Case ID: f-appx_713/html/0683-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

Norma RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW PENN FINANCIAL, LLC, DBA Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, Defendant-Appellee.
    No. 16-15932
    United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
    Submitted February 13, 2018 
    
    Filed February 26, 2018
    Norma Rivera, Pro Se
    William Habdas, Attorney, Ariel Edward Stern, Esquire, Attorney, Akerman LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Defendant-Ap-pellee
    Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
    
      
       The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    
   MEMORANDUM

Norma Rivera appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. See Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l) because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the alleged communications were attempts to collect a “debt” as defined by the FDCPA. See Ho v. ReconTrust Co., 858 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[Actions’ taken to facilitate a non-judicial foreclosure, such as sending the notice of default and notice of sale, are not attempts to collect ‘debt’ as that term is defined by the FDCPA.”); Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 970-71 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “while the FDCPA regulates security interest enforcement activity, it does so only through Section 1692f(6)”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain suffi-’ cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claim under § 1692g because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she made a timely debt validation request or that defendant’s response failed to comply with the requirements of § 1692g. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

The district court properly dismissed Rivera’s FDCPA claims under §§ 1692d, 1692j, and 1692i because Rivera failed to allege facts sufficient to state plausible claims for relief. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692j and 1692i; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED. 
      
       This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.