Case ID: sw_276/html/0266-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DATTIMORE, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HARRIS v. STATE.
    (No. 9275.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    June 17, 1925.
    Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1925.)
    
      1. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;239(2) — Refusal to instruct for acquittal, if reasonable doubt of ownership existed, was proper, where whisky was found in accused’s possession.
    In prosecution for possession of intoxicating liquor for purpose of sale, where whisky was found in sewing machine in accused’s home, refusal to charge that, if jury found, or had reasonable doubt, that liquor found in her possession belonged to some one else, they should acquit her and to charge defining possession was proper.
    2. Intoxicating liquors &wkey;>224 — Presumption of prima facie case not rebutted by denial of ownership of liquor found in possession.
    Denial by accused of ownership of whisky found in her possession does not rebut presumption of prima facie ease.
    Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County; Geo. C. O’Brien, Judge.
    Allie Harris was convicted of possession of intoxicating liquor for purpose of sale, and she appeals.
    Affirmed.
    • Blain & Jones, of Beaumont, for appellant. Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State;
   DATTIMORE, J.

Appellant was convicted in the district court of Jefferson county of possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale, and her punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.

Upon information given him, as to the fact that appellant had liquor in her possession, and that she kept it in her sewing machine, an officer went to appellant’s house. He asked her if that was her machine and received from her the reply that it was. Search of the machine revealed the presence of eight quarts of whisky. The record contains two bills of exception, one of which complains of the refusal of a special charge asked by appellant to the effect that, if the jury found, or had a reasonable doubt of the fact, that the liquor found in the possession of the defendant belonged to some other person, they should acquit her. The other refused charge instructed the jury as to the meaning of the word “possession.” In our judgment, the refusal of neither charge presents any reversible error. The whisky was found in appellant’s house and in her sewing machine, which machine was claimed by her as her property at the time the officer found the whisky.

It is insisted in the brief filed by appollant’.s able counsel that her testimony that the whisky did not belong to her rebuts the presumption of a prima facie case, and that she is entitled to be acquitted. We regret we cannot agree with this proposition. We have discussed in several cases recently the fact that testimony of the accused, or of the near relatives of the accused, to facts which, if accepted as true by the jury, might rebut the state’s case made by the finding of appellant in possession of liquor, would in no sense or way compel the jury to accept same as true.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellant is not satisfied with our holding on the facts in this case. Eight quarts of whisky were found by officers in a sewing machine in appellant’s house. In a nearby closet were other empty jars or bottles and whis-ky glasses, all of which smelled of whisky. According to the state’s testimony, appellant said the sewing machine was hers, and that she slept in the room in which the sewing machine- was found. On the occasion of the finding of the liquor, the witnesses found only appellant, her 14 year old niece, and another woman on the premises. Appellant swore that her niece, at the time of the trial, was in St. Louis, and that the other woman 'was her cook and had left, and she did not know where she was. She swore that the whisky found by the officers belonged to a negro named John Palmer. The state’s witnesses testified that they knew Palmer, but had not seen him in town for a long time. We see no reason to doubt the correctness of our conclusion in our former opinion, and the motion for rehearing will be overruled. 
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