Case ID: so3d_148/html/0127-02.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "PER CURIAM.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Robert ARMSTRONG, Appellant, v. STATE Of Florida, Appellee.
    No. 2D14-1600.
    District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
    Sept. 24, 2014.
    Robert Armstrong, pro se.
   PER CURIAM.

Robert Armstrong filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 on February 29, 2012. The postconviction court dismissed the motion as untimely, erroneously relying on the February 24, 2010, date of a memorandum of sentencing for the filing date of Armstrong’s judgment and sentence and concluding that Armstrong’s motion should have been filed by February 23, 2012. In addition to relying upon the wrong document for determining the date on which Armstrong’s rule 3.850 filing time began to run, the postconviction court overlooked the rule that the time for filing a postconviction motion is triggered by the date on which the judgment and sentence become final. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). When no appeal is filed, finality occurs thirty days after rendition of the judgment and sentence, which is the date on which the time for filing the notice of appeal expires. Westley v. State, 903 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Davis v. State, 687 So.2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).

Armstrong’s judgment and sentence were rendered on March 3, 2010. Because Armstrong did not file a notice of appeal, his judgment and sentence were final on April 2, 2010, and Armstrong’s February 29, 2012, motion was filed well within the two-year time limit. Accordingly, we reverse the postconviction court’s order dismissing Armstrong’s motion as untimely and remand for consideration on the merits.

Reversed and remanded.

ALTENBERND, LaROSE, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.