Case ID: monaghan_1/html/0764-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Barr’s Appeal. [Reeder’s Estate.]
    An adult child, residing with her father at the time of his death, as a member of his family and dependent upon him, is entitled to retain out of his estate, the three hundred dollars exemption alloived to the ividow and child of a decedent, under the Act of April 14,1851, where there is no widow.
    April 24, 1883.
    Appeal, No. 9, Jan. T. 1883, to review decree of O. O. Northumberland Co., approving the report of appraisers appraising the real estate of Henry Reeder, deceased, at $300, under the election of an adult child and member of his family, and dismissing exceptions thereto by Thomas Barr et al., creditors of the estate. Before Merour, C. J., and Gordon, Paxson, Trunkey, Sterrett, Green and Clark, JJ.
    The facts appear by the following opinion of the court below, by Rockefeller, P. J.:
    “ The following affidavit was read at the argument by both parties and admitted as the facts of the case: £ Sophia Reeder, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the youngest child of Henry Reeder, late of McEwensville, in said county, deceased, and that her age is forty-five years; that decedent left no widow to survive him but left seven children living at his decease, all of whom, excepting deponent, the youngest, at the time of his death, were married and were doing for themselves. That deponent, at the time of his death, was and still is unmarried, and was living with decedent, and was supported by him, and was a member of his family. That she, deponent, has always lived with decedent, her father, dependent upon and supported by him up to the time of his death. That by decedent’s, her father’s, death she is left without means of support, and in a destitute condition unless some provision is made for her immediate wants out of her said father’s estate.’
    “ In the case of Steel’s Est., 38 Leg. Int. 486, it was held that ‘adult children, married and having adequate maintenances and means of livelihood are riot entitled to the exemption provided by the Act of April 14, 1851.’ The court in that case went so far as to remark that the Act ‘ has never been construed to include adult children of the decedent, although they may have resided with him as part of his family.’ The case was in the orphans’ court of Philadelphia and entitled to respect, but is not binding authority. This remark of Judge Hanna’s formed no part of his decision. The case before him was a claim by persons who were no part of the decedent’s family, married and , having means of support of their own. I am aware that in several cases, especially those decided in the lower courts, it is said that ‘ if a decedent dies, leaving no widow, but minor children, they are entitled to the benefits intended by the Act and the proper practice is to claim the exemption through their guardian regularly appointed.’ Steele’s Est., supra; Alexander’s Est., 35 Leg. Int. 491, opinion by Jessup, P. J. The latter case was a claim by minor children and the question as to adults did not arise. I have examined all the cases cited by counsel, and such as I have been able to find, and nowhere has it been intimated by the supreme court that a child, over its majority, who is a member of the immediate family of the decedent, and who has not gone out from the parental roof to provide for himself, is not entitled to the benefit of the Act. I am of the opinion that the Act applies to all cases where there has been no severance of the immediate family relation by the party to be affected by it. It is true, in Tiernan v. Binns, 92 Pa. 248, Judge Paxson made use of this expression : ‘We are not embarrassed by the question of the possible rights of minor children for whose benefit the Act was in part intended.’ His attention was not called to the question now before the court in deciding that case. The Act of Assembly does not say the minor children, but ‘ the widow or children.’ In Nevin’s Appeal, 47 Pa. 230, Judge Strong says: ‘ The Act has always been construed rather according to its spirit than its letter ’; but, in speaking of the claim of children, he was sufficiently guarded so as not to construe it to mean minor children alone. He says: ‘ The same regard for the manifest intention of the legislature requires us to-hold that children who are adults, who are not members of the immediate family of the decedent, but have gone out from the parental home to provide for themselves, are not the beneficiaries intended,’ as much as to say that children who are adults, but who are members of the immediate family of the decedent, and have-not gone out from the parental home to provide for themselves, are the beneficiaries intended. It is plain that he was considering and deciding a case of adult children who were no members of the family.
    “A child is a child at all ages. Webster says: ‘In strictness, a child is a shoot, issue or product of the parents. Any person of any age, in respect to the parents, is a child.’ A person may have half a dozen sons and daughters, ranging between the ages of eighteen and thirty, all unmarried and having no adequate maintenance and means of livelihood, all at home and members of his immediate family, and what is there in the spirit or the letter of the Act to prevent them all from participating in its benefits, the adults as well as the minors ? This old man left a daughter, one who had always lived with him as a member of his family, and the admitted facts in the case make it as strong, perhaps, as if it was a claim by a child but a year old.
    “As at present advised, I have concluded to allow this claim but at the argument it was understood that if the court determined that Miss Reeder is entitled to the benefit of the Act, then depositions are to be taken on the exception that the property was appraised below its value. The parties may take depositions and the court reserves the right to decide finally on the whole case until after the hearing on the question of value.”
    After taking testimony, the court filed the following supplemental opinion:
    “ The testimony taken, since the former opinion of the court was filed, does not materially change the facts. That Sophia Reeder is an adult child of Henry Reeder, the decedent, that she was, at the time of his death, and still is, unmarried, that she resided with him at that time and was supported by him, that she was a member of his immediate family, that she never went out from the paternal home to provide for herself but remained at home unmarried, at the request of her father and mother,, and that, by the death of her father, she is left without means of support and in a destitute condition, are facts established by the undisputed evidence- and admissions of the parties. The Act of April 26, 1850, P. L. 581, makes provision for the widow and children ‘ who were residing with him at the time of his death’ where the estate is insolvent. The Act of April 14, 1851, P. L. 613, gives the widow or children property to the value of three hundred dollars and says nothing as-to their residence with the decedent nor as to his solvency or insolvency. These Acts havé always been construed together and according to their spirit rather than their letter. They were intended to-make a temporary provision for the widow, and those immediately dependent upon the deceased. The spirit of these Acts do not, in my opinion, limit the bounty of the legislature to the minor children alone, and no court, I think, has ever said so. Judge Thompson did not think so in Nevin’s Appeal, supra, when he said: ‘ Certainly the children of the decedent, who formed part of his family, and derived their support from him, are, equally with the widow, entitled to consideration and protection; and even though they may, as in this case, have reached adult age, their necessities may be as great as her’s.’ Nor did the supreme court think so in the same case when Judge Strong said: ‘In a certain sense, the widow is a trustee for herself and' the family, not, however, for herself and adult children, who are no members of the-family.’ Even minor children would not he included by the express terms of the Act of 1850, if they did not reside with their parent at. the time of his death.
    “I conclude, therefore, that residence, membership of the family, and dependence upon the deceased, are the true tests, without regard to age. If the legislature had intended otherwise it' would have been easy to have said so, in appropriate language. In deciding upon questions arising under the Act of Assembly on this, subject, judges have frequently used the terms ‘ widow or minor children of any decedent,’ but the word minor is not in the Acts, and the words of the Act of 1850 include all children 1 who were residing with him at the time of his death.’ The property is not to be sold, ‘ but suffered to remain for the use of the widow and family’ are the words of both Acts. The question is, Who constitute the family ? If adults have never left the parental home and have always remained in the family as members thereof, dependent upon and supported by the parent, are they not a part of his family ?
    
      “ The exceptions are dismissed and the report of the appraisers
    The claimant, in her testimony, referred to in the opinion of the court below, further testified as follows, after repeating the substance of the affidavit given above: “ My father was nearly 90 years of age at his death. . . . My father had an income of a pension of $96 per year. This was all the income my father had. My father and myself and my daughter were supported out of this. My daughter is 20 years old. I raised things out of the farden to buy my clothing, and my daughter has been doing for erself. My daughter assisted me.”
    
      The assignment of error was as follows: “ The court erred in overruling the exceptions and approving the report of appraisers, setting apart, under the widow’s exemption law of 1851, the real estate of decedent to Sophia Reeder, an adult child of decedent, who is sound in mind and body and physically able to support herself.”
    
      Oscar Foust, for appellants.
    The Act of 1850, § 25, and the Act of 1851, § 5, are to be construed together. The Act of 1850 was limited to insolvent estates. The Act of 1851 extended the rights of the widow and children to all decedents’ estates, whether solvent or insolvent.
    The primary object of bounty was the widow. She could take to the exclusion of the children. Nevin’s Ap., Pa. 47, 230. The legislature evidently intended the children to take only when the necessity of the case demanded it. The claimant here was able to support herself and had a daughter to help her. Suppose she had an ample estate ? Surely the legislature did not intend to allow her in such case to take against her father’s creditors. The evidence shows that she was not dependent upon her father, but that she helped to support him by her work.
    Steel’s Est., 9 ~W. N. C. 274, gives the proper construction to the Act of 1851.
    No counsel appeared for appellee.
    May 14, 1883.
   Per Curiam,

The Act of Assembly gives to the widow or the children of a decedent the right to retain $300 ■out of the decedent’s estate. The Act fixes no age or circumstances which shall deprive the children of a right so to claim. This court, in view of the spirit of the law, has held that an adult child, living ■apart from the father’s family, and not dependent on him for support, is not entitled to claim under the statute. Here the appellee Always lived with her father, the decedent, as a member of his family. She continued with him after she arrived at the age of twenty-one just as she had before. She remained as a child, not as a servant. The language of the Act does not bar her claim. The spirit and purpose thereof, in providing this sum for the family, give it to her. She fills the requirement of the statute.

Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.

Note. — Judge Hanna, in the later case of Armstrong’s Est., 2 Ches. Co. 476, held that an adult child, being a married woman, living in a house with her husband, separate from her father, whose domicile consisted of two rooms, was ■entitled to the exemption, under the Act of 1851, she being dependent upon her father for her support.

Query: May not adult children take, without regard to dependence, where the family relation exists ? The widow may. The Act does not specify. The •opinion of the supreme court in the above case seems to warrant such construction.