Case ID: scl_35/html/0286-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Curia, per O’Neall, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State v. John D. Thayer.
    
    The writs of venire facias had, over the Clerk’s name, a small slip of paper attached by a wafer. The Court held this to be a sufficient sealing.
    The grand and petit jurors were summoned to attend, and the indictment alleged that the bill was found at “Harry Court House,” instead of “ Comuay-barough,” (the place appointed by law for holding the Courts of Horry District ;) the Court held, that '■ Horry Court House” was the more precise term ; but that in one sense both meant the same, and might be regarded as equivalent convertible terms.
    
      Before Richardson, J., at Horry, Spring Term, 1849.
    The defendant was convicted of petit larceny.
    As regards the seal of the Court, to which objection is taken in the first ground of appeal, it may be proper to state, that the writs of venire had, over the Clerk’s name, a small slip of paper, in the form of a diamond, attached to the sheet by a wafer. The defendant contended that this is not the seal of the Court, there being a stamp belonging to the office of the Clerk, an impression of which accompanies the copy of the indictment, as certified by the Clerk. There is no appearance of any such impression on the original writs.
    The defendant appealed and moved in arrest of judgment:
    1. Because the writ of venire facias summoning the grand jury, who found the bill, was not under the seal of the Court.
    2. Because the writ of venire facias summoning the. petit jurors who tried the cause, was not under the seal of the Court.
    3. Because the grand jurors who found the bill, were summoned in the venire to appear at Horry Court House, (instead of Conwayborough, the place appointed by law for the holding of the-Courts of General Sessious and Common Pleas, for Horry District,) and the sheriff returned, on oath, that he had summoned them accordingly.
    4. Because the petit jurors who tried the cause, were summoned to appear at Horry Court House, and the sheriff returned that he had summoned them accordingly.
    5. Because it was alleged in the indictment, that the grand jurors had found the bill, at a Court of General Sessions, &c. holden at Horry Court House.
    
    6. Because the Venue is laid at Horry Court House.
    
    
      Boyleston, for the motion.
    
      Mclver, Solicitor, contra.
   Curia, per O’Neall, J.

In this case the first two grounds make the objection, which was successfully taken in the State v. Dozier, and the State v. Williams, that the writs of ve-nire were unsealed. Here, however, the writs are sealed.— It is contended, that such a seal as appears, is not the seal of the Court. Ii is, however, verified as such by the Clerk’s' signature, and we are under no necessity to hold that it was not the proper seal when the writs issued, by finding a different seal to the exemplification sent up.

The case of the State v. McElmurray presented the same question under the same facts now before us; and the Court, at page 40, held the seal to be sufficient. That concludes the question here.

The other four grounds relate to the place where the grand and petit jurors were summoned to attend — where the grand jury found the bill, and where the venue is laid, to wit: at Horry Court House, instead of Conwayborough ; where the Acts of 1842 and 1845 direct the Court to be held for I-Iorry District. I am not sure that legal process is not better made returnable to Horry Court House,- for Horry District, than to Conwayborough, for the former indicates the precise spot, in the ville of Conwayborough, where the Court is to sit. It is true that Conwayborough includes it, and as the Legislature have adopted the general name to designate the place where •the Court is to sit, it is sufficient. But Horry Court House is just as well known to all concerned, as Conwayborough, and is more precise. In one sense, both mean the same, and may be regarded as equivalent, convertible terms.

The motion is dismissed.

Richardson, Evans, Wardlaw and Frost, JJ. concurred.

Motion refused.