Case ID: tenn_25/html/0127-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Green, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Brown's adm’rs. vs. Brown’s adm’rs.
    1. By marriage, the sole and absolute property of the wife’s chattels vests in the husband, and if there be any marriage contract whereby tliis right is affected, it is taken away only to the extent stipulated.
    2. When a marriage contract makes no disposition of the wife’s estate after her death, and provides only for her dominion over it during coverture, the right of the husband as survivor is a fixed and stable right, of which he cannot be divested.
    3. A deed which provided that the estate should be and remain the property of the wife, and be subject to her control and disposal forever, is held not to exclude the marital right of survivorship.
    Before the intermarriage of William Brown with Elizabeth Dorsey, widow and devisee of Benjamin Dorsey, of Lincoln county, a marriage contract was executed by both, dated February 7,1827, in which it was agreed between them, that the land bequeathed to her by her late husband should remain, be and continue her property, and subject to her control and disposition; and also all the negroes devised to her by her said late husband, and then in her possession, naming them, and their future increase, “to be and remain the property of the said Elizabeth, and subject to her control and disposal forever.”
    She died intestate in Lincoln county, on the 17th of January, 1842, and administration of her estate was committed to the complainants, by the County Court of Lincoln, at January session, 1845.
    Brown died intestate in said county, on the 6th of May, 1844, and at June session of the County Court 1844, administration of his estate was granted to the defendant.
    This bill was filed in the Chancery Court at Fayetteville, and was heard on bill, answer, replication and proof.
    The chancellor presiding (Cahal) dismissed the bill, and complainant appealed.
    
      Meigs, for complainants.
    The question is — whether Brown was owner of those slaves, jure mariti, upon the death of his wife?
    For complainants, we say not, because the marriage agreement was, that, notwithstanding the marriage,- the negroes were “to be and remain her property forever.” These words are the appropriate terms to the creation of an absolute, unconditional estate in personal property. 2 Bl. Com., c. 25, page 388. The words, “subject to her control and disposal,” might well mean, during coverture; and even the word “forever,” might not absolutely repel that interpretation. But the words, “to be and remain her property forever,” exclude even a qualified property or possibility in the husband. 2 Bl-Com., 395, 396. Marriage vests the sole and absolute property of the wife’s chattels in the husband, to be disposed of at his pleasure, if he chooses to take possession of them: for, unless he reduces them to possession, by exercising some act of ownership upon them, no property vests in him, but they shall remain to the wife, or to her representatives, after the coverture is ■ determined. 2 Black. Comm. 433. But by this ante-nuptial agreement, the husband resigned the right to take possession of these slaves. He. could not reduce them into possession, for he could not exercise any act of ownership upon them. They, therefore, remained to the wife, or to her representatives, upon determination of the coverture.
    Marriage is an absolute gift to the husband of all the goods, personal chattels and estate, which the wife was actually and beneficially possessed of, at that time, in her own right, and of such other goods and personal chattels as come to her during the marriage. 1 Roper on Property, 169.
    Marriage is only a qualified gift to the husband of his wife’s choses in action, viz: upon conditions that he reduces them into possession during its continuance, or survives her. Id. 204-5. It' is only choses in action of the wife, to which the doctrine of survivorship applies. It cannot apply to things personal in her possession during the coverture, of which the marriage was not a gift to the husband, but which were to remain and be her property forever, notwithstanding the marriage.
    
      Fogg, for defendants.
   Green, J.

delivered the opinion of the court.

This bill is brought by the administrators of Elizabeth Brown, deceased, against the administrator of her husband, William Brown, deceased, for certain slaves that were the property of the said Elizabeth before her marriage with the said William, and in relation to which there was an ante-nuptial contract. The said Elizabeth, before her marriage with Brown, was the widow of William Dorsey, and was the owner of land and negroes, as devisee of said Dorsey’s will.

It was agreed between Mrs. Dorsey and Brown, by articles dated the 7th of February, 1827, that the land conveyed to her by her late husband, should remain, be and continue her property, and subject to her control and disposition; and also, all the negroes devised to her by her late husband, and then in her possession, (naming them,) and their future increase, “to be and remain the property of' the said Elizabeth, and subject to her control and disposal forever.”

This contract was signed by Elizabeth Dorsey and William Brown; after which, they were married. Mrs. Brown died the 17th of January, 1842, leaving her husband surviving; and he died the 6th of May, 1844., The question is whether Brown, by virtue of his marital right, became owner of these slaves. By marriage, the sole and absolute property of the wife’s chattels vests in the husband; and if there be a marriage contract, whereby this right is abridged, it is taken away, only to the extent stipulated in the settlement. When the settlement makes no disposition of the property, in the' event of the wife’s death, and provides only for her dominion over it during coverture, the right of the husband, as survivor, is a fixed and stable right, over which the court has no control, and of which he cannot be divested.” Stewart vs. Stewart, 7 J. Ch. Rep. 246. The question then is, whether the marital right of survivorship is excluded by the contract under consideration. The language of the contract is, that the negroes, and their future increase, are “to be and remain the property of the said Elizabeth, and subject to her control and disposal forever.” It is admitted in the argument, that, but for the word “forever,” the marital right would be excluded only during coveture. But can this word make any difference in the meaning of the instrument? The words, to be sure, are appropriate to the creation of absolute estate in the property. They are used to express the quantity of the estate, and the character of dominion, Mrs. Brown was empowered to exercise over the property. But, in this view, the word “forever” has no meaning, showing an intention to exclude the husband’s marital right of survivorship. The property remains absolutely in Elizabeth, “subject to her control and disposal forever.” The meaning of the word “forever,” is limited and defined by the context, “subject to her control and disposal,” and is only an absolute control, free from the marital right during coverture. The case of Stewart vs. Stewart, 7 th Ch. Rep. 245, is in all respects similar to this. In the case of Hamrico vs. Laird, (10 Yerg. R. 222,) which is relied on as authority for the complainants, there was an evident intention to exclude the marital right altogether. In the instrument executed by the parties, before marriage,' it was stipulated, that the said John Hamrico agrees and binds himself, his heirs, &c., “to relinquish, and does relinquish, all claim he has, or ever could have, to the property or money so purchased,.either in law or equity, that he might acquire by marrying or becoming the husband of the said Sarah. Here, Hamrico relinquished all claim he had, “or could have” — words more appropriate to exclude the fight of the husband, as survivor, could scarcely have been employed. In this case, no words indicating the intention of the parties to do more than to exclude the marital right during coverture, are used; and we think the husband was entitled to the property, as survivor; and that, as there are no debts of the wife, his administrators have no right to a recovery. Affirm the decree.