Case ID: va_13/html/0724-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JUDGE TUCKER. JUDGE ROANE JUDGE RLEMING JUDGE TUCKER.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*Beasley v. Owen.
    Monday, April 17th, 1800.
    Appellate Practice — Dismissal of Suits — Redocketing. —If the Clerk of the Court of Appeals be directed by the Court to set aside a judgment, and, by misapprehension. the entry of the order be omitted, it may be done at a subsequent term, and the cause re-docketed.
    Statute of Frauds — Loan of Slaves. — Construction of the statute of frauds and perjuries, as to loans of slaves.
    Same — Same—Case at Bar. — w. H. by his will, dated in 1789, gave a slave, then in possession of his son-in-law, W. B. to his two grandsons, J. B. and E. B. (sons of the said W. B. and at that time infants), as soon as they should come to lawful age; in 1792, he verbally lent the slave to his said son-in-law, “for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of his children,” reserving the right to take him back whenever he should think proper: and, in 1796, four years afterwards, died; in the same year his will was admitted to record, the surviving grand-child being still under age; in 1801, when that grand-child attained his full age. the slave was taken in execution, and publicly sold as the property of W. B. It was held that the recording of the will, in 1796, was a sufficient declaration, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, to protect the right of the grand-child, in opposition to the claims of the creditors of the father.
    At the last term, this cause was argued and decided; but, at Mr. Hay’s request, who stated it to be a case of the first impression on a branch of our statute of frauds, which was not to be found in the statute of 29th Car. II. and that it was of great importance that such an adjudication should be made as would most effectually prevent frauds, in the loan of personal property, the Court»consented to a re-argument at the present term; and accordingly directed the Clerk to set aside the judgment. The Clerk, not hearing the directions of the Court, omitted to make the entry; and the question now was, in what manner the cause should again be put on tlie docket.
    Mr. Hay cited Thornton v. Corbin,  as in point.
    Mr. Call (as amicus curia) also cited Murray and others v. Carrot & Co.  in which case, he observed, a similar order had been made.
    The directions of the Court, in this case, were recollected by the bar, and noted by Judge Tucker, as well as by the reporters-
    JUDGE ROANE considered this a much stronger case than Thornton v. Corbin. There the omission arose from a mistake of the counsel; here it was the act of an officer of the Court, whose duty it was to make the entry. He was in favour of re-docketing the cause.
    JUDGE TUCKER said, that having himself taken a note of the resolution of the Court, and being assured also by the ^gentlemen who report its decisions, that such an order was made, he could have no difficulty in granting the motion to re-docket the cause, especially as it was warranted by precedents.
    JUDGE EEEMING concurring; the cause was re-docketed by the unanimous opinion of the judges.
    On the merits.
    This cause was argued, at the last term, by M’Rae, for the appellant, (Beasley,) and Hay, for the appellee, (Owen,) and again, at this term, by George K. Taylor and M’Rae, for the appellant, and Hay, for the appellee.
    The facts, as disclosed by the appellant’s bill of exceptions, (who was defendant in the Court below,) were, that William Hurt, grandfather of the appellant, lent, in the year 1792, a slave, the subject of the present controversy, to his son-in-law, William Beasley, (the appellant’s father,) to assist in maintaining his (the said William’s) children, reserving the right of taking back the said slave when he should think proper; that the said William Hurt departed this life, in the year 1796, before the expiration of five years from the time of the loan, and while the appellant was an infant; that the said William Hurt had previously, by his will, bearing date the 31st of August, 1789, which was partly proved in Nottoway County Court, in December, 1796, and fully proved on the 5th of January, 1797, (and which is set out in haec verba,) among other things, bequeathed the said slave as follows: “Item, I give unto my two grandsons, John Beasley and Edwin Beasley, the negro' man, now in possession of William Beasley, their father, as soon as they came to lawful age, to be equally divided between them, to them and their heirs forever. Item, my will is, that my son-in-law, William Beasley, shall not have any part of my estate, except what I had given him in the lifetime of my daughter Anne, his late wife;” &c. that John Beasley, the brother and co-legatee of the appellant, died in the lifetime of the testator; and that the *other distributees of the estate of William Hurt, the grandfather, had released all their right to the slave in question to the appellant; that the appellant became of full age in 1801, and was living, as a storekeeper, with a merchant in Petersburg, at that date, when the slave was seized, and publicly sold, by the Sheriff of Charlotte County, (about 90 miles distant from Petersburg',) by virtue of an execution ■against the goods and chattels of the appellant’s father, William Beasley; and the appellee became the purchaser, as the highest bidder, at the sale; (which was not proved to have been forbidden;) that the ■said William Hurt delivered the slave to William Beasley, more than five years before the seizure and sale aforesaid, and that he had continued possessed of the said slave from the time of such delivery, until he was so seised and sold by the sheriff; that, after the appellee (who was the plaintiff in the Court below) had purchased the slave as aforesaid, and had him in his possession, the appellant, in February, 1802, -possessed himself of him; to regain which possession, an action of detinue was brought, to which the defendant pleaded non detinet, and issue thereupon.
    On the above statement of facts, the plaintiff moved the Court to instruct the Jury, that the peaceable and uninterrupted possession, by the said William Beasley, of the slave in question, by virtue of a loan from William Hurt, having continued from the year 1792 till the year 1801, subjected the said slave to the payment of the debts of the said William Beasley, by execution in the year 1801, although William Hurt, the lender, died in the year 1796, after having made a will, in which the said slave is bequeathed, as aforesaid, to his two grandsons. The Court did so instruct the Jury, and the defendant excepted to their opinion. Verdict for the plaintiff for the slave, of the price of 1401. and ISO dollars for detention. The defendant appealed to this Court.
    M’Rae, for the appellant.
    The ground of the instruction of the Court below was, that the loan made by William *Hurt was not a bona fide, but a pretended loan, coming within the meaning of the statute of frauds. We contend that it was a fair transaction.
    On comparing our statute of frauds with the 29th Car. IX. it will be observed, that no provision exists in the latter respecting loans: it follows, then, that no adjudication of the Courts of England, founded on that statute, can apply to the case before us.
    If the loan, which was made in 1792, had continued for more than five years, without demand, or declaration made shewing that the purposes of the loan were fair, there could be no question but the purchaser of the slave would be protected; but, according to the letter and meaning of the act, this loan ought to be considered as preventing the mere possession from giving a title. It is true, at the time of the loan, there was no declaration; but the person lending died in 1796; and the person enjoying the loan had had the slave in his possession for four years only, when the will of Hurt was proved, which made a disposition of the property, and was a complete declaration within the meaning of the act.
    The five years not having elapsed, the right of the lender existed as fully then as when the slave was lent. The four years’ possession did not give a title. Where is the difference between the lender’s making a declaration by his will, and doing it the next day after the loan made? The possession not having given right, there was nothing to prevent the lender from disposing of the slave by his will.
    No fraud appears in the whole transaction. The loan was publicly made, for the laudable purpose of supporting the infant grandchildren of the lender, who reserved the right of taking back the property whenever he should think proper.
    Hay, for the appellee.
    William Beasley was in possession of the slave in 1801: by virtue of an execution, he was taken and sold, in the year 1802, and the appellee (Owen) became the purchaser: it is now contended that Beasley was not the proprietor 1 It is not material whether he was *the proprietor or not. He had been in possession so long, that, according to the laws of the land, the property was liable to be taken in execution, lie had had the uninterrupted possession from 1792 to 1801; was the ostensible owner to all the world; and it is now insisted, that a fair purchaser of this property, under execution, shall be deprived of it!
    There was, in William Beasley, (notwithstanding the intervention of the death of the testator,) a continued possession of the slave, sufficient to protect a purchaser. It is the possession, unaccompanied by a declaration at the item of the loan, or uninterrupted by process of law, which the statute regards.  The question of fraud was not considered by the Court below. It was not a contest between persons claiming under Hurt, but between a purchaser for valuable consideration, and a mere volunteer.
    The declaration in the will of Hurt, has been relied upon by Mr. M’Rae. But the loan was verbally made. A subsequent declaration that a person has made a loan, does not take the case out of the statute. The law requires that the declaration should be made by that deed, or that will under which the benefit of the loan is claimed.
    It is no objection to the title of the purchaser, that Hurt died, and that his will was published before the expiration 454 *of five years. The limitation having once begun to run, it never ceases to operate. This principle was recognised in Fitzhugh v. Anderson,  But, in truth, the slave vested in the executors of Hurt; and the time he was held by them is to be added to the previous time, so as to constitute one continued term.
    The very point decided in Ritzhugh v. Anderson, exists in this case ; and although that occurred anterior to our statute of frauds, yet, on general principles of law and equity, and for the protection of creditors, it was held that the loan should be deemed a gift.
    M’Rae, in reply.
    The case of Ritzhugh v. Anderson, did not turn on the construction of our statute of frauds, and the cases are totally different in all their leading circumstances. In that case, the loan was for an indefinite period, and for no specified object: the son enjoyed the slaves for a great length of time; used them as his own ; removed to a distant county, and acquired credit on the strength of his possession. That decision may be very correct, and still a very different one might, with great propriety, be given in this case. Here the loan was for a definite period: the object was, the support of the grandchildren of the lender; and so far from being fraudulent, it was humane and honourable.
    Wednesday, March-22. The Judges pronounced their opinions.
    
      
       Appellate Practice — Dismissal of Suits — Redocketing, —The principal case is cited xa. foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 221; foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 233; foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 381; Emory v. Erskine, 7 Leigh 269.
      See monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
    
    
      
      Slaves — Loan of. — See principal case cited in foot-note to Jordan v. Murray, 3 Call 86; foot-note to Turner v. Turner, 1 Wash. 139; Collins v. Lofftus. 10 Leigh 10; London v. Turner, 11 Leigh 411; Land v. Jeffries, 5 Rand. 267.
      See monographic note on ‘(Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances"appended to Cochran v. Paris, 11 Gratt. 348.
    
    
      
       3 Call, 221, 232.
    
    
      
       3 Call, 373.
    
    
      
       The statute of frauds and perjuries was first passed in Virginia, in the year 1785. and took effect the first day of January. 1787. (See Rev. Code, v. 1, c. 10, p. 15.) The statute 39 Oar. II. was never adopted in this State. The clause respecting loans, is in the following words: “Where any loan of goods and chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained by the space of five years, without demand made, and pursued by due process at law, on the part of the pretended lender, or where any reservation or limitation shall be pretended to have been made of a use or property, by way of condition, reversion, remainder, or otherwise, in goods and chattels, the possession whereof shall have remained in another, as aforesaid the same shall be taken, as to the creditors and purchasers of the persons aforesaid so remaining in possession, to be fraudulent within this act, and that the absolute property is with the possession, unless such loan, reservation, or limitation of use or property, were declared by will or by deed, in writing, proved and recorded as aforesaid;” i. e. if it include lands, as conveyances of land: if personal estate only, by two witnesses.- — Note in Original Edition.
    
    
      
       2 Hen. & Munf. 289.
    
   JUDGE TUCKER.

By the statute of frauds and perjuries, it is among other things enacted, “that where any loan of goods and chattels, shall be pretended to have been made to .any person, with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained for the space of five years, without demand made and pursued by due process at law, on the part of the pretended lender, the same shall be taken as to creditors and purchasers of the persons aforesaid, so remaining in possession to be fraudulent within that act, *and that the absolute property is with the possession, unless such loan, reservation. or limitation of use or property, were declared by will, or by deed, in writing, proved and recorded as therein before directed.”

It appears by the bill of exceptions, that William Beasley, the debtor, in whose possession the slave in question was taken, by virtue of a writ of fjeri facias, and sold at public auction, by the sheriff, to the plaintiff, Owen, had been in peaceable possession of that slave from the year 1792, to 1801, under a loan thereof, from one William Hurt, who died in 1796, having made his will, dated in 1789, whereby he bequeathed the slave to the appellant, his grandson, who was not of age until 1801; and that Hurt’s executors proved his will, and qualified as executors thereto in December, 1796. The clauses in the will which are relied on, in favour of the appellant, as taking the case out of the statute of frauds and perjuries, are as follows: “Item, I give to my two grandsons, John Beasley and Edwin, the negro man now in the possession of W. Beasley, their father, as soon as they may come to lawful age, to be equally divided, &c. Item, my will is, that my son-in-law, W. Beasley, shall not have any part of my estate, except what I had given him in the life-time of my daughter.” The will was proved in Nottoway County, where the testator appears to have resided. The seizure and sale | of the slave were made by the Sheriff of Charlotte County. There is no residuary clause in the will, so that the value of the labour or hire of the slave from the testator’s death until his grandson came of age in 1801, was undisposed of; the legal right to the slave and to his labour and hire, until that period, was consequently in the executors.

Ip considering this case, I am much inclined to doubt whether parol evidence of a loan of a slave, or of the conditions of such a loan, be admissible in a contest between a creditor or purchaser, from the person in possession, after that possession shall have continued peaceably, and without demand, for five y'ears; upon the grounds of this Court’s decision in the case of Jordan v. Murray, and in Turner *v. Turner, there being the same reason, I conceive, for rejecting such evidence of a pretended loan, .since the statute of frauds and perjuries, as of a pretended gift, under the act of 1758, c. 1. But, as no exception was offered to the admission of such evidence, I pass it over. The object of the statute of frauds and perjuries, seems to me to have been, to shut out all question respecting the property of a slave held in possession by a debtor, or vendor, for the space of five years, as between a creditor of, or a purchaser from, the person, in whom such possession has remained without demand for five years, and the person claiming such slave as his own absolute property, by virtue of any loan, reservation, or limitation of a use thereof, or property therein, unless, such loan, &c. were declared by wilt or .by deed in writing, proved and recorded, as by that act is required. In the present case, I doubt whether the bequest contained in the will of W. Hurt, is sufficiently clear and explicit to answer the purposes of the act, by giving notice to all persons that the paramount right, and absolute property' in the slave, whose name is not mentioned, still remained in the representatives of the testator, William Hurt, notwithstanding the possession was and (as would appear from the will) had been in W. Beasley from the year 1789, to the time that the slave was. taken in execution in the year 1801. But as a majority of the Court are satisfied upon that point, I shall urge it no farthers and only add, that I am of opinion, that the judgment be affirmed.

JUDGE ROANE

was of a different opinion, and assigned his reasons for reversing the judgment, which need not here be stated, his subsequent opinion in this, case rendering it unnecessary.

JUDGE RLEMING

concurred with JUDGE ROANE.

On the last day of the term Hay moved the Court to reconsider the case, which motion being granted, he submitted the following propositions:

*1. That the statute, on which the case depends, being a statute for the prevention of frauds, is to be liberally and beneficially construed, in favour of those interests it is the avowed object of the law to protect.

2. Thai the case of Mr. Owen, a purchaser, under an exe.cution, of property which had been held for nine years, under a loan, is not only within the policy, but the very words of the law.

3. That where slaves, &c. are loaned, the will or deed, by which they are to be exempted from the provision of the law, must precede or accompany the loan, and not follow it.

4. That if a subsequent declaration be sufficient, the will of Hurt does not declare a loan.

5. That if it did declare a loan, the omission of the name of the slave would be fatal.

6. That if the will did declare a loan of the slave in question by name, it would not avail, as the loan declared by the will in 1789, could not be the loan proved in 1792.

7. That if the will has any bearing on the subject at all, it is to revoke the loan; but this revocation not having been followed up by “demand made and due process of law,” Beasley’s possession, after January, 1797, was, in fact and in law, a continuation of the possession which commenced in 1792.

These propositions were amplified and illustrated by Mr. Hay, in his answer to Mr. Taylor, who opened the argument at this term. Mr. M’Rae closed the discussion, in a reply to Mr. Hay; but, the few points, not touched on in the former argument, having been fully considered by the Judges, it is deemed unnecessary to repeat them.

Tuesday, May 9. The Judges again delivered their opinions.

JUDGE TUCKER.

Upon consideration of the arguments offered on the rehearing of his cause, I adhere to my former ^'opinion, that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.

JUDGE ROANE. The general question propounded by the plaintiff in the Court below (the now appellee) for the opinion and instruction of the Court, and on which the instruction we are now reviewing was founded, is, whether the possession of a slave under a loan, for more than five years, subjects that slave to pay the debts of the lendee, under an execution against him, if, within the five years, a will has been made and recorded, conveying the property in the said slave to another.

It is clearly admitted on all hands that a resumption of the slave within that time would put an end to the loan; and I am of opinion that the making' and recording a deed or will, within the time aforesaid, granting away the slave to another will have the same effect. The 3d clause of the act of frauds, has put the recording of a deed or will avoiding a loan by way of limitation or otherwise, on the same footing with an actual resumption of the property. Such recording is deemed to be a notice to the world, adequate to do away the presumption of property otherwise in-ferable from a possession of five years. In a previous part of the same section respecting conveyances of goods and chattels on considerations not deemed valuable in laW, the act has put the proving and recording thereof on the same ground with the actual delivery of possession; and in Claiborne v. Hill, 1 Wash. 177, in the case of a mortgage of slaves a delivery of possession to the mortgagee is held to be supplied by recording the deed of mortgage. The analogy of these cases to the one before us is very strong, in aid of the terms of the clause in question ; and, as a resumption of the property within the five years would, in the case of a loan, prevent the effect of the clause in question, so will the recording a deed or will, within the time aforesaid, containing limitations adverse to the title of the lendee: the notice given to the world, thereby, touching the right of property, prevents the mischief intended to *be guarded against by the act; and it is unnecessary that such recording should be coeval with the date of the loan ; it being sufficient if done at any time within the five years.

It is objected, however, that the will, which is set out in the bill of exceptions, not having bequeathed the slave in question to the appellant and his brother by name, a sufficient notice was not given the world, on this subject, by proving and recording the same. I answer, first, that this is making the case of the plaintiffs better than he himself has made it in his address to the Court; for he there admits, that the slave in question was disposed of by the said will to the defendant; secondly, that although the name of the slave is not used in the will, he is described as being the “negro man new in the possession of William Beasley;’ ’ and 1 ‘id certum est quod cerium reddi potest;” and, thirdly, that, on the other hand, the said will inhibits a right of property in William Beasley to “any part of the testator’s estate, except what he had given him in the life-time of his late wife.” By means of these several criteria, it might as certainly have been collected from the will, taken in connection with other testimony and circumstances, that the slave in question is the one bequeathed in the will aforesaid, as if his name had been particularly' stated. Indeed, in that case, if this negro had been bequeathed by his proper name rather than by a description, it would have been necessary to have ascertained, by evidence de-hors the will, that any given slave was the slave therein intended.

On these grounds, I am of opinion, that the instruction of the District Court was erroneous, and that the judgment ought to be reversed.

JUDGE FLEMING. The only material point in this case is, whether the slave in question was the property of William Beasley, at the time he was taken in execution by the Sheriff of Charlotte; and as the case of Fitzhugh v. Anderson and others, was relied on by the appellee’s counsel as decisive in this, it may not be amiss to shew that the two cases are ‘‘essentially different in some of their most prominent features.

It appears, by the bill of exceptions, that prior to the year 1780, William Beasleys father of the appellant, had intermarried with Ann, a daughter of William Hurt, by whom he had two sons, to wit, John Beasley, who died an infant, and Edwin Beasley, the appellant: also two daughters. That on the 31st of August, 1789, the said William Hurt, duly made and published his last will and testament, (his said daughter, Ann Beasley, being then dead,) by which said will he bequeathed the slave in question to his two grandsons, John and Edwin Beasley, as soon as they may come to lawful age, to be equally divided between them; and willed, that his son-in-law, William Beasley, (father of the appellant,) should not have any part of his estate, except what he had given him in the life-time of his late wife, Ann, daughter of the testator, who died in the year 1796; that on the 1st day of December, in that year, his will was proved, by one witness, in the County Court of Nottoway; and the executors then qualified under the will, which was fully proved on the Sth day of January following, and admitted to record; that John Beasley, one of the legatees of the said slave, died in the life-time of the testator; that the appellant attained the age of 21 years in the year 1801, and was then living a store-keeper, in the town of Petersburg; when, in the same year, 1801, the said slave was publicly sold by the Sheriff of Charlotte County, by virtue of a fieri facias, issued against the goods and chattels of the said William Beasley, father of the appellant; and that the appellee became the purchaser of the said slave at the sale. The plaintiff proved that William Hurt had delivered the said slave to William Beasley more than five years before he was seized and sold, and that he remained in possession of Beasley during the whole time.

The defendant proved, that his grandfather, William Hurt, did, in the year 1792, lend the said slave to his father, to assist in maintaining his children, reserving to himself the right of taking back the said negro whenever he might *think proper; and that William Hurt died in the year 1796, before the expiration of five years from the loan aforesaid, and whilst the defendant was yet an infant. The only pretence of title, in William Beasley, is the length of possession under the loan, which was about four, or at most under five years, prior to the death of William Hurt, by whose will the slave was bequeathed to the appellant, and his infant brother, John Beasley, who (as before noticed) died in the life-time of his grandfather. I consider the possession of William Beasley, subsequent to the death of the testator, merely as a trustee for his infant son, whose interest in the slave vested immediately on the death of his grandfather, to be consummated on his arrival to the age of 21 years; and the recording the will of William Hurt, wherein he expressly declares that William Beaslej' should have no part of his estate, before he had five years’ possession under the loan, was, in mjT conception, legal notice to creditors and subsequent purchasers; and, it seems to me, that the warning of caveat emptor forcibly applies in the case before us. For, although our laws wisely guard against the practis-ing frauds on creditors and fair purchasers, they are no less careful to guard and protect the rights of infants, and with much stronger reason, as the law justly supposes them incapable of acting for themselves. Some doubts that had arisen in my mind, on the first view of this subject, were removed on recurring to the latter part of the second clause of the “act to prevent frauds and perjuries,” wherein it is enacted, that where any loan of goods and chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained by the space of five years, without demand made, and pursued by due process of law, on the part of the pretended lender, or where any reservation or limitation shall be pretended to have been made of a use or property, by way of condition, reversion, remainder, or otherwise, in goods and chattels, the possession whereof shall have remained in another as aforesaid, the same shall be taken as to the creditors and purchasers of the person aforesaid, so remaining in possession, to be *fraudulent within this act, and that the absolute property is with the possession, unless such loan, reservation, or limitation of use of property, were declared by will, or. by deed in writing, proved and recorded as aforesaid. The testator having declared, in his will, that William Beasley should have no part of his estate, except what he had given him in the life-time of his wife, and having bequeathed the slave in question to the appellant and his brother, when they should come to lawful age, was a g'ood and sufficient limitation of the use of the slave in William Beasley, although he, for the laudable purpose of assisting him in maintaining his children, was delivered to him, on loan, after the date of the will, and clearly shews that there was no intention of fraud or deception, which the act seems carefully to guard against.

In the case of Fitzhugh v. Anderson and others, cited in the argument of this cause, and much relied on by the appellee’s counsel, it appeared that John Fitzhugh, father of the complainant, Dennis Fitzhugh, had been in quiet possession of the negroes in controversy (many in number) for upwards of twenty years; had removed with them from Caroline, to the County of Amherst, and had there obtained extensive credits, on the strength of such possession, and many of them had come into the possession of fair purchasers, without notice of any other claim, long before the death of William Fitzhugh the grandfather, (under whose will Dennis Fitzhugh claimed the negroes,) and who lived in the County of King George, ISO miles from the County of Amherst. From these circumstances there appears to me but little analogy between the two cases, they being widely different in several material points.

I am therefore of opinion, that the judgment of the District Court is erroneous, and ought to be reversed.

By the opinions of a majority of the Court, the following judgment was entered:

“This Court is of opinion, that the judgment of the District Court is erroneous in this, that the Court instructed *the Jury that the peaceable and uninterrupted possession, by the said William Beasley, of the slave in question, by virtue •of a loan from William Hurt, which possession continued from the year 1792 until the year 1801, subjected the said slave to the payment of the debts of the said William Beasley, by execution, in the year 1801, although William Hurt, the lender, died in the year 1796, after having made a will, in which he disposed of the said slave to the defendant, his grandson, who was under age until the year 1801; the executors named in the said will, having duly qualified under the same in December, 1796. 'The said judgment is therefore reversed and annulled, and this Court proceeding, &c. it is ordered, that the cause be remanded to the Superior Court of County, for a new trial to be had therein, with direction that no such instruction be given to the jury on such trial.” _ _ 
      
       3 Call, 85.
     
      
       1 Wash. 139.
     
      
       Rev. Code, y. 1, p. 16.