Case ID: mass_16/html/0033-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      By the Court.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

* Aaron Colman versus Barnabas Packard.
    The condition of a mortgage deed was, among other things that the mortgagor should support the mortgagee and his wife during then- lives ; and there was no covenant that the mortgagor should remain in possession, until a breach of the condition. It was holden that the mortgagee was entitled to possessk c ; although the mortgagor offered to prove, by paroi evidence, that it was agreed, at the time of malting the mortgage, that he should continue in possession untL he should fail to perform the condition ; and that he had not so failed.
    This was a writ of entry, in which the demandant counts generally on his own seisin within thirty years, and upon a disseisin by the tenant.
    At the trial before Wilde, J., September term, 1817, at Augusta, the demandant relied upon a deed of the tenant, conveying the demanded premises to him in fee, with condition to be void, if the tenant should support and maintain the demandant and his wife during their lives ; and build a house, &c. on another parcel of land for one of the demandant’s sons. The tenant produced a deed from the demandant, conveying the same premises to him in fee, of the same date with the other; but it was not proved that it was executed after the mortgage. The tenant also offered to prove by paroi evidence, that he had not failed to perform the condition of the mortgage ; and that it was agreed by the parties, at the time of the execution of the mortgage deed, that the mortgagor should continue in possession of the mortgaged premises, until he should fail to perform the condition. All which paroi evidence the judge thought inadmissible, and it was accordingly rejected. If the Court should be of opinion that the evidence ought to have been received, or that, upon a fair construction of the mortgage, the tenant was entitled to retain possession of the demanded premises, the verdict for the demandant w7as to be set aside, and a new trial granted.
    
      Mellen and Boutelle, for the demandant.
    
      Rice and Orr, for the tenant.
   By the Court.

The demandant, as mortgagee, has lawful right to the possession of the demanded premises. There can be no doubt that the parties intended that the mortgagor should remain in possession, until there was a breach of the condition of the deed. But by the principles of the common law, as well as our own statutes relating to the conveyance of real estate, agreements to that effect must be in writing, to be obligatory. It is time it was * known [ * 40 J that contracts like this, where one party conveys his estate to another, in consideration of a support to be furnished by the purchaser, and the latter mortgages the estate for security, will not answer the intended purposes, without a covenant that the mortgagor shall remain in possession. How the parties in this case will adjust the claims of the mortgagee for the stipulated support, when he has obtained possession of the estate but of which it was probably to be afforded, it is difficult to "tell. We, however, cannot make law to suit particular contracts. It has long been settled and well known; that a mortgagee has a right to immediate possession of the mortgaged premises; and yet parties still go on, making mortgages without any covenant respecting the possession, although it is intended that the mortgagor shall remain in possession, until the condition is broken. This is always provided for in England, by covenants in the deed; and the remedy is so simple, that it is surprising it has not been adopted here .

Judgment on the verdict. 
      
       [Vide Jackson, ex dem. Van Allen, vs. Florence, 16 Johns. R. 47. —Jackson vs. Alexander, 3 Johns. 492. —Jackson vs. Delancey, 4 Cowen, 430. —Jackson vs. Pike, 9 Cowen, 69. —Ed.]