Case ID: us-ct-cl_25/html/0021-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Scoeield, J.,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

JOHN W. KIMBROUGH v. THE UNITED STATES.
    [Congressional 310.
    Decided December 2, 1889.]
    
      On the Proofs.
    
    In 1863 a claim filed with the Quartermaster-General is returned without action to the claimant, who then files it with the Third Auditor. It is not filed again under the Act 4th July, 1864.
    A claim for stores and supplies for the use of the Army is barred by the Act 3d March, 1879, (20 Stat. L., p. 650) if dismissed by the Quartermaster-General in 1863 and not again presented under the Act 4th July, 1864.
    
      The Reporters’ statement of the case:
    The following are the facts of this case as found by the court:
    The claim in this case for supplies, or stores, alleged to have been taken by or furnished to the military forces of the United States for their use during the late war for the suppression of the rebellion, was transmitted to the court by the Committee on War Claims of the House of Representatives on the 18th -day of February, 1885.
    The case was brought to a hearing on its merits on the 19th day of November, 1889. The claimant, in his petition, makes the following allegations:
    
      “ That the United States forces by proper authority, July 17, 1863, took from said Thomas Y. Stirman certain quartermaster stores, consisting of horses, harness, saddles, and bridles, which he was using at the time in his livery stable, the value of which amounted to the sum of $978, and appropriated the «ame to the use of the United States army at Cynthiana, Ky., and were in detail as follows: 11 head of horses, which were of the reasonable value of $910; one double set of harness, valued at $20; four saddles, valued at $40; eight bridles,, valued at $8.
    
      “ Your petitioner further states that the claim of said deceased for compensation for said stores and supplies was presented to the Quartermaster-General of the United States,, who referred the claim for settlement to the Third Auditor of the Treasury under the act of March 3,1849, but that officer disallowed the claim on the ground he had no jurisdiction to examine the claim of a citizen and not a soldier under said act.”
    Upon the trial the counsel for the defendants raised the-question of jurisdiction under section 3 of the Bowman act, and asked that the case might be dismissed.
    The court, after considering the briefs and arguments of counsel on both sides upon the question of jurisdiction, found the facts bearing upon the question to be as follows :
    This claim was filed with the Quartermaster-General October 30,1863, by O. W. Bennett, attorney for the claimant; November 5,1863, it was returned to Mr. Bennett without action. Thereafter, on November 10, 1863, it was filed with the Third Auditor of the Treasury by said Bennett. The Auditor examined the case and decided that it did not come “ within the provisions of the act of March 3,1849, as it does not appear that said property was seized by the order of any Army officer or agent of the United States. The men who made the seizure were not impressing, but pillaging, and are liable to be punished therefor.”
    Of this decision the attorney for the claimant (Mr. Bennett) was informed by letter dated December 28,1864. The claim, was never again presented to the Quartermaster-General,
    
      Mr. T. W. Tallmadge for the claimant.
    
      Mr. Lewis Cochran and Mr. W. J. Bannells (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney■ General Cotton) for the defendants.
   Scoeield, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim was transmitted to the Court of Claims February 18, 1885, under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1883, known as the Bowman Act (22 Stat. L., 485), by the Committee on War Claims of the House of Representatives.

By the first section of that act any committee of the Senate or House is authorized to transmitió this court any claim pending before it ; but, by the third section, the court is forbidden to take jurisdiction of any claim “ which is now (March 3,1883) barred by virtue of the provisions of any law of the United States.”

In this way it becomes the duty of the court to determine whether any case thus referred was, at the date of the act, barred by any law of the United States.

By section 2 of the act of July 4,1864 (13 Stat., 381), the Quartermaster-General was authorized to receive and examine claims of this description,, and if convinced that they were just, the claimants loyal, and the stores taken for and used by the Army, to report them to the Third Auditor for settlement.

By the Act of March 3,. 1879 (1 Sup. to Rev. Stat., 481, and 20 Stat. L., 650), it is provided:

“That all claims not presented and filed under said act [referring to act of July 4, 1864] and the acts amendatory thereof, prior to the 1st day of January, 1880, shall be forever barred.”

This claim was presented to the Quartermaster-General by O. W. Bennett, attorney for the claimant, October 30, 1863. On November 5,1863, it was returned to Mr. Bennett without action, and was never again filed with that officer.

November 10, 1863, Mr. Bennett filed the claim with the Third Auditor. That officer examined it, and on December 28, 1864, informed Mr. Bennett, by letter, that the claim did not come “ within the provisions of the act of March 3,1849, as it does not appear that said property was seized by the order of any Army officer or agent of the United States. The men who made the seizure were not impressing, but pillaging, and are liable to be punished therefor.”

These facts do not, in the opinion of the court, show that the claim was presented and filed with the Quartermaster-General under the act of July 4,1864. When it was presented, in 1863, that officer had no jurisdiction, and so returned it to the claimant’s attorney. After the act of 1864 the claimant had more than fifteen years in which to present his claim. Not having done so within that time, his claim is “ forever barred,” and the court must dismiss his petition.