Case ID: ohio-st_49/html/0578-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court :", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Brown v. Infirmary Directors.
    
      Insane persons — Admission to county infirmary — Sale of property.
    
    A probate judge has ao authority, by virtue of sections 707 and 708, Revised Statutes, to order an insane person to be admitted to the county infirmary, except while such insane person is awaiting admission to an insane asylum, or it is dangerous to permit him to be at large. And when so admitted his property is not subject to sale and application by tbe board of infirmary directors, under the provisions of section 981, Revised Statutes, though the person is being supported at the public charge.
    (Decided June 28, 1892.)
    ERROR, to the Circuit Court of Tuscarawas county.
    The proceedings under consideration grew out of an attempt made by the board of infirmary directors to sequester the real estate of Mary Medley, an alleged pauper. The proceedings were begun in the probate court of Tuscarawas county. That court dismissed the petition, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed by the court of common pleas on proceedings in error. The board then took the case to the circuit court on error, where the judgments of both the lower courts were reversed, and the cause remanded to the probate court for further proceedings, whereupon proceedings were instituted in this court to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, and affirm those of the common pleas and probate courts.
    
      Heolea & Green, for plaintiff in error.
    
      James G. Patrick, Prosecuting Attorney, for defendants in error.
   By the Court :

The facts of the case are not disputed. Mary Medley, before the 11th day of March, 1885, had been regularly adjudged insane by the probate court of Tuscara-was county, and committed to the Columbus Asjdum for the Insane, .when, by a warrant of the probate judge, she was removed to the county infirmary of Tuscarawas county, and from that time until the proceedings were begun to sequester her property she continued in the infirmary, and was supported at the public expeáse. Section 981, Revised Statutes, under which these proceedings .were begun, authorizes the sequestration only of the property of one who, whether sane or insane, “is admitted into the infirmary as a pauper.” The authority given by this section must be strictly pursued. In the case before us the alleged pauper was removed from the insane asylum to the infirmary by a warrant of the probate judge. That court or officer has no power to commit a person, whether insane or not, to the county infirmary as a pauper. The only authority vested by law in a probate judge to place an insane person in a county infirmary is found in section's 707 and 708, Revised Statutes, and they authorize such commitment only until the person can be admitted to an asylum, or, when not entitled to admission, such person is at large and dangerous. Neither of these conditions is shown to have existed in the case of Mary Medley, and, if one or the other did not exist, the commitment was without authority of law. Even if the court should presume in favor of the legality of the commitment, that it was upon one or the other of these two grounds, it would not aid the defendant in error, foi; it is only the property of one who has been admitted to the infirmary as a pauper that can be sequestered by the board of infirmary directors. One who has been admitted to the infirmary by order of a probate judge while waiting for admission to an insane asylum, or because it is dangerous to permit such persons to run at large, though maintained at the public charge, has not been admitted as a pauper within the provision of the statute that authorizes the seizure and sale of his property.

Judgment of the circuit court reversed, and that of the common pleas and probate courts affirmed.