Case ID: f-appx_588/html/0018-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Donna VEEDER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Steven NUTTING, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Robert J. Martin, et al., Defendants.
    No. 13-1739-CV.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Dec. 15, 2014.
    Jonathan D. Hitsous, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Denise A. Hartman, Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Defendants-Appellants.
    Keith F. Schockmel, Albany, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
    PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY and PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Defendants Nutting, Burns, Hogan, and Port appeal from the District Court’s March 29, 2013 order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and from its March 26, 2014 order denying defendants’ motion for reconsideration. The question on appeal is whether the District Court properly denied qualified immunity as to these defendants under the plain-view doctrine for the search and seizure of suicide notes written by Garry Veeder, the late husband and father of plaintiffs. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir.2012). Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review a denial of summary judgment, that general rule “does not apply when the summary judgment motion is based on a claim of qualified immunity.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, - U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2018-19, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014). Our jurisdiction, however, is “limited to circumstances where the qualified immunity defense may be established as a matter of law.” Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Officials operating under color of state law are entitled to summary judgment when they can establish that either “(1) a constitutional right was not violated or (2) the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 113 (2d Cir.2014) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Under the plain-view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).

Upon de novo review of the record and relevant law, we conclude that the District Court erred in not granting qualified immunity to defendants Nutting, Burns, Hogan, and Port for the seizure of the suicide notes under the plain-view doctrine. The record shows, and plaintiffs essentially concede, that defendants were lawfully in plaintiffs’ residence in response to their 911 call requesting “immediate assistance” when they first saw the suicide notes, and plaintiffs did not object to defendants’ initial entry. See Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984). Although the District Court found that there was a factual dispute as to whether plaintiff Donna Veeder later executed, and then revoked, a written consent form to search the house, that issue is immaterial where defendants had already seen the notes while lawfully in plaintiffs’ home.

The character of the suicide notes was 'also “immediately apparent.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130. Defendants were responding to a 911 .call stating that Garry Veeder' “had hung” himself. Upon arrival, defendants observed Donna Veeder with a manila folder, and county sheriffs officers, who had arrived earlier, advised defendants that the folder contained suicide notes left by Mr. Veeder. Moreover, Donna Veeder stated to defendants: “[Y]ou and I both know that this is a suicide, this is not a crime, and I want to read my note. I don’t know if my husband has left some kind of instructions or last wishes. I will open my letter and read it in front of you.” Joint App’x 240. Under these circumstances, defendants had “probable cause” to believe that the manila folder contained suicide notes related to Garry Veeder’s death. United States v. Gamble, 388 F.3d 74, 76 (2d Cir.2004). Although plaintiffs contend that the notes were not “incriminating,” we are aware of no clearly established law holding that police may not seize suicide notes that are relevant to the investigation of an apparent suicide. Cf. Earle v. City of Vail, 146 Fed.Appx. 990, 994 (10th Cir.2005) (“While the notes were not necessarily incriminating, they were, on their face, directly relevant to the police officers’ investigation of [the decedent’s] death.”) (persuasive but non-precedential unpublished decision under Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1). Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the seizure of the suicide notes.

The District Court also erred in not granting qualified immunity to defendants Hogan and Port for opening the suicide notes because they did not violate clearly established law. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that courts háve “sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand”). Although there is a general expectation of privacy in letters and other sealed packages delivered through the mail, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), we are aware of no clearly established law, and plaintiffs cite none, holding that the police may not subsequently read a person’s private papers, the text of which is not in plain view, that have lawfully been seized under the plain-view doctrine. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 685, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (holding that law must be sufficiently “particularized” to be clearly established). That is especially true in the particular circumstances presented here, where Donna Veeder offered to read at least one of the notes to the police before it was seized. See Joint App’x 240. Although the better practice likely would have been for the police to obtain a warrant, and they likely would have had probable cause for doing so, we cannot say that plaintiffs have identified a right the contours of which were “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Accordingly, defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their opening the notes. See Plumhoff, 134 S.Ct. at 2023.

Finally, we decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ request, raised in its opposition brief and without a cross-appeal, that we grant summary judgment against defendants on the issue of liability.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the March 29, 2013 and March 26, 2014 orders of the District Court are REVERSED insofar as they denied qualified immunity to defendants Nutting, Burns, Hogan, and Port for the seizure and subsequent search of the suicide notes, and the cause is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 
      
      . Defendants opened the letters after an autopsy concluded that the cause of Garry Veeder’s death was cardiopulmonary arrest by suicidal hanging, and after defendant Hogan, a state police attorney, concluded that he knew of no law prohibiting police from copying suicide notes as evidence in a death investigation.