Case ID: us-ct-cl_63/html/0398-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "Booth, Judge,", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

THOMAS A. SWEENEY, TRADING AS THOMAS A. SWEENEY STORAGE WAREHOUSES, v. THE UNITED STATES
    [No. B-418.
    Decided April 4, 1927]
    
      On the Proofs
    
    
      Contract; interference by third, party; order covering additional expense. — The plaintiff, in the performance of a contract for moving' supplies and office equipment of the Veterans’ Bureau from one building to another in consideration of a stated sum, was refused, contrary to established custom, the use of freight elevators in the building from which the moving was being done. He asked to be relieved of his contract, but completed the work upon being authorized by the contracting officer, through a “ purchase order,” covering the additional expense, to do so. Held, that plaintiff is entitled to recover the expense due to the interference with his work.
    
      The Reporter’s statement of the case:
    
      Mr. Frederick N. Towers for the plaintiff. Frost & Towers were on the brief.
    
      Mr. George Dyson, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General Herman J. Galloway, for the defendant.
    The court made special findings of fact, as follows:
    ■ I. Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the city of Chicago, State of Illinois, where he is engaged in the business of storing, moving, and trafficking in furniture and. other articles of household and office use, under the trade name and style of Thomas A. Sweeney Storage Warehouses.
    II. Under date of May 29, 1922, the United States Veterans’ Bureau, district No. 8, Chicago, Ill., issued a proposal for the moving of the equipment, furniture, and supplies of said bureau from the seventh, eighth, and tenth floors of the Leiter Building, No. 14 East Congress Street, Chicago, Ill., to the eleventh and twelfth floors of the Butler Brothers’ Building, 101 Canal Street, Chicago, Ill.
    Plaintiff filed a bid. His was the lowest bid received, and under date of June 10, 1922, it was accepted by the United States Veterans’ Bureau, said acceptance being as follows:
    Umted States Veteeans’ Bttkeatx,
    
      Washington, D. C., June 10,19¶}%.
    
    In reply to: L & C — 1027—JEM.
    Thomas A. Sweeney,
    
      61¡3 W. 69th St., Chicago, Illinois.
    
    Dear Sir : Your proposal to furnish services to the U. S. Veterans’ Bureau at Chicago, Illinois, under charge of the district manager at Chicago, Illinois, during June, 1922, has been accepted as recommended:
    Moving all equipment, furniture, and supplies from the 7th, 8th, and 10th floors of the Leiter Building Stores to the 11th and 12th floors of the Butler Brothers’ Building, 191 Canal Street, at a cost of $3,100.00, as stipulated in the contract dated June 3, 1922.
    The bureau has notified the manager of the acceptance of your proposal.
    Respectfully,
    W. C. Black,
    
      Chief Cleric, U. S. Veterans’ Bureau.
    
    Under date of June 9, 1922, E. R. Burke, chief of the administration division of the bureau, signed a purchase order directed to plaintiff covering the work to be done.
    III. Plaintiff reported on June 14, 1922, with the necessary men and equipment for completing the work, but representatives or agents of the Leiter estate, which controlled the Leiter Building, refused and denied him the use of the freight elevators which were ordinarily employed in moving furniture into and out. of the building. It was the custom in this and other office buildings in the city of Chicago to-extend the use of elevators for the purpose of moving office equipment to or from the offices of incoming or outgoing tenants.
    IY. On or about June 19. 1922, after plaintiff had been prevented during the five preceding days from making effectual use of the elevators in the building, plaintiff informed the then director of the bureau, C. E. Forbes, in the presence of the district manager and the chief of the administrative division of the bureau, of his inability to complete the contract, in view of the unforeseen obstacles which had been interposed. Said director thereupon advised plaintiff that it was of the utmost importance to the bureau that the moving of its furniture, equipment, and supplies should be completed before the 30th of June, 1922; that if, therefore, plaintiff would proceed with the work he would be properly compensated for the extra work; and under date of June 20, 1922, said director of the bureau confirmed by letter his direction or order to proceed with the work and to incur such necessary additional expenses as might be incidental to its completion under the circumstances. The director’s letter of confirmation referred to above is in the following words and figures:
    UNited States Veterans’ Bureau,
    
      Washington, D. C., Jwne W, 19M.
    
    Disteict Manager, District #8,
    
      U. 8. Veterans’ Bwea/a,
    Chicago, Illinois.
    
    Dear Sir: You are hereby authorized to employ necessary personnel and incur such necessary expenses as may be incidental to the removal of the district office from the Leiter Building to the Butler Building. This authority is given for the purpose of facilitating the removal of the district office by June 30th and for the additional purpose of maintaining the district service at as high efficiency as possible.
    Very truly yours,
    (C. E. Forbes),
    
      Director.
    
    On June 22,1922, a “ purchase order ” was duly issued covering the additional expense authorized by the director of the bureau, and a copy of this order is attached to the petition as Exhibit A and made a part hereof by reference.
    
      Acting upon the authorization so given, plaintiff proceeded at once to employ the necessary extra assistants and supply the necessary extra material to enable him to complete the work, and he did so complete the work within the required time. Thereafter plaintiff submitted his bills for the work done, including therein the extra charges agreed upon, as above set forth. The total bill was for $4,771.52. A voucher for $3,100 was duly issued and paid, leaving a balance due plaintiff of $1,671.52 under the contract as amended.
    Y. Under date of December 10, 1923, C. W. Spofford, district manager, wrote to the Director of the Veterans’ Bureau at Washington, as follows:
    United States Veterans’ Bueeau,
    Chicago, III., December 10,1923.
    
    The Dieeotor U. S. Veterans’ Bureau,
    
      Washington, D. C.
    
    Dear Sir: My attention has been called to the fact that voucher in favor of Mr. Thomas A. Sweeney, for $1,671.52 additional payment above the contract price for moving supplies, office equipment, etc., from the Leiter Building to the Butler Bhilding in June, 1922, has been disallowed by the comptroller. This is an unjust decision.
    Mr. Sweeney contracted to move our offices from the Leiter Building to the Butler Building for a stated suni. He reported for work and after several days, owing to the obstacles placed in our way by the Leiter estate, was able to make practically no progress. He came to me and stated that he wanted to cancel his contract. We were in a very critical position, it being necessary, according to the legal department of the bureau, that all Veterans’ Bureau equipment and supplies be moved from the Leiter Building before July 1, 1922. For that reason I refused to cancel Mr. Sweeney’s contract and stated that under authority given me by Director Forbes under date of June 20 I was empowered to make such expenditures as were necessary in order to facilitate the removal of the district office. Mr. Sweeney proceeded with the contract and rendered bill for extras. This bill was carefully audited in this office, was somewhat reduced, and finally forwarded to central office.
    In my judgment this bill is just and should be paid. The expenditure is authorized by the director himself and was incurred on account of the emergency existing. I recommend that the bill be referred again to the comptroller and approved for payment.
    Yours very truly,
    C. W. SpoeeoRD, District Manager.
    
    The court decided that plaintiff was entitled to recover.
   Booth, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in this case responded to a proposal issued by the United States Veterans’ Bureau, District No. 8, Chicago, Ill. The situation was this: The bureau wras occupying under a lease the seventh, eighth, and tenth floors of the Leiter Building, No. 14 East Congress Street, Chicago. A new location for the bureau had been acquired in the Butler Bros.’ Building, 301 Canal Street, Chicago, eleventh and twelfth floors. The bureau was under the imperative necessity of vacating the Leiter Building by July 1, 1922, and the proposal issued solicited bids for removing the bureau from the Leiter to the Butler Building. Plaintiff offered to perform the service for $3,100 and his bid was accepted. No formal contract, except as evidenced by the proposal, plaintiff’s bid and acceptance thereof, was executed by the parties. A purchase order was duly issued to the plaintiff on June 9, 1922. On June 14, 1922, the plaintiff, with all the necessary equipment and force of employees, appeared to commence the work, and, to their utter astonishment, were denied and refused the use of the freight elevators by the representative of the Leiter Building to transport the office furniture and supplies of the bureau from its quarters to the ground floor. It was and is an established custom in this and other large office buildings in the city of Chicago to make available to incoming and outgoing tenants the free use of the freight elevators. Whether in this instance the facility was denied the plaintiff solely because of the bureau’s departure from the building does not appear; at any rate, no reason was assigned for such conduct, and the exercise of the arbitrary conduct not only seriously discommoded the plaintiff, but put upon him an extra expense of such proportions that compliance with his agreement upon the accepted consideration would entail financial loss.

At the close of the fifth day after performance of the contract began plaintiff placed before the authorized officers of tlie bureau the serious situation which confronted him. He had not been able to make sufficient progress, and the added expense forced upon him the contemplated necessity of seeking a cancellation of his contract. The authorized officers of the bureau, after investigation, realized the handicap the plaintiff was working under, and on June 20, 1922, authorized the plaintiff to proceed with the performance and incur the necessary extra expense entailed by the arbitrary refusal to use the freight elevators. The plaintiff, acting finally under the written authorization of June 20, 1922, did go forward with the moving, and did incur an actual extra expense of $1,671.52. This amount has not been paid him, and for this sum this suit is brought. The officers of the bureau made a careful audit of the extra expense claimed, and after reducing the amount to some extent approved an allowance for the amount herein claimed.

The defendant opposes a judgment, basing its contention upon an assertion that the extra expense incurred by the plaintiff was in legal effect a bonus; that having contracted to perform the service for the stipulated sum of $3,100 the plaintiff could only be relieved from his contract through the intervention of acts of God or the other inevitable events which excuse performance of a contract. We believe the contention untenable. Plaintiff is not claiming a bonus; he seeks not something for nothing. It is conceded that the officers of the bureau possessed authority to make a contract for the removal of the bureau’s effects from one place to another; and if such authority obtained in the first instance, how may it be denied that it did not continue to modify the agreement when mutually' unforeseen and unanticipated events occurred which rendered the performance of the original agreement an unconscionable bargain and hardship? Both parties to the agreement entered into it with an understanding that the usual and customary facilities for its performance were available, and when they subsequently discovered that an entirely different situation prevailed there was nothing in the way of meeting the changed conditions. What the officers of the bureau did was not to increase the profits of the plaintiff or give him more than the original contract provided; they simply modified the contract to the extent of assuming the additional expense put on the plaintiff over and above the original contract price by an event the happening of which' neither party to the agreement contemplated when the contract was made, and one which both parties in the usual course of business of this character had a right to assume would not happen. It would be folly to conclude that the plaintiff would have agreed to remove the bureau for the amount stated in his contract if he had any reasonable ground to believe that he would have been required to carry by hand from the seventh, eighth, and tenth floors all the equipment and supplies of the bureau to the ground floor when a freight elevator was at hand and available for this transportation.

The contract in suit was made in view of an established usage and custom, one long prevalent; both parties to the agreement recognized its existence, and both were equally disconcerted by its refusal. The plaintiff could not go on with the performance of his contract when he faced an additional expense of more than 50 per cent of the price he had originally agreed to charge, an expense which others similarly-situated would not have had, and had no reasonable grounds to anticipate. The bureau realized that it had no right to> insist upon performance under the changed conditions, and expressly promised that if the plaintiff would proceed the bureau would see that he received reimbursement for the extra cost. The plaintiff did proceed under these conditions and under them only. It is not unusual to increase the consideration for a contractual obligation when in the course of performance unforeseen events radically change the relationship of the contracting parties, and by so doing controversy over the terms and conditions of the original contract, is obviated and set at rest. Cook v. Murphy, 70 Ill. 96; Hostetter v. Park, 181 U. S. 30, 40. By so doing, the increased consideration is not a bonus. The cases in this court cited in defendant’s brief are inapposite. Manifestly if the plaintiff was to be paid additional compensation by way of savings he w-as under contract to save in any event, the payment would be a gratuity and without consideration. If the defendant received no benefit in return for payment of added sums, of course the sum to be paid is a bonus; but such is not the case here. The bureau was put to the necessity of removing within a certain period. It had to get out by July 1, 1922. The plaintiff agreed, for a stated sum, to remove all its effects in the usual and customary manner of making removals under the circumstances of the particular case. During the course of the removal the transaction developed into an extraordinary undertaking, one at no time within the contemplation of the parties, and inasmuch as the bureau liad not exhausted its authority to incur the expense of removal, assuredly nothing stood in its way of paying for the service rendered the full amount of the worth of said services.

Judgment for the plaintiff for $1,671.52. It is so ordered.

Moss, Judge; Graham, Judge; Hat, Judge; and Campbell, Chief Justice, concur.