Case ID: f-appx_466/html/0589-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Mahendra Pratap SINGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC., a foreign corporation registered and doing business in the State of Washington; Baldor Electric Company, a foreign corporation registered and doing business in the State of Washington, Defendants-Appellees.
    No. 11-35250.
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Argued and Submitted Jan. 9, 2012.
    Filed Jan. 12, 2012.
    Harish Kumar Bharti, Esquire, Harish Bharti, Seattle, WA, Kenneth Robert Friedman, Sean J. Gamble, Friedman Rubin, Bremerton, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Michael A. Griffin, Karen P. Kruse, Catharine M. Morisset, Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendants-Appellees.
    Before: GRABER, FISHER, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
   MEMORANDUM

Rockwell Automation, Inc., and Baldor Electric Company terminated the employment of Plaintiff Mahendra Pratap Singh as a business development executive. Plaintiff challenged that decision in a lawsuit, but the district court compelled arbitration pursuant to the parties’ agreement, and the arbitrator dismissed Plaintiffs claims on the merits. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s orders confirming the arbitration award and compelling arbitration in the first place, and we review de novo. Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir.2010); Aramark Facility Servs. v. SEIU, Local 1877, 530 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir.2008). We now affirm.

1. We affirm the district court’s order compelling arbitration because the arbitration provision is not unconscionable under Washington law, either procedurally or substantively.

2. The issue of systemic bias — like other issues — had to be raised before the arbitrator but was not. Even assuming that the issue was properly preserved, and properly presented to the district court, the claim was not proved.

3. Plaintiff did not meet any of the statutory standards for refusing to enforce a binding arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir.2009) (“We have stated that for an arbitrator’s award to be in manifest disregard of the law, ‘[i]t must be clear from the record that the arbitrator ] recognized the applicable law and then ignored it.’ ” (alterations in original) (quoting Mich. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir.1995))).

4. We need not reach any issues related to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (“the Convention”), implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. Plaintiff failed to raise his objections to the Convention’s applicability in his opening brief; regardless, its applicability would not change the outcome in any respect.

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
     
      
      . The parties do not object to the district court’s decision to apply Washington law on this question.