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[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding seventh state petition for postconviction relief which was based on newly discovered evidence but rejected by the state courts because the evidence was not newly discovered was properly filed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that rules setting forth time limits for a defendants motion for a new trial grounded on a reason other than newly discovered evidence are not jurisdictional but instead are nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rules", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that newly discovered evidence must be that which existed at the time of trial but for an excusable reason was not discoverable until later", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof § 3583(e)(3) was reasonably foreseeable and provided the defendant with a fair warning. Thus, it was not unconstitutional to apply Johnson retroactively. Although Seals is unpublished, and thus not binding, Seals is authoritative and persuasive. Therefore, applying Johnson retroactively to Martinez’s 1993 conviction does not violate the Due Process Clause, and the district court did not plainly err in reimposing supervised release after the first revocation. Accordingly, Martinez’s sentence is affirmed. AFFIRMED; MOTION DISMISSED AS MOOT. 1 . See, e.g., United States v. Golding, 739 F.2d 183, 184 (5th Cir.1984). 2 . Ketchum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.1986). 3 . See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S.Ct. 403, 406-07, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the evidence would serve only to impeach testimony" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding that whether the plaintiffs reliance on a negligent misrepresentation is justified generally raises a question of fact", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding as a matter of law no justifiable reliance on statements like the deal is real and we will fund next week also observing statement loan was a done deal not sufficient to support claim for negligent misrepresentation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprincipal was an experienced, self-employed businessman who had completed numerous large commercial real estate transactions, (1) admitted that the lender’s employees also had stated the proposal had to be presented to the loan committee, (2) knew the loan committee’s approval was a necessary prerequisite to restructuring, and (3) was in receipt of frequent correspondence from the lender’s attorneys threatening foreclosure and repeatedly posting property securing the loan for sale. Id. at 907, 909-10. In the present case, Schleider had been in the restaurant business since 1974, during which time he had arranged many loans. He testified there had been “renewals and everything had been via telephone. We’d go in and sign what we talked about on the te d 723, 730, 732-33 (N.D.Tex.1999) (holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the moving party bears a heavy burden of proving the facts required for disqualification", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee ", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that the trial court must determine whether the contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion and the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nStates Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has clarified, however, that when a contract award is challenged, based on regulatory or procedural violation, “the disappointed bidder must show a clear and prejudicial violation of applicable statutes or regulations.” Axiom Res. Mgmt. v. United States, 564 F.3d 1374, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, if an award decision is challenged as lacking a rational basis, the trial court “must sustain an agency action unless the action does not evince rational reasoning and consideration of relevant factors.” Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, 595 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed.Cir.2010) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); see also Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1037 (Fed.Cir.2009) (recognizing that trial court has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence and party claiming abuse of that discretion bears a heavy burden" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that copyright protection of computer programs extend beyond the programs literal code to their structure sequence and organization", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that because literary works including compilations and derivative works are within the subject matter of copyright state common law that purported to protect a work for which plaintiffs copyright action was unsuccessful was preempted", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (holding that prejudgment interest ordinarily should be awarded on damages pursuant to claims under the copyright act of 1909 17 usc 1 et seq 1976 ed superceded by the copyright act of 1976 17 usc 101 et seq", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nSecond, the court has concluded that the issues of fact are material, i.e. resolution of the issues might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.’ ” Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Colston v. Barnhart, 146 F.3d 282, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1054, 119 S.Ct. 618, 142 L.Ed.2d 557 (1998)). B. The Copyright Act Standard The Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Although copyright does not extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, or methods of operation, it is well established that the protection encompasses software. See Computer Management Assistance Co. v. Robert F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2000) (recognizing that the copyright act was amended in 1976 to include computer programs in the definition of protectable literary works" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that generally the question of waiver and estoppel is a question of fact", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (recognizing that under district of columbia law what the parties deem to be the material elements of their agreement either set forth in or absent from those documents is largely a question of fact for the jury and concluding in that case that whether an enforceable oral contract was created and was subsequently breached is a question of fact for the jury to decide not this court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding it is a question of fact", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nboat. All six (Martinez-Rios, Ramirez-Fajardo, Castaneda-Marin, Sanchez-Martinez, Ortiz-Cotoa and Carmargo-Silvera) were charged with conspiracy to possess and with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1903(a) and 1903(j), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Carmargo-Silv-era pled guilty and testified on behalf of the government. The remaining five went to trial and were convicted. Discussion Defendants claim the district court erred by deciding, as a matter of law, that the MS was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as required by 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a). Defendants claim that jurisdiction is an element of the offense and should have been submitted for determination by the jury. See U.S. v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (11th Cir.1987) (holding under predecessor to 46 usc app 1903a that jurisdictional element of crime is question of fact for jury to decide" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding that purchase of search terms is a use in commerce", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding because legislature knew how to include terms within statutory definition and did not do so statutory definition did not include terms in light of the terms contemporaneous inclusion of the same terms in a separate provision", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding unconstitutionally broad a statute prohibiting the use of opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding that the inclusion of the terms use and possess in a state law prohibiting the possession storage use manufacture or sale of fireworks in counties exceeding a certain population do not render the states exercise of police power unduly oppressive or unconstitutional", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n(ruling that a city’s fireworks ordinance does not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution because the statute was a reasonable means for attaining the legitimate end of preventing the proliferation of fireworks outlets that, if allowed, would impose unacceptable burdens on the police department in regulating such businesses and protecting the public welfare); South Dakota Dep’t of Pub. Safety ex rel. Melgaard v. Haddenham, 339 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D.1983) (noting that the power of the government to regulate and restrain the use of fireworks does not represent an invalid exercise of the state’s police power and does not amount to a taking of property without just compensation); B & B Distrib. Co. v. Metropolitan Nashville, 667 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App.1983) (holding the exclusivity element is satisfied by showing that others do not jointly possess or use the land" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding good faith jury instruction is not necessary when the court has given an adequate specific intent instruction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding supervisors reference to plaintiff as that white boy was sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory intent for mixedmotives jury instruction", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that circumstantial evidence alone may establish discriminatory intent", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (recognizing that whether an employee uses the mcdonnell douglas approach or relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent the employee must counter the employers legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action in such a manner as to create a genuine issue as to discriminatory intent", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwas in part motivated by her pregnancy. “Direct evidence is that which demonstrates ‘a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged [employment] decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated [the employer’s] decision’ to take adverse employment action.” Deneen at 436 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)). In finding direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination in Deneen, the Eighth Circuit noted that remarks about the plaintiffs pregnancy “were made contemporaneously and directly in connection with the adverse employment decision.” Deneen at 436. See also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that when no objection was made to jury instruction evidence to support finding based on instruction should be assessed in light of the instruction given" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that even though the defendant had not been given actual notice of his registration obligations under sorna his prosecution under that statute did not violate his due process rights under lambert where he was on notice that state law required sex offenders to register", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding failure to give putative father notice of adoption proceedings did not violate due process where he had never established a substantial relationship with his child", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that a creditor who had received actual notice of a bankruptcy proceeding through his counsel did not suffer a due process violation because he had notice in time to file a complaint or at least to file a timely motion for an extension of time", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that due process rights were not violated when alien claimed a lack of actual notice but his attorney received notice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nUnited States v. Hutzell, 217 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir.2000) (”[A]n individual’s domestic violence conviction should itself put that person on notice that subsequent possession of a gun might well be the subject of regulation.... Although an individual’s right to bear arms is constitutionally protected, the possession of a gun, especially by anyone who has been convicted of a violent crime, is nevertheless a highly regulated activity, and everyone knows it.”) (citation 'otnitted); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 226 (1st Cir.1999) (\"[A] person who is subject to [an anti-harassment or anti-stalking restraining] order would not be sanguine about the legal consequences of possessing a firearm[.]”). 65 . See, e.g,, United States v. Hester, 589 F.3d 86, 91-93 (2d Cir.2009) (holding that even though defendant stated he did not read and discuss psr with his counsel he could not show any error that affected his substantial rights" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a protester must show only that there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for that error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (recognizing under plain error review that the burden to show that substantial rights have been prejudiced is on the party that failed to raise the issue below and for an error to have affected substantial rights the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a contractor failed to show a substantial chance it would have received the contract award but for agency error", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nor prospective bidders or offerors whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to award the contract.” Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). In the case of pre-award protests, we have repeatedly limited standing under § 1491 to those bidders who have a “substantial chance” of securing the award and who have been disadvantaged by the government procurement decision they challenge. In Rex Service Corp. v. United States, we held that a contractor did not have standing because it did not “establish that it had a ‘substantial chance’ of receiving the contract” and thus “prove a direct economic interest as a putative prospective bidder.” 448 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed.Cir.2006); see also Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996) (holding that a protester is not required to show that but for the alleged error the protester would have been awarded the contract instead a protester must show there was a substantial chance it would have received the contract but for the alleged error" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that rule 60b jurisdiction is lacking for appeals raising issues decided either explicitly or by necessary implication by this court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the coa", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nonly challenge the “collateral issue” of the “Attorneys’ Fees Award.” In that the trial court left open for future determination the amount Defendants would be taxed, Defendants’ appeal of this collateral issue is interlocutory. Since the trial court did not certify the Attorneys’ Fees Award issue for immediate appellate review, Defendants may challenge the Attorneys’ Fees Award in this appeal only to the extent that the Award affects a substantial right. Defendants make a number of arguments in their brief challenging the Attorneys’ Fees Award; however, their only argument based on a substantial right is their contention that the award is “in derogation of [Defendants’] sovereign immunity.” See McClennahan v. N.C. Sch. of the Arts, 177 N.C. App. 806, 808, 630 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (holding that appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to immediate appellate review" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (holding that juveniles may waive constitutional rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that statute of limitations questions may be resolved on a motion to dismiss", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that reasonable time limitations may be placed on the exercise of constitutional rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin a given case. The establishment of these time boundaries is a legislative prerogative. That body has the right to fix reasonable periods within which an action shall be brought and, within its sound discretion, determine the limitation period.... It should not be the province or function of this court to intrude upon an area peculiarly within the channel of legislative action.\"). 4 . See also Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 115 Utah 183, 203 P.2d 404, 408 (1949) (\"[NJone of the constitutional guarantees embodied in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States are absolute rights. All of them are subject to some regulation by the state.\"). 5 . See, e.g., People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 435 (Colo.1993) (en banc) (recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that retrial did not violate the double jeopardy clause where reversal based on trial error distinguishing reversal for insufficient evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that the fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (recognizing that the mere plausibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to justify reversal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that no court has the authority to substitute a different sentence for that which is required by law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nprovide just punishment for the offense.... ”). We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. The district judge relied upon a variety of factors relevant to a sentencing determination under § 3553(a), some of which indicated that the Guideline range underestimated the seriousness of Mr. Johnson’s crime. Further, we are unable to disagree with the district judge’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors that he considered justified the variance in this case. We “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although there may be other reasonable sentences that the district judge could have chosen, we uphold the district judge’s sentence. See id. (holding that the outcome of the case could have been different if the trial court had imposed the appropriate burden" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment is not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the defendant was able to confront and crossexamine the witness who claimed that the statements at issue were made", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that factors used in determining whether hearsay statements are sufficiently reliable to satisfy hearsay exceptions also apply to whether statements have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under confrontation clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding that thirdparty statements contained in dcfs caseworker reports constituted hearsay", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that “the presumption of reliability that serves as the premise for the public-records exception does not attach to third parties who themselves have no public duty to report.” Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2013) (refusing to admit “third-party statements contained in a police report”). See also United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In general, statements by third parties who are not government employees ... may not be admitted pursuant to the public records exception but must satisfy some other exception in order to be admitted.”). Thus, the responses to the questionnaires must themselves fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rale. Cf. In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 85 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that the united states constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory hearsay statements that do not fall within any recognized hearsay exception" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing that an exercise of the police power necessary to safeguard the public safety and welfare can justify impairment of contractual rights and obligations", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (holding in a suit by cellphone providers that fjederal telecommunications law implicitly acknowledges the importance of the state interest in enforcing its consumerprotection statutes by leaving states some latitude to protect the public safety and welfare and safeguard the rights of consumers quoting 47 usc 253b", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nor person associated with a nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(o )(2). That provision makes clear that the state interests in enforcing consumer-protection laws and combatting deceptive business practices — the interests South Carolina and Tennessee seek to vindicate in their cases — do not tread on the federal interest in regulating the market for credit ratings. Moreover, that provision is, in itself, a recognition and vindication of the importance of the States’ interests in this case. That is, Congress intended for States to retain their ability to enforce their consumer-protection laws against NRSROs; it is for neither federal courts nor those NRSROs to question that judgment. See, e.g., Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., 280 F.3d at 880 (recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering its public waters" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that mandate did not preclude the trial court from considering unconscionability argument on remand because that issue had not been decided by the trial court nor considered by this court in the first appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that trial court did not err", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that although the trial court did not specifically refer to the factors in utah code section 7684012 the trial court complied with the statute by relying on presentence reports that included the pertinent information", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that where the government filed an information identifying the conviction relied upon to enhance defendants sentence and counsel told the court that the defendant did not dispute the conviction the trial judges sentencing ritual here complied with the requirements of 851b", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto the presen-tence report and had asserted that there were no errors in the report, requested that the trial court impose concurrent sentences. The trial court chose to follow Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation. In contrast to Perez, the presentence report supported the trial court's decision, and the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that prior to sentencing the judge had reviewed and considered the information in the presentence report. Therefore, regardless of whether the factors enunciated at the sentencing hearing may have pertained exclusively to the gravity and cireumstances of the offense, the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all of the statutorily prescribed factors. See, eg., State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 854 (holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding grandparent visitation statute serves compelling state interest in maintaining grandparentgrandchild relationship where grandparents had raised child for period of time but agreeing with trial court that something more than childs best interest must be established to serve compelling state interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding that grandparent has no protected liberty interest in the visitation of a child of whom she once had custody", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding that grandmother who had intermittent custody of her grandchild had no protected liberty interest in the continued custody of the child", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (holding there is no protected liberty interest in maintaining the foster family relationship", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nand her father-in-law Nathan Drollinger brought a § 1983 challenge to the terms and conditions of Rosanna's state court probation. One of the probation conditions restricted Nathan's ability to associate with Stephanie Drollinger (Rosanna’s daughter and his granddaughter). The Drollinger court held that this condition implicated Nathan’s protected liberty interest in the society of his granddaughter. 552 F.2d at 1227. It held that the state violated due process by not giving Nathan a hearing before imposing the condition as a term of Rosanna’s parole agreement. Id. The court, however, offered no analysis of the nature, source, or extent of the grandfather's interest. It devoted only a two-sentence footnote to the subject. 7 . See Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729, 732 (1994) (recognizing that a parents liberty interest in the custody of a child is subject to due process protection" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that a party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of an arbitration agreement and show that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding failure to establish terms of an oral loan agreement precluded the existence of a breach of contract claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that defendant must demonstrate meeting of the minds in order to establish existence of immunity agreement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that in order to establish liability under the ada the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of the statute", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernment has breached the clear terms of the agreement. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034-35; Thompson, 25 F.3d at 1562-63; Rowe, 676 F.2d at 528. Accordingly, to succeed on her immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate that an agreement was reached with the government under the terms of which the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation. In order to create a valid contract, the parties must come to a “meeting of the minds.” Restatement (Second) Of Contracts § 17 comment c (1981). Thus, in the parlance of contract law, to succeed on her transactional immunity claim, Kozak must demonstrate at least a meeting of the minds that the government would refrain from prosecuting her in exchange for her cooperation in the investigation. See McHan, 101 F.3d at 1034 (holding that the burden is on the defendants to establish the existence of absolute legislative immunity" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that there was no interrogation where the police asked only routine booking questions that did not relate even tangentially to criminal activity moreover there is no evidence that the defendant was particularly susceptible to these questions or that police somehow used the questions to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that routine booking questions do not violate the constitutional protection against self incrimination as they do not constitute interrogation", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (recognizing routine booking question exception observing that the underlying rationale for the exception is that routine booking questions do not constitute interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses and holding that where questions regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating information the questioning constitutes interrogation subject to the strictures of miranda citations omitted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that questions regarding a defendants name address height weight eye color birth date and current age constituted custodial interrogation but fell within the routine booking question exception which exempts from mirandas coverage questions to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services but observing that that the exception would not apply to questions posed during the booking process that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions citations and internal quotation signals omitted", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nopinion articulates, see concurring and dissenting opinion at 129-30, 34 P.3d at 1028-29 (specifically, prongs (l)(b) and (2)), and believes thal we have . 2 (5th Cir.1993) (observing that, \"[i]n the wake of Muniz, ... a routine booking question exception to the Fifth Amendment exists” and citing, inter alia, cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n. 2 (8th Cir.1989) (asserting that \"[i]t is well established that Miranda does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\" and citing cases from the United States Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits); United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1068 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that questions concerning the place and date of birth fall within the routine booking question exception to miranda" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that individual debtors may use chapter 11 to save the family home from foreclosure", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that a wife with a child from a prior relationship was not entitled to use and possession of the family home", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that because the wife failed to present any evidence as to the legal services performed in the trial court the wife was not entitled to a second hearing to establish attorneys fees", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (recognizing that reciprocal obligations of parent and child are essentials of the family relationship", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nlieu of child support and spousal support. If the parties had intended payments for spousal support, they could have included that language in the order. In addition, the Consent Order provides that Mallory and appellee will have the use and possession of the family home until 2004. The use and possession statute’s sole purpose is for the benefit of the child or children of the family. Md.Code (1973, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 8-206 of the Family Law Article; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 410 A.2d 1052 (1980). A parent’s or spouse’s needs are of no consideration except as those needs contribute to, or reflect upon, the obligation she or he owes to the children. Barr v. Barr, 58 Md.App. 569 at 585, 473 A.2d 1300 (1984). See Also Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 294 Md. 183, 448 A.2d 353 (1982) (holding that wife was entitled to prejudgment interest on alimony and child support arrearages from the date those payments were due" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding that intent need not be express and in fact need not actually exist in the owners mind but may be implied from acts and conduct of the owner which are unequivocally and convincingly indicative of a dedication and upon which the public has a right to and does rely", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding the effect of a commonlaw dedication is to create only such an estate or right in the public as is necessary to enable it to enjoy the uses for which the dedication is made and to reserve the fee to the dedicator", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding that predicate acts need not be in furtherance of the enterprise", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding because dedication is a theory premised on estoppel the owner can be precluded from resuming rights over the property if the public acts upon the owners manifestations", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncourt’s dismissal for mootness de novo”). [¶ 10] A trial court properly dismisses a case for mootness if the case “has lost its character as edication). [¶ 15] Common-law dedication requires, (1) an intention to dedicate and, (2) public acceptance of the dedication. Cole, 17 N.D. 409, 117 N.W. at 358. Intent to dedicate, “is to be ascertained from the acts of the owner, and not from the purpose hidden in his mind.... Dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the party can be manifested.” Ramstad v. Carr, 31 N.D. 504, 154 N.W. 195, 199 (N.D.1915) (citation omitted); Cole, at 358 (stating, “the intention to dedicate be properly and clearly manifested”); Security Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. C & C Investments, 448 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Minn.App.1989) (holding deceptive acts which were not disclosed to the investing public are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance because a plaintiff cannot rely on acts of which it is unaware" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that defendants have a right to be present at voir dire", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that when the purpose of the request is to compare the testimony of jurors but no such comparison was made at the trial level a court need not provide a free voir dire transcript", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that trial minutes were not sufficient substitute for transcript of voir dire and could not afford meaningful review when both sides exercised peremptory challenges", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that the selection of the jury constitutes part of a public trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmatter illustrates the impossibility of an adequate appellate review. During voir dire, the State inquired whether any of the prospective jurors or members of their families had experienced drug addiction problems, and it appears from the transcript that several answered affirmatively. Unfortunately, they are not identified by name or juror number. This is critical because Mr. McKenzie alleged that the State improperly exercised a peremptory challenge on the sole African-American member of the jury panel. The gist of Mr. McKenzie’s argument was that the reason advanced by the State to sustain its challenge, although appearing race neutral, was pretextual. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996). The Assistant State Attorney expressed concern that the juror seemed d 1994) (holding that missing portions of transcript of voir dire did not entitle the defendant to a new trial for murder because the alleged errors in jury selection were harmless as a matter of law" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that a timely filed motion for sanctions which specifically requested modification of judgment extended trial courts plenary power", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (recognizing that the idea bars an award of attorneys fees for work performed subsequent to a settlement offer of all requested relief", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding that timely filed motion for sanctions which requested an award of over 40000 in attorneys fees requested a substantial change in the judgment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto act extends beyond thirty days. Landmark American Ins. Co. v. Pulse Ambulance Serv. Inc., 813 S.W.2d 497 (Tex.1991); Check v. Mitchell, 758 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tex.1988); Ramirez v. Williams Bros. Const Co., 870 S.W.2d 551, 552 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). We acknowledge that a trial court cannot issue an order of sanctions after its plenary power expires. Scott & White Memorial Hosp. v. Schexnider, 940 S.W.2d 594, 596 n. 2 (Tex.1996). However, where a party timely files a motion for sanctions which assails the trial court’s judgment and results in a modification of the judgment, the jurisdictional extension within Rule 329b(g) applies. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith Southern Equipment, Inc., 981 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. granted) (holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding similar evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict of possession with intent to distribute cocaine", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding five complaints of excessive force over twentytwomonth period sufficient to sustain jury verdict", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for use of excessive force is distinct from inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto allege that a municipal custom or policy caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (quoting Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir.1993))); Lozada v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-0038 (ILG)(JMA), 2013 WL 3934998, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2013) (dismissing Mo-nell claim as conclusory where plaintiff failed to “provide any facts that would allow the court to infer what city policies, practices, or customs contributed to or caused the deficiency” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 2. Failure to Supervise Plaintiff also raises a failure-to-supervise claim against the City. As with h ants’ CCRB and LAB disciplinary records in opposition to Defendants’ motion (see generally Discip. Records), and although she does not raise such an argument in d 319, 331 (2d Cir.1986) (holding that exhaustion requirement applies to excessive force claims" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was appropriate because the plaintiff failed to designate evidence that demonstrates that the defendant abused the qualified privilege", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that party may not appeal summary judgment in favor of opponent when grounds opposing summary judgment asserted on appeal were not raised before trial court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that summary judgment in favor of the defendant was proper where students injuries were the result of an unforeseeable attack by other students before school", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsee also Cooper, 508 P.2d at 950-51 (upholding judgment for the plaintiff who was injured in collision with horse on road, finding that trespasser’s opening of gate was not intervening cause in light of defendant’s failure to lock gate and defendant’s knowledge that horses had previously escaped and that trespassers often entered property); Breising, 477 P.2d at 987 (implying that car repair shop may have been liable to owner of vehicle that was left with keys in ignition and was subsequently stolen, but upholding summary judgment against individual who was injured in an accident with thief). The Kansas courts have approved summary judgment in other eases which we find distinguishable from the instant case. See Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P.2d 895, 903-04 (1973) (holding that the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant and denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendant breached its duty to act in good faith" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that delay caused by or consented to by a defendant is not unreasonable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding the tenday requirement was ministerial and the defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding defendant did not demonstrate that commonwealth failed to act diligently in commencing revocation hearing or that defendant prejudiced by delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance due to the alleged conflict of interest because the defendant failed to demonstrate a conflict as nothing was presented to refute the attorneys testimony that his loyalty was to his clients", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 279, § 3, that statute does not require, in the absence of prejudice, automatic dismissal, if such disposition does not occur within the six-month period set forth in the statute. The defendant also contends that his due process rights were violated when he did not receive a hearing within the time specified in G. L. c. 279, § 3. We disagree. We recognize that a person whose probation is subject to revocation is entitled to a revocation hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 112 (1990). However, the defendant in this case has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth intentionally delayed the revocation hearing or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. See Commonwealth v. Odoardi, 397 Mass. 28, 36-37 (1986) (holding that no prejudice to the defendant arose from a delay in holding his parole revocation hearing twentyfour hours beyond the ninetyday limit" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that attorneys claim for professional services against person sui juris or against property of such person must rest upon contract of employment express or implied made with person sought to be charged or with his agent", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that under the applicable statutory provisions a person need not be impoverished or devoid of all assets to qualify as an indigent sick person but only that the person be unable to pay for necessary medical care", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that a person is seized for purposes of article i section 7 of the hawaii constitution when a police officer approaches that person for the express or implied purpose of investigating him or her for possible criminal violations and begins to ask for information", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nEstate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). In reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the lower court’s ruling. In re Estate of Stull, supra, citing Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gyns., P.C., 256 Neb. 19, 588 N.W.2d 798 (1999). ANALYSIS On appeal, Muff and Lauridsen argue that the county court erred in awarding Thomsen fees because there is no such office as an attorney for an estate and, secondly, because at all times Thomsen was proceeding contrary to Tucker’s expressed desires and wishes. Ordinarily, the right of an attorney to compensation for his or her services depends upon a contract of employment, express or implied. In re Estate of Stull, supra. See, also, Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981) (holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that a private right of action exists", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that no private right of action exists", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding no duty and noting that foreseeability bears on the scope of a duty and not whether it exists in the first place", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe court of appeals extended this rationale to professional negligence claims against insurance agents. It held that such claims may not be assigned because the relationship of insurance agent and client is similar to that of attorney and client. Premium Cigars, 208 Ariz. at 566 ¶¶ 25-26, 96 P.3d at 564. An insurance transaction, the court said, “is not simply a commercial transaction but a transaction personal in nature for the benefit of the client.” Id. at ¶ 24, 96 P.3d 555. Furthermore, like attorneys, agents owe a “duty to the insured to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence” in carrying out the duty to procure insurance. Id. at 566 ¶ 22, 96 P.3d at 564 (quoting Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 140 Ariz. 383, 397, 682 P.2d 388, 402 (1984) (holding that such a duty exists" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that conviction based on plea of nolo contendere bars subsequent 1983 claim because even though such a plea does not involve admission of guilt it does communicate acceptance of conviction and sentence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nunless such intention is made clearly to appear by express declaration or by necessary implication.... We think the rule applies as much to inherent powers as it does to ‘long established legal principles.’ Therefore, we hold that chapter 853 did not take away the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny DANC pleas.” (Citations and some internal quotation signals omitted.)). “By necessary implication,” HRS ch. 853 coopted the field previously occupied by inherent judicial power with respect to granting and denying DAG pleas. Effective June 14, 1983, die legislature amended HRS ch. 853 to extend to the grant and denial of DANC pleas, see 1983 Haw. Sess. L. Act 290, §§ 1 through 6 at 617-18, thereby legislatively overruling State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pleadings filed by a criminal defendant who is represented by counsel are generally treated as a nullity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding that pro se pleadings from defendants who are represented by counsel in the pending criminal proceedings are unauthorized", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nCURIAM. DISMISSED. See Logan v. State, 846 So.2d 472 (Fla.2003) (holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of defendants purse which he carried was authorized by a warrant to search his person", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of shoulder bag was not authorized by search warrant for apartment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of appellants suitcase found on the floor next to the couch on which he was sleeping was an unconstitutional search of his person and was not authorized by a search of the residence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that search of backpack constituted a search of defendants person and was not authorized by search warrant for premises", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nanatomy does not naturally contain external pockets, pouches, or other places in which personal objects can be conveniently carried. To remedy this anatomical deficiency clothing contains pockets. In addition, many individuals carry purses or shoulder bags to hold objects they wish to have with them. Containers such as these, while appended to the body, are so closely associated with the person that they are identified with and included within the concept of one’s person. To hold differently would be to narrow the scope of a search of one’s person to a point at which it would have little meaning. Id. Several other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that the search of a person includes containers held by the person. See United, States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 784 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that the ninth circuit is bound by the california supreme courts interpretation of california law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that our courts are bound by the united states supreme courts interpretation of the federal constitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (recognizing that federal courts are bound by pronouncements of the california supreme court on applicable state law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmatter of state law. And because “the highest state court is the final authority on state law,” Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177, 61 S.Ct. 176, 85 L.Ed. 109 (1940), and further because “no federal court interpreting California law could change the California Supreme Court’s [ruling on an issue],” this Court cannot follow the Ninth Circuit cases cited by Uber in the face of directly contradicting California Supreme Court authority. Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 546 (C.D.Cal.2012); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (noting that the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Sen’s., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 889 (9th Cir.2010) (holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding if an employee does not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern the employee has no first amendment cause of action based on his or her employers reaction to the speech", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that the plaintiffs speech was not constitutionally protected because it was made in his official capacity and there was simply no evidence that he was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that an employee engages in protected activity under the first amendment when he threatens to file a lawsuit on a matter of public concern", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that if the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern there is no first amendment violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndisclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public’s interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Speech involves a public concern when the speaker intends to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust by a public official or to disclose any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance within a governmental entity.” Eisenhour v. Weber Cty., 744 F.3d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Den-ton’s motive was to regain his job—not to expose some wrongdoing or malfeasance. Because Denton’s arbitration testimony did not concern a matter of public interest, summary judgment in favor of defendants was appropriate. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding an employee is an agent of his employer where the employer assumes the right to control time manner and method of work", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employee requesting unforeseeable medical leave is not required to even mention the fmla when requesting leave for a serious health condition", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the employee must at least provide his employer with enough information for the employer to be put on notice that the fmla is a consideration", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employee gives his employer sufficient notice that he is requesting leave for an fmlaqualifying condition when he gives the employer enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that an event described in 29 usc 2612a1 has occurred", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nafter learning that leave was needed for a serious health condition. In determining whether an employee provided sufficient notice to his employer, the Sixth Circuit has held that the “critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee’s request to take time off for a serious health condition.” Brohm v. JH Properties, Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.1998). Courts have held that an employee merely notifying his employer that he is sick, without more, is not sufficient notice to invoke the FMLA. Rather, the employee must notify the employer that he is suffering from a serious health condition that prevents him from performing his normal job. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an employer may deny restoration when it can show that it would have discharged the employee in any event regardless of the leave" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis to support a finding of probable cause because the affidavit recounted the alleged criminal activity in detail", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that magistrate must have substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that the defendant who filed a timely motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged fourth amendment violation in the district court but failed particularly to argue that the detectives affidavit was inadequate to provide the magistrate judge with probable cause waived his affidavit argument on appeal pursuant to fedrcrimp 12e", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that a magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed where the supporting affidavit elaborated on the crime in detail", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe business records of Maxtron, Santos International, and United Investors related to criminal activity. Because the magistrate's probable cause finding included two separate determinations, we deem it necessary to engage in a two-step probable cause analysis. As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for her probable cause finding that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the places specified in the warrant. See Thurman, $46 P.2d at 1260. Assuming the magistrate had a substantial basis for her initial probable cause det ) (concluding that an affidavit describing the defendants' scheme in detail, including personal observations of the crime, warranted a finding of probable cause); State v. Romero, 624 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Utah 1981) (holding that the affidavit gave absolutely no indication that the fruits of criminal activity would probably be found at that location rendering the officers belief in probable cause based solely on the affidavit objectively unreasonable " ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for itto comply with both federal and state requirements and reasoning that it offered no such evidence and never argued that it attempted to give a warning but was prohibited from doing so by the fda", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that it is not", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that because the repose period in question was eliminated before it expired it never operated to insulate defendants from liability and never vested defendants with any substantive rights", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding that it may not", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nabout preempted labeling issues) (examining the same FDA decisions at issue in this case ,and finding that the. FDA’s 2006 and 2008 rejections of Abbott’s attempts to add a developmental delay warning constitute-clear evidence the FDA would have rejected a similar change to the 1999 Depakote label); In re Fosamax, 951 F.Supp.2d 695, 703 (D.N.J.2013) (finding clear evidence the FDA would not have approved a label change prior to the plaintiffs injury where FDA had rejected prior attempts to strengthen the relevant label); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 797 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1276-77 (W.D.Okla.2011) (finding clear, evidence that the FDA would have rejected an expanded warning for Effexor after the FDA rejected the warning added by the defendant). See also Levine, 555 U.S. at 571-72, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (holding insurers uim offer was ineffectual when it offered no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with department of insurance guidelines" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that a defendant may be convicted of theft twice on the basis of intentional possession at one time of stolen property if the property forming the basis of the one conviction was stolen at different times and places from different owners than the property forming the basis of the second conviction", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that the officers examination revealed that there was probable cause to believe that the property was stolen", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding proof of possession of stolen goods is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction for theft", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (holding that exclusive possession of recently stolen goods warrants the inference that he stole all of the property for which the defendant is accused of taking provided all the property was stolen at the same time emphasis added", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nhome, appellant possessed the rifles and exhibited them to Quinley. Quinley’s testimony was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that appellant exclusively possessed the stolen rifles recently after they were stolen. Appellant’s reliance on Smith v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 157, 439 S.E.2d 409 (1994), is misplaced. Smith involved the application of the exclusive possession inference to the Commonwealth’s charge of grand larceny of a truck based solely upon the defendant’s possession of a checkbook and knives which the owner of the truck had left in the truck but had not seen for months prior to the theft. In Smith, the evidence failed to prove that the truck, checkbook, and knives were stolen at the same time. Cf. Williams v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 583, 597, 50 S.E.2d 407, 414 (1948) (recognizing that defendants intent to return stolen items to their rightful owner is a valid defense to charge of receiving stolen property" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that for today at least persons of hispanic origin must be accorded the protections of section 1981", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that plaintiffs complaint which included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with his termination was sufficient to provide notice of plaintiffs age and national origin discrimination claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that white persons may state a claim under section 1981 and noting the racial character of the rights being protected ", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfound to state a cause of action under section 1981 because “Hispanics are frequently identified as ‘nonwhites,’ ”); Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, 495 F.Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (D.N.M.1980) (Plaintiff, an Iranian citizen, found to state a section 1981 cause of action on the basis that he may belong to a group commonly perceived to be different from the white majority.); Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Ctr., 80 F.R.D. 254, 262-64 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff’d, 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981) (Mexican and Mexican-American plaintiffs found to state a cause of action under section 1981 because in analyzing discrimination against these groups race, national origin, and ethnicity may be indistinguishable.); Ortega v. Merit Insurance Co., 433 F.Supp. 135, 139 (N.D.Ill.1977) (holding that texas twoyear statute of limitations applied to section 1981 action for discrimination on the basis of national origin" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that when the courts oral statements in the plea colloquy conflict with the written agreement the courts oral statements control", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding sworn statements made during a codefendants plea colloquy were properly received as substantive evidence pursuant to fedrevid 801d1a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary a defendant is bound by statements made under oath during his plea colloquy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that a defendant is bound by representations made during a guilty plea absent a valid reason for controverting those statements", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nto 161 months of imprisonment. Nicholson timely appeals. Counsel has raised two issues: (1) whether Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and (2) whether his sentence was unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. The Government first asks us to dismiss the appeal, based on Nicholson’s waiver of his appellate rights in his plea agreement. We decline to enforce the waiver, however, as this provision of the plea agreement was not reviewed at Nicholson’s plea hearing. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, we find that Nicholson’s claims fail on the merits. First, the record reveals that Nicholson’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977) (holding that despite the lack of a statutory requirement that severe child abuse be shown by clear and convincing evidence due to the consequences of such a finding the clear and convincing standard must be applied" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that while rule 68 does not explicitly require that an offer of settlement under that rule be made in writing its requirement that the offer be served upon the adverse party implies as much", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (recognizing further that the offer of proof allows the aggrieved party to present a proper record for review on appeal and in the absence of such an offer error may not be preserved", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (holding an unaccepted rule 68 offer does not moot a claim", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof law. Thus we review the district court’s determination de novo. See Arkla Energy Resources v. Roye Realty & Developing, Inc., 9 F.3d 855, 865 (10th Cir.1993); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). In our judgment, Driver was the “prevailing party” within the meaning of § 3629(B). Although CUIC’s interpretations of § 3629(B) have some appeal, the language of that statute counsels a different construction. Section 3629(B) expressly requires a “written” offer of settlement. It twice refers to the type of offer in question and twice qualifies it as “written.” And it expressly requires that a covered offer be “submit[ted]” to the insured, which provision seems to us to contemplate that a qualifying offer be in writing. See Grosvenor v. Brienen, 801 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.1986) (holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (holding that glc 152 15 provides that the only party immune from suit under the statute is the direct employer a special employer is not immune because the special employer is not liable for the payment of workers compensation and there was no agreement between the direct employer and the special employer that the special employer would be liable for the payment of such compensation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (holding injured employee who asked his employer for medical assistance and employer refused and employee then went to physician of his own choice employee could recover medical benefits", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (holding that where employee gave notice to employer of injury and employer told employee that nothing could be done for him through workmans compensation employer had breached statute and was liable for medical treatment which was reasonable and necessary to restore employee to maximum usefulness", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (holding that employee who resigned left voluntarily where employer accepted resignation told employee not to come to work anymore and paid employee through end of notice period", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nfor out of state medical treatment is as follows: 4. Prior authorization must be obtained from the payer for referral to out-of-state providers. The documentation must include the following: a. Name and location of out-of-state provider b. Justification for out-of-state provider, including qualifications of the provider and description of services being requested. ¶ 30. Henderson, by his own admission, neither attempted to obtain prior approval from Fleming or from the Commission nor did he provide the required documentation before receiving medical services and supplies from Dr. Whitecloud, an out of state provider. Henderson, admittedly without any notice to Fleming or the Commission sought and received medical treatment from Dr. Whitecloud. Henderson argue o.2d 320 (Miss.1969) (holding employee could proceed against employer in action for fraudulent misrepresentation where employees complaint alleged inter alia employee was regularly exposed to lead fumes and dust at place of employment employer tested employees blood to monitor lead levels employer willfully and intentionally withheld employees test results which showed employee had developed leadrelated diseases and employer subsequently altered those results to induce employee to continue working for employer employee further alleged employers concealment of employees condition prevented employee from reducing his exposure to lead and obstructed him from receiving appropriate medical treatment and that delay in treatment resulted in aggravation of employees injury" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (holding that the plaintiffs claim of being startled by a child on a slide did not prevent summary judgment in her case because t he simple fact wa s that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard which caused her fall prior to encountering it", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (holding that to defeat summary judgment plaintiff was obliged to offer evidence indicating that persons who actually participated in her termination decision had knowledge of her protected characteristics", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (holding that opinion that fuel oil on her shoes caused her to fall is one which a normal person would form on the basis of observed facts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n7 37 Ga. App. 299 (139 SE 828) (1927). 8 See id. at 300. 9 Id. 10 See id. 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Robinson, 268 Ga. at 744 (2) (a). 12 See Yasinac v. Colonial Oil Properties, 246 Ga. App. 484, 486 (2) (541 SE2d 109) (2000) (“the distraction doctrine does not apply where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the hazard before the alleged distraction occurred”); Means v. Marshalls of Ma., 243 Ga. App. 419, 420, 421 (2) (532 SE2d 740) (2000) (physical precedent only) (the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the debris on the floor barred her recovery for her fall even though she claimed to have been distracted by attempting to prevent a dressing room door from hitting a child); McCoy v. West Bldg. Materials of Ga., 232 Ga. App. 620, 622 (502 SE2d559) (1998) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs admissions in her deposition undermined her claims" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that trial court did not err", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that an 80year sentence for production of child pornography was not disproportionate to the crime be cause of the devastating consequences of sexual abuse of children", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that the district court did not err in using a previous conviction for gross sexual imposition to enhance a sentence for receiving child pornography", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that mailing child pornography to another in the expectation of receiving similar materials in return constituted distribution for purposes of 2g22b2", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ntrafficking is the offense, but previous sexual abuse or exploitation creates the enhancement. The requisite pattern for enhancement is a “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of .a minor,” not, as Olfano seems to argue, a pattern of activity similar to the incident in question. We have not expressly addressed the difference-in-kind argument, aside from our holding in Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 794-95, that trafficking in child pornography is not sexual exploitation of a minor. Although we have yet to interpret section 2G2.2 in light of the 1996 amendments, several other courts of appeals have recognized that remote or unrelated instances of sexual misconduct can support a sentencing enhancement. See United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that private possession of child pornography is not protected by the first amendment" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthey “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (holding that a plaintiff analogous to ms salyer who did not work in private homes did not fall within the companionship services exemption", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthey “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (recognizing that generally services that benefit debtor are services that facilitate completion of a case", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthey “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (holding that plaintiff who provided similar services which were arguably attendant care services under state law fell within the exemption", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthey “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (holding that an attorneys services were personal services rendered or labor done under the predecessor statute to section 38001", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthey “provide fellowship, care, and protection” for Mr. Salyer, who, “because of ... physical ... infirmity, cannot care for his own needs.” Because those services “may include household work related to the care of the aged or infirm person such as meal preparation, bed making, washing of clothes, and other similar services,” we find the regulation to be directly on point. Furthermore, we cannot say that this regulatory definition of “companionship services” is either “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” that it elucidates. Thus, we must give it “controlling weight.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The handful of cases that have considered the “companionship ser 1988) (holding that legal services attorney lacked standing to challenge state court judges alleged retaliation against clients represented by legal services for using legal services relying upon article iii and younger comity" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (recognizing a public employees first amendment right to address matters of legitimate public concern", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (holding public employees conduct and expression in internal investigation of employees at county prosecutors office to expose potential wrongdoing constituted matter of public concern", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that employees allegation of corrupt and wasteful practices at municipal hospital obviously involved matter of public concern", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that employees voluntary testimony is also inherently a matter of public concern", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nv. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir.1999)). If a plaintiff has alleged these three elements, the public employer may still avoid liability if it shows that the plaintiffs speech was likely to disrupt the government’s activities to an extent that outweighs First Amendment value of the speech. Mandell, 316 F.3d at 382-83; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (explaining that court must balance the interests of the employee “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”); Cobb, 363 F.3d at 102. Alterna 46 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that the absence of a motivating desire to address a matter of public concern was not dispositive as to whether the speech addressed a matter of public concern" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nor unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding the moving party must meet its burden by showingthat is pointing out to the trial courtthat there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving partys case", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nor unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding that once the moving party meets its burden the nonmoving party is obliged to produce evidence in response", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nor unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nor unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (holding due to the moving partys failure to meet its initial burden the onus never passed to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial citation omitted", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nor unnecessary will not be counted____ That is, while the materiality determination rests on the substantive law, it is the substantive law’s identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs.” (citations omitted)). The existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment[.]” Id. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party must put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (recognizing that even where a party has the burden of proof at trial that party need not produce proof supporting his claim in response to a motion for summary judgment unless the movant has first presented evidence that would negate an element of the nonmovants claim or indicates that the nonmovant will be unable to meet his burden at trial it is never enough simply to state that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npredicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding that the habitualoffender provisions could be used to enhance a sentence for a conviction that constituted firstdegree retail fraud because of a prior conviction mcl 750356c2 as added by 1988 pa 20", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npredicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is valid because no prison term was imposed and the conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a subsequent offense", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npredicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding that a juvenile adjudication may be used as a prior conviction for apprendi purposes", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npredicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding the death sentence proportional for the firstdegree murder conviction where the aggravators included prior violent felony conviction and hac", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npredicate to enhance his sentence as a second-offense habitual offender. While defendant objects to this, he offers no statutory or legal analysis to support the contention that his claimed double enhancement is inappropriate. The critical point from Bewersdorf is that the OUIL provisions increased the punishment for each repeated offense, just as the SORA provisions do in the present case. In fact, defendant concedes that there is no error in enhancing a SORA-2 sentence under the habitual-offender provisions as long as the habitual-offender enhancement is based on a felony other than a SORA violation. Thus, to this extent, defendant agrees with our conclusion that MCL 28.729(1) sets forth separate, elevated offenses. 51 E.g., People v Eilola, 179 Mich App 315, 325; 445 NW2d 490 (1989) (holding that any fact other than a prior conviction may not be used to enhance a defendants sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless it is submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnegative and conclude that Merrill Lynch’s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “Pfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (holding that accountants worksheets did not contain privileged communications", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnegative and conclude that Merrill Lynch’s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “Pfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (holding that disclosure to outside accountants did not waive the work product privilege since the accountants are not considered a conduit to a potential adversary", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnegative and conclude that Merrill Lynch’s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “Pfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (holding that when a party discloses an item to an adversary even in the context of settlement a waiver of the work product privilege is effected", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnegative and conclude that Merrill Lynch’s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “Pfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (recognizing that the duty has been applied to accountants", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnegative and conclude that Merrill Lynch’s disclosure of the reports to Deloitte & Touche did not constitute a waiver of the applicable work product protection. In a frequently cited case, In re Pfizer, Inc. Sec. Litig., Judge Buchwald held that Pfizer’s disclosure of documents to its independent auditor, KPMG Peat Marwick (“Peat Marwick”), did not waive its work product privilege. 1993 WL 561125, at *6. Judge Buchwald’s decision was based on her observation that “Pfizer and Peat Marwick obviously shared common interests in the information, and Peat Marwick is not reasonably viewed as a conduit to a potential adversary.” Id. Other courts have adopted precisely this analysis. E.g., Gutter v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., No. 95 Civ. 2152, 1998 WL 2017926, at *5 (S.D.Fla. May 18, 1998) (holding that the attorneyclient privilege applied to communications with accountants where defendants demonstrated the necessity of the accountants services by showing that the accountants provided services that were beyond counsels resources and abilities but were uniquely within the accountants qualifications" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(“New Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (holding that an insurer can deny benefits based on late notice by the insured only when the insurer is prejudiced by the delay", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(“New Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (holding that the insureds liability has been established by the settlement and the insurer may not later relitigate the issue", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(“New Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (holding that a condition subsequent presupposes an existing obligation that is to be defeated or forfeited if the condition is not fulfilled", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(“New Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (holding that an insureds compliance with a condition precedent is not tested by the presence or absence of prejudice to the insurer but only by whether the condition has been fulfilled by the insured under all the circumstances", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(“New Jersey courts have applied the Cooper prejudice rule in various other contexts,” including in cases “involving both excess insurance and reinsurance despite the fact that reinsurance agreements are not contracts of adhesion.”). The Cooper decision rejected prior case law that did not require that an insurer show appreciable prejudice when an insured breached a condition precedent to insurance coverage: Cf. Whittle v. Associated Indem. Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J.Err. & App.1943) (finding the insurance policy notice and cooperation provisions to be conditions precedent to coverage, and that the insured breach of those provisions permitted the insurer to disclaim coverage); Ebert v. Balter, 74 N.J.Super. 466, 181 A.2d 532, 535 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1962) (holding that right to payment does not accrue until condition precedent has been fulfilled" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninterlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that if the federal claims are dismissed before trial the state claims should be dismissed as well", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninterlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the parties stipulation of dismissal with prejudice was a final judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninterlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that the circuit courts order concluding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain a complaint because the case had been dismissed without prejudice constituted a final order because all other claims either had been refiled or dismissed with prejudice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninterlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that because the claims were dismissed with prejudice there was a final judgment for purposes of appellate review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninterlocutory orders prior to the entry of judgment ....”) (emphasis added). 15 . Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l)(A)(ii). 16 . Id.-, see also 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2363 (3d ed. 2015). 17 . First Nat’l Bank of Toms River, N.J. v. Marine City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3d Cir. 1969). 18 . E.g., Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2012); De Leon v. Marcos, 659 F.3d 1276, 1283 (10th Cir. 2011); SmallBizPros, Inc. v. MacDonald, 618 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010); Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007); Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1984). 19 . Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 1989). 20 . Small ay Int’l. Co., 600 F.3d 878, 883-84 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that because no class was certified at the time the individual claims were dismissed the class action was properly dismissed" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSome of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (holding that rule 35 does not permit sweeping examinations of a party who has not affirmatively put into issue his own mental or physical condition by asserting his mental or physical condition either in support of or in defense of a claim and that mere relevance to the case is insufficient", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSome of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (holding that a medical impairment is deemed severe when alone or in combination with other medically determinable physical or mental impairments it significantly limits an individuals physical or mental ability to do basic work activities", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSome of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (holding that emotional distress requires a showing of either physical symptoms or mental illness", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSome of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (holding that evidence of an impaired mental condition that does not rise to floridas definition of insanity is not admissible", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nSome of the prerequisites for review by extraordinary writ are arguably met here. The district court’s order brings about a serious intrusion into Vidrine’s privacy and his mental and emotional health, and the question presented is a novel issue of importance affecting privacy interests and the contours of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. In addition, the district court’s use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 was likely a “clear abuse of discretion.” E.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234. Vidrine did not put his mental or physical health “in controversy” as a disputed merits issue, Fed.R.CivP. 35(a)(1); rather, his mental health is only relevant to whether he may be made to sit for a deposition, cf, e.g., Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 118-19, 121, 85 S.Ct. 234 (holding testimony about plaintiffs mental and physical state before treatment by physician was relevant" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (holding that an initially reasonable seizure can become an unreasonable seizure that violates the fourth amendment when officers refuse to return seized property", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (holding that excessive force claims are not subject to exhaustion requirement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (holding that there was no fourth amendment seizure where delivery of package was not delayed because it is the extent of the interference with the defendants possessory interest in the property that determines whether a seizure has occurred", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (holding that a twohour residential seizure was not excessive", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n21.) The conversation captured by Riddle’s digital recorder belies this assertion and makes clear the extent of his intrusion, which included ordering Modrell to remain in one place and threatening to handcuff him. Riddle has not identified, and this Court cannot discern, any law-enforcement interest that justified encroaching on Modrell’s privacy and freedom of movement in this way. d. Duration of Seizure The fourth McArthur factor considers whether the length of the seizure was reasonably related to the law-enforcement interest at stake. Scmgineto-Miranda accounts for this factor as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis, see supra note 7. A two— to three-hour delay to procure a search warrant is not per se unreasonable. Compare McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332, 121 S.Ct. 946 (holding the eighth amendment succinctly prohibits excessive sanctions it provides excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted " ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (holding that appellant waived issue by failing to raise it in opening brief", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (holding party failing to adequately brief complaint waived issue on appeal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (holding that party waived argument by failing to brief it on appeal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (holding that defendant waived his blakely claim as issue on appeal by failing to raise it in his initial brief", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nF.3d 98, 100 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Garcia, 240 F.3d 180, 183-84 (2d Cir.2001)). We readily conclude that Duncan had sufficient warning to satisfy the due process concerns articulated in Rogers v. Tennessee. We have carefully reviewed each argument asserted on appeal, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment, sentence, and forfeiture of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 . In his initial brief, Duncan made this Ap-prendi-type argument only with respect to the drug type issue, and not with respect to the other two enhancements referenced in any of the briefs, i.e., the firearm and role enhancements. Accordingly, he is not entitled to have this Court entertain the argument with respect to those other two enhancements. See United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241(11th Cir.2004) (holding that the defendant waived an argument by failing to raise it in his appellants brief" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncourt, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that in the context of a rule 10b5 claim when the merger was approved and the exchange of securities occurred the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new security and paid for it by turning in his old one", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncourt, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that sjince the consumer cannot obtain the right to occupy the room without paying the retail room rate charged by the otc that retail rate is the taxable amount or rent where rent means the consideration received for occupancy valued in money", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncourt, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that the owner of retail store should receive the interest it had paid on interim financing and the rent paid on the old building for the period of delay until substantial completion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncourt, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that no interest is paid on benefits awarded based on a finding of cue", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncourt, finding that the Director of the Division of Building and Construction had testified that substantial completion of the entire project had occurred “around June of 1975.” Id. at 41, 453 A.2d 559. The court stated that it was not aware mages? lost profits can be assessed up to the date of substantial completion. For example, in D.A. Davis Construction v. Palmetto Properties, Inc., 281 S.C. 415, 315 S.E.2d 370 (1984), the court awarded three months’ lost rental income to the owner for the builder’s failure to substantially complete the project on the date specified in the contract. Id. at 372. The owner presented evidence that the property was to have been rented to a beer distributor upon substantial completion. See also Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So.2d 1356 (La.Ct.App.) (holding that the portion of the retirementplan annuity paid for by the employer but not the portion paid for by the employee is includable in the marital estate " ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nappropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (holding legislatures allocation of road funds did not vio late state constitution because the wisdom economy and policy of statutes are for legislative decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nappropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (holding no reasonable suspicion where only indicia of criminal activity was truck driving on public road late at night", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nappropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (recognizing exception under state constitution", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nappropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (holding that park services decision not to repave a particular section of road was within discretionary function exception because this section was thirtythird on a maintenance priority list of eighty sections of park road and determining the appropriate course of action would require balancing factors such as beach drives overall purpose the allocation of funds among significant project demands the safety of drivers and other park visitors and the inconvenience of repairs as compared to the risk of safety hazards", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nappropriation to fund a statutory right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is normally beyond our powers to order. Hillis v. Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139, 148 (1997) (internal citation omitted); accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 763, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (“[AJppropriating funds is a peculiarly legislative function, and one expressly committed to Congress by Art. I, § 9.”); Cal. Ass’n. of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4th 792, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 224, 246 (2003) (finding legislature’s policy decisions when appropriating funds and setting spending priorities from its tobacco tax revenue did not violate state constitution); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, 873 (1938) (holding that a bia road was a tribal road by considering the nature of the rightofway at issue and finding that although the tribe had relinquished certain gatekeeping rights by allowing public use of the road and collaborating with the bia in maintaining it the tribe had maintained other significant gatekeeping rights because the rightofway was not granted to the state and the road did not form any part of the states highway system" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (holding that a decedents tax settlement with the irs did not establish the value of his estates claim against the irs as a matter of law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (holding that although irs failed to comply with procedures of section 6335 tax sale was valid due to ratification by taxpayer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (holding that failure of irs agent to follow irs electronic surveillance regulations before recording conversations between taxpayer and agent did not require suppression of tape recordings in prosecution of taxpayer accused of bribing irs agent since irs was not required by constitution to adopt its regulations governing electronic surveillance violation of agency regulations did not raise constitutional questions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (holding that a notice of tax deficiency sent to a taxpayer by the irs need not be signed in order to be valid", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nwas void. Because the Johnstons moved for a summary judgment on this issue, they must prove that they are entitled to prevail as a matter of law. See Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at 644. The record indicates that the IRS gave notice beginning on March 21, 1995 that a sealed bid sale was scheduled for April 11, 1995 in Houston, Texas. The sale was then postponed on April 11. Appellants received a second notice of sale on November 22, 1995. The property was sold to the Bennetts at the sealed bid sale on December 12, 1995 in Houston, and the Bennetts received a certificate of sale. After the 180-day redemption period had expired, a quitclaim deed was issued to Mary Bennett on June 11, 1996, which deed she recorded the next day. The procedures for seizure of land mandated by section 6 r.1973) (holding that irss failure to comply with seizure and sale provisions of section 6335 renders tax sales voidable at taxpayers option rather than void as matter of law" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nloss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that in pennsylvania there is a rule that proof of the ownership of a business vehicle involved in an accident raises a presumption that the operation of the automobile was for the owners business purposes", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nloss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that evidence showed hewlettwhite florist shop had been an established business for thirtythree years and that the sale of flowers was not an uncertain or speculative business so as to preclude lostprofits award", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nloss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that stateagent immunity was not available to a county employee who sued the plaintiff and had him arrested for operating without a business license because the evidence showed that in so doing the defendant acted with malice willfullness or so beyond his authority that sovereign immunity would not apply footnote omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nloss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that evidence that appellee received complaints intended for appellant showed actual injury to business reputation", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nloss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered”); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis). Moreover, no controverting evidence exists in the record showing any other growth rate should be applied or undermining the data utilized or the computations performed by Shipp to arrive at the growth rates he utilized. Additionally, the western-hat market is neither new nor uncertain, and cowboy hats are not untested products. Compare White, 651 S.W.2d at 262 (holding that an employee qualified as a business visitor which the janis court subsequently defined as a business invitee" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (holding that federal employee could not sue supervisors for discharge alleged to have violated her first amendment rights", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (holding plaintiff may sue federal agents for money damages for violation of his constitutional rights", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (holding that search of middle school student violated her fourth amendment rights", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (holding that due to the csra a federal employee has no independent right of action for damages against a supervisor who improperly disciplined the employee for exercising his first amendment rights", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat this court must find that it is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs First Amendment claim. Because Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of employment discrimination based on national origin, plaintiffs First Amendment claim is preempted. Cf. Thorne v. Cavazos, 744 F.Supp. 348, 352 (D.D.C.1990) (finding that the remedial provisions of ADEA [or in this case Title VII] provides plaintiff with sole remedy for constitutional claims). Therefore, plaintiffs First Amendment claim should be dismissed. B. Civil Service Reform Act Preemption. Even if plaintiffs First Amendment claim is considered separate and apart from his Title VII claim, it is still preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat (N.D.Ohio 1988) (holding that employers have standing to sue" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (holding that plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim was predicated on tort and that it was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for tort actions", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (holding the government liable to plaintiffs for breach of contract", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (holding that there must be a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of contract in order for a party to bring a valid claim in tort based on a breach in a contractual relationship", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (recognizing that there can be compelling circumstances in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwith other free individuals — was unknown through much of history and is unknown even today in many parts of the world. Like other aspects of personal autonomy, it is too easily smothered by government officials eager to tell us what’s best for us. The recent tendency of judges to insinuate tort causes of action into relationships traditionally governed by contract is just such overreaching. It must be viewed with no less suspicion because the government officials in question happen to wear robes. Ill Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. The California Supreme Court is once again leading the way. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1988), has taken a bite out of Seaman’s by holding that tort remedies are 805, 195 Cal.Rptr. 421 (1983) (holding that a party can be liable in tort for actions authorized by the contract" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (holding section 102 of the cra creating the power to recover damages and providing for jury trial did not apply to case pending on appeal on the date of enactment", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (holding no remedy available under amended provisions of title vii for violations occurring prior to date of amendment november 21 1991 where discriminatory acts did not continue into the postamendment period", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (holding that congress intended the courts to apply the civil rights act of 1991 to cases pending at the time of its enactment and to preact conduct still open to challenge after that time", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (holding that conduct prior to passage of the civil rights act of 1991 is admissible to provide context and background", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nid. at ¶ 19, and that she “was not afforded the opportunity to transfer to another Georgia-Pacific office as were at least two other similarly situated male employees on prior occasions,” id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that Georgia-Pacific discharged her “because of her gender.” Id. at ¶ 21. In Count IV of her complaint, plaintiff seeks relief under section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (Nov. 21, 1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (“1991 Act”), which provides, inter alia, for compensatory damages and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and for the right to a jury trial if the plaintiff seeks either compensatory or pun as not addressed this issue. Compare, e.g., Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp., 812 F.Supp. 286 (D.P.R.1993) (holding that the damages and jury trial provisions of the 1991 act apply to conduct occurring prior to the date of enactment" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbecause the patentee cancelled a claim covering “triple superphosphate” and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbecause the patentee cancelled a claim covering “triple superphosphate” and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (holding regular use of process cannot constitute abuse of process", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbecause the patentee cancelled a claim covering “triple superphosphate” and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (holding that when a prisoners deliberate indifference claim is covered by the eighth amendment the substantive due process claims are duplicative and thus the substantive due process claims should be dismissed", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbecause the patentee cancelled a claim covering “triple superphosphate” and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (holding that to establish a claim for abuse of process a claimant must demonstrate an act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nbecause the patentee cancelled a claim covering “triple superphosphate” and expressly disclaimed that compound in his arguments to the examiner to gain patent allowance. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Ballard Medical Products v. Allegiance Healthcare Corporation, 268 F.3d 1352, 1359-62, 60 USPQ2d 1493, 1499-1501 (Fed.Cir.2001), which involved means-plus-function claims. There, the patentee asserted that the accused devices were equivalents, under paragraph 6 of section 112, to the claimed function’s corresponding structure. Id. at 1359, 268 F.3d 1352, 60 USPQ2d at 1499. We rejected that assertion on the basis of prosecution disclaimer: When a patentee advises the examiner (and the public after patent issuance) that a particular structure is not within his invention, the pate 7 (holding that the limitation sputterdeposited dielectric excluded a twostep process because the patentee argued during prosecution that the metal oxide in the process was directly deposited and that the invention thus only covered a onestep process" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was “guilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give charge because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his requested charge was tailored to the evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was “guilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (holding that because a mutual combat charge authorizes a jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter in lieu of murder it is a charge that benefits a defendant and as such a convicted defendants complaint that it was improper to give the charge is without merit", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was “guilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (holding that because trial court actually gave part of a jury charge that appellant claimed was improperly omitted and because remainder of courts charge adequately defined one of the legal terms at issue the courts jury charge taken as a whole was not misleading and did not constitute reversible error", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was “guilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (holding that jurys failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninstruction notes that if the defendant is not also charged with malice murder, the words in parentheses should be omitted. See id. In this case, although Appellant was not indicted for malice murder, the trial court included the parenthetical words in its jury instruction on felony murder. The court also charged that if the jury found that Appellant was “guilty of the offense of murder with malice af n that the State had to prove malice aforethought for Appellant to be found guilty of felony murder made it harder for the State to make its case, since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder (although it is not inconsistent with that crime). Instructional errors that could only benefit a defendant are harmless. See Sanders v. State, 283 Ga. 372, 375 (659 SE2d 376) (2008) (holding that failure to charge jury that state had burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in the heat of passion was harmless because the evidence did not support a charge on passionprovocation manslaughter" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nOF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See § 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the statute describes but one offense which can be committed by either or both of two methods", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nOF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See § 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (holding that a statute must not be given the one of two reasonable interpretations which will render it unconstitutional", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nOF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See § 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (holding that tex transp code ann 545060a describes one offense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nOF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See § 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nOF THE COURT PER CURIAM The Appellee herein was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in October of 1988. A Motion in Limine to exclude the results of the chemical breath test was made by the defense based on a lapse of two hours between arrest and test. Said Motion was granted. The State appeals. Testing is unnecessary in order for the State to prove a case against a defendant charged with driving under the influence. See § 316.193(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987); Layman v State, 455 So.2d 607 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), cert. denied, 459 So.2d 1040 (Fla. 1984) (holding that a defendants sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time he committed the offense" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (holding joinder not practicable where 100 to 150 class members were geographically dispersed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (holding that joinder is impracticable where the class consisted of at least fifty members", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (holding that 100 to 150 members is within the range that generally satisfies the numerosity requirement", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (holding numerosity requirement to be satisfied where putative securities fraud class consisted of more than 90 geographically dispersed plaintiffs", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThus, it appears to this court they would still be a proper member of the class. Their claims do not have to be identical to the class representatives. ii. Geographic Diversity It is undisputed the potential class covers tribes all over the United States. They involve tribes in 35 states. Defendant argues geographic diversity is insufficient to defeat joinder because it cannot be ascertained where the purported class members reside due to the vagueness and imprecision of the proposed class. However, the court agrees with plaintiffs that the geographic diversity of the potential class members makes joinder impractical, if not impossible. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 1159, 120 S.Ct. 1169, 145 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2000) (recognizing that in determining numerosity the proper focus is not on numbers alone but on whether joinder of all members is practicable in view of the numerosity of the class and all other relevant factors" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (holding that testimony that wood was rotten should have been allowed", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (holding that psychologists testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony was both relevant and reliable and thus should have been admitted", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (holding that child support should have been made retroactive", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (holding that the prisoner should have been allowed to choose whether to leave his car parked in a public parking lot", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial testimony describing the soil from the stain on the sweatpants as “kind of soot,” reveals that defense counsel objected to the description and the trial court sustained the objection. Even if the trial court had overruled the objection, we would find no error in its doing so because the officer’s description — although it may contain a conclusion, opinion, or inference-accords with the ordinary experience of everyday life. “Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions or separate physical conditions.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Woods, 663 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Mo.App. S.D.1983), citing Whitney v. Cent. Paper Stock Co., 446 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1969) (holding that an arbitrators award should have been vacated" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanufacturers.”); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (recognizing that the supremacy clause does not of its own force create rights", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanufacturers.”); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanufacturers.”); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (holding that congress enacted section 365 to provide debtors the authority to reject executory contracts this authority preempts state law by virtue of the supremacy clause and the bankruptcy clause", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanufacturers.”); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (recognizing that the supremacy clause is not a source of any federal rights", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nmanufacturers.”); id. (\"Permitting GM in bankruptcy, to ignore state dealer laws upsets the competitive balance among GM and every other automotive manufacturer. ”). 127 . It also at least seemingly would not be a person aggrieved with standing to appeal, but that is an issue for the appellate courts. 128 . See discussion at 492-93, above. 129 . Adelphia Settlement-Bankruptcy, 327 B.R. at 166. 130 .Adelphia Settlement-District, 337 B.R. at 477. 131 . See In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 199-206 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009); see also id. at 205-06 (“Where a state law unduly impede[s] the operation of federal bankruptcy policy, the state law [will] have to yield’ ”) (quoting In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2009)). 132 . 406 B.R. at 205-06; see also Vallejo, 403 B.R. at 77 (holding in a bankruptcy context that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the supremacy clause" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that where an authorized disclosure is voluntarily made to a nonfederal party whether or not that disclosure is denominated confidential the government waives any claim that the information is exempt from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that in analyzing whether materials are protected from disclosure under exemption 5 of foia which protects materials covered by the deliberative process privilege a court must first be able to pinpoint an agency decision or policy to which these documents contributed and stating that the decision whether to prosecute an individual is the type of decision protected by the privilege", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that emails among prosecutors relating to decision not to prosecute were covered by the deliberative process privilege", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that the information is not protected by attorneyclient privilege", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n499 F.Supp.2d 501, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2007) for the proposition that the privilege does not reach \"routine operating decisions.” PL’s Mem. for Mot. to Compel at 26, but it is the Mead Data opinion that has precedential value here. 7 . Even the cases the Committee cites indicate that the privilege covers agency deliberations about decisions, as well as the formulation of policy positions. In Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666, 677 (D.C.Cir.1981), the Court stated, \"the privilege protects documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated ....” See also Paisley v. C.I.A., 712 F.2d 686, 698-99 (D.C.Cir.1983), vacated on other grounds, 724 F.2d 201 (D.C.Cir.1984) (holding that internal emails about how to present an agency decision to the public were covered by the deliberative process privilege" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (recognizing that under puerto rico law res judicata may not apply if public policy demands an exception but noting that this exception was successfully argued in only two cases and concluding that public policy does not demand an exception in this case", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that the exception does not apply to osha inspection cases", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that alleyne does not apply to cases on collateral review", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (recognizing exception", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequires tha ion the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.”). The same is true under federal law. See United States v. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 F.3d 281, 285 (2d Cir.2002) (compiling cases); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1119 (3d Cir.1992) (\"For parole and probation revocations, the Guidelines specify that the original sentence and the sentence imposed after probation is revoked are added and counted as if they were one sentence.”). 4 . In subsequent cases, we noted that this exception to mootness only applies where a “personal liberty interest is at stake.” Matter of Kulp Foundry, Inc., 691 F.2d 1125, 1129 (3d Cir.1982) (holding report to authorities for violating osha does not qualify as protected activity under title vii" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (holding that informant acted under color of law when fbi supervised recording", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (holding that private doctor under contract with a state prison to provide medical care to prisoners acted under color of state law when he treated inmate", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (holding that a federal drug informant acting under the partial direction of the fbi and for pay was not a federal employee under the ftca", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich would undoubtedly violate due process if true. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1994). To establish such, a violation, the defendants must show that (1) the government acted in bad faith by not preserving evidence, (2) the exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent before its destruction and (3) the defendant cannot obtain the same evidence elsewhere. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Watts, 29 F.3d at 290. The defendants produced no credible evidence that any evidence was actually destroyed. Whitacre never claimed he destroyed tapes; rather, he offered but then recanted an allegation that a friend to whom he sent some tapes destroyed the Cir.1977) (holding that cooperating witness under direction of fbi was acting under color of law" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nat the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that when fleeing felon tossed a mesh bag weighing four or five pounds toward the officer the officer would have been justified if he fired at that moment out of fear that the bag might knock his firearm out of his hand but that he was not justified in firing after bag hit him and fell to the ground without injuring him and suspect turned and ran", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nat the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (holding the opening and inventory of a shoulder bag was reasonable despite the possible alternative of securing the bag as a whole", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nat the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that the opening of a makeup bag was justified when a woman had grabbed the bag when the officer turned away had resisted it being taken from her the bag felt heavy her companion had been armed the previous day and the officer and individual were alone", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nat the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (holding an officers reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed was sufficient justification for seizure of suspects makeup bag and exigent circumstances justified the subsequent warrantless search of the closed bag", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nat the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated. See Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir.1999) (finding issue of fact regarding whether officer was justified in firing on vehicle from side after stepping out of the way to avoid being run over, and explaining that “[a] passing risk to a police officer is not an ongoing license to kill an otherwise unthreatening suspect”); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1162 n. 9 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that analyzing separate segments of single encounter may be appropriate if “the officers’ initial decision to shoot was reasonable under the circumstances but there was no need to continue shooting”); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that the owner of a shoulder bag located on the front seat of his girlfriends car had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bag and its contents" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (holding that a statute that does not provide for notice and a hearing is not unconstitutional because those provisions may be incorporated by implication to prevent a holding of unconstitutionality", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (holding evidence was not newly discovered because the underlying facts were well within the partys knowledge prior to the district courts entry of judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (holding recoupment statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for a hearing prior to entry of judgment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe initial order to be a final adjudication of Dudley’s repayment obligation. We analyze Dudley’s due-process claim with this understanding of the court’s action. We think the hearing provided to Dudley satisfied due process. It occurred pri- or to final judgment being rendered against him, and he was allowed to present evidence and argument with respect to the amount of the judgment as well as any repayment plan. Therefore, the hearing afforded Dudley was “at a meaningful time” and was conducted “in a meaningful manner” as required by the Due Process Clause. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d at 241. Even though Dudley was given the opportunity to be heard, he points out section 815.9 makes no provision for a hearing and so is unconstitutional on its face. See Fitch, 581 F.Supp. at 278 (holding that imposition occurs at time of entry of judgment" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (holding that universitys amendment of regulation made moot a challenge to regulations", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (holding that a first amendment challenge to an expired restraining order which had enjoined a rally was not moot", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (holding that because the order lacked an independent basis it was an abuse of discretion to issue the mutual restraining order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (holding that challenge to oneyear order for protection was not moot even though it had expired", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nit fails prong one. Cases that qualify under prong one present controversies of inherently limited duration. In one of these cases, it is not “reasonably foreseeable” that plaintiffs can obtain full review before their case becomes moot. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 774, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). For example, “[pjregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness. It truly could be capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (quotation marks omitted). Cases challenging a prior restraint on free speech also typically fit into this exception. See, e.g., Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-79, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968) (holding that a challenge to a mining plan was moot where the action sought to be enjoined hadbeen completed" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (holding exclusion h does not apply where employees were merely negligent", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (holding that it is well established that whether an employees actions were within the scope of employment is a question of fact and even if some of the actions were unauthorized the question of whether the actions were within the scope of employment is for the jury", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (holding that written warnings that impacted the probability an employee would be terminated are adverse employment actions", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (holding an employees actions in disregarding his doctors warnings were negligent", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nand Fenner had not misrepresented his condition as he was merely asked his opinion about his physical abilities: “Do you have any injuries, you know, that would prevent you from doing this type of work.” Fenner answered in the negative. Whether this ruling was correct must remain unexamined. Trimac’s appeal on this issue was deemed untimely by this Court, and consequently, we are constrained to review only Fenner’s post-employment conduct. 11 . Some of the cases the majority offers to support its argument are inapplicable, as well, because they rely on a lower standard than that required in South Dakota. See, e.g., Appleby, 22 Ark.App. 243, 738 S.W.2d 807 (considering whether an employee's actions aggravating a pri- or injury were merely reasonable); Amoco Chemical Corp., 318 A.2d 614 (recognizing as viable actions in tort negligent hiring and negligent retention" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLandvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (holding that assertions of privilege must normally be raised as to each record sought and each question asked so that the court can rule with specificity", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLandvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (holding that products dissimilar in price can have similar features so as to compete with each other", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLandvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (holding that the district court is not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the 3553a factors or to discuss each of the 3553a factors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLandvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (holding that each provision of a statute must be afforded meaning when possible", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLandvest Corp., Civ. A. No. 04-2025-CM, 2006 WL 897612, *7-8 (D.Kan. Mar. 31, 2006) (three years prior to plaintiff's termination was a reasonable scope in light of the three-year statute of limitations). 17 . Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). 18 . Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan.2005); Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D.Kan.2001). 19 . Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 220 F.R.D. 633, 646 (D.Kan.2004) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)). 20 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 615-16; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan.2003). 21 . Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 616; Owens, 221 F.R.D. at 652; Steil, 197 F.R.D. at 445. 22 . See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir.1974) (holding that each element required under the act must be included in the written notice and each element must be sufficiently clear and accurate " ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that exaggeration of pain versus treatment sought was substantial evidence for the aljs credibility determination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding the alj was permitted to consider fact claimant had not sought treatment for her alleged back pain", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that credibility determinations are reviewed only for substantial evidence", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that ves unchallenged testimony was substantial evidence supporting aljs decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nALJ did not accurately describe the treatment received by Ms. Grier for fibromyalgia and the ALJ also failed to credit Ms. Grier’s longitudinal history of back pain. The Regulations state that relevant factors for an ALJ to consider when evaluating a claimant’s pain symptoms include, “the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication” taken by the claimant, as well as any “[treatment, other than medication, [claimant] receives or ha[s] received for relief of [claimant’s] pain or other symptoms[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v). A claimant’s statements “may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints[.]” SSR 96 — 7p; see also Farley v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-2219-VEH, (Doc. 11 at 9-12) (N.D.Ala. Dec. 2, 2009) (holding that court reviews aljs decision for substantial evidence on the record as a whole including the new evidence submitted after the determination was made" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncreate such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington’s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington’s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer’s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld “police reports provided support for [the defendant’s] defense that someone else murdered” the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose information regarding a witnesss past cooperation with law enforcement did not constitute a brady violation in light of other impeachment evidence in the record including testimony regarding the witnesss extensive drug use and past cooperation with the dea", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncreate such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington’s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington’s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer’s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld “police reports provided support for [the defendant’s] defense that someone else murdered” the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (holding claim based on failure to disclose information to the epa preempted", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncreate such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington’s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington’s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer’s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld “police reports provided support for [the defendant’s] defense that someone else murdered” the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (holding prosecutions failure to disclose information of other africanamerican females in vicinity of drug sale constituted a brady violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncreate such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington’s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington’s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer’s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld “police reports provided support for [the defendant’s] defense that someone else murdered” the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncreate such a doubt, it is material even if it would not convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Gates was the killer. Under the circumstances presented by the record before us, we cannot be confident that the result of Harrington’s murder trial would have been the same had the exculpatory information been made available to him. We hold, therefore, that Harrington’s due process right to a fair trial was violated by the State’s failure to produce the police reports documenting their investigation of an alternative suspect in Schweer’s murder. See Mazzan, 993 P.2d at 74-75 (finding Brady violation where withheld “police reports provided support for [the defendant’s] defense that someone else murdered” the victim); Davis v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 588, 491 S.E.2d 288, 293 (1997) (holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (“Congress did expect ‘prohibited personnel practices’ to cover supervisors’ violations of employees’ constitutional and privacy rights.”); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted “flexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment”); Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (holding that admiralty and general maritime claims fall within the category of any other civil action governed by the second sentence of 1441b", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (“Congress did expect ‘prohibited personnel practices’ to cover supervisors’ violations of employees’ constitutional and privacy rights.”); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted “flexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment”); Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (recognizing that claims alleging due process violations arising out of employment actions fall under the catchall category of prohibited personnel practices ", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (“Congress did expect ‘prohibited personnel practices’ to cover supervisors’ violations of employees’ constitutional and privacy rights.”); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted “flexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment”); Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (“Congress did expect ‘prohibited personnel practices’ to cover supervisors’ violations of employees’ constitutional and privacy rights.”); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted “flexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment”); Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (holding that claims arising under the age discrimination in employment act may be subject to arbitration", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof personnel management ... with proper regard for their... constitutional rights.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(b)(12); See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.1991) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-1717 (1978), as reprinted- in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N, 2860, 2865) (“Congress did expect ‘prohibited personnel practices’ to cover supervisors’ violations of employees’ constitutional and privacy rights.”); Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1988); Jarvis v. Cardillo, No. 98 CIV. 5793, 1999 WL 187205, at *9 (S.D.N.Y, Apr. 6, 1999) (observing that the CSRA has been interpreted “flexibly to cast a wide net over constitutional challenges arising from federal employment”); Porter v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, No. 93 C 6900, 1995 WL 461898, at *6 & n. 4 (N.D.Ill. July 17, 1995) (holding that claims arising under the sixth amendment fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of federal claims" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants’ counsel’s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of “evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... ” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding trial court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct hearing and render decision on motion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants’ counsel’s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of “evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... ” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that trial court was required to give full effect to supreme courts judgment and that by failing to do so the trial court abused its discretion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants’ counsel’s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of “evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... ” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing expert testimony that directly linked the characteristics of sexually abused children to the complainants in this case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants’ counsel’s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of “evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... ” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by not making the necessary inquiry and in failing to address two factors that bore directly on the rule 60b motion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe case, the trial court did hot consider the factors enumerated in either Rule 60(b)(1) or in Starling. There was no inquiry by the trial court into whether appellants’ counsel’s actions constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect which would justify setting aside the order of dismissal. Moreover, there was no inquiry into whether appellants had actual notice of the proceedings, acted in good faith, and took prompt action; nor was there any inquiry as to possible prejudice to the non-moving party or a recognition by the trial court of “evidence in the record reflecting unjustified delays, or noncompliance with the court rules, attributable to the appellant .... ” Id. (citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Lustine Realty Co., 640 A.2d 708, 709 (D.C.1994) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a rule 60b motion when the relevant change in law occurred eight months prior and petitioner filed the motion two days before his execution" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncharacterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (holding that the common law presumption of incapacity of a minor between the ages of seven and fourteen years to commit a crime no longer applies", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncharacterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (holding that federal common law is the law that would govern in the absence of the warsaw convention", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncharacterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (recognizing presumption", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncharacterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (holding that a common law presumption of death is triggered after an absence of seven years", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncharacterize the ruling of the trial court. The trial court actually concluded that “the evidence before the Court is as strongly supportive of Paul Donald Cappo having voluntarily disappeared.” Thus, the trial court ruled that the evidence that Paul Cappo voluntarily disappeared was as strong as the evidence that he was murdered. The court did not conclude that Paul Cappo had voluntarily disappeared, but rather that appellant had failed to meet her burden of proving not only that he did not voluntarily disappear, but that he died from accidental bodily injury. Appellant attempted to rely on the legal presumption of Paul Cappo’s death created by his absence of at least five years. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 490.260 (1986); Sanderson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 194 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Mo.App.1946) (holding that the presumption is weaker if triggered at all where there is not a tradition of state legislation" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that during police interrogation right to remain silent must be invoked unambiguously", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that a defendant who is subject to custodial interrogation must be advised in clear and unequivocal language of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to a lawyer", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that a suspects invocation of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal to require that police questioning cease", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that prior to engaging in custodial interrogation police must warn a suspect that he has a right to remain silent that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto be read his Miranda rights before the school police questioned him and, given their failure to do so, we find that Appellant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination was violated. Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case. CAPPY, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. CASTILLE, Justice, files a dissenting opinion. NEWMAN, Justice, files a concurring opinion. SAYLOR, Justice, files a concurring opinion. EAKIN, Justice, did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. 1 . Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (holding that constitutional precedent does not require that a convicted defendant be warned of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting to a routine authorized presentence interview" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(holding that an appellate court considers the entire record on appeal not just the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(holding that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be raised on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(holding issues not raised in appellate brief are waived", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(holding that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised later on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nTherefore, it was an allegation based on speculation and conjecture. The trial court conducted a hearing, at which Walker could have pursued this legal theory, objected to the State’s alleged lack of evidence of probable cause to arrest, presented evidence to support his allegation, and argued that the lack of evidence required that his statement be suppressed. Walker, however, remained silent; he did not pursue this issue in the trial court; and he did not allow the trial court the opportunity to prevent the alleged injustice. See Adams v. State, 585 So.2d 161, 164 (Ala.l991)(“Matters not objected to at trial cannot be considered for the first time on appeal, since review on appeal applies only to rulings by the trial court.”)- Cf. Coulliette v. State, 857 So.2d 793, 795 (Ala.2003)(holding that because a specific argument raised on appeal was not presented at suppression hearing the motion to suppress did not give the trial court notice of the specific issues the defendant raised in his appellate brief therefore the trial court did not have the opportunity to rectify these alleged errors the defendants motion was not sufficient to preserve the issues presented by him in his brief quoting aeree v state 673 so2d 855 856 alacrimapp1995" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding that the state law violated equal protection principles", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding that where racial bias motivated its original enactment a facially neutral felon disenfranchisement law violated the equal protection clause", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding that a provision in the alabama constitution violated equal protection even through it was facially neutral because it was motivated by animus", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding complaint that sentence violated equal protection was waived because of failure to object at trial", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nFCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)). Under rational basis review, a classification is permissible “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis.” Id. (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096). Plaintiffs contend that the EO discriminates on the basis of religion and was designed to exclude Muslims from the United States. They further allege that it singles out citizens of seven different countries. At oral argument, plaintiffs relied on “astonishing evidence of intent” from President Trump which, in their view, demonstrates that EO was “substantially motivated by improper animus.” See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) (holding that an illinois countys facially neutral twotiered ballot ordering system did not violate the equal protection clause" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not “additional non-statutory aggravators.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “additional” to mean “a factor unrelated to the Defendant’s crime of conviction.” This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as “any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (holding that hurst did not render unconstitutional californias capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a jury in the factfinding process", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not “additional non-statutory aggravators.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “additional” to mean “a factor unrelated to the Defendant’s crime of conviction.” This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as “any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (holding that alabamas capital sentencing scheme which utilizes a factfinding jury remains constitutional under hurst", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not “additional non-statutory aggravators.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “additional” to mean “a factor unrelated to the Defendant’s crime of conviction.” This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as “any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not “additional non-statutory aggravators.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “additional” to mean “a factor unrelated to the Defendant’s crime of conviction.” This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as “any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (recognizing two solutions in a sentencing scheme very similar to hawaiis 1 the present system of fixed terms with factfinding assigned to a jury or 2 reform of the system to create a true sentencing range", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nargument is that because these factors restate the factors charged in the indictment, they are not “additional non-statutory aggravators.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). Defendant urges the Court to interpret the Fourth Circuit’s use of the word “additional” to mean “a factor unrelated to the Defendant’s crime of conviction.” This argument ignores the fact that the FDPA expressly permits juries to consider statutory aggravators as well as “any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given.” 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In other words, the FDPA empowers jurors to consider nonstatutory ag-gravators that are appropriately noticed. Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that allowing 689, at *6 (Ala. Crim. App. June 17, 2016) (holding we reject the notion that alabamas statutory scheme for compensating attorneys in capital cases in and of itself denies a defendant effective representation" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, “the incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.” 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to “material adverse action”); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that change of schedule video surveillance and disciplinary warnings were not material adverse actions sufficient to sustain retaliation claim", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, “the incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.” 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to “material adverse action”); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that denial of transfer request from a morning to a night shift was not adverse employment action because difference in working hours alone is not sufficient under title vii", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, “the incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.” 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to “material adverse action”); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding delayed paychecks denial of personal time criticism of work performance and shift change were adverse actions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, “the incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.” 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to “material adverse action”); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nnot be sufficient, but cumulatively such actions may arise to adverse action for purposes of supporting a retaliation claim. For example, in Sanford v. Main Street Baptist Church Manor, Inc,, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although some of the incidents might not rise to the level of adverse action, “the incidents taken together might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination charge.” 327 Fed.Appx. 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 90 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding combination of being assigned absent students, temporary paycheck reduction, and failure to notify of curriculum claim cumulatively amount to “material adverse action”); Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed.Appx. 585, 589 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that counseling sessions and written criticisms of employees work performance did not fall within the types of materially adverse employment actions" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nas all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding the state law claims were not preempted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nas all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding rla duty of fair representation claim preempts identical state law claims of fraud and deceit", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nas all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nas all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding state law fraud and deceit claims to be preempted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nas all require interpretation of the CBA and arise out of the same circumstances from which the duty of fair representation arises. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-13, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1910-12, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state law claims preempted by federal labor law where evaluation of the state claim requires consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (“if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is preempted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 180 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 93A). Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth’s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (holding that summary judgment on chapter 93a claim is appropriate when summary judgment is granted on fraud claim and chapter 93a claim is solely based on the underlying claim for common law fraud", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 93A). Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth’s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (holding that where there was no evidence of the claimed underlying violation and where there were no unique arguments related to the chapter 93a claim defendant was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs chapter 93a claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 93A). Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth’s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (holding that where summary judgment is granted on the underlying tort claims a conspiracy claim must also fail", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 93A). Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth’s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that motion for summary judgment was not opposed", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nc. 93A). Plaintiffs’ final amended complaint, which they filed with leave of court on April 2, 2004, does not, however, contain a Chapter 93A claim, nor did it incorporate by reference any earlier complaint or claims. Defendant persuasively argues that the Chapter 93A claim has, therefore, been waived. Even if the Chapter 93A claim were properly before the Court, however, it would fail because plaintiffs have alleged no facts to support the contention that Banknorth committed unfair or deceptive trade practices other than those relating to their fraud claim and to Banknorth’s alleged breach of the RCA. As explained above, summary judgment will be entered with respect to those claims for the reasons set forth. See, e.g., Macoviak v. Chase, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 667 N.E.2d 900, 904 (1996) (holding that district court should not have granted summary judgment solely on basis that a motion for summary judgment was not opposed" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that patria potestas rights under mexican law are custody rights under the hague convention", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that additional claims brought under state law are preempted by the montreal convention", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that because hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction lacks specific remedy for rights of access to children matters relating to access are best left to the state courts which are more experienced in resolving these issues", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that state rights are equivalent to federal rights in this area", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.2000). Patria potestas is codified in Peruvian law under the term “parental authority,” which is defined as the right and duty of the parents, to take care of the person and properly of their minor children. Civil Code of Peru § 418. In addition to providing rights and duties relating to the development, education, and assets of a child, parental authority gives parents the right to “[k]eep the children with them and appeal to the proper authority in order to recover them,” which necessarily implies rights relating to the child’s residence. Code of Children and Adolescents of Peru art. 74(e). Such patria potestas rights, which Correa received when the Children were born, are recognized as “rights of custody” within the meaning of the Hague Convention. See Whallon, 230 F.3d at 459 (holding that rights under vienna convention are not the equivalent of fundamental rights such as the right to counsel" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCamacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmlesserror analysis", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCamacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (holding that no seizure occurred where the defendant initially stopped in compliance with a police officers order but then drove off quickly before the police officer could reach the suspects car", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCamacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (holding that evidence obtained by improper search or seizure is inadmissible", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCamacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (holding that a seizure results whenever an individual is stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to achieve that result", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCamacho Every citizen has a Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force during lawful arrests. See Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir.2004). “Violation of the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control” over the plaintiff. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). An excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment requires that the police act “through means intentionally applied” to secure physical control of the plaintiff. Id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378. The acquiring of physical control, or seizure, need not occur in the manner originally intended by the police, but it must result from volitional police activity performed for the purpose of seizing the plaintiff. Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (holding that probable cause alone justifies a warrantless search or seizure of a vehicle lawfully parked in a public place" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (recognizing that fdutpa cases apply a benefit of the bargain damages formula", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (recognizing that berry altered the apportionment and valuation portions of the taggart formula", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (holding that banks damages were benefit of the bargain type damages that fail to constitute a substantial and independent injury sufficient to remove borrowers claim from the operation of the statute of frauds", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe product as promised minus the value of the product delivered.”). Thus, the proper question is not how much the erroneous sticker may have reduced the vehicle’s perceived value for any individual purchaser or lessee. Rather, damages should reflect the difference between the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with perfect safety ratings for three standardized categories and the market value of a 2014 Cadillac CTS with no safety ratings. Unlike the calculation of an individual consumer’s direct pecuniary loss, which would limit the plaintiff to the difference of what she paid and the actual value received, the FDUTPA “benefit of the bargain” model provides a standardized class-wide damages figure because the plaintiffs out-of-pocket payment is immaterial. See Coghlan, 240 F.3d at 453 (holding that competitor could seek only injunction under fdutpa not damages" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that county commissioners court that had adopted order designating roads to be improved if bond issue carried could not designate other roads to be improved with proceeds of bonds after election contrary to the will of those having to bear the bond burden", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (recognizing that no bond or a nominal bond may be appropriate in cases involving the public interest", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof property-tax payers obligated to pay through their taxes for bonds issued for public construction projects pursuant to voter approval in a bond election. Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 34; Black, 246 S.W. at 80; Moore, 200 S.W. at 374-75; Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities, 79 S.W.3d at 676. Each of these cases involved a suit brought by property taxpayers who had voted to issue bonds to be paid for from general tax revenues, in- eluding from their property taxes. See Fletcher, 39 S.W.2d at 82-33 (treating pre-election orders as contract between commissioners’ court and “electorate entitled to vote at said election” and overturning dismissal of voter and property-tax payer suit alleging diversion of proceeds from sale of bonds issued for use on certain public road); Black, 246 S.W. at 80 (holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nAlthough Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nAlthough Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (holding that use certainly includes brandishing a firearm quotation marks omitted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nAlthough Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (holding defendants minimum sentence could not be increased for brandishing a firearm where based on jury instructions jury convicted defendant of the lesser offense of carrying rather than brandishing the firearm", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nAlthough Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nAlthough Joseph challenged the constitutionality of the drug-quantity determination in his sentencing memorandum, the Government points out that Dunbar did not make a constitutional challenge in the district court, and argues for plain-error review. The result is the same regardless whether our review is de novo or for plain error. According to the Court, Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime. It follows, then, that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (internal citations omitted) (holding that the trial court was not entitled to impose a threeyear mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon where the jury verdict did not specifically find actual possession" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOpinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (holding the district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff who is represented by counsel never filed a motion to amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOpinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOpinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOpinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nOpinion w . Having concluded that this Court has jurisdiction over this matter, this Court nevertheless notes that Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594, 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011) sets forth certain limitations on the constitutional authority of bankruptcy courts to enter final orders. Therefore, this Court has a duty to constantly inquire into its constitutional authority to enter a final order for any matter brought before this Court. In the first instance, this Court concludes that its denial of the Application is not a final order because the denial is without prejudice to the refiling of another application seeking approval of the Firm that includes the information discussed in this Memorandum Opinion. See WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCo., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (holding that courts interpret indemnity provisions same as written contracts", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCo., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (holding extrinsic evidence may be used only to interpret not alter a written contract", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCo., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (recognizing that the rules of statutory construction apply when we interpret constitutional provisions", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCo., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (holding same", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCo., 347 Mass. 285, 288 (1964) (internal citation omitted) (“The construction of an unambiguous written contract is a ‘pure question of law’ ”). Moreover. “[i]t is . . . elementary that an unambiguous agreement must be enforced according to its terms.” J.F. White Contracting Co. v. MBTA, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 938 (1996). Accordingly, the Agreement's construction should be resolved by the court. See id. The court will limit its review to the document itself, rejecting parol evidence “to vary the unambiguous terms of the contract.\" Vakil v. Anaesthesiology Associates of Taunton, Inc., 51 Mass.App.Ct. 114, 119(2001). As part of the written contract, the Agreement’s indemnity clause will be construed by the court. See Herson v. New Boston Garden Corp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 778, 782 (1996) (holding that the indemnity provisions to which gs 22b1 apply are those construction indemnity provisions which attempt to hold one party responsible for the negligence of another" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (holding that the plaintiff successfully pleaded an adverse employment action where the plaintiff alleged facts indicating that his duties were so restricted on the midnight shift that it is as if he is not a sergeant", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (holding that termination is an adverse employment action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (holding that once a plaintiff has pled facts in the complaint indicating that the statute of limitations is a complete or partial bar to an action it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to plead either in the complaint or in amendments to it facts establishing an exception to the affirmative defense", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas overworked or that his job duties were otherwise burdensome. Mota, 261 F.3d at 521, is similarly distinguishable. In Mota, the plaintiff presented evidence that, during his employment as a visiting professor, the university “stripped [him] of his duties as principal investigator on certain projects.” Significantly, the university limited Mota’s ability to serve as principal investigator only “on certain projects,” and there was no indication that being a principal investigator on those projects was a significant part of his job as a visiting professor. Id. In contrast, Thompson alleges that he lost his ability to perform his essential job functions in all investigations, not just on certain projects. Compare id., with Schirle, 484 Fed.Appx. at 898, and Lavalais, 734 F.3d at 633 (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndecision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (recognizing that owens clarified wilson and designating the sixyear limitations period in section 54105 subd 15 as the applicable limitations period for section 1983 claims", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndecision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (holding that the limitations period in section 13 214a takes precedence over the limitations period for personal injuries found in section 13 202 of the code", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndecision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (holding that placement of a contractual limitations period in a section entitled claims was reasonable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndecision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndecision in Goodman and recognized that Minnesota’s personal injury limitations period governed section 1981 actions. See Rhodes, 709 F.Supp. at 168; Rice, 677 F.Supp. at 612. In Rhodes, the court acknowledged that the courts of this district had applied the two-year statute of limitations for section 1983 claims following the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See Cook v. City of Minneapolis, 617 F.Supp. 461, 463-65 (D.Min 615 (8th Cir.1995) (analogizing section 1983 claims and section 1981 claims with claims brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, and recognizing that in Minnesota, section 1983 claims are governed by the six-year limitations period); see also Berg v. Groschen, 437 N.W.2d 75, 76-77 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (holding that the statute of limitations for 1983 claims is the most closely analogous state limitations period for general personal injury claims" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (holding that a white defendant can object to the exclusion of minority jurors through the use of peremptory challenges", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (holding that a defendants exercise of peremptory challenges is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (holding that is not the fact that a jury is all white or all black that violates batson rather it is the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (holding that the defendant was precluded from asserting error where the defendant had used all of his peremptory challenges and did not ask for more", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\njurors 7, 9, 20, 41,43, 65, and 84 as those who expressed concerns about the facts of the case. None of these individuals were ultimately empaneled: five were excused for cause because they stated they could not be fair and impartial, one was stricken by the defense using a peremptory challenge, and one was not selected. See State v. Rackley, 2000-NMCA-027, ¶ 9, 128 N.M. 761, 998 P.2d 1212 (explaining that “[t]he jury selection process, including the excusal of jurors for cause, insures that a defendant is tried before an impartial jury”). Finally, Defendant had two remaining peremptory challenges at the conclusion of jury selection and has not offered an explanation as to why she did not exercise those challenges. See State v. Isiah, 1989-NMSC-063, ¶ 29, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293 (holding that where a defendant does not use all of his or her peremptory challenges the defendant may not complain of prejudice for failure to dismiss prospective jurors" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (holding that an alien must show error and substantial prejudice in order to prevail on a due process claim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (holding that the first grable requirement was met where the plaintiff in order to prevail on his legal malpractice claim had to show that he would have prevailed on his claim under federal patent law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (holding that the plaintiffs state statutory claim against volkswagen did not give rise to federal question jurisdiction under grable since the claim was based on alternative theories some of which had no necessary federal element", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (recognizing that in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a movant must show that he was prejudiced by his counsels performance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na right possessed by all [Tennessee] residents,” not a right created by federal law. Fin. & Trading Ltd. v. Rhodia S.A., No. 04 Civ. 6083(MBM), 2004 WL 2754862, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2004) (Mukasey, J.). Notwithstanding the fact that S & P is an NRSRO, and thus subject to federal regulation, Tennessee’s claims “may be assessed entirely by applying [state] common law standards to the facts in this case.” Id. at *7. The contrast with Grable and its progeny is telling — and dispositive. In Grable, the plaintiff would “necessarily” have had to show a violation of federal law even if the defendant had never removed the case to federal court and even if the defendant had never invoked federal law as a defense. See 545 U.S. at 314-15, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Gunn, 133 S.Ct. at 1065 (holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that a federal court does not sit as a superpersonnel department to review the prudence of employment decisions", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that this court does not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims because the court may review neither criminal matters nor the decisions of district courts", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that because the department of revenue is subordinate to the board of tax review in the decision making process the department is not an adversely affected or aggrieved party having standing to petition for judicial review of the boards order reversing a decision of the department", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to review per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to cases not pending review in this court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nas to correct an inadvertent omission concerning a hiring freeze. See Gassaway Decl. ¶¶ 8-13; [D.E. 35-7]; [D.E. 35-8]. Moreover, ECSU reposted the position two additional times after .Gray and Cherry applied in order to increase the applicant pool, and such reposting ■ obviously did not favor Gray who already had applied. See Gassa-way Decl. ¶¶ 12-13; Branch - Decl. ¶ 7; [D.E. 35-9]; [D.E. 35-12]; [D.E. 35-13]; [D.E. 35-14];, [D.E. 35-15]. Furthermore,, a job posting for a senior law-enforcement management position that references a preference for law-enforcement management experience is not evidence that an employer intentionally sought to exclude African-Americans in general, or to exclude Cherry in this case. Cf. Feldman v. Law Enf't Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 350 (4th Cir.2014) (holding that the supreme court has final appellate review of agency decisions" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that a prisoners claim under the ftca based on being imprisoned for an extra ten days did not call into question the conviction or sentence and was not barred by heck", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that the plaintiffs evidence of pretext which included but was not limited to her supervisors statement that she had enough of the plaintiff going to her supervisor about her was not sufficient to preclude summary judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that the plaintiffs claim against the united states for negligence was not a tort claim within the ftca where it was founded upon an alleged failure to perform explicit or implicit contractual obligations", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that plaintiff established a prima facie claim of retaliation because the defendants failure to transfer her out of her abusive working environment could be viewed as an adverse personnel action and there was a causal link between the filing of plaintiffs complaint and the defendants failure to transfer her", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto recover the benefits that she claimed. Ms. Wilson did not initiate this action until July 28, 2011, approximately 34 months after the three year contractual time limit for a lawsuit expired. The record does not support Ms. Wilson’s request for equitable tolling of that limitation period. Doc. 19 at 22-23 (third alteration in original). We agree. A plaintiff is not reasonably diligent when she fails to investigate basic issues that are relevant to her claim or to proceed with it in a reasonably prompt fashion. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 457-58, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (explaining that equitable tolling generally cannot be invoked if “the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights”); Motta, 717 F.3d at 846-47 (holding that equitable tolling could not apply to the plaintiffs ftca claim because she was not diligent and her lack of diligence was evidenced by her failure to call the ftca helpline search a website that included a relevant link or ask for an address before the limitations period ran" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnumbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnumbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (holding under flsa", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnumbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (holding that plaintiffs were injured by defendants collection and publication of highly sensitive personal information including credit card numbers social security numbers financial account numbers and information regarding plaintiffs personal issues including sexuality mental illness alcoholism incest rape and domestic violence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnumbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (holding that social security benefits should not be set off from adea lost wages award", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnumbers of named plaintiffs and putative class members. In Flores, the court issued a protective order preventing defendant’s discovery of the plaintiffs immigration documents, social security numbers, and passports in a suit seeking unpaid wages under the FLSA. 233 F.Supp.2d at 462, 465. The court concluded that the information was irrele vant and its minimal probative value outweighed by its potential for prejudice. Id. at 464-65. See also Zeng Liu, 207 F.Supp.2d at 193 (denying defendant’s request to discover information relating to plaintiffs immigration status because such information is both irrelevant and the need for its disclosure outweighed by the risk of injury to the plaintiffs, even if the parties were to enter into a confidentiality agreement); Cabrera, 695 N.W.2d at 81 (holding that the flsa does not preempt a state law contractual claim that seeks to recover wages for time that is compensable under the contract but not under the flsa" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nservice of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that that foreign corporation that acted as agent for retail customers within the united kingdom had insufficient contacts with florida to permit the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the corporation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nservice of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (recognizing that personal jurisdiction of federal courts of course may be grounded in state longarm or other jurisdiction statutes in civil rico cases", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nservice of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that the court must look for continuous and systematic general business contacts ie general jurisdiction if the causes of action do not arise from or relate to the foreign defendants contacts with the forum state", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nservice of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that the foreign administrator of a deceased nonresident was subject to jurisdiction under the illinois state longarm statute because dece dent would have been subject to jurisdiction had he lived", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nservice of summons, Omni 484 U.S. at 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to effectively extend the territorial reach of a federal statute by applying a national contacts test for personal jurisdiction where service is not effected pursuant to that federal statute. In fact, in the only case to directly address the issue, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held, without analysis, that because RICO contains no provision for worldwide service, a plaintiff who attempts to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign national served outside the United States “must rely on the long-arm statute of the state in which he files his suit.” Stauffacher v. Bennett, 969 F.2d 455, 460 (7th Cir.1992); see also Brink’s Mat Ltd. v. Diamond, 906 F.2d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (holding rico plaintiff may resort to state longarm statute to serve foreign defendants abroad and assuming personal jurisdiction question would turn on foreign defendants contacts with middle district of florida" ]