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Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Glass, et al. Appellants, versus The Sloop Betsey, et al.
    1794.
    CAPTAIN Pierre frc~de 7ohannene~ the comifiander of a French privateer, called the Citizen Genet, ha.viiig cap- tured as prize, on the high feas, the flo6p Betfey, lent the veiTeI into Baltimore; but upon her arrival there, the owners of the iioop and her cargo filed a libel in the Diftria Court of Mary~- land, claiming reftitution, becaufe the veffel belonged to fubje&s of the king of Sweden, a n~utra1 power, and the cargo was owned, jointly by Swedes ai~d Americans. The captor filed a plea to the j'uiifdi~ion of tt,e court, which, after argument, was allowed ; the Circuit Court aflirn-ted the decree; and, thereupon~ the r~refent a~oea1 was itiffttuted.
    The generaFqueftkn~vas-Mrj~ether under the c~rcumftan- ces of this cafe, an ArneriéaivCouft of Adthiralty, h~s ju~i1d~c- tion to entertain the complaint, or libel, of the owners~ and to decree reffitution of the property ? It was argued by E. Ti/gb- man and Lewis, for the ~pp~I1aiits ; andby lPincbejler (of ~fd- ryid,zd) and The Poncean, for the aj~p~11ee.
    For the App ~#ant.ç the cafe was lrie~y opened.1 upon the ~ol~ lowing princi'ples~ rfhe quelUon is of great irnportaflce; and extends to the whole judIci~1 authority of the U~te4 States ; for, if the admiralty h~s no jurifdi~io~i, there can be no jurif-. d~&ion in an~ common l~w court. Not is it-material to dif- tinguifh the o~ierthip of the veffel and cargo; fince ftrangers, or al~ens, in amity, are entitled equally with Americans to navc their property protected by the laws. Vatt. B. 2. f. 101, 103. p. 267. There can be no doubt that this ~s a ~ivi1 caufe of ad- nHi;aILy and maritime jurifdiaion~ z~d fo within the very terms ofthe judi~ia1 a&. rtefdtution, or iio. reftitution, is the lead- in~ point; that nece11~ri1y, indeed~ involves the point of prizes orno Prize, as a 4efence for capturing but if the admiralty is once fairly poffeiTed of a caufe, i~ ha~ a ri~tht to try every ~1nCi- dental q~e~-ion~ That the veffel is a 1e~a1 prize, ~iiay be a good plea. to the fuit; but it is no~a good plea ~o the jqrildk- tion of the court; and the captor ~y br~ng~ng his prize ~ito an Arnarican port1 has blinfeif fubmitted co the American iurifdic- tion, which is in this inftance to be exercifed by the ~Judicia1, flit the Executive, department. Const. U. S. art. 3. s. 1. Jud. Act. f. 9. Doug. 580, 84, 5. 592. 4. Carth. 474. 1 Sid. 320. 3 T. Rep. 344. 4 T. Rep. 394, 5. Skyn. 59. T. Ray. 473. Carth. 32 6 Vin Abr. 515. 3 Bl. Com. 108. 1 Vent. 173. 2 Saund. 259 2 Keeb. 829. Lev. 25. Sid. 320. 4. Inst. 152. 154. 2 Bulsh. 27, 8, 9. 2 Vern. 592. 3 Bl. C. 108 2 L. Jenk. 755 727 733 751 754 755 780.
    
      For the Appellees, the captors (after some exceptions to the regularity of the appeal, which were waved by consent) it was observed, that this is not a libel for a trespass, and so within the jurisdiction of the District Court; because a seizure as prize, is no trespass, though it may be wrongful. Nor can any act subsequent to the seizure for securing and bringing the prize into port, give jurisdiction, if the seizure does not. Doug, 571. Neither can the question be, whether the taking was to illegal as to amount to piracy; and therefore, that there ought to be restitution; for piracy can only be decided in the Circuit Court. But the question raised by the libel is a question of prize; and the decision of that must precede the subsequent one of restitution; which, so far from being the main and original question, is the consequence of the former. Admitting, then, the present capture to be unlawful, because it is neutral property, still the District Court has no jurisdiction of a question of prize by the constitution and laws of the United States, nor by the laws of nations.
    I The District Court has no jurisdiction by the Constitution and laws of the United States (which form the only possible source of Federal jurisdiction) for, although it is admitted, that by the 1st and 2d sections of the 3d article of the Constitution, and the Judicial act, the jurisdiction of the District Court extends to all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; yet, it is denied, that prize is a civil cause of that description; nor can the expression vest a power in the District Court to decide the legality of a prize, even by a citizen of the United States. A citizen, indeed, can only make a prize when the United State are at war with some foreign power; but being at peace with all the world, no such question can now be agitated; and, of course, no jurisdiction, in such a case, can exist in any of its courts. By, comparing the act of Congress with the Constitution, it is obvious, that the former does not vest in the District Court, the same, or so extensive, a judicial power, as the latter would warrant. The Constitution embraces admiralty cases of whatever kind,—whether civil, or criminal, done in time of peace, or in time of war; but the act of Congress limits the power of the District Court to civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and the court can have no other, or greater power, than the act has given. Civil causes cannot possibly include captures, or the legality of a prize which can only be made in time of war. The words are used to denote that the causes are not to be foreign causes, or arising from, and determinable by, the jus be/li; but are fuch as relate to the community, a~riilng ~L-t the time of peace, and are determinable by the civil or zeni-ciptil law; whereas prize is hct a civil marine caufe; nor is it afubje&ofciviljurifdi~tion~ Doug. ~Ruth~ InJI. 595. Ifle juriicltc.tton Ot tfle a(Jtntralty courts o~ i~ng(ana, anti ot. the United States, arifes from the fame words; but it is ma~ nifeft, that the latter has no other jurifdi~t~on by la~v, than ~h~t which has been exeitifed by the Infiance court in England, wrncn is w1~e1y ditterent trom the prize courts though the powers are ufually exercifed by the fam8 perfon. The prize court can on~.y have contin~nce during war, and derives its powers from the warrant which calls it into aá~ivity. Doug~ 613. 2 Woodes. - ~5z. Golleffi. Jurid. ~z. The JnJlance court tierives its juritdi~tion troin a comrnhi4zon, enumerating particularly every obje& of judicial cognizance; but not a word of prize; any more than is contained in the a~ of Con-a grefs, wlienenuirierating the obje~s of judicial cognizance in the dif'tri& court. The manner of proceeding in thefe courts is totally different. The queffion of prize, or no prize, is the boundary line, and not the locality; and the nature of that queftion not only excludes the Injiance, but the common law, and all other courts; fo that whenever a caufe involves the queftion of prize, and a determination of that queftion muft precede the judgment, they will decline the exercife of jurif_ di~ion and refer it to the prize court. Befides, Congrefs have not yet declared the rules for regulating captures on land, or water; (Const. art. 1. Sec. 8. and if the district court is now court of prize, it is a court without rules, to determine what is, or what is not, lawful prize; for, the rules of au Infi~-tnce court will net apply. If, upoii the whole, the diltria court has no jurifdi&ion, under the aa of Congrefs, of acafe ofprizc by a citi±exi of the United Statei, it cannot have jurifdi6~iori of a prize by a citizen of France, which `is the queftion railed by th~ libel.
    II. The DiffrliEt Court has no ji~rifdi&ion by the law, ufage and pra~Uce of nations. The injury, if any, by the capture, is done by a citizen of France to the fubje~s of the King of ~Yweaen, anc~ to a citizen ot the United ~tates; and tlie quef.~ tion is, whether that injury is to be redrelfed in any court of the United States, who are in peace and amity, by treaties. with France and Sweden, and who are neutrafln the prefent war? Admitting, in the firft place, that Sweden is alfo at peace with France, ~nd neutral in the war, the injury, fo far, is an attack upon the iovereignty of Swed,n, which Sweden alone can take cognizance of: A neutral nation has nothing to fay to a capture, or ar~v other injury perpetrated by a citizen France on the of 8wedcn~ 1 8wedcn~ Bynk. 177. - F~itt. 6. 
      !~.J 54, 55. 4 El. Com~66. Vatt. b. 2. C. 6. iS.p. `44-. 249. to ~5. 4~q. Lee on Capt. ~5. 6, 7, 8,~. If the government of the United -States could not ixiterfece,a fortiori, its-courts ofjufcice cannot. 1 he lame realoning applies tothe cale of the American, w1~ole property is alledged to be captured; his application ought to
    
    
      be made to his government; theinjury he complains of, being of national, not of judicial, enquiry; and, indeed,the very care is provided for in the treaty between the United 3tates and Sweden.
      
    
    
      Hitherto the care has been corifideredas it appears from the allegations in the libel; but it is proper likewife to confider the law as it ~ri1es upon the fa&s difclofed in the plea. This plea to tj~e jurifdi5~ion ifates formally the exiftence of war be- tween Prance and £~gland; the public commiffion of the captor; the capture of the veffel and cargo on the high feas, as prize, alledging the fame to be the property of Bri~JJ, fubjcc~±s; ~nd the bringing the prize into port, by virtue of the treaty between America and France0 Upon this ftatement, two ad- ditional ohje~%ons arife to the jurifdi&ion of the Diftri~ Cou;t: ift~ That by the law of nations, the cciurts of the captor can aIQrle determine the queftion df prize, or no prize; and ~d. That the courts of Jinerica cannot take cognizance of the caufe, without a manifeft violation of the i7th artic1~ of the treaty between the Uaited States and France. 1. The right of a belligerent
    
    
      1. The right of a belligerentpower to make captures of.the property of the enemy is inconteftibIe~ and to inforce that iight, the law of nations fuhje&s ~he Ihips of neutral nations to f~arch, and,. in cafes of juffifiable fufpicion, to' feizure~ and detention; when the event of the enquiry, if an acquital is pr~noun.ced, will furnifh the criterion of dama~es. Doug 571. By capture the thing is acquired not to the indxvidual, but the Jiate; and the law of nations gives, as to the external effe~s, a juG property in movable or immovable~, fo acquired, whether from enemies, or offending neutrals; and no neutral power can be permitted to enquirement into the justice of the war, or the legality of the capture. 2 Wood. 446. Vatt. b. 3. S. 202. Lee on Cap. ~. The great cafe of the ~iIeJia loan is a decided authoritTin fupport of this argument. It is there expreisly ifated "that prize, or no prize, can only he decided by the admiralty ~ourts of that government to whom the captor belongs ;" and, confequently, " the ere&~ng of foreign juril- di~ions elfewhere to take cognizance thereot is contrary to the .knowu pra~tke of all i\ations, in like cafes ;-~ proceed~ ing which no nation can ad~it." GelleE~. 7iird. That an 4~merican
    
      
      American is a party to the suit, can make no difference; because, if the jurisdiction does not exist, it cannot be assumed, or exercised, in any cafe. In proof of the practice innumerable authorities may be adduced; from which, however, the following are selected: Treaty of 1699 between Great-Britain and Denmark;—of 1763, between Great-Britain, France and Spain;—of 1753, between Great-Britain and France;— of 1786, between the same parties; and the several treaties between the United States, and Holland, Sweden, and Prussia, respectively. Har. Law Tracts 466. Lee on Capt. 238. Doug. 616.
    If, as already has been shewn, the District Court is not vested with any separate power as prize court neither can it on the instance side of its admiralty jurisdiction, take cognizance of the question of prize, upon any principle or usage heretofore received as law. The question of prize is to be determined by the jus belli; whereas the instance court is a court of civil jurisdiction, regulated by the civil law, the Rhodian law, the laws of Oleron, or by peculiar municipal laws and constitutions of countries, towns, or cities bordering on the sea. It is not bounded by the locality of an act; but regulates its decisions by the laws peculiar to the nation by which it is constituted, in matters happening on the sea, which, if they had happened on land, would have been cognizable in the common law courts. 1 Bac. Abr. 629. 1 Com. Dig. tit. “ Admiralty." E. 12. 4 Inst. 134. But a, tort on the high seas being merged in the capture as prize, the instance court cannot have jurisdiction, unless the main question is at rest, which will never be the case, whether the libel is for restitution, or condemnation. 2 Lev. 25. Carth. 474.
    It is urged, however, that the captor has by his own act, in bringing the thing seized into port, and coming himself within the territory of the United States, made it necessary to proceed in the present form. But the original act derived its quality from the intention of the seizure, which was as prize; and the law precludes any court from deciding on the incident, that had no jurisdiction of the original question. The cafe of the Silesia loan. Coll. Surid. Before the bringing into port, the legality of the capture was triable only in the prize courts of France; the bringing into port was lawful by the law of nations; and if the American courts had no jurisdiction at the time of the capture, a subsequent lawful act could give none. 1 Lev. 243. 1 Sid. 367. 2 Lev. 25. Carth. 474. The cafes cited by the appellant’s Counsel, do not militate against this doctrine. The cases in 2 Sand. 259. 1 Vent. 175. Sid. 120. did not involve the question of prize; the sole controversy was, whether the taking of the vessel was piratical, or not, and whether a subsequent sale on land transferred the jurisdiction from the admiralty to the common law courts. The observation of Justice Blackstone (3 Bl. Com. 108.) is not supported by the authorities, to which he refers; and evidently arose from inadvertancy, or inaccuracy, of expression. Palaches case, 4 Inst. 154. 3 Buls. 27. 8. 9. was founded on particular statutes, which facilitated the mode of obtaining restitution of goods piratically seized; the question of prize never occurred in the investigation. Sir L. Jenkins reports a number of cases before the King in council, upon captures within the limits of the government; but they do not instance the exercise of any judcial authority in effecting restitution. If the act of bringing the thing into the territory gives any jurisdiction, it is to the sovereign, not the judicial, power. 2 Wood. 439. And the captain of the French privateer has done no act, which can authorize the exercise of jurisdiction over his person. The rule authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over persons coming within the limits of a country, has been narrowed down, by the voluntary law of nations, to cases where there is either a local allegiance, or voluntary submission. To this source might be referred the right of a government to punish faults, and decide controversies, between strangers, or between citizens and strangers: but still state has no right over the person of a stranger, who still continues a member of his own nation. Vatt. b. 2. f. 106. 108. Local allegiance is not due from a stranger brought in by force, or coming by licence; nor, if it does exist, does it give jurisdiction over faults committed out of the country, before a residence. Vatt. b. 4. s. 92. The captors, in the present case, came hither, by licence, under the sanction of a treaty; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed, that they intended to submit to the municipal authority; unless the presumption arises from the treaty: It does not so arise from affirmative words; and any implication is rebutted by the provision of the treaty, that they shall be at full liberty to depart. But, on the other hand, the principle on which depends the right of the country of the captors to decide, whether the property captured is lawful prize, is, briefly, because the captors are members of that country, and because it is answerable to all other states for what they do in war. 2 Ruth. Inst. 597.
    
    II. The interference of the American courts will be a manifest violation of the 17th article of the treaty with France. The terms of the treaty are clear and explicit, that the validity of prizes shall not be questioned; and that they may come into, and go out of, the American ports at pleasure. To decide in opposition to a compact, so unequivocal and unambiguous, would endanger the national tranquility, by giving a just, and honorable cause of war to the French Republic.
    
    
      For the Appellants, in reply. The arguments of the opposite counsel present three objects for investigation: 1st. Whether the treaty between France and the United States, prevents any arrest of the vessel and cargo, under the authority of our government? 2d. Whether the District Court is a prize court? and 3d. Whether, even if it is a prize court, the remedy, in the present case, ought not to be fought through the executive, instead of the judicial, department?
    I. The 17th article of the Treaty expressly extends only to “ ships and goods taken by France from her enemies;" and being in the affirmative, as to enemies, it affords a strong implication of a negative as to neutrals and Americans. If, indeed, the citizens of France may keep a neutral, as a prize taken from their enemies, they may likewise, any where abroad seize American property and American citizens in vessels, and our government cannot interfere, even in our own ports, to prevent their being carried away; since, according to the opposite construction, the article prevents any interference in any case. The words, however, are directly against that construction; and even were it otherwise, the absurdity and injustice of the consequences which flow from it, would demand a different construction. Vatt. b. s. p. 369. Gro. s. 22. p. 365. Puff. 544. s. 19. p. 1. rot. 358. s. 12. p. 2. Vatt. b. s. 282. p. 380. 381. The sense must be limited, as the subject of the compact requires; and when a. case arises, in which it would be too prejudicial to take a law according to; the vigor of the terms, a restrictive interpretation should be used. Vatt. b.s. 292. p. 391. Grot. s. 27. p. 361. Vatt. b. s. 295. p. 392.
    II. It is admitted that the Constitution gives to Congress, the power of vesting a prize jurisdiction in the Federal Courts; but, it is urged, that this power has not been exercised, because “all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction'’ which are the terms of the investment, do not include prize causes. In examining the judicial act, however, to discover the intention of the legislature; it is plain that civil is used, upon this occasion, in contra-distinction to criminal. In other parts of the act, the word “civil” is dropped; (sec. 12, 13. 19. 21. and in the 30th section a provision is made expressly for a case of capture. The truth, is, Admiralty is the genus, instance, and prize courts are the species, comprehended in the grant of admiralty jurisdiction. Doug. 580. 579. 582. 583. 594. 1 Sid. 367. 3 T Rep. 323. 1 Dall. Rep. 105. 6. Lord Mansfield does, indeed, say, that prize is not a civil and maritime cause, Doug. 592; but he, also says, that, it is a cause of admiralty jurisdiction. It is urged, that prizes can only be made in time of war; but it is sufficient to observe, in answer, that, however just the abstract proposition may be, it is equally clear, that prize courts may proceed in time of peace, for what was done in time of war. Doug. 583. Carth. 474, 4 Inst. 154. Buls. 13. 1 Lev. 243. Hume's Hist, of Eng. vol. 7. p. 431. 2 Sound. 259. 2 Lev 25. It is further urged, that the power of declaring war, and making rules respecting captures, is vested in Congress; and that Congress has made no such rules; but, surely, whether the rules were made, or not, (and they are proper to be established for a division of captures,) the property of an enemy, in case of a war, would be lawful prize. Those rules can have nothing to do with creating a jurisdiction. Nor is it available to say, that this question results from, war, and, therefore, is not of civil jurisdiction; for, taking the word civil as opposed to the word criminal, the consequence does not follow; and the distinction appears in 4 Inst. where the property was libelled civiliter, after an ineffectual attempt criminaliter.
    III. In Europe, the Executive is almost synonymous with the Sovereign power of a State; and, generally, includes legislative and judicial authority. When, therefore, writers speak of the sovereign, it is not necessarily in exclusion of the judiciary; and it will often be found, that when the Executive affords a remedy for any wrong, it is nothing more than by an exercise of its judicial authority. Such is the condition of power in that quarter of the world, where it is too commonly acquired by force, or fraud, or both, and seldom by compact. In America, however, the case is widely different. Our government is founded upon compact. Sovereignty was, and is, in the people. It was entrusted by them, as far as was necessary for the purpose of forming a good government, to the Federal Convention; and the Convention executed their trust, by effectually separating the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive powers; which, in the contemplation of our Constitution, are each a branch of the sovereignty. The well-being of the whole depends upon keeping each department within its limits. I n the State government, Several instances have occurred where a legislative act, has been rendered inoperative by a judicial decision, that it was unconstitutional; and even under the Federal government the judges, for the same reason, have refused to execute an act of Congress. When, in short, either branch of the government usurps that part of the sovereignty, which the Constitution assigns to another branch, liberty ends, and tyranny commences. The Constitution designates the portion of sovereignty to be exercised by the Judicial department; and and, among other attributes, devolves upon it the cognizance of “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction”; and renders it sovereign, as to determinations upon property, whenever the property is within its reach. Those determinations must be co-extensive with the objects of Judicial sovereignty; which, according to the nature of the objects, will be regulated by common law, by statute law, and by the law of nature and nations. It is competent to execute its decrees; and can, if necessary, raise the Posse Civitatis. To the Judicial, and not to the Executive, department, the citizen, or subject, naturally looks for determinations upon his property; and that agreeably to known rules, and settled forms, to which no other security is equal. Why, then, recur to the executive, when the property, in the present instance, is on the spot, and in the hands of the judicial officers? By what rules is the executive to judge? What forms shall it adopt? And to what tribunal shall we appeal from an erroneous sentence? Will it not be novi judicii, nova forma? As in Milo’s case, the eye of the lawyer will, in vain, look for veterum consuetudinem fori, et pristinum suorem judiciorum. But can the executive give complete redress by assessing damages; or accomplish equal and final justice, by ascertaining the rights of different claimants? Will the injured have its assistance, of course and of right, or as it may please the officers of State? And shall even American citizens be detained prisoners in our own harbours, depending for their liberty upon the will of a secretary of state? It will not be pretended, as the foundation for such a doctrine, that the executive is more independent, and less liable to corruption, than the Judicial power: And where shall be the boundary to executive interferences in questions of property, if it is admitted in the present case, which is merely a question of that description?
    If the property were to be removed from, or if it had never been brought within, the reach of the judicial authority, and it should be diverted by an unjust sentence abroad, then the citizen must, of necessity, avail himself of the executive authority, Through the medium of negociation, or reprisal. 1 Bl. Com. 258. 2 Ruth. Inst. 513, 4. 5. Lee. 46. 6. Sir T. Ray. 473. But, when the property is here, it is incumbent on the opposite party now, that the general jurisdiction of courts, which applies, prima facie, to every thing within their reach, does not apply in the particular case of the property of one neutral power captured, and brought into the ports of another neutral power. In the cases cited from Lee 204. Coll. Sur. 135, 137, 153, there had been regular proceedings in England, which the king of Prussia attempted to undo, by erecting a court of his own to revise them. Lee. 238, 9. And the obligation of the treaties that have been referred to, can only affect the parties; as they are matter of positive agreement.
    But even in England, the judicial power, possesses the jurisdiction, which is asserted to belong to the judicial power of the United States. The question is restitution, or no restitution, involving the question of prize, or no prize, brought forward by the captured, and not by the captor. The question of prize or no prize, is emphatically of admiralty jurisdiction, exclusively of the common law; and must be determined. agreeably to the law of nations. Doug. 580, 4, 5. 592, 4. Carth; 32. 474. 1 Sid. 320. 3 T. Rep, 344. 4 T. Rep. 394. 5. Skin. 59. Ray. 473. Carth. 32. The admiralty being once properly possessed of a cause, takes cognizance of every thing appertaining to it, as incident. 3 Bl. Com. 108. 6 Vin. Abr. 515. 1 Ray. 446. 2 Ruth. Ins 594. Besides, all these cases clearly establish a distinction between a want of jurisdiction, and a dismission of the libel for good cause. The case in 4 Inst. 154, and that of 2 R. 3. demonstrate, that where it is proved, 1st. That the sovereign of the complainant is in amity with our sovereign; and 2d. That his sovereign was in amity with the sovereign of the captor; the party may sue for restitution. The admiralty of England will decide, though a foreign power issued the captor’s, commission. 3 Bulsh. 27, 8, 9. 2 Vern. 592. Sir L. Senk. 755.
    The act of bringing the vessel into an American port, must be regarded as a voluntary election to give a jurisdiction, which they might otherwise have avoided. If the American courts have no jurisdiction, the captors avoid all jurisdiction, as they avoid that of their own country; for, the attempt by a French Consul to take cognizance in our ports, can never be countenanced. But shall they keep the vessel and cargo here ad libitum, and Americans, as well as neutrals, wait their motions? for, it is urged, that reprisals cannot issue till the courts of the captors have refused justice; and those courts cannot enquire into the merits till the vessel is brought within the jurisdiction of France.
    
      
       The Appeal had not been presented to any Court of Judge of the United States, but to a Notary Public of Baltimore, The Court directed, that the waver of the exception, by consent, should be entered, as they would not allow any judicial countenance to be given to the proceeding before the Notary.
    
    
      
      See th~ fecoi~d f~'parate ~i.
    
    
      
       See Hayburn's Cafe, 2 Val. p.
      
    
   THE COURT,

having keptthe caufe under advifement for feveral days, informed the counfel, that befídes thé queftion of jurifdidtipn as to the Diftrict Court,, another quefti.on fairly arofeupon the record,—whether any foreign nation had a right, without the pofitive ftipulations'of a treaty, to eftablifh in this country, an admiralty jurifdidfion for taking cognizance of prizes captured on the high feas, by\ its fubjedts or citizens, from its enemies ? Though this queftion had not been agitat- ; ed,.the Court deemed it of great public importance to be decided; and,meaning to decide it, they declared a defire 4o' hear it difcufléd. Du Ponceau, however, obfcrved, that the parties to the-appeal did .not conceive themfelves ¡ntérefted in the point; and that the French minifter had given no inftrUc-tions for arguing it. Upon which, Jay, Chief fuf ice, pro-, ceeded to deliver the following unanimous opinion.

BY THE COURT;

The Judges being decidedly of opinion, that every District Court in the United States, possesses all the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize court, and that the plea of the aforesaid Appellee, Pierre Arcade Johannene, to the jurisdiction of the District Court of Maryland, is insufficient: THEREFORE IT IS CONSIDERED by the Supreme Court aforesaid, and now finally decreed and adjudged by the same, that the said plea be, and the fame is hereby overruled and dismissed, and that the decree of the said District Court of Maryland, founded thereon, be, and the same is hereby revoked, reversed and annulled.

And the said Supreme Court being further clearly of opinion, that the District Court of Maryland aforesaid, has jurisdiction competent to enquire, and to decide, whether, in the present case, restitution ought to be made to the claimants, or either of them, in whole or in part (that is whether such restitution can be made consistently with the laws of nations and the treaties and laws of the United States) THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said District Court of Maryland do proceed to determine upon the libel of the said Alexander S. Glass, and others, agreeably to law and right, the said plea to the jurisdiction of the said court, notwithstanding.

And the laid Supreme Court being further of opinion, that no foreign power can of right institute, or erect, any court of judicature of any kind, within the jurisdiction of the United States, but such only as may be warranted by, and be in pursuance of treaties, it is therefore decreed and adjudged that the admiralty jurisdiction, which has been exercised in the United States by the Consuls of France, not being so warranted, is not of right.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the said Supreme Court, that this cause be, and it is hereby, remanded to the District Court, for the Maryland District, for a final decision, and that the several parties to the same do each pay their own softs.