Case ID: sw_203/html/1096-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DAVIDSON, P. J. PRENOERGAST, J. PER OURIAM. MORROW, J. DAVIDSON, P. J. PRENDERGAST, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

FRY v. STATE.
    (No. 4390.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Jan. 16, 1918.
    On Motion for Rehearing, June 5, 1918.)
    1. Criminal Daw <&wkey;371(5) — Passing Fobbed Instruments — -Guilty Knowledge — Proof.
    In prosecution for passing forged instrument, where the evideis.ee, circumstantial or direct, shows prima facie that collateral instruments passed by accused were forgeries, such collateral instruments are admissible to show intent or guilty knowledge.
    2. Criminal Daw <&wkey;>351(10) — Evidence—Incriminating Circumstances.
    In prosecution for passing forged instruments, that defendant, afte'r being indicted, attempted at night- to get into the courthouse to gain access to the papers involved at which time two men were killed, was admissible, and the details were admissible, as res geste of the transaction, on the question of whether his intent was simply to inspect the documents or to destroy evidence.
    Prendergast, J., dissenting.
    Appeal from District Court, Olay County; William N. Bonner, Judge.
    E. W. Fry was convicted of passing a forged instrument, and he appeals.
    (Reversed and remanded.
    Edgar Scurry, of Wichita Falls, Wantland i& Parrish and Taylor, Allen & Taylor, all of Henrietta, and B. X. Cummings, of Waco, for appellant. P. A. Martin, Deslie Humphrey, Dist. Atty., and Jno. C. Kay, all of Wichita Falls, and E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

The indictment in the first count charged forgery, and in the second passing a forged instrument. The count charging the passing was alone submitted to tbe jury. So the forgery count passed out, and upon which in future trials he will stand acquitted.

There are a great many bills of exceptions reserved to the introduction of testimony, and several exceptions properly pointed out errors in the court’s charge. The state seems to rely upon the case of Fry v. State, 182 S. W. 331. There is a marked distinction between that and the present case. That opinion recites in quotation an agreement as follows:

“It is agreed by counsel, and it is admitted by the defendant, that the entire bunch of warrants purporting to be issued by the county clerk of Young county and his deputies and the entire bunch of checks purporting to be issued by I. B. Padgett, county treasurer of Young county, and drawn on the Graham National Bank, are each and all the genuine warrants, so issued by the clerk, and that the checks are the genuine checks of I. B. Padgett, drawn by him or by his authority, and that the indorsements appearing on the back of said checks, as E. W. Fry, are the genuine indorse-ments and signatures of the defendant E. W. Fry.”

This record does not contain such admission, and the issue of the genuineness of the indorsement of the checks is one of the most serious question arising on this record. The checks admitted were considerably over 100 in number. A serious question arising was that appellant did not sign his name or that of the payee upon the back of the cheeks. These issues were sharply contested. The state contended that the signature of appellant was genuine, and that the payee’s name was forged. These questions were to bo solved largely, if not exclusively, by the knowledge of the witnesses as to the handwriting of appellant. These transactions cover two or three years of time. The cheeks were introduced by the state upon the theory that it was necessary to prove intent of the appellant by means of systematic passing forged instruments. System is only used where it connects with the main fact, and this to show intent or knowledge or identity. Independent of these, system is not introducible as we understand the law. It is not permissible to prove independent transactions unless by doing so they show the intent of the accused, or connect him with the main fact; that is, the case on trial. The mere fact that system was pursued is not admissible independent of the other matters. The writer has not believed, nor does he yet believe, that these checks were admissible from any viewpoint of this record, or of the record in the case of Fry v. State, 182 S. W. 331. He took occasion in that case to note the fact that he did not believe the extraneous offenses, or the details thereof, should have been admitted, but the majority of the court did not take that view of the case or the law. But here we have an entirely different case from the former one, and in all of the cases there was an issue sharply drawn and hotly contested that appellant’s name was not genuine; that his name as written on these checks was not in his handwriting. The case is one of purely circumstantial evidence, and the court so charged the jury. In this case we are of opinion these checks should not have been admitted under the circumstances stated. In all of the: checks, amounting to a great number, the issue was fought with i ence to each check introduced as to the genuineness of appellant’s name. From the fact that his name was on these instruments, the deduction was supposed to be dra--that, if he signed his name upon these checks, he forged the name of the payee in the checks, or knew, if he did not sign the name, that the indorsed name was a forgery. This necessarily involves evidence as to the genuineness vel non of appellant’s name and of these various checks. So it will be seen from this statement that each check involved a separate trial as to that particular transaction, and we have the main trial turned aside from passing the instrument made payable to and indorsed by Lowe, which was the check upon which the indictment was based to all the other checks introduced. There is no question, it seems, of the fact that the check was genuine as drawn by Padgett, the alleged county treasurer. The fraud consisted in the indorsement of Lowe’s name upon the back of it, and passing the check in that condition. Lowe testified that he did not sign his name, and that the county did not owe him the amount for which the check was drawn. The same may be said of the other checks, practically all of them. It is a rule that only the case upon which the indictment declares a violation is to be tried. Extraneous or collateral offenses may be introducible to show intent, knowledge, or identity, and sometimes this may be inferred from system. But wherever the state turns aside and introduces collateral offenses, and it becomes necessary to prove the case, they are admitted with a view of ascertaining whether they are genuine. If not, they should not be introduced. This constitutes as many trials on the independent offenses as there are number of alleged independent offenses or collateral crimes. This diverts the minds of the jury and of the court from the case on trial. It involves trials separately upon each collateral offense to ascertain whether or not he is connected with that offense criminally. This was recognized by the court, and the jury instructed with reference to it. The court’s charge in this connection is as follows:

“The state has introduced in evidence a number of checks with their indorsements, other than the check mentioned in the indictment, and upon which the defendant is being tried in this case, and, with reference to these checks you are instructed: (1) That the said checks were only admitted in evidence for the purpose of showing the intent of the defendant and his system of conduct with reference to such checks, if in fact they show such intent and system of conduct, and they cannot be considered by you for any other purpose. (2) You are further instructed that you cannot consider for any purpose any such checks other than the ,T. T. L-owe check, except such, if any, as you may find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt were altered or knowingly passed as true by the defendant without lawful authority and with intent to injure and defraud.”

So it will be seen from the court’s charge, as well as from what has been said with reference to the fact, that appellant was tried upon each collateral offense, and the jury was so informed, and that they must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that these checks were altered or knowingly passed as true by defendant without lawful authority. Then in order to arrive at a conclusion on the part of the jury as a predicate for the consideration of the illegality of these checks,- they must first determine that they were fraudulent or altered. So it will be seen, before the jury could consider these collateral offenses as evidence, they must first determine, after hearing all the facts pro and con, that they were illegal and fraudulent before passing upon the intent of the appellant. If there were 150 to 200 of these checks introduced, the jury would necessarily, under the facts, under the issues and under the charge of the court, have to determine first whether these dliecks were fraudulent, and if so, then they might consider them with reference to the main case, but, unless they did so determine, they could not be so considered. That is the ef-feet of tile charge of the court. There is no question that appellant was tried on many of them on their merits, prerequisite to their consideration as evidence. Under such circumstances these checks were not admissible. The charge above quoted, as well as the fifth subdivision of the charge, seems to be erroneous. Esception was reversed to the fifth subdivision because it was illegal in various ways, and especially that the jury must determine whether or not defendant bd‘ lieved these checks were genuine or false, and, if they should believe that the indorse-ments were made without legal authority and with intent to defraud, then they should consider them; otherwise they should not. The theory of the defendant was that, as the state was relying upon the fact that he passed the instrument, it being a case of circumstantial evidence, the jury must find that he, and not the jury, believed the check was not genuine. If he believed the check was genuine, he . was entitled to an acquittal, because there would be no fraudulent intent. The jury must look at this case, as all the other cases, from the viewpoint of defendant, and not from their viewpoint. If defendant believed the check was not fraudulent, or that the indorsement was made with lawful authority, then he would not be' guilty, although he may.have passed it. But the court instructed the jury that it was their province to believe the indorsement was made without lawful authority and with intent to defraud. Of course, they must so believe, but as a prerequisite in a case of this sort they must also ascertain the fact that defendant' so believed. This matter, was a part of the case, and the jury should have been instructed to look at it from defendant’s standpoint as to whether he believed the indorsement was illegal. The exception to this charge is as follows:

“Because the same instructs the jury that, if the name J. T. Bowe was written on the .back of the instrument set out in the second count .of the indictment by defendant Pry, or any other person, the same would be forgery, and said paragraph assumes that the defendant knew that said indorsement to be a forgery.”

The belief of the defendant was a matter for the jury to determine, and not the court. We are of opinion this exception was well taken.

There is a bill of exceptions reserved to the action of the court, permitting the state to go into the homicide transaction, involving the difficulty and all of its details, as well as the preparation for the entering of the courthouse at night and taking checks from the vault, which finally resulted in the homicide. This matter was gone into in detail in many ways which we deem unnecessary to detail. The majority is of opinion this testimony was introducible. The writer is of opinion that if this attack was made upon the officer at the courthouse with a view of securing this and other illegal checks as a means of destroying testimony, then it was admissible, but is of the opinion that the details of the whole trouble are not admissible. It was not necessary to go into all details of the shooting affair, but if wrong about that then there is another question; that is, as far as the state did go into these matters as criminating, evidence, the defendant had the right to have witnesses present to meet and to introduce all' defensive evidence to meet the state’s evidence. The opposing side always has a right to explain any matter introduced by the other side which tends to incriminate or to be used adversely to him. This has been the subject of so many decisions, and, not only so, but by express enactment of the Legislature we deem it unnecessary to discuss that matter. It seems from the bill of exceptions that there had been a trial of the homicide case against appellant, and he had been acquitted. If the state upon another trial should introduce the trouble occurring at the courthouse which resulted in the homicide, then, as far as the state goes in introducing incriminating circumstances and facts against him, defendant would have the right to rebut this by any testimony legitimately meeting and contesting such crim-inating facts. This case, it occurs to the writer, is an exemplification of the rule that extraneous matters should be gone Into cautiously. This record seems to make it certain that a great number of extraneous matters were placed before the jury, the number of which the writer has not taken the trouble to enumerate, and all the facts and circumstances connected with each one of those collateral offenses introduced. These extraneous matters were proved before the jury by the state, and denied by appellant. So we have the jury trying as many different offenses in this case as there were collateral offenses introduced. Before the state could use these matters against the accused upon his trial, it was necessary for the jury to determine the guilt of the defendant or apparent guilt in each collateral offense. If there were 150 to 200 of those extraneous crimes, then the jury had to determine in 'each that appellant was criminally connected with it to authorize its consideration under the theory of system to show his intent or knowledge. In the case of Fry v. State, 182 S. W. 331, it is recited there were 500 or 600 of these extraneous crimes or offenses introduced. The statement of this matter ought to. show the error in the use of such testimony.

For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

PRENOERGAST, J.

All the cheeks and indorsements thereon held herein inadinissi-ble, in my opinion, were clearly admissible, and correctly so held in the other case appealed by him (182 S. W. 331), and that case is not distinguishable from this in principle.

All the testimony as to the killings which was admitted was clearly admissible.

This case should be affirmed! I dissent.

On Motion for Rehearing.

PER OURIAM.

Rehearing denied.

MORROW, J.

(concurring). The appellant was charged with forgery and passing a forged instrument. The count charging forgery was not submitted. The instrument involved was a check drawn by I. B. Padgett, county treasurer, on the Graham National Bank for the sum of $84.50, payable to J. T. Lowe. It bore the indorsement of J. T. Lowe and E. W. Fry, and was passed by E. W. Fry, ■ and the state’s theory that J. T. Lowe’s name was forged, and that the appellant passed the instrument knowing of the forgery, is sustained by the verdict of the jury. It appears that the county, by authority of the commissioners’ court, was engaged in certain improvements requiring -the employment of labor and teams, and that there was a custom, sanctioned by the commissioners’ court, under which persons to whom the county was indebted collected their money by presenting an account therefor to the appellant, who was county judge; that upon his approval the county clerk issued a warrant for the amount, on the delivery of which to the county treasurer a check was issued, payable to the holder of the claim, and that the check in question was the result of a transaction following this custom. The fact that the check came into the possession of and was passed by appellant was established. J. T. Lowe testified, in substance, that he was not entitled to either the warrant or the check, and that he did not receive, indorse, or authorize the indorsement of the check. There was testimony pro and con touching the contention that the name of J. T. Lowe was written on the cheek by the appellant. The cross-examination was conducted with a view of suggesting that, although the J. T. Lowe, who testified, had not indorsed the check, it was issued to and indorsed by another of the same name and innocently passed by appellant. To discharge the burden that was upon it to show that the check was forged, and that appellant with knowledge of the forgery passed it, and to meet the suggestion mentioned, the state introduced evidence of other similar transactions, which theory was that appellant conceived the purpose to fraudu- . lently withdraw from the treasury of the county some of the money, and devised to that end a system of making fictitious accounts, entering his approval thereon, ordering the county clerk to issue warrants therefor, and obtaining against the same the treasurer’s check upon the funds of the county made payable to the fictitious creditor of the county, which check he would pass after wilting the name of the payee and his own name on the back thereof. In support of this theory the state introduced a large number of accounts, warrants, and checks, with which it showed, or undertook to show, appellant’s connection. These transactions covered a period of about three years, part of them prior and part of them subsequent to that upon which the prosecution is founded. Their admissibility was challenged by the appellant. The general rule is, of course, that an accused is to be'tried upon the merits of the charge against him, and the proof of other crimes is not received. Gilbraith v. State, 41 Tex. 567, and other cases cited in Branch’s Ann. P. O. p. 99.

The question is, Does the proof made here come within one of the exceptions to this rule? That there are exceptions to the rule is as well established as the rule itself. Branch’s Ann. P. 0. p. 98, § 166, and cases cited. That cases of passing forged instruments, where there is an issue of guilty knowledge or intent, come within one of the exceptions has often beén affirmed by this court. Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645; Francis v. State, 7 Tex. App. 501; Heard v. State, 9 Tex. App. 20, and other cases cited in Branch’s Ann. P. 0. p. 864, § 1412. Mr. Wharton in his work on Criminal Evidence, vol. 1, p. 135, § 35, states what we understand to be the correct rule, as follows:

“Evidence of collateral offenses often becomes relevant where it is necessary to prove scienter, .or guilty knowledge, even though the reception of such evidence might establish a different and independent offense.” “In prosecutions for receiving stolen goods, guilty knowledge is the gist or substance of the offense to be established by the prosecution; and evidence of collateral offenses is admissible to establish such knowledge. It is equally important in forgery and counterfeiting to establish scienter. The accused is charged with holding or circulating forged paper. He may hold one without being justly chargeable with knowledge of its character; when 3 or 4 are traced to him, suspicion thickens; if 15 .• or 20 are shown to have been in his possession at different times, then the improbability of innocence on his part decreases in proportion to the improbability that such papers could have been in his possession without his knowledge of the true character of the paper. If the accused is charged with knowingly making or holding or passing the forged paper, the possession being shown, but knowledge of its character being disputed, the fact to be proved is that the knowledge was guilty knowledge; and it is admissible to show 'that shortly before or after the fact charged he had made or had held or had uttered similar forged instruments to an extent that renders it improbable that he should have been ignorant of the forgery.”

This accords with the rule stated by Mr. Wigmore in his work on Evidence, vol. 1, § 309. See, also, Ruling Case Law, vol. 8, p. 204. There being an issue of guilty knowledge in the passing of the instrument in question, we think that evidence that appellant passed other forged checks similar in character was admissible. To make them admissible, however, they must be forgeries, and the accused’s connection with them must be proved. Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645.

To identify the instrument with which appellant was connected, the state relied mainly upon the testimony oí I. B. Padgett, who was county treasurer at the time of the transactions. It is plain from the statement of facts that, in the operations of the commissioners’ court, under the custom above referred to, a great many valid transactions occurred. In other words, through the method mentioned a great many accounts were presented and proved by appellant, warrants drawn and checks collected, satisfj'ing valid claims against the county and going into the hands of the lawful holders. There is evidence of the banker who paid these checks that his only means of knowing that the particular checks submitted to him as a witness were paid to appellant was the fact that his name was indorsed thereon, and he admitted that he sometimes required indorsement for tire purpose of identification, and that the fact that appellant’s name was on the check was not conclusive to him that the check may not have been paid to the payee and the indorsement made for the purpose of identification. Padgett identified, as we gather from the record, 193 checks. The relevancy of these checks against appellant depended upon proof that the indorsement thereon was forged. To meet the legal requirement that proof of the forgery be made by it, the state relied upon various circumstances. As to some of the checks, we gather from the evidence that there was testimony that the supposed spurious indorsement was written in appellant’s handwriting. As' to others, the state produced witnesses who were residents of the county and whose names were identical with the payee in the checks, which witnesses declared that they had no connection with the check or its indorsement. As to some of the checks introduced in evidence and identified by Padgett, there was evidence that there lived in the county persons whose names corresponded with that of the payee. As to the major portion of them, however, the evidence showed that the payee, was unknown, and from this circumstance the state presented the theory that the warrants were obtained by appellant in the name of fictitious persons, and that he wrote, or caused to be written, upon the checks the fictitious name, writing his own thereunder and passing the check.

The witness Padgett in his testimony referred to several batches of checks, which he said he examined, and which bore the genuine indorsement of appellant. He gave testimony with reference to each of these checks, aggregating, as we estimate them, 193. He testified that most of the payees of the cheeks were unknown to him, though some of them were known, and from his testimony it is difficult for us to determine just how many of the payees he claimed to have known. The banker referred to testified to a wide acquaintance in the county, and in connection with his testimony there was introduced a detailed list of those who were unknown. In this list there were 144 name's.

There was evidence that the persons who worked for the commissioners’ court were both local and transient people. There was also evidence that other members of the commissioners’ court approved some of the accounts in the name of appellant. Ordinarily we understand the rule to be that, where the payee of a questioned instrument is represented to be or reside in the particular locality, and sufficient inquiry is made, developing the fact that such person is not known in the locality named, a finding of the jury that this payee is a fictitious person would be sustained. Greenleaf on Evidence, § 109; Cyc. vol. 19, pp. 1414, 1421. In this case a. number of persons to whom the county might have been indebted were transient, and some of the transactions introduced were quite remote, but, assuming that the proof met the legal measure that would establish the fact that the persons who were not known were. fictitious, and that the appellant forged the indorsement on these, and that he also forged the indorsement on the 6 or 7 with reference to which testimony was given as above stated, there remains some 40 of the checks identified by Padgett, with reference to which there appears to be no sufficient proof of forgery. They seem to be drawn by Padg-ett in favor of payees who were not unknown, and he gave no testimony to negative their genuineness nor to refute the validity of the indorsement. It may be that this is not a correct analysis of the evidence, and the counsel conducting the trial are able to point out evidence fulfilling the legal requirement that all of the collateral transactions used against appellant were forgeries. They have not in their brief, nor in their motion for rehearing, pointed it out, and we, after repeated readings of the statement of facts, have failed to discover it.

Giving full assent to the proposition of state’s counsel that, when conditions are such that collateral crimes are admissible against an accused, the state is not limited as to the number it may introduce, it cannot be denied that its right to introduce each of them depends upon its ability to introduce legal evidence competent to establish in a forgery case that the collateral transaction was a forgery.

No inference of a corrupt intent in passing the forged instrument declared on the indictment is to be drawn from the passing of a similar instrument which is not shown to be a forgery. We know of no rule which would inhibit use of circumstantial evidence to establish the fact, that an instrument provable as a collateral transaction was a forgery, but, as said by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Williams, 27 Vt. 725:

“To be entitled to any force, as it is only circumstantial and collateral to the main issue, its truth should be established beyond all question or cavil.”

And as said by Mr. Greenleaf:

“When such other instruments said to be forged are offered in proof of guilty knowledge, there must be strict proof that they are forgeries.” Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 3, § 1X1.

The principle that the proof upon which collateral crimes will become admissible must amount to proof, and that evidence of circumstances upon which a suspicion may be founded is not sufficient has often been approved. State v. Saunders, 08 Iowa, 370, 27 N. W. 455; People v. Altman, 147 N. Y. 473, 42 N. E. 180. This principle is recognized in Taylor’s Case, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 109, 81 S. W. 933, wherein the court says: •

“We would not be understood as hohlina- that contemporaneous suspicion against appellant would be admissible, but contemporaneous acts tending to show and make out a prima facie case of forgery or passing a forged instrument.”

The principle has been definitely affirmed in Ham’s Case, 4 Tex. App. 645.

Our conclusion is that in those instances in which evidence, circumstantial or direct, show prima facie that the collateral instrument was a forgery and was passed by appellant, it should be received, and that the record, as presented and as we read and understand it, shows that a number of instruments of this class were introduced in evidence, and the jury authorized to consider them against appellant, where there was an absence of sufficient evidence to prove that they were in fact forgeries, and'that in consequence of the admission of these a reversal of the case should be ordered.

There was evidence that after appellant was indicted for forgery he sought, without success, through his attorney, to have access to the various documents which bore upon these transactions that were in one of the vaults in -the courthouse, and that he subsequently undertook to go into the-■courthouse at nighttime and secure access to these documents. In his efforts to do so shots were exchanged between appellant and some of the parties with him, who were disguised, and persons guarding ■ the courthouse, these shots resulting in the death of ■one of appellant’s party and one of the guards. The efforts to accomplish this purpose were admissible. Parker v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 526, 67 S. W. 121. The incidents of the transaction which were proved were res geste of the transaction, and were .admissible as giving color to the acts and enabling the jury to weigh them in solving the controversy between the state and the' defendant as to whether his purpose was simply to inspect the documents, or to obtain and suppress the evidence of the offense. Wharton, Crim. Ev. § 748.

I concur in the order overruling the motion for rehearing.

DAVIDSON, P. J.

I agree to the overruling of state’s motion for rehearing, but adhere to the original opinion as my opinion of the case.

PRENDERGAST, J.

I concur with Judge MORROW in holding the forged checks were admissible. I think the proof was sufficient to admit all of them. Rut even if it could be held -the proof might be lacking, as to some of them, their admission was an immaterial error. I also concur with Judge MORROW in holding the facts of the killings objected to were admissible. Upon the-whole, the case should be affirmed, not reversed. 
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