Case ID: sw2d_628/html/0406-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. FLANIGAN, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

David Ray STUCKEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sam STUCKEY, Defendant-Respondent.
    No. 12554.
    Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division Three.
    Jan. 29, 1982.
    John P. Heisserer, Thomas L. Arnold, P. C., Benton, for plaintiff-appellant.
    David E. Blanton, Blanton, Rice, Sickal, Gilmore & Winchester, Sikeston, for defendant-respondent.
   PER CURIAM.

Defendant filed a motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s case in this personal injury action. The court sustained the motion and made a docket entry to that effect. The record reflects the entry of no judgment for defendant consistent with the bare docket entry ruling the motion. Such recital does not constitute a final judgment nor an otherwise appealable order. § 512.-020, RSMo 1978; Herndon v. Ford, 470 S.W.2d 168 (Mo.App.1971). The prematurity of this appeal goes to appellate jurisdiction which this court has a duty to ascertain sua sponte. City of Sikeston v. Missouri Utilities Co., 526 S.W.2d 401 (Mo.App.1975).

The appeal is dismissed.

FLANIGAN, Judge,

dissenting.

For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in Gothard v. Spradling, 561 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Mo.App.1978) I respectfully dissent.