Case ID: so2d_621/html/0689-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. COWART, Judge, Retired, PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant, v. James A. FOWLER, as Trustee, Appellee.
    No. 91-1426.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    April 16, 1993.
    Order Granting Rehearing to Certify Conflict Aug. 6, 1993.
    Thornton J. Williams, Gen. Counsel, and Thomas F. Capshew, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida Dept, of Transp., Tallahassee, for appellant.
    Jay W. Small of Brigham, Moore, Gay-lord, Wilson, Ulmer, Schuster & Sachs, Orlando, and Alan E. DeSerio of Brigham, Moore, Gaylord, Wilson, Ulmer, Schuster & Sachs, Tampa, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment based on this court’s en banc opinion in Department of Transportation v. Weisenfeld, 617 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), and remand for further proceedings consistent with that opinion.

HARRIS and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.

COWART, Judge, Retired, dissents with opinion.

COWART, Judge, Retired,

dissenting.

We should affirm the trial court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment that, as a matter of law, a temporary taking of the appellee landowner’s property occurred between December 21, 1988, when appellant, Department of Transportation (DOT), a state agency with the power of eminent domain, recorded in the public records of the county in which the landowners land lies, a “map of reservation” [per § 337.-241(2) and (3), Fla.Stat. (1987)] which encompassed some lands owned by appellee, and May 31, 1990, when appellant DOT recorded a withdrawal of the “map of reservation”.

The Florida Supreme Court declared the statutory provisions for filing moratoriums creating “maps of reservations” unconstitutional for the very reason that the result of such action is in the nature of a lis pendens, clouding and rendering title to property unmarketable, taking from the affected landowners without compensation, a valuable attribute, and right, of private property, to-wit: the right, at will, to freely sell and transfer the title to such property.

The landowner’s motion for attorney’s fees should be granted and that matter reserved for the trial court to determine the amount of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs to which the landowner is entitled to reimbursement under section 73.131(2), Florida Statutes, or other authority. See County of Volusia v. Pickens, 435 So.2d 247 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), rev. denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983) and Orlando/Orange County v. W. & F. Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd., 582 So.2d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 591 So.2d 183 (Fla.1991).

Neither the trial court ruling nor the appeal in any way involves the amount of compensation to which the appellee landowner may be entitled as a result of the action by the DOT.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

We grant appellee’s Motion for Rehearing to expressly certify, as we did in Department of Transportation v. Weisenfeld, 617 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), that our decision herein is in conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

HARRIS, C.J., GRIFFIN, J., and COWART, J.A., Senior Judge, concur. 
      
      . Joint Ventures v. Department of Transportation, 563 So.2d 622 (Fla.1990).