Case ID: ny-super-ct_54/html/0545-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Per Curiam :", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DANIEL B. FAYERWEATHER, et al., Appellants, v. THE PHENIX INSURANCE CO., Respondent.
    
      Marine insurance—Negligence, not amounting to barratry, insurers not liable for—Fresumption of unseaworlhiness from sinking of vessel— Clause in policy subrogaling insurers to claim of assured against carriers, and clause in bill of lading giving carriers, in case of their liability, full benefit of insurance; assured in such case cannot recover against insurers for loss caused by carrier's negligence.
    
    Before Sedgwick, Cli. J., Freedman and O’Gorman, JJ.
    
      Decided May 2, 1887.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment entered in favor of defendants on a trial before the court without a jury, the court rendering the following opinion:
    Tritax, J.—“ The plaintiffs seek to recover for a loss that they sustained upon goods that had been insured by the defendant under a policy of marine insurance. The goods were on board a steamer at the time the loss occurred. The goods were insured against ‘ perils of the sea, barratry of the master and mariners, and all other perils, losses and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment or damage of the said goods and. merchandise or any part thereof.’ The evidence shows that the steamer sank through the negligence of one of the mariners.
    
      “ The negligence of the master or mariners was not one of the things insured against. Negligence is not barratry unless it be so gross as to amount to evidence of .fraud. Atkinson v. Great Western Insurance Co., 65 N. Y. 538. In this case, there is no evidence of gross negligence. There is nothing in the case which tends to show that the vessel was sunk through the willful or fraudulent act of the master or mariners, and it is settled that insurers are not responsible for the fault, negligence or misconduct of the master or mariners not' amounting to barratry. Grimm- v. Phenix Insurance Co., 13 Johns. 451.
    “ No presumption arises from the fact that the vessel sank that she was unseaworthy at the time of the commencement of the voyage, because she sank after the voyage had ended, and the cause of her sinking is explained and is shown to have been something outside of the condition of the vessel. In other words, the evidence shows a cause of loss that excludes an inference of unseaworthiness. Berwind v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 53 Super. Ct. 103.
    “ It was agreed in the policy of insurance that the assured would subrogate to the insurer all their claims against the transporters of said merchandise not exceeding the amount paid by said insurers. After making this agreement with the insurers, the plaintiffs contracted with the transporters— That in case of any loss, detriment or damage to be sustained by any of the property herein receipted for during the transportation whereby any legal liability or responsibility shall or may be incurred by the terms of this contract, the carrier shall have the full benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon, or on account of, said goods.’ The evidence shows that the goods were lost through the negligence of the transporters. This is enough to make them liable to the plaintiffs. And, therefore, by the above provision of the contract between the plaintiffs and the transporters, the transporters were entitled to the full benefit of this policy of insurance; but, by the very terms of the policy of insurance, it was agreed that the defendant, the insurer, should be subrogated to any claim that the plaintiffs might have against the transporters. But for this clause of the bill of lading, the defendant would have a right of action against the carrier for damages. This right of action does not depend upon the implied right of subrogation ; the contract which gives the defendants this right of action is express. It is an agreement between the plaintiff's and the defendant that the plaintiffs will assign to the defendant any cause of action that they may have against the carriers; but by the agreement above mentioned they have in effect released the carriers from any cause of action. If the plaintiffs should recover in this- suit compensation from the insurance company, the agreement in the bill of lading has made it impossible for plaintiffs to do what they agreed with the defendant they would do.
    “ The plaintiffs allege that they gave to the defendant due notice and proof of loss, as required by the policy of insurance. This allegation is denied by the defendant. There was no evidence given on the trial that would authorize me in finding that, as a matter of fact, the plaintiff did give to the defendant proof of loss; but there is evidence that would warrant me in finding, if such fact had been alleged in the complaint, that strict service of the proof of loss had been waived by the defendant. But, as this allegation of waiver was not made in the complaint, I make no finding in regard to it. It is well settled that a proof of loss is a condition precedent to maintaining the action, and that, if the plaintiff relies on a waiver of the proof of loss instead of upon the fact that proof of loss was made, such waiver must be alleged in the complaint and proved on the trial.”
    
      Stewart L. Woodford and William C. Wallace, for appellants.
    
      George A. Black, for respondent.
   Per Curiam :

“The judgment is affirmed, with costs, on the opinion of the learned trial judge.”