Case ID: mass_27/html/0283-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Shaw C. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Joseph Locke, Administrator of Thomas Richardson, versus Isaac Whiting.
    Where a deed of mortgage purported to convey the whole of an estate, parol evidence tending to prove that the deed was intended and understood by all the parties to convey a moiety only, and that the whole was included in the deed through mistake on the part of the scrivener, was held to be inadmissible.
    This was a writ of entry brought upon a mortgage of certain real estate, made by one Amos Needham to Thomas Richardson, the intestate. The tenant disclaimed as to one undivided moiety, and claimed to hold the other moiety under Samuel Needham.
    At the trial, before Wilde J., it was proved, that the intestate, who was originally the owner of the estate, having proposed to give a moiety of it to Polly Needham in consideration of, services rendered by her, Amos Needham, her brother, agreed to purchase the other moiety. Accordingly, on March 21st, 1822, deeds were draw.) up by a conveyancer and executed, by which the whole estate was conveyed to Amos Needham, and mortgaged back by him to the intestate in order to secure the payment of part of the purchase money of one moiety. On the same day Amos Needham executed a deed of a moiety to Polly Needham ; and both moieties were after-wards conveyed by Amos and Polly to Samuel Needham. The deeds were duly recorded.
    It was contended by the tenant, that the deed of mortgage was drawn up so as to include the whole estate, through mistake on the part of the conveyancer, and that it was intended and understood by all the parties to be a mortgage of one moiety only ; and parol evidence was offered to prove that the intestate intended to give one moiety of the estate free from any incumbrance, to Polly Needham. This evidence was objected to by the demandant, as inadmissible, but it was admitted by the judge ; and. the question was reserved for the consideration of the whole Court.
    The verdict was for the tenant;. but if this evidence was improperly admitted, a new trial was to be granted.
    
      Jan. 14 th, 1831, in Suffolk.
    
    
      Hoar and Preston, for the tenant,
    cited Sugden’s Vend. 100, 103 ; Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388 ; Christ v. Diffenbach, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 465 ; Washburn v. Merrills, 1 Day’s R. 139 ; Cromwel's case, 2 Co. 76 ; Leland v. Stone, 10 Mass. R. 459.
    
      Stearns and Joseph Locke, for the demandant,
    said, that in some cases courts of equity have admitted parol evidence to show a mistake in a deed, and upon its being made manifest, have granted relief; but this authority is peculiar to courts of equity, and the evidence must be of the clearest and most satisfactory nature. Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 240 ; Rutland's case, 5 Co. 26 ; Meres v. Ansell, 3 Wils. 275 ; Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. R. 29 ; 1 Bigelow’s Dig. Contract, S; Paine v. M' Intier, 1 Mass. R. 69 ; Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Co. 4 Mason, 172 ; Parkhurst v. Van Cortlandt, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 273 ; Jackson v. Croy, 12 Johns. R. 427 ; Pierson v. Hooker, 3 Johns. R. 68 ; Jackson v. Foster, 12 Johns. R. 488 ; Jackson v. Sill, 11 Johns. R. 201 ; Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. R. 139.
   Shaw C. J.

afterward drew up the opinion of the Court. On the trial of the issue in this case, the mortgage deed, which had been duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, was read, and purported to carry the entire estate. It was contended in behalf of the defendant, that' the mortgage was intended and understood by all the parties to be a mortgage of one moiety only, and that the deed was drawn so as to include the entire estate by mistake ; and parol evidence was offered to satisfy the jury that such was the fact. As no other defence was relied on, the judge permitted the evidence to go to the jury, intending to reserve the question of its admissibility for the consideration of the Court. It was accordingly given, together with some evidence on the part of the demandant, tending to show that there was no mistake in the deed, and that the moiety in controversy was intended to be included, as security for the mortgage debt. The question is whether this evidence ought to have been admitted. The question has been argued and several authorities been cited on both sides. The ¿eneral rule unquestionably is, that parol evidence is not admissible to enlarge, restrain or control the plain legal operation of an instrument in writing ; and this rule is particularly applicable to a conveyance* of real estate, which is required by statute to be by deed, duly executed, acknowledged and recorded, and which is not only to stand as the evidence of title between the parties, their respective grantees and representatives; but which is to be placed on record, for the information and government of all those who have an interest in obtaining the most authentic information in regard to such title. The Court can perceive no intelligible ground, in the circumstances of the present case, upon which to regard it as an exception to a general rule, so salutary and so firmly established. Without attempting to review the cases, in which this question has been discussed, a question rendered more complicated by the conflicting decisions of different States, the Court are unanimous in the opinion, that in this case it was not competent for the tenant to show by mere parol evidence, that the mortgager did not intend to convey that which his deed plainly includes. The order of the Court therefore is, that the verdict be set aside, and a new trial granted. 
      
       See Child v. Wells, 13 Pick. 121 ; Harvey v. Newton, 7 Pick. 29; Webb v. Roberts, 11 Wendell, 426; Snyder v. Snyder, 6 Binney, 426 ; Gittings v. 
        Hall, 1 Harr. & Johns. 14; Beeson v. Hutchinson, 4 Watts, 442; Spring v. Lovett, 11 Pick. 417; Miller v. Travers, 8 Bingh. 244 ; Lincoln v. Avery, 1 Fairfield, 418. Nor can it be shown in this way that by mistake one tract was inserted in a deed instead of another. Bell v. Morse, 6 N. Hamp R. 205; or that one course in a deed was inserted instead of another. Linscott v. Fernald, 5 Greenleaf, 496; or that by a line named in a deed presumed to be a straight line, a curved line was in fact intende i Allen v. Kingsbury, 16 Pick. 235.