Case ID: f-appx_685/html/0515-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Payam KAMBOD, Petitioner, v. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; National Transportation Safety Board, Respondents.
    No. 16-71054
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2017 
    
    Filed March 23, 2017
    Payam Kambod, Pro Se
    Agnes M. Rodriguez, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Casey Gardner, Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for Respondent Federal Aviation Administration
    Agnes M. Rodriguez, Esquire, Senior Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for Respondent Michael P. Huerta
    Before: LEAVY, W. FLETCHER, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Payam Kambod petitions pro se for review of the National Transportation Safety Board’s (“NTSB”) final order revoking Kambod’s airline pilot, flight instructor, and ground instructor certificates. We have jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a), 44709(f), and 46110(a). We review the NTSB’s final order under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Gilbert v. NTSB, 80 F.3d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1996). We deny the petition for review.

The NTSB’s determination that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not abuse his discretion in denying Kambod’s requests for a continuance was not arbitrary and capricious because the ALJ had broad discretion to regulate the conduct of the hearing. See 49 C.F.R. § 821.35(b); Adm’r v. Lackey, NTSB Order. No. EA-5419 (2008) (“We have long held that law judges have significant discretion in overseeing administrative hearings and admitting evidence into the record.”).

The NTSB’s determination that the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in denying Karabod’s request for a waiver of emergency proceedings was not arbitrary and capricious because delaying the proceedings after the hearing had commenced would have placed an undue burden on the Administrator, court resources, witnesses, and the ALJ. See 49 C.F.R. § 821.52(d); Tur v. FAA, 4 F.3d 766, 770 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing waiver of emergency proceedings).

Because Kambod failed to raise any of his other contentions before the NTSB, those contentions are waived. See '49 U.S.C. § 46110(d); Reid v. Engen, 765 F.2d 1457, 1462 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (declining to rule on issues not raised before an agency tribunal).

We reject as without merit Kambod’s contentions regarding FAA or ALJ bias.

PETITION DENIED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.