Case ID: so2d_493/html/0528-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "BARFIELD, Judge. NIMMONS, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

CAROL ENTERPRISES and Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Lonnie HELMS, Appellee.
    No. BG-106.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
    Sept. 3, 1986.
    
      James T. Walker, of Brennan, Hayskar, Jefferson & Gorman, Fort Pierce, for appellants.
    Richard A. Kupfer, of Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth & Romano, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
   BARFIELD, Judge.

The employer/carrier appeal the deputy commissioner’s order approving a $52,000 advance of permanent total disability benefits to claimant. We reverse the deputy’s order and remand for further proceedings.

The order provides in pertinent part

... it is ordered that the employer, through its carrier, pay the claimant an advance in the amount of $52,000; ...

This order for disbursement is preceded by the following paragraph:

Payment of this advance to the claimant will be contingent upon appointment of a trustee in the Charlotte, North Carolina, area acceptable to the undersigned Deputy Commissioner. This trustee will be charged with the responsibility to insure that the claimant timely completes the requirements to function as a general contractor in North Carolina as well as insuring that the claimant will obtain whatever help may be available in that area from such as the Small Business Administration or SCORE that assists small businesses. The trustee will also be charged with the responsibility of insuring that the proceeds of the $52,000 are used only for payment of legitimate family expenses or legitimate furtheranc-es of the claimant’s business.

While we may not have authorized a lump-sum advance of permanent disability payments in this case, we cannot say the deputy commissioner abused her discretion in authorizing the advance and in recognizing the need for placing controls over the money. What concerns us is the apparent attempt of the deputy commissioner to establish a trust. The deputy commissioner does not have the authority to establish a trust. It is not the use of a trust which we reject but the deputy’s attempt to direct the creation of the trust.

Having determined that a lump-sum advance is appropriate but should not be made without restraints, the deputy commissioner should have required the claimant to come forward with proof of an appropriate vehicle for the administration of the money consistent with the purposes for its authorization contained in the order. In other words, it was the claimant’s burden to present to the deputy a proposed trust instrument inclusive of the identification and qualifications of the trustee for approval or rejection by the deputy commissioner.

This case is REVERSED and REMANDED to the deputy commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ZEHMER, J., concurs.

NIMMONS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

NIMMONS, Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur with the majority’s reversal of the subject order. However, my problem with the deputy’s order requiring the employer/carrier to pay the $52,000 lump-sum advancement is not limited to the technical shortcomings in the deputy’s effort to establish a trust apparatus governing the expenditure of the subject funds. Rather, I would hold that there was insufficient evidence supporting an order directing payment — whether directly to the claimant, or through a vehicle such as a trust, or otherwise — of such an advancement. More specifically, there is not competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the payment of benefits via a lump-sum advancement is in the claimant’s best interest, a prerequisite under Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975), the statute applicable in the instant case.

The deputy found that the claimant continued to suffer from alcohol problems and that his abuse of alcohol had plagued him for a period of seven years commencing some time after the subject 1976 industrial accident. The claimant had experienced three periods of treatment in alcohol abuse centers and a visit to a detoxification center.

The claimant sought the partial advancement of permanent total disability benefits so that he could establish himself in the construction business as a general contractor. He had never operated a general contracting business. He testified to vague notions of what it would take to become a licensed and bonded general contractor. The claimant’s training and background for the successful operation of a general contracting construction business are somewhat sparse.

Since his accident, the claimant has not demonstrated any reasonable business acumen or ability to manage money. After receiving $168,000 in a third party action against the tortfeasor responsible for his injuries, such funds were admittedly soon dissipated through imprudent spending.

When the claimant expressed a desire to enter the taxidermy field, the employer/carrier advanced approximately $4,000 to put him through taxidermy school in Wisconsin. However, he failed to pursue taxidermy after his training.

In addition to his other problems, the claimant is heavily indebted, including, among other indebtedness, $12,000 owed to pawnshops.

In spite of the claimant’s apparently sincere expressions of his desire to establish his own general contracting business, I am unable to agree that there is competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the proposed business venture was reasonably likely to succeed and thus in his best interests within the meaning of Section 440.20(10), Florida Statutes (1975). I would therefore reverse outright the deputy’s order. 
      
      . I do not take issue with the majority’s tacit finding that the deputy’s order did not run afoul of the requirement that an advancement must not materially prejudice the rights of the employer/carrier. See Court of Flags v. Outland, 382 So.2d 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). The employer/carrier failed to offer any evidence of prejudice which would be occasioned to it by such advancement.