Case ID: va_43/html/0326-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "By the Court.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Rand v. Reynolds.
    July Term, 1845,
    Lewisburg.
    Negotiable Notes — Endorsers—Notice of Protest — Two Post Offices. — An endorser residing in a district of country passing under a particular name, and having a post office within it; and being equidistant from that office and another out of the bounds of the district, a notice of protest sent to the first mentioned office, was held sufficient, though in fact he was accustomed to receive his letters and papers from the other office.
    This was an action brought by Vernon Reynolds against William J. Rand, as endorser upon a note made by Whitaker & Co., and endorsed by Rand. The only question was as to the sufficiency, of the notice. On the trial of the cause, the jury found a special verdict, from which it appeared, that the note which was dated on the 28th December 1836, and payable at twenty months, was given for goods sold and delivered by Reynolds to Whitaker & Co., and endorsed by Rand as their surety. That it was deposited at the Bank of Virginia in Charleston, for collection; and not being fully paid when it fell due, it was regularly protested for non-payment, and a notice directed to Rand at the Kanawha Salines post office, was put into, and mailed at the post *office in Charleston. It appeared, farther, that both Charleston and the Kanawha Salines post offices were on the north side of the Kanawha river, and that Rand lived on the south side of the river, about three miles from each place. That Charleston had been for years, and then was his regular post office, where he generally received his letters, and to which his papers were directed; though occasionally letters were directed to him at the Kanawha Salines post office. It appeared, farther, that at the time of the protest, Rand was a member of the firm of Noyes, Rand & Co., who were engaged in the manufacture of salt on the Kanawha river, about one half mile below the Kana-wha Salines post office, and on the opposite side of the river; that the said firm kept a business office for their salt transactions at the place where they manufactured salt, but that the books of the firm were kept by the defendant at his own residence; and that he visited the salt works once, twice, and sometimes thrice a week, and at other times not oftener than once in two weeks. It appeared farther, that the defendant Rand was a member of a mercantile firm in the town of Charleston in 1836; near the end of which year, the firm sold out its goods; and that the business of the firm was not finally closed at the date of the protest. Of that firm, Rand was the active member, and transacted most of its business. That the letters received by the manufacturing, as well as the mercantile firm, were generally received at the Charleston post office, though occasionally letters were received at the Salines office, but it was not the regular office of either of the firms. It also appeared, that the region of country called the “Kanawha Salines” lies on both sides of the Kanawha river, commencing about two miles on the north side of the river, above Charleston, and about half a mile above the same place, on the south side, and extends up the river on both sides about twelve miles; and that the defendant Rand, at the.date of said *protest, resided on the south side of the river, about three miles above Charleston. The plaintiff lived on the north side of the river, about two miles above the Kanawha Salines post office.
    The Court gave judgment for the plaintiff upon the special verdict, and the defendant applied for and obtained an appeal to this Court.
    B. H. Smith, for the appellant,
    referred to Reed v. Payne, 16 Johns. R. 218; Bank of Columbia v. Bawrence, 1 Peters’s R. S78; Taylor v. Bank of Illinois, 7 Monroe’s R. 583, to shew that the notice should be sent to the place where the defendant transacts his business and receives his letters. He referred to Cuyler v. Nellis, 4 Wend. R. 398, to shew that the plaintiff should make en-quiry for the proper office; and to The Bank of Geneva v. Howlett, 4 Wend. R. 328; | Bank of Bogan v. Butler, 3 Bittell’sR. 499; ] Bank of Utica v. Dellot, 13 Johns. R. 432; Ireland v. Kip, 10 Id. 490; S. C. 11 Id. 91; Bowery v. Scott, 24 Wend. R. 358. These cases, he contended, established the doctrine, that where notice had not been sent to the proper office, the plaintiff must shew that this has not arisen from any want of diligence on his part in making the necessary enquiries to ascertain the proper office. And he then insisted, that there could be no doubt in this case that the proper office was at Charleston; and a simple enquiry at that office would have given the plaintiff the necessary information; but that enquiry he did not make, and he must therefore suffer the consequences of his own neglect.
    Price and Summers, for the appellee.
    It is not necessary to prove that the endorser received the notice, but that such means have been employed as may reasonably be expected to convey it to him; and that ordinary diligence has been used to ascertain those means. *Ripscomb v. Chapman, 1 Johns. R. 296; Bank of Columbia . v. Bawrence, 1 Peters’s R. 578; Bank of Geneva v. Howlett, 4 Wend. R. 328. These cases shew that the notice may be sent either to the office nearest the dwelling house of the endorser, or to that nearest his place of business.
    In this case, the defendant was a resident of the Kanawha Salines. He had broken up his business in Charleston, and was engaged in the manufacture of salt within half a mile of the post office to which the notice was sent. It surely was not for the plaintiff or the notary to know that he kept the books of his firm at his own house, or that doing business within half a mile of a post office established for the convenience of the manufacturers of salt, he chose to receive his letters at Charleston.
    It is said the notary should have made enquiry; and that a simple enquiry at the post office in Charleston, would have given him the information he wanted. The first enquiry the notary would have made, is, where does the defendant reside? And the answer would have been, in the Kanawha Salines. The second enquiry would have been, where does be do business? And the answer would have been, within half a mile of the Kanawha Salines post office. If then the notary had received the additional information that Rand received letters and papers at the post office in Charleston, it could not have informed him that he did not receive them from the other office, which, whether we look to his residence in the Salines, or his place of business, was the proper office at which to address him.
    
      
      See monographic note on “Bills, Notes and Checks” appended to Archer v. Ward, 9 Gratt. 622.
    
   By the Court.

Affirm the judgment.