Case ID: f-appx_688/html/0041-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Ames RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donald WATNICK, Julie Stark, Defendant-Appellees.
    No. 16-1705-cv
    United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
    April 14, 2017
    FOR APPELLANT: Frank Raimond, Raimond & Wong LLC, New York, NY.
    FOR APPELLEES: Cheryl F. Korman (Janice J. DiGennaro, on the brief), Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale NY.
    PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
   SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Ames Ray appeals from the district court’s decision granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

“We review de novo the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 179 (2d Cir. 2014)).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is hable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

I. Plausibility

We agree with the district court’s determination that none of the allegedly deceitful statements set forth in the complaint could plausibly be understood to be deceitful when read in the proper context. The district court analyzed each of those statements in its written decision and explained why each failed to raise a plausible claim of deceit under New York Judiciary Law § 487. We affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s thorough and well-reasoned written decision.

II. New York Judiciary Law § 487 “Extreme or Egregious” Standard

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint on the independently sufficient ground of the implausibility of the allegations of intentional deceit, we need not reach the issue of whether the allegations were, or needed to be, “extreme or egregious,” so as to satisfy the requirements of New York Judiciary Law § 487.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.