Case ID: yeates_3/html/0350-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Shippen, C. J. Yeates, J. Smith, J. Brackenridge, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*John Burke for the use of Thomas Harrison against Richard Allen.
    B. mortgages land to K., and the same not being recorded in six months, sells the same land to A. and receives a bond in part payment, and then assigns over the bond informally to H. Á. does not record his deed in six months, and K’s. mortgage is first recorded, which was the first notice either to A. or H. of the mortgage. •Adjudged that the mortgage cannot be set up as a defence against the equitable as-signee of the bond. Alitsr as to B. the obligee.
    This suit was tried at bar last September term. It was debt on a bend dated 23d April 1796, conditioned for the payment of 337I. 10s. in six several instalments, which was informally assigned to Harrison, on some day previous to the 21st January 1797, and whereon the assignee had received from the obligor 50 dollars on the 2d February, and 150 dollars on the 24th April 1797. It was given in part consideration of certain lands sold and conveyed to Allen by Burke on the same 23d April 1796, but the deed for the premises was not recorded until the 12th February 1798.
    But prior to this date, on the 8th October 1795, Burke had mortgaged the premises to Elizabeth Kintzing, to secure the payment of 200I. and interest, which mortgage was recorded on the 25th January 1798.
    Neither Allen nor Harrison knew of the mortgage until the recording thereof, which gave them constructive notice thereof.
    It was agreed on the trial, that a verdict should pass for the plaintiff for the penalty, subject to the court’s opinion, on the following reserved point: Whether the plaintiff is entitled against the defendant to recover the whole amount of the bond on which the suit is brought; or, whether the mortgage to Elizabeth Kintzing shall be deducted if less ; and if the said mortgage exceeds the balance due on the said bond, whether the same is not a good defence against the plaintiffs’ demand ? If the court’s opinion shall be in favour of the plaintiff, then judgment to be entered for him ; but, if otherwise, then a judgment of nonsuit to be entered.
    The point reserved was fully argued by Messrs. Hallowell and Condy for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Ingersoll and T. Ross for the defendant, last December term.
    The counsel for the plaintiff urged, that the real parties in' the present suit were Harrison and Allen; Kintzing had been since called in, and all the parties were now before the court, as on a bill of interpleader before the chancellor. If the contest was merely between Burke and Allen, there is no doubt but the latter would prevail; but Harrison and Kintzing were equitable claimants without legal rights. An interference of interests took place upon the assignment of the bond. When Allen purchased the premises, above six months had elapsed after the date of the £ 1 ^mortgage which was unrecorded, and therefore being 35 J ignorant thereof, he took the lands unincumbered. He had made two payments to Harrison, and thereby acknowledged the debt. Nothing ex post facto could revive the incumbrance. But it will be relied on, that the mortgage was entered of record eighteen days before the defendant’s deed. This we contend is of no avail. The act of 28th May 1715, 1 St. Laws 112, fully provides for the cases of mortgages, which remaining unrecorded for six months, are utterly void as to third persons. The act of 18th March 1775, only respects absolute conveyances, and not mortgages. Under the former the possession is changed, but not under the latter, The words of the ist section, 1 St, Laws 703, “ all deeds and conveyances; &c. whereby the same “may be any way affected in law or equity/’ See., may be satisfied, by referring them to articles of agreement. The defendant’s deed is within that law, and being unrecorded for six months, would be void against subsequent deeds and mortgages without notice. This case is distinguishable from Levinz v. Will, 1 Dali. 434. To give the mortgage operation would materially injure an honest assignee, who is entitled to recover what appears on the face of the bond to be due at the time of the assignment. Ib. 28. Here Harrison expended his money on the credit of Allen, but Kintzing gave credit to Burke for two years and three- months, to the detriment of innocent persons. She disregarded a duty which the law called on her to discharge, and must abide by the consequences. The claims of creditors shall not prevail against the equity of the wife, to have a settlement made on her, at least adequate to her fortune. 2 Atky. 417. Nor the assignees of the husband, he being a bankrupt. 1 Wms. 382, 459. Cox’s note. But if the husband assign the fund for a valuable consideration, the assignee shall hold it discharged of the equity in favour of the wife. 2 Vern. 270. 1 Fonbla. 90.
    The defendant’s counsel contended, that he was entitled to defaulk the mortgage/at the time of the bonds being assigned. 1 St. Laws 65. 1 Dali. 28. What ought not to be paid shall be considered as paid. Ib. 257. An assignment is in fact no more than an agreement that the assignee shall have the same benefit in the thing assigned, as the original party. The as-signee must take it, subject to all its equity. Doug. 614. 10 Mod. 450. 2 Vern. 692. The assignees of a bankrupt stand in the same situation as the bankrupt where there has been no collusion. 1 Atky. 160. 2 Term Rep. 462. Though the words of the recording act of 1715, are very strong, that mortgages shall be of no effect unless recorded within six months, yet it was determined in Levinz v. *Will already cited, that though r* not recorded in due time, they may be available against L the mortgagors, and their creditors. But the words of that act are, “ no deed or mortgage, or defeasible deed in the nature of “mortgages, shall be good or sufficient, &c. unless,” &c. Now these expressions will equally include the deed to Allen, ás the mortgage to Kintzing. If however the construction which has been said to have obtained of that law, should confine the clause to mortgages alone, still the act of 1775 comprehends the case of a mortgage equally as a deed, the words being “ all deeds and “ conveyances of or concerning any lands, tenements or heredi-taments, whereby the same may be any way affected in law or “equity, shall be acknowledged and recorded, &c., or shall be “adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, whose deed shall be first recorded.” A subsequent mortgagee is expressly named, so must necessarily a prior mortgagee be included. The deed first entered on record shall take effect, and Kintzing’s deed of mortgage was first recorded. Hence the mortgage will be an incumbrance on the lands, which the defendant will be bound to satisfy. It will remain on record and affect his title materially. No earthly power can compel the mortgagee to enter satisfaction. It will-be observed, that in the 3d section of the last law, there is a proviso, that the act shall not extend to any lease not exceeding 2 r years, where the actual possession goes along with the lease. The exception proves the rule.
    It has been asserted, that Harrison is the real plaintiff ; but it cannot be pretended, that he could support the action in his own name. The declarations of a plaintiff, though only a trustee, may be given in evidence, to defeat his action. 7 Term Rep. 663-6. Burke has behaved villainously, and it is admitted that the defence would be good against him. Why not also against his assignee, to whom he can communicate no more right than he possessed himself ? Which of the two innocent persons should suffer by his misconduct ? The plaintiff cannot succeed at law; and the payments made by the defendant can have no effect against him, when he had no notice of the mortgage, and was ignorant of his rights. Plarrison therefore has no superior equity to Kintzing. Both appear to be honest creditors. She did not record her mortgage in six months; the same default must be ascribed to Allen, as to his deed. But the first mortgage was recorded, and if the equities are equal, the law must prevail. This court will not add to the penalties prescribed by the legislature, against an innocent creditor. A deed, which is void as a common law conveyance, may operate as a -*• f i *covenant to stand seized to uses. 2 Wils. 22, 75. A defective surrender for want of presentment within 12 months, held good against creditors and assignees. 1 Cha. Ca. 170. 2 Vern. 564. Here Harrison succeeds to all the rights of Burke, but is subjected to all the equity to which he was subject.
    
      Curia advisare vzdt.
    
    And now this term, the court proceeded to deliver their opinions seriatim.
    
   Shippen, C. J.

Elizabeth Kintzing, though a bona fide creditor, lost the surety of her mortgage, as to all other persons except Burke, and those who were in pari delicto, by not recording her mortgage in six months. Allen was an innocent purchaser, ignorant of the mortgage. He therefore shall not suffer by her default, who by not recording in time, put it in the power of Burke to deceive him. As to Harrison, he was an innocent assignee of Burke; and though in general, an assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor, yet this appears to me one of those cases, where an assignee stands on better ground, than the assignor. Because otherwise, he would be a sufferer, not by the roguery of Burke alone, but by the negligence of Kintzing, who now claims an equity at his expence.

As to Allen’s losing the land by not recording his deed within six months, he does not by this revive the right of Kintzing, but would have subjected himself only to the claim of a subsequent purchaser, who recorded before him. Then as Kintzing could not avail herself of her mortgage as against Allen, and he must pay the amount of his bond to somebody, it must be to •Harrison the innocent assignee.

Yeates, J.

The true construction of the recording laws, will in my idea, in a great degree, determine the point reserved, in this case.

The mortgage by John Burke to Elizabeth Kintzing is dated 8th October 1795, and was not entered on record, until 2 years, 3 months and 17 days after it was executed. The mortgaged premises were conveyed by Burke, the nominal plaintiff, to Richard Allen the defendant, on the 23d April 1796, and this deed was not entered on record, until 1 year, 9 months and 20 days had expired, being 18 days after the mortgage was recorded. .

Hence it is contended, that the mortgage shall prevail, on the ground of its being first recorded. And if it is an existing le*gal incumbrance, affecting the defendant’s lands, there ,-¥ can be no question, as to its being entitled to be defaulked [*355 out of the present bond.

The 8th section of the law of 28th May 1715, (1 St. Laws 112) is as follows: “No deed, or mortgage, or defeasible deed “in the nature of mortgages, hereafter to be made, shall be “ good or sufficient, to convey or pass any freehold of inheritance, “ or to grant any estate therein for life or years, unless such “deed be acknowledged or proved and recorded, within six “months after the date thereof, where such lands lie, as herein “before directed for other deeds.”

It is objected, that the conveyance to the defendant is comprehended in this description. But it is to be observed, that the words, in the nature of mortgages, run through the whole sentence, and the latter word is in the plural number; they limit and controul the generality of the preceding expressions. Besides, other deeds in the close of the section, contradistinguish the objects of it, from the deeds in general provided for in the preceding parts of the law ; and the uniform construction of the act, since it has passed, has been, that in this particular, it solely relates to mortgages, and defeasible deeds in their nature. It would be highly dangerous at this time, to adopt the words in a different sense, whereby many titles might be affected.

The first section of the law of 18th March 1775, (1 St. Laws 703,) enacts, that deeds and conveyances of lands, which shall not be recorded in the proper county within six months after their execution, “ shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against “any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable considera- “ tion, unless such deed or conveyance be recorded before the “proving and recording of the deed or conveyance under which “such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim.” The reason of the provision is manifest, because if in consequence of the neglect of the grantee to record his deed within the time appointed, other persons have been induced to pay and expend their money ignorantly and without notice of the former conveyance, the loss should fall on the first grantee only, who has caused the same. But a prior mortgagee, who could not possibly suffer by,a want of knowledge of the subsequent deed’s being executed, is neither within the words nor spirit of the provision. The terms, subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, are repeated, and there is no appearance in any part of the act of any intention of the legislature to make any alteration of the former act, as to the invalidity of mortgages not recorded within the six months, or to revive them against subsequent bona fide *356] *purchasers if they were first put on record. That act has fully provided for the case of mortgages unrecorded.

I conclude, therefore, that the mortgage to Elizabeth Kintzing does not bind the lands conveyed to Richard Allen, though it would have been effectual against John Burke himself, the mortgagor, if the same was in his hands, agreeably to the authority of Levinz v. Will, (1 Dall. 134,) on this plain ground, that in such case no one would be injured thereby.

I readily agree with the counsel, that if Burke was the real plaintiff, the defalcation contended for would certainly take place, and that an assignee is subject to all the equity which subsisted between the original parties. I lay no stress whatever on the circumstances of the payments of 50 dollars in February 1797, and of 150 dollars in April following, by Allen to Harrison. Such acknowledgments of the debt, or even an express promise to pay the obligation would not conclude the defendant, if made in a state of ignorance of a subsisting defence. 5 Burr. 2670. 1 Vern. 32. 1 Vez. 126, 400. 1 Fonbla. 106. 1 Espin. Ni. Pri. 174. 1 H. Bla. 64. But if Harrison had been led by the assertions or promises of Allen to take the assignment and pay his money, then the defendant would have made himself liable, because his declarations and engagements would form a new contract between him and the assignee, and he would not be permitted to injure an innocent stranger. This doctrine was laid down on full consideration, by Judge Smith and myself at Reading, at Nisi Prius in September 1799, between Ludwig assignee v. Croll, and was again asserted by Judge Smith at the sittings in Philadelphia, between Cairnes for the use of Olden v. Field and Harlan, and afterwards on a motion for a new trial, was assented to by the whole court, March term 1800.

In this case, I view Thomas Harrison as the true and real plaintiff, the legality and equity of whose demand is now before the court. The decisions of courts of law formerly were extremely narrow and contracted as to the assignment of choses in action; but they will now take notice of a trust, and see who is beneficially interested. And why not of an equity ? says Ashurst, J. 1 Term Rep. 619; and in the elaborate argument of Mr. Justice Buller, in Master v. Millar, he observes that the good sense of the rule, that a chose in action cannot be assigned or granted over to another is very questionable. In early as well as modern times, it has been so explained away, that it remains at most only an objection to the form of the action, in any case. The courts of law will take notice of the assignment of choses in action, though they adhere to the formal objection, that the *action shall not be brought in the name of the assignor; [*357 but there is no use in preserving the shadow when the substance is gone, and that it is merely a shadow is apparent from the later cases, in which the court have taken care that it shall never work injustice. 4 Term Rep. 340, 341.

The defendant Allen is bound to perform his contract and pay the stipulated price, but not beyond it. Whom then ought he to pay ? Has Mrs. Kintzing or Mr. Harrison the superior equity, or best founded claim to the money ? The former relied on the lands as her security, and at one time had a lien on them, but afterwards permitted it to slip through the fingers ; and if my ideas of the two recording acts are correct, the lands in the defendant’s hands cease to be chargeable with the mortgage. She neglected to perform a duty which the law imposed upon her, and if any injurious consequences result from her laches, she only is blameable. On the other hand, Harrison purchased the bond, relying on the credit and responsibility of Allen and is guilty of no default whatever. When he took the assignment before 21st January 1797, no incumbrances appeared on record to put him on his guard against Burke, and it is admitted that neither he nor Allen knew of the mortgage executed by Burke, until the same was recorded.

On the whole, I think the claim of Harrison much superior in point of equity to that of Kintzing, and that the money intended to be secured by the mortgage of the latter should not be deducted from the sum due on the bond.

Smith, J.

I fully concur in the opinion delivered by my brother Yeates, though we have had no previous conference on the subject.

The dispute in this case, is in fact, between Thomas Harrison, to whom the bond, on which the action was brought, was equitably assigned before the 21st January 1797, and Elizabeth Kintzing, to whom the premises which Burke afterwards sold to the defendant, and for part payment of which this bond was given, had been previously mortgaged, viz. on the 8th October 1795, to secure the payment of 200I. Richard Allen is, or ought to be, a mere stakeholder. Is Harrison, the equitable assignee, entitled to recover under the circumstances stated, or is this mortgage a defence to the plaintiff’s demand ?

In equity each is entitled to the money; for it is not alleged that Kintzing did not lend, or that Burke was not indebted to her every farthing of the 200I. ; nor is it alleged that Harrison did not give the full value for the bond, by Burke’s being previously indebted to him or otherwise; nor is it suggested, that he had *any notice of the mortgage till it was recorded, *358] which was more than a year after the bond had been assigned to him.

The act of May 1715, requires, that mortgages should be recorded in six months, or they shall not be good or sufficient to convey or pass any freehold or inheritance, or to grant any estate therein for life or years. And the act of March 1775, directs that all deeds and conveyances, &c. for or concerning any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or whereby the same may be in any way affected in law or equity, and not recorded in six months, shall be fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, &c. These laws are founded in wisdom and productive of justice and security, to purchasers and mortgagees in most cases. A case may happen, in which the protection intended by them cannot reach a subsequent mortgagee, without any want of caution on his part, as the title deeds in Pennsylvania do not necessarily, and in practice, accompany mortgages. In all other instances these laws protect purchasers and mortgagees; but both may lose that protection by their own neglect. Unless Kintzing has been guilty of such neglect, in not duly recording her mortgage, the plaintiff cannot recover, because it was given prior to the sale to the defendant, and if recorded in due time, it will take effect from the time of its execution.

The bond is equitably assigned; but it is a rule in law, that a bond, which is only assignable in equity, (and consequently a bond equitably assigned, or even legally assigned, as it may be in Pennsylvania) is still liable to and attended with the same equity, as if remaining with the obligee. 2 Verm. 765, 692. 1 Wms. 496. Prec. Cha. 522. 1 Equ. Ca. Abr. 45, pl. 5. 10 Mod. 455. 1 Stra. 240. The rule is right, that whoever takes the assignment of a bond, being a chose in action, takes it subject to all the equity in the hands of the original obligee; but length of time and circumstances may vary that, and make the case of the assignee stronger. 1 Vez. 123, per Ld. Hardwicke.

It has been assumed for granted in the argument, that the mortgage would be a good defence to Allen, against a recovery by Burke. I will also suppose the same thing, by which the question will be, whether length of time and circumstances have made the case of the assignee stronger ? I will state and observe upon both.

The mortgage is dated 8th October 1795, and the law required that it should be recorded in six months ; but it was not recorded till 25th January 1798, just two years, three months, and seventeen days after its date. Fifteen days after the time, within which it ought to have been recorded, Burke sold the mortgaged ^premises to Allen, a bona fide purchaser without notice, [*359 Allen gave the bond in question to Burke for part of the I-purchase money, which was equitably assigned to Harrison, one year and four days before the mortgage was recorded. This assignment was made either in payment of a precedent debt, or for the value paid by Harrison to Burke ; for it is not suggested that he purchased it at a cent under its value. I perfectly agree with the defendant’s counsel, that if Harrison has not more equity than Kintzing, he cannot recover. This is one of those cases in which, from length of time and the circumstances stated, the bond so assigned became not liable to and attended with the same equity as when remaining with the obligee. The case of the assignee was thereby made stronger, and he has more equity than the mortgagee. One of them must suffer. Kintzing, by her neglect, became the instrument to enable Burke to commit the fraud. She alone must suffer by it, and not Harrison, who was in no default. By Kintzing’s neglect, Harrison took the assignment; by a continuance of that neglect for 1 year and 4 days after he took it, he was lulled into perfect security. Payments were even made to him in part. Burke is able to pay, or he is not. If he is, Kintzing can recover her money from him, and if not, she, and not Harrison, ought to be the loser. Moreover, by her neglect after the assignment, Harrison .was prevented from looking to Burke for the money which he had paid him for this bond. This circumstance also adds to Harrison’s equity, and lessens Kintzing’s.

But because the mortgage was recorded before the deed, which the defendant had also neglected to have recorded within the six months, the mortgagee is said to be yet entitled to recover, by the last clause in the 1st section of the act of 1775, and on the authority of Levinz v. Will, 1 Dall. 434.

The words of this act are certainly sufficiently comprehensive to include mortgages, had there not existed then the act of 1715, the 8th and 9th sections of which relate to mortgages exclusively. The 8th section declaring, that “ no deed or mortgage, “ &c. shall be good or sufficient to convey or pass any freehold “ or inheritance, or to grant any estate therein for life or years, “ unless recorded in six months,” it would be a strained construction to say that the clause referred to in the act of 1775, extends to mortgages, and gives them an effect by implication, contrary to the express words of the act of 1715, to the injury of innocent third persons. By the 8th section of the act of 1715, the recording of mortgages in six months is made a condition precedent; before the performance of it, no estate is conveyed or passed. But when this condition is performed, the mortgage takes effect by relation from the sealing and delivery. Cro. *Car. 218, 449, 569. Cro. Jac. 52. 1 Wils. 212. 4 Co. 71. Holt 220. 2 Inst. 674. 1 Co. 99, b. Burr. 1131, 2787, 1952, 1962. 1 Bla. Rep. 251, 605. Pow. on Dev. 600.

By the act of 1775, recording is not necessary to pass the estate. It is declared, “that it shall be adjudged fraudulent and “void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a “valuable consideration.” As against all other persons, it is bona fide and valid, although never recorded; and even as against them, if it be recorded before their deeds, though after the six months. So by constraction, if they had notice of it, express or implied, it is valid against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees. 1 Equ. Ca. Abr. 358. 2 Equ. Ca. Abr. 482. Cowp. 712. 3 Atky. 654. 13 Vin. 550, pl. 9. 1 Vez. 64. Hargr. Co. Lit. 290, b. Ambl. 436, 624. Therefore the last clause in the first section of the act of 1775, for recording of deeds, does not apply to mortgages, not recorded within six months.

I have considered the case of Levinz v. Will with much attention, especially as I understood some years ago, that at least one of the bar, whose legal abilities I highly respect, had expressed dissatisfaction at the decision. I am free to own that at times my mind has been inclined to waver on the subject; but I cannot go so far as to say, that had I then been obliged to give my opinion, I would not (after hearing the strong reasoning of the late Chief Justice,) have concurred. Even if my doubts had been much stronger than they were, I would hold myself bound by the decision. But it does not reach this case. There was no innocent purchaser without notice to be affected by the neglect of the mortgagee. It does not appear that any of Levinz’s creditors had trusted him on the credit of the mortgaged property, or that the neglect of the mortgagee had enabled Levinz to commit a fraud upon any person. PIere, let me repeat, as one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss ought to be borne by the person who is guilty of laches. I am therefore of opinion that judgment be entered for the plaintiff.

Brackenridge, J.

All the members óf the court have formed the same judgment, without communication between themselves.

When the legislature made bonds and notes assignable, and in the case of a bond with the solemnity of two witnesses, I scarcely think they had in view, that a defence could be set up against the assignee. But it has been early decided that it could be done, and we are bound by the decision. An exception has been taken to the general rule, and it has been lately decided, that where the taking an assignment is contemplated by a person, *and on application to the debtor, he is given to *361] understand that the bond will be paid, a defence cannot be afterwards set up. It might have been said in this case, that the debtor in saying that the bond was good, could mean no more than that for any thing he then knew, the bond was good and would be paid, and that this admission made by him under a mistake and ignorance of what afterwards appeared, as to the consideration on which it was given, ought not to take away the equity of defence which otherwise did exist. But the point has been solemnly determined. This exception is founded on something done by the debtor before the assignment, an act of his which establishes a privity of transaction between the intended assignee and the debtor. But in the case before us, another exception is contended to be just, something not done before the assignment, which might have been done, and ought to have been done, the losing the consideration of the bond by neglect, the not recording a deed.

It would not lie in the mouth of the assignor to set up this. But an action of assembly has provided, that on the sale of real estate, it shall lie in the mouth of a purchaser without notice. There is not the same reason that it should lie in the mouth of an assignee of a bond, the consideration of which was the sale of the real estate; for the consideration does not appear upon the bond or note. He cannot by searching offices, or inspecting records, obtain information, of the validity of the writing, and that the sum on the face of it is recoverable. The debtor may say to the assignee, what have I to do with seeing you ? you took the assignment on the credit of the assignor. I am blameable for not supposing it possible that my consideration might fail by the dishonesty of the vendor, and by vigilance secured myself against it. You are blameable in not supposing it possible that the assignor might be dishonest, and made enquiry before the assignment, or secured yourself in the contract, or have had nothing to do with him at all; there is no privity between you and me in this transaction, that your taking this assignment should put me in a worse situation than I should otherwise have been in.

These were my ideas on first thinking on the subject, but I concur with the opinions which have been delivered.

In the case before us, a second class of exceptions have been stated; something done, or not done which ought to have been done by the debtor after the assignment. On application to the debtor, he says the bond is good. This may be under a mistake and ignorance of his defence ; it can mean no more, than that for any thing I know, the bond is good. It has been so decided *in the case at Reading, and even after such application, [*362 a defence was admitted against the assignee.

But payments have been made upon the bond. A bond may be payable by instalments, and the payment of the whole sum due would amount to no more than saying generally, the bond is good ; but the paying of the sum due and taking time from the assignee, and inducing him to forbear, would be another matter. He is laid asleep as to the assignor, to whom his eye had been before. For though it has been decided, or collected from the decisions of this court, that a covenant does not run with the assignment, that the bond or note shall at all events be. paid, so as to secure against the insolvency of the debtor; yet it does, as to the want of consideration in whole or in part, and the assignee shall in that case recur to the assignor. If he loses any advantage of recurring instantly, by the act of the debtor, it is reasonable that the debtor should lose the equity of defence against him, which he might have had against the assignor. In the case before us, payment of part was made, and the assignee seems to have forborne. On this ground I feel- myself more firm, and. concur in favour of the assignee. He seems to be supported by the opinion of Ld. Hardwicke, in 1 Vez. 123, that length of time and circumstances may vary the general rule, that the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all the original equity, and may make the case of the assignee stronger.

Cited in 4 Yeates 279 to show that the eighth section of the act of 17x5 does not apply to deeds in general. Cited for the same purpose in 7 Watts 283.

Cited in 3 Phila. 113.

Judgment for the plaintiff.