Case ID: scl_23/html/0220-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Curia, per O’Neall, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State vs. John J. Singletary, Rebecca Rhame, and others.
    A bequest of slaves to a trustee, in trust that he would permit them to be freo, is void as to the trust, and vests the right or property in the trustee as a valid legacy to himself. But if he abandon his right of property and attempt to execute the trust, they may be seized under the Act of 1800, as illegally emancipated.
    BEFORE RICHARDS ON, J., AT CHARLESTON, JANUARY, 1838.
    The defendants were indicted for a riot, committed, as alleged, in taking possession, in a tumultuous manner, of the negroes, &c., of one John K. Dangerfield, under a pretence of a lawful authority to seize them as slaves illegally emancipated.
    
      Dangerfield claimed a right of property in them by virtue of tbe last will and testament of one -Broad, wbo bequeathed the negroes to him in trust that he would permit them to be free. To this will Dangerfield qualified as executor. He kept the negroes on a plantation, which was also given him by the will of Broad, for their support, and made crops with them for that purpose: if the proceeds exceeded the current expenses, he appropriated the excess to his own use. He also hired out some of the negroes. The first year after the testator’s death, Dangerfield paid taxes for them as belonging to the estate of Broad, and tried to carry the will into effect; but the second year he treated the negroes as his own.
    On the 31st of December, 1837, having heard of some disturbance at the plantation, Dangerfield went there, and found the defendants, John J. Singletary, Rebecca Rhame, and Mr. and Mrs. Dehay. Singletary told him that he had taken possession of the negroes, and had authority from the clerk of the Court to do so; threatened to tie one of the negroes, and that he would shoot Dangerfield if he attempted violence upon him; took a negro by the collar whom Dangerfield wished to send for assistance. The party had come there in a wagon belonging to Dehay, and brought with them a negro man and some ropes. Mrs. Rhame said the negroes should be carried away, and that Singletary acted for her. Dehay said nothing — Mrs. Dehay regretted that she was present. Singletary had with him the Act of 1800, and read from it; he signified that he intended to set the negroes free before the clerk; he also exhibited a power of attorney from Mrs. Rhame, who said she had possession and intended to keep it. One Eerguson, for whom Dangerfield in the meantime had sent, advised him to order Singletary out of the yard, and if he did not go, to compel him; upon this, the defendants went away. These were the material facts-
    His Honor, the presiding' Judge, instructed the jury, that the violence and the tumultuous manner of the seizure of the negroes by the defendants, were matters entirely for their consideration: as was also the question whether there was any concert between them to assist in the seizure. He also charged, that by the will of Broad the negroes became the property of Dangerfield — that the condition or trust of keeping them as free, was void, and the legacy to Dangerfield valid; tbat be bad all the rights of an owner, and could use them as be chose. Tbat as long as Dangerfield bad not attempted to emancipate and abandon them, (of which facts the jury were to judge,) no person was authorized to seize them under the Act of 1800; tbat so much of the will of Broad as directed the negroes to be kept or set free, being void in law, could only operate as a recommendation to Dangerfield. But it might indicate the meaning of bis conduct; and if the jury thought be bad abandoned bis property in them, or bad assented to Broad’s testamentary condition tbat the negroes should be free; then (such acts being of bis own choosing) the negroes might be seized under the Act of 1800, as abandoned or illegally emancipated. He thought, however, tbat the evidence would scarcely warrant the conclusion tbat Dangerfield bad so divested himself of bis property in them.
    The jury found the defendants guilty.
    In appealing, they urged that bis Honor erred in bis charge to the jury on the law, in this; that he stated that since the Act of 1800, all emancipation was illegal, and that the effect of that law was simply to render all deeds and wills void, which purported to emancipate; and so Dangerfield, as executor and legatee, took the negroes as bis property, and the condition being void they were bis, and be might work them more or less, as be pleased, which is tantamount to saying be could carry the trusts of the will into effect, without rendering the negroes liable to the Act of 1800.
    Also in this, that the Act of 1820 would be inoperative, unless such a construction was given.
    That the Judge charged the jury, that the qualifying under the will, returning the property as Broad’s, and actually suffering the negroes, fifteen in number, to reside on Broad’s land, and maintain themselves, was not such an assent to the legacy of freedom, as to subject the negroes to the Act of 1800.
    Whereas, the defendants contend that the will is an attempt to confer freedom substantially on slaves, contrary to law, and the gift to an executor for that purpose only, is an evasion of the law. That as Dangerfield qualified and swore to carry the will into effect, and did not act in contravention of - the will, and declared on the stand that all be bad done was to give effect to the will, the slaves were liable to be seized.
    The defendants moved for a new trial, on that ground, and also, because there was no sufficient proof of any concert to do an unlawful act by violence, or to commit a breach of the peace, and none was committed, except by the prosecutors; not one feature of a riot was made out against the defendants.
    
      B. F. Hunt and O. M. Smith, for appellants.
    Bailey, Attorney-general, contra.
   Curia, per O’Neall, J.

This Court is satisfied with the instructions of the presiding Judge to the jury. Their verdict upon the facts cannot be disturbed.

The motion is dismissed.