Case ID: f-appx_683/html/0599-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Cherie PHILLIPS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HSL PROPERTIES INCORPORATED; HSL Asset Management LLC, doing business as Canyon Oaks Apartment Homes, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-15251
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2017 
    
    Filed March 20, 2017
    Cherie Phillips, Pro Se
    Erline Phillips, Pro Se
    Matthew D. Koglmeier, Esquire, Ko-glmeier Smith PLC, Mesa, AZ, for Defendants-Appellees
    Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Cherie Phillips appeals pro se from the district court’s post-judgment order granting defendants’ motion to strike Phillips’s response to their motion for attorney’s fees. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to strike documents under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Islamic Shura Council of S. Cal. v. FBI, 757 F.3d 870, 872 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by striking portions of Phillips’s response to defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees because the stricken statements were harassing and unnecessary to a determination of attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Contrary to Phillips’s contention, the district court retained jurisdiction to rule on defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees and related matters. See Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1983) (the district court retains jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees after the decision on the merits had been filed).

To the extent that Phillips is attempting to appeal the dismissal of her action, we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue because Phillips failed to file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (in a civil case, the notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007) (“This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.” (citation omitted)).

We reject as without merit Phillips’s contention that the district court was biased.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Defendants’ request, set forth in the answering brief, to strike Phillips’s opening brief for noncompliance with Fed. R. App. P. 32(a), is denied.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. .