Case ID: so2d_609/html/0104-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Marie Yvana LOUIS and Eddy Andre, Appellants, v. FORTUNE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
    No. 92-738.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
    Nov. 24, 1992.
    Donnise A. DeSouza, Hollywood, for appellants.
    Diane H. Tutt, Ft. Lauderdale, for appel-lee.
    Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BARKDULL and HUBBART, JJ.
   PER CURIAM.

We reverse the summary judgment for the insurance carrier, notwithstanding a settlement by the insured with a third party tortfeasor. There are triable issues of material fact in regard to the components of the negotiations resulting in the settlement, and also a doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the threshold for recovery. Parker v. Bryce, 96 So.2d 154 (Fla.1957); Correia v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, 393 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Ritchey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 361 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).

The cause is remanded to the trial court for a trial on all the issues.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

BARKDULL and HUBBART, JJ, concur.

SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge

(dissenting in part).

Although I agree that the summary judgment for the carrier must be reversed and that the threshold issue requires a trial, I think that judgment should be entered for the claimants on the settlement question. On that point, Fortune argues only that it was relieved of liability for the medical bills under its coverage merely because the insureds paid those expenses from the proceeds of their third party settlement. Of course, there is absolutely nothing to this contention as a matter of law.