Case ID: ala-app_18/html/0699-07.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "MERRITT, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

(93 South. 927)
    WIGGINS v. STATE.
    (1 Div. 457.)
    (Court of Appeals of Alabama.
    May 30, 1922.)
    Appeal from Circuit Court, Monroe County; John D. Leigh, Judge. John Wiggins was convicted of violating the prohibition law, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    The evidence for the state tends to show that the defendant came by the cotton patch where the two state witnesses were picking cotton,* and after picking around several rows with them asked if anybody wanted to buy any “shinney,” saying that he had a quart and wanted $3 for it. No one bought. No one knew whether the bottle contained whisky or something else. There was some evidence that one of them bought whisky that night, but whether from the defendant or not does not appear. The defendant admitted the conversation, admitted that he had the bottle of kerosene with him at the time, but denied that at the time he had any whisky, or sold any.
    Ilybart & Hare, of Monroeville, for appellant.
    The evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, and the court should have given the affirmative charge for the defendant. 88 South. 355; 89 South. 98; ante, p. 218, 90 South. 36; 90 South. 42; 90 South. 45.
    Harwell G, Davis, Atty. Gen. and Lamar Field, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
    The affirmative charge cannot be considered, as it is not a part of the record, because not numbered or indorsed, or signed by the judge. Acts 1915, p. 815; Sharpley v. State, ante, p. 620, 93 South. 210.
   MERRITT, J.

The defendant was convicted of a violation of the prohibition laws and he appeals. The court has read and considered the evidence contained in this record, and we are of the opinion that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant a conviction. The general affirmative charge, requested by the defendant, should have been given. The judgment of conviction is reversed, and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.