Case ID: mass_85/html/0014-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Metcalf, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Joseph A. Veazie vs. Martha C. Carr.
    The taking of money by the holder of an overdue note from the maker, in consideration of forbearance for a time to come to press him for payment, and forbearance accordingly, without the consent or knowledge of an indorser who has been duly notified of the dishonor of the note, will discharge the latter from his liability thereon.
    Contract against the executrix of the will of H. W. Carr, upon a promissory note indorsed by him.
    At the trial in this court, the evidence showed that after the dishonor of the note, and notice, the maker paid money to a duly authorized agent of the plaintiff for forbearance to press him for payment, before a certain future time; which was granted accordingly. Upon these facts, and others, which are not now material, Metcalf J. reported the case to the whole court.
    
      W. S. Leland, for the plaintiff.
    
      W. Gaston, for the defendant.
   Metcalf, J.

There is one ground of defence in this case which is decisive against the right of the plaintiff to recover, and we therefore express no opinion on either of the other points discussed at the argument.

The indorser of a note is discharged by a valid agreement, made without his consent, between the holder and the maker, to give .time to the maker. And such is the law, although the indorser has had legal notice of non-payment by the maker. Hubbly v. Brown, 16 Johns. 70. Wood v. Jefferson County Bank, 9 Cow 206. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 202. Byles on Bills, 183. Story on Notes, § 413. So the drawer and the indorser of a bill of exchange are discharged by a like agreement between the holder and acceptor to give time to the acceptor. By Richards, B., in Badnall v. Samuel, 3 Price, 535. Roscoe on Ev. 171. Philpot v. Briant, 4 Bing. 717, and 1 Moore & Payne, 754. Bayley on Bills, (6th ed.) 338 & seq. By a valid agreement to give time is meant an agreement for the breach of which the maker or the acceptor has a remedy either at law or in equity. Maltby v. Carstairs, 1 Man. & Ryl. 562, note (a). Greely v. Dow, 2 Met. 176. M’Lemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 554. Burge on Surety-ship, 204. Such an agreement was made in this case between the holder and the maker of the note, and has been fulfilled by the holder.

The rule of law which we apply in this case extends not only to indorsers of notes and drawers and indorsers of bills of exchange, but also to all those who, on the face of a contract, sustain the relation of surety. Gifford v. Allen, 3 Met. 255. Theobald on Prin. & Surety, § 159 & seq. United States v. Hillegas, 3 Wash. C. C. 70.

Judgment for the defendant