Case ID: miss_28/html/0637-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Chief Justice Smith Mr. Justice Fisher", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Daniel W. Murphy vs. The State.
    An indictment under the act of 6th of March, 1850, to suppress trade and barter with slaves, framed in the general manner indicated in the second section of that act, would be invalid. Murphy v. The State, 24 Miss. 590, cited and confirmed.
    As a general rule in criminal as well as in civil eases, a person interested in the event of a suit or prosecution is not a competent witness; as where a penalty is imposed by statutes, and the whole or a part is given to the informer or prosecutor, who becomes entitled to it forthwith upon the conviction, he is not at common law a competent witness for the prosecution; hut there are many exceptions to this rule, which are said to be as old as the rule itself.
    It is laid down as an exception to this general rule, that where a statute can receive no execution unless a party interested be a witness, then he must be allowed; and also in cases of necessity when no other evidence can be reasonably expected. So where a penalty is given by statute which contemplates that the informer, prosecutor, or other person who is to receive a portion of the penalty shall be a witness, it is clear that it is not necessary that it should make an express declaration to that effect, but the court may infer such intention from the language of the act or its professed objects. Held, that under the statute of 6th of March, 1850, to suppress trade and barter with slaves, where an indictment is found against a person for a violation of the provisions of that act, the prosecutor is a competent witness to prove the offence committed.
    As a general rule every material averment in an indictment must be proved; but it is unnecessary to prove the offence to the whole extent charged, and it is sufficient to prove so much of the indictment as shows that the defendant has committed the substantive crime therein specified. Held, therefore, where by the proof either whiskey, gin, rum, or brandy was sold to the slave by the defendant in violation of the act of 1850, a conviction was authorized.
    By the provisions of the third section of the act of 1850, upon proof made that the slave obtained the whiskey, &c., from the store of the defendant, if the ownership of the slave is sufficiently established, a presumption of the defendant’s guilt is raised, and in the absence of all opposing testimony, the jury are bound to convict him.
    Neither the identity of the slave nor his ownership is in anywise an ingredient in the offence in such a case, but being alleged, it is necessary that they be satisfactorily proved; and the same strictness is not required in proof of that character, which is requisite in the establishment of the corpus delicti, except in cases where the subject of the averment is a record or a written agreement.
    Fisher, J., dissent. — At common law, the prosecutor being an incompetent witness against the accused, in such case the statute under which this indictment was found also disqualifies him.
    In error from the circuit court of Madison county, Hon. E. G. Henry, judge.
    The facts of the case will be found fully set out in the opinion and in the briefs of defendant’s counsel.
    
      Franklin Smith, for appellant.
    Plaintiff in error was indicted under the law approved March 6th, 1850, p. 100, of the acts of that year, chapter 31, entitled, 
      “ An Act to suppress trade and barter with slaves, and for other purposes.” The indictment was found at the October term of the circuit court of said county, 1854, and avers “ that Daniel W. Murphy, late of the county aforesaid, yeoman, on the 18th day of April, A. D. 1854, with force and arms, at the county aforesaid, yeoman, unlawfully did then and there sell spirituous liquors, namely, whiskey, rum, gin, and brandy, to a certain slave named Allen, owned by Robert Love, without the consent in waiting of the master, owner, overseer, employer, or mistress of said slave, contrary to the form of the statute,” &c.
    The case was called for trial on the 17th of October, 1854, and the plaintiff in error plead not guilty, and was put upon his trial. Thereupon the district attorney called as a witness Henry R. Coulter the prosecutor, and marked as such on the back of the indictment, who, being sworn, the district attorney propounded a question to him as to his knowledge of the charge in the indictment; defendant objected to the answering of the question by said Coulter, and to said Coulter’s competency as a witness in the cause on account of the direct interest which said Coulter had in the result of said prosecution, the statute section 5, p. 102, directing that one half of all fines collected under the provisions of said act shall be paid to the prosecutor.” The court overruled the objection of the defendant, and ruled said prosecutor to be a competent witness notwithstanding his obtaining by defendant’s conviction one half of any fine which might be imposed upon him. To this ruling of the court defendant excepted, filed his bill of exceptions, and said prosecutor and witness then proceeded to state that on the morning of the 18th day of April, 1854, he, prosecutor, was standing about three hundred feet from Murphy’s store, and he saw a mule team-wagon of Judge Robert Love, loaded with cotton, stop near him, when its driver, whom he thought was Judge Love’s Frank, but who he learned afterwards by talking with Judge Love that it was Allen, Judge Love’s Allen, that he knew it was a negro of Judge Love ; said wagon stopped near where prosecutor was standing, the driver of said wagon took out of the wagon a bottle without stopper, and that witness tried to take it from him, but failed to do so; said driver jerked away from him and went with his bottle into the house of said defendant’s store, and that witness saw said driver enter the front door of said Murphy’s store, and after being there some time, the said driver returned to his wagon with a bottle under his coat, and put a bottle from under his coat back into the wagon; prosecutor then proceeded to said wagon, took out said bottle, and found whiskey in the bottle, which witness thought was the same bottle he took with him. The State by its attorney then introduced Judge Robert Love as a witness, who, being sworn, deposed that he had and owned, a mule team wagon and a driver named Allen, on the 18th day of April, 1854, and that said driver was engaged in hauling cotton about that time. This was all the evidence in the cause. When the State closed, the defendant offered to prove by John B. Hemphill, the district attorney of the fifth judicial district, who was in attendance, on the grand-jury which found and presented said indictment, and offered to prove by said district attorney Hemphill, that Henry R. Coulter, the prosecutor, was the sole witness before the grand-jury, and on whose testimony alone said bill of indictment was found; but the court ruled said proof to be illegal, and would not allow said Plemphill to answer said question or to be sworn in the cause for that purpose, to which rulings of the court defendant excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions. Defendant introduced no evidence to the jury. And all the testimony in the cause here closed. The State asked an instruction which the court gave. The defendant asked the following instructions which the court refused, the first only being granted as asked for by defendant. The second instruction was, “ The indictment charging the offence to be that the defendant did unlawfully sell spirituous liquors, namely, whiskey, rum, gin, and brandy, unless the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant did sell rum, whiskey, gin, and brandy, the law is for the defendant, and they will find him not guilty.”
    The third instruction asked by defendant was as follows: a Unless the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant knew of the slave’s getting spirituous liquors, as charged, they will find for the defendant. This instruction was amended by the court as follows: “ But If the slave came out with spirituous liquor which he did not take in, the defendant’s knowledge is presumed.”
    The fourth instruction asked by the defendant was as follows : “ Even if the jury should be satisfied that the slave got whiskey out of defendant’s house, yet, unless the jury believe from the evidence that defendant knew of his so getting the whiskey, the law is for the defendant, and the jury will find the defendant not guilty.” To the refusing of the said second and fourth instructions, and to the court’s said amendment to said third instruction, defendant excepted, and tendered his bill of exceptions.
    The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant below moved in arrest of judgment, because there was no valid, that is, no constitutional law or statute to found a judgment upon under a verdict rendered with such testimony and instructions. Court overruled the motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant excepted, and filed his bill of exceptions. Defendant then moved for a new trial, because the jury found contrary to law and evidence; 2, because court erred in refusing defendant’s instructions, as hereinbefore stated; 3, because the eourt erred in allowing the prosecutor to be a witness, he having a direct interest in the result of the suit or prosecution, as regulated by section 5 of the law of 1850; 4, because the court refused to let the district attorney answer the question whether Henry R. Coulter, the prosecutor, was not the- only witness sworn before the grand-jury, and upon whose testimony the indictment was found. Which motion for new trial the court overruled; and defendant, having embodied the testimony in' his bill of exceptions, tendered the same to the action of the court in overruling said motion, and the same was signed, sealed, and enrolled, according to the statute.
    The defendant was modest enough not to ask that the jury must be satisfied before they could convict, or that the defendant did sell the commodity, or was present when it was sold; but he was content to ask that unless they were satisfied from the evidence that defendant knew of the commission of the offence, they must find for the defendant. But the court charged in this case (in which there was not a scintilla of proof that defendant was in the store at the time, or where he was), that the presumption was that he knew of the negro’s getting the commodity, which he came out of the store with in his hands, and that he got it in his store. History reads some sad lessons to the judicial mind as to what Draconic laws have been put upon the statute-book to enforce some supposed “ necessity” of “ State” (the tyrant’s plea), or to sacrifice, in its diseased condition, to popular odium, some of its supposed enemies, and to punish even the innocent to get at the guilty, on that same “ tyrant’s plea of necessity.” But the just judge of all ages has defied alike the depraved mandates of the excited populace and the cruel behests of the tyrant, and vindicated the august position of representative of God, asks only what is law, and here in America, especially, what says the written constitution ?
    That the legislature has gone too far in section 3 of the laws of 1850, p. 101,102, we think that even a slight investigation of first principles will show. In every age and country of the civilized world, where the common law has been known, its humane maxims that crime “ must be fully proved,” and that every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty,” are household words, known to the tyro and the citizen, as well as to the wisest of the bar, — incorporated into jurisprudence, interwoven into the very network of society, — truths as startling to deny, next to the denial of a future state of rewards and punishments, and of the soul’s accountability to God. Early and late, at the first dawn of legal science, in the reigns of the worst of the Tudors or the Stuarts, before the American Revolution and since, up to the last page put to press by the last author, — these truths of the common law of England and America have never been doubted or called in question in the countries named until the passage of the law of 1850 in this ultra republican State of Mississippi. Wills on Circumstantial Ev. p. 120, 121, 145; 3 Greenl. Ev. p. 29, 30. Where has a contrary doctrine prevailed ? In countries of the civil law; in countries of extorted confessions by thumb-screws and the rack, the iron boot, and the boiling lead, — places where the poor wretch is presumed guilty, and on that presumption is tortured until he confesses; in the dungeon of the Bastile, and in the tyrant’s state prison, “ where hope never comes, that comes to all.” It was in one instance made to sully the pages of the statute law of old England, but it was driven from it in disgrace, amidst the execrations of all honest men. I allude to that horrid law, which makes the blood curdle in the veins at the recital of it, which presumed the mother of an illegitimate child, when it died, guilty of infanticide, unless she could prove, by one witness at least, that the child was born dead. Wills on Circum. Ev. p. 125. The crying injustice of condemning men in advance, of holding them guilty unless they proved themselves innocent, has been immortalized by Virgil, where he makes the common sybil lead his hero through the regions of his fabled hell. On his way to the Elysian plains, the horrid sounds of Tartarus, surrounded by a triple wall, salute his ears; the clank of iron, the rattling of chains, the groans of anguish, the reverberations of the lash! Affrighted, he asks of his conductress what mean those sounds, who the culprits, by what manner of punishments afflicted ? The sybil replies, that “ no pure spirit can ever enter those accursed abodes. There the Cretan Rhadamanthus holds his dreadful courts, — he first punishes, and then hears the crimes; compelling the prisoner to confess,” &c.
    “ffulli fas casto sceleratum insistere limen . . . Gnossius hsec Rhadamanthus habet durissima regna Castigatque auditque dolos: subigitque fateri,” &c.- — [6th JEnead.
    Now, what does this law of 1850, sect. 3, ch. 31, p. 101, 102, do but pursue the rhadamanthian system? If a negro (in a county where two thirds of the population are such) is seen going into a store and come out with an article which he might have purchased in it, the owner of the store is presumed guilty, and will be thrown into prison until he proves himself innocent; and that he may never be able to do this, the district attorney is allowed to select any day in three hundred and sixty-five to prove that a negro urns seen going into the store and coming out.
    
      Is this according to the republican system established by our constitution ? We think not. Among the sacred rights guaranteed in the declaration of rights in this State, which, in the conclusion of that declaration, are “excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall for ever remain inviolate,” is the right, by section 10, to demand “ the nature and cause of the accusation,” “to be confronted by the witnesses against him,” to have a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and “ public trial by an impartial jury” of the county where the offence was committed; nor can he be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, “ but by due course of law.” The 3d section of the law of 1850, ch. 31, p. 101, 102, docs not confront a man with the witnesses against him; it condemns him without any witness; it does not give him a trial; the question of his guilt is not before the j ury (as in other cases to be tried by them), on the evidence adduced; but he is already pronounced guilty without evidence, before his trial begins. He is deprived of his liberty, on each charge, from one to twelve months (see sect. 1, ch. 31, Laws of 1850, p. 100), not by due course of law; for due course of law, at the time the constitution was framed, required that crime should be “ fully proved,” and not presumed. These views are susceptible of the clearest demonstration, by authority as well as reason. The number proper to constitute the tribunal called “jury” is nowhere defined in our constitution, and yet it is a term susceptible of the clearest definition, by reason of the common law when the constitution was adopted. To dispense with the necessity of proof, is just as great a stretch of power, as would be the legislative dispensation of the number of twelve men on the jury; and we have authority for saying, that if the legislature were to prescribe as a jury a.less number than twelve men, the law would be unconstitutional. Byrd v. The State, 1 How. R. 177; 1 Tuck. Black, p. 60; 1 Thomas Coke, p. 8.
    The counsel for the prisoner requested in the court below, that the jury might be instructed that the defendant must have had some knowledge of the offence to make him guilty. Even in the trial of the mob cases of 1780, Erskine took as the foundation of the defence of the deranged lord (George Gordon) the maxim of the law for ages, the maxim of reason and of common sense, “ Actus reum non facit nisi mens sit rea'1'1 — The mind, must be guilty, else the prisoner is not. This maxim is nullified under this law. It is not only the keeper of the store that is to be punished, but, as in this case, the owner of the store. Now the presumption of law is, that the owner would not violate the law; that he carries on an honest traffic; that as retailing was not allowed, that if the negro got any thing in the store he must have got it (by watching his opportunity when the owner was absent) from some other person present. Yet under this law defendant might have been asleep in another house, or he might have been in the streets collecting, or in New York buying a new stock of goods, or in Texas hunting wild lands, and yet unless he can prove that he was in another house, asleep, in the streets, or elsewhere, on the particular day selected by the district attorney, he is made guilty of an offence which is itself presumed, and loses his liberty. He ought to be proved to have been there, that the deed was done, that he did it, that he was present when another did it, or at least, that he knew of the crime and did not prevent it, but directly, indirectly, or tacitly connived at it. Unless these positions be correct what becomes of the first principles of the law ? “ Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto.” “ Nemo punitur sine injuria facto seu defaltoP— 2 Co. Inst. 287. In such way is a man to be punished by due course of law, for his own offences proved and established; and until proved and established he is to be presumed innocent. No man can be said to have “ a trial ” of his case when he is already condemned. without the production of a particle of proof to fix a crime upon him. Under this section third, he has not a trial under the law on evidence; but remote facts only are proved, from which the crime is to be presumed. And then a presumption is raised on that presumption, that he did it, and his trial thus becomes a mockery, because in violation of the first principles of a fair “trial.” He is not to be proved guilty, but he is to be taken as guilty in the outset on the presumption of a crime being committed; and, secondly, on the presumption that prisoner did it, in outrage of the due course of law, which presumes him innocent until proved to be guilty. By Section twenty-eight of the declaration of rights, “ the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate;” under the instructions founded on this law, the jury being compelled to presume every thing against the prisoner, he has no more opportunity tobe “tided” by “jury” than if the jury were abolished. The law had as well have said, if a negro be seen going down the side of the street, all persons there inhabiting must prove themselves innocent or else they shall be presumed guilty; what need is there for a jury in such a case ? The judge can act as well without the jury as with it. All that is required is to prove an innocent act, — namely, that a negro was seen going down the street, — upon that being proved, a crime is to be presumed, and upon the crime being presumed, all there inhabiting are proved guilty of it! When the innocent act can be so readily proved, and the consequences as above attach, which from their nature could not be rebutted, what would there be in such cases for the jury to try? So in this case a negro man going into a store is a perfectly innocent act, and the owner of the store engaged in splitting wood in his back yard is another innocent act; but as the negro was found to have a commodity on coming out, it is not to be presumed that he got the commodity himself, or from some other person accidentally there present, but a crime is to be presumed, and the owner to be presumed the guilty agent; what then is left for the jury to try ? Nothing. The innocent act is established, it is undoubted, it is undisputed; the consequences of guilt are not found by the jury on the evidence, but are found fastened by the law. What then does the jury try? the proof only o'f the innocent act! the guilty consequences, the evidences of guilt, they do not try; that is found to their hands. This is not finding facts by the jury; such proceeding is palpably unconstitutional, and has been so pronounced in similar cases by this court. Smith’s Administrator v. Smith, 1 How. R. (Miss.), p. 102-105. “ The trial by jury must remain inviolate,” and the party can be deprived of his liberty only “ by due course of law.” Flournoy 
      v. Smith et ai, 3 How. R. (Miss.), 62-65. The ablest courts will not allow constitutional rights to be frittered away by ingenious sophistries, but will adhere to the plain letter and the meaning attached thereto when the constitution was framed. Thompson v. Grand Gulf Railroad and Banking Go. 3 How. R. (Miss.), 247-250; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; 1 Condensed Rep. S. C. U. S. p. 267, 284, 285.
    The fearful consequences of declaring a State law unconstitutional were hurled at Chief Justice Marshall with great fierceness by a daring man in the case of Craig et al. v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, R. 410, 438. But the venerable and upright judge in declaring the law unconstitutional mildly replied to all the “ sound and fury ” about the consequences of the court’s so doing, “ These are considerations which address themselves to those departments which may with perfect propriety be influenced by them.” “ This department can listen only to the mandates of law, and can tread only that path which is marked out by duty.” 4 Peters, R. 438. These latter words ought to be written in letters of gold and hung up in every court in Christendom. It will not answer to say, experimentian in vili corpore, — this law is made to experiment on bad citizens. In Craig v. State of Missouri, a man was most unconscionably seeking to take advantage of an unconstitutional law. The person may be vile; the principles to be struck down on his account may be sacred and of incalculable value to all the citizens as a community; and the only question for a just court is, What are the mandates of (constitutional) law ? what is the path marked out by duty 1 Whenever the legislature is to look to who are good or bad citizens, apart from the crime itself, and make that apply to particulars which will not admit of universal enforcement, our liberties are at an end. In many respects this is an infamous, iniquitous, tyrannical law, worthy of the worst days of the Stuarts, and of the worst of the judges. There is now a petition in the governor’s office from respectable citizens, stating that every man and lady in and about Canton who has a family, could be indicted every week under the first section of this act. A rigid enforcement of this law would sweep it from the statute-book in six days after the legislature met. It is a twoedged sword; spies and informers hired by the law to eavesdrop and hang about houses, will pass from the stores to private dwellings, and then the judges will be called on, on principle, to denounce a law which conjures up a swarm of vampires on the body politic; but if towards storekeepers, the sacred principles of the constitution cannot be vindicated, nor can they be vindicated towards any other class of men. Section 3, p. 101,102, is unconstitutional, because it makes a difference between the man whose store is also his dwelling-house and the man who has a dwelling-house apart from his store. In the latter case the dwelling is the owner’s castle, and is respected; crime is not presumed against its inmate. The offence has to be made out under the first section of the act, (laws 1850, p. 100,) as in other criminal cases, by being “ fully proved.” In the case of the storekeeper who has a dwelling and store in the same house, it is made a crime against him for a particular class of persons to be seen entering his house, though such persons are the lawful inmates of every dwelling-house in the State. A difference is set up between different classes of citizens against one set; crime has to “ be fully proved; ” towards the other set, crime may be presumed against the person charged on the presumption that a crime has been done by somebody. This difference between classes of citizens falls directly under the condemnation of the declaration of rights, and is scouted with reprobation by the solemn adjudication of this court. Smith’s admi’r v. Smith, 1 How. 102-105. Striking at bad citizens may do for tyrants and their tools, but pure, enlightened courts, never allow the constitutional rights of freemen to be crushed on any such plea.
    John Wilkes, a member of the British house of commons, was a man of very bad private character (had he been a man of good character, Dr. Johnson says, he would have dethroned George III.); he was sent to the tower under the warrant of the secretary of State. He demanded through his counsel of the court of king’s bench his liberty by writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the publication of a libel (which was the offence alleged) was not a breach of the peace, and that the privilege of parliament exempted him from arrest in all cases except in treason, felony, and breach of the peace. The State was in a diseased condition at the time, (1763,) and the necessity of enforcing the law was very great. But the able judges of the king’s bench looked only to the cause without regard to persons, and based their unanimous decision on the constitutional rights of the citizen, as if there stood before them the purest man in the kingdom! Chief Justice Pratt delivered the opinion of the court, and said in conclusion of the decision, “ I cannot find that a libeller is bound to find surety of the peace, nor ever was in any case except one, namely, the case of the seven bishops, where the judges said that surety of the peace was required in the case of a libel; Judge Powell, the only honest man of the four judges, dissented, and I am bold to be of his opinion, and to say that case is not law; but it shows the miserable condition of the State at that time; upon the whole it is absurd to require surety of the peace or bail in the case of a libeller, and therefore Mr. Wilkes must be discharged from his imprisonment.” The King v. Wilkes, 2 Wilson, R.. p. 160.
    Is it not absurd, in a criminal case, in the nineteenth century, in free America, that a man is to be presumed to be guilty of a crime, from an innocent act per se, without other proof? And will not the court of last resort vindicate the constitution and the due course of law from “the miserable condition of the State ” in which unskilful legislators, seeking to reach an evil,, have created a greater one in section third, by crushing the rights of habitations, and trampling underfoot the safeguards secured by the constitution ?
    The law is constitutional, so far as counsel knows, and capable of enforcement, like other laws, except as to section three. In pronouncing that unconstitutional, the court only pronounces what the supreme fundamental law demands at their hands, for which they are in nowise responsible, except so far as responsibility arises from the discharge of a sacred duty.
    The rest of the law can be enforced, as in other cases, and the consequences to society are for- the contemplation of the legislature, but section third is obnoxious to the constitution,, it interferes with the due course of law, destroys the trial by jury- and confers separate privileges on one class of citizens which are not conferred on another.
    In the case of The Slate v. Borgman, reported in a note to 2 Nott & McCord’s R. 34-37, the views herein taken will be found in the main sustained, especially as to the constitutional necessity of connecting by proof the defendant with the crime, 'either by proving that the defendant participated in, or did the act, or was present when it was done, or tacitly approved of, or instigated it by his recognition of the act in permitting another habitually to do it in his employ, with his knowledge.
    In this case, it was not proved that the defendant was in his store, knew of the crime, or that he had a clerk or negro through whom he habitually transacted the traffic.
    II. Hitherto this question has been argued as if the constitutionality of this law, of section 3d, p. 101, 102, were necessarily involved. But there is a point in this case, which puts the reversal of this judgment, and the granting of a new trial, on indisputable grounds, without involving the constitutionality of the third section at all; a point which necessarily causes a reversal and remanding for new trial, without regard to the merits of the constitutional question. It is evident from the proof, that the district attorney designed to punish the defendant by aid and through the vigor of section third, as a keeper or owner of a storehouse. But as has been said of persons designing certain bequests in a will, and failing to express their wish, voluit sed non dicit, so it may be said here of the district attorney, voluit sed non fecit. The word, “ storehouse” nowhere appears in this indictment, nor any thing like it. The statutory, indispensable words, “ keeper or owner of such storehouse,” nowhere appear in this indictment. The presumptions of section third can be of no service against any one, except against persons “ owning or keeping a storehouse, warehouse, tippling-shop,'or other place fitted up or kept for trading.” § 3, p. 101. It is only against “ a person owning or keeping such storehouse,” &c. That the going in of a negro, and coming out with something which he might have purchased therein, is “ presumptive evidence ” of guilt. § 3, p. 102.
    No matter what the proof was in this cause, yet to bring the party within the purview of the provisions of section third, it is altogether essential that the language of the statute “ creating the offence ” (the offence was unknown; at the common law it is the creature of the statute and born out of it) should have been pursued. The court charged on section third, the case was pressed under section third by the State, the proof was made to fit section three. Yet it is very evident from thé averments of the indictment, that the presumptions of section three, and the instructions under section three, were all illegally applied, and that to have had the advantage of the “ presumptive evidence ” against the defendant, it should have been charged that the defendant was “ the owner or keeper of a certain storehouse, and that the slave did bring out of such storehouse a certain commodity, which said defendant sold to said slave in said storehouse, without the permission, &c., contra, formam, &c. &e.” So that the court might see that the proof sustained the charge, and that the judgment and punishment were applied which the law prescribed, and to do this there must appear on the record the offence charged in the language of the statute. 1 Chitty, Cr. Law, p. 168, 169, 171, 281-283; Anthony v. State, 13 S. & M. 264, 265; Starkie, Cr. Pi. 252, 253.
    The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, because there was no valid constitutional law under which the instructions were legally sufficient to convict. If the court of appeals should take that view, the judgment would be in that court, judgment arrested and prisoner discharged, the statute of limitations of twelve months barring any further indictment, (without our fault,) the charge being laid on the 18th day of April, 1854. But if the honorable court should not adopt this view of the case, it is evident that they will find by looking at the testimony in this cause, that the law arising on the averments contained in this indictment, makes the case fall under section first of the act, p. 100, and not under section three. And the court will perceive that in trying a case under section first, the party is to be convicted as at common law, “ on full proof,” and on “ the presumption of his innocence until he is proved to be guilty,” and that the proof in this case could not legally convict him without the aid of the presumptions in section three, and to get the aid of the presumptions in that section, the defendant must have been brought by proper averments within “the statutory definition ” of the offence contained in said third section.
    From the averments in this indictment, the court is constrained by the rules of criminal pleading, and the benefits of a fair trial, as provided in the authorities last referred to, to make the case fall under section first, (p. 100, Laws of 1850,) and not under section third. Mr. Murphy’s house is not averred to be “ a storehouse; ” the defendant is not averred to have been keeping or owning such storehouse at the time of the commission of the offence. The question to decide under the law then is, Is the proof as disclosed in this record sufficient to convict a man under section first, without the aid of section third ? This indictment compels the testimony to be sufficient to convict under section one, before there can be any legal conviction under this indictment. Is the testimony, then, sufficient in this case to convict any citizen in the State, independent of all considerations of his being “a storehouse owner or shopkeeper ? ”
    D. G. Glenn, attorney-general, for the State.
    The name of the slave, the name of the owner, and the kind of article sold, are set out in the indictment.
    1. H. R. Coulter proved that he saw a boy in charge of a wagon and team of Judge Love, go into defendant’s store with an empty bottle, and in a few minutes come out with a bottle full of whiskey. He thought his name was Frank, but has learned since it was Allen. Knew it to be a negro of Judge Love’s. Judge Love proves that his boy Allen, with wagon and team, was hauling cotton through Canton on that day. This was all the evidence.
    2. Motion in arrest of judgment, because there was no valid law under whose provisions an indictment could be found. I cannot see how the constitutionality of a law can be tested on a motion in arrest of judgment. If it can be, I know of no valid objection to the act of 1850. It is a stringent police regulation, it is true, to preserve a peculiar class of our population, and when once promulgated is as binding as any other law. The court silently ignore this objection to this law in a case decided, 2 Cushm. R. 590.
    4. There are three bills of exceptions. The first presents whether Coulter, the prosecutor, was a competent witness. The act of 1850, under which the indictment was found, provides, “ that one half of all fines collected under the provisions of this act, shall be paid to the prosecutor.” Acts of 1850, p. 102.
    Upon this point there is some conflict of authority. The rule at common law was against the competency of the witness, and the admission of such a witness seems to be based upon statutory provisions. In America a different rule is in force and supported by high authority, even in England of late.
    When it is.plain the infliction of a fine or penalty is intended as a punishment in furtherance of public justice, rather than as an indemnity to the party injured, or to secure a mere pecuniary benefit to the prosecutor, and that the detection and conviction of the offender are the objects of the legislature, the case will be within the exception, and the person benefited by the conviction will, notwithstanding his interest, be competent. 1 Greenl. § 412; 3 McLean, R. 53, 299; 16 Pet. R. 203; 1 Bald. R. 90; Bayley, J., 9 Barn & Cres. R. 556.
    It is clear, in this case, that if the rule of exclusion is held to prevail, the State will be deprived of the means of suppressing a great public evil, and it is further clear that the fine given the prosecutor was intended as a punishment of the offender, rather than as a reward to him. Public policy and' public interest demand the admission of the witness here.
   Mr. Chief Justice Smith

delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted under the act of the 6th of March, 1850, “ to suppress trade and barter with slaves.”

Several exceptions are now urged to the validity of the judgment.

1. It is insisted that the court below erred in overruling the motion in arrest of judgment. The reason assigned in support of that motion, denies the constitutionality of the act under which the indictment was framed.

The same objection was made in Murphy v. The State, 24 Miss. R. 590. In that case the question arose on a motion to quash the indictment, which was framed under the same statute. On that occasion this court entertained no doubt of the constitutional power of the legislature to declare that it would be criminal to commit any of the acts enumerated in the first section of the statute, and consequently to provide for the punishment of the offenders in the mode provided. It was held, also, that indictments for the offences defined in the first section, “ framed in the general manner indicated in the second section,” would be invalid, inasmuch as an indictment thus framed, and which would consequently contain no allegation of the character or quantity of the produce alleged to have been sold or received, nor of the name of the slave with whom the illegal traffic was had; nor of the name of the owner of such slave, would violate the right secured by the tenth section of the bill of rights to the accused, to demand the “nature and cause of the accusation against him.”

In the case at bar the date of the offence, the character of the commodity, the name of the slave and his owner are alleged in the indictment. There can, therefore, be no doubt, under the previous decisions of this court, that the motion in arrest of judgment was properly overruled.

2. On the trial, Henry R. Coulter, the prosecutor, whose name was indorsed on the indictment, was offered as a witness for the prosecution. His examination was objected to by the defendant, on the ground that he was interested in the event of the suit. The objection was overruled, and the defendant excepted. The competency of this witness is the next question for our •consideration.

The first section of the act under which the plaintiff in error was convicted, provides that upon a conviction for any of the offences therein defined, the party convicted “shall be fined in a sum not less than fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred dollars.” The fifth section directs that “ one half of all the fines collected under the provisions of this act, shall be paid to the prosecutor, and the other half to be appropriated to the common school fund of the county.”

It is very manifest, under these provisions, that the witness examined on the trial below had a direct interest in the result of the prosecution. The question arising here is, Did that interest render him incompetent as a witness for the prosecution ?

It is unquestionably true, as a general rule, in criminal as well as in civil cases, that a person interested in the event of the suit or prosecution is not a competent witness. Thus, where a penalty is imposed by statute, and the whole or a part is given to the informer or prosecutor, who becomes entitled to it forthwith upon the conviction, he is not, at common law, a competent witness for the prosecution. Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 126; Greenl. Ev. 472, § 403. But there are many recognized exceptions which are said to be as old as the rule itself. Thus it is stated as a clear exception, that where a statute can receive no execution unless a party interested be a witness, there he must be allowed. This exception to the general rule is based upon the presumption that the rules of the common law are laid aside by the statute, that it may have' effect; which would be otherwise wholly defeated. Gilbert, Ev. 114. So cases of necessity, where no other evidence can be reasonably expected, have been from the earliest periods recognized as another exception. Thus, for example, in prosecutions for robbery, the person robbed is a competent witness for the prosecution, although he will, upon conviction of the offender, be entitled to a restitution of his goods. Greenl. Ev. 480, § 412. Another exception is, that of a person who is to receive a reward for or upon the conviction of the offender. A person thus situated is universally recognized as a competent witness, whether the reward be offered by the public or by private persons. “ The case of a reward, (says Mr. Justice Bayley,) is clear on the grounds of public policy, with a view to the public interest; and because of the principles upon which such rewards are given. The public has an interest in the suppression of crime, and the conviction of criminals. It is with a view to stir up greater vigilance in apprehending, that rewards are given; and it would defeat the object of the legislature by means of those rewards to narrow the means of conviction, and to exclude testimony which would be otherwise admissible.” Rex v. Williams, 17 Com. Law R. 440.

Where a penalty, given by statute, is recoverable on the indictment itself, so that the person entitled to the penalty is not driven to a suit, his title thereto gives such an interest as will render him incompetent as a witness. But if the act by which the penalty is given to the informer, prosecutor, or other person, contemplates his being a witness, his competency is of course continued; and it is clear that it is not necessary there should be an express legislative declaration to that effect, but that the court may infer such intention from the language of the statute or its professed objects. Cases of this description are recognized as another exception to the rule at common law. Murphy v. United States, 16 Peters, R. 211; Rex v. Trasdale, 3 Esp. R. 68; Howard v. Shipley, 4 East, R. 180.

It is insisted in behalf of the State that the case at bar falls within the principle of this last exception; that there has been, although no express words to that effect are contained in the statute, a legislative capacitation given ” to the prosecutor.

In Rex v. Williams, it was said by Mr. Justice Bayley, “ Where it is plain that the detection and conviction of the offender are the objects of the legislature, the case will be within the exception, and the person benefited by the conviction will, notwithstanding his interest, be competent.” This language was quoted with entire approbation, by Judge Story, in Murphy v. The United States; and the rule is laid down in almost the same terms in Greenleaf’s Evidence, 480, § 12.

It is very manifest, if this rule is to determine the question under consideration, that the prosecutor, notwithstanding he had a direct and certain interest in the event of the prosecution, was a competent witness. For it cannot be doubted that the detection and conviction of offenders were the objects of the legislature, and not the private benefit of the prosecutor. But if this rule is applied as the test by which the competency of persons who are to be benefited by the conviction of offenders, there is no case in which a person having a direct and certain interest in the event of the prosecution, unless rendered incompetent by express legislative declaration, would not be competent. For the manifest reason that the presumption is not to be entertained, that the legislature would create an offence and impose a penalty with any other view than the public good, or that the penalty would be given to the informer or prosecutor for any other purpose than that of promoting the detection and conviction of offenders. The rule, as laid down in Rex v. Bay-ley, does not appear to be sustained by the cases cited in the opinion of the court, and is not defensible upon principle. And although it has received the approval of some high authorities in this country, we are not prepared to give it our sanction; as it is evident that its recognition and application would effectually annul the unquestioned principle of the common law, that where the penalty is recoverable on the indictment itself and the informer or prosecutor is not driven to a suit, he is in consequence of his title to the penalty rendered incompetent as a witness.

The question then is, Can it be implied from the particular provisions and policy of the act that the legislature intended to make the prosecutor a competent witness in prosecutions for offences under the act ?

The statute against bribery, 2 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 8, provided, that any offender against the act discovering, within a certain time, any other offender within the act, so that the person so discovered be thereupon convicted, the discoverer, not having been before that time himself convicted of the offence, shall be indemnified and discharged of all penalties and disabilities incurred under the act; that is, he should have the benefit of using the verdict against the other offender for his own indemnity. Under the particular provisions and policy of that statute, it was held that the discoverer was a competent witness for the plaintiff in an action for the recovery of the penalty imposed by the act. In the language of Lord Ellenborough, “ a parliamentary capacitation was given to the witness through whom the fact is discovered, and who might otherwise at common law have been incapacitated.” Howard v. Shipley, 4 East, R. 180. In Rex v. Trasdale, which was an indictment on the 21 Geo. 3, ch. 37, § 1, for exporting machines used in the manufactures of that country. By the statute, the offender, upon conviction, was to forfeit the machines, &c., and also ¿£200. The forfeitures, where not otherwise provided, were to go to the'informer. The informer was called as a witness, and objected to on the ground of interest. The objection was overruled by Lord Kenyon, who considered the term “ informer ” in 21 Geo. 3, as equivalent to the term “person discovering” in 2 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 8; and as it had been decided that the legislature must have intended that the person designated as the “ person discovering” in the one case should be a witness, it must be taken it had the same intention as to the person designated by the word “informer” in the other. 3 Esp. R. 68; 17 Com. L. R. 448. Both of these cases were cases of secrecy, and the detection and punishment of the violators of these statutes deemed of great importance to the public. The terms “discoverer” and “informer,” as employed in the English statutes, implied a personal knowledge of the criminal act sought to be detected and punished. Hence the courts were doubtless justified in holding that the witnesses were made competent by a parliamentary declaration; for if the witnesses offered on those occasions had been excluded on the ground of their interest in the event of the prosecution, the provision would have been rendered nugatory and useless. It would have been holding out inducements to persons to discover offences committed in violation of the statute, and to inform upon the offenders, when by the operation of the common law rule the discoverer and informer would be excluded from the rewards proffered by the statutes themselves.

But it is insisted that the term “ prosecutor” does not generally and necessarily imply a knowledge of the criminal act charged in the indictment; hence that the rule laid down in the English cases above cited ought not to be applied to the case at bar.

The illicit traffic with slaves is an evil, in this community, of great magnitude. Acts in violation of the statute on the subject are committed in secret, generally at night, and always in the absence of the owner of the slave, who is the person most seriously affected. The history of the legislation on this subject, and of the criminal jurisprudence, furnish unmistakable evidence of the difficulty encountered in the detection and punishment of offenders under the existing laws. The consequent impunity with which illegal trading with slaves was carried on, not less than its ruinous consequences, led to the adoption of the statute, remarkable for its stringent provisions, under which this indictment was framed. Whilst, therefore, it may be conceded that the prosecutor is not presumed, necessarily, to have a personal knowledge of the offence charged, and hence that the term is not used in our statute in a sense equivalent to the term “ discoverer,” as employed in the English statute against bribery, nevertheless, we cannot doubt, from our view of the particular provisions and policy of the statute, that they amount to a legislative declaration that the person prosecuting for an offence under the act may be a witness against the party charged. A different construction, instead of advancing the objects of the act, would narrow the means of the detection and punishment of offenders, by taking away the inducement held out by the legislature with the view of stirring up greater vigilance in bringing them to justice; for it is manifest, if the expectation of sharing the penalty consequent upon conviction is the operative motive with the prosecutor, and the provision is based upon that supposition, it is unreasonable and illogical to expect that any person would act the part of an informer or prosecutor without hope of being remunerated. For that reason, as well as from the character of the offence, and the secrecy with which it may always be committed, it is greatly to be apprehended, if the prosecutor should be excluded as a witness, that the statute itself will fail of any beneficial execution. We feel fully justified, therefore, in holding that the objection to the competency of the witness was properly overruled.

3. The cour-t was requested by the defendant to charge the jury, “ that unless they believed from the evidence that the defendant did sell whiskey, gin, rum, and brandy, the law is for the defendant, and. the jury will acquit him.” The refusal of the court to give this charge is excepted to. The indictment charged the illegal sale of whiskey, gin, rum, and brandy to a slave.

The general rule is, that every material averment in the indictment must be proved; but it is generally unnecessary to prove the offence to the whole extent charged. It is invariably sufficient to prove so much of the indictment as shows that the defendant has committed a substantive crime therein specified. Rex v. Hunt, 2 Camp. R. 585; Swinney v. The Slate, 8 S. & M. 576. Proof, therefore, that either whiskey, gin, rum, or brandy was sold to the slave by defendant, would have authorized a conviction. There was hence no error in withholding the instruction.

4. The court was further asked to charge that “ even if the jury were satisfied that the slave got whiskey out of defendant’s house, yet unless the jury believe from the evidence that defendant knew of his getting the whiskey, the law is for the defendant, and the jury will find the defendant not guilty.”

This instruction was given, qualified by adding to it the following words: “ But if the slave came out with spirituous liquor which he did not take into the defendant’s house, the defendant’s knowledge is presumed.”

The charge as modified was correct. It is in strict accordance with the fifth clause of the third section of the act; which, upon the proof before the jury, raised the presumption of the defendant’s guilt, as charged in the indictment, upon the proof made that the slave obtained the whiskey from the store of the defendant, if the ownership of the slave was sufficiently established, the jury in the absence of all opposing testimony, were bound to convict, unless the provisions of the third section of the act are void. In our opinion they are not so. Those provisions may be extremely unwise and impolitic. They are certainly rigorous and harsh; but we are not prepared to say, with counsel, that the legislature in the enactment of them transcended their constitutional authority.

5. It is in the last place objected, that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.

According to the rule of evidence laid down by the third section, the proof was complete of the commission of an offence, when it was shown by the testimony that a slave had obtained the whiskey from the store of the defendant. Neither the identity of the slave nor his ownership was in anywise an ingredient in the offence for which the defendant was indicted. But being alleged, it was necessary that they should be satisfactorily proved. It is clear, however, that the same strictness is not required in the proof of an averment of that character, which is requisite in the establishment of the corpus delicti, except in cases where the subject of the averment is a record or a written agreement. Applying this rule, we think the verdict ought not to be disturbed.

• Let the judgment be affirmed.

HaNdy, J., concurred.

Mr. Justice Fisher

delivered the following dissenting opinion:—

It is admitted that the prosecutor, according to the rules of the common law, was an incompetent witness against the accused. The question then arises, how has the prosecutor been rendered competent? The majority of the court say, by the statute. But the statute is entirely silent on the subject. The word “ prosecutor ” occurring but once in it, and then so as to disqualify him as a witness.

It is the right of every person put upon his trial for the alleged commission of a criminal offence, that none but competent witnesses should be introduced against him. This is a right secured by the common law, and a statute which attempts to abridge or interfere with such right, must receive a strict construction, by which is understood a construction according to its letter. But if it be entirely silent in this respect, there is nothing to construe, and the statute does not, of course, speak at all on the subject.

The same may be said in regard to penal statutes, or statutes which create offences. They must be strictly construed, that is to say, they must not be extended by implication beyond the legitimate import ” of the words used, so as to embrace cases not clearly described by such words.

Remedial statutes may receive a liberal or, in other words, an equitable construction, by which the letter of the act “ is sometimes restrained, and sometimes enlarged, so as more effectually to meet the beneficial end in view, and prevent a failure of the remedy.” And hence it is often said that such a case, though not embraced by the letter, is nevertheless embraced by the equity of a particular statute. A remedial statute may, therefore, speak both by its words and by its equity. But a penal statute having no equity, can, of course, speak only by its words, and if they are not in such statute, it does not speak at all on the subject, and hence the rule of the common law, whatever it is, remains unchanged.

My opinion therefore is, that the witness should have been excluded.