Case ID: so2d_593/html/0585-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "ALLEN, Judge. ERVIN, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and Bureau of State Employees, Appellants, v. Henry CLARK, Appellee.
    No. 91-78.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Feb. 7, 1992.
    Rehearing Denied March 10, 1992.
    
      Scott V. Berglund of Miller, Kagan & Chait, P.A., Deerfield Beach, for appellants.
    Jerold Feuer, Miami, for appellee.
   ALLEN, Judge.

The employer appeals a workers’ compensation order by which the presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applied and the claimant was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Because the claimant did not demonstrate that he is one of the specified firemen within the ambit of section 112.18(1), the statutory presumption should not have been applied.

The claimant was a fireman employed by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, at the Avon Park Correctional Institution. He terminated this employment upon the advice of his physician and sought workers’ compensation benefits after developing severe cardiovascular problems. The matter proceeded to a hearing and the claimant asserted that he is entitled to the presumption in section 112.18(1), which provides:

Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida municipal, county, port authority, special tax district or fire control district fireman caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence....

In awarding benefits, the judge relied on the Industrial Relations Commission decision in State of Florida, Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry v. Stanford, Cl. No. [ XXX-XX-XXXX ] (October 10, 1978), cert. denied 375 So.2d 912 (Fla.1979), and suggested that the entire state may be considered a fire control district under section 112.18(1). Stanford involved an application of section 112.18(1), but the opinion merely recites several issues and notes that the appellants “failed to demonstrate reversible error.” The Stanford decision does not establish that the entire state is a fire control district.

The legislature has used the term “fire control district” in various enactments. Chapter 379, Florida Statutes (1965), identified one fire control district when section 112.18(1) was first adopted. The Laws of Florida contain numerous special acts relating to other fire control districts. Over a dozen such acts can be found in the 1965 Laws, and more recent Laws also contain such provisions. These acts generally confer power and authority in furtherance of fire control activities within defined geographical boundaries. See e.g., ch. 90-459, Laws of Fla.; ch. 65-1342, Laws of Fla. The reference to fire control districts in section 112.18(1) should be construed in connection with these enactments.

The claimant did not show that he is a fireman for a “fire control district” as that term has been used by the legislature in the Florida Statutes and the Laws of Florida. Nor did the claimant show that he is otherwise within the ambit of section 112.-18(1), and the statutory presumption should not have been applied in this case.

The order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded.

SMITH, J., concurs.

ERVIN, J., concurs with opinion in which SMITH, J., concurs.

ERVIN, Judge,

concurring.

I reluctantly concur with the result stated in the majority’s opinion and do so only because it appears to be compelled by the enumeration of certain classes of firemen designated in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1987), none of which, for the reasons stated by the majority, includes appel-lee. Although it is difficult for me to believe that the legislature deliberately intended to bar firemen employed by state agencies who are not specified in subsection (1) from the benefit of the presumption, in that the presumption is remedial legislation, designed to relax the burden of proof formerly placed upon the designated classes of firefighters, see Caldwell v. Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration, 372 So.2d 438, 440-441 (Fla.1979), the legislature, for some inexplicable reason, has not yet chosen to confer the presumption upon firefighters who are employed by non-designated governmental entities.

It is moreover somewhat anomalous that the legislature has otherwise provided in chapter 112 that the sum of $20,000 shall be paid on behalf of any firefighter employed by “a state board, commission, department, division, bureau or agency, or a county, municipality,” who, while engaged in the performance of his or her duties, is killed, or receives an injury which results in the loss of his or her life within one year after being so injured, which amount is in addition to any workers’ compensation death benefits received. § 112.191(l)(a) and (2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1987). Thus, while under section 112.191 the legislature broadly delineated the classes of employers of firefighters to whose beneficiaries additional benefits are payable, it continues to restrict the categories of employers under section 112.18(1).

Having examined the above provisions, it appears to me that the legislative omission of state agencies in section 112.18(1) was merely inadvertent and not intentional. Nevertheless, if the omission is to be rectified, it must be done by the legislature, not by this court. 
      
      . Section 112.1914(1) and (2), Florida Statutes (1987), also confers an additional benefit of $50,000 to certain classes of beneficiaries of a firefighter who is employed by "the state or any political subdivision of the state” who is unlawfully and intentionally killed during the actual performance of his duties.