Case ID: ga_48/html/0050-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "McCay, Judge.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Swift, Murphy & Company, plaintiffs in error, vs. Mary F. McLemore, defendant in error.
    (Atlanta,
    January Term, 1873.)
    1. Possessory Warrant — Certiorari—Attorney and Client. — In this case, which was a bill of exceptions to the judgment of Judge Johnson, refusing to sustain a certiorari in a possessory warrant case, it appeared that the warrant was .for three bales of cotton; that the cotton was made on the plantation of Mrs. McLemore, the plaintiff, by one Joiner and herself, who had farmed together in the making thereof; that Joiner had, during the summer, given to the plaintiff a lien upon all his interest, for advances, etc., with a power to sell; that, later in the year, he had, in writing, sold and transferred to her his whole interest in the crop; that, whilst the cotton was on the farm, it was levied on as the property of Joiner and carried to a warehouse; that Mrs. McLemore put in a claim to it; that, on the trial of the claim, the property was found to be. hers; that, two days after the finding, Joiner, by consent of one of the claimant’s attorneys, took the cotton'from the warehouse and sold it to the plaintiff in the claim case, and delivered it to him, and that he, the said plaintiff,.is now the owner, the present defendants being only his bailees.
    In our judgment, the cotton was legally in Mrs. McLemore's possession at the time of the levy; that, after the trial of the claim case, the custody of the warehouseman was her custody; that there is no proof of the authority of the attorney of Mrs. McLemore, two days after the trial and verdict, to consent for Joiner to take the cotton, and we, therefore, affirm the judgment refusing to order a new trial before the magistrate, or to restore the cotton to the defendants in the possessory warrant.
    Possessory warrant. Certiorari. Attorney and client. Before Judge Johnson. Muscogee Superior Court. May Term, 1872.
    Swift, Murphy & Company filed their petition for certiorari to the decision of Thomas J. Shivers, a Notary Public and ex ofhcio Justice of the Peace, upon the trial of a possessory warrant for three bales of cotton, in favor of Mary F. McLemore, *against petitioners. The application was sanctioned and the writ issued. The answer of the Justice showed that, upon the trial of the case, it was proved by F. M. Reese, that plaintiff and one John H. Joiner farmed together in Lee county, Alabama, during the year 1870, and were jointly interested in the crops. That Joiner, being indebted to plaintiff for money loaned, to secure the same, executed to the plaintiff a deed of trust or mortgage, with power of sale, which embraced all his interest in the crops of cotton, corn, etc., dated February 10th, 1870, and recorded on July 7th, 1870. That Jinks & Shannon, a firm of merchants at Loachapoka, Alabama, attached five bales of cotton as the property of Joiner, on the premises cultivated by said Joiner and the plaintiff. That a claim was filed by the plaintiff and a trial had before a Notary Public and a jury at Loachapoka, Alabama, which tribunal decided in favor of the claimant. That Joiner, on December 22d, 1870, sold and conveyed to the plaintiff his entire interest in the crop, except three bales of cotton, one of which was to go to Andrew Dawson, and two to J. C. Phillips. That the Alabama Notary Public ordered the officer having the cotton in charge, after it had been awarded to the plaintiff by the verdict of a jury, to deliver the same to Joiner, who claimed it as exempt, under the laws of Alabama. The warehouseman refused to deliver up the cotton, on the ground that it had been awarded, by the verdict of a jury, to the plaintiff, and he had been instructed by witness not to deliver said cotton unless so ordered by the plaintiff’s attorneys. That Joiner then saw Mr. Willis, one of the plaintiff’s attorneys, who went with him and instructed said warehouseman to deliver said five bales of cotton to Joiner, upon his paying all charges. That Joiner paid the charges, took possession of the cotton and sold the same to Plollifield & Jinks. That this last transaction, to-wit: the delivery of said five bales of cotton to Joiner, was proved to have occurred on the Monday subsequent to the verdict of the jury and the order of the Court that said cotton should be delivered to the plaintiff. That Hollifield & Jinks *shipped three bales of the cotton to the defendants, and two bales to Montgomery, Alabama. That Jinks, of’Hollifield & Jinks, is the same person as Jinks, of Jinks & Shannon. That he was present at the trial of the claim case, knew its result, and plaintiff’s right to the cotton at the time Hollifield & Jinks purchased from Joiner.
    The Court affirmed the judgment of the Justice, and the defendants excepted, and now assign said ruling as error.
    Peabody & Brannon, for plaintiffs in error.
    James M. RussEEE, for defendant.
   McCay, Judge.

The propriety of the judgment in this case turns almost wholly on the evidence. It is not very clear, from the evidence, in whose possession this cotton was at the date of the levy. It was, however, at the .farm of the plaintiff when seized under the possessory warrant. It was made by herself, and the defendant in the ñ. fa., on her plantation. Prima facie, we should say the possession was hers; she being; the owner of the land. When the claim case was determined in her favor the possession of the warehouseman, where the officer had it stored, was hers. The only question left was whether her possession was legally changed. That depends on the authority of the attorney and the magistrate to interfere with it; clearly it would seem the order of the magistrate, in the teeth of the verdict and some days after, was void. Nor does the mere facts that Mr. Willis, who had been the plaintiff’s attorney on the previous trial, gave him authority to dispose of the cotton some days after the trial.

We do not think, therefore, the judgment of the magistrate in this case was one requiring the Judge of the Superior Court to interfere by certiorari. One might, perhaps, differ with the magistrate as to the weight of the proof, but that does not authorize, certainly does not require, a certiorari.

Judgment 'affirmed.