Case ID: f-appx_406/html/0121-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jeffrey Michael WILSON, aka Jeff Wilson, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-50648.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted Dec. 9, 2010.
    
    Filed Dec. 14, 2010.
    Stephanie Christensen, Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Neha Mehta, Carlton Gunn, Esquire, Federal Public Defender, FPDCA-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Before: PREGERSON and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and HOLLAND, Senior District Judge.
    
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
    
      
       The Honorable H. Russel Holland, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jeffrey Michael Wilson (“Wilson”) entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Wilson contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress evidence.

“We review for an abuse of discretion a [district] court’s decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress.” United States v. Quoc Viet Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir.2000)).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing because Wilson failed to identify any “significant disputed factual issue” in his motion to suppress. See Howell, 231 F.3d at 621. Even though there was a factual dispute regarding the scope of Officer Vetere’s patdown, the district court correctly concluded that this factual dispute was immaterial.

Assuming that Officer Vetere’s patdown of Wilson exceeded its permissible scope, Officer Vetere’s subsequent act of looking in the rear passenger window was not “fruit of the poisonous tree” because there was sufficient evidence to justify the search of Wilson’s truck independent of any initial illegality. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); see also United States v. Miller, 812 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (9th Cir.1987).

Officer Vetere’s search of Wilson’s truck was conducted based on lawfully obtained probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a crime. Id. at 1208 (“Historically, individuals always [have] been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection afforded by a magistrate’s prior evaluation of those facts.”). Officer Vetere searched Wilson’s car because (1) Wilson appeared “agitated and nervous”; (2) Wilson produced no identification; (3) Officer Vetere looked through the rear passenger’s side window of Wilson’s truck and saw in plain view the butt end of what he believed to be a rifle, partially concealed by a T-shirt and towel; and (4) when asked, Wilson admitted to having a gun in his truck. None of these facts were discovered through a violation of Wilson’s constitutional rights. Together, these facts were sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Wilson’s truck contained evidence that Wilson was violating CaLPenal Code § 12025, which prohibits concealing a firearm within a vehicle, and CaLPenal Code § 12031, which prohibits “carrying a loaded firearm ... in a vehicle[.]” Officer Vetere thus had probable cause to search Wilson’s truck under the automobile exception.

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing. The district court did not abuse its discretion because Wilson failed to identify any “significant disputed factual issue” in his motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.