Case ID: f-appx_434/html/0656-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Aaron DOYLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brian CHASE; Law Offices of Brian Chase PLLC, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 10-35545.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted May 2, 2011.
    Filed May 24, 2011.
    George Martin Ahrend, Dano Gilbert & Ahrend PLLC, Moses Lake, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    William Louis Cameron, David L. Martin, Esquire, Lee Smart, PS, Inc., Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: SCHROEDER, McKEOWN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Aaron Doyle appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in his action under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030, against Brian Chase and the Law Offices of Brian Chase (collectively, “Chase”). Doyle asserts that Chase violated the CFAA by accessing, without Doyle’s authorization, Doyle’s USB thumb drive, which contained personnel records sealed by the California state court. Doyle contends that he satisfied the “loss” requirement as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(ll) because of his need for a forensic computer expert to detect and delete all of the documents that were copied from the thumb drive to Chase’s computers.

The district court concluded that even accepting Doyle’s theory of loss, his assessment of loss is entirely speculative. We agree. Doyle bases his loss assessment solely on two expert declarations. The district court correctly concluded that the discussion of damages in the first declaration was too speculative to survive summary judgment. See e.g., Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.2007) (“Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment.”). The second, which attempts to calculate the basis for the future expenditure of more than $5,000, was submitted well beyond the discovery deadlines. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider this untimely declaration. See, e.g., Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2001).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.