Case ID: f-appx_568/html/0028-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Andrew E. WISOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF SCHENECTADY, NEW YORK, Karen A. Drago, Schenectady County Court Judge, Defendants-Appellees, Laura Tracy-Ireland, Schenectady County Court Law Clerk, County Court, Schenectady, NY, Defendants.
    
    No. 13-2258-cv.
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    May 30, 2014.
    Andrew E. Wisoff, Niskayuna, NY, pro se.
    Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Denise A. Hartman, Victor Paladino, Assistant Solicitors General of Counsel, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Karen A. Drago.
    
      Alaina K. Laferriere, Carter, Conboy, Case, Blaekmore, Maloney, & Laird, P.C., Albany, NY, for City of Schenectady.
    Present: RALPH K. WINTER, JOHN M. WALKER, JR., JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption in this case to conform to the listing of the parties above.
    
   SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew Wisoff, pro se, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Schenectady and Hon. Karen A. Drago, Schenectady County Court Judge. In his proposed third amended complaint, Wisoff alleged that Judge Drago deprived him of procedural due process by dismissing, without notice and an opportunity to be heard, his appeal of his conviction and fine for city code violations, and that the City improperly benefitted by collecting the fine. Wisoff sought an order vacating the dismissal of his appeal, reinstating a stay on his payment of the fine, and directing the City to reimburse him for the fine. The District Court dismissed the action. The issues on appeal are whether judicial immunity and/or the so-called “Rooker-Feldman ” doctrine barred Wisoffs claims against Judge Drago, and whether Wisoff failed to state a claim against the City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

In reviewing the dismissal of Wisoffs complaint, we apply the familiar standards of review. “When reviewing a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 35-36 (2d Cir.1997). Dismissal of a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.2000).

We similarly “review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir.2009). We accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Id. The complaint “must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

Upon such review, we see no error in the dismissal of Wisoffs claim against Judge Drago for substantially the reasons stated in the District Court’s order— namely, that Wisoff failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction in light of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, in the alternative, that Judge Drago is entitled to judicial immunity. We also conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing Wisoffs due process claim against the City pursuant to Monell for failure for failure to allege a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused Wisoffs alleged injury. See Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018).

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of the arguments raised by Wisoff on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s May 7, 2013 judgment. 
      
      . Because Wisoff sought leave to file a third amended complaint while defendants’ motion to dismiss was pending, the District Court considered the merits of defendants’ motion in light of the allegations contained in this most recent complaint, which names only the City and Judge Drago as defendants.
     
      
      . Because die City moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), not 12(b)(6), the District Court’s dismissal of Wisoff’s due process claim against the City for failure to adequately allege Monell liability was a sua sponte dismissal. A district court may dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to state a claim so long as the plaintiff is given notice of the grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to be heard. Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991). Here, although the City moved to dismiss under the wrong Rule, its motion was entirely premised on Wisoff's failure to allege the existence of a municipal policy, practice, or custom that caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. As such, Wisoff had the required notice and opportunity to be heard.