Case ID: abbn-cas_1/html/0174-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      The Court ruled as above.\n    ", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

PRODUCE BANK v. MORTON.
    
      N. Y. Court of Appeals;
    
    
      November, 1876.
    [Overruling 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. (8 J. & S.) 328.]
    Assignment for Benefit of Creditors.—Creditor’s Action.—Execution.—Appeal.—Motion for New Trial.
    Execution against all of several joint debtors, parties to the action, is sufficient foundation for a creditor’s suit, notwithstanding a formal irregularity docketing the judgment only against those served.
    Since L. 1874, p. 824, c. 600,—providing for omission to file the schedules under an assignment for benefit of creditors,—delay to file them does not affect the validity of the assignment.
    
    A judgment in a creditor’s suit vacating a conveyance as fraudulent, directing a delivery of the fund to a receiver, and payment of plaintiff’s judgment, is final, and appealable to the general term, although a reference is ordered to carry it into effect; hence, it seems, a motion for a new trial under section 268 of the code is not proper.
    To determine whether an appeal lies to the court of appeals, without leave, under L. 1874, p. 378, c. 322, interest due upon the judgment cannot be added, to make it exceed $500 exclusive of costs.
    
    Plaintiff brought a.creditor’s action in the New York superior court against Joseph Morton, and others, and Austin Baldwin, their assignee for benefit of creditors, to set aside the assignment for lack of compliance with the act of 1860, and the amendments thereof.
    
      The superior court, at special term, gave judgment for plaintiff. Defendant moved for, and obtained, at general term, an order for a new trial (reported in 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. [8 J. & S.] 328, rev’g 49 How. Pr. 277). Plaintiff appealed to this court.
    
      D. Judson Newland (Newland & Sanxay), for appellants.
    
      A. C. Fransoli and J. F. Mosher (Fransoli, Tilney & Mosher), for respondents.
    
      
       Compare Thrasher v. Bentley, p. 39 of this vol., and cases there referred to, and Haas v. O’Brien, p. 173.
    
    
      
       S. P. in foreclosure, Morris v. Morange, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 447. Otherwise if the amount to be paid plaintiff was to be determined by the referee. Tompkins v. Hyatt, 19 Id. 534. Compare Weaver v. Barden, 49 Id. 286; Catlin v. Grisler, 57 Id. 363.
    
    
      
      
         See Walker v. U. S., cited on p. 24 of this vol.
      As to effect of a stipulation reducing the amount in controversy,— see King v. Galvin, 62 N. Y. 238.
    
   The Court ruled as above.

As to the appealability of the judgment and order, the opinion (Rapallo, J.) remarked:—“ But the point is made that the cause was not properly before the general term ; that it was not a proper case for a motion for a new trial (section 268 of the Code). We are inclined to the opinion that this point is well taken, and that the judgment was final, and reviewable by appeal. There was nothing left to be judicially determined. The amount of the plaintiff ’ s claim was ascertained, judgment was rendered that the assignment be set aside, that the assignee deliver over the assigned property to a receiver, and that the plaintiff be paid out of the proceeds the amount of his claim and costs. This was a final disposition of the whole controversy, and no further judgment was to be rendered. The machinery of a reference and receivership was for the sole purpose of carrying the judgment into execution,- and not the foundation of any further judicial action in the case. ........

Judgment was entered July 21, 1875, and the sum directed to be paid plaintiff for principal and interest amounted to only $491.20. That judgment is all the appellant has at stake. A new trial has been ordered, and the object of this appeal is, by the reversal of that order, to restore the judgment. We think, in such a case, the amount of the judgment when entered must govern the question of appealability, and that interest accruing after its rendition cannot be added for the purpose of bringing it up to the requisite amount. According to our construction of the act of 1874, it prohibits an appeal from an order granting a new trial where the amount of the judgment or subject-matter in controversy does not exceed $500. In appeals from orders granting or refusing a new trial where judgment has been rendered for a specific amount, that must be the test. Where there is no judgment, or it is not for a specific sum, the value of the subject-matter in controversy must be ascertained. The appeal should be dismissed, with costs. 
      
       Will probably be reported in 63 or 64 N. Y.
      
     
      
       The clause relied on is the amendment of 1867: “Where the decision filed under § 367, does not authorize final judgment, but directs further proceedings before a' referee or otherwise either party may move for a new trial at general term,” &c.