Case ID: ohio-st_96/html/0301-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      Donahue, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

The State, ex rel. Linden, v. Davis, Mayor.
    
      City charter of Cleveland — Judicial powers of mayor — Determination of sufficiency of petitions — Against prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquors — Section 6142, General Code.
    
    1. The charter of the city of Cleveland specifically reserves to the mayor of the city the judicial powers conferred upon mayors of municipal corporations by the general laws of the state.
    2. Section 6142, General Code, is a valid exercise of the power conferred upon the general assembly by the constitution of this state, and vests in the mayors of municipal corporations jurisdiction to hear and determine the sufficiency of petitions filed with them under the provisions of that section.
    (No. 15530
    Decided June 26, 1917.)
    In Prohibition.
    On the 27th day of February, 1917, the relator, Carl P. Linden, filed in this court a petition praying that a writ issue prohibiting the defendant, Harry L. Davis, as mayor of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, from exercising any further jurisdiction whatsoever in connection with the hearing of a petition filed with him under the provisions of Section 6142, General Code, against prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors in a residence district in the city of Cleveland, described in said petition.
    The petition avers that under the charter of the city of Cleveland there is no office of mayor as contemplated in Section 6142 of the General Code of Ohio, and that the said Harry L. Davis as mayor of said city under the provisions of said charter has no judicial powers derived from the constitution, or from the laws of the state, or from said charter; that the said Harry L. Davis as such mayor has no jurisdiction to hear and determine matters and points at issue in connection with said petition and has no jurisdiction to make a finding and determination thereon, but that notwithstanding his want of jurisdiction he has conducted a hearing on said petition and will make a finding and determination on the matters in connection with said petition, unless prohibited by ah order of this court; and that if he should find the petition sufficient, the relator, and other qualified electors similarly situated, would have no adequate remedy at law.
    Upon this petition an alternative writ issued.
    The respondent for answer admits the recitals in the relator’s petition as to the filing with him as mayor of the city of Cleveland of a petition against the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors as a beverage in a residence district in the city of Cleveland, described in such petition, admits the proceedings had thereon, and denies the further allegations of the petition.
    No evidence except the charter of the city of Cleveland was offered by either party, and the cause was submitted to the court upon the pleadings and this charter.
    
      Mr. Charles M. Earhart and Mr. J. A. White, for relator.
    
      Mr. W. S. Fitz Gerald, director of law; Mr. Ven Svarc and Mr. George W. Shaw, for defendant.
   Donahue, J.

The charter of the city of Cleveland does not divest its mayor of any of the authority conferred upon him by the laws of the state of Ohio. On the contrary, it is specifically provided, in Section 72 of the charter, that the mayor shall “exercise such powers and perform such duties as are conferred or required by this charter or by the laws of the state.” This language is certainly clear and unambiguous,- but this is supplemented by Section 2, which provides that “the enumeration of particular powers by this charter shall not be held or deemed to be exclusive but, in addition to the powers enumerated herein, implied thereby or appropriate to the exercise thereof, the city shall have, and may exercise all other powers which, under the constitution and laws of Ohio, it would be competent for this charter specifically to enumerate.”

The title of the office of mayor is not changed by the charter. Even if it were, Section 191 of the charter provides that the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon any officer, commission, board or department of the city under the laws of the state, shall, if such office or department is abolished by this charter, be thereafter exercised and discharged by the officer, board or department upon whom are imposed corresponding functions, powers and duties thereunder. Under this provision, even if the office of mayor had been abolished, and' another office created having corresponding functions, powers and duties of a mayor, the incumbent of such office would have the powers conferred and the duties imposed by the laws of the state upon the mayors of other cities of the state not having adopted a charter. Flotron v. Barringer, 94 Ohio St., 185, and Ide v. State of Ohio, 95 Ohio St., 224.

The further questions presented by the pleadings and the evidence are fully disposed of in Heininger v. Davis, Mayor, ante, 205, submitted prior to but considered by this court in connection with this case. Under the provisions of Section 6142, General Code, the defendant has full jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of the sufficiency of the petition filed with him, and the writ of prohibition prayed for in the relator’s petition must be refused.

Writ refused.

Nichols, C. J., Newman, Jones, Matthias and Johnson, JJ., concur.