Case ID: mont_174/html/0078-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "\n      MR. JUSTICE DALY", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

HARTEN JENSEN, Claimant and Respondent, v. ZOOK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION CO., Employer and ARGONAUT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
    No. 13671.
    Submitted June 7, 1977.
    Decided Aug. 31, 1977.
    568 P.2d 555.
    Harris, Jackson & Utick, Andrew J. Utfck, Helena, argued, for defendant and appellant.
    Harrison, Loendorf & Poston, Jerome T. Loendorf, Helena, argued, for claimant and respondent.
   MR. JUSTICE DALY

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Defendant-insurer, Argonaut Insurance Company appeals from the findings of fact and conclusions of law, order and judgment of the workers’ compensation court. The workers’ compensation court ruled insurer was liable to claimant for compensation benefits due as the result of claimant’s industrial injury.

On August 28, 1974, claimant suffered an industrial injury in the course of his employment with Zook Brothers Construction Co. An examining physician described the injury as a severe crushing injury to the left hand. Claimant incurred the injury when he was in the process of greasing a backhoe, one of claimant’s duties as an oiler on heavy equipment. The backhoe operator moved the backhoe bucket, crushing claimant’s hand.

The insurer accepted liability for claimant’s injury and made compensation payments to claimant for temporary total disability during the period August 28, 1974, through October 3, 1975, pursuant to section 92-701.1, R.C.M. 1947. Claimant’s disability status was changed to permanent partial disability and disability benefits were paid during the period October 4, 1975 through March 26, 1976. By letter dated October 10, 1975, insurer invited claimant to discuss a final settlement of the claim; the parties failed to reach any agreement on settlement of the claim.

By letter dated May 24, 1976, insurer advised claimant it had paid all benefits which claimant was entitled to under the Montana Workers’ Compensation Act. On June 14, 1976 claimant filed a petition for hearing with the workers’ compensation court alleging claimant was totally disabled as a result of his industrial injury of August 28, 1974, and was wrongfully refused compensation benefits. Claimant sought a ruling of the workers’ compensation court ordering that:

“1. Claimant continues to be totally disabled as a result of his industrial injury of January 1, 1976.

“2. That Defendant insurer wrongfully refused to reinstate biweekly compensation payments, and in accordance with Section 92-701.1, R.C.M.1947, the Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability payments at the weekly rate provided by law, retroactive to March 26, 1976, and is entitled to weekly temporary total disability payments as long as Claimant continues to be temporarily totally disabled as a result of his industrial injury.

“3. Claimant is entitled to that amount of compensation which represents the difference between the rate of compensation he was paid and the rate he should have been paid between August 28, 1974 and March 26, 1976.

“4. The Defendant has unreasonably refused to reinstate compensation payments, and in accordance with Section 92-849, R.C.M.1947, Claimant is entitled to an increased award of ten (10) per cent in accrued weekly compensation benefits.

“5. In accordance with Section 92-616, R.C.M. 1947, the insurer shall pay reasonable costs and attorneys fees.” (Emphasis added.)

Hearing was held before the workers’ compensation court on August 31, 1976. On November 15, 1976, the workers’ compensation court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law and order holding:

“CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
“1. That the claimant Harlen Jensen, was injured in the course of his employment with the Zook Brothers Construction Company on the 28th day of August, 1974.
“2. That the claimant is totally disabled within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
“3. That the Defendant, Argonaut Insurance Company, is liable to the claimant for all compensation provided by the Workers’ Compensation laws of the state of Montana, which are due as a result of the injuries received by claimant on August 28, 1974.
“4. That claimant is entitled to the payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees and for costs expended in the course of the Workers’ Compensation hearing and preparations for the same.” (Emphasis added.)

On December 6, 1976, the insurer petitioned the workers’ compensation court for rehearing. Insurer’s petition for rehearing was denied and judgment was entered for claimant on December 9, 1976. The workers’ compensation court’s judgment adopted the court’s conclusions of law, set out heretofore, and set claimant’s attorney fees and costs at $937.50.

On December 10, 1976, the Division of Workers’ Compensation issued a memorandum. It reads in pertinent part:

“The impairment rating as given by the attending physician of 5% has been paid out. There is no indication whether the Judge in his conclusion No. 2 refers to temporary total disability or permanent total disability, nor does it refer to any specific amount of compensation. Under the circumstances, I am unable to request the carrier to make any payments until we have some clarification as to what should have been ordered.”

Insurer appeals directly to this Court, from the final judgment of the workers’ compensation court, pursuant to section 92-852(2), R.C.M.1947. McAlear v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 171 Mont. 462, 558 P.2d 1134; Skrukrud v. Gallatin Laundry Co., Inc., 171 Mont. 217, 557 P.2d 278.

The insurer presents two issues on review:

1. Whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law and order, and judgment of the workers’ compensation court are intelligible and capable of comprehension?

2. If the first issue is resolved in the affirmative, whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the workers’ compensation court?

The law is clear in Montana that the findings and decision of the workers’ compensation court are presumed to be correct and if supported by credible evidence, must be affirmed. McAlear v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., supra; Skrukrud v. Gallatin Laundry Co., Inc., supra; Miller v. City of Billings, 171 Mont. 91, 555 P.2d 747.

The initial obstacle confronting this Court is determining the meaning of the conclusions of law and judgment of the workers’ compensation court. The issues which confronted the workers’ compensation court were:

1. Whether claimant is presently disabled, within the meaning of the Montana Workers’ Compensation Act?

2. If claimant is found to be disabled, whether claimant’s disability is total or partial, permanent or temporary?

3. To what amount of compensation is claimant entitled? The workers’ compensation court concluded “claimant is totally disabled within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law” and insurer “is liable to the claimant for all compensation provided by the Workers’ Compensation laws of the state of Montana”. Such a holding is incomplete and fails to provide this Court with a final judgment capable of being reviewed on appeal.

We refrain from considering the second issue on appeal — whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the workers’ compensation court, until its decision is clarified.

The cause is remanded to the workers’ compensation court for clarification, consistent with this opinion.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HATFIELD and JUSTICES HASWELL and SHEA concur.