Case ID: us-ct-cl_36/html/0328-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Peelle, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

ALFRED L. ROYCE v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [No. 21415.
    Decided April 29, 1901.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    The question in this case is whether a provision in the act to reorganize the Navy (3d March, 1899) operates retroactively, so as to give to chaplains who have been appointed from civil life a credit of five years, which will increase their pay for past services, or whether it is prospective, to take effect after June 30, 1899.
    I. The proviso in the Act 3d March, 1899 (30 Stat. L., pp. 1004, 1007, § 13), declaring that naval chaplains shall have the rank of lieutenant, and that “all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or ::iay be appointed, to the Navy from civil life, shall, o,„ the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years’ service,’’ is subject to the initial clause of the section, “after June 80, 1899,” etc.
    II. A chaplain appointed in the Navy from civil life in 1881 is not entitled under the statute to have his account reopened from the day of his appointment and be credited with five years’ service in 1881 and increased longevity pay for past services.
    
      III. Where the enacting clause of a statute is general in its language and objects, a proviso must be construed strictly; the proviso takes no case out of the enacting clause which is not fairly within its terms. Therefore the initial clause of section 13, “after June SO, 1899,” extends to the pay of all officers mentioned in the section.
    IY. One general purpose of the enacting clause and proviso, taken together, was that all officers who had been theretofore appointed in the Navy from civil life should be credited with five years’ service, for the purpose of computing their pay, after June 30,1899.
    
      The Reporten? statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
    I. The claimant is a citizen of the United States and an officer of the United States Navy, at present assigned to duty at the Naval Home, in the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania.
    II. On February 18, 1881, the claimant was duly appointed a chaplain in the United States Navy from civil life, and at all times thereafter has held that office and performed the duties thereof which have been assigned to him. During the period of five 3rears next ensuing his said appointment his assignments to duty were as follows:
    Sea duty, 2 years 11 months and 13 days.
    Shore duty, 1 year 1 month and II days.
    Leave or waiting orders, 11 months.
    III. During the said period of five j^ears the United States allowed and paid to the claimant pajr at these rates:
    While on sea duty, §2,500 per annum.
    While on shore duty, §2,000 per annum.
    While on leave or waiting orders, §1,600 per annum.
    The total amount received by the claimant for his said services, rendered during the said period of five years, was §11,055.21.
    IY. On April 21,1899, the claimant demanded of the United States the sum of §1,500 as additional compensation for his said services rendered during the said period, claiming that on March 3, 1899, he became entitled to such additional compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the act of Congress entitled “An act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States,” approved March 3, 1899. The claim was disallowed by the Auditor for the Navy Department, and the claimant has not been paid the said sum or any part thereof.
    
      Mr. Joseph K. Mg Gammon and Mr. James II. Hayden for the claimant:
    The defense is based upon the general rule of construction that retrospective laws are “in their nature odious,” and that a statute should be given a prospective operation only unless its terms show clearly that the legislature intended it to operate retrospectively. It is contended in the brief for the United States that section 13 of the navy personnel act, with all its provisos, including the second, took effect on July 1, 1899, and that, so far as they relate to the pay of naval officers, their operation must be confined to pay which accrued subsequent to June 30.
    We submit: (1) The general rule does not apply to the proviso in question; (2) the terms of the statute show that Con gross intended it to operate retrospectively.
    1. The general rule does not apply to the proviso in question.
    There is an exception to this rule as well established as the rule itself, namely, that where statutes are remedial in their nature and do not disturb vested rights they are to be construed liberally, even though retrospective in their operation, in order to accomplish the beneficent purpose for which they were enacted.
    The navy personnel act did not impair any contract or disturb any vested right. By its enactment Congress intended to accomplish a beneficent object. There had been considerable discontent in the Navy with regard to the relative rank and status of officers of the line and those of certain corps, and especially on account of the low rates of pay allowed throughout the. naval service. It appeared that officers of the Navy had been receiving less pay than officers of corresponding rank in the Army, although the naval officers were intrusted with the performance of duties quite as arduous and important as those of the Army. Congress appreciated that this was not just, and saw fit to provide a remedy by adjusting the status of the line and the staff and by prescribing an equitable increase of pay for the Navy. There is no reason why such an act should not operate retrospectively. It falls within the exception to the general rule.
    In Ex-pcurte BueMey (53 Ala., 55), it was said:
    “There are other statutes which, when operating retrospectively, have not incurred judicial condemnation, and to which a liberal construction for the consummation of the just and beneficent purposes in view has been freely accorded. Such statutes are intended to remedy a mischief, promote public justice, correct innocent mistakes into which parties have fallen, to correct irregularities, or give effect to the acts and contracts of individuals fairly done and made.”
    In People v. Ulster Go. (63 Barbour, N. Y., 83) the court, after stating the general rule, said:
    “The only exception to this rule is that referred to by Chancellor Kent (1 Comm., 2d ed., 455), in which he says that this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes which may be of a retrospective nature, provided they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested rights ánd only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.” (See also Underwood v. Lilly, 10 Sergeant & Rawle (Pa.), 97-101 (one of the authorities cited in the brief of the United States); Blaheney v. Farmers, etc., Bcmk, 17 Sergeant & Rawle, 64; Foster v. Essex Banlc, 16 Mass., 245.)
    2. The terms of the statute show that Congress intended it to operate retrospectively.
    The Comptroller of the Treasury has held (6 Comp. Dec., 713) that the second proviso, like the main body of secton 13, and the first proviso “did not take effect until after June 30, 1899,” because it was limited and controlled by these words, contained in the main body of .the section, “that after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay Corps shall receive,” etc.
    We submit that it requires no argument to show that the second proviso is not germane to the main body of the section or the first proviso. While all of these relate to the pay of persons in the naval service, the body of the section and first proviso deal with the pay of certain commissioned officers, and the second proviso deals with quite another classification of persons in the service, including both commissioned and warrant officers. Hence the limitation does not apply to the second proviso, which should be treated as an independ--ent section and given effect from March 3, the date of passage of the act.
    But even if this ruling of the Comptroller were correct his further ruling that the operation of the second proviso should be confined to pay accruing after June 30 does not follow as a necessary conclusion. In thelanguage of the second proviso we have a clear expression of the legislative intent that it should have a retrospective effect and apply to pay for services rendered prior to July 1, 1899. The proviso by its express terms is applicable to all officers appointed from civil life. It was expressty made applicable to officers who had been as well as to those who thereafter might be appointed to the Navy from civil life. It was prescribed that each officer so appointed should be credited, as of the date of his appointment, with five years’ service.
    It was also prescribed that this credit should be given for the purpose of computing the rate of each officer’s pay. The ruling of the Comptroller and the present contention of the United States would confine the operation of the section to officers appointed after June 30 and those who had been in service for less than five years, instead of applying it to all officers so appointed. To exclude officers appointed more than five years prior to June 30, or March 3, 1899, it would be necessary to interpolate in the proviso after the words “have been” the words “appointed to the Navy from civil life within five years.” It would also be necessary to strike out the words “on the date of appointment”-and in- lieu thereof insert this: “ On July 1,1899, or in case of subsequent appointments, on the dates thereof.”
    We submit that it is not within the power of a court to make such changes in a statute and so to limit its general provisions.
    The interpretation of the proviso for which we contend is based upon language employed by Congress. If so interpreted it would not be inconsistent with any other part of the act.
    
      Mr.- Assistant Attorney- General Pradt for the defendants:
    Laws fixing a future date for going into effect are to be construed prospective!y. (Wade on Retroactive Laws, sec. 34; Black on Interpretation of Laws, 252, citing Dewart v. 
      Purdy, 29 Pa. St., 113.) The office of a proviso is generally either to except something from the enacting- clause or to qualify or restrain it generally. It is confined to that which precedes it or to the section to which it is appended, unless clearly intended to have a wider scope. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 273; Minis v. United /States, 15 Peters, 423; Ryan v. Garter, 93 U. S., 78; Wyman v. Southard, 10 Wheat., 1, 30.)
    Except in the case of remedial statutes, and those which relate to procedure in courts, it is a general rule that statutes do not operate retrospectively unless it is explicitly so declared, or unless such intention appears by necessary implication so clearly as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt on the subject. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 250, and cases cited; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 6 ed., 77, 455, and cases cited; Wade on Retroactive Laws, sec. 34; Gitry Railmay Company v. Qitizend State Railmay Company, 166 U. S., 537.)
    The statute does not explicitly declare that it is to be retrospective, and since every portion can be given a sensible interpretation consistently with its operation upon future pay alone, and in view of the further consideration that the proviso should properly be held to take effect at a date subsequent to the passage of the act in which it is found, it is respectfully submitted that a case is presented where construction should follow the general rule and the operation of the law be limited to future service.
   Peelle, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, a chaplain in the United States Navy, seeks to recover the difference between the pay he received under Revised Statutes, section 1556, during his first five years’ service, and the additional pay he now claims under the act of March 3, 1899, section 13. (30 Stat. L., 1004, 1007.)

The facts, about which there is no controversy, are that, on February 18, 1881, the^claimant was appointed from civil life a chaplain in the United States Navy, and has ever since held that office, performed its duties, and received the pay attached thereto. Section 13, upon which the claimant grounds his right to recovery, reads:

“That, after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, commissioned officers of the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay Corps shall receive the same pay and allowances, except forage, as are or may be provided by or in pursuance of law for the officers of corresponding rank in the Army: Provided, That such officers when on shore duty7 shall receive the allowances but. fifteen per centum less pay7 than when oil sea duty; but this provision shall not apply to warrant officers commissioned under section twelve of this act: Provided further, That when naval officers are detailed for shore duty beyond seas they' shall receive the same pay and allowances as are or may be provided by or in pursuance of law for officers of the Army detailed for duty in similar places:
Provided further, That naval chaplains who do not possess relative rank shall have the rank of lieutenant in the Navy; and that all officers, including warrant officers, who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing their pay, with five years’ service. And all provisions of law authorizing the distribution among captors of the whole or any7 portion of the proceeds of vessels, or any property hereafter captured, condemned as prize, or providing for the payment of bounty for the sinking or destruction of vessels of the enemy hereafter occurring in time of war, are hereby7 repealed: And provided further, That no provision of this act shall operate to reduce the present pay' of any commissioned officer now in the Navy; and in any7 case in which the pay of such an officer would otherwise be reduced he shall continue to receive pay7 according to existing law: And provided further, That nothing in this act shall operate to increase or reduce the pay of any officer now on the retired list of the Navy. ”

That section, as its title indicates, is a part of the “act to reorganize and increase the efficiency of the personnel of the Navy7 .and Marine Corps of the United States.”

The question is, Does the language of the third proviso operate retroactively7, or is it limited in its scope to those officers only whose pay would thereby7 be increased after June 30, 1899, as was held by7 the Assistant Comptroller?

The first two provisos clearly7 apply7 to the class of officers described in the purview or body7 of the section — i. e., to “commissioned officers of .the line of the Navy and of the Medical and Pay7 Corps;” but it will be noted that the third proviso, though it contains the words- “provided further,” refers to an entirely different class of officers — i. e., warrant officers (who in express terms are excepted from the purview or body7-of the section by7 the first proviso) and to “chaplains, who do not possess relative rank,” and for that reason are given “the rank of lieutenant in the Navy.”

The general rule of law, says Mr. Justice Story in the case of the United States v. Dickson (15 Pet., 141, 176), “which has always prevailed and become consecrated almost as a maxim in the interpretation of statutes, that where the enacting clause is general in its language and objects and a proviso is afterwards introduced, that proviso is construed strictly and takes no case out of‘the enacting clause which does not fall fairly within its terms. In short, a proviso carves special exceptions only out of the enacting clause; and those who set up any such exception must establish it as being within the words as well as within the reason thereof. ”

The language of the proviso, though in the nature of independent legislation, applying to a different class of officers who are paid upon a different basis, yet considering the whole section and the reason and purpose of the legislation, we think the Congress intended that the words “after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine ” should apply to all officers mentioned in the section. That fixes the beginning of their increased pay at the beginning of the fiscal year. '

But whether this latter be the correct construction is immaterial in this case, as the claimant was appointed from civil life in 1881, and if the proviso operates retroactively, so as to give him increased pay for services theretofore rendered, then it is immaterial whether his right became consummate upon the approval of the act or after June 30, 1899, for in either e^ent he would be entitled to recover.

Under Revised Statutes, section 1556, the pay of chaplains is fixed as follows:

“During the first five years after date of commission, when at sea, two thousand five hundred dollars; on shore duty, two thousand dollars; on leave, or waiting orders, one thousand six hundred dollars; after five years from such date, when at sea, two thousand eight hundred dollars; on shore duty, two thousand three hundred dollars; on leave, or waiting orders, one thousand nine hundred dollars.”

It will thus be seen that chaplains are entitled to but one lustrum of five years, after which their pajr is increased $300 per year for each class of service.

What did the Congress intend by the use of. the words “ officers who have been * * * appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited, for computing- their pay, with five years’ service? ”

That is to say, all officers “who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life” shall be placed on an equality in respect to pay after June 30, 1899, so that chaplains serving less than five years prior to that date were entitled to be credited with five years’ service, not for the purpose of giving them additional pay for services theretofore rendered, but as a basis upon which to compute their future pay.

It was the method adopted by Congress for increasing the pay of officers appointed to the Navy from civil life, and is, in legal effect, the same as though the act had provided in express terms that after June 30,1899, the annual pay of chaplains who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall be $2,800, etc.

With such a provision it could not be contended that the pay of those officers then receiving $2,800 per annum would be increased. Increase and equality in pay after June 30, 1899, is evidently what the Congress intended.

Retroactive laws are not looked upon with favor, and should not be applied unless the intent is expressed in such plain language as to admit of no other meaning. (Southerland on Statutory Construction, sec. 163 et seq.)

Even though the language used would seem upon other principles of interpretation to require a retroactive construction, yet in the absence of a clearly expressed intent to the contrary the presumption is against it. (Endlich on the Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 272 et seq.)

Assuming, as the claimant contends, that the language “ officers who have been * * * appointed ” shows an intent to include those who have reached their maximum pay, still the whole lang-uagó and purpose of the act must be construed together, and thus reading it we think it clear that what the Congress intended was that all officers who have been or may be appointed to the Navy from civil life shall, on the date of appointment, be credited with five years’ service, for the purpose of computing their pay, after June 30, 1899. The words “ for computing their pay ” limit the operation of the language to future pay, and while those theretofore appointed are entitled to be credited with five years’ service equally with those thereafter appointed, yet such credit can only be given, for the purpose of computing their pay, after Juno 30,1899. Hence, those on that date who were receiving their maximum pay will necessarily be excluded from its provisions.

Otherwise the act bestows upon them a gratuity. True, the Congress have the authority to enact such laws, but in doing so they must use language that will admit of no other meaning.

In the Hawkins Case (19 C. Cls. R., 611) all officers in the Navy, upon the passage of the act of March 3, 1883 (22 Stat. L., 172), became entitled to credit, as a basis for longevity pay, for any prior actual service rendered by them as officers or enlisted men in the Regular or Volunteer Army or Navy, or both, and to receive all the benefits thereof “in the same manner as if all said service had been continuous and in the Regular Navy in the lower grade having graduated pay. ” And while the last proviso prohibits additional pay to'them during the time of their service in the Volunteer Army or Navy, it does not for their service in the Regular Navy, i. e., for their service in the Volunteer Army or Navy they are entitled to be credited for such service as though it had been continuously rendered in the Regular Navy in the lowest grade having graduated pay; and this was the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Rockwell (120 U. S., 60, 62). Later, in the case of United States v. Foster (128 U. S., 435, 437), referring to the acts of 1882 and 1883, the court held, in substance, that those acts did not authorize a restatement of the pay accounts of such officers who served in the Regular or Volunteer Army or Navy so as to give them credit in the grade held by them prior to the passage of said acts, but that Congress only intended to give them credit in the grade held by them after those acts took effect for such prior service, counting the same as continuous in the Regular Navy. Thus will be seen a clear distinction between those acts and section 13 of the act in the present case, which merely authorizes a credit “for computing their pay, with five years’ service,” thus clearly implying that the credit to be given is for the basis of fixing their future pay.

It can not be claimed that the interpretation given to the language of the proviso will operate to discriminate against those officers long in the service any more than any act of Congress would increasing the pay of such officers and making the same pay applicable to those thereafter appointed.

The petition was dismissed.