Case ID: serg-rawl_4/html/0231-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Tilghman C- J. Tilghman C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Moore against Albright administrator of Hunter. Same against Cook administrator of M‘Cord.
    In Error.
    
      Thursday, May 21.
    THESE causes were tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county, on issues directed by the board property, by virtue of an act of assembly, passed the 20th March, 1810. It appeared, that there was a controversy fore the board of property respecting the right to receive the valuation money of certain lands within the seventeen ships of Lwzerne county, which had been released to the Commonwealth by James Moore, deceased. A claim was made on behalf of Alexander Hunter, and of the representalives of William M'-Cord, deceased, who it was alleged were in equity entitled, each to one-third part of the valuation money. The act of assembly directs, that in all cases of kind which shall be controverted before the board of property, it shall be the duty of the board, on the demand of either party, to direct an issue to the Court of Common Pleas of the county in which the seat of government is, or may be established for the time being, in order to have the right of such contending parties fixed and ascertained, and declares, “the said Court shall mould the said issue in such manner as shall be calculated to do justice to the contending parties, so that the whole merits shall be fully and fairly tried, and shall have power to decree touching the costs of such issue as to right and justice shall appertain, &c. and the judgment an(* decree of the Court thereon shall be final, and the board Df property shall issue the certificates for such valuation mo- . * ,. , ,, mes accordingly.”
    
      
      \ ,yr¡t 0f a the Court of to the oompenS'iorf ‘9 Pjmnsyiva0f certain [he^Vventeen townships, &c. aata<*" declares, that Indíefree of
    In framing Common Pleas are to proceed according to their own judgment; and it is not material who are the parties to the issue, provided, the matters in controversy be fairly brought to trial.
    The jury, in an issue so framed, are to find generally for the plaintiff or defendant, and a verdict finding the sums due to each party is bad. .
    
      Two feigned issues were framed in the usual manner by ^ * order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster county, which was then the seat of government. In one of them Alexander Hunter was plaintiff, and the administrators of James Moore defendants. In the other, John Cook administrator of William MlCord was plaintiff, and the administrators of James Moore defendants. In one of these issues a wager was supposed to be laid, that the legal representatives of Alexander Hunter, deceased, (not the Alexander Hunter named in the issue,) were entitled to one-third part of the valuation money; and in the other the wager was, that the legal representatives of William M'-Cord were entitled to one-third part of the valuation money. Pending the action Alexander Hunter, the plaintiff in the first issue, died, and the Court, against the will of the defendants, permitted the plaintiff’s attorney to substitute as plaintiff Andrew Albright, the administrator de bonis non of that Alexander Hunter, who had not been a party to the issue, but who, it was alleged, was really the person entitled to one-third of the valuation money. .
    On the trial of ML Cord’s issue, the plaintiff refused to produce the letters of administration of John Cook, upon which the defendants prayed leave to put in a plea, that the said John Cook was never administrator of the said William M(Cord; but the Court refused to admit the plea, and exceptions were taken to the opinion of the Court on both these points. Another exception arose from the verdict returned by the jury in M‘Cord’s issue, which the Court refused to accept. It was in these words :—“ The jury take the liberty of reporting to the Court, that the defendant is to receive the first purchase money, and one-third part of the balance of what it was sold for, with costs of warrants, surveys, and money expended for that use. The two-thirds of the balance for the use of the plaintiff.”
    
      On the return of the record to this Court, Montgomery and C. Smith, for the defendants in error, moved to quash the writ, contending, that the proceedings below were final by the act of assembly under which' they took place. This act of assembly which was passed on the 20th March, 1810,
      
       they said, directs issues to be sent to the Court of Common Pleas in controverted cases, and declares, that the judgment and decree of the Court thereon shall be final, and that the board of property shall issue certificates for such valuation money accordingly. The terms of the law are explicit, and the rule of construction is, that where the words of a statute are plain and clear, they are to be understood according to their genuine signification.and import. 6 Bac. Ab. 380. 391.
    But admitting, that the proceedings below may be removed to this Court, a certiorari and not a writ of error, is the proper writ for that purpose, because they were not according to the course of the common law. The case of Clark v. Teat,
      
      y only proves, that another act of assembly, which took away writs of error, did not extend to cases of landlord and tenant. In the present case, the Court of Common Pleas moulded the issue as they pleased, and were to decide as to costs according to their discretion, making either party or both pay them.
    
      Hopkins, contra.
    The intent of the act of assembly was not to prevent a writ of error, but merely to declare, that when the matter is tried and decided by the Common Pleas, according to law, there should be no further inquiry. The jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench in England cannot be taken away but by express words. Rex v. 31orley,
      
       where it is said, that this point is perfectly settled. It is no less settled in relation to the jurisdiction of this Court. In Burginhofen v. Martin,
      
       it was taken for granted by counsel, and declared by the Court, that the Supreme Court possessed the power of examining the proceedings of justices of the peace in cases in which the demand was under 40 shillings, though the law gave no appeal to the Common Pleas; and that the jurisdiction of superior courts was only abridged by the express negative words of a statute. The 12th section of the landlord and tenant law, declares, that the judgment . of the justices’s shall be final and conclusive to the parties, yet it was decided, in Clark v. Yeat,
      
       that a writ of error lies on a judgment of the Common Pleas, given in a proceeding between landlord and tenant, and removed to that Court by certiorari. It is not correct, that the proceedings were not ' 1 ° according to the course or the common law. They were so exactly, for after the issue was formed it was tried by jury, precisely like every other issue in that Court. In appeals r . . r , . _ . r rrom justices of the peace to the Common Pleas, a writ of error lies, because, after the appeal, the proceedings are according to the common law.
    
      
       5 Sm. L. 151.
    
    
      
       4 Jiinn. 185.
    
    
      
       2 Burr. 1042.
    
    
      
      
         3 Yeates, 479.
    
    
      
      
        Purd. Dig. 580.
    
    
      
       4 Sinn. 185.
    
   The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Tilghman C- J.

A motion has been made to quash the writ of error in this case, because the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was conclusive, and not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. The cause was tried in the Court of Common Pleas on a feigned issue, directed by the board of property, under the act of 20th March, 1810, 5 Sm. L. 151, in order to decide a controversy between the parties, respecting the share to which they were respectively entitled, of a sum of money, to be paid by the Commonwealth, in consideration of their having released their right to several tracts of land in pursuance of the “ Act for offering compensation to the Pennsylvania claimants, of certain lands within the 17 townships in the county of Luzerne, and for other purposes therein mentioned.” The act, by virtue of which the issue was sent to the Court of Common Pleas, declares, “that the judgment and decree of that Court, shall be final.” When words are used by the legislature, which had been used in former laws, and received a well known construction, it must be supposed, that it was intended to preserve an uniformity of construction. Now it had been settled long before the act of 20th March, 1810, that the jurisdiction of this-Court is not taken away by implication. It is not sufficient, to say, that the decision of the inferior Court shall be final. These expressions do not necessarily imply, that the proceedings may not be reviewed for the purpose of correcting errors in law. Two instances were mentioned by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, which fix the construction beyond doubt. By the act of 28th May, 1715, justices of the peace were author'ssed to decide in certain cases, where the debt did not exceed 40 shillings, and it was declared, that their judgment should be final and conclusive, to both plaintiff and dependant, without further appeal. Yet these judgments have always been removed to this Court by certiorari; and the proceedings quashed if appearing to be contrary to law. In the act, giving a summary proceeding to landlords to recover possession from tenants who hold over after the expiration of their leases, it is said, “ that the judgment shall be final and con-elusive to the parties.” Yet these proceedings have always been reviewed on removal to this Court by certiorari. But it is contended, that the proceedings in the case before us, if subject to our jurisdiction, should have been removed, not by writ of error, but certioraribecause, they are not according to the course of the common law. The principle is just, that proceedings not according to the course of the common law, are not removeable by writ of error. But what, is the fact ? It is true, that the proceedings before the board of property wer.e not according to common law. But those in the Common Pleas, were strictly so. The record shews a declaration, plea, issue, and trial by jury, in the usual form. It is on that record only, that we are to decide. With the board of property we have nothing to do. I cannot distinguish this case from an issue sent by the Register’s Court to be tried in the Common Pleas, on a disputed will. The Register’s Court does not proceed according to the common law. But the issue is tried in the Common Pleas according to the common law, and therefore the record may be removed to this Court by wriCof error. This is the usual long established practice; and considering it as decisive of the present question, I am of opinion, that the motion to quash the writ of error should be dismissed.

The motion to quash the writ of error having been dismissed, the counsel proceeded to argue the exceptions taken to the proceedings of the Court below; after which

Tilghman C. J.

delivered the opinion of the Court, as follows, having previously stated the case.

It was the object of the act of assembly under which these issues were framed, to have the merits of the controversy tried in the Court of Common Pleas, according to the rules of the common law. The board of property was to direct an issue, and inform the Court of Common Pleas of the subject of that issue. The Court was then to mould the issue acC01‘ding to their discretion. The board of property trans-m'ttec^ t0 Court, a transcript of the proceedings which had taken place before them, and directed, in general terms, that an issue should be formed. They might have been more particular in their directions, but what they did, was sufficient in substance. There w;as enough before the Court, to shew them the subject of the controversy. In the forming of the issue, the Court were to proceed according to their own judgment. It was not material who were made plaintiffs or defendants, provided the matters in dispute were brought to trial. It is our duty to examine, whether the trial was conducted according to law. As to the form in which the matter was brought to trial, it appears to me, that we ought not to intermeddle. Indeed we are too much in the dark, as to the transactions which gave rise to this controversy, to judge whether a better form could be devised than that which was adopted by the Court of Common Pleas. We have heard something of articles of agreement between James Moore, Alexander Hunter, and William M‘Cord, in pursuance of which the released lands were taken up. But what these articles were, we know not. It is impossible for us, therefore, to say, that the Court of Common Pleas were wrong, in permitting Andrew Albright to be placed as plaintiff on the record, or in refusing to suffer the defendant to put in a plea, that John Cook was not the administrator of William M'-Cord. These were circumstances affecting only the forms and not material to the merits of the trial. They do not appear to be errors.

Another exception was taken to the opinion of the Court, in M'-Cord’s issue. The jury offered a kind of verdict, as follows:—“ The jury take the liberty of reporting to the Court, that the defendant is to receive the first purchase money, and one-third part of the balance of what it was sold for, with costs of warrants, surveys, and money expended for that use. The two-thirds of the balance, for the use of the plaintiff.” This the Court refused to receive, and told the jury, that if they were of opinion M'-Cord had a right to one-third of the lands released, they should fin'd generally for the plaintiff j but if their opinion was otherwise, they should find for the defendant. In this, the Court did no more than hold the jury to the issue, which was certainly right. The point of the issue was, whether M1- Cord was entitled to one-third. A finding on any other point, was wandering from the mark.

Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that no error appears on the record, and therefore the judgment should be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.