Case ID: f-appx_698/html/0439-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Steve CRUMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. S. SANCHEZ, Captain; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 15-55961
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted September 26, 2017 
    
    OCTOBER 4, 2017
    Steve Crump, Lancaster, CA, pro se.
    Christopher Findley, AGCA-Office of the Attorney General (San Diego), San Diego, CA, Defendant-Appellee.
    Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Steve Crump, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging retaliation. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Crump did not properly exhaust his grievances to the final level of review or show that exhaustion was effectively unavailable. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] grievance [only] suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”); see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion is not required where administrative remedies are rendered “effectively unavailable”).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Crump’s motion to file his opening brief as nunc pro tunc (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED. 
      
      This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.