Case ID: f-appx_422/html/0620-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Jeffrey R. TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee.
    No. 09-71253.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted March 8, 2011.
    
    Filed March 18, 2011.
    Jeffrey R. Taylor, Tigard, OR, pro se.
    Patricia McDonald Bowman, Trial, John A. Dicicco, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Clarissa C. Potter, Esquire, Kenneth Greene, Esquire, Supervisory, Richard T. Morrison, Esquire, Gilbert Steven Rothenberg, Esquire, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert R. Di Trolio, Esquire, Donald L. Korb, Esquire, Acting Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for Respondenh-Appellee.
    Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes dais case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Jeffrey R. Taylor appeals pro se from the tax court’s decision upholding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue’s denial of his request for innocent spouse relief for tax years 1986 and 1987. We have jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We review for clear error the tax court’s determination that a taxpayer is not entitled to innocent spouse relief. Guth v. Comm’r, 897 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir.1990). We affirm.

The Tax Court did not clearly err in denying Taylor innocent spouse relief because the evidence in the record, including Taylor’s guilty plea to tax evasion for 1987 and the stipulated decision imposing fraud penalties for 1986 and 1987, supported its conclusion that Taylor had actual knowledge of the items giving rise to the tax deficiencies when he prepared and signed the relevant joint federal income tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)(C), (c)(3)(C) (no entitlement to innocent spouse relief where taxpayer knew or had reason to know of understatement, or had actual knowledge of items giving rise to deficiencies). In light of these circumstances, the Commissioner’s discretionary decision to deny equitable relief was also reasonable. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f) (providing for innocent spouse relief where equitable).

Taylor’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

Taylor’s motion to supplement his reply brief is granted.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.