock. He says of this yoii may be sure, and perhaps more. He- himself makes the distinction between what is certain, and what is to depend upon further consideration $ and he adds, that he is now about to have the writings drawn up by a lawyer. When we consider this as a letter from a father to a son, and not penned with the precision of a formal Heed, I cannot well imagine how the assurance or promise could hare been more distinctly or positively made. It was objected that it was uncertain as to tlie'number of negroes, the promise being in the alternative eleven or twelve negroes. But surely the promise is certain as ^0 11 ; it might be more, but not less. It was further objected that the quantity of estate in the negroes is not stated. But in gifts or dispositions of personal property, no words of inheritance or perpetuity are necessary; every disposition of negroes, cattle or other personal property is absolute, unless restrained by words limiting the extent of the gift or disposition. This is the general rule, and it is to be taken in the strongest sense, where the provision is about to be made by a father for an only child on the point of marriage. With respect to the consideration of the promise, it appears to have been made with a view to his son’s marriage. He tells his son he has heard that he is about to be married, and he is evidently pleased with it. He therefore holds out encouragement to him to proceed and carry his intentions into eifect. He assures him he will make a provision for him, which he states. It is material that the letter has no other object and treats of no other subject than the contemplated marriage, and the provision he would make for him in that event. He adds indeed as has been urged in argument for the defendants, that he would give him the negroes and stock, whether iio married or not.\ But surely the promise to give the son eleven negroes 1 on the marriage is not weakened by the declaration that j he will give in all events. The language of the father fairly viewed is, I have heard you are about to be married, I am well pleased with this ; I am on that account, drawn to make you this communication, stating what 1 can do for you, and promising to make that provision to encourage and aid you in your marriage. But such is my natural affection for you, that I promise to make you that gift at all events. Would not the. effect be oonclu-sive on the mind of a parent, whose daughter was court* ed by a young gentleman on his producing such a letter to him from his father, that the provision promised him, was well assured and certain ? Undoubtedly it would. What use was made of the letter, and what effect was produced by it, was not shewn by any evidence ; but it was calculated to produce a great effect, and to remove objections on the score of fortune. And we see that in fact the marriage took effect within two months after the date of the letter. The vehement presumption therefore is that the letter had contributed to the desired effect. I feel therefore warranted in saying that this was a solemn promise made by a father to a son to induce and promote his marriage, and that the marriage took effect soon after with a lady of some fortune, and that (marriage being the highest consideration known to the law) the promise is binding on the father, and that the subsequent generality of the promise ought not to Weaken the effect of the leading consideration. It was objected that the locus penitcntice remained with the father till the deed was executed or the negroes delivered. But I answer that if the locus penitentice was in the father, it could only be till the marriage took effect ; after that, it was at an end. And it is not pretended, and there was not a shadow of proof that he did recaí the promise (made in his letter) before the marriage j or that he changed his mind as to his son’s marriage. And doubt much if after a treaty of marriage to which the father consented and had promised to make a provision, and the affections of the parties were engaged, whether, the father would be at liberty to retract his promise without there existed some strong reasons to justify his objections. I think some of the cases go as far as this, and I am sure the reason and equity of them do. If non-performance of a contract or promise, was to be considered as evidence of the existence and exercise of locus penitentice, how many contracts should we see dissolved on that pretence, which yet our Courts decree execution of. Another objection was made that this, promise was general, not with a view to a particular lady, and no treaty was made with her or her friend. It is 1 think fairly answered, that the strong probability is, that when the father heard that his son was courting, he ° heard also who the lady was and was satisfied. Besides the son was of mature age, and the father wished the son settled, and manifestly confided in his discretion as to his choice. He leaves it to him and approves of whatever he should do, and writes a letter promising a provision which was calculated to procure his son a favorable reception. Besides the son has an interest as well as the lady in the promise, upon which he finally is induced to take on himself the burthen of a family. A solemn promise in an informal writing, founded on natural affection, which is a good consideration, is as binding as .a formal deed, especially when it leads to so important and hurthensome ah act as the assuming the expenses of a family. Some stress was laid on the lapse of time between the date of the letter and the demand of the complainant. In ordinary cases thelapse of time has weighty in some cases it operates as a positive bar to the demand ; in others it furnishes a presumption of a waiver of claim ; mothers a legal presumption arises that the demand has been satisfied. In cases like this however the statute of limitation does not apply, and time is not ¡mportant. In point of fact it is not pretended that the father ever delivered the negroes or the stock to the son-, and there is not a tittle of evidence to shew a waiver by the son ; and in my opinion the relation of. a son to a father ought to take away any presumptions arising from his not enforcing his demand by suit. It would have been very ungracious in the son to have extorted iinme,-diately, by process of law, what had been promised by the father from affection, and postponed perhaps by his necessity or convenience. His dutiful forbearance ought not to be construed into a waiver of his right, or to work a prejudice to his demand. One more objection was stated, that no time was fixed for the performance of ■the promise.- It is true no precise day was named in the 
      letter; but the promise bad reference to the expected marriage, the occasion was at hand, and he assures his soil the deed was drawing. I will not go through all the cases 011 this first point of the Case which we are consi» dering. A short view will be Sufficient: 1 Fonbl. 179. The text of Fonblanque (by Mr. Ballow) supported by the decided cases, shews that an agreement by letter in relation to marriage, takes the case out of the operation of the statute of frauds. The case of Wangford v. Fo-therly,2 Yern. 322, shews that it general letter, written by a father promising a portion of 1500L with his daughter, and seeming to approve her marriage, would support a decree for a portion against his estate after his death. See Halfpenny v. Ballet, 2 Yern. 373 ; Cocks v. Mascall, 2 Yern. 200. In Luders v. Anstey, 4 Yes. jun. 50Í, it was decided that a settlement should be made according to a letter written previous to a marriage, though there was no express assent.- The Lord Chancellor says (pages 512, 514) the marriage having taken place immediately, a distinct, positive dissent would be necessary to prevent the effect of the letter. The case of Ayliffe v. Tracy, 2 P. Wins. 65, I am hot entirely satisfied with, and it is differently stated in 9 modern, p¿ 3, and in that case the Lord Chancellor' relied oil the husband’s accepting the legacy in the room of the portion agreed for, though less in amount; and upon ano^ thcr daughter having less than either the legacy or promised portion. Upon the whole therefore I am of opinion that the promise in the letter was sufficiently positive and precise, and under the circumstances of the case was binding on the fattier.
    It is therefore ordered and decreed that the complainant shall have the benefit of the promise contained in his father’s letter, and that the executor, Mr. William Godfrey do deliver to complainant all the negroes of the estate, except the' woman ordered to be set free, and except those bequeathed to the widow for life, so that the number eleven be made up, and if there be any deficiency in the number that the same be made up by the sale of such part of the estate as may not be included in the bequest to .the widow» And that the executors do account with the complainant for the profits and labor, of the said eleven negroes from the death of the testator. And that they pay over to the complainant one half of the ready money bequeathed to the complainant, with costs of suit out of the estate.
    (Signed,) Henry 'Wii.i.iam Desaussttre.
    From this decree of the Circuit Court, the defendants appealed on the following grounds :
    Because the decree of the Circuit Judge is predicated on the idea that the promise contained in the testator’s letter of the 15th November, 1796, was a promise in consideration of marriage $ whereas the words of the said letter clearly negative that idea, and shew as conclusively that marriage was not the consideration of the said promise, as if he had said so expressly.
    That the words in the said letter are, "whether you marry or not,” which are as expressive that marriage was not the consideration of the promise, as if he had said “ without regarding the event of your marriage, which forms no part of the inducement or consideration of this promise.”
    That if this is so, then the promise was merely nudum pactum, which could not be enforced hy this Court.
    That the cases in 2d Vera. 322, 373 and 200, relied on by the Circuit Court in support of its decree turned on the principle of a portion or settlement in consideration of marriage, and though in the two latter cases there was no writing signed, yet it was proved that the marriage was afterwards had by the consent of the father, and so the contract in consideration of which the promise was made, executed by one party. But here the promise was not made in consideration of marriage, but expressly otherwise, and therefore those cases do not apply.
    That the Circuit Judge also erred in his construction of the above words of the said letter when he says, « hut surely the promise to give the son eleven or twelve ne-Sroes otl the marriage is not weakened by the declaration that he will give in all eventsbecause in fact wils no stlC^ Prom*se to give the negroes on the marriage, or in consideration of the marriage, but nothing more than a declaration that he intended to give him eleven negroes without any regard or reference to his marriage.
    That the case in 4 Yes. jun. 501,14, is similarto those' in 2d Yern. and turns expressly on the ground of a written promise by the husband to the wife before marriage as an inducement and consideration to and for marriage, and to obviate objections on the part of the wife, in consequence of which the marriage took effect, and therefore is wholly inapplicable to the present case.
    For all which reasons these appellants do appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court aforesaid, and pray that the same may be reversed, and that the bill of the said complainant may be dismissed with costs.
    At the hearing on the appeal, the following argument took place:
    Mr. Fuaseh, lor the complainant,
    produces the letter from the father of Mr. Caborne, |a short time before his marriage approving his intended marriage, and promising him eleven or twelve negroes, by deed of gift, and half of his stock, whether he married or not. The date of the letter, 15thNovember, 1796. The marriage took place on the 12th January, 1797. The letter implies a consent to the marriage.
    The word give, implies an absolute estate in the negroes and other property. The idea conveyed is, that it was an entire gift, without limitations or conditions. 1 Fonbl. 206.
    The letter imports a consideration made in reference to marriage: 2d Yentris, 361, Bird v. Bloss. One wrote a letter signifying his assent to the marriage of his daughter with J. S. and that ho would give her 150oh. sufficient promise within t|je statute of frauds. (Here was a treaty of marriage.) 2 Freeman, 201, ford v. Fotherly. (Here was a treaty of marriage.) 2 Yern. 373, Halfpenny v. Ballet. No evidence that the father before or subsequent to the marriage declared any dissent to the marriage.
    The father has made a will giving less to the son. This is not a compliance with the contract.. 2 Yern. 322, Wanchford v. Fotherly. After the letter promising a marriage portion, a settlement was to be drawn, but the young póople meanwhile married. As they were ready to go to church, the father of the lady declared he would give them nothing ; yet the Chancellor decreed for complainant, though his wife was dead. Lord C. said the father’s countermand when ready to. go to church was nothing after ; the young pei’sons affections were engaged. 2 Yern. 200, Cook v. Mase all; case of a treaty of marriage ,* 1 Vern. 110, More v. Hart; Gray and wife v. executors of John James, decided by Judge James and affirmed by the Coui’t. The letter in the case before the Court not more ambiguous than the letter in the case of Gray and wife.
    An objection is made to the lapse of time between the letter & the marriage. In cases where lapse of time has been held to be a waiver or abandonment j it is where long delays have occurred j where great changes have taken place ; where some plain act of waiver has occurred.
    Newland on contracts, 242, quotes Gibson v. Patterson, 1 Atk. 12, to shew that time not important. No a.-bandonment or waiver, by the son nor father.
    The will departed from the contract in Juno, 1808s It gives him a life estate only, in seven negroes. Also some other negroes to his wife for life ,• then to his son George for life, and limits over to strangers. The rest and residue of his estate to his wife and son George, •(which residue is stated by the answer to be 03000, divisible between the mother and son,) no ready money. If the will gives less than the letter, it is not in satisfaction of the promise in the letter; and therefore shall ffó'fc a su^)s^u^e* The child shall take both : Newland 2,75, Talbot v. Duke Shrowsberry ; 2 P. Wms. ISO ; 2 Eq. Cases, 203. Assimilates it to dower, where the w^ow *s not barred °f dower by bequests in a will unless clearly so. 2 Freeman, 242, rule as to widows dower ; 2d Com. on contracts, 416.
    Mr. PaekbR, for defendants appellants,
    makes five points. 1. No promise in consideration of marriage. 2. No promise at all. 3. If any promise it was nudum pac-tum. 4. If not nudum pactum, it has been performed. 5. If not performed, the son must elect.
    As to the first. The words of the letter are “ whether you marry or not, I will give you eleven or twelve ne-groes,” clearly not a promise in consideration of marriage. It was whether he married or not. It was a thing to be done. The locus penitentice remained open. Then the cases do not apply. All parties supposed to have knowledge of the laws.
    Mr. Parker concurs entirely in the case of Gray and wife v. executors of James, decided by Judge James ; but insisted it did not apply.
    Second point. The letter from Mr. Caborne to his son is no contract at all. The case different between parents and sons ; mere effusions of parental affection* Sons claiming under such assurances, must shew t’hat the father meant to obligate himself at all events, to convey this property to his son. The father promises to leave the son the negroes by a deed of gift. This is an ambulatory promise, and leaves the locus penitentice. This is the law between strangers contracting for valúa ble consideration, a fortiori a voluntary promise to a son. No consideration expressed on the paper ; no love and affection. The promise was voluntary and was not performed, not executed. The letter wants certainty ; it says eleven or twelve negroes. The deeds were to be drawn; but were not; locus penitentice ; and he has availed himself of it. This is nudum pactum, 1 FonbJ. 342 ; 7 term reports 350, Rann v. Hughes.
    Agreement without consideration is nudum pactum, whether in writing or not. Censures the doctrine Pillans v. Vanmierop, in 3 Bur.
    Fourth. If not nudum pactum, the agreement has been performed. Nothing in the letter says what estate was to be given to the son, for life, or absolutely, The will has given seven negroes for life; nine to wife for life and then to son for life, and all the stock, and half the personal estate left in residuum, say jgl 500.
    Fifth. If complainant is entitled to execution of the promise of the letter, he must elect between the letter and the will.
    2 Ves. jun. 367, Whistler v. Webster, the doctrine of election differs from the doctrine of satisfaction, and has no relation to quantities or values. 3 Ves. jun. 191, Wilson v. Mount. In the case before the Court Mr. Caborne claims under the will, and shall not claim benefit of a promise in hostility with the will. The will disposes of all his property : 1 Ves. jun. 135.
    In this case a disappointment must arise, if Mr. Ca-borne claims under the will and the promise.
    Mr. Simojvs, for the complainant, respondent.
    As to the will having performed the promise contained in the. letter, by the bequests in the will, Roberts on fraud, 47.
    
    The performance must be of something of the same kind, quantity and value, and must concur in time.
    The contest usually is between different children, and the Court strives to restrain double portions to some children to the prejudice of other children. But here there is a oontest between the only child of testator and mere strangers.
    1 Ves. 520, Barret v. Beckford. Double portions not favored lest too much be taken from the heir. But he is not favored by our laws which equalize : satisfaction and performance synonimous. 2 Salkela, 461, Saville v. Saville ; 2 Ves. 38, Allen v. Allen $ 2 Fonbl. 327 ; 1 Bro. 130, Haynes v. Micho j 1 Bro. rep. 555, Holmes v. Holmes ; 1 Bro. rep. 425, Graves v.-.
    Compare the facts of this case. A promise by letter to give eleven or twelve negroes, and awill making othex gifts. It is objected that the promise is not to give an absolute estate in the negroes. It might be for life j but it was a promise to provide for a family. How different the will. It is not a performance ; all the leea- . .. . ° cies are for life, except the resideum in money, and most of the legacies are contingent, (dependant on his survive inghis mother inlaw.) The residuum, (about glaOO,) cannot be considered as a satisfaction for eleven or twelve negroes, worth at least $ 4500.
    The letter is not confined to the eleven or twelve ne-groes and part of the stock. It says that certain, and perhaps more.
    Not certain by the letter when the property was to he .given to the son j something, obscure» But examine the letter carefully (with a view to a marriage) and it seems that it was to take effect when the marriage takes effect. If so then the father kept the property, and the son is entitled to the full benefit of it.
    In 2 Bro. rep. 516, 521, it is laid down that the rule of construction under these cases on this doctrine of satisfaction is not to be extended.
    Question of election. Defendant must shew it is a case of election, and that the will is inconsistent with the promise, by tending to defeat other legacies.
    Such a promise from a father is a debt of the highest order •, due by testator to his son. It is a debt, and his will professes to provide first for debts.
    The son and father never quarrelled, lived in harmony. Can it be believed that the father would under Such circumstances, cut off a son with a mere life estates, by his will, leaving his son and his children unprovided for, in favor of strangers ; yet such would be the effect of the construction of defendants. It is more natural to suppose that he meant to comply with the promise by letter, and make further provision by will.
    Probability is that -testator meant to purchase ne-groes for his son, else it woutd have broken his gang too much, as he had but about nineteen negroes.
    .As to the stock, that left could pot have been that spe-ken of in the letter. It must have died off in twelve or fifteen years, between the date of the letter and the death of testator. Something will be still left to the strangers.
    The lapse of time between the promise and the death of the father, is said to be against the son. This might be of importance between strangers ; but not between father and son. Son could never sue his father in his lifetime, without disgrace; therefore no abandonment of his claim.
    Mr, PpvIoxeatj, for Mr. Caborne.
    1. The letter created a debt which was obligatory on the father. 2. The will has not satisfied the debt. 2 Yern. 322, Wank-ford v, Fotherly ; 5 Yiner, 522, Hodgson v. Hutcheson. The promise enforced even in a case where a father retracted. Yes. jun. 199, Dundas v. Dutens.
    The promise in this case was in consideration of marriage. The whole letter looks to the maniage. It originated in enquiry relative to the marriage, and ends on the same subject. Evidently to encourage the son’s marriage. He soon after the receipt of it married. The violent presumption is that he and the lady married on the strength of the letter. 1 Sanders, note 211, 6. 1 Yern.'llO, 201 : Perhaps the best rule is that any damage, or any suspension, or forbearance of his right, or any possibility of a loss occasioned to the plaintiff by the promise of another, is a sufficient consideration for such promise, and will make it binding, though no actual benefit accrued to tlieparty undertaking: 3 Burr, 167"3.
    The wall is not a satisfaction of the promise : 1 Atk.. 4'27, Bellasis v. Uttwhatt. The thing given in satisfaction must be óf same nature, &c. : 1 Yes. jun. Forsyth v. Grant; 2 Yern. 298, Goodfellow v. Burchell; 3- P. Wins. 6 ; 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. ; 2 Yern. 258.
    A contingent legacy or provision cannot satisfy a portion : 2 P. Wins. Eastwood v. Burke. 1 Bro. 129, 3 Atk. 96 : Wherever there is a difference in any circumstance, a legacy shall not be taken in satisfaction of a prior debt.
    
      3 Yes. jun. 466 : Slight circumstances laid hold of by the Court, to prevent the legacy being considered as a satisfaction for a debt. Kekewicke’s digest 216: Legacies to strangers to abate in preference to legacies to children. All the property came to the complainant’s •father by his wife, the complainant’s mother.
   The Court of Appeals delivered the following decree t

The only point made in this case arises on a letter £rom a father to his son, who was about to marry 5 in which he says, I am informed you are going to be married 5 if so I sincerely wish you and the lady happy, whoever may be your wife, and hope you will do all in your power to render her life so. Whether you marry or not I shall leave you in a deed of gift eleven or twelve negroes and half my stock; this you may be certain of, perhaps more. I am now about having the writings drawn by a lawyer. Why don’t you write a few lines this way to let me know the truth of the report ?” The son married two months after the date of this letter, and the father died without complying with his promise, and the bill is brought for a performance of it. The counsel for the defendants says that this promise was not made in consideration of marriage, and that it is not binding ; that it is a general promise to the son whether be married or not, and is nudum pactum. The letter was written on the occasion of the report of the intended marriage of the son, relates to that subject, and the marriage followed soon after. The promise to the son if he married, is not in the least impaired by the expression in the letter « whether ho married or not.” The promise in the event of marriage is still of force, and the only operation of the words whether he married or not,” is to give to it a greater extent. The son married and is entitled to have the promise to him made good. The decree is affirmed.

(Signed,) Theodore Gaixxard,

Henry W. Besaxis suiie, Wm, Dgbebv James.