Case ID: f-appx_698/html/0480-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Richard J. TRITZ; Irene C. Tritz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED STATES of America; Does, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 16-56240
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    OCTOBER 3, 2017
    Richard J. Tritz, Mission Viejo, CA, Mission Viejo, CA, Mission Viejo, CA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
    Sherra Wong, Gretchen M. Wolfinger, Attorney, Joan I. Oppenheimer, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division/Appellate Section, Andrew Thomas Pribe, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USLA— Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Richard J. Tritz and Irene C. Tritz (“taxpayers”) appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their tax refund action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Buffalow v. United States, 109 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1997). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because taxpayers failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether they were entitled to a refund, as the settlement payment was not made on account of “physical injuries or physical sickness” and was therefore not excludable from taxpayers’ gross income. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2), (a) (exempting settlement payment based on physical injuries or physical sickness from taxation, but not treating emotional distress as a physical injury or physical sickness); Rivera v. Baker West, Inc., 430 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2005) (setting forth framework for determining when settlement proceeds qualify for a § 104(a)(2) exclusion and explaining that, in analyzing a settlement agreement, the court first looks to the express language of the agreement).

The district court’s failure to rule on taxpayers’ motion to compel further discovery is not grounds for reversal because taxpayers failed to show how additional discovery would have precluded summary judgment. See Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998) (standard of review).

We reject as meritless taxpayers’ contentions that the settlement agreement should be voided, and that their due process rights were violated.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.