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[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that rules setting forth time limits for a defendants motion for a new trial grounded on a reason other than newly discovered evidence are not jurisdictional but instead are nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rules", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony" ]
); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455-56, 124
2
1
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding as a matter of law no justifiable reliance on statements like the deal is real and we will fund next week also observing statement loan was a done deal not sufficient to support claim for negligent misrepresentation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient" ]
). We conclude there is no evidence to support
2
2
[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proving the facts required for disqualification", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee ", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the trial court must determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden" ]
) (internal quotation marks omitted). Third,
3
3
[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that copyright protection of computer programs extend beyond the programs literal code to their structure sequence and organization", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc 1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc 101 et seq", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works" ]
). A copyright owner possesses the exclusive
4
4
[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (recognizing that under district of columbia law what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding it is a question of fact", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding under predecessor to 46 usc app 1903a that jurisdictional element of crime is question of fact for jury to decide" ]
). Defendants claim they objected to the
4
5
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding that purchase of search terms is a use in commerce", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding the exclusivity element is satisfied by showing that others do not jointly possess or use the land" ]
); see also City of Akron v. Budiani, 52 Ohio
3
6
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding supervisors reference to plaintiff as that white boy was sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory intent for mixedmotives jury instruction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given" ]
); Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d
1
7
[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that even though the defendant had not been given actual notice of his registration obligations under sorna his prosecution under that statute did not violate his due process rights under lambert where he was on notice that state law required sex offenders to register", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding failure to give putative father notice of adoption proceedings did not violate due process where he had never established a substantial relationship with his child", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights" ]
); United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 468
0
8
[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error" ]
). In CACI Field Services, Inc. v. United
3
9
[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that rule 60b jurisdiction is lacking for appeals raising issues decided either explicitly or by necessary implication by this court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review" ]
), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 220, 642 S.E.2d
4
10
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations" ]
); Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa
3
11
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden" ]
). IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the sentence handed
1
12
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that factors used in determining whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy hearsay exceptions also apply to whether statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under confrontation clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that thirdparty statements contained in dcfs caseworker reports constituted hearsay", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception" ]
). Because the Spa does not contend that the
3
13
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing that an exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare can justify impairment of contractual rights and obligations", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (holding in a suit by cellphone providers that fjederal telecommunications law implicitly acknowledges the importance of the state interest in enforcing its consumerprotection statutes by leaving states some latitude to protect the public safety and welfare and safeguard the rights of consumers quoting 47 usc 253b", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters" ]
); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 F.Supp.
2
14
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that mandate did not preclude the trial court from considering unconscionability argument on remand because that issue had not been decided by the trial court nor considered by this court in the first appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that trial court did not err", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the factors in utah code section 7684012 the trial court complied with the statute by relying on presentence reports that included the pertinent information", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that where the government filed an information identifying the conviction relied upon to enhance defendants sentence and counsel told the court that the defendant did not dispute the conviction the trial judges sentencing ritual here complied with the requirements of 851b", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report" ]
). We conclude that the trial court did not
2
15
[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection" ]
); In re Adoption of Taylor, 678 S.W.2d 69,
1
16
[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity" ]
); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 36
2
17
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that there was no interrogation where the police asked only routine booking questions that did not relate even tangentially to criminal activity moreover there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these questions or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda citations omitted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that questions regarding a defendants name address height weight eye color birth date and current age constituted custodial interrogation but fell within the routine booking question exception which exempts from mirandas coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services but observing that that the exception would not apply to questions posed during the booking process that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions citations and internal quotation signals omitted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that questions concerning the place and date of birth fall within the routine booking question exception to miranda" ]
). 21 . We expressly decline to adopt, as a
2
18
[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (recognizing that reciprocal obligations of parent and child are essentials of the family relationship", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due" ]
). Moreover, in addition to any order that the
1
19
[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding that intent need not be express and in fact need not actually exist in the owners mind but may be implied from acts and conduct of the owner which are unequivocally and convincingly indicative of a dedication and upon which the public has a right to and does rely", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding because dedication is a theory premised on estoppel the owner can be precluded from resuming rights over the property if the public acts upon the owners manifestations", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware" ]
). [¶ 16] A common-law dedication must be proven
0
20
[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that when the purpose of the request is to compare the testimony of jurors but no such comparison was made at the trial level a court need not provide a free voir dire transcript", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that trial minutes were not sufficient substitute for transcript of voir dire and could not afford meaningful review when both sides exercised peremptory challenges", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that missing portions of transcript of voir dire did not entitle the defendant to a new trial for murder because the alleged errors in jury selection were harmless as a matter of law" ]
). As did the Florida Supreme Court in Delap v.
4
21
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that a timely filed motion for sanctions which specifically requested modification of judgment extended trial courts plenary power", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (recognizing that the idea bars an award of attorneys fees for work performed subsequent to a settlement offer of all requested relief", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees" ]
); Kirschberg v. Lowe, 974 S.W.2d 844, 847-48
3
22
[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding five complaints of excessive force over twentytwomonth period sufficient to sustain jury verdict", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims" ]
), with Seri v. Town of Newtown, 573 F.Supp.2d
2
23
[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper where students injuries were the result of an unforeseeable attack by other students before school", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith" ]
); Hickert v. Wright, 182 Kan. 100, 319 P.2d
3
24
[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding defendant did not demonstrate that commonwealth failed to act diligently in commencing revocation hearing or that defendant prejudiced by delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance due to the alleged conflict of interest because the defendant failed to demonstrate a conflict as nothing was presented to refute the attorneys testimony that his loyalty was to his clients", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit" ]
). The defendant received a probation revocation
2
25
[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that under the applicable statutory provisions a person need not be impoverished or devoid of all assets to qualify as an indigent sick person but only that the person be unable to pay for necessary medical care", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that a person is seized for purposes of article i section 7 of the hawaii constitution when a police officer approaches that person for the express or implied purpose of investigating him or her for possible criminal violations and begins to ask for information", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim" ]
). In Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., supra, the
0
26
[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that a private right of action exists", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that no private right of action exists", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that such a duty exists" ]
)). Like the courts in the legal malpractice
4
27
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent 1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense" ]
), on which Justice Acoba relies, see concurring
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28
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se" ]
). DAVIS, POLSTON, and THOMAS, JJ.,
3
29
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search" ]
); Minnesota v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218, 220
3
30
[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law" ]
). In Ahmed, the plaintiff was hired to work as
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31
[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that an employee engages in protected activity under the first amendment when he threatens to file a lawsuit on a matter of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern" ]
). Association Claim The gravamen of this claim
0
32
[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employee requesting unforeseeable medical leave is not required to even mention the fmla when requesting leave for a serious health condition", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc 2612a1 has occurred", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employer may deny restoration when it can show that it would have discharged the employee in any event regardless of the leave" ]
) Although “[t]he employee need not assert his
3
33
[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis to support a finding of probable cause because the affidavit recounted the alleged criminal activity in detail", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that the defendant who filed a timely motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged fourth amendment violation in the district court but failed particularly to argue that the detectives affidavit was inadequate to provide the magistrate judge with probable cause waived his affidavit argument on appeal pursuant to fedrcrimp 12e", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed where the supporting affidavit elaborated on the crime in detail", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable " ]
). Indeed, contrary to Norris's assertion,
0
34
[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for itto comply with both federal and state requirements and reasoning that it offered no such evidence and never argued that it attempted to give a warning but was prohibited from doing so by the fda", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that it is not", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that it may not", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding insurers uim offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with department of insurance guidelines" ]
). Although there have been a limited number of
0
35
[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that a defendant may be convicted of theft twice on the basis of intentional possession at one time of stolen property if the property forming the basis of the one conviction was stolen at different times and places from different owners than the property forming the basis of the second conviction", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (recognizing that defendants intent to return stolen items to their rightful owner is a valid defense to charge of receiving stolen property" ]
). Consequently, the Court found that the
3
36
[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that for today at least persons of hispanic origin must be accorded the protections of section 1981", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that plaintiffs complaint which included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination was sufficient to provide notice of plaintiffs age and national origin discrimination claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting the racial character of the rights being protected ", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin" ]
); Enriquez v. Honeywell, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 901,
0
37
[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding sworn statements made during a codefendants plea colloquy were properly received as substantive evidence pursuant to fedrevid 801d1a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied" ]
). Moreover, because Nicholson did not move in
2

Adapting LLMs to Domains via Continual Pre-Training (ICLR 2024)

This repo contains the evaluation datasets for our paper Adapting Large Language Models via Reading Comprehension.

We explore continued pre-training on domain-specific corpora for large language models. While this approach enriches LLMs with domain knowledge, it significantly hurts their prompting ability for question answering. Inspired by human learning via reading comprehension, we propose a simple method to transform large-scale pre-training corpora into reading comprehension texts, consistently improving prompting performance across tasks in biomedicine, finance, and law domains. Our 7B model competes with much larger domain-specific models like BloombergGPT-50B.

[2024/6/21] 🤗 We release the 2nd version of AdaptLLM at Instruction-Pretrain, effective for both pre-training from scratch and continual pre-training 🤗

**************************** Updates ****************************

1. Domain-Specific Models

LLaMA-1-7B

In our paper, we develop three domain-specific models from LLaMA-1-7B, which are also available in Huggingface: Biomedicine-LLM, Finance-LLM and Law-LLM, the performances of our AdaptLLM compared to other domain-specific LLMs are:

LLaMA-1-13B

Moreover, we scale up our base model to LLaMA-1-13B to see if our method is similarly effective for larger-scale models, and the results are consistently positive too: Biomedicine-LLM-13B, Finance-LLM-13B and Law-LLM-13B.

LLaMA-2-Chat

Our method is also effective for aligned models! LLaMA-2-Chat requires a specific data format, and our reading comprehension can perfectly fit the data format by transforming the reading comprehension into a multi-turn conversation. We have also open-sourced chat models in different domains: Biomedicine-Chat, Finance-Chat and Law-Chat.

LLaMA-3-8B (💡New!)

In our recent research on Instruction-Pretrain, we developed a context-based instruction synthesizer to augment the raw corpora with instruction-response pairs, enabling Llama3-8B to be comparable to or even outperform Llama3-70B: Finance-Llama3-8B, Biomedicine-Llama3-8B.

2. Domain-Specific Tasks

Pre-templatized Testing Splits

To easily reproduce our prompting results, we have uploaded the filled-in zero/few-shot input instructions and output completions of the test each domain-specific task: biomedicine-tasks, finance-tasks, and law-tasks.

Note: those filled-in instructions are specifically tailored for models before alignment and do NOT fit for the specific data format required for chat models.

Evaluating Any Huggingface LMs on Domain-Specific Tasks (💡New!)

You can use the following script to reproduce our results and evaluate any other Huggingface models on domain-specific tasks. Note that the script is NOT applicable to models that require specific prompt templates (e.g., Llama2-chat, Llama3-Instruct).

1). Set Up Dependencies

git clone https://github.com/microsoft/LMOps
cd LMOps/adaptllm
pip install -r requirements.txt

2). Evaluate the Model

# Select the domain from ['biomedicine', 'finance', 'law']
DOMAIN='law'
  
# Specify any Huggingface model name (Not applicable to chat models)
MODEL='AdaptLLM/law-LLM'
  
# Model parallelization:
# - Set MODEL_PARALLEL=False if the model fits on a single GPU. 
#   We observe that LMs smaller than 10B always meet this requirement.
# - Set MODEL_PARALLEL=True if the model is too large and encounters OOM on a single GPU.
MODEL_PARALLEL=False
  
# Choose the number of GPUs from [1, 2, 4, 8]
N_GPU=1
  
# Whether to add a BOS token at the beginning of the prompt input:
# - Set to False for AdaptLLM.
# - Set to True for instruction-pretrain models.
# If unsure, we recommend setting it to False, as this is suitable for most LMs.
add_bos_token=False

# Run the evaluation script
bash scripts/inference.sh ${DOMAIN} ${MODEL} ${add_bos_token} ${MODEL_PARALLEL} ${N_GPU}

Raw Datasets

We have also uploaded the raw training and testing splits, for facilitating fine-tuning or other usages: ChemProt, RCT, ConvFinQA, FiQA_SA, Headline, NER, FPB

Domain Knowledge Probing

Our pre-processed knowledge probing datasets are available at: med_knowledge_prob and law_knowledge_prob

Citation

If you find our work helpful, please cite us:

@inproceedings{
cheng2024adapting,
title={Adapting Large Language Models via Reading Comprehension},
author={Daixuan Cheng and Shaohan Huang and Furu Wei},
booktitle={The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations},
year={2024},
url={https://openreview.net/forum?id=y886UXPEZ0}
}
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