Case ID: sw_204/html/1169-01.html
Source: Caselaw Access Project
Author: {"author": "DAVIDSON, P. J.", "license": "Public Domain", "url": "https://static.case.law/"}
Date Created: 2024-08-24T03:29:51.129683

SULLIVAN v. STATE.
    (No. 4676.)
    (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
    May 29, 1918.)
    1. Attorney and Client — Criminal Law <S=661 — Necessity of Proof — Waiver.
    While counsel cannot agree to waive the introduction of criminative facts, accused may if the waiver is warranted by law.
    2. Intoxicating Liquors <⅜=>39 — Local Option — Evidence.
    In a prosecution for violation of the Local Option Law (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5715-5730), the fact that local option was in effect in the county would not he considered as a criminative fact, so that, in the absence of objection, the admission in evidence of an agreement of counsel that the felony local option law was in effect in the county was not error.
    3. Intoxicating Liquors @=»39 — Local Option — Proof.
    Local option may be shown by oral testimony or agreement in the absence of objection.
    4. Criminal Law <S=>404(4) — Admission of Evidence — Reversible Error.
    In a prosecution for violation of the Local Option Law, the admission, over objection, of the supposed bottle of whisky turned over to the deputy sheriff liy the state’s witness, where the evidence as to the identification of the bottle as that purchased was not clear, was reversible error.
    Appeal from District Court, Grayson County; C. T. Freeman, Judge.
    Frank Sullivan was convicted of violating the Local Option Law, and he appeals.
    Reversed and remanded.
    H. P. xlbney and B. F. Gafford, both of Sherman, for appellant. -E. B. Hendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
   DAVIDSON, P. J.

Appellant was convicted of violating the Local Option Law (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5715-5730), his punishment being assessed at one. year’s confinement in the penitentiary.

The state’s case, in substance, is that Roberts, a deputy sheriff, gave the witness Gate-wood a dollar bill with which to purchase intoxicants. He testifies that he took the number of the bill and later during the day recovered it from appellant. Gatewood testified that Roberts gave him the dollar bill, and that he went with another, witness named Craven to appellant and bought whisky and paid for it with the dollar bill given him by Roberts. There is testimony of another witness for the state,' who was a constable in one of the outlying precincts, to the effect that he saw the witness Gatewood come from appellant’s place of business, and later they got the whisky from his person. Gatewood says there were two or three other parties in the house at the time he made the purchase, but these witnesses were not used on the trial. Craven testified that Gatewood came to a barber shop and gave him a drink of whisky out of a. bottle which he had then in his possession; that this was before Gatewood claimed to have gone to appellant’s place of business. In fact, Craven denies the testimony of Gatewood, and shows that Gatewood had the whisky before he saw appellant, and that he (Craven) borrowed 50 cents from Gatewood, and Gatewood informed him he had no money except this dollar bill, which he handed to Craven, and Craven went to appellant’s place of business and changed it and got in return two half silver dollars. This accounts, from defendant’s standpoint, for the whisky, and for the fact that appellant had the dollar bill. Appellant’s theory seems to be, from this testimony, that this was a sale by Gatewood to Roberts for the dollar hill, and that he did not purchase the whisky from appellant, but had it in his possession, and later gave the whisky to Roberts in return for the dollar bill.

There is an agreement set out in quotations in the record to the effect that the felony local option law was in force in Gray.-r son county, and had been since 1910 up to the present time. There was no objection urged to this testimony at the time it was offered. Had an objection been made, the court would have sustained it. We are of opinion under the authorities, as the matter is presented, it does not constitute reversible error. While counsel cannot agree to waive the introduction of criminative facts, the defendant may if the waiver is warranted by law; but the fact that local option was in effect would not be considered as a crimina-tive fact, and in the absence of objection we are of opinion this was not error. This matter came for decision in Morton v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. at page 133, 38 S. W. 1019. The opinion was written by Judge Hurt, in which the proposition was laid down that local option may be shown by oral testimony or agreement, in the absence of objection. The same proposition is laid down in Eoff v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 245, 170 S. W. 707. Also in this connection see Bills v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 541, 117 S. W. 835.

A bill of exceptions was reserved to the admission of the supposed bottle of whis-ky turned over to Roberts by Gatewood. The •evidence as to the identification of the bottle as that purchased is not clear and is seri•ously contested; but the bill recites, substantially, that over several objections by appellant the bottle was- permitted to go to the jury as well as its contents. We are of •opinion this was not only error, but, under the circumstances of this case, of sufficient importance to require a reversal of the judgment. See Dane v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 86, 35 S. W. 661; Parker v. State, 75 S. W. 31; Branch’s Ann. P. C. p. 702; Alexander v. State, 204 S. W. 644, recently decided.

For this error, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded. 
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