Case ID: f-appx_465/html/0696-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Joan ELIZABETH, aka Joan Aarestad, aka Joan Elizabeth Aarestad, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, individually and as Receiver for IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 10-55640.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    
      Submitted Dec. 19, 2011.
    
    Filed Jan. 10, 2012.
    Joan Elizabeth, Pasadena, CA, pro se.
    Scott H. Christensen, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Washington, DC, Rita M. Haeusler, Esquire, Alex Edwin Spjute, Esquire, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Michelle Ognibene, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Arlington, VA, for Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Joan Elizabeth appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) in her action challenging the FDIC’s deposit insurance determination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We dismiss the appeal as moot.

Elizabeth has been refunded the entire uninsured deposit amount that her action sought to recover, in accordance with a change in federal law after the district court issued its judgment. Because there is no longer a live issue or controversy and no effective relief can be granted, we must dismiss the appeal as moot. See Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 118 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992) (“[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Far W. Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision-Director, 119 F.3d 1358, 1366-67 (9th Cir.1997) (FDIC is not subject to a prejudgment interest award because it operates as a regulatory entity, and Congress has not explicitly waived its immunity against interest).

We do not consider Elizabeth’s contentions concerning the FDIC’s alleged negligence because Elizabeth did not adequately raise the issue before the district court. See Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 389 n. 6 (9th Cir.1996).

DISMISSED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.