Case ID: f-appx_689/html/0043-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Hassan Ali ABBAS, Esq., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard A. MARTIN, Esq., Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Defendants-Appellees.
    16-1089
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 27, 2017
    FOR APPELLANT: HASSAN A. ABBAS, pro se, Hanover Park, IL.
    FOR APPELLEES: KELLY M. DALEY (Peter A. Bicks, on the brief), Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, New York, NY.
    PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Hassan Abbas appeals pro se from a final order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Sullivan, J.) dismissing his complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

On July 16, 2014, this Court granted a motion for sanctions against Abbas in an unrelated lawsuit brought by Abbas and a Congolese corporation (of which Abbas was the sole corporate officer) against two banks that were represented by Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (“Orrick”). Abbas, a lawyer, was then “of counsel” to the law firm Handler Thayer LLP (“Handler Thayer”). Later that day, Richard A. Martin, then a partner at Orrick, notified Handler Thayer by email that if Abbas did not pay the sanctions, Orrick would “look to” Handler Thayer to do so. App’x at 33. When, soon after, Handler Thayer terminated its “of counsel” arrangement with Abbas, Abbas then filed the present action alleging that Martin’s email constituted tortious interference with Abbas’s business relationship. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to plausibly allege the claim.

Under New York law, which the parties agree controls here, a plaintiff alleging tortious interference must establish that “(1) [he] had a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) the defendant acted solely out of malice, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper means; and (4) the defendant’s interference caused injury to the relationship.” Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 17 (2d Cir. 2003).

“[A]s a general rule, the defendant’s conduct must amount to a crime or an independent tort” in order to constitute tortious interference. Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 3 N.Y.3d 182, 190, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100 (2004). Where (as here) no such crime or independent tort is alleged, a defendant may nevertheless be held liable if he engages in conduct “for the sole purpose of inflicting intentional harm on plaintiff ],” id. or, perhaps, if he has employed other “wrongful'means,” id. at 191, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100. Assuming, arguendo, the latter exception exists, the New York Court of Appeals has suggested that “ “wrongful means’ include physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions,” id and “extreme and unfair economic pressure,” id. at 192, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Abbas alleges that Martin’s email was motivated solely by malice and that it qualifies as “wrongful means.” As to malice, given Martin’s interest in ensuring that his clients collect the monetary sanctions they were owed, Abbas has not plausibly alleged that Martin’s motivation was devoid of “legitimate economic self-interest.” Id. at 191, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (requiring a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And Martin had at least an arguable basis under agency principles for seeking payment from the potentially deeper pocket of Abbas’s firm in the event Abbas defaulted. Under Illinois law (Handler Thayer is a Chicago firm), a law firm may be held liable for monetary sanctions imposed on one of its lawyers acting within the scope of his authority. See Brubakken v. Morrison, 240 Ill.App.3d 680, 686-87, 181 Ill.Dec. 398, 608 N.E.2d 471 (1992).

As to “wrongful means,” an email from one law firm to another informing it that it may be held accountable for the monetary sanctions imposed on one of its attorneys bears no resemblance to the type of conduct the New York Court of Appeals has identified as tortious interference. The email was neither fraudulent nor “extreme and unfair,” and therefore was not wrongful. Carvel Corp., 3 N.Y.3d at 192, 785 N.Y.S.2d 359, 818 N.E.2d 1100.

Accordingly, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 
      
      . According to Abbas, this was an informal arrangement and was not governed by contract.
     
      
      . This is especially true given Abbas’s undisputed use of Handler Thayer email and letterhead in the lawsuit in which he was sanctioned — in fact, the latter was mentioned in Martin’s email.