Case ID: f-appx_177/html/0354-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Prince Aaron Dukes FOSTER, Defendant—Appellant.
    No. 05-4795.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted: April 27, 2006.
    Decided: May 1, 2006.
    
      Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender; Devon L. Donahue, Assistant Federal Public Defender; Diana H. Cap, Research and Writing Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes; Christine Witcover Dean, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
   PER CURIAM:

Prince Aaron Dukes Foster appeals the sentence imposed after the district revoked his term of supervised release. The court imposed a sentence exceeding the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Foster to the maximum twenty-four month term of imprisonment.

A sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release that falls within the range authorized by statute is reviewable only if it is “plainly unreasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (2000). The reasonableness of a revocation sentence is reviewable for abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir.1995). The sentencing ranges provided by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, p.s. (2005), are advisory and do not bind the sentencing court. Davis, 53 F.3d at 642. Foster’s sentence fell within the statutory range.

After reviewing the record, joint appendix, and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that the district court’s sentence was reasonable in light of the circumstances present in the case. We therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED