Case ID: f-appx_398/html/0299-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

BACKYARD WRESTLING, INC., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PRO-ACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC., a California corporation; Len Levy, an Individual; Richard Mendelsohn, an individual, Defendants, and Wenceslado Herrera, aka wayne Herrera, dba Distinctive Movie Network, dba Movie Network, Inc., dba Wayne Enterprises, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-55589.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted June 9, 2010.
    Filed Oct. 6, 2010.
    Paul Murphy, Esquire, Troy Slome, Murphy Rosen & Meylan LLP, Santa Monica, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Raphael Cung, Special Counsel, Spillane Weingarten, LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
    Pro-Active Entertainment Group, Inc., A California Corporation, pro se.
    Len Levy, Rancho Mirage, CA, pro se.
    Richard Mendelsohn, Memphis, TN, pro se.
    Joseph C. Maher, II, Esquire, Law Office of Joseph C. Maher, Beverly Hills, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: GOODWIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, United States District Judge.
    
    
      
       The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Defendantr-Appellant (“Herrera”) appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff, asserting two grounds for vacating the judgment: 1) Plaintiff-Appellee (“BWI”) was a void Delaware corporation, thereby lacking the capacity to sue, and thus BWI did not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing; and 2) the district court made erroneous findings of fact at the prove-up hearing following a default judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm the judgment.

Herrera claims that under Delaware law (BWI is a Delaware corporation), a void corporation loses its capacity to sue except as to matters related to winding up the business of the corporation. See Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 278. BWI is not a dissolved corporation, but rather a once-void and now-renewed corporation. Under Delaware law, where a corporation was void but then renewed, it is as though the corporation was never void, and the corporation regains all of its previous rights, including capacity to sue. Frederic G. Krapf & Son, Inc. v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713, 715 (Del.1968), BWI submitted to this Court a Certificate of Renewal, which indicates that BWI became a void corporation for failure to pay taxes on March 1, 2009, and then received a Certificate of Renewal on December 8, 2009 and a Certificate of Good Standing on January 14, 2010. Accordingly, Herrera’s argument fails and the judgment of the district court must be upheld despite BWI’s void status from March 1, 2009 to December 8, 2009. Under Del.Code Ann. tit. 8, § 312(e), and applying Krapf, even if BWI lacked capacity to sue at the time of the district court’s March 19, 2009 judgment on damages and entry of permanent injunction, the fact that BWI has been reinstated through the Certificate of Renewal results in a validation of all its corporate acts, including suit against Herrera.

The findings of fact challenged by Herrera were made at the prove-up hearing on damages. We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and must be “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Household Credit Serv. v. Ettell (In re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir.1999); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir.2002). No finding of fact was clearly erroneous.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.