Case ID: scl_10/html/0136-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Nott, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

*John B. Truchelut ads. The City Council.
    Every process, issuing out of the City Court of Charleston, must show upon the face of it, that the case was within the jurisdiction of the court; but an averment to that effect is unnecessary, 
    
    The exposure of goods at the door of a shop, furnishes evidence, from which the jury may presume that they were intended for sale.
    
    The publication of an ordinance in a newspaper, in which the by-laws of the City Council were usually published, is sufficient promulgation.
    
    Although the ordinances of the City Council, up to & particular time, were originally void, yet an Act of Assembly, ratifying and giving effect to them, will render them valid; and an offender against them must be prosecuted under the ordinance, and not under the act.
    Tried originally before the Recorder of Charleston, and at January term, 1818, before his Honor Judge Grimke.
    This -was an action brought to recover from the defendant the sum of twenty dollars, for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the City Council.
    The process stated that the defendant, on the 23d of February, 1816, did place, or cause to be placed, in the city of Charleston, a bench with jars, pots, &c., for the purpose of exposing them for sale ; whereby he violated the 6th clause of the ordinance of the City Council, entitled “ An Ordinance to define Power and duties of the Commissioners of Streets and Lamps.”
    *The witness for the prosecution (Mr. Giles) stated that, on the day mentioned in the process, there were some jars, pots, &c., on a bench before the defendant’s door. That he did not ask if they were for sale, nor were they offered for sale in his presence. The bench was placed against the side of the house. _ That the ordinance on which this prosecution was founded was published in the “ Courier” newspaper alone ; and since he had been marshal, the ordinance had only been published in one paper.
    
      The defendant pleaded in abatement that the process was informal, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the court was not particularly and distinctly set forth in the process, which the plaintiff ought to have done, as the court was one of inferior jurisdiction.
    The Recorder overruled this plea, and ordered the defendant to plead issuably, and go to trial. This was done.
    The Recorder charged the jury in favor of the City Council, and a verdict was found for the City Council, for the amount of the penalty claimed by the process.
    Defendant now appealed on the following grounds :
    1. That the Recorder was mistaken in the law; and that his Honor the judge who tried the case at the last Circuit Court, was also mistaken in the law, when he decided against the plea in abatement, andthatthey'itn's&'cfo'onofan inferior court should not be set forth in its process.
    2. That the ordinance under which the defendant was prosecuted, was never promulgated to that extent which the spirit of our government and laws require ; it having only been published in one newspaper, and that one not of general circulation.
    3. That the verdict was contrary to evidence, there being not a tittle of testimony produced on the part of the city, to prove that the goods or articles were exposed for sale.
    
    4. That the ordinance under which the defendant was prosecuted, had been declared void by a decision of this Court; and although it had been since ratified *by an act of the Legislature, yet that could not make it good as an ordinance of the City Council, but the defendant should have been prosecuted under the act, and not under the ordinance.
    
      
      
         Powers v. The People, 4 John. Rep. 292. R. Sup. 205, 1 McC. 511.
      Ñ. B. — There were several other oases depending on the same principles, which were governed by the above decision. R.
    
   Xne opinion oi tne Uourt was delivered by

Nott, J.

The City Court was established, and its powers and jurisdiction defined by several Acts of the Legislature; those are public Acts of which this Court is bound to take notice. In cases of contracts, its jurisdiction extends only to such citizens of the State as reside within the city. It extends only to offences committed within the city, and against the by-laws of the city council; and to eases only within and not exceeding the sum of one hundred dollars; and every process must show upon its face that the case was within the jurisdiction of the Court. Peacock v. Bell, et al., 1 Saunders, 74-5; 6 Mod., 228; Trevor v. Wall, 1 D. & E., 151; Waldock v. Cooper, 2 Wilson, 16; 2 Levinz, 87, and -- v. Lee, Lord Raymond, 211. But it does not appear indispensably necessary that it should contain such an averment. It is sufficient that the process itself furnishes the proof. And if the Court can see that it contains all the legal requisites to give jurisdiction to the inferior Court, such an averment will not be required. When there is nothing to be supplied on the face of the process, it is unnecessary ; and all that can be inferred from the cases relied on, is, that the jurisdiction must appear, but not that it must be averred. The only case brought to our view, where such an averment has been held necessary, is the case from Washington’s Reports, 82; but the correctness of that decision, I think, is very successfully combatted by the president of that Court. By a reference to this process, it will appear that the offence was committed within the city, and against the by-laws. The sum for which the defendant was prosecuted, is confessedly within the jurisdiction of the Court. Such an averment, then, could give no *more information to the Court, nor add anything to the process which did not before appear.

J. B. White and Gross, for the motion. Gadsden and Bichardson, contra.

2. The exposure of the goods, at the door of the shop, furnished sufficient evidence, from whence the jury might presume that they were intended for sale. The object of the law was, to prevent the annoyance to which every.person was exposed by the various obstructions thus thrown upon the pavement. If they were placed there for any special purpose, consistent with the provisions of the law, the onus probandi lay on the defendant.

3. The law was published in one of the public newspapers in the city. It was the paper in which the by-laws of the city council were usually published, and one employed by them for that purpose. And the Court does not see that it was not a paper of general circulation. It appears to me, that the publicity given to the ordinance, was as great as is given by the Legislature to the laws of the State. I think, therefore, that it was sufficiently promulgated.

4. I am not aware of any decision of this Court declaring all the ordinances of the city council, anterior to a particular period, void. But if such a decision has taken place, the evil which might otherwise have resulted from it has been prevented by the Act of the Legislature, ratifying and giving effect to all those ordinances. There is no doubt but that the Legislature possessed such power; and having exercised it, those ordinances have become as good and effic'acious as any passed since that period.

I am of opinion, on all the grounds, that the motion must be refused.

CoLCOCK, Cheves and Gantt, JJ., concurred.