Case ID: app-dc_24/html/0001-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Mr. Justice Morris", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

LONG v. SCOTT.
    Equity; Resulting Trusts; Equitable Liens.
    1. To establish a resulting trust in favor of one furnishing purchase money of real estate, it must be clearly shown that the whole of the purchase money was paid by the one seeking to have such trust declared, or that the purchase was of some definite interest or determinate aliquot part of the property.
    2. Where a mother paid part of the purchase money of a dwelling house bought by her son, on the oral agreement of the son that she should have practically a life estate in the premises in common with him, an equitable lien in favor of the mother may be declared upon the property, upon her eviction from it, to the amount of the sum so advanced, where a resulting trust in her favor cannot be declared because of nothing to show the actual amount paid for the property.
    No. 1373.
    Submitted April 15, 1904.
    Decided May 4, 1904.
    HeabiNg oh an appeal by tbe complainant from a decree of the Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia dismissing a bill in equity to charge certain real estate with an equitable lien or resulting trust in favor of tbe complainant.
    
      Reversed.
    
    
      The Couet in tbe opinion stated tbe ease as follows:
    Maria Long, tbe appellant in this cause, filed ber bill of complaint in tbe supreme court of tbe District on September 24, 1902, to charge certain real estate in tbe city of Washington with a trust or lien in ber favor, and to enforce such trust or lien. She alleged in ber bill that, on or about June 27, a. d. 1877, she bad been induced by ber son, Samuel Wills, now deceased, to pay $400 on account of the purchase of a bouse and lot in this city, being tbe real estate referred to, upon tbe promise and agreement of said Wills with tbe complainant that she was to own and possess a proportionate part of said real estate for ber own exclusive use and benefit, together with tbe freedom of tbe premises for and during ber natural life; that this sum of $400 contributed by her was tbe first money paid on account of tbe purchase; and that thereupon ber son, Samuel Wills, delivered to ber the possession of a room in said premises, which she continued to use and occupy, with tbe freedom of tbe premises, until May, 1895, when she was induced to leave tbe place by alleged false representations on tbe part of tbe appellee, Shedrich D. Brow. She alleged also that during ber occupation she bad paid taxes, both general and special, for tbe property, tbe amount of which, however, is not stated and does not appear.
    It is alleged, further, that tbe title to tbe property was taken by Samuel Wills, not in bis_ ow name, but in tbe name of hi» wife, Mary M. Wills, who never at any time contributed any money on account of tbe purchase; and that Samuel Wills, from bis earnings as an employee of tbe War Department, contributed tbe remainder of tbe purchase money, tbe amount of which is not stated, and seems probably to have been $2,300.
    Mary M. Wills died intestate before ber husband, leaving surviving ber two children, one of whom died at tbe age of twelve years without issue, and tbe other, Beatrice Wills, survived and married tbe appellee, Shedrich D. Brow. Samuel Wills, son of tbe complainant and purchaser of tbe property, survived and lived on tbe premises with bis wife and children and bis mother until April 12, 1892, when be died intestate. Beatrice AVillsy who married Shedrich D. Brown, and in whom was the legal title to the premises, died in 1895, leaving her husband surviving her and one infant child, who died in the following year, 1896. The title, that was in this child, thereupon devolved upon the appellee, Elsie A. Scott, the sister of the purchaser, Samuel Wills, subject to a tenancy by the curtesy in Shedrich D. Brown; and this last is now in the possession of the property, and has evicted the complainant therefrom.
    The bill of complaint proceeds to allege that Brown is an intelligent young man; that the complainant is an ignorant and illiterate woman, now about one hundred years of age; that Brown, having first ingratiated himself into the favor of the complainant, subsequently induced her to remove from the premises on the promise to pay her $5 a month during her life; that he paid her this sum for one month, and never paid her any more during the eighty-six months following before the filing of the bill of complaint, for which he was indebted to her in the sum of $430. And, as already intimated, the bill prayed for the establishment of a trust or lien in her favor as against Elsie A. Scott, her daughter, in whom is the legal title to the property, subject to the life tenancy of Shedrich D. Brown, and against this latter as the person in possession and entitled by his curtesy to such possession. These two, Elsie A. Scott and Shedrich D. Brown, were the defendants to the bill.
    Elsie A. Scott neither appeared nor answered. Appearance was entered for Brown, but he never answered. Decrees pro confesso were taken in due time against both. Subsequently an order was entered making these decrees absolute. This was on December 2, 1902. The record before us shows that there was then testimony taken in January of 1893; but there is nothing to show by what order, or upon what authority, it was taken. We are informed orally, however, that the court below required some testimony to be taken in support of the bill of complaint before it would malm any final decree. In this testimony the allegations of the bill are substantially proved. In fact, the principal witness on behalf of the complainant is the defendant and appellee, Elsie A. Scott, her daughter, who proved the payment of tbe $400 and other payments also by her mother, and who seems to be willing that her mother should have the relief prayed for by her. It is shown, also, that, at the time of the taking of the testimony, the property was worth about $3,000; but there is no satisfactory testimony as to the amount paid by Samuel Wills at the time of his purchase in 1877, unless we accept as such a statement by one of the witnesses; apparently an entirely disinterested person, to the effect that about the time of the purchase Samuel Wills came to him to borrow some money from him, and stated to him that he had bought a house on Madison street, on which the property in controversy is located, for twenty-three hundred dollars ($2,300).
    At the final hearing the court below dismissed the bill of complaint on May 4, 1903; and the complainant has brought the cause to this court by appeal.
    
      Mr. M. F. Mangan, Mr. Joseph H. Stewart, Mr. Wilton J. Lambert, and Mr. D. W. Baker for the appellant.
    
      Mr. Henry E. Davis for the appellee Shedrich D. Brown.
    There was no appearance for the appellee Elsie A. Scott.
   Mr. Justice Morris

delivered the opinion of the Court:

Passing over, as unimportant in the determination of the merits of this case, some questions of pleading and practice that present themselves at the threshold, we are of opinion that neither the bill of complaint, nor the testimony taken in support of it, shows sufficient ground for the declaration of a resulting trust in this case in favor of the complainant for the portion of the purchase money of the property in controversy shown to have been paid by her. Eor the establishment of such a resulting trust it must be clearly shown that the whole purchase money was paid by the person seeking to have such trust declared, or that the purchase was of some definite interest or determinate aliquot part of the property. In the absence of any satisfactory proof of tbe amount of tbe purchase money in this ease, and therefore of proof as to the proportion of the sum of $400 advanced by the complainant to the whole purchase money, it is impossible to es*tablish a resulting trust in any part or share of the property in favor of the complainant.

But while the bill of complaint and the testimony are insufficient to establish a resulting trust, we are likewise of opinion that there is sufficient allegation and ample proof of facts in this case to show an equitable lien on this property in favor of this complainant to the amount of $400. It has been broadly held in some cases that an equitable lien will be declared to exist when there are such relations between the parties as will make it right and just to declare the lien. Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Mich. 30, 19 N. W. 580; Perry v. Board of Missions, 102 N. Y. 99, 6 N. E. 116; Rucker v. Abell, 8 B. Mon. 566, 48 Am. Dec. 406; Gavin v. Carling, 55 Md. 530; Society of Shakers v. Watson, 15 C. C. A. 632, 37 U. S. App. 141, 68 Fed. 730. It is not necessary for us to go that far in the present case. For here an express agreement is shown, although not in writing, whereby, in consideration of the contribution by the complainant of the sum of $400 to the purchase money of a certain piece of property, she was promised by the purchaser that she should have practically a life estate in the premises, in common with the purchaser; and, upon that inducement and with that agreement between herself and her son, the purchaser, she paid her share of the money and entered into the possession of the property, and retained that possession until she was evicted under what she would seem to regard as false representations.

It seems to us that it would be difficult to conceive a case, apart from one of express agreement, in which a court of equity would be more justified in declaring an equitable lien. Indeed, we find very little difference in principle between this case and one of express agreement, in consideration of a specified sum of money, to put a party in possession for life, with possession thereupon taken. The agreement here was substantially an express agreement; and while, under the circumstances, it may have been insufficient to create either a resulting trust, or sxich an estate for life as the law will recognize, the case presented would become one of the grossest injustice if a court of equity will permit this complainant in her remarkably advanced years to lose the benefit of the money which she put into this property, now enjoyed at her expense by a stranger to her blood.

It would appear that it was the theory of a resulting trust which was mainly, if not exclusively, presented to the court below, and for the failure to establish which the learned justice Avho held that court dismissed the bill of complaint. In so ruling we think he was right. But the theory of an equitable lien was evidently ignored in the case, and, inasmuch as that theory is fully substantiated by the record, we think there was error in the dismissal of the bill.

We are of opinion that the decree appealed from should be reversed, with costs; and that the cause should be remanded to the Supreme Court of the District, with directions to enter a decree establishing an equitable lien upon the property mentioned in the proceedings to the amount of $400, and for such further proceedings, orders, and decrees as may be right and proper to enforce the same. And it is so ordered. Reversed.