Case ID: f-appx_403/html/0557-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Mahtabuddin Patel MOHAMMAD, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 10-401-ag.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 14, 2010.
    
      Khagendra Gharti-Chhetry, New York, New York, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Lyle D. Jentzer, Senior Litigation Counsel; John M. McAdams, Jr., Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Mahtabuddin Patel Mohammad, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a January 6, 2010 order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Mahtabuddin Patel Mohammad, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 6, 2010). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Here, Mohammad’s motion to reopen was indisputably time-barred as it was filed more than one year after the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal of his removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there are no time or numerical limitations if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Mohammad contends that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion as untimely because it failed to consider his evidence of changed country conditions. The record does not support this claim, as the BIA explicitly referenced his evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 (2d Cir.2006).

Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that Mohammad did not establish changed country conditions. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard). Although Mohammad submitted evidence detailing violence by Hindu extremists against Muslims, the record included evidence of similar violence before 2006. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in according little weight to the letter from Mohammad’s wife or Mohammad’s own statement that his wife had told him about threats to his life. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 324 (finding that the weight afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the agency). The letter does not provide any details of changes in India in general, and the wife’s evidence of threats to Mohammad’s life after his September 2006 hearing does not represent changed conditions, since Mohammad had submitted evidence of similar alleged threats to his life as part of his original application for asylum.

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Mohammad failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. As it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion as untimely, we do not address his argument that he demonstrated his prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and related relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).