Case ID: sw2d_4/html/0559-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MARTIN, J. MARTIN, J. LATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DEUSCHLE v. STATE.
    (No. 11086.)
    Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Nov. 2, 1927.
    State’s Rehearing Granted Dec. 14, 1927.
    Rehearing Denied April 11, 1928.
    On State’s Motion for Rehearing.
    1. Weapons <&wkey; 7 — Unlawful purpose and intent precludes right to carry pistol on public road running through owner’s premises (Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484).
    Right of owner of premises to carry pistol on public road running through the premises, under Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484, which exempts carrying of arms on one’s own premises, cannot coexist with unlawful purpose and -intent in carrying pistol.
    2. Assault and hattery &wkey;o92 — Evidence of intent in carrying pistol on public road through defendant’s homestead, where assault was proved, sustained conviction for assault while unlawfully carrying pistol (Pen. Code, 1925, arts. 483, 484, 1151; Const. Bill of Rights, § 23).
    Evidence of unlawful purpose of defendant in carrying pistol into and across public road which ran through her homestead separating her tracts of land held to sustain conviction, under Pen. Code 1925, art. 1151, for assault on another while unlawfully carrying pistol, where assault was sufficiently proven, since under circumstances unlawful intent destroyed defendant’s right to carry arms, under Pen. Code, arts. 483, 484, in view of Const. Bill of Rights, § 23.
    On Motion for Rehearing.
    3. Weapons <&wkey;6 — Person may not carry pistol from place to place idly, or habitually, or for unlawful purpose (Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484).
    While one may carry pistol from place where same is legitimately had to another like place for some legitimate purpose, person has no such right to carry such pistol idly, or merely for sake of carrying it, or habitually, or for some unlawful purpose, under Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484.
    4. Weapons <&wkey;17(2) — Person carrying pistol idly across property of others or public has burden to prove carriage was lawful (Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484).
    One may not idly or without lawful purpose carry a pistol from one place to another across property of others or public, under Pen. Code 1925, arts. 483, 484, and such carriage when proved is deemed unlawful, and burden of proving it was lawful is generally on the person accused.
    Commissioners’ Decision.
    Appeal from District Court, Kaufman County; Joel R. Bond, Judge.
    Annie Deuschle was convicted of assault with a prohibited weapon, and she appeals.
    Affirmed.
    Morris Brin and M. F. Cate, both of Terrell, and Wynne & Wynne, of Kaufman, for appellant.
    M. Ashworth, Co. Atty., of Kaufman, and A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.
   MARTIN, J.

Appellant was convicted under article 1151 of the Penal Code 1925; the indictment charging that while unlawfully carrying on and about her person a pistol she unlawfully and willfully made an assault upon Martha Weiland.

Under this indictment it devolved upon the state to show (1) that appellant unlawfully assaulted the prosecuting witness with a pistol, and (2) that the pistol was then and there being unlawfully carried by appellant. Article 1151, P. C.; Reneau v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 250, 291 S. W. 899. The evidence we deem sufficient upon the first of these issues and that upon the second issue was substantially as follows: A public road ran through the homestead of appellant; the house, barn, and cow lot were on one side of this road and a cow pasture in which the milch cows were kept 'was immediately opposite on the other side of the road; there being about 100 acres on one side of the road and about 10 acres on the other side. The appellant had a pistol on the date of the offense in the public road between her residence and the cow pasture and on said oc-, casion, the state’s witnesses testified, fired two shots towards the prosecuting witness, who was passing in an automobile. The testimony for appellant shows that she had been across the road after the cows and returning fired a shot at a rabbit. It further shows the impossibility of appellant’s using her homestead without using the public road, the title to which road in the public it seems amounted only to an easement, the fee remaining in the appellant’s husband. This case turns upon the sufficiency of the above evidence to show that appellant was unlawfully carrying the pistol when the alleged assault was made. Judge Hurt summarily disposes of a similar contention in the ease of Ball v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 25 S. W. 627, in the following language:

“Appellant carried the pistol on a public road. The road ran through the premises of Mr. Stanford. That point of the road at which appellant carried the pistol was situated on Stanford’s premises — his homestead. Appellant lived with Stanford; he had no other home. Did he violate the statute prohibiting the carrying of a pistol? He did not.”

To the same effect is Ross v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 28 S. W. 199. See, also, the following cases: Mendez v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 272, 250 S. W. 680; Parker v. State, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 260, 174 S. W. 343. Under these authorities the evidence was clearly insufficient to show the existence of one of the indispensable elements of the offense denounced in article 1151, P. O.

Article 483, P. C., makes the carrying of a pistol unlawful and article 484, P. C., excepts out of the operation of article 483, peace officers, the carrying of arms on one’s own premises, persons traveling, and others. One whom the facts place clearly within any of the exceptions contained in article 484, P. O., cannot be prosecuted for the offense of unlawfully carrying a pistol, whatever may have been his intent in carrying it. Herein lies the distinction between cases like Moore v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 502, 217 S. W. 1036, and the instant case. The evidence shows appellant within one of said exceptions, viz;.: The carrying of a pistol on one’s own premises. This being established, the state’s case fails under the indictment herein.

It does not follow, of course, that the appellant has violated no law under the testimony of the state’s witnesses; but, the prosecution instituted being for an offense which demanded proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the unlawful carrying of a pistol, and this proof in our opinion 'being insufficient, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the 'judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and approved by the court.

On State’s Motion for Rehearing.

MARTIN, J.

In our original opinion we reluctantly followed the case of Ball v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 25 S. W. 627, which was interpreted by us to mean that a public road running through a homestead was a part of the premises, as that word is used in article 484 of the Penal Code, so that a person in posses, sion of same charged with unlawfully carrying a pistol came within one of the exemptions named in said article. The facts of the Ball Case are meagerly stated and perhaps a fuller statement might disclose that it is not out of line with what upon fuller consideration we now believe is the correct rule in cases of this character. If our original interpretation be correct then the Ball Case is unsound and any express or implied holding of same as interpreted above is overruled.

One of the jury questions in this case was whether or not appellant had the pistol at the time of the assault for an unlawful purpose. She had the right to the full use of the public i*oad in question in the performance of any act or thing pertaining to the legitimate use and enjoyment of her premises and when so using it did not violate the pistol law in having with her such a weapon on the public road. It would, we think, however, be stating the rule too broadly and be provocative of too much mischief to say that she would have the right to carry prohibited weapons upon such a road irrespective of her intent and purpose in having same. Athough a public road running through a homestead may be a part of the premises for the purpose of their legitimate use and enjoyment by the owner, the real right of possession to such road belongs in the public so as to exclude its use by such owner for an illegal purpose not in any way connected with the right of use and possession of the'premises through which the road runs..

Section 23 of the Bill of Rights to our state Constitution provides:

“Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the state; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.”

In response to and in furtherance of said permissive clause, the Legislature to prevent crime has prohibited the carrying of certain arms with the exemptions set out in article 484 of the Penal Code. This class needs no further authority than the terms of the statute as a defense and-having the right by law to carry a pistol; the purpose in carrying same is immaterial. There is, however,’ a second class, not defined by statute, which under our decision are exempted from the operation of the pistol law. Their right to carry a pistol may be said in a general way to be an incident of their constitutional right to own, possess, and bear arms. The following Texas cases illustrate this class:

A weapon may be lawfully carried to one’s home, place of business, or to a repair shop for the purpose of repairing it. Mangum v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 90 S. W. 31; Roberts V. State, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 112, 131 S. W. 321; Morris v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 67, 163 S. W. 709; Fitzgerald v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 266, 106 S. W. 365,124 Am. St. Rep. 1095. Or a pistol may be carried from store to store in search of ammunition. Waddell v. State, 37 Tex. 354. Or at the direction of his employer an employee may carry to another store. Huff v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 441, 102 S. W. 407. He has a right to carry the pistol to deliver it to the party to whom he sold it. Upton v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 231, 26 S. W. 197. Section 987, Branch’s Penal Code, states the rule broadly in pistol cases as follows:

“An act in violation of ‘the letter but not of the spirit of the law is no offense.”

See, also, Moore v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 502, 217 S. W. 1036; Elliott v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 242, 45 S. W. 711.

In the second class of cases the right to carry a pistol cannot coexist with an unlawful purpose and intent in carrying it. When the purpose for which it was being carried ceased, the legal right to carry it also ceased, while in the first class of cases mentioned above such purpose could not be inquired into, if the facts conclusively showed that the person charged was within one of the exceptions of the statute.

We have concluded that the facts of this case place it within the second of said classes instead of the first, as formerly held.

The appellant had the undoubted right to go upon the public road with a pistol in making a journey to and from her separated tracts of land for the purpose of transacting business legitimately connected with the operation of her premises, but, when her purpose was unlawful and had no legitimate connection with the business arising out of or incident to her possession and enjoyment of the premises, her right to have a pistol ceased and her act in carrying it thereupon became unlawful.

Errors of omission occurred in the court’s main charge of which complaint is made. Special charges given at the request of appellant, we think, cured these errors. Their interest to the bench and bar do not justify the use of lengthy space in their discussion. The charges are, as a whole, if anything, perhaps more liberal than appellant was entitled to.

Believing that no error was committed, the judgment heretofore entered reversing and remanding this cause is hereby set aside, the state’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and approved by the court.

On Motion for Rehearing.

LATTIMORE, J.

That one may carry a pistol from a place where same is legitimately had to another like place for some legitimate purpose seems uniformly held; but this does not mean that such person may so carry such weapon idly, or merely for the sake of carrying it, or habitually, or for some unlawful purpose. Cassi v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 369, 216 S. W. 1099; Moore v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 502, 217 S. W. 1036. We did not intend any expression in our judgment of affirmance herein to be understood otherwise. Appellant defended in this case on the theory that she did not carry across the public road in front of her house the pistol with which the alleged assault, if any, was made, but that she took it no further than to her gate, where she left it while she went across the road and returned. The state’s witness Howard testified that appellant took the pistol from her pocket and fired it while in said public road, and this gave rise to the issue chiefly discussed in the opinion heretofore, as to whether she would be guilty in the event she did so carry said pistol on and across said road.

We have carefully considered the able motion for rehearing, but are not satisfied that the Ball Case, referred to in our former opinion, or the Ross Case, 28 S. W. 199, would justify us in holding that one might legally carry a pistol on a state highway under facts such as appear in this case. Nothing in either of the cases referred to apply to the character of case or the kind of road which appears here. The road referred to in said cases might easily have been a second or third class or even a neighborhood road as defined by our statute. If the facts in this case justified the jury in finding that appellant carried the pistol in question to a point in the public road and that she there shot same at the alleged injured party, then in our opinion they were warranted in the verdict of guilty. Appellant herself swore: “I had no business to take the pistol with me across the road.” “Before I went after the cows I laid the pistol inside the yard.” Granting the right then of one under circumstances showing some need or lawful reason to carry a pistol from one premise to another, we are forced to hold a discussion of such right merely academic here for the reason that appellant not only did not furnish proof of some lawful purpose in such carriage, but denies that she did tarry said pistol from her yard across the road to the pasture. To be sure we recognize the rule that, if evidence other than that of the accused raises or supports the proposition that she lawfully carried the pistol from one premise to another, this would be enough to properly raise the issue, but there is no such other evidence in this case.-

One cannot idly or without lawful purpose carry a pistol from premise to premise across the property of others or of the public ; and such carriage when proven is deemed unlawful, and the burden of proving thac such carriage was lawful and within sonqe of the exemptions is upon the accused, as appears in Bridgers v. State, 8 Tex. App. 145; Stilly v. State, 27 Tex. App. 445,11 S. W. 458, 11 Am. St. Rep. 201; Williams v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 639,169 S. W. 1154; Blair v. State, 26 Tex. App. 387, 9 S. W. 890; Hunter v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 459, 166 S. W. 164. In the well-considered case of Moore v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 502, 217 S. W. 1036, it seems held that when the facts are presented on which a defensive issue depends and the jury resolves same against the accused, if sufficient to support the finding, this would be conclusive. The reasoning of the court in that ease seems applicable here.

Being unable to agree with appellant’s contention, the motion for rehearing is overruled. 
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