Case ID: sw_185/html/0011-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      DAVIDSON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FREGIA v. STATE.
    (No. 4022.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    April 6, 1916.)
    1. Homicide <s=»90 — Assault to Murder-Deadly Weapon.
    A pocketknife is not per se a deadly weapon. Consequently, where accused assaulted his wife with a pocketknife, he cannot be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, unless he was in such a position that he could inflict bodily injury, or the knife was such that he could inflict serious or mortal wounds. Consequently, a charge which merely submitted the question whether accused made an assault with a deadly weapon, and authorized a conviction of assault to murder in case he did, is erroneous.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 119; Dec. Dig. <⅜^>90.] ■
    2. Homicide <§=>94^-ássault to Murder-Defenses.
    Where, acting under influence of a sudden passion aroused by adequate cause, accused assaulted his wife with a pocketknife, but death did not result, he cannot be convicted of assault to murder.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 122; Dec. Dig. ⅞⅛94.]
    3. Homicide <§=j257(8) — Assault to Murder —Intent to Kill.
    Proof that accused used a pocketknife in an assault on his wife does not of itself show intent to kill.
    [Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 551; Dec. Dig. <⅜=>257(8).]
    Appeal from District Court, Liberty County; J. Llewellyn, Judge.
    Joe Fregia, alias Joe Williams, was convicted of assault to murder, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of assault to murder, his punishment being assessed at two years’ confinement in the penitentiary.

Exceptions to the court’s charge were presented in due time, properly approved by the judge. The exceptions are: First, that it is not authorized by the undisputed evidence of the state’s witnesses, which testimony shows that defendant was at no time within such distance of Dizzie Fregia as to inflict injury upon her vdth the knife; second, there is no evidence that authorizes the submission to the jury of a charge of assault with intent to murder with a deadly weapon.

The court submitted the state’s case on the theory that the weapon used was a deadly weapon, and as used, if the jury so found, Would entitle the state to a conviction for assault to murder. It is deemed unnecessary to go into a detailed statement of the facts. The alleged assaulted party was appellant’s wife. The trouble occurred at a social function, defendant coining upon the scene and finding his wife selling ice cream in connection, or apparently so, with another man. There had been trouble between defendant and his wife. She testified that he had been cruel to her prior to this time, having made personal assaults on her. The only evidence in the case with reference to the instrument used was that it was a pocketknife. Its length, or its size, is not given, except that it was a poeketknife. There is same dispute as to whether it was open or not, even from the state!s standpoint; but there is conflict in the testimony from the defendant’s side that it was not, and that he did not make an assault upon her with a knife. The evidence is variant as to the immediate difficulty, the wife testifying that appellant had a poeketknife and cut at her. He denied this. The distance between them, or whether she was in danger of being cut by the knife, is left too uncertain and indefinite, we think, to show that he was within striking distance by means of the use of the knife. He followed her to her father’s house and near by was shot by the man who was with her at the social function.

The court should not have assumed, under these facts, that the weapon was a deadly weapon. A poeketknife is not per se a deadly weapon, and in order to constitute it such there must be evidence to show that it was so used. The court did not instruct the jury with reference to this particular matter, but simply submitted the matter to the jury to find if appellant made an assault with a deadly weapon upon the alleged assaulted party they would convict of assault to murder, if there was an intent to kill, and, if not, then it would be aggravated assault. We are of the opinion that the court’s charge is erroneous. It should have instructed the jury that before he could be convicted of assault to murder he must be within such distance that he could have inflicted an injury upon the alleged assaulted party by the use of the means employed, and further that the jury should have been instructed as to what it takes to constitute a deadly weapon, especially under the facts of this case. If he had a pistol and was shooting at her within short range, we would have had a different proposition; but the only evidence we have here is the fact stated and undisputed that it was a poeketknife, without any further description. To the mind of the writer the facts do not justify the conviction of assault to murder. See Branch’s Grim. Daw, § 517. Mr. Branch thus lays down one of the rules:

“If weapon is not shown to be deadly, or wounds serious, it is not assault to murder, though defendant said he intended to kill; the desire to kill is not proof that weapon was deadly.” Gage v. State, 77 S. W. 806; Foster v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 399, 46 S. W. 231; Sloan v. State, 76 S. W. 922.

To constitute an assault with intent to murder, the assault must be coupled with an ability to commit a battery upon the person assaulted. McCullough v. State, 24 Tex. App. 128, 5 S. W. 839. See also the statute.

If defendant was acting under the influence of sudden passion aroused by an adequate cause, conviction for assault to murder, death not resulting, will not be sustained. Mays v. State, 19 S. W. 504. Proof that weapon used was a poeketknife is not sufficient of itself to show that the intent was to kill. Martinez v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 33 S. W. 970.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded. 
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