Case ID: sw_151/html/0812-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PRENDERGAST, J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

McCRARY v. STATE.
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    Dec. 4, 1912.)
    1. Criminal Law (§ 1091*) — Appeal and Error — Burden op Showing Error.
    On appeal from a conviction for unlawfully carrying a pistol, a bill of exceptions stated that a witness for the state testified that he saw a pistol in accused’s pocket and told him he had better behave himself or he would get into trouble. Appellant denied this, and objected to the testimony, on the ground that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and calculated to prejudice the jury against him, since he was not being prosecuted for misbehaving himself or disturbing the peace, but had pleaded guilty to that offense. The court qualified the bill by stating that accused had denied such statement, and that it was admitted as-a part of the res gestse. Held, that the bill was so meager in stating the status of the case as not to show any reversible error.
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal' Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2815, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091.*]
    2. Criminal Law (§ 1172*) — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.
    In a prosecution for carrying a pistol, where the court properly stated the law as to unlawfully carrying a pistol, an instruction that, if accused did unlawfully “have” on or about his person a pistol as charged, he should be found guilty, did not prejudice accused, because of the use of the word “have,” instead of “carry.”
    [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3128, 3154-3157, 3159-3163, 3169; Dec. Dig. § 1172.*]
    Appeal from Smith County Court; Jesse F. Odom, Judge.
    Oscar McCrary was convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and he appeals.
    Affirmed.
    C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   PRENDERGAST, J.

The appellant was convicted for carrying a pistol and fined $100, the lowest penalty. The evidence by the state is clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction. That by the defendant, if believed, would have justified an acquittal. The jury must have believed the state’s evidence, and disbelieved appellant’s. We cannot disturb the verdict.

By one bill of exceptions it is stated that one of the state’s witnesses, Jim Rushing, testified that when appellant was in his store in the afternoon of July 11, 1911, at which time he saw in the inside coat pocket of appellant what he took to be the handle of a pistol, he said to him, “You had better behave yourself, or you will get into trouble.” Appellant testified, and denied making any such statement. Appellant’s objection to this was that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and calculated to prejudice the jury against him. The objection further is that he was not then being prosecuted for misbehaving himself, or disturbing the peace, but had pleaded guilty to that offense, it seems, on the samé occasion, and had paid his fine therefor. The court qualified this bill by stating that appellant had testified, denying making such statement, and that this statement by Rushing was made to him at the time he saw what he took to be a pistol in appellant’s pocket, and was admitted as a ■ part of the res gestae; that appellant had pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace there on that same day; that this testimony could: not have in any way injured appellant’s-rights, especially as the jury gave him the minimum penalty. The bill is so meager in stating the status of the ease as not to specifically show that there was any error in the admission of this téstimony. His objections thereto were very general. It seems the evidence was admitted to impeach appellant’s testimony. This bill shows no reversible error.

By another bill appellant objects to that part of the court’s charge wherein he uses this language: “Now, if you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did, in Smith county, Texas, on or about the 11th day of July, 1911, unlawfully have on or about his person a pistol, as charged, you will find him guilty,” etc. The objection to this charge is the use of the word “have,” underscored above. This objection is hypercritical. The complaint and information charged that on said date appellant did then and there unlawfully carry on or about his person a pistol, and the proof by the state is that he did so carry a pistol. The court, in his charge, properly stated the law that, if any person shall unlawfully carry on or about his person a pistol, etc. Taking the charge as a whole, no possible injury could have occurred to the appellant by the use of the word “have,” instead of “carry,” under the circumstances.

The judgment is affirmed.