Case ID: scl_2/html/0034-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State against Bryan Connor.
    Where * ma* is convicted of an infamous a jury, and movesarfbr a fne,iari'est’ of'' judgment, he is no longer bailable ; for the eommu-nity has no foi-C1 tim Upu-man'11 for a*a crimen falsi, than the four walls of a prison.
    Though in minor offen-ces, such as assaults, batteries,'&c. See. it is usual to admit persons after conviction, to bail, to appear at the constitutional court of appeals, in cases where motions for new trials, or in arrest of judgment are made, and to abide the final judgment of áuch court.
    UPON an indictment for forgery at common law, by . altering the date of a receipt.
    The defendant in this case was convicted of the offence, on very clear testimony, and as soon as the verdict was re-corded, the Aitorney-Generq/ (as is usual on sucn occasions) moved the court that he might be taken into custody, and ° J * committed to close prison; (having been out on bail before;) ' but as soon as, he heard the' verdict,- hé slipped out or court through the crowd and got off, before-'the sheriff or his officers could lay hold of him. On the meeting of the court next morning, Mr. Holmes, his counsel, moved that he might still be continued on bail, until a motion he had to make before the constitutional court of appeals could be argued in his favour, in arrest of judgment, which he then gave notice he would bring forward before the judges, at the next meeting of that court, as also a motion for a new trial.
    In support of this motion, Mr. Holmes contended,
    that if the defendant was bailable originally, he was still entitled to this privilege, until the final decision of' the' court of appeals was known upon this case. That a conviction by a jury was not final and conclusive in a case of this kind. That it was possible a jury might find without evidence, or, contrary to evidence ; that some of the jury might be prejudiced, and carry their prejudices with them into a jury box. It sometimes happened that even the court suffered irregular, or perhaps illegal testimony to be given to a jury. The constitution of our country had therefore wisely- established another, and higher tribunal than this court, for the purpose of investigating and determining all those points, and ordering new trials in all such cases. He further said, that in some cases, the indictment might be faulty, and not so framed as to embrace the defendant’s case, which formed a good ground for a motion in arrest of judgment, on, principles of law. This also was another point for the com-sideration of the court of appeals, who had a power to quash such indictment, and discharge the defendant. To Confine a defendant, therefore, in prison, without bail or mainprize, after the finding of the jury, might and often would deprive him of the means of pursuing all or any ol these constitutional modes of redress, which had been so wisely provided on his behalf.
    The Attorney-Genera!, in reply,
    observed, that there was a wide difference, between bailing in cases bailable before conviction, where the guilt or innocence of a man was doubtful; and continuing bail in cases after trial and conviction, where the stamp of guilt was fixed upon a defendant by the finding of a jury. That however the presumption of law might be in favour of a prisoner’s innocence before trial, and such he confessed was the humanity of our law, yet, it could no longer remain so after trial and conviction. The presumption of law then was, that he was guilty ; which excluded the idea of bail, especially in all cases where infamous or corporal punishment was to be inflicted on the offender.
    That the defendant in this case had been convicted of a crimen fuhi, which calls for infamous punishment; one for which if he had been indicted Under the statute, and found guilty, his life must have paid the forfeit. That nothing but the four walls of a prison was a sufficient security to the community for the safe keeping of such a man, till he receives his punishment, as an example to others, the great end of our criminal law. He admitted, that there was another and higher tribunal than this court, to which the defendant might appeal, either in arrest of judgment or for a new trial. But every day’s experience shewed how often this inestimable privilege was abused, under frivolous motions on trivial grounds for the purposes of delay, in order to give offenders an opportunity of going off with impunity, or gaining time to evade the justice of the country, He was well aware, he said, that the judges could nots and never would attempt to deny a prisoner this right when demanded, where he was entitled to it 5 but it was-their bounden duty to see that under pretence of proses cuting this right, they did not elude the penalties of the law for offences. Hence it had been the invariable practice in all cases where infamous or corporal punishment was to be inflicted, to commit to prison, till the case could finally be determined by the constitutional court, and in cases of ag* gravated assaults and batteries, or trespasses, &c. to order much higher and better security to be given by offenders of this latter class, than had been given \o answer to the charge originally, that they would personally appear before the judges at the court of appeals, to receive and abide the judgment of that court in the cases submitted to them. By this means, convicted persons of every class of offenders from the highest to the lowest, had this great advantage of being heard by the judges of the land, upon all points or matters of law, in the dernier resort, and the community had its security for bringing offenders to justice, without the one escaping with impunity, or the other being robbed of its object of just chastisement.
   The presiding judge laid down the rule in such cases to be this. That in all dubious cases, (under the degree of treason or felon)’, plainly set forth in the warrant of commitment,) as long as it was uncertain whether the party was guilty or innocent of the charge alleged against him, such was the humanity of the law, that he ought to be bailed. But when a prosecution was so far advanced, as to establish the guilt of .the party accused by a conviction of the jury, the probability of innocence no longer existed ; on the contrary, the law would and ought to presume him guilty. The discretionary power of the court then ceases, in all cases where infamous corporal punishment is or ought to be inflicted on the accused person, found guilty of the offence.

That from the very nature of man, who was not lost to all shame, there was nothing he would not forfeit of a pecuniary nature, rather than sutler infamy and disgraceful punishment. Unfortunately, the welfare of society called, in some cases, for such examples, to prevent the repetition of offences. In all such cases, therefore, no bail could, or ought to be taken or continued. The defendant must stand committed. There could be no other sufficient security to the community, until his case can ultimately be decided by the constitutional court of appeals. Though it had been usual in cases of assaults, batteries and misdemeanors, where onl) fine or imprisonment was to be the punishment, to admit persons convicted of those minor offences to bail, for their appearance at the constitutional court, where motions for new trial or in am st of judgment were made on their behalf, to abide the final determination of such appellate court, which additional bail was generally proportioned to the nature and circumstances of the case, as appeared upon trial.

The motion was therefore overruled, and the defendant ordered into the sheriff’s custody.

At the next meeting of the constitutional court of appeals, the two motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, were argued by Mr. Holmes on behalf of the prisoner, and opposed by the Attorney-General; but as there were no sufficient grounds to support either of them, they were both dismissed.

After which, the defendant was sentenced to fine and imprisonment, by the judge who presided on the trial in the circuit court.

On this occasion the judges took an opportunity of expressing their opinions, in favour of the refusal of the circuit court, to admit a defendant to bail after his conviction, in a case so highly criminal; but admitted the necessity of an exercise of a discretionary power, even after conviction, in cases for lower offences, to bail for the appearance of offenders at the constitutional court of appeals, to abide the final sentence of that court.

Present, Burke, GaiMKE, Waties and Bat;