Case ID: sw_299/html/0869-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "HARYEY, P. J. CURETON, C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

PLUMMER et ux. v. VAN ARSDELL et al.
    (No. 1005-4882.)
    Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.
    Nov. 30, 1927.
    1. Appeal and error @=>l — Party has no constitutional right to appeal from order granting new trial (Rev. St. 1925, art. 2249).
    No party to civil action has constitutional right of appeal from trial court’s order granting new trial; privilege of appeal therefrom being derived solely from Rev. St. 1925, art. 2249.
    2. Appeal and error <S=>2 — Appeals pending from' orders granting new trials when statute authorizing them was repealed must be dismissed (Acts 40th Leg. c. 52, repealing Rev. St. 1925, árt. 2249).
    There being no saving clause with respect to pending appeals from orders granting new trials in Acts 40th Leg. (1927), c. 52, repealing provision of Rev. St. 1925, art. 2249, granting privilege of appeal from such orders, appeals undetermined at time of repeal -must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
    3.Appeal and error <S=o2 — Act repealing statutory provision authorizing appeals from orders granting new trials held not retroactive, though applicable to pending appeals; appellant having no vested right to review (Acts 40th Leg. c. 52, Rev. St. 1925, art. 2249).
    Appellants having no vested right to review by appellate court under provision of Rev. St. 1925, art. 2249, granting privilege of appeal from olders granting new trials, Acts 40th Leg. (1927), c. 52, repealing such provision without saving clause as to pending appeals, cannot be regarded as retroactive.
    Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.
    Action by Mrs. Perla Yan Arsdell and husband against P. R. Plummer and wife. Judgment for defendants, and, from an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for a new' trial, defendants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified to the Supreme-Court the question whether plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the appeal should be sustained.
    Question answered in the affirmative.
    Marvin H. Brown and Mayer, Rowe & Brown, all of Fort Worth, for appellants.
    H. T. Cooper, of Fort Worth, and ’Clifford G. Beckham, of San Antonio, for appellees.
   HARYEY, P. J.

Certified question from the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District. The certificate reads as follows:

“In the above-entitled cause James Van Ars-dell and wife sued P. R. Plummer and wife, Mrs. P. R'. Plummer, to recover damages. for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Van' Ars-dell in a collision between a car driven by Mrs. Van Arsdell and a car driven by P. R. Plum-mer, and alleged to have been driven by him as the agent of his wife. In the trial court, upon a verdict returned by the jury in favor of the defendants, judgment was rendered in their favor. Thereafter, and on March 23, 1926, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, and from that order the defendants have prosecuted an appeal to this court. The transcript of the record was filed in this court on August 12, 1926, and appellants’ briefs were filed August 13, 1926. On April 9, 1927, this court reversed the order of the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the decision of this court, On May 14, 1927, ap-pellees’ motion for rehearing was overruled.
“On May 24, 1927, appellees filed their motion to dismiss the appeal, based upon the act of the regular session of the Fortieth Legislature, as shown on pages 75 and 76 of its acts, which became effective February '21, 1927. This act so amended article 2249, Rev. Statutes of 1925, as to repeal the former provision therein allowing an appeal from an order of court granting a’ motion for a new trial.
“After the filing of that.motion, we set aside our 'former order overruling appellee’s motion-for rehearing, and continued that motion pending the disposition of the later motion to dismiss the appeal.
“In view of the fact that many appeals are now pending from orders granting motions for new trial, filed prior to the passage of the act of the Fortieth Legislature referred to above, and in view. of the importance of the question, we ’deem it advisable to certify to your honorable court for determination the question whether or not the motion filed herein to dismiss the appeal upon the ground stated should Be sustained?”

No party to a civil action has a constitutional right of appeal from an order of the trial court granting a new trial. The privilege of appeal from an order of that kind was rooted exclusively in the statutory provision granting that privilege, as contained in article 2249 of the Revised Statutes of 1925. The amendment that was made of that article in February, Í927, effected a repeal of the provision in question; and, as there is no saving clause in the repealing act, with respect to pending appeals from orders granting new trials, those appeals which were undetermined fell with the law which had authorized them. The Court of Civil Appeals no longer had jurisdiction in those matters, and the pending proceedings died where the repealing statute found them. An appealing party had no vested right to a review by the appellate court under the provisions of the repealed laws; 'consequently the law withdrawing such reviewing power' from that court could not be. regarded' as retroactive. Baltimore, etc., R. R. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 401, 25 L. Ed. 232; Gwin v. U. S., 184 U. S. 674, 22 S. Ct. 526, 46 L. Ed. 748.

The1 appellees’ motion to dismiss the appeal herein should be sustained by the Court of Civil Appeals, and we recommend that the certified question be so answered.

CURETON, C. J.

The opinion of the Commission of Appeals answering the certified question is adopted and ordered certified. 
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