Case ID: us-ct-cl_9/html/0178-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Milligan, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HILL’S CASE. John Hill v. The United States.
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    
      An army contractor in December, 1862, is arrested and thrown into the old Capitol prison, by order of Che Secretary of War, because of money fraudulently obtained by him from the Government. Subsequently, a friend pays for him $1,500, and he is discharged from arrest. He brings Ms action to recover back the money so paid, on the ground that it toas paid tinder duress by imprisonment.
    
    Under the Act 2d June, 1862, (12 Stat. L., §16 p. 411,) an army contractor is subject to the rules and regulations of the land forces, and liable to he arrested and tried by court-martial for fraud.
    II. Where an army contractor has been arrested for fraud, by order of the Secretary of War, a payment of money made by him to the Government to procure his discharge is not a payment under duress. To constitute duress, the imprisonment must be unlawful or by an abuse of lawful authority.
    
      
      Messrs. Hughes, Denver &• Peolc for the claimant:
    The history of the case is fully set forth in the petition. The claimant was arrested in Décember, 1862, by detectives and officers of the United States, and confined in the old Capitol prison, in Washington City, and detained there, closely imprisoned, until April 29,1863, without charges of any kind whatever, when he was discharged on the payment by James P. Gregory, for the claimant,'[to L. Turner, judge-advocate, of fifteen hundred dollars, on. the 29th of April, 1863. This money was placed in the Treasury by Gen. James A. Hardie, November 16,1868. The proofs show no other iiayment than this, and therefore the allegation in the petition is sustained to this extent only. The question presented for the court to determine is, Whether officers of the Government can thus, on their own responsibility, extort money from a citizen without due process of law ? There were no charges ever preferred against the claimant; he was never brought before a civil or military tribunal ; but was arbitrarily arrested and confined in prison until he or his friends complied with the demands made on them for money, and then he was released. The whole proceeding was a high-handed usurpation of power, for which the reasons given in Judge-Advocate-General Turner’s receipt is no sufficient excuse, and that was evidently inserted as a fender for the wrong done. To the language used in that receipt, or in the memorandum of General Hardie, the claimant was not a party, nor Can he be held responsible for any statement extorted from him by his jailors while he was held in prison. If he had been guilty of any crime or offense against the laws of the land, it was the duty of the officers to prefer charges against him, and' send him before the proper tribunal to be tried on them j but there is no law in this country which authorizes an officer of the Army or any one else to arrest a citizen, throw him in prison, and keep him there as long as it suits his own will or caprice, constituting himself prosecutor, judge, and jury, impose and collect fines without any evidence whatever, even though the money thus collected should be placed in the coffers of the nation. But this is just what has. been done in this case. The Judge-Advocate of the Army has no more right to impose a fine on a citizen, or soldier even, than the humblest citizen in the country. Neither has he the right to imprison, or cause to be imprisoned, any one, excejJt upon. charges properly made out, nor to detain any one in arrest more than eight days, without preferring charges against him; and in no case can he of his own volition inflict a sentence or impose a fine. There is nothing in the laws of Congress or the regulations of the Army which now or at any former time conferred any such power on a judge-advocate or inspector-general.
    
      Mr. Alexander Johnston (with whom was the Assistant Attorney-General) for the defendants:
    The plaiutiff has not furnished any testimony whatever that he ever paid the sum of $3,500 to an agent of the United States, or any other sum, or that he ever signed any such statement as he alleges, acknowledging his indebedtness to the United States in that or any other amount. The testimony in the case does not show that he ever paid anything to the United States, or to any one else for the use of the United States; or that, if money was at any time paid to the United States on his account or behalf, he repaid the same. If there is anything clear about the matter, it is that he never paid anything in the premises, and is not entitled, therefore, to receive anything. When plaintiff swore to his petition he was not under any sort of duress, but it is manifest that he swore without regard to fact or truth. The allegation that the plaintiff signed a written confession or cognovit u under duress ” is nob supported by testimony of any description. No such confession as that which he alleges appears in the case, not' any proof that he made any such confession, or anything like it, under duress or otherwise.
    This statement does not say that he owed the Government $3,500, or any other particular amount; but it does present the elements of a fraudulent transaction, which, as between himself and his confederate rascal, on the basis of “ honor among thieves,” entitled him to a profit at the expense of the Government of at least $2,500, and the presumption is that he received his full share of the plunder. The simple fact of his being imprisoned on a charge of fraudulent dealing with the Government did not constitute duress. There is no proof or showing that he was illegally arrested or confined, and the onus is on him to furnish such proof. In its absence, the court will not presume that his arrest and confinement were illegal.
    The misstatements in plaintiff’s petition evidence a design on bis part again to defraud the Government, and if he bad in fact any claim whatever, are sufficient, under section 11, (12 Stat., 7(35,) to “forfeit the same to the Government.”
   Milligan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant was arrested in December, 1862, and thrown into the old Capitol prison, in Washington, D. C., and there detained until the 29th of April, 1863, when he was discharged on his friend, James P. Gregory, paying to one Turner, judge-advocate, the sum of $1,500.

The money paid by Gregory was obtained by him from Clement Hughs, and wheu it was paid over to the judge-advocate, he executed and delivered to Gregory the following, receipt.

.“Washington, April 29,1863.

• “ Received of James P. Gregory, for John Hill, fifteen hundred dollars, being money fraudulently obtained from the Government by said Hill.

’ “L. TURNER,

u Judge-Advocate.”

This money ($1,500) was subsequently paid into the Treasury by the Inspector-General, James A. Hardie, with “ other sums received from fraudulent contractors in the old Capitol prison, bribes,” &c.

And this suit is now brought to recover the money so paid to the United States, on the ground that it was paid under duress by imprisonment.

The record is exceedingly barren in its circumstantial as well as its essential facts, and we would be perplexed to know how to dispose of the case were it not for the sworn statement made by the claimant himself while in prison.

• This statement bears date January 30,1863, and seems to have been made with the view of ascertaining what was necessary for the claimant to do in order to secure his release from confinement. It appears to have been voluntarily made, and in it he undertakes to purge himself from all offenses he had committed while acting in the capacity of an Army contractor.

Among other things, by no means creditable, he admits that he had a contract with Colonel Ingalls to deliver 1,000 tons of bay at $25 per ton, and 50,000 bushels of oats at 54 cents per bushel, which he procured a Mr. White, of Baltimore, to fill. After he had made the arrangement with White to furnish'the oats, he informed the claimant that he was then filling a contract for a Mr. Moore, and “ that he was adding 15 per cent, to the weights on the bills of lading, as he understood the Government did not weigh the grain upon the Peninsula, and that he would do the same with my contract, and give me one-third of that per cent.”

The claimant further adds: “ He commenced to ship the oats, and I went to the Peninsula to receive and deliver them, and when two or three cargoes had been delivered, I made out the account as per the bills of lading sent to me by White, and collected the draft on the Treasury from Colonel Ingalls for the same.” Admitting that the claimant was a contractor in the Army at the time of his arrest, he was, under the sixteenth section of the Act June 2, 1862, (12 Stat. L., p. 411,) subject to the rules and regulations for. the government of the land forces, and liable to be arrested and tried by a court-martial for “ fraud or willful neglect of duty.”

The claimant solemnly admits his fraud, but claims that that admission was made under duress, and cannot therefore be received as evidence against him.

In answer to this position, it may be admitted, if a person be under an arrest for improper purposes, without a just cause, or where there is an arrest for a just cause, but without lawful authority, he may be considered as under duress. But “ the general rule is,” says Chancellor Kent, (2 Kent’s Com., p. 574,) “ that either the imprisonment or the duress must be tortious and without lawful authority', or by an abuse of the lawful authority to arrest, to constitute duress by imprisonment.”

It follows from this rule, if the claimant’s imprisonment was tortious and without authority of law, or if the authority existed and was abused in his arrest, he was under duress by imprisonment when he made the confession, and it cannot be received in evidence against him. But, on the other hand, if he was lawfully arrested, and there was no abuse of lawful authority in the act itself, his confession was made without duress, and may’be received against him.

The right as well as the duty of the Government to interpose and arrest the fraudulent execution of contracts made under its authority are no longer open questions in this court.

The Supreme Court, in Adams’ Case, (7 C. Cls. R., p. 58,) in discussing this question in'connection with the power of the Secretary of War, as head of the War Department, says: “And whether he (the Secretary) makes the contracts himself, or confers the authority upon others, it is his duty to see that they are properly and faithfully executed, and if he becomes satisfied that contracts which he has made himself are being fraudulently executed, or those made by others were made in disregard of the rights of the Government, or with the intent to defraud it, or are being unfaithfully executed, it is his duty to interpose, arrest the execution, and adopt effectual measures to protect the Government against the dishonesty of subordinates.”

The authority of the Government to arrest and imprison the claimant as an Army contractor being conferred by statute and sanctioned by the Supreme Court, there is nothing in this record which tends to show that that authority was abused in the arrest complained of. On the contrary, the claimant, having solemnly admitted his own fraud without duress by imprisonment, his statements became evidence before us, and, as such, makes it the duty of the Government to protect itself against the dishonesty of the claimant.

The cause of the arrest, from all that appears in this record, was not a crime that could not be- compromised without implicating the officers engaged in it, but an offense cognizable before a court-martial, and the claimant, through his friend, having re-imbursed the Government, in the judgment of the judge-advocate, was discharged. Whether the judge-advocate did his duty or not in this respect, it is very clear the claimant, after accepting the benefits of the.compromise, cannot now complain of it, or maintain this suit to recover the money paid for his release.

The petition is dismissed.