Case ID: h-j_2/html/0324-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "The Court", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Hughes vs. O’Donnell.
    "Where tht attorney of the pi jntiffhnd Riven ihe «lefmdánt a re ceipt for a sum of money; stated to lie in full of the judgment, but ■uhieh was for a less sum than the amount due — 7/cW, that ' the receipt1 was not conclusive evidence that the judgment Mas ta ti&lied so lav as to prevent the plain'ilf from takii £ out execution on the .ju<:£ mem for any balance winch miftht be actually due \hereon.
    Appeal from Baltimore county court. This was an ac-, tion on the case, for maliciously causing the plaintiff, (now; appellee,) to be taken in execution, and falsely imprisoned, on a judgment which had been satisfied, &c. The general issue was pleaded.
    1. The plaintiff, at the trial, offered in evidence a re-, cord of a judgment, and proceedings thereon, in a suit wherein the defendant (now appellant,) was plaintiff, and. the plaintiff, (the appellee,) was defendant, setting forth, that at May term 1§Ü0, a judgment was recovered in the, general court, by the then plaintiff, for £110 4 0 current money damages,' and £61 50 arid 1863 lbs. of tobacco, costs. That on the 34 of February 1801, a ca. sa. issued on the judgment, and was served on the then defendant. The plaintiff also offered in evidence the following receipt of Zcbulon Hollingsworth, esquire, attorney for; the plaintiff in the judgment, to prove its payment aud satisfaction: “4th August 1800. I have this day received of John OHonnell, esquire, the sum of one hundred and forty pounds one shilling and ten pence, in full of the within judgment.
    
      Z. Hollingsworth, Att’y. for C. Hughes.**
    
    The defendant then offered to show, that the above re-.ceipt was given by mistake for a less sum of money tha¡) was due on. the judgment. But the court were of opinion, that the receipt was conclusive evidence that the judgment was satisfied, so far as to prevent the plaintiff therein from issuing any execution for any balance that might in fact be due. The defendant excepted.
    2. The plaintiff further offered in evidence, that th? defendant in this cause, notwithstanding the receipt, and the notice thereof, ordered an execution to issue for the whole amount of the judgment, without endorsing thereon the sum of money so received on account thereof, and directed the whole amount to be executed for. The defendant then moved the court to direct the jury, tljat notwithstanding the receipt, if there was any balance due on the judgment, that the plaintiff in the judgment might take out an execution for the same. But the court was of opinion that the receipt, purporting to be in lull of the judgment, Hughes was so far bound thereby that he cotjfd not take out execution for any balance which might be ac,-\ tually due. The defendant excepted. The verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff, this appeal was brought by the defendant.
    The case was argued before Tilgiiman, Buciianan, and Gantt, J. by
    
      ilaqicr, for the Appellant.
    The receipt in this case, though expressed to be in lull of the judgment, was not so, and not being so, was not conclusive satisfaction of the judgment, and an execution might issue for the balance, and the plaintiff in the judgment was not bound to endorse the sum of money which had been paid. The authority oí an attorney at law ceases after the judgment is entered, and he has no right to enter the judgment satisfied, when in fact it is not so. lie may perhaps receive payment, and give a receipt therefor; but lie has no right to enter the judgment satisfied. He may say what he has received, and as far as that payment goes, it probably is a discharge. Until the whole sum of money, however, is received, the plaintiff may go on and issue execution, and if a part only Is due, he'can issue for that. The opinion of the county court goes so far as to say that the attorney may enter the judgment satisfied, and the plaintiff’ is bound by it. It lias been decided that an execution is not rendered illegal if it has not an endorsement ¶>£ the amount actually due. The sheriff is not bound to execute the writ without such endorsement; but lie may tío so if he pleases. Howard vs. The Levy Court, 1 Harr. & Johns. 566.
    
      Pniyviance and S. Chase, jr. for the Appellee.
    If the principal himself liad received the money, and given a receipt in full of the judgment, he could not issue an exception, thereon, unless lie had given notice of (he mistake. If the-attorney enters a judgment satisfied, the plaintiff is bound by it. He has his lemedy against the attorney, but cannot go against (he defendant. The authority arid extent of the powers of an attorney are fully laid down and recognized in the following authorities: Latuch vs. Pasherante, 1 Salk. 86. Lamb vs. Williams, Ibid 89. Powel vs. Little, 1 W. Blk. 8. Welsh vs. Hole, 1 Doug. 238. 1 Dull. M. 291, pi. 17, 20. 1 Bac. Ab. 188. 1 Com. Dig. 40. Read vs Dupper, 6 T. R. 361. Randle vs. Fuller, Ibid 456. Ormerod vs. Tate, 1 East, 464. There was-EO' endorsement on (lie execution of any money paid, and the defendant was taken in execution for the whole amount of the judgment. The jury were to judge whether it was a malicious proceeding, and if so, to give damages accordingly. It does not appear that the execution issued for the balance. If any balance was due, it was only 1 19 9, which might have been settled in another way. There might have been a preceding payment. The appellant, with a full knowledge of the payment which bad been made, issued the execution for the whole amount for which the judgment had been rendered. This action is for a malicious prosecution-of an execution; for vexati-ously causing the appellee to be taken in execution, and demanding a larger sum of money than was due; for an abuse of the process of the court. It would be a dangerous doctrine if a client could undo and destroy what his attorney had done. If an attorney recovers a judgment for a sum of money which his client might consider too smalt, could he dissent from the judgment, and bring a new suit? The same principles prevail with respect to the attorney as to all other kinds of agents. If an attorney abuses the interest of bis client, he is answerable to him. The receipt of the attorney was sufficient to authorise the clerk of the court to ente’r the judgment satisfied; and it not being so entered, can make no difference. Ad-milting that the receipt did not operate as an extinction of the claim, yet it operated so far as to prevent an execution from issuing. The appellant did not issue the execution upon the ground of a small balance being due, but he issued it for the whole. He should have given notice to the appellee of the mistake, and that a balance was due. His proceeding was as much an abuse of the process of the court, in demanding a large sum of money, when little was due, as it would be to demand a larger sum when there was nothingdue.
    
      harper, in reply.
    During the pendency of a suit the attorney’s acts will bind his client. He is then pursuing his authority. But his authority ceases when judgment3s obtained, and he has no right to enter it satisfied when it is not so. If he acts within his instructions, it will bind his client.
   The Court

dissented from the opinions expressed by the court below, in both of the bills of exceptions.

JUDGMENT BE1ERSED, AND PROCEDEN DO AWARDED,