Case ID: f-appx_704/html/0711-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Odilia ALVAREZ-CORRAL, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 14-72299
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted November 15, 2017  San Francisco, California
    Filed November 29, 2017
    Christopher John Stender, Esquire, Attorney, Federal Immigration Counselors, AZ, PC, Phoenix, AZ, for Petitioner
    Edward C. Durant, Attorney, Juria L. • Jones, Andrew Nathan O’Malley, Trial Attorneys, OIL, DOJ — U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA
    Before: GOULD and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and GRITZNER, District Judge.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
      The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Odilia Alvarez-Corral, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an expedited removal order reinstated by the Secretary of Homeland Security and an immigration judge’s subsequent determination that Alvarez-Corral did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We do not have jurisdiction to consider Alvarez-Corral’s collateral attack on her underlying expedited removal order. See Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008).

The immigration judge’s decision is sufficiently detailed to satisfy the requirements of due process. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 807 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004).

The immigration judge’s reasonable fear determination is supported by substantial evidence. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 2016). Alvarez-Corral denied suffering past persecution or torture in Mexico. Alvarez-Corral speculated that her ex-boyfriend might harm her if she returned to Mexico, yet she identified no specific threats and admitted to having no recent contact with him. Also, Alvarez-Corral mentioned only hearing stories of the Mexican government and police’s ineffectiveness, but she has no individualized reason to think that it would acquiesce in her being harmed. We conclude that this evidence would not compel any reasonable adjudicator to conclude that Alvarez-Corral had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. See id. at 833.

DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.