Case ID: so2d_630/html/1150-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM. W. SHARP, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Norma VAUGHAN, Appellant, v. Clarence Buford VAUGHAN, Appellee.
    No. 93-1377.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
    Dec. 3, 1993.
    
      Norma Vaughan, Winter Park, pro se.
    Gregory M. Wilson, Orlando, for appellee.
   PER CURIAM.

The final judgment of dissolution is reversed on two grounds. First, the lower court erred in refusing to consider appellant’s application for attorney’s fees pendente lite on the merits. This was a matter for the court having jurisdiction over the dissolution to determine, not for the guardianship court to decide. Additionally, the order of the guardianship court on which the petition was based is facially insufficient to support the guardian’s petition for dissolution and will have to be refiled. Section 744.3725, Florida Statutes, on which petitioner relies, requires the court to authorize the guardian to act after specific steps have been taken and only on clear and convincing evidence. Such an order must set forth the guardianship court’s findings and conclusions, otherwise, meaningful appellate review of the final judgment of dissolution would be impossible.

COBB and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.

W. SHARP, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.

W. SHARP, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur with the majority opinion, but write to stress why I think it is particularly important that Norma Vaughan be provided funds for temporary attorney’s fees. This case may well be one of first impression in this state on the question of whether a guardian of an incapacitated person can obtain a divorce for his ward from a competent spouse, solely because the ward has been incapacitated for a total of three years. See §§ 744.3215(4), 744.3725 and 61.052(l)(b). Section 61.052(l)(b) indicates mental incapacity of a spouse is a ground for the competent spouse to seek a divorce, provided the rights of the incapacitated spouse are duly protected. But its express terms do not foreclose the ability of a guardian of an incapacitated spouse to sue a competent spouse for a divorce solely because the ward has been incapacitated for three years. This interpretation would be a departure from precedent in this state and other jurisdictions. It has potentially far-reaching social implications and could raise constitutional issues, as well. 
      
      . Based on this record, there is no basis for this court to determine whether appellant is entitled to fees pendente lite or, if so, in what amount or for what legal services.
     
      
      . Because of the defects we have identified in this opinion, we do not now decide the issue of the power of a guardian, on behalf of his ward, to obtain a divorce from a competent spouse.
     
      
      . See Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla.1950); Wood v. Beard, 107 So.2d 198, 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958).
     
      
      . Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse's Guardian, Committee, or Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage or Make a Compromise or Settlement in such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3d 681 (1966).