Case ID: ny-super-ct_10/html/0318-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court. Campbell, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Pierre F. Renard and Others v. Ernest Fiedler.
    The plaintiffs sold and delivered to the defendant 43 bales of jalap, at the price of 45 cents per lb., deducting the duties; and in the bill which they rendered to the defendant, deducted for the duties $894.25, instead of $699.40, which was the whole amount of the duties properly chargeable. The bill so rendered was paid by the defendant, and the plaintiffs afterwards discovering their mistake, brought this action to recover the difference between the sums of $894.26 and $699.40, as a balance due to them upon the sale.
    
      Held; that the rule of law that money paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered, was not applicable, and that the settlement between the parties ■ being founded upon an erroneous calculation of the amount due, was no bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.
    Judgment for the plaintiffs affirmed with costs.
    (Before Oakley, C. J., Campbell and Boswoeth, J.J.)
    May 3;
    May 20, 1854.
    This motion was brought to recover the sum of ¡$174.40,-which was alleged in the complaint to be a balance due to the plaintiffs upon a sale made by them to the defendant of 43 bales of jalap in March, 1848.
    The answer admitted the sale and delivery of the jalap, which at the time was in .the public store, the duties being unpaid; but averred that the whole sum which the defendant agreed to pay therefor was $3,324.03, which sum he had paid in full to the plaintiffs.
    The cause was tried before the late Mr. Justice Sandford and a jury in December 1850.
    Upon the trial, evidence was given on the part of the plaintiffs, tending to show that the jalap was purchased by the defendant at the rate of 45 cents per lb., duties off; and it was proved that in the account rendered arid paid, the sum deducted for the duties payable was $874.25, whereas the true amount of the duties chargeable under the revenue acts was only ,$699.40. The error .which occasioned the difference arose from computing the duties at 25 instead of 20 per cent, ad valorem.
    
    When the plaintiffs rested, the counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that the proof demonstrated that if there was any mistake, it was a mistake of law, and not of fact. The motion was denied, and the counsel excepted. Evidence was then given on the part of the defendant tending to show that he purchased the jalap, as alleged in his answer, for the net price of $3,324.03, without any reference to the amount of duties, which, as he purchased with a view to the immediate exportation of the jalap, and therefore with no intention of paying any duties, was to him immaterial. The exportation took place, and no duties were in fact paid.
    The judge left it to the jury to determine what was the true contract between the parties—instructing them that if it was such as alleged by the defendant, he was entitled to their verdict ; but that if they believed from the evidence that it was such as was alleged by the plaintiffs,.the verdict should be rendered in their favor for the sum, with interest, demanded by the complaint.
    To this charge and instruction the counsel for the defendant excepted.
    The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for $208.87.
    The defendant appealed from the judgment entered upon this verdict, and the cause was now heard upon the bill of exceptions attached to the record.
    
      E. Sandford, for the defendant, argued as follows.
    
      The motion to dismiss the complaint should have been granted. The sale note states the terms of the sale to be at 45 cents per pound, long price, entitled to debenture, and the alleged mistake in the account which was rendered and settled is, that the duty was computed at the rate of 25' per cent., when by law the duty was only 20 per cent. This was a mistake of the law made by the plaintiffs, for which they were not entitled to bring or maintain this action. The court must refer to the statute law to obtain any evidence that any ignorance of law or mistake could be alleged in the transaction (Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674, 681, 687; Lyon v. Richmond, 2 J. C. R. 51, 60; Champlin v. Laytin, 18 Wend. 407, 412, 417; Stores v. Barker, 6 J. C. R. 166; Hyde v. Farmer, 1 Barb. S. C. R. 75, 81; 1 Story Eq. Jur., § 111). The evidence given on the part of the defendant proved that the sale was settled for, and the price, according to his understanding of the terms of the contract, fully paid by him before the commencement of this action. That the plaintiffs received the price so paid by him in full satisfaction of the goods sold and delivered, and received all the consideration therefor in money, which they contemplated receiving at the time of entering into the bargain. They sold, upon an entry in their own books, stating the duty to be 25 per cent. That the defendant exported the goods immediately after their purchase, and no duties thereon were paid by the defendant. The defendant had never imported any jalap, and the plaintiffs were importers of the article. Yet no mistake was pretended on their part until after they had rendered an account of the sale, and heard in reply from their correspondent at Vera Cruz. If a mistake on the part of the plaintiffs could be inferred from the testimony, there was no evidence to show that the defendant did not fully pay all that he assented or agreed to pay, as he understood the transaction at the time. The motion to dismiss the complaint, which was made after the testimony was closed, should have been granted. The judge therefore erred in submitting the question to the jury. And the judgment at the Special Term should be reversed, and judgment should be given for the defendant, dismissing the complaint with costs.
    
      
      G. F. Betts, for the plaintiffs,
    insisted that they were entitled to an affirmance of the judgment, and in his argument made the points and cited the authorities that follow.
    I. The jury have found that the jalap was agreed to be sold at 45 cents for each pound, duties off, and not for a net sum of $3,320.03, as was pretended by the defendant. That question was properly submitted to the jury.
    31. This action is brought to recover an unpaid balance of the price of the goods sold; not to recover back money paid, nor to reform an agreement. 1. The whole price has not been paid, and there is a balance of $174.85, with interest from March 15th, A. D. 1848, that was never paid by the purchaser to the vendor. 2. The plaintiffs have, then, the right to recover this balance, unless they are precluded by some principle of law. They would not he thus precluded by payment in money of part of a debt, though they agreed to accept this in satisfaction of the whole debt, and gave a receipt in full. (Seymour v. Minturn, 17 John. 169 ; Johnston v. Brannan, 5 John. 268 ; Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East. 232; Steinman v. Magnus, 11 East. 390 ; Donn v. Hatcher, 10 Ad. and E. 121; Thomas v. Heathorn, 2 B. and C. 477.) Nor by payment of the whole, if such payment had been in forged paper or spurious ■ coin. (Markle v. Hathfield, 2 John. 455; Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 182 ; Jones v. Ryde, 5 Taunt. 488 ; Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill, 340.) Or in bills of a bank that had stopped payment. (Lightbody v. Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 9; S. C., 13 Wend. 101.) Or by the note of an agent of the debtor. (Davis v. Allen, 3 Comst. 168.) 3. No competent or sufficient reason is alleged in the answer, or proved by the defendant, why he should be discharged from paying the balance due. The mere rendering the bill, and giving a receipt upon it, cannot discharge him.
    HI. In making out the account sales, the plaintiffs gave the defendant credit for the duties, and by mistake subtracted $874 Ts/o, instead of $699 j\\, the duties being 20 per cent., and not 25 per cent. And this error was a mistake of fact, and not of law. (Tariff Act of 1846 ; Schedule E. (20 per cent. ad valorem.) Jalap is specified; 1 Sto. Eq. Jur., § 121, 122, 130.) And even if an error of that description could be called, a mistake of law, the action would still be maintainable. (Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 Wheat. 214, 215; Stapylton v. Scott, 13 Ves. 425; Bingham v. Bingham, 1 Ves. Senr. 127; Pusey v. Desbouvrie, 3 P. Wms. 320; Wilan v. Wilan, 16 Ves. 72; Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 345; Champlin v. Layton, 6 Paige, 189 ; Lawrence v. Beaubien, 2 Bailey, 623.) It may be that a court will not relieve from a pure mistake of law ; but that exists only when the facts are known, and the legal effect or ope-, ration of the known facts is misjudged. (1 Sto. Eq. J., § 115 ; Storrs v. Barker, 6 John. C. R. 169 ; Gilbert v. Gilbert, 9 Barb. 534; Procter v. Thrall, 22 Verm. 262; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. U. S. R. 55 ; Haven v. Foster, 9 Peck. 122.)
   By the Court. Campbell, J.

As there was a conflict in the evidence, the question as to the true nature and terms of the contract of sale was properly submitted to the jury, and as the-cause is now before us only upon the bill of exceptions,» the verdict of the jury must be regarded by us as conclusive. Assuming, as we are bound to do, that the contract between the parties was such as found by the jury, it is certain that the defendant has not paid for the jalap which he purchased the full sum that he agreed to pay, and consequently that the plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for the balance proved to be due, unless they are estopped from demanding its payment by the settlement between them and the defendant, and the receipt in full which was then given.

The argument on the part of the defendant is that the plaintiffs are concluded by the settlement, since it appears by their own showing that in making it they acted solely under a mistake of law—an erroneous construction of the tariff—and that in no case can a party be entitled to relief upon the ground of such a mistake—since every person is presumed to know the law, and in no case, and for no purpose, is permitted to aver his ignorance.

We think that this doctrine was laid down by the counsel for the defendant in much broader terms than the decisions warrant. It may be admitted, that the law is settled, that.no action will lie for the recovery of money that has been paid, not under a mistake or ignorance of facts, but solely under a mistake or ignorance of the law applicable to facts fully known; but we are all of opinion that this rule, which is the only one that the decisions can be said to have established, cannot justly be invoked for the protection of this defendant. The plaintiffs are not seeking to recover back money which they have paid, but to enforce the payment of that which they have proved to be due. They call upon the defendant to fulfil his contract, not by refunding that which he has received, but by paying that which he agreed, and has refused, to pay. If he made the contract, which the jury have found he did, he is bound in conscience and good faith to make the payment that is demanded; and we do not think it has been shown that there is any rule of law, differing from the plain rule of justice and morality, that can excuse, far less justify, his refusal.

The only answer given to the claim of the plaintiffs is, that they have received from the defendant the whole sum which they stated to be the price of the jalap, and have given to him a receipt in full. These facts combined, we repeat, constitute the sole defence, since, we apprehend, that, had no such receipt been given, and the payment alone had been proved, the title of the plaintiffs to recover would have been free from doubt, and probably would not have been denied.

It is, therefore, upon the legal operation and effect of this receipt that the controversy wholly turns. It is needless, however, to cite authorities to show that a receipt for money is, in all cases, open to explanation and even contradiction—that it is, in all cases, presumptive merely, and not conclusive evidence, of the payment which it acknowledges. In numerous cases the effect of a receipt, as a bar, has been got rid of by positive evidence of the error which it involved; and we are persuaded that the principle of these decisions is applicable to all cases in which, from a mistake in computation, an error of calculation, a less sum has been demanded and received than was really and justly due. Indeed, an error of calculation, no matter from what cause it arises, may, in all cases, be reasonably considered as a mistake in fact and not in law.

We confess that we are not at all disposed to extend the doctrine, which makes a distinction between different causes of error, by denying a remedy in one class of cases which it grants in another, although in both the error, if not corrected, is equally a source of injustice. It is peculiar, and not very creditable, to the system of jurisprudence that we have adopted and follow. It has, doubtless, sprung from a misapplication of the maxim that “ ignovambia legis nemmem exousat.” That every man must be presumed to know the law is indeed a necessary rule in the administration of criminal justice, but its application to bar a civil remedy is not demanded by any reasons of public policy, and, in many cases, is a resort to a fiction, not for the purpose of promoting, but of defeating justice. Hence, courts of equity have long struggled against the doctrine and have excepted many cases from its operation; and we think, that courts of law, when not bound down by precedents, may reasonably follow the example.

The judgment for the plaintiffs is affirmed with costs.