Case ID: f-appx_498/html/0075-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

ZHEN-YANG HUANG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
    No. 11-278.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    Sept. 27, 2012.
    
      Eric Y. Zheng, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Judith R. O’Sullivan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, SUSAN L. CARNEY, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Zhen-Yang Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the January 4, 2011, order of the BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Zhen-Yang Huang, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Jan. 4, 2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

The BIA’s denial of Huang’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Huang’s 2010 motion was untimely because the final administrative order was issued in 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, Huang failed to establish a material change in country conditions.

Huang argues that he will be subject to the Chinese government’s human rights abuses against Christians who attend unregistered churches because of his 2010 conversion to Christianity and his assertion that he would attend an unregistered church if he were removed to China. Huang alleges that such abuses have increased since his 2003 merits hearing. However, the evidence did not show that there is a reasonable possibility that, out of the 40 to 60 million members of unregistered churches in China, the Chinese government would likely become aware that he also is a member. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam).

Because the evidence Huang submitted was insufficient to establish a change in country conditions material to Huang, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to show a ground for an exception to the filing deadline, and in consequently denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).