Case ID: f-appx_401/html/0504-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM:", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Fernando MARTINEZ-CACERES, a.k.a. Javier Diaz Sanchez, a.k.a. Jose Fernando Martinez-Caseras, Defendant-Appellant.
    No. 09-16440
    Non-Argument Calendar.
    United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
    Oct. 29, 2010.
    Sylvia A. Irvin, Donna Lee Elm, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.
    
      Patricia D. Barksdale, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
    Before EDMONDSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
   PER CURIAM:

Jose Fernando Martinez-Caceres appeals his sentence for illegal reentry into the United States following a previous deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On appeal, Martinez-Caceres contends that the district court erred by imposing an enhanced sentence based on a felony conviction that was not set forth in the charging information. He recognizes that Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) holds that a prior conviction is not an element of the offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b), but he argues that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and subsequent cases have called the validity of Almendarez-Torres into question. He asserts that we should not apply Almendarez-Torres to the “distinguishable facts” of his case. For the reasons stated below, we affirm Martinez-Caceres’s sentence.

We review constitutional issues de novo. United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 978 (11th Cir.2008). In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court explained that a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is not an element of the offense, and, therefore, it need not be alleged in the indictment or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, 118 S.Ct. at 1222. Although Apprendi and subsequent decisions have cast doubt on the reasoning of Almendarez-Torres, we have repeatedly explained that Almendarez-Torres remains binding precedent unless and until that case is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. Steed, 548 F.3d at 979-80; United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1273-76 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Gibson, 434 F.3d 1234, 1246-47 (11th Cir.2006).

Martinez-Caceres’s argument that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on a prior conviction not charged in the information is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, 118 S.Ct. at 1222. As noted above, Almendarez-Tor-res remains binding precedent in this Circuit unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court. See Steed, 548 F.3d at 979-80; Greer, 440 F.3d at 1273-76; Gibson, 434 F.3d at 1246-47. Although Martinez-Caceres suggests that Almendarez-Torres is distinguishable, he does not point to any differences between that case and his own. Almendarez-Torres addressed the same legal question and the same statute that are at issue in this case. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, 118 S.Ct. at 1222. Almendarez-Torres is directly on point, and, under that decision, the district court did not err by imposing an enhanced sentence based on a conviction not alleged in the information. Accordingly, we affirm Martinez-Caceres’s sentence.

AFFIRMED.