Case ID: sw_154/html/1007-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PRENDERGAST, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SKINNER v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    March 5, 1913.)
    1. Indictment and Information (§ 129)— Joining Distinct Offenses.
    An indictment charging in one count that defendant did unlawfully injure the fence of a certain person, and in another count that he stole wire from such person, was not invalid as containing counts not arising out of the same transaction.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 414-418; Dec. Dig. § 129.]
    2. Indictment and Infobmation (§ 81)— Clerical Mistake — Designation of Defendant.
    A count in an indictment for larceny was not fatally defective because, after mentioning defendant four times by his name, “F. C. Matthers,” it referred to Mm as “the- said F. C. Manner”; it appearing that the mistake was merely clerical and could have misled no one.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §| 216-224; Dee. Dig. § 81.]
    3. Cbiminal Law (§ 875) — Verdict—Sufficiency.
    That the verdict in a larceny case read, “We, the jurors, find,” instead of, “We, the jury, find,” did not render it insufficient.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 2089, 2090; Dec. Dig. § ■875.]
    4. Criminal Law (§ 1114) — Appeal and Error — Presentation for Review.
    The Court of Criminal Appeals cannot consider questions raised by assignments of error, but is restricted by the statute to questions raised by bills of exceptions or in the motion for new trial.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2918, 2921; Dec. Dig. § 1114.]
    Appeal from Coke County Court; G. S. Arnold, Judge.
    Alee Skinner was convicted of theft, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    W. C. Merchant and D. I. Durham, both of Robert Lee, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    
      
      For otber cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
    
   PRENDERGAST, J.

Appellant was indicted in two counts: The first charging that he did unlawfully break, pull down, and injure the' fence of F. C. Matthers without Ms consent. The other charges theft of wire from said Matthers of the value of $1. Both counts were? submitted to the jury for a finding by the court. The jury by its verdict found him guilty of theft under the second count, and assessed his punishment at a fine of $25 and one day in jail. No motion whatever was filed in the lower court, other than a motion for new trial. The questions raised by that motion are also presented1 by bill of exceptions to tbe overruling of the motion for new trial on that particular ground. The evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the verdict. There are but three questions raised necessary to be decided.

One is appellant claims that the indictment was invalid because there were two counts therein claiming that they did not arise out of the same transaction, and therefore the conviction could not be sustained. This has many times and uniformly been decided against appellant by this court, and is unquestionably settled. Gould v. State, 147 S. W. 248; Tucker v. State, 145 S. W. 611, and cases cited in both of these decisions.

Another question appellant raises is that the second count of the indictment is fatally defective in that in the last part thereof, instead of giving the name E. C. Matthers, it gives the name P. C. Manner. No motion was made to quash or in arrest of judgment on that account. In order to show this question fully, we will quote that count in the indictment, omitting the first and formal parts thereof. It is: “That Alee Skinner, in the cotmty of Coke, and state of Texas, did on or about the 1st day of February, 1912, unlawfully and fraudulently take from and out of the possession of F. C. Matthers 150 feet of wire, the same then and there being the corporeal personal property of the said F. C. Matthers, and being of the value of $1; the said wire being taken without the consent of the said F. C. Mat-tbers from the possession of the said F. C. Matthers, and with the intent then and there, on the part of him (the said Alee Skinner) to deprive the said F. C. Manner of the value of said wire, and with the intent to appropriate the same to the use and benefit of him (the said Alee Skinner).” By the testimony and in no other way in the record is1 any one by the name of “Manner” in any way connected with the transaction.

Taking this count of the indictment as a whole, it is perfectly apparent that, by some clerical error, the name “F. C. Matthers” was- given as “F. C. Manner.” But the use of the name “Manner” at the place where it is, instead of the name “Matthers,” could -not and did not mislead appellant, nor any one else. In view of our statutes on the subject of the certainty required in indictments, this indictment is perfectly good, and the court did not err in not granting a new trial on that ground of appellant’s motion for new trial. Bailey v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 586, 141 S. W. 224; Compton v. State, 148 S. W. 581; Ferrell v. State, 152 S. W. 901; Martinez v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 584, 103 S. W. 930; Emmons v. State, 43 S. W. 518; Rowan v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 625, 124 S. W. 668, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1005; Feeny v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 589, 138 S. W. 135, and authorities there cited; Gentry v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 498, 137 S. W. 696.

The other complaint is that the verdict of the jury is insufficient and fatally defective. The complaint on this point is that where it says, “We, the jurors, find,” it should say, “We, the jury, find.” In our opinion, while the word “jury” is usually used in verdicts, and the forms prescribe that word to be used, the word “jurors,” instead, clearly means and is the same thing. The verdict is unquestionably sufficient. Section 897, -White’s Ann. C. C. P.

This court cannot consider questions raised by assignment of error like the civil courts do. We are restricted by the statute to questions raised by bills of exceptions or in the motion for new trial. The evidence being amply sufficient to sustain the verdict in this case, there is no other question raised necessary to discuss or decide.

The judgment is affirmed.