Case ID: f-appx_15/html/0180-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 00-4810.
    United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
    Submitted July 26, 2001.
    Decided Aug. 16, 2001.
    
      J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, SC, for appellant. Scott N. Schools, United States Attorney, Mary Gordon Baker, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, SC, for appellee.
    Before TRAXLER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
   OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Eric L. Brown pled guilty to two counts of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (West 2000), and one count of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), and was sentenced to a term of forty-six months imprisonment. Brown appeals his sentence, alleging that the district court erred in finding that a five-level enhancement for distribution applied under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2G2.2(b)(2) (1998). He also contends that the district court erred in finding that the enhancement need not be based on facts charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

Brown traded approximately thirty images of child pornography over the internet with a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In his interview with the probation officer, Brown admitted that he had traded images of child pornography with people who had the same interest, but he opposed the enhancement for distribution under USSG § 2G2.2(b)(2), arguing that it should not be applied because he had not distributed the images for pecuniary gain or in a “quid pro quo” manner.

Application Note 1 to § 2G2.2 provides that, for purposes of sentencing under that guideline, “ ‘[distribution’ in-eludes any act related to distribution for pecuniary gain, including production, transportation, and possession with intent to distribute.” USSG § 2G2.2, cmt. n. 1 (1998). We have held that the enhancement applies to distributions that are not made solely for pecuniary gain, as have the majority of circuits that have considered the issue. United States v. Williams, 253 F.3d 789, 792-795 (4th Cir.2001). There was information before the sentencing court that Brown had distributed child pornography to an informant, and that after his guilty plea Brown acknowledged receiving images of child pornography and saving the pictures to send to other people. Despite Brown’s disclaimer, the court could infer that Brown distributed the images in the expectation that he would receive similar images in return. Such a transaction is a distribution for pecuniary gain. Williams, 253 F.3d at 795.

Brown further contends that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the enhancement violated his due process rights because distribution was not charged in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. His argument is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Kinter, 235 F.3d 192, 199-201 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 1393, 149 L.Ed.2d 316 (2001) (holding that Apprendi does not affect a judge’s application of the guidelines when the enhancement does not increase the statutory range).

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.