Case ID: sw_236/html/0734-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MORROW, P. J. HAWKINS, J..", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SANCHEZ v. STATE.
    (No. 6276.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Oct. 19, 1921.
    Rehearing Denied Jan. 11, 1922.)
    1. Criminal law &wkey;>i 166Í/2(8)— Refusal to dismiss veniremen for cause held not reversible error.
    Though opinions formed by veniremen and the sources thereof were not such as would apparently characterize them as impartial jurors, within Codo Cr. Proe. 1911, art. 692, subd. 13, error in refusing to dismiss them was not sufficient for reversal, where neither served on the jury that tried defendant.
    2. Criminal law <&wkey;l34(I)— Motion to change venue on ground of prejudice not considered in absence of compurgators.
    A motion to change the venue on the ground of prejudice will not be considered where compurgators, as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 62S, were not obtainable.
    3. Criminal law &wkey;> 11661/2 (8) — Refusal to dismiss juror held not reversible error.
    Where bill of exceptions showed that a juror to whom objection was made stated he was without bias or opinion, but on cross-examination that he had heard and read about the case, but had formed no opinion and cotild render an impartial verdict, whereupon defendant’s counsel passed him, but, after state’s counsel accepted him, challenged him for cause, whereupon the court re-examined him, and he stated he could try defendant solely on the evidence, and defendant renewed the challenge, which was overruled and the juror sworn, and a peremptory challenge was not used, counsel stating to the court that he wanted the juror forced on him, the judgment will not be reversed, the juror not being subject to such disqualification as would prevent its waiver, and not having been forced on defendant.
    4. Criminal law <@=>956(10) — Evidence held to show that death penalty against defendant’s accomplices was not considered as reason for like punishment in defendant’s case.
    Evidence, on defendant’s motion for new trial, that all except one of the jurors knew, in advance of his selection, of previous convictions and assessment of penalties on defendant’s accomplices, and that one knew of the previous trial of one of codefendants before he attended court and did not learn of the other conviction after his selection, held to sustain the court’s finding that the death penalties assessed in the companion cases had not been referred to by the jurors as a reason for giving a like punishment in defendant’s case.
    5. Criminal law <&wkey;>l 134(10) — State of public mind and difficulty of selecting impartial jury not available o:n appeal.
    Though the fact that the public mind was shocked by the murder, and that knowledge of the result of previous trials of defendant’s accomplices rendered it difficult to select an impartial jury might appeal to the trial judge in considering whether, on his own motion, he should change the venue, such conditions are not available on appeal except to impose on the court the duty to carefully scrutinize the record, and accord accused the benefit of every legal doubt as to the fairness of his trial.
    6. Jury <&wkey;IOI — Jurors’ knowledge of result of trials of codefendants did not disqualify them unless they formed opinions therefrom.
    Jurors’ knowledge of the result of previous trials of codefendants did not disqualify them, unless they had formed opinions therefrom concerning the guilt or innocence of accused.
    7. Criminal law <&wkey;l 158(3) — Court’s finding that jurors did not make improper use of knowledge of codefendants’ convictions and sentences held binding on appellate court.
    The finding of the trial judge that jurors, who knew of the result of previous trials of defendant’s coprincipals, did not use such knowledge to bring about his conviction or enhance the penalty against him is binding on the appellate court, where based on conflicting testimony.
    8. Criminal law &wkey;>528 — Exclusion of confession of accomplice convicted and sentenced to death held proper.
    In a prosecution for murder, the exclusion of the confession of an accomplice who had been convicted and sentenced to death that he and another killed deceased, and that defendant, had nothing to do with it, was not erroneous; such extrajudicial statement of one beyond the reach of the law being inadmissible.
    
      On Motion for Rehearing.
    9. Criminal law <&wkey;l 111 (3)— Appellate court
    bound by recitals in bill of exceptions.
    In determining -whether defendant’s rights were abridged by not giving his counsel time to prepare for trial, the appellate court is bound by the recitals in the trial court’s bill of exceptions.
    Appeal from District Court, Falls County; Prentice Oltorf, Judge.
    Pedro Sanchez was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Nat Llewellyn, of Marlin, for appellant.
    It. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   MORROW, P. J.

The conviction is for the murder of Oscar Sharp; appellant is condemned to suffer death.

The facts developed are not different from those in the companion cases. Israel v. State, 230 S. W. 984; and Flores v State, 231 S. W. 786.

Israel, Mores, and appellant, Sanchez, were confined in the county jail. Flores had the privilege of the “run-around.” Sharp, a deputy sheriff, while feeding the prisoners, was seized by Flores and assaulted by Israel. Flores, obtaining Sharp’s pistol, shot him to death. Appellant, according to the state’s' witnesses, participated, seizing the deceased around the legs and obtaining possession of the jail keys. The keys were wrested from him by another prisoner, who threw them out the door and gave the alarm. In separate trials antecedent to that of appellant, the death penalty was assessed against both Flores and Israel.

Appellant insists that he was denied the rights accorded him under articles 672, 578, and 558, Code Crim. Proc.; that is, he was not given the benefit of the mandatory statute requiring that he be served with a copy of the return of the venire writ one day before the trial, that his appointed counsel was not given time to prepare for trial, and that the two days allowed by statute for filing the pleadings were not accorded him. The facts set out in the bills of exceptions which were prepared by the court fail to support appellant’s complaint. The copy of the return on the venire writ was served upon him several days before the trial. His case was originally set for the 22d of the month, later postponed to the 26th, and subsequently deferred to the 29th of the month. The counsel, appointed some 10 days prior to the first setting, represented the appellant the 24th, when he was permitted by the court to withdraw, and another appointed in his stead. The new appointment was made on the afternoon of the 24th, but the counsel failed to see the appellant, and did not have the papers in the case until the morning of the 26th of the month. Failure to obtain the papers was due to the absence of the clerk, though they might have been obtained from the deputy had counsel known there was one. Counsel was told by the court, on the hearing of his motion, that he would give him such time as he deemed necessary to prepare and file any motions that he desired, including the motion to change venue, and, in fact, he did postpone the trial for three days.

Bills of exceptions Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 refer to the action of the court in refusing to sustain the appellant’s challenge of certain veniremen for cause.

Venireman Linthicum said, in substance (bill No. 6) that he had learned of the homicide, and expressed an opinion concerning all who took part, but had no knowledge whether appellant was a participant or not; that he was aware of the penalty assessed against those who had been tried, and was of the opinion that, if appellant’s connection was shown with the commission of the offense, he should be dealt with in the same manner as were his associates.

The attitude of Juror Jenkins (bill No. 7) was not materially different from that, of Linthicum, save that he was a friend of the deceased of long standing.

Venireman Davis (bill No. 9), while he had not heard of the trials of the companion cases, was aware, in a general way, of the evidence. He said:

“I feel that I have an opinion. I suppose I would take that opinion in the jury box. I think that it would take less evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt than it would if I had not formed an opinion about the othe_r cases. It would take evidence to remove the opinion I now have. I would have to be convinced. The defendant would have to bring that evidence in to convince me that he was not guilty.”

This opinion was established upon what he had read ir. the newspapers and what he had heard. The juror expressed, on cross-examination, the belief that he could lay aside the opinion and become an unprejudiced juror, and said that, from hearsay, he was aware of the fact that the appellant was with the parties who had been convicted with the killing of Sharp. We are not prepared to say that the trial judge was warranted in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause for the jurors named. The opinions formed by the veniremen and the source thereof were not such as would apparently characterize them as impartial jurors within the purview of the statutes of this state. See Code Crim. Proc. art. 692, subd. 13; Vernon’s Texas Crim. Law, vol. 2, p. 375, note 30, and cases cited; also Shannon v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 5, 28 S. W. 540; and other cases listed by Mr. Branch in his Texas Renal Code, §§ 658, 559. The conclusion of the veniremen that they might discard their opinions and render an impartial verdict was not, under the circumstances, conclusive of their impartiality. Gallaher v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 307, 50 S. W. '388. Assuming them not to have been impartial jurors, inasmuch as neither of them served on the jury that tried the appellant, the error in refusing to dismiss them was not alone sufficient to work a reversal of the judgment. Morrison v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 499, 51 S. W. 358; Taylor v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. R. 546, 72 S. W. 396; Reynolds v. State, 71 Tex Cr. R. 454, 160 S. W. 364; Havard v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 578, 166 S. W. 507; Myers v. State, 7 Tex. App. 653; and other cases listed in Branch’s Tex. Penal Code, § 543, p. 279.

The established rule appears to be that to secure a reversal by reason of an erroneous failure of the trial judge to sustain the challenge of veniremen for cause the bill of exceptions must show injury, and where the bill fails to show that the error resulted in forcing upon the jury, against appellant’s will, an objectionable juror, it is insufficient to comply with the rule. Villereal v. State, 61 S. W. 761; Mays v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 170, 96 S. W. 329; Galan v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 619, 177 S. W. 125; Hudson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 323, 13 S. W. 388; Sutton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 298, 20 S. W. 564;; Aistrop v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 460, 20 S. W. 989; Green v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 647, 98 S. W. 1059; Campos v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 291, 97 S. W. 100; Lahue v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 162, 101 S. W. 1008; Wyres v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 28, 166 S. W. 1151. This is not shown in either of the bills.

A motion to change the venue upon the ground of prejudice was prepared and sworn to by the appellant, but compurgators were not obtainable. These were essential to require its consideration as an application upon the part of the appellant. Code Crim. Proc. art. 628. The court rightly sustained an exception to it. Mitchell v. State, 43 Tex. 512; O’Neal v. State, 14 Tex. App. 582; Macklin v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 197, 109 S. W. 145; Gibson v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 349, 110 S. W. 41. The court, as disclosed by the bill, considered whether it was his duty to change the venue on his own motion. Bill of exceptions No. 13, relating to this matter, was prepared by the trial judge. From it, it is made to appear that there were 100 men drawn; 71 summoned. A number were excused by agreement. Fifty appeared and were exhausted without obtaining a jury. Talesmen were called, and after the examination of a total of 103 men, the jury was complete. Sixty-two were excused upon challenge for cause. Twelve were peremp-1 torily challenged by the state, and 17 were excused upon peremptory challenges of the appellant. Of those excused, 18 were because of conscientious scruples against capital punishment; 4 were - prejudiced against the nationality to which the appellant belonged. Of those peremptorily challenged, only 4 had an opinion. Ten of the 12 jurors who served had no opinion, while 2 had qualified opinions obtained from hearsay, which would not influence their verdict.

All of the jurors who served were accepted by the appellant before the exhaustion of his 15 peremptory challenges, with the exception of the Juror Johnson. The bill of exceptions shows that Johnson stated that he was “without bias, prejudice or opinion.” On cross-examination, he said he had heard something about the case, and read of it when it occurred, and heard it discussed, but had formed no opinion as to what should be done with the participants; had given it but little thought; that he had no doubt that Sharp was dead, and believed he was killed in jail, and that he had heard it reported that he was killed by two Mexicans and a negro who were trying to escape; that there was no doubt in' his mind as to those facts; that he had known Sharp about 10 years; liked him as a man, but had had no business with him; that he could render an impartial verdict. Upon conclusion of this examination, no point was made touching his qualifications, but appellant’s counsel said, “We pass the juror,” and state’s counsel, after deliberation and conference among themselves, accepted the juror. Upon this happening, counsel for appellant challenged him for cause because “it appears that the juror had heard all the facts in the case and said he thought it was true.” The court then reexamined the juror, and he stated that he had no opinion whatever about this case; that he could try the defendant solely on the testimony in the case, uninfluenced by anything he had heard or any information as to how it happened, and the fact that he had an opinion that Sharp was killed would have no bearing upon his passing upon the testimony impartially; that he could and would disregard anything he had heard about it and try the case on the evidence adduced on the trial. The counsel for appellant did not further cross-examine the juror, but renewed his challenge for cause, which was overruled, and the juror sworn. No exception was reserved to the ruling of the court at the time, nor was it indicated that the juror was objectionable on any other ground; nor was any request made to be accorded the privilege of exercising peremptory challenge, though the court had taken such action in two previous instances. As soon as the juror was sworn, appellant’s counsel stated to the court that “he wanted the juror forced on him,” and did not, at any time, take or have noted any exception to the overruling of his challenge for cause.

This bill pertains solely to the action of the court in failing to change the venue. If, however, that part of it touching the action of the court with reference to the Juror Johnson may be given effect as though it were a part of bills of exceptions 6, 7, and 9 relating to failure to sustain peremptory challenges, it does not disclose facts which would warrant this court in ordering a reversal of the judgment. At the time the appellant passed the juror and the state accepted him, appellant knew of him all that he knew at the time he ultimately made his challenge. It cannot be justly contended that the juror was subject to such disqualification as would prevent -its waiver (Poole v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 348, 76 S. W. 565), and the conduct of the appellant with reference to him, if not a waiver, was upon the border line (Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 260; Baker v. State, 3 Tex. App. 525; Drake v. State, 5 Tex. App. 655; McMillan v. State, 7 Tex. App. 142. Even after the state had accepted him and the court had overruled appellant’s challenge for cause, he did not seek the privilege of exercising peremptory challenge. Whether Johnson was an objectionable juror, within the scope of that term as defined by the decisions of this court, is doubtful. See Hudson v. State, 28 Tex. Cr. R. 338, 13 S. W. 388; Maines v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 113, 31 S. W. 667; Keaton v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 145, 49 S. W. 90; Connell v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 153, 75 S. W. 512. Assuming that he was, however, the bill does not show that he was forced upon the appellant against his will. This we infer from the recital in the bill:

. “As soon as the juror was sworn, appellant’s counsel stated to the court that ‘he wanted the juror forced on him,’ and did not at any time take or have noted any exception to the overruling of his challenge for cause.”

The bill, as indicated above, is addressed to the action of the court in refusing to change the venue, and to that action exception is reserved.

The appellant sought a new trial upon the ground that the jury, in their retirement, received new evidence, namely, the fact that Flores and Israel had been convicted and given the death penalty for the same offense, and that such evidence was used against the appellant. The evidence heard upon this issue is set out in a bill of exceptions prepared by the trial judge in lieu of the one tendered by the appellant. In the bill, it is specifically stated that the court had found as a fact “that no new evidence was received by the jury in its retirement, and that the evidence did not sustain appellant’s claim that one or more of the jurors argued” or said that the death penalty ought to be as-sessed because it was assessed in the companion cases. It is stated in the bill that, with one exception, each of the jurors knew in advance of his selection of the previous conviction of the codefendants. *Hogg, the excepted juror, knew before he came to court that one of the participants had been convicted and the death penalty assessed against him, and that he learned that the other was in like situation after he came into court, bút whether after he became a juryman he could not say. On the first ballot, all members of the jury, save Hudson, were for the death penalty. Hudson testified on the hearing of the motion for new trial that he knew of the result of the trial of the appellant’s codefendants before hé was taken as a juror, and that he knew of no references to the other convictions while he was on the jury. It appears from the bill also that Hudson’s knowledge was developed in his voir dire examination; that with the knowledge he was selected as a juror without objection.

In the examination of the witnesses reference was made to their testimony upon the former trial, and in the case the conduct of Flores and Israel was the subject of frequent reference. ' The evidence showed, without dispute, that Flores fired the fatal shot, and it was the state’s theory of appellant’s case that he was a principal offender, and the matter was so submitted to the jury.

We have carefully examined the testimony embraced in the bill, which was heard upon the motion for new trial. From the testimony of the Juror Atkins, standing alone, the inference would be properly drawn that in the jury’s discussion the fact that the death penalty had been assessed .in the companion cases was referred to as a reason for giving a like punishment in appellant’s case. The cross-examination of the Juror Atkins, taken in connection with the testimony of the other jurors who testified on the motion for new trial, leaves the record in such shape as would not justify us in overturning the finding of the trial judge that the averment in the motion- for new trial was not sustained. That all of the jurors save Hogg knew of the previous convictions and assessment of the death penalty is obvious, and the record reveals nothing controverting the court’s conclusion to that effect; that Hogg knew of the previous trial of one of the codefendants before he attended court is definitely established, and the record sustains the finding of the trial judge that it was not shown that he had learned of the other conviction after his selection as a juror.

The trial of each of the three charged with the homicide followed the death of the deceased in rapid succession. The public mind was no doubt shocked by the murder of the officer, taken at a disadvantage while he was in the discharge of his duty. The knowledge of the jurors of the result of the previous trials alone rendered it difficult to select an impartial jury. The conditions, however, concerning the trial, while they might have appealed to the trial judge in considering whether, upon his own motion, he should change the venue, are not available upon appeal except to impose upon the court the duty to give to the record a most careful scrutiny and to accord to the accused the benefit of every legal doubt arising from the record as to the fairness of his trial. The knowledge of the jurors of the result of the trials of the codefendants did not disqualify them unless, upon such knowledge, they had formed opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused. Such is the declaration of this court in Thompson’s Case, 19 Tex. App. 593; Johnson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 379, 17 S. W. 252; Steagald v. State, 22 Tex. App. 488, 3 S. W. 771; Suit v. State, 30 Tex. App. 323, 17 S. W. 458; Pierson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 57, 17 S. W. 468; Peddy v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 550, 21 S. W. 542.

If the evidence sustained the allegations in the motion for new trial that the result of the other trials was urged and used against the appellant, a different and serious question would arise. The theory upon which one who is aware of the conviction of the codefendants is held qualified is the conclusion that he will be impartial, arising from his statement that the knowledge mentioned will not influence him in the conduct of the trial. This theory would be inconsistent with the subsequent conduct of the juror in using his knowledge of the result of the trial of the coprincipals to bring about the conviction of the accused on trial or enhance the penalty against him. Weaver v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 112, 210 S. W. 698. The finding of the trial judge that such use was not made of the knowledge of the jurors, based as it is upon conflicting testimony, is binding upon this court. Howe v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 177 S. W. 500; Shaw v, State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 155, 22 S. W. 588; Branch’s Ann. Texas Penal Code, § 574; Potts v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 47, 118 S. W. 535.

Complaint is made of the exclusion of the confession of Jordan Israel to the effect that he and Elores killed the deceased, and that the appellant had nothing to do with it. The extrajudicial statement of Israel that he and Elores, and not the appellant, took part in the homicide was not admissible. Such has been the ruling of this court on numerous occasions. Bowen v. State, 3 Tex. App. 618; Holt v. State, 9 Tex. App. 583; Walsh v. State, 85 Tex. Cr. R. 216, 211 S. W. 241. The same rule has received the sanction of the text-writers as well as the courts in other jurisdictions. Wharton’s Crim. Evidence, vol. 1, p. 476, and note in Amer. State Rep. vol. 131, p. 778. Upon the subject, Mr. Wharton says:

“Allowing proof of innocence by the self-assumed blame of one beyond the reach of the law would soon disorganize criminal procedure.”

A review of the record reveals no weakness in the testimony, no ruling of the trial court, nor act upon the part of the jury which would warrant a reversal of the judgment.

It is therefore affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

HAWKINS, J..

Appellant insists that we were in error in holding that his rights were abridged in not giving his counsel time to prepare for trial. We have' again carefully examined the bill of exceptions presenting this question. We are bound by the recitals in the bill. When the case was finally called for trial on November 26th, the newly appointed counsel desired further time to prepare some motions, and we quote from the bill as to what occurred:

“ * * * Before any proceeding of any kind was had, the court stated to defendant’s counsel that the court was willing to give him all the time he thought necessary for him to prepare for and file any motions he might desire to file, but called attention to the fact that it would- necessitate the return . of the special veniremen who were present consisting of about 50, and asked counsel if he had any objection to proceeding with the examination of such jurors as were present, with the understanding that adjournment would then be taken to Monday the 29th, at which time he could present any motions desired, and same would be heard and passed on as seasonably filed. Counsel stated that he was perfectly willing to pass upon the jurors present under such an understanding, and no further objection to proceeding was made by counsel. As soon as the jurors present were tested, court adjourned as agreed from Friday morning until Monday. On Monday defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment, which was heard upon its merits and overruled. Defendant then filed a motion for change of venue, which was heard under the agreement made the preceding Friday, and overruled on demurrer by the state on the ground that same was not supported by any affidavits as required by statute. Defendant’s counsel thus had all of the 27th and 28th to further prepare for trial, and the ‘agreement mentioned was understood by all parties as the postponement the defendant desired, and all that he desired; the only qualification being the agreement to test the jurors present Friday, which counsel for defendant agreed to without hesitation.”

Many other matters are presented in the motion for rehearing. They only assert the correctness of the assignments of error in the original brief, and question the conclusions announced in our former opinion. While all issues presented originally received our most careful consideration, yet, because of the severest penalty known to our law having been assessed, we have again patiently examined the bills of exceptions presenting the various alleged errors committed on the trial. We find no occasion to write again at length with reference to them. The re-examination has only confirmed our belief that we reached and announced correct conclusions in our original opinion, and the only ones properly dedudble from the record before us.

The motion for rehearing is overruled. 
      <g=For otlier cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
     
      <§=oFor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes