Case ID: walker_1/html/0246-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

KAUFFELT’S ESTATE.
    An absolute bequest may be changed to a life estate, by implication, from a subsequent clause in the will.
    Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of York County.
    Sarah Kauffelt, the widow of George Kauffelt, filed her petition asking for a citation upon George D. Ebert, executor of George Kauffelt, to compel him to deliver to her unconditionally certain shares of bank stock which had been bequeathed by George Kauffelt in the following clause of his will:
    “I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife Sarah Kauffelt, forty-two (42) shares stock of the First National Bank, of Wrightsville, five (5) shares of stock in the Columbia National Bank. I give and bequeath, to heif also, the house and lot in which I reside; together with all the furniture and appurtenances belonging thereto; to have and to use the same during, her natural life. After her decease, two thousand and one hundred dollars of my estate shall revert and fall back to the heirs ,of my wife, the said Sarah Kauffelt. The remainder shall revert to my legal heirs.”
    The petitioner contended that under the above clause she was entitled to said bank stocks absolutely and asked to have them delivered to her.
    .The executor filed his answer, averring that he was ready and willing to transfer the bank stocks to their proper owner ; but that owing to ambiguities in said clause, he was unable to determine whether the widow was entitled to it absolutely, or only the income thereof, and asking the Court to determine this question.
    Testimony was taken on behalf of the collateral heirs of the decedent, who claimed that the widow was only entitled to a life estate in said bank stock, to show that the intention of the testator was to give her only the income and not the corpus of the stock. The principal part of the testimony was objected to as not being legal evidence in this case. The party who wrote the will also testified that at the time of writing it, he understood that the testator meant to give the stock to his wife absolutely ; but after having the will in his -possession a few days, and reading it several times, he arrived at a different conclusion.
    On April 5, 1880, the Court dismissed the petition in the following opinion by
    Fisher, P. J.
    We think, in relation to the bank stock mentioned in the bequests of George Kauftelt to his wife, she took only the income during her life, and has no right to demand an absolute assignment or transfer of them. Whatever his intention was, it is not clearly expressed ; but reading the will and considering the force' of every word, we cannot say that she took anything more than a life estate, and must, therefore, dismiss this bill; but we think it ought to be done at the cost of the estate, and that the expense of litigation ought to be paid by George D. Ebert, out of the funds in h:s hands belonging to his testator’s estate, because one of the reasons for commencing it was for the security of Mr. Ebert, the executor.
    I do not know whether there is.any dispute about the proceeds of the sale of a piece of woodland sold to George'' Budding for $160.00, which the testator directs his executor to sell, and directs that one-half of the “proceeds to go to my wife, Sarah Kauftelt, and the remaining to go to my lawful heirs.” This portion of his directions in relation to his real estate is found in what he calls the “codicil.” I think there can be no doubt that Mrs. Sarah Kaufielt takes absolutely the one-half of this fund.
    And now, to wit, April 6, 1880, the Court dismiss this bill or petition, and direct that the costs of the petition, and or all the witnesses, and of the commissioner taking the testimony, and the fees of the Clerk of the Orphans’ Court, be paid by George D. Ebert, executor of the estate of George Kauffelt, out of the money which came into his hands belonging to the estate of the testator.
    Sarah Kauffelt then appealed, complaining of the foregoing decree. *
    
      
      E. W. Spangler, Esq., for appellant argued:
    Where the writer of a will is inops coneilii, the intent of the testator must be gathered from the words of the will, as such words are understood and accepted by the common mind: Hunter’s Estate, 6 Barr, 106.
    There is nothing in this will that would convey to the professional mind any other meaning than that the appellant was to have the bank stocks absolutely. The entire punctuation bears out this interpretation.
    The word “also” is the beginning of the second paragraph, and serves to point out the beginning of a new devise or bequest: Evans vs. Knorr, 4 Rawle, 66; Spirt vs. Bence, Cro. Car. 368; Weidman vs. Maish, 4 Harris, 511; Horwitz vs. Norris, 10 P. F. Smith, 282.
    See also Shirey vs. Postlethwaite, 22 P. F. Smith, 39; Newbold vs. Boone, 2 P. F. Smith, 167.
    In the construction of wills, the law, in doubtful cases, leans in favor of an absolute, rather than a defeasible estate: Amelia Smith’s Appeal, 11 Harris, 9; Rewalt vs. Uhrich, 11 Harris, 388.
    In cases of doubt, the construction of a will is to be as conformable as possible to the general rules of inheritance: France’s Estate, 25 P. F. Smith, 221.
    If the appellant only gets a life interest in the bank stocks, her interest under her husband’s will will be comparatively insignificant to what she could get if she had chosen to take against the will, for in the latter event, in addition to her share under the intestate laws, she could have recovered from the estate the twenty-one hundred dollars which she loaned the testator: Mellinger vs. Bausman, 9 Wright, 522; Moyer’s Appeal, 27 P. F. Smith, 482.
    Plain and distinct words in a will are only to be. construed by words equally plain and distinct: 1 Redfield on Wills, *438.
    Insensible clauses must be rejected: Horwitz vs. Norris, 10 P. F. Smith, 287; McBride vs. Smyth, 4 ib., 245; Sheetz’s Appeal, 1 Norris, 217.
    
      The testimony of Rev. S. E. Herring as to the declarations of the testator of his intentions in making the will was incompetent and not evidence: Wallize vs. Wallize, 5 P. F. Smith, 242; Best vs. Hammond, ib. 409; Comfort vs. Mather, 2 Watts & Serg’t, 450; Wusthoff vs. Dracourt, 3 Watts, 240; Varner’s Appeal, 6 Norris, 423.
    
      W. C. Chapman, Esq., contra, argued that
    Parol evidence is admissible to put the Court in the place of the.testator: 1 Redfield on Wills, 496.
    Or to explain any latent ambiguity: Venor vs. Henry, 3 Watts, 385; Brownfield vs. Brownfield, 2 Jones, 136.
    An inspection of this will will show that the scrivener did not km w either the proper place for capital letters, nor how to punctuate, nor how to spell. It is therefore obvious that no argument in favor of a construction, founded on punctuation, or on the commencement of a word with a capital letter, can be predicated upon the performance of a man who plainly does not know the proper use of either.
    If the appellant gets the bank stock absolutely, and the house and lot and furniture for life, and after her death her collateral relations get $2,100 as directed in the will, there will he nothing left for the testator’s collateral relations.
    
    The construction should be consistent with the whole scheme of the will: Middlewarth’s adm’r vs. Blackmore, 24 P. F. Smith, 414.
    Every sentence and word in a will must be considered in forming a judicial opinion upon it, and the intention of the testator from the words of a will taken together must govern in its construction: Schotts’ Estate, 28 P. F. Smith, 40; Turbett vs. Turbett, 3 Yeates, 187.
   The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court below on May 17, 1880, in the following opinion :

Per Curiam.

Parol evidence is admissible to identify the subject matter of a devise; and to show the person intended to whom a bequest has been made by a wrong Christian name; but the legal construction of a will cannot be changed by the parol declarations of the testator as to his intention. In this case the parol evidence is too vague and uncertain to affect the construction of the will in the slightest degree. It stands on its own language and must be controlled thereby. This construction we think the learned judge ruled correctly. In view of the inartificial manner in which it is written, little weight should be given to its punctuation. The value of the estate, and the general intent of the will, show the wife was to have a life estate only, in all the property devised to her.

Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.