Case ID: nc_234/html/0259-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "JOHNSON, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

STATE v. BILL GIBBS.
    (Filed 10 October, 1951.)
    1. Public Lands § 1—
    The word “reservation” as descriptive of land has the definite and specific meaning of public land reserved for some special use, such as parks, forests, Indian lands, etc.
    2. Hunting and Fishing § 1—
    An indictment charging that defendant entered and hunted upon property leased by a gun club without written permission from the owner or lessee in violation of Chap. 539, Public-Local Laws 1933, does not charge the offense defined by the statute, since the statute refers to hunting and fishing on “reservations” without written permission from the owner, and the indictment is properly quashed upon motion.
    3. Indictment and Warrant § 9—
    An indictment for a statutory offense must contain averments of all essential elements of the crime created by the statute, and merely charging a breach of the statute in general terms and referring to it in the indictment is not sufficient.
    4. Same—
    The statutory directive that an indictment shall not be quashed for informality or refinement does not dispense with the requirement that each essential element of the offense must be charged. G.S. 15-153.
    5. Indictment and Warrant § 17—
    A bill of particulars is for the purpose of providing information not required to be set out in the indictment, and can never supply matter required to be charged as an essential ingredient of the offense. G.S. 15-143.
    Appeal by State of North. Carolina from Bobbitt, J., at Regular August Term, 1951, of YaNcey.
    Affirmed.
    Criminal accusation under bill of indictment in the Superior Court of Yancey County charging that the defendant “. . . did enter upon and hunt and trespass on the property leased by Yancey Rod and Gun Club without written permission from the owner or Lessee, in violation of Public-Local Laws, 1933, Chapter 539.”
    Chapter 539 of the Public-Local Laws of 1933 is entitled “An act to protect hunting and fishing, and timber reservations in Yancey County,” and provides:
    “Section 1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to enter upon any hunting and fishing or timber reservations in Yancey County, without a written permission from the owner, and any person violating the provisions of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not less than twenty-five dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the discretion of the court.”
    Upon the call of the case and before plea, the defendant moved the court to quash the bill of indictment for that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a violation of Chapter 539, Public-Local Laws of 1933, and for that the act is unconstitutional.
    The court was of the opinion that the bill of indictment does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a criminal offense under Chapter 539 of the Public-Local Laws of 1933, and for that reason, and on that ground alone, allowed the defendant’s motion to quash the bill, - and judgment was entered accordingly, from which the State appealed.
    
      Attorney-General McMullan, Assistant Attorney-General Moody, and Charles G. Powell, Jr., Member of Staff, for the State, appellant.
    
    
      W. E. Anglin and Garrett D. Bailey fox defendant, appellee.
    
   JOHNSON, J.

The purpose of Chapter 539 of Public-Local Laws of 1933, as shown by its title, is to protect hunting and fishing and timber reservations in Yancey County, and the Act provides: “that it shall be unlawful for any person to enter upon any hunting and fishing or timber reservation in Yancey County, without a written permission from the owner . . .”

The properties protected by the Act are “reservations.” The word reservation as applied to a description of land has a definite, specific meaning. It is defined in Webster as “a tract of public land reserved for some special use, as for schools, for forests, for the use of the Indians, etc.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 2d Ed., p. 1026, “In public land laws of the United States, a reservation is a tract of land, more or less considerable in extent, which is by public authority withdrawn from sale or settlement, and appropriated to specific public uses; such as parks, military posts, Indian lands, etc.”

The essential elements of the crime created by the Public-Local Act under which the bill of indictment was drawn are (1) entry (2) upon a hunting and fishing or timber reservation in Yancey County (3) without a written permission from the owner.

The bill of indictment does not charge that the defendant entered upon any hunting and fishing or timber reservation. This omission renders the bill fatally defective. S. v. Miller, 231 N.C. 419, 57 S.E. 2d 392; S. v. Morgan, 226 N.C. 414, 38 S.E. 2d 166; S. v. Jachson, 218 N.C. 373, 11 S.E. 2d 149; S. v. Ballangee, 191 N.C. 700, 132 S.E. 795.

Decision here would seem to be controlled by the rule stated in S. v. Morgan, supra (226 N.C. 414, p. 415) : “It is a universal rule that no indictment, whether at common law or under a statute, can be good if it does not accurately and clearly allege all tbe constituent elements of tbe offense charged.”

Also in point is tbe following observation of Adams, J., in S. v. Ballangee, supra (191 N.C. 700, pp. 701 and 702) : “Tbe breach of a statutory offense must be so laid in tbe indictment as to bring tbe case within tbe description given in tbe statute and inform tbe accused of tbe elements of tbe offense. . . . Merely charging in general terms a breach of tbe statute and referring to it in the indictment is not sufficient.”

“Tbe bill need not be in tbe exact language of tbe statute, but it must contain averments of all tbe essential elements of tbe crime created by tbe act.” S. v. Miller, supra (231 N.C. 419, p. 420).

In S. v. Jackson, supra (218 N.C. 373), Justice Barnhill succinctly states tbe formula this way: “An indictment for an offense created by statute must be framed upon tbe statute, and this fact must distinctly appear upon tbe face of the indictment itself; and in order that it shall so appear, tbe bill must either charge tbe offense in tbe language of tbe act, or specifically set forth tbe facts constituting tbe same. . . . 'Where tbe words of a statute are descriptive of tbe offense, an indictment should follow tbe language and expressly charge tbe described offense on tbe defendant so as to bring it within all tbe material words of tbe statute. Nothing can be taken by intendment. . . .’ ”

In tbe light of tbe foregoing authorities, it is manifest that tbe court below properly quashed tbe bill of indictment. Tbe decisions cited by tbe State seem to be distinguishable.

We have not overlooked G.S. 15-153, which provides that an indictment shall not be quashed by reason of a mere “informality or refinement.” This statute, however, does not dispense with tbe requirement that tbe essential elements of an offense must be charged, and many decisions of this Court have so held. See S. v. Tarlton, 208 N.C. 734, 182 S.E. 481, and cases cited; S. v. Cole, 202 N.C. 592, 163 S.E. 594, and cases cited and analyzed.

Nor have we overlooked G.S. 15-143, which provides that a bill of particulars may be ordered in tbe discretion of tbe court. Tbe function of a bill of particulars under tbe statute is to provide “further information not required to be set out” in tbe bill of indictment, but never to supply matter required to be charged as an essential ingredient of tbe offense. S. v. Cole, supra; S. v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769, 12 S.E. 2d 654.

For tbe reasons given, tbe judgment below is

Affirmed.