Case ID: dc_10/html/0011-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

THE WASHINGTON AND GEORGETOWN RAILROAD CO. v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
    At Law. —
    No. 14,510.
    The Board of Public Works had no authority to enter into a contract for paving a sidewalk oil one of the streets around the Capitol, which was provided for in sundry civil appropriation act of March 3, 1873, 17 Stats, at Large.
    STATEMENT 0E THE CASE AND DECISION.
    Demurrer to declaration.
    The facts alleged in the declaration are substantially these: On the 7th of November, 1878, the Board of Public Works issued a notice to the effect, that owners of property might receive permission to lay improvements in front of their property so far as inside walks, pai’king, and curbing were concerned, according to certain regulations that were prescribed in said notice. When the work was performed, certificates were to be issued for the amount due the person performing the work; which certificates were to be deducted from the assessment for street improvements on private property. Afterwards, on the 7th day of March, 1874, written orders were made by the board permitting the plaintiff to do the necessary parking on the north side of B street north, from First street west to New Jersey avenue, and also to grade and pave the footways along the same part of B street. Thereupon the plaintiff, about the 1st day of April, 1874, performed the labor and furnished the materials necessary, and graded and paved the footway of, and parked, the said portion of B street in a good, workmanlike manner. The work and materials were approved by the engineer of the board, and was thereby accepted by the District of Columbia, and has ever since been used as a public thoroughfare, and the labor and materials were reasonably worth the sum of $2,269.95, one-third of which sum was, according to law, assessable against the plaintiff, as the owner of the adjoining property, leaving a balance due the plaintiff from the defendant of $1,513.30.
    The defendant demurred, on the ground that the action alleged to have been taken by the Board of Public Works did not constitute a valid contract binding upon the District. The following matters of public law are here referred to as included in the issue. The thirty-seventh section of the act of Congress of Fetuuary 21,1871, requires that all contracts made by the board shall be in writing and signed by the parties making the same, and that the board shall have no power to make contracts to bind the District to the payment of any sums of money except in pursuance to appropriations made by la-w, and not until such appropriation shall have been made. The act of Congress of May 8, 1872, (17 Statutes at Large, section 6,) enlarged the public grounds around the Capitol by extension between First street east and First street west northwardly to the south side of North B street and southwardly to the north side of South B street.
    The sundry civil appropriation act of 3d March, 1873, (17 Statutes at Large, 519,) appropriated “ for grading and paving the streets and footways around the Capitol, and running from Pennsylvania avenue to B streets north and south, to the line of the east front of the Capitol, and for improving the grounds within that area, one hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars: Provided, That in the improvements of streets about the Capitol the Secretary of the Interior shall assess and collect the cost of all improvements made in front of all private property in the same proportion as charged by the District authorities for similar improvements.”
    The above act by its terms covers the streets and footways around the Capitol grounds, and, it is contended by the defendant, includes the streets and sidewalks where the parking and paving was performed by the plaintiff.
    The cause upon demurrer was certified to be heard at the general term in the first instance. The court sustained the demurrer, holding that the law above cited provided that the streets where the plaintiff sues for laying a sidewalk and pai’king were to be improved by the United States, and that the Board of Public Works had no authority for charging any portion of the expense to the District of Columbia, or to assess any portion of it on private property; that this power is placed in express terms by the act in the Secretary of the Interior, and not in the Board of Public Works.
    Demurrer sustained.
    
      Enoch Totten, for plaintiff.
    
      E. L. Stanton, attorney for District of Columbia.
   An amended declaration was afterwards filed in this cause by permission of the court, and it appearing thereby that B street was not within the public grounds surrounding the Capitol, the plaintiff’s right to recover was sustained.