Case ID: f_80/html/0868-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      PARDEE, Circuit Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SICKLES et al. v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.
    (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
    April 12, 1897.)
    No. 526.
    1. Construction of Will—Charitable Bequests—Riohts of Heirs.
    When a will makes several bequests to charities, including a bequest of the residue of the testator’s estate, and also provides that, in the event of the failure of any such bequest, the executors shall pay over the amount bequeathed to such uses as they think most in consonance with the testator’s wishes, the heirs of the testator can take nothing on the failure of any charitable bequest.
    2. Conflict of Laws—Construction of Will.
    The law of a testator’s domicile controls as to the formal requisites of the validity of a will as a means of transmitting property, the capacity of the testator, and the construction of the instrument; but, if a will contains a particular bequest of funds to be transmitted to and administered . for particular purposes in another state, the validity of such bequest must be tested by the law of the latter state.
    3. Charitable Bequests—Performance of Conditions.
    Under the law of New York and of common-law states generally, a valid bequest for charitable uses is not revocable, on account of failure of the trustees to comply with conditions attached thereto, unless such revocation is expressly reserved in the will.
    4. Gifts—Donatio Causa Mortis—Charitable Uses.
    Under the law of Louisiana, there is a distinction between a mode or charge and a condition, as affecting a donation; and the expression of a purpose in the making of a donation is not equivalent to the imposition of a condition, within the meaning of articles 1559 and 1710 of the Civil Code relating to the revocation of donations. Accordingly, held, that a donation mortis causa for charitable or pious uses is not revocable in favor of the heirs, because of the failure of the donee to administer the charity.
    In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
    In 1856, Simon Van Antwerp Sickles, formerly a -resident of the city of New Orleans, state of Louisiana, but then a resident of the state of New York, departed this life, leaving an olographic will, executed on the 30th day of July, 1855, as follows: “I, Simon Y. Sickles, late of the city of New Orleans, now residing in the village of Nyack, county of Rockland and state of New York, considering the uncertainty of this mortal life, but being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do make, publish, and declare the following to be my last 'will and testament: I hereby enjoin it upon my executors, hereinafter named, to dispose of all my real and personal estate, excepting that specifically devised by me, and to apply the proceeds thereof to the purposes of this will, first paying all my just debts. I give and bequeath unto my brother .Tames ten thousand dollars, for his own sole use forever; and I also give and bequeath to my said brother Tames the sum of six thousand dollars, to be held by him in trust, and invested in bond and mortgage in his name, as trustee, and the income thereof applied to the use of my brother William during his natural life, half-yearly, and upon his death, whether before or after me, said sum of six thousand dollars shall be paid over to such of his children as shall survive him, in equal shares (excepting Margaret, who is otherwise provided for), when they respectively .become of age, with the accumulated interest I give and devise unto my niece Mary Ann Sickles the farm on which she now resides, situated in the county of Adams, or Hancock, or both, and state of Illinois, purchased by me of Mr. Tucker, containing 110 acres, and also the eighty acres of land adjoining said farm, and subsequently bought by me of Mr. Ellison. I give and bequeath unto my nieces Tañe and Elizabeth, and to my nephew Tames, children of my brother Nicholas, the sum of three thousand dollars each. I give and devise unto my brother William the forty acres of land lying on the northeast comer of the farm he now occupies and owns, situate in Adams county, and state of Illinois. I give and bequeath unto my cousin Mary Y. A. Ostrom and Tames E. Yan Antwerp the sum of one thousand dollars each; unto my aunts Sarah King and Mary Salsbuyy the sum of five hundred dollars each; unto my cousins Mary Yan Wagener, Catharine Blanrelt, Francis Heath, Mary Green, Sarah Herring, Tohn L. Salsbury, and my friends William Demarest, of New York, and Margaret, wife of William S. Dunham, of Brooklyn, the sum of five hundred dollars each. I give and bequeath unto Abraham Springstein, late in the employ of my brother WiL liam, five hundred dollars. I give and bequeath unto William G. Trimmins, now one of the firm of Sickles & Go., one thousand dollars. I give and bequeath unto my executors in trust, to pay over to the societies or institutions hereinafter named, or to the treasurers thereof for the time being, for the use of such institutions respectively, the following sums, namely: To the Protestant Boys’ Orphan Asylum of the city of New Orleans five thousand dollars, and to the Protestant Girls’ Orphan Asylum of the same city five thousand dollars. My executors will select those asylums most in need of this bequest; and bestow it accordingly. To the Catholic Female Orphan Asylum on Camp street, in the city of New Orleans, where my friend Margaret is worthily engaged, five thousand dollars. To the New York Magdalen Female Benevolent Society of the city of New York ten thousand dollars. To the Association for the Belief of Bespectable Aged Indigent Females in the city of New York the sum of five thousand dollars. To the New York Institution for the Instruction of the Deaf and Dumb five thousand dollars. To the New York Institution for the Blind in the city of New York five thousand dollars. I also give and bequeath unto my executors in trust the sum of ten thousand dollars, to be paid to the treasurer for the time being of the Protestant Orphan Asylum situated on the banks of the Hudson river, in the city of New York, on the east side of the river, the same to be applied to the use of said asylum. I give and bequeath unto my esteemed friend, the Bevd. Lewis M. Pease, superintendent of the Five Points House of Industry in the city of New York, in consideration of his self-devotion to the cause of humanity, the sum of five thousand dollars. In his truly noble efforts to rescue from crime, and elevate the character of, the sons and daughters of misfortune, he merits the gratitude of mankind. In the event that my brother-in-law Biehard D. Gantillon survives my sister Mary, I give and bequeath unto him, to have and to hold during his natural life, the use of the farm, buildings, and appurtenances, situated near the village of Nyack, on which he now resides, and containing about seventeen acres; and, upon his death, I give and devise said farm, buildings, and appurtenances unto the New York Magdalen Female Benevolent Society in fee simple; and if, for any legal difficulty, such society cannot take title thereto, then I direct my executors to sell and dispose of the same, and to apply the proceeds thereof to the use of said society. I give and bequeath unto the trustees of the Bock-land County Female Institute the amount of my present subscription of eight thousand dollars, and, in addition, I give and bequeath ten thousand dollars more. It is my will that the income of these sums should be applied in the education and support in this institution of orphan girls, to be selected from among the most promising in point of character and intellect from the orphan asylums in the city of New York, provided, however, that there shall be reserved from the income of said fund for the board and education in said institution of my niece Margaret Sickles, or, in the event of her death before majority, any other of my nieces, not exceeding two, whom my sister may choose to send, a sum sufficient for this purpose. It is my expectation that said institution will be lawfully incorporated, and, when this shall happen, said sum of ten thousand dollars shall be paid over to the trustees or managers thereof upon trust to invest the same, and to apply the income thereof as hereinbefore set forth. I give and bequeath unto my executors in trust, to pay over to the trustees of the Five Points House of Industry, or its treasurer for the time being, twenty thousand dollars, to be applied to the uses thereof. Said institution is in the city of New York. All the rest and residue of my estate, both real and personal and wheresoever situate, I give, devise, and bequeath to the municipal authorities of the city of New Orleans, to be appropriated to the establishment of a city dispensary for the gratuitous dispensing of medicine, and medical advice to the poor of said city. It is my will that none of the foregoing charitable bequests shall fail by reason of my not having described correctly the beneficiaries intended by me. If, in consequence of any lack of authority on the part of any of such beneficiaries to receive the sums given them, or in ease any of said bequests cannot take effect in consequence of any legal objection, it is my will, and I direct, that my executors shall in such event pay over the amount of the bequest or bequests so failing to such charitable and educational uses as they shall think most in consonance with pay wishes and intention expressed in this will. Finally, I nominate and appoint my friends James S. Aspinwall, of the city of New York, and John G. Gaines, of the city of New Orleans, and my brother James B. Sickles, of the city of St. Louis, or such of them as shall qualify, the executors of this, my last olographic will and testament. I give to them full power to sell either at public or private sale, and convey by proper deed of conveyance, all my real estate not specifically devised, to compromise and submit to arbitration all claims in favor of or against my estate, also without the interference of judicial or extrajudicial authority, to make inventory and dispose of all my estate, and to settle and liquidate the same in as ample a manner as I might myself do were I living and acting in my own behalf. I have signed and sealed this, my olographic will, entirely written in my own hand, this thirtieth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five (1855).
    “[Signed] Simon Y. Sickles.”
    The succession of said Sickles was opened in the state of New York, and thereafter ancillary proceedings were had in the Second district court of the parish of Orleans, state of Louisiana, wherein the last will and testament of the deceased was duly proved, and John G. Gaines duly qualified as testamentary executor. Such proceedings were then had that the real estate situated in Louisiana and other property belonging to the estate of the said Sickles were duly inventoried, sold, and accounted for. After the payment of special legacies and other obligations and expenses, on May 6, 1864, $14,000 were paid over to the city of New Orleans as the residuary legatee; and afterwards, ofi August 26, 1871, the further sum of $2,884.93, being the balance in the hands of the executor as the assets of said succession, was likewise paid over. February 16, 1893, Mary A. Sickles and numerous other persons, alleging themselves to be the heirs at law of Simon Van Antwerp Sickles, brought this action against the city of New Orleans to recover the aforesaid sums, amounting to $16,884.93, with legal interest on $14,000, and on $2,884.93, from the respective dates on which said sums were received by the city, on the ground that the city of New Orleans has wholly failed to fulfill the conditions of the bequest made by Simon Van Antwerp Sickles, and it has never made any attempt or shown any disposition to fulfill said conditions, said city having not only never established the city dispensary required, but, on the contrary > has actually applied and appropriated said money to other purposes, in gross violation of the trust and the conditions imposed. On February 27, 1893, the city of New Orleans filed exceptions to the demand of the plaintiffs, on the following grounds, to wit: First, that the said plaintiffs are not the proper parties to institute the proceeding on the last will and testament of Simon Van Antwerp Sickles, having no interest in the same; second, no cause of action. These exceptions, on being heard by the court, were ordered referred to the merits, and thereafter, on April 29, 1893, the city of New Orleans filed an answer, as follows: “'This defendant now, and at all times hereafter, saving and reserving to itself all and all manner and benefit and advantage of exception or otherwise herein filed, or which may be hereinafter filed, denies each and every allegation contained in plaintiffs’ petition, saving and excepting what may be hereinafter admitted. Your respondent admits that, by his last will and testament, the said Simon Yan Antwerp Sickles bequeathed to the city of New Orleans, for the establishment of a free dispensary, wherein drugs and medical advice would be furnished free to the indigent, the residue of his estate, after payment of debts and legacies, and that the executor of the said will, J. B. Gaines, did turn over to the city of New Orleans, for the purpose designed by the testator, on the 12th day of May, 1864, the sum of fourteen thousand dollars; and subsequently, on the 19th day of April, 1865, the additional sum of 2,884 93/i00 dollars, making a total of 16,884 93/ioo dollars. Your respondent denies that the defendant city has at any time or in any way squandered or misapplied the funds so bequeathed, but, on the contrary, has fostered the same with the care and the full intention and purpose of carrying out to the very letter the beneficent object of the testator. That the defendant, on the 31st of August, 1871, by Ordinance No. 1,011, A. S., authorized the selection of a drug store to furnish medicines to the poor; and, by and in virtue of the said ordinance, Dr. Shelly was appointed druggist, and dispensed drugs, etc., to the poor, up to the month of December, 1872. He was succeeded by Dr. Kelly. On the 24th of January, 1872, by Ordinance No. 1,325, A. S., it was ordered that the Sickles fund be placed in charge of the administrator of finance; that said fund be specially kept apart and separate from any funds belonging to the city of New Orleans; that said funds be invested in city securities, and the interest collected therefrom be applied to supplying the indigent sick with medicines; that by Ordinance No. 2,139, A. S., May 21, 1873, the administrator of public accounts was authorized and directed to issue to the custodian of the Sickles fund a warrant for consolidated bonds at par, for the sum of 20,124 &5/100 dollars, being the amount due by the city to the said fund on the 1st day of May, 1873. From this time, up to October 1, 1877, drugs, medicines, and advice were furnished to the poor to the extent of the means derived from said fund in the hands of the administrator of finance, at which date, however, by Ordinance No. 4,189, A. S., all further expenditure on said fund was stopped, and the mayor was authorized to select a committee of three physicians to devise some means of carrying out the object of the bequest; and the mayor appointed Drs. J. D. Bruns, Charles 0. Turpin, and F. L. Taney to act on said committee. This action on the part of the council was no doubt provoked by the report of the administrator of finance, the Hon. J. C. Denis, of date of the 29th of October, 1877, which informs the committee that ‘now the utmost amount of the revenue that can be expected will be about $1,200 per annum, which would have nearly sufficed to carry on the previous rate of monthly expenditure, but that for the past four months, by what seems to be a preconcerted arrangement, a raid has been made on this fund by prescriptions, at the rate of over $325 per month, which the fund is entirely inadequate to furnish. * * *’ In January, 1878, the committee of physicians appointed by the mayor made their report, containing various suggestions as to how the dispensing of drugs gratis would be more advantageously made, which, though received with due courtesy, were not put into execution; and from that time to this day the effort of the city of New Orleans has been to increase the fund by judicious and successful investments, until such time when the revenues derived from it will be such that the grand purpose of the benevolent testator will be a permanent memorial of his love for the poor. As will be seen by the annexed report of A. P. Harrison, to whom, for a number of years, this sacred fund hás been intrusted, and to whom is due chiefly the credit for the grand condition in which the fund now is, it will be seen that the fund, which originally, as above set forth, amounted to the sum of 16.S84 °3/ioo dollars, is of date of February 20, 1893, of face value 37,-267 se/100 dollars, actual market value 58,795 S6/ioo dollars, showing an increase of over threefold of thé original amount bequeathed. Kespondent denies the right of plaintiffs to demand a money judgment against the city of New Orleans. Respondent further denies the right of said plaintiffs to stand in judgment; that the plaintiffs, being special legatees, have received from the testator all that he desired that they should receive; and that, under the construction of the will, should any eleemosynary institution fail to receive the amount which he designed it to receive, that it should go to some other institution of charity. Respondent further denies the right of the poor of the city of New Orleans to be deprived by any act of the city administration of the charitable provisions made for their benefit. Respondent specially denies the right of the said plaintiff's to demand a rescission of the bequest, for the reasons that, in the provisions of said will for the institution of a free dispensary, no time was designated by testator wherein the establishment of a free dispensary should be made. Respondent, by way of answer, specially pleads prescription of ten years to plaintiffs’ action. Annexed hereto, and making part hereof, are certified copies of ordinances, resolutions, and reports herein referred to. Respondent prays that judgment be rendered in favor of the defendant, the city of New Orleans, and for all and general relief.”
    Other proceedings were had, not necessary to recite, and finally a jury was impaneled, and the action tried. The evidence submitted substantially established the facts averred in the answer, and thereupon, on motion of the defendant, the court directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. Due exeexitions were made to this action of the court, as well as to the refusal of the court to give the following charges requested by the plaintiffs, to wit: “(1) To establish a dispensary for the gratuitous dispensing of medicine to the poor of this city does not necessarily mean to establish and maintain for all time a dispensary containing a stock sufficient to dispense medicine daily to all the poor. (2) No time having been specified by the testator within which the dispensary was to be established, the law implies that he intended that it should be established within a reasonable time; that is to say, as soon as it was practicable to establish such a dispensary as was eontemxfiated by the testator. (3) The jury must look at the intention of the testator, and, if they find that such a dispensary as he had in mind could have been established with the said Sickles fund at any time prior to the suit, then the city has failed to perform the conditions inrposed upon it as donee, and a verdict should be rendered for the plaintiffs. (4) If the jury find that the city at any time used said money received from the Sickles estate for any purpose other than that for which it was bequeathed, then a verdict should be rendered for the plaintiffs. (51 If the jury find that said money was at any time indistinguishably mixed with the general or any other fund of the city, and that thereafter the city paid back the amount, with interest, and then for the first time separated said money from the other funds of the city, that is presumptive evidence that the city used the money for its own account, and for other purposes than that for which it was bequeathed; and, if the city has failed to show the contrary, then this presumptive evidence becomes conclusive evidence of that fact. (6) That ‘all the rest and residue of my estate, both real and personal, and wheresoever situate,’ is, in law, ‘a universal legacy,’ the action to recover which is prescribed by the prescription of thirty years; and, twenty-nine years having run when this action was instituted, the donee has had more than a reasonable time to comply with the bequest. (7) That the city of New Orleans is the donee of the bequest in this case, and is subject to the same obligations and governed by the same rules as other donees, under articles 1559 and 1710 of the Revised Civil Code.” The plaintiffs below, having failed to obtain a new trial, prosecute this writ of error, assigning 13 specific errors, the first 8 of which relate to the general charge given to the jury, and the charges requested by the plaintiffs, but refused, and the last five assignments relate to rulings of the court not appearing in the record, or else not reviewable on error.
    J. Ward Gurley and D. G. Mellen, for plaintiff in error.
    Sami. L. Gilmore and W. B. Sommerville, for defendant in error.
    Before PARDEE and McCORMICK, Circuit Judges, and MAXEY, District Judge.
   PARDEE, Circuit Judge,

after making the above statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Under the will of Simon Van Antwerp Sickles, there is no estate to vest in his heirs at law on the failure of any charitable bequest therein named. The intention of the testator in this respect is clear. Aside from bequeathing to the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans all the rest and residue of his estate, both real and personal, wherever situated, to be appropriated to the establishment of a city dispensary for the gratuitous dispensing of medicines and medical advice to the poor of said city, the will provides that, in the event that any of the specific charitable bequests therein made should fail, the executors should pay over the amount of the bequest or bequests so failing to such charitable and educational uses as they should think most in consonance with the testator’s wishes and intention expressed in the will; thus apparently following the doctrine of cy-pres. Under such testamentary disposition, the heirs at law can take nothing on the failure of any charitable bequest. Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 2 How. 126, 191; McDonogh’s Ex’rs v. Murdoch, 15 How. 367; Prevost v. Martel, 10 Rob. (La.) 512; McDonogh’s Will Case, 8 La. Ann. 171, 220, 253. All the charitable bequests, except the one to the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans, are of specific amounts of money; and it would seem that the bequest to the municipal authorities of Hew Orleans is a'bequest of money, because the will provides that the executors shall dispose of the real estate not specifically devised, collect all claims, dispose of all the estate, and settle and liquidate the same; and it is apparent from the face of the will that the testator’s intention was that the sáid municipal authorities should receive nothing but money. In equity (where, perhaps, this case should have been brought), there is no question on this point. See Macn. p. 29; Pom. Eq. Jur. § 1159. The court of appeals of New York, in Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 431, in dealing with a will containing provisions similar to those in the Sickles will, says:

“If the residuary bequests are valid, there was an equitable conversion of the whole estate into personalty for all the purposes of the will. The gifts were of money, the avails of the real and personal estate, and the conversion of the realty into personalty, under the authority conferred upon the executors, is regarded as having been accomplished at the death of the testator. Leigh & D. Conv. 5, 109; Phelps v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Thornton v. Hawley, 10 Ves. 129; Stagg v. Jackson, 1 N. Y. 206. If, therefore, the disposition of the residue of the estate in favor of the two corporations named as legatees is valid as a bequest of personal property, and to the extent that the two corporations can take under the will, regarding the gift as of personalty, and not of realty, the will must stand. The Centenary Fund Society is a foreign corporation, having its existence under the laws of Pennsylvania, and located within that state. The existence, however, of corporations organized under the laws of a sister state, is recognized by the courts of this state; and they may take property here under wills executed by citizens of the state if, by the law of their creation, they have authority to acquire property by devise or bequest.”

The law of the testator’s domicile controls as to the formal requisites essential to the validity of the will as a means of transmitting property, the capacity of the testator, and the construction of the instrument. Story, Confl. Laws (8th Ed.) § 479ab; Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, supra. Movable property has no locality, and therefore the law of the domicile of the owner governs its transmission, either by last will and testament or by succession in case of intestacy. Story, Confl. Laws (8th Ed.) § 481; Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 179, 2 Sup. Ct. 336; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. 460. Although, within the law of the domicile, a will has all the forms and requisites to pass the title to movable property, nevertheless, if the will contains a particular bequest of funds to be transmitted to and administered for particular purposes in another state, the validity of such particular bequest must be tested by the law of the state to which the fund is, by the terms of the will, to be transmitted and administered. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, supra. Under the laws of the state of New York, as in common-law states generally, a valid bequest for charitable uses is not revocable on account of failure by the trustees to comply with any conditions attached thereto, unless such revocation is expressly reserved in the will. Perry, Trusts, § 744; Reformed Church v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77. A donation to the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans for charitable purposes is substantially a donation to the city for the purposes named, and may be accepted and administered. Rev. Civ. Code, arts. 433, 1549; Succession of Mary, 2 Rob. (La.) 438; Fink v. Fink, 12 La. Ann. 301. Donations to charitable uses are not only permitted in Louisiana, but are highly favored. Succession of Mary, supra; McDonogh’s Will Case, supra; Succession of Vance, 39 La. Ann. 371.

Interpreting the will of Simon Yan Antwerp Sickles according to the laws of the state of Hew York, in which state said Sickles resided, and where his said will was made, we find that the bequest to the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans, for the purposes named, was not revocable for any failure of said authorities to comply with any of the conditions attached thereto; and, testing the validity of said bequest by the law of Louisiana as to the right and power of the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans to accept and administer said trust, the same is valid in all respects. It would seem that what has been said should dispose of this case, because, if the heirs at law have no interest, or if the bequest to the municipal authorities of the city of Hew Orleans is not revocable, the plaintiffs in error cannot complain of the instruction given to the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. The majority of the court, however, are not willing to rest their decision upon either of these points, because the case was tried in the court below, and has been presented by both sides here, as a case arising wholly under the law of Louisiana; and therefore I proceed to consider whether, under the law of Louisiana, a donation mortis causa to municipal authorities for charitable or pious uses, having once vested, is revocable in favor of the heirs at law, whenever the said authorities shall fail to administer the charity, although no revocatory right is reserved by the donor.

Articles 1559 and 1710, Rev. Civ. Code, provide as follows:

“Art. 1559. Donations inter vivos are liable to be revoked or dissolved on account of tbe following causes: (1) Tbe ingratitude of tbe donee; (2) tbe non-fulfillment of the eventual conditions, which suspend their consummation; (3) the nonperformance of the conditions imposed on the donee; (4) the legal or conventional return.”
“Art. 1710. The same causes which, according to the foregoing provisions of the present title, authorize an action for the revocation of a donation inter vivos, are sufficient to ground an action of revocation of testamentary dispositions: provided, however, that no charges or conditions can he imposed by the testator on the legitimate portion of forced heirs, nor can they lose their inheritance for any act of ingratitude to the testator, prior to his decease. That he has not disinherited them shall be sufficient evidence of his having forgiven the offense.”

The learned counsel for the plaintiff in error, in their very lucid brief, contend that the bequest or donation in this case was made on a condition within the meaning of articles 1559 and 1710,—i. e. that a free dispensary should be established by the city; that the city is the donee, and, as such, is subject to the same obligations and governed by the same rules as other donees under said articles, there being no exception made in the case of donations for pious uses; and that the word “conditions,” in article 1559, is used in the sense of “charges,”—i. e. “a donation may be revoked for failure on the part of the donee to execute the charges on him imposed.” It is conceded that, under the civil law prevailing in Louisiana before the adoption •of the 'Civil Code, a donation mortis causa to charitable uses was not revocable for the failure of the authorities to administer the charity, unless the revocation was expressly reserved by the testator in his will.

Under the same law, there was a well-recognized distinction between the mode (or charge) and the condition as affecting donations, .and this distinction is clearly stated in De Pontalba v. New Orleans, 3 La. Ann. 660, which was a suit to annul a donation inter vivos made in 1785 to the city of New Orleans for a leper hospital. The donation was qualified as follows: ‘Which he gives wholly and gratuitously to you, in order that the lepers, of whom there is a large number at present, may be harbored, and in order that the public may perpetually enjoy this endowment,”—and was accepted and applied for some time to the use contemplated by the donor, but was afterwards abandoned as a hospital, the building having been burned. The court says:

“We fake this donation to be a donation sub modo. The laws cited by the plaintiff’s counsel from the Fuero Real and the Partidas were undoubtedly the general rules on the revocation of donations; but those rules were liable to many exceptions, and, in applying them, regard must be had to the distinction made by the civil and the Spanish laws between the mode or charge and the •condition. The inobservance of the condition often avoided the donation, when the inexecution of the charge did not. Thus says Pothier: ‘If the charge on which the bequest is made is not in itself impossible, but fails before the legatee has been put in mora, his obligation to execute it ceases, and the legacy is due. For instance, a testator has given me a legacy, and charges me to be tutor of his children. If the judge, on the advice of the family, has appointed Another tutor, as I can no longer be appointed, I am liberated from the charge, .and entitled to the legacy. In such a case, the legacy made sub modo differs from that made under the condition, if he is tutor of my children.’ Pothier des Testaments, Donations, etc., No. 114. Merlin, deriving the doctrine on the subject from the Roman law, says that a material difference must be made between the motives which the donor mentions as being the cause of the liber.ality, and the conditions he imposes, because, although the failure of a condition annuls the donation, it remains valid, although the motives therein expressed he untrue. Merlin, Répert. verbo ‘Donations,’ § 6, No. 5. See, also, (39. 4.) D., 5 De Donationibus. The same distinction, also drawn from the civil law, is recognized by the English courts. The rule there is that, where a legacy is bequeathed for a particular purpose, it is not conditional, so as to fail with the purpose for which it is given. Thus, a legacy made to a woman for the maintenance of her children has been held valid, notwithstanding she has no children, or they all die. So, also, where lands were given to a mother for the education and maintenance of her daughter till eighteen years old, and the daughter died under eighteen, it was adjudged a good term to the mother till the daughter would have obtained eighteen years had she lived. Ward, Legacies, No. 142, and cases there cited. 8 Law Lib. Delvincourt and Duran-ton, upon whose authority the opinion of the court below rests, were misunderstood by the learned judge. We perceive no material difference between the opinion of Delvincourt and those of Merlin and Pothier. Duranton, if his authority was so decided as the judge supposes it to he, ought not to prevail against those three commentators. But he does not greatly differ from them. He merely says that, when a donation is made ob rem futuram, it is a mode affixed to the liberality, and, when the motive fails, the validity of the donation depends upon the intention of the donor to be deduced from the act. 8 Du ranton, No. 548.”

The Civil Code, when adopted, contained this article:

“Art. 3521. From and after the promulgation of this Code, the Spanish, Roman and French laws, which were in force in this state, when Louisiana was ceded to the United States, and the acts of the legislative council, of the legislature of the territory of Orleans, and of the legislature of the state of Louisiana, be and are hqreby repealed in every ease, for which it has been especially provided in this Code, and that they shall not he invoked as laws, oven under the pretense that their provisions are not contrary or repugnant to those of this Code.” Fuqua’s Civ. Code La. art. 3521.

This article, retained in the Code up to 1870, was omitted in the revision of that date. Construing this article, the supreme court of Louisiana, in Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193, said:

“The repeal spoken of in the Code and the act of 1828 cannot extend beyond the laws which the legislature itself had enacted, for it is this alone which it may repeal. ‘Eodem modo quiquit eonstitntnr, eodem modo dissolvitur.’ The civil or municipal law, that is, the rule by which particular districts, communities, or nations are governed, being thus defined by Justinian,—‘Jus civile est quod quisquí sibi populus constituit.’ 1 Bl. Comm. 44. This is necessarily confined to positive or written law. It cannot be extended to those unwritten laws which do not derive their authority from the positive institution of any people, as the revealed law, the natural law, the law of nations, the laws of peace and war, and those laws which are founded in those relations of justice that existed in the nature of things, antecedent to any positive precept. We therefore conclude that the Spanish, Roman, and French civil laws, which the legislature repealed, are the positive, written, or statute laws of those nations and of this state, and only such as were introductory of a new rule, and not those which were merely declaratory; that the legislature did not intend to abrogate those principles of law which had been established or settled by the decisions of courts of justice. * * * We know not any Roman or French statute which was in force in this country at the period of the cession, and to which the repeal in the Code and the act of 1828 could extend. Nevertheless, it is the daily practice in our courts to resort to the laws of Rome and France, and the commentaries on those laws, for the elucidation of principles applicable to analogous cases.”

According to this, the Code did not repeal principles of construction and interpretation, nor the legal meaning of words and terms, but, following the well-recognized rule, used words and terms according to the meaning and interpretation of the same as previously dedared by judicial authority. We find no decision of the supreme court of Louisiana conflicting with De Pontalba v. New Orleans and Reynolds v. Swain, but we find recently, in Succession of Vance, 39 La. Ann. 371, in a suit by the city of New Orleans for a legacy construed to mean and be for the benefit of the indigent insane, and where the defense was that the particular insane asylum mentioned in the will had been closed and abandoned by the city before the city accepted or made demand for the legacy, the court held:

“The executor puts himself out of court by the very attitude which he assumes when he Charges that the legacy has returned to the succession, by reason of the discontinuance of the asylum. He thereby impliedly admits that the legacy has passed from the succession to the legatee, but insists that it has returned. This cannot be under our system of law, which forbids giving and not giving. Had the testatrix thus stipulated, however, that condition, being prohibited, would have been illegal, and, as such, dealt with or reputed as not written. If the legacy has passed, as it surely has, then the succession has been devested absolutely, and the legatee has acquired. An unconditional legatee cannot, after vesting, be devested under any contingency. * * * Here the question is not one of identity. It is simply one of existence or not.— one which is practically whether a municipal corporation has a right to claim a legacy made to an institution at a time under its direct management, and which has been discontinued as a distinct organization after the death of tiie testator. There is no dispute that, if the insane asylum which was in being at that date existed to-day in the same conditions, the city would have a right to recover. But we have said that the place, mode, or manner in which the insane of the city are maintained is insignificant, the intention or object of the testatrix being the relief of those persons of whom the city takes charge and for whom she provides. We therefore conclude that the legacy made by the deceased for such relief, having once vested, cannot be, and has not been, devested, and that consequently the city is entitled to recover it, the same to be used exclusively in furtherance of the benevolence of the testatrix.”

If this language is to be given any force, we must conclude that it means that a donation to a municipality for charitable uses is unconditional, although the special charity to be aided is named, and that such donation is irrevocable for any reason, which is the same as holding that the charge to- apply a charitable donation to the uses of a particular charity is not imposing on the donation a condition, within the meaning of the word in article 1559.

Counsel for plaintiff in error rely upon the case of Girod v. Crossman, 11 La. Ann. 497, which was a suit to revoke and annul a legacy for the neglect and refusal of the devisee to comply with the conditions on which it was claimed the legacy was made. Reliance is placed upon this passage in the opinion of the court:

“On tbe third ground, it may be admitted, so far as this case is concerned, that tbe modus or charge upon the legacy is in the nature of a condition, and subject to the rules which govern other conditional legacies. 2 Moreau & C. 739, Law 6; 3 Savigny, 230, bk. 2, e. 3, § 128. We concur also with plaintiff’s counsel that, in order to ascertain how the condition conceding it to be one should be performed, we should look at the intention of the testator.” Page 500.

This is the mere admission of a contention not necessary to determine (obiter dictum), and falls far short of deciding that modes or charges expressed in a donation to pious uses are conditions, within the meaning of article 1559, Rev. Civ. Code. The real beneficiaries to charitable donations are generally the unorganized poor, and the administration of the charity is necessarily confided to agents. If such charities are not properly administered, or by neglect are allowed to lapse, the fault is not attributable to the beneficiaries, nor always to the public, but generally to the bad judgment or neglect of administrators. The state, as parens patrise, can and should protect all such charities by legislation and through the courts, as is the universal rule in civilized states. Where a municipal corporation is the instituted donee, and its mayor and council misapprehend the limitations and charges of the trust, and thereby delay or wholly fail to carry the charity into effect, it would be contrary to equity, as-well as contrary to the donor’s intention, to decree a revocation (really, a forfeiture) on that account. Besides, such donations are generally intended to and really constitute perpetuities, and, unless-the same expressly appears in the act of donation, it cannot be said that the donor intended that the thing or amount donated should ever return to himself or his estate, much less to his heirs at law.

Enough has been cited and said to show why we find that article 1559, Rev. Civ. Code, was not intended to, and does not, include, among donations liable to be revoked, those donations to pious uses which, otherwise absolute and unconditional, merely specify or direct the particular charity favored by the donee, and why we conclude that, under the recognized jurisprudence of Louisiana, such donations are not revocable. In our opinion, the plaintiffs in error (plaintiffs below) are not entitled to recover in any aspect of the case as presented by the record, and therefore the general charge in favor of the defendant was correct and proper. Judgment affirmed.