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[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding cafeteria management fee is not taxable even if it is bundled with the sales price of food", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding that 455 appeal fee is clearly a taxable cost citing section 19201 and appellate rule 39e4", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n2. Clerk Fees The SFWMD is further presumptively entitled to recover the Clerk Fees under Appellate Rule 39, which like Rule 54 is read in conjunction with Section 1920. See Fed. R.App. P. 39 advisory committee’s note (observing that “[statutory authorization for taxation of costs is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1920”). Section 1920(1) provides that taxable costs include “Fees of the clerk and marshal.” Appellate Rule 39(e)(4) specifically, allows the district court to tax “the fee for filing the notice of appeal.” Although they are costs of appeal, costs enumerated in Appellate Rule 39(e) are “made taxable in the district court for general convenience.” Fed. R.App. P. 39(e) advisory committee’s note. See also King v. Gowdy, No. 02-CV-75136, 2008 WL 1820837, at *4 (E.D.Mich. Apr. 22, 2008) (holding that section 7263 authorizes this court to review fee agreements when appeal is properly before this court and when fee agreement has been filed with court at time appeal is filed" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that where the landlord was aware the tenant had moved out a tenant who attached a lock to the door and accidentally retained the keys to the lock was not a holdover tenant", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (holding the landlord did not trespass when his agent entered the premises for the purpose of showing them to a potential tenant", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (holding landlord jointly liable when he knew of or acquiesced in the tenants trespass", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (recognizing the general rule that the landlord is not liable for dangerous conditions existing once the tenant takes possession of the premises", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfrom Bagelmann. As in the Restatement example, the implied right in the present case follows logically from certain express terms of the agreement — i.e., the landlord’s right to sell or mortgage the property. And unlike in Bagelmann, the contract here contains an express term (the right to sell) to which the implied obligation (the right to show the property) can be attached. It would “destroy[ ] or injur[e] the right of [Alta Vista] to receive the fruits of the' contract” if we were to decline to find an implied right to show the premises to prospective buyers. See Am. Tower, 809 N.W.2d at 550. Other courts have agreed that the right to sell property implicitly includes the right to show it to prospective purchasers. See, e.g., Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681, 685 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that the tenant was not a holdover tenant despite retaining keys because the tenant recognized the termination of the tenancy relinquished possession of the premises and the landlord was able to gain access to the property" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (holding that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary denial of cancellation of removal based on a lack of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (recognizing that the iirira strips the court of jurisdiction over the attorney generals discretionary extreme hardship determination but retaining jurisdiction over constitutional due process claims", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (holding that the transitional rules preclude direct judicial review of the bias discretionary determination of extreme hardship in suspension of deportation cases", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (holding under the predecessor to 1229bb that denials of suspension based on the element of extreme hardship are discretionary decisions", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCURIAM: Jose Rodriguez Rueda petitions this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l). Rueda contests the merits o 999) (holding that discretionary denials of motions to reopen are reviewed only for abuse of that discretion" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (holding that limitation of liability clause was unambiguous", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (holding that an identical or nearly identical limitation of liability clause was valid and enforceable under georgia law", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (holding that the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (holding that if easement language is clear and unambiguous and does not limit its duration then the court cannot impose such a limitation", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbad law, we conclude that the territorial restriction in Atlanta Speciality’s uninsured motorist policy does not violate Mississippi public policy as embodied in the UM Act. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment for Atlanta Speciality. REVERSED AND RENDERED. 1 . The Mississippi Supreme Court has found various provisions of uninsured motorist policies ambiguous. See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Brown, 446 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1984) (limitation of liability clause); Pearthree v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 373 So.2d 267, 270-71 (Miss.1979) (same); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Bridges, 350 So.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Miss. 1977) (same); compare Blansett v. American Employers Ins. Co., 652 F.2d 535, 536-37 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug.1981) (per curiam) (holding that duration of limitation is a factor in determining whether limitation is significant" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that the filing deadline under title vii is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations is subject to waiver estoppel and equitable tolling", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding claims based on title vii subject to arbitration", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding as subject to equitable tolling title vii statute authorizing suit brought within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding title vii subject to equitable tolling", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Army argues that the two jobs are not identical and Nealon failed to present “comparable worth” evidence below. However, it is for the district court to determine on the merits whether the two jobs are sufficiently similar to find an EPA violation; Nealon. was never permitted to offer evidence on the merits because her suit was dismissed before trial, on the Army’s motion. B. Finally, Nealon argues that the fact that her favorable EEOC I decision was issued during the limitations period, in October 1987, warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations period. We agree. As a general matter, statutory time limits in suits against the government are subject to equitable tolling principles. See Irwin v. Veterans Administration, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 453, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990) (holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (holding a party to a contract who is himself in default cannot maintain a suit for its breach", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (holding that an arbitration agreement enforceable against party who signed the agreement even where the other party did not sign it because generally it is enough that the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced signs it", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (holding that a party may not contract away the protection that a statute is intended to afford him nor may the other party to the contract exempt itself from its duty to comply with such statute", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (recognizing that a contract is to be construed to give reasonable effect to each of its provisions", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe arbitration clause, we further conclude that Ms. Chapman’s decision to accept arbitration bound Ms. Barron to arbitrate future disputes with Betty Dare. Unlike the parties in McMillan, DeArmond, and Lisanti, the record indicates that Ms. Chapman voluntarily and knowingly chose arbitration of future disputes. The Resolution of Legal Disputes form clearly stated that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes indicated a waiver of a right to sue or go to trial in a court of law. To the extent that Plaintiff argues on appeal that Ms. Chapman did not fully understand the implications of the arbitration clause, we find this argument unavailing. Parties to an agreement are presumed to know and understand the terms of the agreement. See Ballard v. Chavez, 117 N.M. 1, 3, 868 P.2d 646, 648 (1994) (recognizing that each party to a contract has a duty to read and familiarize himself with its contents and generally is presumed to know the terms of the agreement" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\none or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (holding claim is not cognizable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\none or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (holding claim is cognizable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\none or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\none or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (holding that while batson claim was waived derivative claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the batson claim is cognizable under the pcra", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\none or more of the following: (i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i). 14 . Appellee presumably concedes that the remaining subsections of Section 9543(a)(2)-are not applicable to his Batson claim. 15 . Moreover, this Court has examined Batson claims within the PCRA framework, albeit without challenges being raised as to the applicability of the PCRA eligibility requirements relied upon here by Appellee. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268 (2006) (finding Batson claim waived); Commonwealth v. Sneed, supra, (holding that claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase of capital case is cognizable under the pcra" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt harmless. The district court stated that although the jury’s special verdict “would have no impact upon the [c]ourt’s sentencing decision,” it would impact the court’s decision if “the Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.” As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that in order to conclude that federal constitutional error is harmless court must find that error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt harmless. The district court stated that although the jury’s special verdict “would have no impact upon the [c]ourt’s sentencing decision,” it would impact the court’s decision if “the Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.” As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (holding a constitutional booker error harmless on the ground that because the district court stated its sentence would be the same even if the guidelines were only advisory we know with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt what the district court would do upon remand", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt harmless. The district court stated that although the jury’s special verdict “would have no impact upon the [c]ourt’s sentencing decision,” it would impact the court’s decision if “the Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.” As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that apprendi error is harmless if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt harmless. The district court stated that although the jury’s special verdict “would have no impact upon the [c]ourt’s sentencing decision,” it would impact the court’s decision if “the Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.” As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that booker constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because on remand the district court would have given defendant the same sentence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncourt harmless. The district court stated that although the jury’s special verdict “would have no impact upon the [c]ourt’s sentencing decision,” it would impact the court’s decision if “the Supreme Court later determine[d] that Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] extends to federal sentencing.” As mentioned above, the special verdict indicated that Soreide was responsible for $7 million to $20 million in actual loss and more than $20 million in intended loss, and that he participated as an organizer or leader. Because these jury findings were identical to those made by the sentencing judge and because they would be applied upon resentencing, any constitutional error was harmless. See United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. ¶ 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff “can freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,” such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix’s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the “substantial probability” of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (holding that the driver of a car who had permission to use the car had standing to challenge its search", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. ¶ 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff “can freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,” such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix’s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the “substantial probability” of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (holding that passengers of a vehicle which they did not own had standing to challenge the validity of a traffic stop", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. ¶ 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff “can freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,” such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix’s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the “substantial probability” of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (holding that senator mcconnell lacked standing to challenge a provision of the bipartisan campaign reform act of 2002 bcra that at earliest would have affected him in his 2008 reelection campaign", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. ¶ 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff “can freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,” such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix’s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the “substantial probability” of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (recognizing taxpayer standing to assert a constitutional challenge to the manner of a judicial election given the special circumstances involved", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nhe held a press conference announcing his candidacy, Nix Decl. ¶ 7; see also Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 907 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that a plaintiff “can freely augment his pleadings with affidavits,” such as the affidavit Nix filed discussing, among other things, his press conference, to establish the plaintiffs standing). The district court nonetheless app . FEC, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In our view, Nix’s allegation that he intended to run in the November 2011 election and his public announcement at the press conference sufficiently establish the “substantial probability” of imminent injury required for Article III standing. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C.Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 92 (holding that incumbent congressmen subject to twoyear election cycles had standing to challenge the fecs implementation of certain provisions of bcra" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court’s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that whether an officers force was reasonable must be analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court’s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that the protect act amendments to the standard of review apply retroactively", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court’s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that an excessive force claim is governed by the fourth amendments objectively reasonable standard rather than the fourteenth amendments shock the conscience standard", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court’s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that claims that law enforcement officials used excessive force in making an arrest are properly analyzed under the fourth amendments objective reasonableness standard", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ngovernmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Following the Supreme Court’s holing in Graham, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected alleged deprivations of substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment based either on excessive force or on malicious prosecution. Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.2008) (dismissing a substantive due process claim for deprivation of a life interest because the claim was based on excessive force more appropriately brought under the Fourth Amendment); Torres-Rivera v. O’Neill-Cancel, 406 F.3d 43, 51-53 (1st Cir.2005) (holding that new york law reasonable cause standard is equivalent to fourth amendments probable cause standard" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that neither the faa nor principles of preclusion or waiver could operate to bar the eeoc from seeking monetary relief on behalf of aggrieved individuals", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that even if indirect purchasers are barred from seeking damages relief they may still obtain injunctive relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding a party seeking mandamus must serve the party against whom relief is sought", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that an arbitration agreement between a charging party and an employer precludes the eeoc from seeking purely monetary relief in federal court on behalf of the charging party but not from seeking broad injunctive relief", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge LEE joined. Judge KING wrote a dissenting opinion. OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: This appeal presents the question of first impression in this circuit whether and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging party and his employer. Other circuits are split on the proper response to this question. Compare EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that a private party may bring an action in a federal district court seeking injunctive relief on the basis of garmon preemption for only arguably protected or prohibited activity" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequire a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, “the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of — any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.” (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that irrespective of whether bateman and all the potential class members can demonstrate actual harm resulting from a willful violation of the fail and accurate credit transactions act they are entitled to statutory damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequire a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, “the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of — any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.” (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that rule 23b2 calls for injunction as to all class members or to none of them and does not authorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequire a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, “the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of — any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.” (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that a plaintiff can seek statutory damages even in the absence of actual damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequire a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, “the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of — any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.” (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that fdcpa statutory damages did not predominate over the requested equitable relief because given the defendants net worth and the number of class members each class member would be entitled to receive only 025 in statutory damages", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nrequire a showing of actual harm when a plaintiff sues for willful violations.” Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir.2014). The court reasoned that when, as with the FCRA, “the statutory cause of action does not require proof of actual damages, a plaintiff can suffer a violation of the statutory right without suffering actual damages.” Id. at 413; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed [under the FCRA] with respect to any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of — any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1000.” (emphasis added); Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that class certification is not appropriate because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the calculation of individualized actual economic damages if any suffered by the class members can be performed in accordance with the predominance requirement of rule 23b3" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case “is not about the applicability of environmental laws.” The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX’s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court’s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (holding that while it is not appropriate to consider the merits in determining certification the admissibility of all evidence which has relevance to the merits is not barred if it is relevant to the purpose of refuting or supporting the existence of a class", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case “is not about the applicability of environmental laws.” The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX’s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court’s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (holding that the district court is not free to consider the potential for issue reduction when determining whether a putative intervener has a protectable interest in the merits of the action", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case “is not about the applicability of environmental laws.” The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX’s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court’s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case “is not about the applicability of environmental laws.” The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX’s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court’s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (holding that either the district court or the court of appeals must issue a certificate of appealability on both the merits and the procedural bar before we can consider the merits of a claim that the district court held to be procedurally barred", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe City from intervening as a matter of right. B. The District Court Improperly Engaged In Issue Reduction. The district court acknowledged that the complaint contained allegations regarding both abuse of process and federal preemption, but inappropriately claimed that the case “is not about the applicability of environmental laws.” The district court is mistaken; the question of federal preemption necessarily concerns the applicability of environmental laws. CEMEX’s prayer for relief clearly states that it wishes to conduct its gravel mining operation without impediment from state environmental laws. The district court’s focus on abuse of process and away from the application of environmental laws is not only mistaken, but also impermissible. City of Los Angeles, 288 F.3d at 399 (holding that the district court is free to consider the full record in the case when selecting the appropriate sanction" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndifferent place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the “attempt” language appears after “knowingly” and before the other elements of the crime. “Attempt” can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the “means or facility of interstate commerce” element. Second, even if the “attempt” language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. “[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.” United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that the government need not prove that the defendant actually knew the exact nature of the substance to establish mens rea knowledge of drugs illegality is sufficient", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndifferent place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the “attempt” language appears after “knowingly” and before the other elements of the crime. “Attempt” can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the “means or facility of interstate commerce” element. Second, even if the “attempt” language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. “[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.” United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndifferent place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the “attempt” language appears after “knowingly” and before the other elements of the crime. “Attempt” can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the “means or facility of interstate commerce” element. Second, even if the “attempt” language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. “[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.” United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (holding convictions under fla stat 893131 qualify as serious drug offenses pursuant to the acca despite the florida statutes lack of a mens rea element", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndifferent place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the “attempt” language appears after “knowingly” and before the other elements of the crime. “Attempt” can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the “means or facility of interstate commerce” element. Second, even if the “attempt” language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. “[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.” United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndifferent place in the superseding indictment than it does in the statute makes no difference here. First, the “attempt” language appears after “knowingly” and before the other elements of the crime. “Attempt” can fairly be read to modify all of the elements that follow the word, not just the “means or facility of interstate commerce” element. Second, even if the “attempt” language in the superseding indictment is somewhat imprecise, this does not render the superseding indictment insufficient. “[D]ue process does not require a recitation of the statute; it requires only that the [indictment] as a whole set forth the critical details of the offense charged.” United States v. Lentsch, 369 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that an indictment that omitted the mens rea element was sufficient because it cited the applicable statutes which informed the defendant of the elements of the charged offenses" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovided, however, that: (t ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of § 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (holding prescription defense available to wife who asserted that she was holding her husbands pills on his behalf", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovided, however, that: (t ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of § 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovided, however, that: (t ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of § 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (holding that a wifes minimal involvement in her husbands business coupled with the lack of evidence that she knew of or intended to further her husbands fraudulent schemes was insufficient evidence of conspiracy", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovided, however, that: (t ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of § 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (holding that the tolling provision of 91141 did not apply when the plaintiff knew that medical negligence may have contributed to her husbands death but asserted that she did not know the identity of the doctor who treated him", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovided, however, that: (t ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ “(2) In respect to those injuries or damages due to acts of medical * * * malpractice which could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence be discoverable at the time of the occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action, suit shall be commenced within three (3) years of the time that the act or acts of the malpractice should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been discovered.” (Emphases added.) Under the plain language of § 9-1-14.1, in order to toll the malpractice statute of limitations, there must be a finding that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence at the time the injury occurred, yet failed to discover a wrongful act on the part of the defendant. See Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403, 404 (R.I.1997) (holding that where petitioner testified she did not know who fired shots at her ear or why the evidence did not compel the conclusion that the shooting was based on her political opinion" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto DOJ before the IC’s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement “but for” the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are “Reasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys’fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys’ fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova’s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys’ fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (holding that fees for fees are not reimbursable under 28 usc 593f1", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto DOJ before the IC’s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement “but for” the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are “Reasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys’fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys’ fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova’s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys’ fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto DOJ before the IC’s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement “but for” the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are “Reasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys’fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys’ fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova’s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys’ fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (holding a bankruptcy court is not a court of the united states entitled to waive filing fees pursuant to 28 usc section 1915a", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto DOJ before the IC’s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement “but for” the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are “Reasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys’fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys’ fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova’s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys’ fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (holding that a case awarding fees under 42 usc 1988 has no application in a private claim for attorneys fees sounding in mississippi contract law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto DOJ before the IC’s appointment that she will not recover under the Act. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Mullins would not have incurred the attorneys’ fees and expenses for which she seeks reimbursement “but for” the requirements of the Act. D. Fees are “Reasonable\" under the Act 1. Attorneys’fees As we have often observed, the fee petitioner bear rneys’ fees and expenses and we will review each bill separately to ensure that all items sought are reimbursable under the Act and are reasonable. The January 1993 bill totals $22,322.50 and Mullins subtracts $6,800 for representation prior to IC diGenova’s appointment on December 14, 1992, and $632.50 for research in connection with recovering attorneys’ fees, which is not reimbursable under the Act. See Gadd, 12 F.3d at 257 (holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmotion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that the race of the prosecutor is irrelevant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmotion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmotion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that an official capacity suit should be treated as a suit against the entity", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmotion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that if property is not property1 of the public entity then the public entity cannot be subject to suit under the dangerous condition waiver", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmotion to dismiss. A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity As a threshold matter, we must determine if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immu nity. If so, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. See Lovely, 570 F.3d at 782 n. 2 (6th Cir.2009) (“[Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional doctrine----”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Nair v. Oakland County Cmty. Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if CNI enjoys tribal-sovereign immunity, we need not address the issues of diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1011 (10th Cir.2007) (holding that if an entity enjoys tribalsovereign immunity federal jurisdiction is otherwise irrelevant and dismissal of the suit is proper" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake’s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake’s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that we may not review a district courts refusal to grant a downward departure unless the court mistakenly believed that it lacked the authority to grant such a departure", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake’s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake’s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district courts refusal to grant a downward departure was discretionary and not because it believed it lacked the authority to depart where the court assessed the facts of the case and concluded that the departure requested does not seem to have a basis", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake’s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake’s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that a district courts statement that there was no basis for a downward departure did not indicate that it believed it lacked authority", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake’s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake’s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court was not required to state affirmatively on the record that it knew it possessed the authority to depart downward", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\na substantial preliminary showing that Officer McGrew recklessly made false statements and has further shown that the false statements were necessary or material to the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause, we remand the case for a Franks hearing on Flake’s allegations. B. Downward Departure in Sentencing Flake contends that the federal district court erroneously concluded during the sentencing proceedings that it did not have the legal authority to depart downward on the basis of the six months that Flake had already been held in custody on related state charges. We find no support for Flake’s contention in the record and hold that the district court was aware of and properly exercised its discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 222 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district courts denial of a downward departure was an exercise of discretion and therefore not reviewable" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that admitting evidence of a defendants prior statement to an investigator proffered by the commonwealth did not violate the defendants fifth amendment rights by forcing him to testify to dispute it", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that a defendants fifth amendment rights were violated when an interpreter was withdrawn by the court", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that state prosecutor violated fifth amendment by telling jury that a defendants failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (recognizing that the fifth amendment forbids comment by the prosecution on a defendants failure to testify", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndoes not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 435 U.S. at 340-41. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that giving the instruction was “like waving a red flag in front of the jury,” finding this assertion premised on an “indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions” that (1) jurors would not notice the defendant did not testify absent the instruction, and (2) jurors would disregard the instruction not to give weight to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. at 340. 7 The right to testify was extended to criminal defendants in Vermont by Public Act No. 40, § 1, 1866 (predecessor to 13 V.S.A. § 6601). 8 Baker's ruling is no longer controlling in light of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965) (holding that prosecutors direct comments on a defendants failure to testify were not cured by subsequent inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction regarding the defendants right not to testify" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (holding that a notice of claim period did not begin to run until discovery of the injury", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (holding the sixyear limitations period begins to run upon date that payment is made", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (holding that the time limits in section 53525 begin to run as soon as the oil or gas is delivered not when payment is actually made", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the unmarketability of one person’s title should not delay the payment of other entitled parties’ royalties, but it is not clear whether the unmarketa-bility of part of one person’s title justifies a delay in paying the rest of that same person’s proceeds. While the issue is not free from doubt, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not interpret this provision as excusing a delay in the payment of royalties on the interest in which Howell’s title was marketable. See Wright, The Arkansas Law of Oil and Gas, 10 U.Ark. Little Rock L.J. 5, 25 (1987-88) (“the Arkansas Supreme Court is likely to interpret section 53-525 in favor of the ... party entitled to receive lease proceeds” (citing, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 Ark. 338, 705 S.W.2d 423, 424-25 (1986) (holding that because an indemnitor is not liable until the indemnitee actually makes payment interest does not accrue until the payment is made" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDoggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (holding that the damage for tenancy at sufferance during the holdover period was the monthly rent under the lease versus the apartments fair market value because the lease contained a provision requiring lease payments beyond the lease term", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDoggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (holding that the appraisers interpretation of the lease was unreasonable on its face because they had appraised the value of a single lot instead of the entire tract contrary to the language of the lease", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDoggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (holding that former employees of a brokerage firm who had a contractual right to a share of any commission received by the firm upon extension of a lease were not entitled to a share of the commission received when the landlord and tenant entered an amendment to the lease which extended the duration but also added new terms this was a new lease not an extension of the prior lease", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDoggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (holding that the lessors interest in the leased property was subject to liens because it was perfectly obvious that the parties knew that the improvements at issue were the pith of the lease and that except for them the lease would not have been executed and because the improvements were essential to the purpose of the lease", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nDoggett, 663 A.2d at 517 n. 8, and we “will not question” the value fixed by the appraiser that the parties have chosen “in the absence of fraud or mistake.” Id. at 515. However, when an appraiser must interpret the meaning of a legal document — a contract between parties — before he may perform his appraisal, that interpretation is subject to judicial review. A court “will defer to the appraiser’s interpretation of the lease as long as it is reasonable and does not exceed the appraiser’s authority,” Doggett, 663 A.2d at 516, but the court noted in Marceron that unlike the actual appraisal of value, which is accorded deference, an appraiser’s interpretation of his instructions as set forth in a contract is “clothed with no presumption of correctness.” Marceron, 258 F.2d at 158 (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the termination of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination but gave the lessee a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndenied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence”); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(recognizing double jeopardy bar is inapplicable where a variance between indictment and proof necessitated prosecution under a new indictment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndenied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence”); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(holding that variation between an indictment and proof to a jury is not material where the allegations and proof substantially correspond", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndenied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence”); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(recognizing that evidence may be legally insufficient where there is variance between indictment allegations and proof", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndenied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence”); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(holding evidence legally insufficient", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndenied, 488 U.S. 840, 109 S.Ct. 108, 102 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988); Jaranee v. State, 770 So.2d 644, 647-48 (Ala.Crim.App.1999)(argument as to variance between indictment and proof \"goes to sufficiency of the evidence”); Bennett v. Tennessee, (Tenn.Crim.App.1998)(argument that there was a fatal variance between indictment and proof at trial viewed as sufficiency claim under Jackson); Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 796 n. 21 (stating variance between indictment allegation and proof was insufficiency of evidence problem), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Deltenre v. State, 808 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(variance between indictment allegations and proof resulted in legally insufficient evidence); Franklin v. State, 659 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)(holding variance between enhancement allegation and proof renders evidence legally insufficient only if variance is material" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nChief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a “stand committed” fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., “stand committed”) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (holding that while it is unconstitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a debt it is constitutional to imprison someone for failure to pay a fine the term debt is to be understood as an obligation arising otherwise than from the sentence of a court for the breach of the public peace or commission of a crime", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nChief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a “stand committed” fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., “stand committed”) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (holding that a state cannot imposte a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nChief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a “stand committed” fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., “stand committed”) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (holding in a case where the maximum time of imprisonment was extended because an indigent defendant was unable to pay a fine and court costs that a state may not constitutionally imprison beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nChief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a “stand committed” fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., “stand committed”) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (holding that state may not imprison indigent defendant solely for inability to pay fine", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nChief Judge. Arnold Ellis, the appellant, is serving a 12-year prison term as a result of his 1983 conviction for drug offenses. As part of his sentence, the court ordered him to pay a “stand committed” fine of $60,000. Such a fine requires him to remain in prison (i.e., “stand committed”) until he pays it. .Ed.2d 130 (1971) (holding that due process prohibits a state from denying indigent parties access to its divorce court based on their inability to pay filing fees and costs" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was “anything else in [the car] we need to know about”); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because “officers reasonably believed that they were in danger”); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed defendant as to location of a gun in an apartment even where most of the other adults in the apartment were handcuffed because even assuming the executing officers believed that the residence was secure the circumstances were still sufficiently dangerous", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was “anything else in [the car] we need to know about”); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because “officers reasonably believed that they were in danger”); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (holding that exception applies to statement by handcuffed parolee concerning whereabouts of a gun in an apartment where parole officers had specific information from a third party that a gun was likely present in the apartment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was “anything else in [the car] we need to know about”); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because “officers reasonably believed that they were in danger”); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (holding that the defendant had a duty to retreat from the doorway between his apartment and the apartment hallway because that area functioned as a hybrid privatepublic space", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was “anything else in [the car] we need to know about”); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because “officers reasonably believed that they were in danger”); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the hallway of an apartment building where the building door was unlocked and the hallway was easily accessible to the public", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n467 U.S. at 655, 104 S.Ct. 2626. The Court decided, however, that the danger to unsuspecting civilians sufficed to apply the exception. Id. at 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626; see also United States v. Liddell, 517 F.3d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir.2008) (applying exception when after defendant was removed from his car, arrested, handcuffed, and put in back of police car, police found an unloaded gun under front seat and then asked whether there was “anything else in [the car] we need to know about”); New-some, 475 F.3d at 1225 (determining that exception applied where defendant was handcuffed on floor because “officers reasonably believed that they were in danger”); Luker, 395 F.3d at 835 (applying exception where defendant had already been arrested, handcuffed, and patted down); Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (holding that public safety issue remained notwithstanding that newton was handcuffed and in hallway outside his apartment because the unlocated gun presented a deadly risk to everyone on the premises" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner’s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, “dime-bag” dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner’s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court’s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (recognizing a challenge to jurisdiction as a viable claim", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner’s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, “dime-bag” dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner’s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court’s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (recognizing sentencing manipulation as a viable defense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner’s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, “dime-bag” dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner’s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court’s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (recognizing primary assumption of risk as a viable doctrine", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner’s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, “dime-bag” dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner’s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court’s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to assert an entrapment defense that was legally available and where there was no other viable defense to present", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe second controlled drug buy was merely to increase his sentence. Turner’s sentencing entrapment claim is based on his self-proclaimed status as a small-time, “dime-bag” dealer who was not predisposed to sell the quantity of drugs requested by the informant. We dispatch first with Turner’s sentencing manipulation claim. As the district judge acknowledged, our circuit does not recognize the sentencing manipulation doctrine. Id. at 76; see also United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 346 (7th Cir.2008); United States v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir.2007). Turner concedes this precedent but encourages us to reconsider the court’s position, pointing to other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir.2007) (holding that such a theory is viable under title vii" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison’s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (holding that no physicianpatient relationship between doctor who gave informal opinion over telephone at request of treating physician and minor patient whose case was discussed and thus doctor did not owe duty of care to patient", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison’s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (holding that a question of fact existed regarding whether the hospital held the doctor out as its agent if the hospital provided the doctor without explicitly informing the patient that the doctor was not its employee", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison’s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (holding that fault may not be assessed against a patient in a medical malpractice action in which a patients negligent conduct provides only the occasion for the medical attention care or treatment which is the basis for the action where the defendant doctor was treating the plaintiff patient for injuries sustained in a car accident negligently caused by the plaintiff who was driving while intoxicated", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison’s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (holding that the section 3b13 enhancement was warranted because the ophthalmologist convicted for medicare fraud abused the trust implicit in a in a professional medical practice because of the essential trust between patient and physician and because the government as insurer depends upon the honesty of the doctor and is easily taken advantage of if the doctor is not honest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof trust relative to Medicare. Additionally, Garrison did not-hold a position of discretion concerning her crime of false reporting to Medicare, as required for application of the abuse-of-trust enhancement. As her counsel explained at sentencing, Garrison lacked the discretion and ability to conceal the false cost reports submitted for Medicare, reimbursement and relied on others to accomplish this deception. In contrast to Garrison’s lack of discretion and inability to produce the fraudulent Medicare reimbursement requests as section 3B1.3 envisions is a physician who possesses the expertise to create erroneous medical records and, consequently, fraudulent Medicare reports that are difficult to deteet and to question. Cf. United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1041, 1064 (9th Cir.) (holding erisa did not apply when doctor was not employee of the medical association of the state of alabama" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmedicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmedicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (holding that experts medical opinion constituted no evidence because it was based upon speculation and surmise rather than reasonable medical probability", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmedicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (holding that the admission of expert testimony was prejudicial where the testimony was pervasive", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmedicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmedicine), could not eliminate any of the other potential causes either. All he could do was assess the likelihood it was one cause or another, and he found that the tetanus was least likely to have originated with the wound on May 13th. In fact, Avery said it was less than a hundredth of one percent that Lerma would get tetanus that many days later. Dr. Avery’s conclusion was based on (1) evidence that the tetanus fully developed outside the twenty-one day limitation, and (2) the fact that the caused tetanus versus diabetes or dental problems or any other source is just an inference of causation amounting to no more than conjecture or speculation. See Schaefer, 612 S.W.2d at 204-5. Therefore, we hold his testimo ny presents no evidence as to causation of Lerma’s death. See id. (holding expert testimony was based on reasonable medical probability where there were multiple possible causes and expert testified that one cause was more probable than the others" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThe Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (holding that the circuit court was not authorized to overturn state agencys decision where the sanction was lawful authorized and within the discretion of the agency and it was not shown to be arbitrary or capricious", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThe Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (holding that agencys practical method for accomplishing its goal of safe disposal systems was reasonable and not arbitrary", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThe Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (holding that when the agencys decision was based on an erroneous and completely unsupported assumption the decision was arbitrary and capricious", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThe Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (holding that judicial review of an administrative agencys decision is limited solely to whether given the relevant standard and facts the agencys decision was arbitrary illegal capricious or unreasonable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nThe Jerrels proposed tattooing and a plastic tagging method. After seriously considering these alternatives, the hearing officer ultimately rejected them as not sufficiently permanent or visible. The fact that DNR gave the Jerrels two years to come up with an alternative solution — from 1990 to 1992 — does not excuse the Jerrels’ complete failure to provide evidence that their horses had been branded. Even after the branding requirement was clarified, the Jerrels were given two more years to comply before the leases were finally terminated in 1994. The court’s opinion notes that DNR believed that the Jerrels worked with it in good faith until 1990. But by failing to consider the Jer-rels’ subsequent four years of promises, delays, and total non-compliance before DNR term (Alaska 1988) (holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nonly after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (holding that documents reflecting the department of educations review of a universitys compliance with title iv were covered by the privilege and rejecting the argument that a specific policy judgment is necessary for the privilege to apply because the privilege servesto protect the processes by which governmental decisions as well as policies are formulated", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nonly after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (holding that defendants privilege login combination with the in camera review requested by plaintiffsis adequate to determine whether the elements of the privilege have been established", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nonly after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (recognizing privilege", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nonly after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (holding that production of documents without a claim of privilege waives the right to later claim that privilege", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nonly after a responsible agency official assesses whether “the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in disclosure”—was met. See Pac. Gas, 70 Fed.Cl. at 144 (quoting Marriott, 437 F.3d at 1307). Next, Kansas contends that the government has not sufficiently “identified or described” the documents by stating with particularity what information is subject to the privilege. Having reviewed the government’s privilege logs (both initial and supplemental), the Court concludes that the government’s descriptions were sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether the privilege was applicable, and that, in any event, the Court has now conducted an in camera review of the documents withheld. See Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed.Cl. 496, 503 (2010) (holding that a complete prohibition against an opponents use of in camera review to establish the applicability of the crimefraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege is inconsistent with the policies underlying the privilege" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nby using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (holding that because a disclaimer relates back to the decedents death the status of parties in the chain of succession are established as of the time of death regardless of when the disclaimer is made", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nby using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (holding that decedents overpayment of premiums during the policys first year extended coverage so that the policy would not have lapsed at the time of his death", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nby using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (holding that policy limits are not a defense to coverage and that policy limits define the amount of coverage", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nby using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (holding that if there are multiple causes of action and one would potentially constitute a claim within the scope of the policys coverage the insurer would have a duty to defend until it could confine the claim to a recovery excluded from the policy internal quotation marks and citation omitted", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nby using the policy’s cash value or “paid up” provisions. The court’s opinion makes no reference to a 31-day grace period as an “extended coverage” for purposes of section 234(1) and we reject plaintiffs assertions that such a conclusion may be inferred from the opinion’s language. Moreover, as defendant notes, the court’s interpretation of section 234(1) was dicta, as the insured in First National Bank died long after the six-month period ended. First National Bank, 122 Ill. 2d at 118, 121-22. For these reasons, First National Bank does not govern the facts before us. Indeed, our research has uncovered no case holding that a 31-day grace period operates as an extension of coverage. See generally Estate of Blakely v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 100, 110 (1994) (holding that policy coverage is triggered in each year that the plaintiff inhaled asbestos" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconcur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that 911 call reporting domestic dispute and child telling officer that a man with a gun was inside fighting with her mom constituted exigent circumstances that justified warrantless entry into home", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconcur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (holding the fourth amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconcur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconcur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a warrantless entry by police into an apartment based on an uncorroborated anonymous 911 report of a mentally ill man acting crazy and possibly in possession of a gun violated the fourth amendment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconcur in the result. Although I agree with much of the substan tive analysis presented by the majority in its treatment of various of Appellant’s claims, I have sufficient differences with various elaborations that I am unable to supply a full joinder. In particular, as pertains to Part II of the majority opinion — which addresses Appellant’s claim of deficient stewardship by virtue of his attorneys’ failure to seek suppression — I agree with Appellant that the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that an anonymous 911 report of a domestic disturbance, coupled with a responding officer’s “gut feeling,” meets the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement so as to justify entry by police into a residence. Accord Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 232-36 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that warrantless arrest based on probable cause did not violate the fourth amendment" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsquarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where the officers corroboration of events that occurred during the controlled buy as set forth in the affidavit provide sufficient probable cause", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsquarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that issuance of an order to show cause satisfied this requirement", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsquarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding irs need not meet any standard of probable cause to obtain enforcement of a summons ", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsquarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsquarely stand for the proposition that indictment clause claims are immediately appeal-able because the Court may have assumed that trial would proceed according to the indictment. 4 . See also 420 U.S. at 125 n.26, 95 S.Ct. at 869 n.26 (“Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they appear for trial.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Pickard, 207 F.2d 472, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1953) (absent arrest, prosecution by information may proceed without oath or affirmation of probable cause); Church v. United States, 412 F.2d 836, 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (same). But cf. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a summons is sufficient restraint to invoke probable cause requirement where failure to appear on summons may result in issuance of warrant" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchild who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (holding age discrimination claim barred", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchild who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (holding that as 2330155 applies the twentyone day period for payment to ppi payments", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchild who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (holding that parental right to recover medical expenses extends beyond age eighteen to age twentyone because parental support obligation continues until twentyone", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchild who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (holding that a statement of fact relating to the plaintiffs age was not direct evidence of age discrimination because the relevance of the comment is provided by inference", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nchild who is incapacitated by a disability. See id. at 117; Sininger v. Sininger, 300 Md. 604, 479 A.2d 1354, 1358 (1984) (interpreting what is now Md.Code Ann., Fam.Law § 13-102(b) (1991), which requires parents to support adult children who cannot be self-supporting due to mental or physical infirmity). While parents may be under a legal obligation to support an adult child in some cases, the District of Columbia courts have not addressed the question of postmajority parental recovery of expenses in such a ease, and the plaintiffs have cited no authority from other jurisdictions to support their position. They rely on Martell v. Boardwalk Enters., 748 F.2d 740 (2nd Cir.1984), but that case is inapposite because it concerned the statutory definition of majority. See id. at 754-55 (holding that sixth amendment prejudice resulted from an unasserted error that added six to twentyone months to the defendants sentence" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperiod, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that a plan administrators decision to deny benefits was arbitrary and capricious even though an attending physician had submitted a form stating the plaintiff could sit for six hours stand for two hours and walk for two hours", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperiod, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that extremely tight handcuffing for nearly fourteen hours that left indentations in plaintiffs arms for over six hours did not amount to excessive force", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperiod, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that detention for three hours in a checkpoint station required probable cause", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperiod, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that to state a claim for wage violations under the flsa plaintiffs must provide at least some approximation of the overtime hours that defendants required them to work and a time frame for when those hours were worked", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nperiod, claimed serious physical injuries to neck, arms, and shoulders). With no additional alleg L 3822220, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2012) (granting summary judgment on tight handcuffing claim where plaintiff experienced 24 hours of swelling and went to hospital but no treatment was provided for wrists); Wang, 2012 WL 119591, at *7 (granting summary judgment where plaintiff was “shrieking in pain” from tight handcuffs but plaintiff, sought no medical attention and there was no evidence that the handcuffing caused actual physical injury); Abdul-Rahman, 2012 WL 1077762, at *7-8 (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings where only alleged injury was numbness and marks on wrists); Bender v. City of New York, No. 09-CV-3286 (BSJ), 2011 WL 4344203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (holding that seven hours was a reasonable amount of time to deliberate meaningfully about the choice" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding inadmissible expert testimony that included statements that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under utah law that the material actually provided to investors did not meet disclosure requirements under the act and that the agreements at issue were securities under utah law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must show that a defendant 1 made a material misrepresentation or a material omission as to which he or she had a duty to speak 2 with scienter 3 in connection with the purchase or sale of securities", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that such information is not material under securities law", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (holding that omission of information about shares held in corporations was material even if the securities were worthless at the time", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat revenue sharing information was required by ERISA disclosure provisions: The allegedly omitted disclosures are not required by the language of the regulations and would instead require judicial expansion of the detailed disclosure regime crafted by Congress and the Department of Labor pursuant , to its statutory authority. ■Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that receiving this additional non-prescribed information would effectively enhance investment decisions. In assessing the likely return on an investment the fees netted against the return are certainly relevant, but knowing the subsequent distribution of those fees has no impact on the investment’s value. See In re Merrill Lynch Investment Management Funds Securities Litigation, 434 F.Supp.2d 233, 238 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (recognizing a duty of best execution under federal securities law" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprograms therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (holding that upon expiration of period of supervised release habeas petitioner was no longer in custody", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprograms therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (holding that reasonableness review applies to a sentence imposed upon a revocation of supervised release", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprograms therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprograms therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (holding that this title and regulations permitting release of state prisoners prior to expiration of their minimum sentence imposed broad discretion upon prison officials", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nprograms therefrom. § 1053. Establishment of rules and regulations; penalties The Bureau of Correction shall establish rules and regulations for granting and administering release plans and shall determine those inmates who may participate in any plan. 61 P.S. §§ 1051,1053. As these statutes indicate, the Bureau of Corrections is empowered with discretion to grant release prior to the completion of a state prisoner’s sentence. See also Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138 (3d Cir., 1981) (Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-release programs vest broad discretion in the Board of Corrections with regard to location of pre-release centers, the types of programs available, and the administrative criteria for pre-reléase.); U.S. ex rel. Williams v. Cuyler, 447 F.Supp. 540 (E.D.Pa., 1977) (holding that state prison officials enjoy wide discretion in regards to a prison boards finding of guilt" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that plaintiffs failure to allege compliance with these statutes did not bar his claim against members of county board of supervisors as individuals for illegal expenditures of public funds", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that to violate a specific intent statute the defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that plaintiffs adequately alleged familial association claim with no discussion of specific intent", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that plaintiffs must allege intentional action by the state to interfere with a familial relationship and noting that without adopting specific intent requirements for this claim courts risk constitutionalizing all torts against individuals who happen to have families", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate actor could be held to violate the right to familial association absent a showing of the actor's specific intent to interfere with the family's relationship. 35 . While decisions by other circuit courts are obviously not binding precedent here, the Supreme Court has instructed that a right may be clearly established even absent \"controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or the governing circuit court if there is or was a \"robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority” from the other circuits establishing the right. Ashc 5 (8th Cir.2006) (\"A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that to prevail on a 1983 claim a plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law in other words that there was state action" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nposition of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (holding that the court of claims did not have jurisdiction over plaintiffs first amendment claim of improper removal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nposition of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (holding thatit landlords right of entry was not dispositive of control over snow removal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nposition of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (recognizing that enhancement requires control over a participant in the scheme not only control over the scheme itself", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nposition of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (holding over", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nposition of Henholder, not owner. Id. (\"The Court, in effect, views a conditional land contract as a sale with a security interest in the form of legal title reserved by the vendor. Conceptually, therefore, the retention of the title by the vendor is the same as reserving a lien or mortgage\"). Ownership of the property was transferred to Smith upon execution of the land sale contract, and Jackson had no duty at the time of the accident to maintain the tree as provided by the city ordinance. Conclusion The trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson is affirmed. SHEPARD, C.J., and SULLIVAN, J.,, concur. RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion in which DICKSON, J., concurs. 1 . Dorothy Jackson was not named as a defendant. Ray Scheible, Travis's father, was name .2006) (holding over of tenant after expiration of term effect of landlords acceptance of rent" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (holding that doctrine does not violate right of confrontation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (holding that doctrine does not violate due process", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (holding coconspirator hearsay exception does not violate confrontation clause", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe victim had no further contact with the defendant. I The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court violated his constitutional right to equal protection and due process’ when it declined to instruct the jury regarding “constancy of denial.” 1 At the center of the defendant’s argument is his contention that the constancy of accusation doctrine is unconstitutional and unfair. The defendant, therefore, contends that the constancy of denial instruction is constitutionally required to offset the harmful impact of the constancy of accusation instruction. We disagree. It is well settled that the doctrine of constancy of accusation does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation, equal protection or due process. See State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290-91, 677 A.2d 917 (1996) (holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that insurer could not tortiously interfere with its own insurance plan", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding only that although a party cannot interfere with its own contract a supervisor who is not an officer of a plaintiffs employer is not a party to the plaintiffs employment contract and therefore can interfere with it", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that state malpractice claims against insurer for negligently failing to obtain replacement insurance plan was not preempted", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that a corporate officer acting in his or her official capacity could not tortiously interfere with a corporate contract because corporations act only through their officers and agents", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhave dismissed tortious interference claims as preempted by ERISA, those cases typically involve a situation in which an entity seeks to utilize the interference claim to duplicate relief available under ERISA. For example, when a participant or assignee argues that,' with respect to a particular claim for payment, the claims administrator (or some affiliate thereof) “interfered” with payment under the plan by unfairly denying the claim, courts have found that the interference claim is preempted. See, e.g., Adkins v. Unum Provident Corp., 191 F.Supp.2d 956, 959 (M.D.Tenn.2002); Steele v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 499 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1041 (E.D.Tenn.2007); Ctr. for Special Procedures v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 09-6566(MLC), 2010 WL 5068164, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that insurance certificate holder could not maintain negligence action against insurer when certificate holder was not insurers customer did not discuss insurance coverage with insurer and did not make any specific request to procure insurance coverage" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nKennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that adam walsh act violates fifth amendments guarantee of procedural due process", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nKennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that adam walsh act does not violate procedural due process require excessive bail or violate separation of powers", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nKennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that an alien is entitled to the fifth amendment guarantee of due process which is satisfied by a full and fair hearing", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nKennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that dna act violates neither substantive nor procedural due process under the fifth amendment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nKennedy). The judgment of conviction having been vacated, the present defendant is treated as a charged, not as a convicted child pornographer. The question now posed is whether the pretrial condition of curfew with electronic monitoring mandated by the Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied in view of this court’s finding that electronic monitoring is not needed to avoid flight or any danger to children or to society. The answer: The Adam Walsh Act is unconstitutional as applied to this defendant under present circumstances. B. Constitutionality The Eighth Amendment provides “excessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. amend. VII. This limit of federal authority applies to the states. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2649, 171 L.Ed.2d 601 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that adam walsh act does not prohibit inspection by defense expert" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee “mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity”). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (holding that a defendants insanity due to voluntary intoxication is not a defense", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee “mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity”). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (holding that defendants constitutional right to travel was not abridged when he was ordered not to make contact with the victim he attempted to rape", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee “mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity”). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (holding that the defendant had abandoned any possessory or privacy interest in bags found in the truck he was driving where he stated that he did not own the bags did not know who did and did not know what was in them", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee “mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity”). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (holding district court erroneously preclud ed evidence of involuntary intoxication as a defense to charge of rape based on defendants offer of proof that he smoked marijuana which he did not know contained angel dust and voluntarily drank alcohol the combined effect of which led to the defendants involuntary acts", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat [i]t is common knowledge that unlawful street drugs do not come with warranties of purity or quality associated with lawfully acquired drugs such as alcohol. Thus, unlike alcohol, unlawful street drugs are frequently not the substance they purport to be or are contaminated with other substances not apparent to the naked eye. 175 Cal.App.3d 785, 221 Cal.Rptr. 631, 637 (1985); see Minn.Stat. § 152.01, subd. 9a (2006) (defining a controlled-substanee “mixture” as “a preparation, compound, mixture, or substance containing a controlled substance, regardless of purity”). Appellant cites several cases from other state and federal jurisdictions, arguing the availability of such a defense. See, e.g., People v. Brumfield, 72 Ill.App.3d 107, 28 Ill.Dec. 422, 390 N.E.2d 589, 592-93 (1979) (holding that defense counsels failure to present voluntary intoxication as a defense in a capitalmurder prosecution was not beyond the range of reasonable professional judgment and thus did not amount to ineffective assistance in view of inconsistency of intoxication defense with deliberateness of the defendants actions during the shootings" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nallowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so” (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (holding moving to proceed pro se after jury was impaneled but before it was sworn was timely as a matter of law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nallowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so” (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nallowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so” (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nallowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so” (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (holding no presumption of acquiescence because defendant was never allowed to proceed pro se", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nallowed to represent himself at trial requires answers to two principal questions: whether the defendant is competent to represent himself at trial, see Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170, 177-78, 128 S.Ct. 2379, [2387-88], 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), ... and whether the request to proceed pro se is genuine, see, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817, 95 S.Ct. [at 2532] (it is the defendant's \"basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so” (emphasis added)). U.S. v. Barnes, 693 F.3d 261, 270 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 917, 184 L.Ed.2d 704 (2013). 57 . A similar argument was made and rejected in Hacker v. Herbert, 825 F.Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 58 . Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.11, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1873 n.11, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ir. 1973) (holding that a rule 121 colloquy is required only in response to a timely and unequivocal invocation of the right to proceed pro se" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRule 404(b) prohibits introducing “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow’s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court’s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that a threemember panel consisting of prison officials and potentially inmates is sufficiently impartial to adjudicate major infractions insofar as knowledge of the conditions of the prison environment is important to an understanding of the significance of events which occur therein prison officials and offenders theoretically comprise an ideal disciplinary hearing committee", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRule 404(b) prohibits introducing “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow’s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court’s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that government was entitled to present rebuttal evidence of accuseds disciplinary infractions where accused presented testimony that he was avoiding trouble in prison", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRule 404(b) prohibits introducing “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow’s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court’s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that prison disciplinary hearing committee members are entitled to qualified immunity", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRule 404(b) prohibits introducing “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow’s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court’s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that the disclosure of proper rebuttal witness was not required", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRule 404(b) prohibits introducing “[e]vi-dence of a crime, wrong, or other act ... to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). But the Government may offer otherwise inadmissible evidence to “explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party.” United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 329 (4th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court appropriately permitted the Government to introduce the challenged evidence because Crow opened the door to such evidence. Crow’s contention that he opened the door as to testimony from one witness, but not another, is at odds with this Court’s precedent. See Higgs, 353 F.3d at 329-30 (holding that police failure to inform the accused of his attorneys attempts to contact him and misstatements to the attorney as to whether the accused was at the police station did not violate the accuseds due process rights" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri’s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that “the people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always — they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.” We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT’s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (holding that direct evidence of a fact is not necessary and that circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient but may also be more certain satisfying and persuasive", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri’s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that “the people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always — they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.” We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT’s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (holding that new evidence is evidence not previously of record and not merely cumulative of other evidence", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri’s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that “the people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always — they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.” We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT’s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (holding that direct evidence by definition is evidence that does not require an inferential leap between fact and conclusion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri’s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that “the people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always — they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.” We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT’s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (holding that direct evidence of retaliation is lacking where the evidence if believed would not require the conclusion that defendant unlawfully retaliated against plaintiff emphasis in original", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nafter Atkins received the promotion. According to Akouri’s testimony, when he asked why Atkins had been chosen for the promotion, Blanchard responded that “the people working in the crew are not the same that are working in the office. There is no black or Hispanic [employees] in the back. There is always — they are all white and they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent, and something like that.” We deem this language direct evidence of discrimination. There is no mere suggestion or need for inferences because the statement relates directly to the DOT’s decision to promote Atkins over Akouri as Assistant Maintenance Engineer and blatantly states that the reason he was passed over for the promotion was his ethnicity. See Carter, 132 F.3d at 642 (holding that evidence which suggests but does not prove a discriminatory motive is circumstantial evidence by definition" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the Bakers’ forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage’s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants’ concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff’s contentions — that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker’s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier — defendants’ explanation “seems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities” in defendants’ review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (recognizing first amendment retaliation right", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the Bakers’ forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage’s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants’ concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff’s contentions — that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker’s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier — defendants’ explanation “seems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities” in defendants’ review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (holding plaintiff did not exhaust his retaliation claim where his eeoc charge made no mention of retaliation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the Bakers’ forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage’s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants’ concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff’s contentions — that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker’s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier — defendants’ explanation “seems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities” in defendants’ review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (holding that plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of his first amendment right to intimate association where he alleged that his employer harassed him in retaliation for his fathers political activities", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the Bakers’ forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage’s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants’ concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff’s contentions — that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker’s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier — defendants’ explanation “seems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities” in defendants’ review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (holding that although plaintiffs claims for disability discrimination and hostile work environment were rejected by the jury and plaintiff only prevailed on his first amendment retaliation claim no reduction in requested fees was warranted on partial success grounds because the issue of plaintiffs transfer was inextricably intertwined with his retaliation claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof the Bakers’ forestry practices was legally impermissible, defendants abandoned their effort to obtain an EIR or any further review. Given this evidence and Natural Heritage’s role as an advocacy organization, there is no evidence that defendants’ concern for the vitality of the heronry was a pretext. As compared to plaintiff’s contentions — that defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s dated and somewhat elusive opposition to unrealized legislation and by Mr. Baker’s suit against Dr. Parsons, threatened after defendants had already expressed opposition to the proposed pier — defendants’ explanation “seems both the most logical inference and one that is wholly consistent with the alleged [delays and] irregularities” in defendants’ review process. Custodio, 964 F.2d at 39, 43 (holding that the plaintiffs first amendment retaliation claim regarding a waste disposal permit failfed for lack of evidence that whatever shortcomings and irregularities occurred were in retaliation for his personal political views" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\norder, or other order....” Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a “person who is being subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J„ dissenting) (stating that it “appears doubtful” that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\norder, or other order....” Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a “person who is being subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J„ dissenting) (stating that it “appears doubtful” that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that the timely filing of an eeoc charge pursuant to 706 of title vii 42 usc 2000e5 did not toll the statute of limitations for an action brought on the same facts under 42 usc 1981", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\norder, or other order....” Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a “person who is being subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J„ dissenting) (stating that it “appears doubtful” that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that person in 42 usc 1983 does not include states", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\norder, or other order....” Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a “person who is being subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J„ dissenting) (stating that it “appears doubtful” that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that principles of comity bar challenges to state tax law which seek money damages under 42 usc 1983", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\norder, or other order....” Thus, I find no authority which would permit an award of damages to the plaintiff, or require that a jury trial be held, under Title III of the ADA. As stated in Dorsey v. City of Detroit, 157 F.Supp.2d 729, 733 (E.D.Mich.2001): Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages or, concomitantly, a jury trial, when the action is brought by a “person who is being subjected to discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). [FN4] See also Gonzales v. National Bd. of Med. Examiners, 225 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J„ dissenting) (stating that it “appears doubtful” that Title III plaintiffs are entitled to jury trial as Title III permits only injunctive relief) (citing cases); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir.1999) (recognizing that title iii enforcement statute 42 usc 12188 which incorporates the remedies of 42 usc 2000a3a does not include money damages" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nor threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.”)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA’s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (recognizing an intermediate level of scrutiny in which the governmental objective must be important and the challenged law must be substantially related to that objective", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nor threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.”)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA’s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (recognizing the protection of preliminary governmental materials", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nor threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.”)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA’s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (recognizing subsection e as the sole exception to the boardcertification requirement", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nor threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.”)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA’s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (holding that lprs are entitled to the protection of the equal protection clause", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nor threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act are far broader than simply providing for the conservation of individual species or individual members of listed species.”)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (noting that the plain intent of Congress in enacting the Endangered Species Act was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost); Catron County Bd. of Com’rs, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir.1996) (identifying ESA’s core purpose as prevention of the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 233 (D.C.Cir.1982) (recognizing environmental protection as the sole objective of the endangered species act" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.” (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers’ compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that notice and a hearing were required before the commissioner of insurance could require an insurance company to change its definition of at fault in order to secure approval of an increase in insurance rates", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.” (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers’ compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that defendant reasonably could have foreseen use of the mails because he had completed insurance forms that required verification from his doctor and the insurance company and his doctor did not share the same location", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.” (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers’ compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that under georgia law a holder of a master insurance policy is an agent of the insurance company and not the insurer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.” (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers’ compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that plaintiff could recover medical fees not actually paid by the insurance company pursuant to an insurance contract", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n[the compensation claim], state the reason in detail.” (Emphasis added). This question should have indicated to Rhodes that there is a separate government entity responsible for adjudicating disputes over compensation claims that arise between workers and their employing agencies. Thus, Rhodes reasonably should have understood that this entity, rather than her employing agency, would receive her completed form. Thus, the workers’ compensation form itself put Rhodes on notice that it would be sent to the Department of Labor. Because Rhodes could not reasonably have expected that her form would be hand-carried to that agency, a reasonably jury could conclude that Rhodes should have known that her form would be sent by mail. See United States v. Fore, 169 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1999) (holding that even if an insurance broker is the agent of the insurance company for purposes of soliciting and procuring the policy that would not necessarily make the broker the agent of the insurance company for the purpose of receiving notice of suits and claims" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nOn the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (“where brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully”); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider “participated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders”); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (holding that consideration for guaranty of loan previously made was that guarantors friend the bank manager who issued the loan would not lose his job for making a bad loan", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nOn the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (“where brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully”); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider “participated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders”); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (holding title company liable for bad faith", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nOn the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (“where brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully”); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider “participated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders”); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (holding bank liable for making loan to company and then demanding continuation of program where employees without any financial information traded earnings for unregistered subordinated promissory notes", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nOn the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (“where brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully”); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider “participated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders”); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (holding owner of company qualified as an employer due to inter alia his authority to hire and fire employees and overall financial control of company", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nOn the one hand are Securities and Exchange Commission v. Washington Co. Utility District, 676 F.2d at 224 (manager of public utility district had duty to disclose kickback from underwriter of bond); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir.1979) (“where brokers are obligated to investigate, the failure to do so subjects them to a holding that they acted wilfully”); Klein v. Computer Devices, 591 F.Supp. at 280 (duty was breached where aider “participated in the preparation and review of the allegedly defective prospectus and ... actively promoted the sale of shares ... by, for example, orchestrating the entire transaction, placing advertisements and processing purchase orders”); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793 (holding the bank liable where the bank had almost complete control over the operation of the company during its last three quarters of operation and where withheld taxes were not paid to the irs on instructions from the bank" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napplication signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant’s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML’s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant’s medical history, NML’s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). NML’s form was entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only.” Id. The form entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only” is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep’t) (holding that where employer paid benefits under group disability policy to employee under mistaken belief that his condition resulted from illness rather than injury arising out of and in course of employment employees acceptance of such benefits did not bar him from benefits to which he was entitled under workers compensation law and employer was properly allowed credit for payments made under disability policy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napplication signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant’s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML’s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant’s medical history, NML’s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). NML’s form was entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only.” Id. The form entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only” is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep’t) (holding evidence including that insurer only charged life insurance premium that would ordinarily apply to onehalf the amount of coverage actually permitted by policy as written did not warrant retroactive reformation of policy to reduce coverage amount because it did not demonstrate mistake on insureds part and insurance company did not present evidence on what parties agreed to before the policy was issued", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napplication signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant’s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML’s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant’s medical history, NML’s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). NML’s form was entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only.” Id. The form entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only” is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep’t) (recognizing that production of a written insurance policy was unnecessary to prove the existence of the policy because the proof required was proof of the fact of insurance and not of the contents of a writing", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napplication signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant’s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML’s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant’s medical history, NML’s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). NML’s form was entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only.” Id. The form entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only” is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep’t) (holding fact that prototype group disability policy submitted to insurance department for approval contained blanks and that therefore policy actually issued with blanks filled in may have been unapproved in violation of insurance statutes did not warrant voiding of nonduplication of benefits clause in group disability policy", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\napplication signed by defendant, relating to matters of a general nature unrelated to the applicant’s medical history, was approved by the Acting Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York on March 27,1990. (Exh. Y annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). With regard to the second part of NML’s form of disability insurance application, relating specifically to an applicant’s medical history, NML’s form of medical questionnaire which it submitted to the Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York was approved on January 13, 1986. (Exh. Z annexed to Pl.’s Summary Judgment Motion). NML’s form was entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only.” Id. The form entitled, “Nonmedical Applications Only” is exactly the same .Y.S.2d 500, 502, 107 A.D.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Dep’t) (holding that a policy with an excess other insurance clause provides no coverage until a policy with a pro rata other insurance clause is exhausted" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhe is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (holding that as a matter of law claim stated in amended complaint did not relate back to original complaint", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhe is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (holding that when a plaintiff mistakenly sues a decedent and not the decedents estate and seeks to recover only against insurance proceeds if the decedents insurer had notice of the action and knowledge of the plaintiffs mistake within the period specified by rule 15c an amended complaint will relate back to the date of the original complaint absent any prejudice to the insurer and the estate and assuming the other requirements of rule 15c are met", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhe is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (holding that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original complaint in which all claims were barred by the statute of limitations", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhe is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhe is removed; his appointment is voidable, not void.”). CONCLUSION ¶ 21 For these reasons, we vacate the superior court’s order granting Progressive’s motion and dismissing the complaint. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. CONCURRING: PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Presiding Judge and PATRICIA A. OROZCO, Judge. 1 . The complaint names George Pop as the defendant. Duncan has not amended the complaint to substitute the Estate of George Pop for George Pop. Progressive, however, has not contested the propriety of the complaint and it has proceeded as though the Estate of Pop is a named defendant. Accordingly, for purposes of this decision, we assume that the complaint is sufficient as against Pop's estate. See Pargman v. Vickers, 208 Ariz. 573, 575, ¶4, 96 P.3d 571, 573 (App.2004) (holding that plaintiffs amended complaint could not relate back because there was no evidence in the record that the defendant had notice of the suit within the 120 day period required by rule 4m" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAs the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (holding that a district court may have jurisdiction over action taken by the national labor relations board despite an express statutory finality provision when the agency has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a specific prohibition in the national labor relations act", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAs the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (holding ports authority was not an employer subject to the jurisdiction of the national labor relations board", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAs the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (holding that unemployment compensation should not be deducted from a back pay award under the national labor relations act because failing to deduct unemployment payments does not make the employee more than whole", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAs the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (holding that the but for test applied in a mixed motive case under the national labor relations act", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAs the only entity with power to enforce the remedy, the Panel concluded that the SEC had standing as a creditor in the bankruptcy case to request a dischargeability determination because that agency was the only entity that could enforce the right to payment. Cross, 218 B.R. at 79. Based upon the Court’s research, it seems fair to observe that “[m]ost courts that have addressed the issue ... [conclude] that any time a governmental entity has a right of action against a debtor, the governmental entity is a creditor as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.” AARP v. First Alliance Mortgage Co. (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 269 B.R. 428, 435 (C.D.Cal.2001) (citing additional authority). See also Nathanson v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 344 U.S. 25, 27, 73 S.Ct. 80, 97 L.Ed. 23 (1952) (holding that the nlrb was a creditor within the meaning of the code because it had been granted the power to enforce the national labor relations act even though a back pay award was made to individual workers not to the government" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (holding that credit for social security old age and survivor benefits does not also include credit for federal disability benefits", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (holding that offset for social security retirement benefits does not include federal disability benefits and stating that there was no legislative intent to embody the entire subchapter of the social security act dealing with both disability benefits and old age benefits", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (holding that disability pension benefits could be offset against both temporary and total permanent disability compensation benefits", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (holding parent entitled to credit for any social security disability benefits paid to child as a result of parents disability", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nreach retirement age and payments to survivors upon the death of the insured. This was the original name for the retirement and death benefits established by the Social Security Act of 1935. As the scope of these benefits expanded, the name changed to Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and then to Old Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI). Today, the system is most often referred to as Social Security. Black’s Law Dictionary 1260 (10th ed.2014). Moreover, since its enactment, we have consistently construed the offset provision to refer to federal social security benefits. In Telle v. Northfield Iron Co., we allowed an offset for federal social security retirement benefits, but not disability benefits. 278 Minn. 129, 132, 158 N.W.2d 270, 272 (1967) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of social security disability benefits" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nadjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (holding that disparate impact claims are not cognizable under the adea", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nadjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (holding that in title vii disparate impact case an employer may rebut prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating that the employment policy at issue is related to the employees job performance and justified by business necessity", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nadjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (recognizing cause of action under section 504 based on claims of disparate impact", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nadjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (holding that there is no disparate impact claim under the adea", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nadjudication of the controversy.” Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3)). When making the determination of predominance and superiority, a court must consider, among other things: “(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, plaintiff fails both the predominance and superiority requirements. 1. “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficien Cir. 2005) (holding that disparate impact analysis may be applied to subjective employment practices in employment discrimination actions" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nalso said, “the child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.” What was needed, in his opinion, was “a permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.” The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett’s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court’s de d.2d 240 (1962) (holding south carolina not bound by virginia courts order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody because virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nalso said, “the child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.” What was needed, in his opinion, was “a permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.” The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett’s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court’s de d.2d 240 (1962) (holding federal courts are bound by state court determinations of state law", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nalso said, “the child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.” What was needed, in his opinion, was “a permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.” The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett’s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court’s de d.2d 240 (1962) (holding that temporary order amounted to order modifying custody of children because language changed custody for an indefinite period", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nalso said, “the child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.” What was needed, in his opinion, was “a permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.” The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett’s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court’s de d.2d 240 (1962) (holding that state courts in construing and interpreting state law are not bound by the decisions of federal courts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nalso said, “the child might go back to New Jersey and flourish just as well.” What was needed, in his opinion, was “a permanent arrangement where this child can have access to both parents given the geographic distance.” The court modified its extant order to award custody to the plaintiff until the end of the school year in June; during the summer Carly was to be returned to the defendant in New Jersey. The court left open what the custody arrangements would be thereafter, though its order recited custody would remain in the plaintiff until further order of the court. Instead of appearing at Dr. Barrett’s office on August 31, the defendant had taken Carly and returned to New Jersey. She claims that she took this action on the advice of her counsel. After the court’s de d.2d 240 (1962) (holding that federal courts are bound by state interpretations of state law" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplainly stated that, “[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.” (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplainly stated that, “[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.” (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that a person is seized when a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplainly stated that, “[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.” (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that in a 1981 case it not controlling that a black person is suing a black person", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplainly stated that, “[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.” (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that burglary may qualify as offense against person if as committed it is in fact a crime against a person", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplainly stated that, “[i]n exchange for the benefits offered by Amtrak, [CO] agrees ... not to seek employment with Amtrak in the future.” (Ford Deck, Ex. 46 at 2.) Plaintiff was not similarly situated to CO in all material respects. Accordingly, because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that Amtrak treated similarly situated employees in a more favorable manner upon termination, her evidence regarding her severance package does not demonstrate that defendants’ proffered explanation for her termination is mere pretext for racial or gender discrimination. 7. Disparate duties and opportunities Plaintiff claims she was fired because Porter set her up to fail. While this allegation is conclusory and speculative and does not create a genuine issue of mater 3, 408 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that the person who travels as an agent of person defrauded is a victim" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the forum state.’ ” Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it “requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.” Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, “absent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (holding minimum contacts were necessary for personal jurisdiction over defendant", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the forum state.’ ” Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it “requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.” Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, “absent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (holding that the effects of a tortious act cannot subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in a forum where no other contacts exist", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the forum state.’ ” Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it “requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.” Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, “absent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (holding that specific jurisdiction requires plaintiff to show that defendants forum contacts be related directly to the subject of the lawsuit", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the forum state.’ ” Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it “requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.” Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, “absent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (holding no specific jurisdiction where alleged tortious conduct was not related to defendants contacts with texas", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin the forum state.’ ” Id. (quoting Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 946 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir.1991)). It is important to note, however, that the Calder test does not displace the five-factor personal jurisdiction test set forth above, see supra p. 987; rather, it “requires the consideration of additional factors when an intentional tort is alleged.” Dakota Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d at 1391 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, even assuming that the Calder effects test is satisfied in this case, “absent additional contacts, mere ef fects in the forum state are insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Johnson, 614 F.3d at 797 (internal citation omitted); accord AmerUs Group Co. v. Ameris Bancorp, No 4:06-cv-00110, 2006 WL 1452808, at *6 (S.D.Iowa May 22, 2006) (holding that personal jurisdiction over a party is proper if the party has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). RECAP’s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (“Case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].”). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that “physical or mental impairment” includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP’s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a “limitation” under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that alcoholism is not a per se disability under the ada and evidence that alcoholics in general are impaired is inadequate to show the substantial limitation of one or more major life activities", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). RECAP’s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (“Case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].”). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that “physical or mental impairment” includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP’s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a “limitation” under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that reproduction is not a major life activity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). RECAP’s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (“Case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].”). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that “physical or mental impairment” includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP’s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a “limitation” under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that disqualification from an especially traumatic occupation does not constitute a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). RECAP’s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (“Case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].”). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that “physical or mental impairment” includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP’s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a “limitation” under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that whether depression gives rise to a substantial limitation on a major life activity for purposes of ada depends on its severity", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20). RECAP’s clients fall into the first two categories. In the first category, an individual 82 (3d Cir.1987) (“Case law establishes that alcoholics are handicapped within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act].”). Legislative history also supports this conclusion. See H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333 (noting that “physical or mental impairment” includes “drug addiction and alcoholism”) (internal punctuation omitted). RECAP’s clients therefore meet the first part of the definition of a disability. But mere status as an alcoholic or substance abuser does not necessarily imply a “limitation” under the second part of that definition. See Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316-17 (5th Cir.1997) (holding that breathing is a major life activity within the contemplation of the ada" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that the remedy in a prison conditions case must remedy actual injuries that have been identified by the court and suffered by the plaintiffs", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that the remedy provided by a statute independent of the gtla was not subject to the gtla", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that the phrase provided by law means prescribed or provided by statute", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that georgia refund statute signifies state waiver of immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of the statute", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphasis added). The GTLA declares as well that “[w]hen immunity is removed by this chapter [the GTLA] any claim for damages must be brought in strict compliance with the terms of this chapter [the GTLA].” Id. § 29-20-201(c) (2012) (emphasis added). Both the history and the text of the GTLA demonstrate that, as to tort actions against local governmental entities, the Legislature intended it to be a comprehensive statutory scheme. Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496. However, the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity. See id.; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn.1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at *5 (Tenn.Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCo., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (holding lien claimant could not recover for trackiron furnished for use in repairing mine but not actually used", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCo., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (holding that it is not", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCo., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (holding that party did not fail to mitigate his damages by not repairing motor home because evidence proved it could not be repaired", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCo., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (holding that the challenged evidence the government introduced in rebuttal was substantive evidence and not relevant for impeachment purposes because it was not offered to show that the witness was not a credible person but to show that she was not at the defendants home during the relevant time making her testimony that she did not see any drugrelated activity while at the defendants home irrelevant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nCo., 618 So.2d 874, 879 (La.1993) (concluding that damages may include cost of restoration of the property to its original condition or, if that is economically wasteful, the difference in value of the property before and after the harm). Orion asserts that Syracuse’s claim for damages resulting from the removal of the tags must be denied because Syracuse failed to mitigate those damages. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2002 (a contracting party “must make reasonable efforts to mitigate” damages caused by another’s breach of contract). See also Elliott v. Normand, 976 So.2d 738, 745 (La.Ct.App.2008) (denying storage charges for boat where party failed to mitigate its damages by not acting promptly to get boat repaired). Cf. Rogers v. Nelson Dodge, Inc., 407 So.2d 443, 447 (La.Ct.App.1981) (holding that it may not" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel on the strength of gonzalezs sworn responses at the pleataking that no one was threatening him or forcing him to plead where the defendant alleged that his attorney forced him to plead guilty and threatened him if he did not take the plea", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding even when a request for an attorney is ambiguous it is incumbent upon law enforcement to seek clarification of the ambiguity before denying the statutory right to counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting the court may consider a defendants lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel and the timeliness of defendants request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that an ambiguous mention of an attorney is not a request for counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto counsel. Of course, it could be said that Clark can hardly complain about the district court’s grant of his own motion. But, because the court’s discretion to deny a request for self-representation requires the court to consider the defendant’s interest, I would conclude that a defendant who makes such a motion, against the advice of or without the support of his appointed counsel ke a searching inquiry of Clark’s reasons for wanting to dismiss his present counsel. , On their face, Clark’s claims that counsel had not visited him in jail, had not discussed the case with him, would not seek out suggested witnesses, and would not have the gun checked for fingerprints, raised serious questions that required inquiry. See, e.g., United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666, 669 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a defendants claim that his attorney did not meet with him or seek out witnesses required a searching inquiry before denying the request for new counsel" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nunder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nunder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (holding attorney lacked standing to challenge amount of attorney fees awarded plaintiffs not parties to the appeal", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nunder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that attorney fees must be awarded where plaintiffs section 1983 claim was unreasonable and groundless", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nunder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (holding that chanenge to the amount of attorney fees was not preserved for appeal where appellants objection challenged only the entitlement to fees", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nunder the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 . Plaintiffs have abandoned on appeal their claim that a July 1, 2002, letter signed by plaintiffs themselves, rather than their attorney, was a qualified written request. 2 . Plaintiffs’ attorney characterizes himself'as the appellant in this appeal, but he does not have standing to appeal the attorney-fee award. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1213 (10th Cir.2000). We construe the attorney-fee appeal as part of the merits appeal brought by plaintiffs since they are patties to the appeal. Cf. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir.1993) (recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (holding among other things that the officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance without more did not establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (holding police officer had probable cause to believe defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (holding that the defendants speeds and marked lane violations at 300 am were sufficient to give officer reason to believe the defendant was operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncross the double-yellow center line two to three times, cross the fog line on the right-hand side of the roadway, and make an overly tight turn. He activated his blue lights in Orleans, but the defendant did not come to a stop until four-tenths of one mile into Brewster, as soon as was safe to pull over. At the suppression hearing, Officer Davis testified that when he activated his blue lights, he did not believe the defendant had committed any arrestable offenses. The evidence of the defendant’s erratic driving was objectively sufficient to give a reasonable officer in Officer Davis’s position reason to believe the defendant had committed the arrestable offense of operating while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. See Commonwealth v. O’Hara, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 608, 610 (1991) (holding inter alia that experienced officers observations that the defendant was under the influence of either methamphetamine or cocaine did not by itself establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that whether an alien satisfies the continuous presence requirement of 8 usc 1229b is a nondiscretionary determination because it involves straightforward statutory interpretation and application of law to fact and is therefore reviewable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that an aliens continuous physical presence is broken if the alien was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that the decision whether an alien meets the hardship requirement in 8 usc 1229b is a discretionary judgment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that a determination regarding whether an alien met the continual physical presence requirement of 1229b was nondiscretionary and thus reviewable", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding an alien’s eligibility for § 1229b relief. See, e.g., Reyes-Vasquez v. Ashcroft, 895 F.3d 903, 906 (8th Cir.2005) (“Although the decision to grant cancellation of removal is a discretionary act by the Attorney General that we may not review, ... we may consider the predicate legal question whether the IJ properly applied the law to the facts in determining an individual’s eligibility to be considered for the relief.” (internal citations omitted)); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 703 (6th Cir.2005) (“The denial of relief based on the ground that the alien has failed to demonstrate a continuous physical presence ... is a non-diseretionary factual determination and properly subject to appellate review.”); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir.2003) (holding that boards ruling that aliens continuous physical presence terminated when he voluntarily departed country was a reasonable interpretation of 8 usc 1229b 2012" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that evidence that the defendants believed that the plaintiffs general outspokenness on security and corruption encouraged media criticism of the defendants was sufficient for a jury to infer causation in the retaliation claim", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that because evidence was sufficient to support defendants 1962c convictions and jury could infer from evidence that defendants each manifested an agreement to participate in enterprises affairs evidence was sufficient to support defendants 1962d convictions for rico conspiracy", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (recognizing that jury may infer from the evidence that defendants money came from drug sales", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the plaintiffs argument rebutting the defendants legitimate nondiscriminatory reason on the plaintiffs discrimination claim also rebutted the defendants reason on the plaintiffs retaliation claim because they were the same", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof Captain Davison’s efforts, Chief Forte repeatedly had to address with the public, and once with Councilman Benson, accusations about the Plan’s impact on public safety and the likelihood of more deaths like Gallagher’s. Evidence in the record also indicates that Captain Davi-son’s relentless public opposition on behalf of the Union delayed implementation of Chief Forte’s Plan. From all of this evidence, we believe a jury could infer that Chief Forte’s repeated decisions not to promote Captain Davison were in part motivated by her constitutionally protected activities. Id. at 797 (“a plaintiff must prove an employer’s retaliatory motive played a part in the adverse employment action”) (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 959-60 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the plaintiffs claim that city encouraged private individuals to trespass on the plaintiffs land was properly a fourth amendment rather than a substantive due process claim" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the tests was supported by reasonable suspicion, Jones claims, Amundsen has failed to show the violation of a constitutional right. Amundsen concedes that the stop was initially justified due to her improper lane change, but does not appear to concede that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. She argues that the roadside sobriety tests fell outside the proper scope of the stop. We review the permissibility of a traffic stop “under the principles pertaining to investigatory detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio.” United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). That is, we first consider “whether the officer’s action was just 5 (10th Cir.1995) (holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding that the trier of fact must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding that defendants relatively minor participation in the crime is a mitigating factor that sentencer must consider", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding that sentencing scheme that permitted a limited range of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional because the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendants character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nin context, and because it was unable to do so, afforded them no weight. We agree with the trial court’s ruling and thus deny relief on this issue. Psychological Mitigation Evidence In Spann v. State, this Court held: Mitigating evidence must be considered and weighed when it is contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is uncontroverted and believable. This requirement applies with equal force when the defendant asks the court not to consider mitigating evidence .... (Citation omitted.) The sentencing court must “expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant.” 857 So.2d 845, 857 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 995 (Fla.2001)); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider as a matter of law any relevant mitigating evidence" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmatter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (holding that mailing element was satisfied where the defendants sent letters to fraud victims in an attempt to convince them that the promised services would be performed even though mailings were sent after victims money had been obtained", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmatter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (holding defendants agreement to consentsearch provision not coerced merely because it was one of two undesirable options", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmatter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (holding that consentsearch provision of a probation agreement was voluntary even though defendant would have been sent to prison if he rejected it", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmatter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (holding probationer voluntarily accepted consentsearch provision by accepting probation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmatter — makes for an admirable floor, but it is certainly not a ceiling. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 961-63 (Fla.1992). With this background in mind, we proceed with what we now recognize as the Tonn-Ochoa analysis. IV. Discussion. It is well-settled that warrantless searches are virtually “ ‘per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)); accord State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). One recognized exception to the warrant requirement of our constitution is consent. State v. Reinier, 628 N.W.2d 460, 464- 288-89 (1980) (holding consentsearch provision in parole agreement was coerced and involuntary" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nBecause the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in Leal’s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina’s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo’s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City’s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over statelaw tort claims on an interlocutory appeal from a denial of qualified immunity", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nBecause the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in Leal’s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina’s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo’s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City’s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding that local school boards were not entitled to eleventh amendment immunity even though entitled to sovereign immunity in the same degree as the state itself from tort suits", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nBecause the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in Leal’s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina’s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo’s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City’s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nBecause the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in Leal’s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina’s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo’s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City’s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nBecause the hearing examiner had the jurisdiction and authority to reduce Leal’s indefinite suspension to a 644-day temporary suspension without pay, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in Leal’s favor in Cause No.2003-CVQ-001720-D2 and render judgment reinstating the hearing examiner’s decision. And, because Dovalina established his qualified immunity from Leal’s procedural and substantive due process claims, we reverse the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Leal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765-D2 and render judgment in Dovalina’s favor. However., we do not have jurisdiction over the City of Laredo’s appeal in Cause No.2001-CVQ-000765~D2 and therefore dismiss the City’s appeal. See Bexar County v. Giroux-Daniel, 956 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (holding a local government sued under 1983 has no immunity even if its employee is entitled to qualified immunity and the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over the local governments interlocutory appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nU.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that noncriminal aliens could seek review of the agencys orders through either a petition for review or a 2241 petition", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nU.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that an aliens express waiver of his right to appeal to the bia deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the aliens subsequent petition for review", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nU.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that the real id act gave us jurisdiction to review a criminal aliens petition for review of an order of removal raising a question of law", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nU.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nU.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress provided for judicial review of final orders of removal issued by the BIA. Moreover, Section 1252(b)(1) states that “[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under [§ 1252(a)(1) ], ... [t]he petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act, a non-criminal alien could seek judicial review of the BIA’s decision through either (i) a petition for review, which was required to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of its final order of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), or (ii) a habeas corpus petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for which there was no time limit. See Luya Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that review under 2241 still available notwithstanding express language in iirira barring review by any court of final orders of removal for aliens deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense and distinguishing between direct and collateral review" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that a broad statutory definition of a term that was inconsistent with the terms plain meaning did not affect the terms definition in other contexts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the definition of supplier under the ocspa is substantially broader than the definition of debt collector under the fdcpa", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the definition of operating deficits is not ambiguous despite the absence of a definition of the phrase in the contract", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that in the absence of a statutory definition a term should be accorded its ordinary meaning", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n& Guaranty Co., 996 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Mo.1999). To determine the ordinary meaning of a term in an insurance contract, the Missouri Supreme Court “consults standard English language dictionaries.” Id. If there is no ambiguity, the court need not resort to construction of the contract, but rather the intent of the parties is determined from the four corners of the contract. Id. “To ascertain the intent of the parties to an unambiguous contract, we give the language used its natural, ordinary, and common sense meaning, and consider the entire contract, along with its object, nature and purpose.” Robbins, 27 S.W.3d at 496. The absence of a definition of “managerial” in the contract does not, by itself, create ambiguity. See Burns v. Plaza West Associates, 979 S.W.2d 540 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding that the statutory definition of motor vehicle is not controlling" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (holding that an iowa statute requiring a foreign corporation to hold a certificate of authority to transact business in the state was preempted by the nba as the statute pertained to national banks because it infringed on the powers provided to national banks by the nba", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (holding that the keeper has independent authority to determine whether properties are eligible for listing on the national register and to name them to the national register without the agreement of state agencies", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (holding that so long as the seller did not have an agreement with the buyer during the term of the listing agreement it was free to delay selling until after the listing agreement had expired even where the delay was for the purpose of escaping the payment of a commission", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nby the Keeper or designee unless the Keeper disapproves a nomination ....”); id. § 60.6(t) (\"Any person or organization which supports or opposes the nomination .,. may petition the Keeper during the nomination process either to accept or reject a nomination .... Such petitions received by the Keeper prior to the listing of a property ... will be considered by the Keeper and the nomination will be substantively reviewed.”); id- § 60.15(a)(4) (\"Properties removed from the:National Register for procedural error shall be reconsidr ered for listing by the Keeper after correction of the error or errors by ... the Keeper, as appropriate,”); Friends of the Atglen-Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 253 (3d Cir.2001) (citations omitted); Moody Hill, 205 F.3d at 558 (holding a states regulation of wyoming national guard was insufficient to implicate a special sovereignty interest because of the dual federal and state nature of national guard service" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (holding an attorney is an agent of the client and therefore cannot conspire with the client", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (holding that an attorney may only undertake to represent a new client against a former client where there is no confidential information received from the former client that is in any way relevant to representation of the current client", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (holding that suspension for fortyfive days with requirement of paying restitution of 47950 to client plus costs was appropriate disciplinary sanction for attorneys conduct relating to representation of client in divorce action in failing to act with diligence failing to keep client informed failing to adequately explain matters to client and failing to return unearned advancefee upon termination of representation and for attorneys conduct in failing to respond to two letters from office of bar counsel seeking explanation of inconsistencies in attorneys response to bar complaint", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (holding multiple instances of neglecting client matters engaging in misrepresentation failing to notify a client of his suspension from the practice of law and failing to respond to inquiries from the iowa supreme court board of professional ethics and conduct warranted eighteenmonth suspension", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwas dismissed for Sotak’s want of prosecution. Even worse, Sotak did not appeal the dismissal and did not inform his clients their case had been dismissed. In the Wheeler matter, Sotak failed to file the report of first injury within the required timeframe. In the American Built and Ellsworth matters he failed to serve opposing parties within the ninety day parameter set forth in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5). These cases illustrate Sotak’s consistent failure to perform his assumed obligations. B. Misrepresentation In the Wheeler, American Built, and Ellsworth matters he also made misrepresentations to hide the neglect. Misrepresentation of neglect warrants a more severe sanction. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 646 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Iowa 2002) (holding client is not liable for actions of attorney who misled client as to the status of case" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that exclusionary rule only requires exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights and that exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of statutory rights is not necessarily required", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule absent an underlying constitutional violation or right", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that because code 19260 a procedural statute did not expressly provide a right of suppression of evidence a violation of that provision did not require application of the exclusionary rule in the absence of a constitutional violation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthe treaty’s requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations. See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (“The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.”). See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule “was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not ‘authorized’ by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.”); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that a violation of 6103 does not require the application of the exclusionary rule" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that a party in an action pending in a federal court was subject to the counterclaim rule and thus violated 65440 by commencing another action in a state court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in considering merits of state law counterclaim that formed part of the same case as federal counterclaim even though court had dismissed federal counterclaim quoting 28 usc 1367a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that lessees fraud in the inducement claim should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim where lessors original claim was for breach of the lease", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that a waiver of counterclaims potentially valid in state court was inoperative in federal court when its application would have prevented the assertion of a counterclaim that under fedrcivp 13a was compulsory", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot be adjudicated as counterclaims in a § 3213 proceeding. Noting that Wireless could, if it chose, press its allegations in a separate action, the court then granted summary judgment for Com/Tech. Wireless appealed. “Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996). Classifying a rule as substantive or procedural is sometimes a subtle undertaking. See id. But where the matter in question is one covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “it is settled that ... the Federal Rule applies re gardless of contrary state law.” Id. at 427 n. 7, 116 S.Ct. 2211. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3213 d F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that the prosecution in a subsequent action of claims that had been compulsory counterclaims in a previously filed declaratoryjudgment action violated 65440" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that a petitioner may overcome a procedural default by demonstrating either 1 an adequate cause for and actual prejudice arising from the default or 2 that a miscarriage of justice caused by a substantial denial of constitutional rights will occur if the petitioners federal claims are not considered quoting lynd v terry 470 f3d 1308 131314 11th cir2006", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that in the case of state procedural default a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate among other things that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that trial court must make entry of default prior to entry of default judgment and court may not make entry of default when there is no default in law or in fact", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that a federal court may excuse a state habeas petitioners procedural default if the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim and prejudice resulting from such failure", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith Rule 32.6(b)’s pleading requirements. Ala. R.Crim. P. 32.7(d). While the Court of Criminal Appeals refers to all three of these rules in its peitinent order, we focus our analysis on Rule 32.6(b), as Frazier’s failure to provide \"full disclosure of the factual basis” of the relevant claim was the sine qua non of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s dismissal. 7 . It is uncontroversial that \"[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir.2001); see also Owen v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 908 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that the novelty of a petitioners claim can constitute cause for a procedural default" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that when an employer takes steps to accommodate an employees restrictions it is not thereby conceding that the employee is disabled under the ada or that it regards the employee as disabled", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that employers must when appropriate accommodate a disabled employee by reassignment to a vacant position if employee cannot be accommodated in existing job", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that an employer does not necessarily regard an employee as disabled simply by finding the employee to be incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that the employers willingness to accommodate the employee undercut the employees claim of constructive discharge", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1132 n. 8 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that, once an employee notifies an employer of a disability and requests reassignment, both parties should “interact in good faith to determine how to reasonably accommodate the employee”). We begin by recognizing that a request for reassignment may constitute protected activity under the ADA. We have treated requests for reasonable accommodation as protected activity under the ADA. See Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249, 1265 (10th Cir.2001); Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999). And a request for reassignment to a vacant position is a request for a reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see also Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that an employee whose disability is related to his ability to perform the duties of his position is not disabled under the act and therefore an employer has no duty to accommodate" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (holding that state did not have jurisdiction over tribe where tribe paid into workers compensation program but had not waived sovereign immunity", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (holding that where defendant objected in the district court only to the loss calculation and not specifically to the calculation of restitution the issue of restitution was not properly presented to the district court", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (holding that conversion theory of recovery does not extend to money owed on a debt or to general damages", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (holding that price controls did not extend to the calculation of royalty owed to the osage tribe under the 1974 regulations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat 659 (citing 10 C.F.R. at § 211.61 (1975)). The government also promulgated mandatory petroleum price regulations that applied to “each sale, lease or purchase of a covered product in the United States.” Id. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 212.2). “Oil from stripper well leases, which represented ‘probably a majority’ of the production at the Osage Reservation, was exempt from price controls under § 4(e)(2) of the EPAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted). For the three Tranche One trial months that fell within the time period when price controls were in effect — January 1976, May 1979 and November 1980 — the court found that, in addition to the “offered price” breach, the Osage Agency had misapplied price controls to its calculation of royalties owed to the Tribe. Osage II, 72 Fed.Cl. at 661 (holding that waiver in a sue and be sued clause is limited to actions involving the corporate activities of the tribe and does not extend to actions of the tribe in its capacity as a political governing body" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nresulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (holding that due process requires a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nresulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (holding that district court may order hearing as remedy for termination of public employee without due process", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nresulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (holding that state could not conduct sua sponte review of unappealed due process hearing order", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nresulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (recognizing due process right to notice and informal hearing in school disciplinary process", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nresulting IEP against a substantive standard.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205, 102 S.Ct. 8034. Like that under the APA or the CRIPA, the IDEA’S exhaustion scheme was carefully designed to balance the individual complainant’s interest in retaining prompt access to a judicial forum and the countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303 (discussing policies served by the IDEA’S exhaustion requirement); cf. McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145-149, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (describing the balance of interests applicable in exhaustion determinations). Courts therefore may not, consistent with the intent of Congress, impose exhaustion requirements that “merely add additional steps not contemplated in the scheme of the Act.” Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2nd Cir.1988) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nforum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (holding a party cannot be joined to prevent removal where no cause of action can be brought against that party", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nforum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (holding that a criminal statute does not provide a corresponding civil cause of action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nforum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (holding that a municipal corporation cannot form the requisite criminal intent and cannot be held liable under civil rico laws", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nforum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (holding civil action cannot be joined to a criminal appeal", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nforum, there can be no-“parallel” state court litigation on the basis of which a federal court could exercise Colorado River abstention). B. The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly are not “parallel” under Colorado River. As a general matter, a § 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum. Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction could exist over the Marcuses’ damages claim. In the present case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court. Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum. See Hutchins v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 635, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 (1992) (holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the states criminal code" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nargument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that comparison between plaintiff africanameriean law student who was expelled for academic reasons and white student with psychiatric disorder was like comparing apples with oranges", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nargument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that a white office was not similarly situated to a black officer who was charged with more offenses than the white officer", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nargument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that no special relationship existed between the school and student", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nargument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that juveniles use of the f word in dispute with principal and another student over whether student had stolen her money did not constitute fighting words", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nargument that Defendants treated similarly situated white inmates more favorably than him to be unpersuasive. Plaintiff asserts that the named white inmates must be considered similarly situated because they were found to be in violation of prison rules for playing either their television or radio too loudly. However, the decision as to what sanction to impose for a particular rule violation may be based on the factors set out in Section III(D)(12) of the ISP Handbook. Giles has not shown himself to be similarly situated, considering such factors, with the three white inmates who received sanctions for playing either their television of radio too loud. See generally Anderson v. University of Wisconsin, 665 F.Supp. 1372, 1395 (W.D.Wis.1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir.1988) (holding proper remedy when a christian student newspaper was denied student activities funds was to make funds available to the religious paper not to deny funds to nonreligious student groups" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfaked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding trial court erred by instructing jury that employer would be liable under burk if plaintiff showed improper motive was a factor in the decision to discharge him rather than a significant factor", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfaked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that defendant failed to plead sufficient facts and instructing the trial court to dismiss the plaintiff from the case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfaked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that sudden emergency is an affirmative defense which must be specifically plead", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfaked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that trial court erred by instructing jury regarding sudden emergency", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfaked left syndrome accident. On appeal, the Estate concedes that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that it was not covered by other instructions. However, the Estate contends that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in the record because the alleged sudden emergency was the faked left syndrome and the faked left syndrome does not apply to the accident in question. As discussed supra, no evidence was presented to support the applicability of the faked left syndrome, and the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony regarding the faked left syndrome. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury regarding sudden emergency. See, e.g., Collins v. Rambo, 831 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that trial court erred in instructing the jury on unavoidable accident when no evidence supported its submission" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nherself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat’s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze “the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience” and the individual’s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nherself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat’s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze “the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience” and the individual’s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (holding that episodic multiple sclerosis is categorized as an impairment that will consistently meet the definition of disability and a ministroke is categorized as an impairment that may be disabling for some individuals but not for others", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nherself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat’s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze “the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience” and the individual’s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (holding that monocular vision is not invariably a disability but should be analyzed on an individual basis taking into account the individuals ability to compensate for the impairment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nherself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat’s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze “the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience” and the individual’s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (holding that the determination of whether an individual is disabled should be made with reference to measures that miti gate the individuals impairment including in this instance eyeglasses and contact lenses", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nherself, to get her own meals, to perform household chores or to drive. Similarly, at work Gretillat found ways to perform tasks that otherwise might involve squatting, crouching, crawling or kneeling. For example, instead of squatting to get things out of the bottom of a refrigerator, Gretillat would bend over sideways, get a pair of tongs or a long-handled spoon or ask a co-worker to help. Gretillat’s admitted ability to compensate for her limitations weighs against a finding that she is disabled under the ADA. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681 (directing district courts to analyze “the extent of the limitation ... in terms of [the plaintiffs] experience” and the individual’s ability to compensate for the impairment) (citing Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162) (holding that a claimants failure to list an impairment either in her application for disability benefits or through her testimony disposes of the claim because the alj was under no obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not offered at the hearing as a basis for disability" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnew trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court’s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding' “that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff had standing to challenge constitutionality of a georgia criminal trespass law because he was warned twice to stop handbilling and was told that if he engaged in the activity again he would be arrested", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnew trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court’s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding' “that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant was placed in official detention when two police officers approached him and told him that he was under arrest as the defendant could not reasonably have believed that he was free to leave", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnew trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court’s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding' “that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that under royer the defendant was arrested when he was prevented from boarding his plane placed in handcuffs involuntarily transported in restraints to an official holding area some distance from the place of the original stop confined to a small interrogation room and kept there under observation for more than a momentary period yet he was never informed how long he would be detained nor told that he was not under arrest", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnew trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court’s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding' “that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant was not in custody for miranda purposes when fieldsobriety tests were conducted and when deputy responded in the negative to defendants question of whether he was under arrest and never placed defendant in handcuffs or in the back of a patrol car during the questioning", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnew trial, and Muller moved for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Defendants challenged the Court’s pre-trial 'suppression orders, the evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to declare a mis 994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding' “that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under Terry v. Ohio ... is not enough to allow the police to transport the person stopped to the police station and extract information through detention and interrogation” (citation omitted)). Other appellate courts have also concluded that transportation to and detention in a police station or other custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that a de facto arrest had occurred where petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found but rather was taken to a police car transported to a police station and placed in an interrogation room" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAction until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAction until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAction until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (holding that a valid judgment hen is enforceable against the property of the estate recovered by the trustee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAction until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (recognizing the cause of action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nAction until' after the Bankruptcy Court granted him a discharge, he was fully aware of the Guarantors’ repudiation of the Consulting Agreement before he filed his bankruptcy petition, see R.67, Ex. O (Exs. C-E to Dist, Ct. Compl.), and the breach of contract claim is therefore property of his estate, see O’Dowd v. Trueger (In re O'Dowd), 233 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing a pre-petition cause of action is property of the estate). Insofar as the Consulting Agreement payments are recovered in the Contract Action, such payments will not be for any services actually performed by Segal but will be damages for his pre-petition breach of contract claim and will therefore be property of the estate. See Venn v. Sherman (In re Sherman), 322 B.R. 889, 892-93 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.2004) (holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (recognizing that probation officers are mandated to enforce a sentencing courts terms and conditions of supervised release", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (holding the district courts revocation of defendants term of supervised release did not end the courts jurisdiction over defendants release", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nWright contends that the district court erred by sentencing him to consecutive sentences of imprisonment following the revocation of his supervised release because the original plea agreement and sentence provided that the terms of imprisonment be concurrent and co-terminous. The district court did not err because under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district court may impose consecutive sentences after the revocation of supervised release even when the original sentences were concurrent. See United States v. Jackson, 176 F.3d 1175, 1176 (9th Cir.1999). Wright also contends that the district court erred by imposing a term of supervised release following his re-imprisonment. This contention is foreclosed by United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 713, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding opinion of expert may not ordinarily be compelled against experts wishes", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding that an insurer had conclusively established a reasonable basis for denying a claim when it relied on an experts opinion even though another expert had expressed a conflicting opinion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 446 (4th ed.1994). 6 Malingering is the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms motivated by external incentives, such as obtaining compensation or drugs, avoiding work or military duty, or evading criminal prosecution. American Psychiatric Association, supra, at 683. 7 The record does not reflect whether Dr. Nadel agreed to testify for defendants. If Dr. Nadel had been unwilling to do so, defendants could not have compelled his testimony. See Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 369, 599 A.2d 149 (noting New Jersey in minority of jurisdictions not permitting compulsion of expert testimony); see also Genovese v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 234 N.J.Super. 375, 380, 560 A.2d 1272 (App.Div.) (holding even though experts are permitted to give an opinion they may not offer an opinion regarding the credibility of others" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhas not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that probation is not a sentence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhas not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that where original sentencing judge imposed a guidelines sentence defendant could not be sentenced as a habitual offender upon violation of probation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhas not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (recognizing of course the suspension of the imposition of sentence and the grant of probation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhas not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhas not made any provision for deferring or staying adjudication as part of that disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a) (1998); cf. Minn. Stat. § 609.095(b) (1998) (providing that except in drug cases or by agreement of the parties, court may not refuse to adjudicate guilt). The supreme court has noted a trial court order providing for vacation and dismissal as part of a stay of imposition. City of St. Paul v. Froysland, 310 Minn. 268, 269, 246 N.W.2d 435, 436 (1976). But there is no precedential authority approving such a disposition. See Minn.Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2) (1998) (providing that if felony defendant given stay of imposition successfully serves probation the conviction is deemed to be a misdemeanor); United States v. Johnson, 43 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that minnesota stay of imposition is sentence for purposes of federal sentencing guidelines even if no term of probation was imposed" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (holding that the flsa is not within the purview of section 5 of the fourteenth amendment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (holding that while an original bankruptcy proceeding where the state is not named as a defendant is not a suit an adversary proceeding directly against the state would be", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (holding that a workers compensation proceeding is a legal proceeding", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (holding issues within scope of administrative hearing are within the reviewing courts purview", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nproceeding to allow for issuance of a writ of error coram nobis to permit a collateral challenge to a judgment of conviction based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jarrett v. State, 2014 Ark. 272, 2014 WL 2566093 (per curiam). Again, a coram-nobis proceeding is an exceedingly narrow remedy that requires a showing of facts that were extrinsic to the record that would have prevented rendition of the judgment at trial. Pitts v. State, 2014 Ark. 132, 2014 WL 1096185 (per curiam). Petitioner’s claim that he was not afforded an adequate opportunity to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is not within the scope of such a proceeding. We decline to refashion the writ to afford petitioner a remedy. See Zulpo v. State, 2014 Ark. 14, 2014 WL 197837 (per curiam) (holding that the scope of a coramnobis proceeding would not be expanded to include an argument outside the four categories recognized as being within the purview of a coramnobis proceeding" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\napproach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (holding such service satisfies due process", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\napproach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (holding that a predeprivation opportunity to be heard satisfies the due process clause", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\napproach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\napproach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\napproach is the correct one here. With the benefit of a full factual record — in this case, following years of discovery — plaintiffs in pattern and practice claims cannot rely on abstract legal concepts alone. Although abstract legal concepts may inform the Court’s analysis regarding the risk of error, GE must also demonstrate that the current procedures in fact result in an unacceptable rate of error. It would make little sense to ignore the empirical record altogether in favor of a hypothetical concern that the risk of error may be too high, a. Abstract Concepts According to GE, the crucial element missing from EPA’s pre-UAO issuance process is a neutral decision-maker. Although the Constitution does not require a neutral decision-maker, see, e.g., Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 968 (holding that an opportunity to be heard by a contracting officer the very person deciding whether the plaintiff is a responsible contractor satisfies due process" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (holding that hgn evidence is scientific and therefore must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence governing the admission of such evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (holding that the rules of evidence normally applicable in criminal trials do not operate with full force at hearings before the judge to determine the admissibility of evidence there is therefore much to be said for the proposition that in proceedings where the judge himself is considering the admissibility of evidence the exclusionary rules aside from rules of privilege should not be applicable and the judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (holding that any error in the exclusion of evidence is cured by the subsequent admission of the evidence", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto section 4177(d)(4) as section 4177(d)(4) defines fourth offenses as felonies. Therefore, we hold that only when an individual is convicted of a violation of 21 Del.C. § 4177(a), such violation occurring after three prior convictions under section 4177(a), may he or she be sentenced as a fourth-time offender under section 4177(d)(4). Conclusion We hold that it was an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to admit the HGN evidence without the proper foundation. Because the error was not harmless, we reverse the appellant’s conviction for the June 25, 1995 incident and remand the case for a new trial. Consequently, we also set aside Zimmerman’s sentence for the Au person, bec o. 185, 1996, 1997 WL 70816 (Feb. 7, 1997) (ORDER). 9 . Id. at 356-62. 10 . See Ruthardt, 680 A.2d at 356 (holding that scientific evidence must satisfy the pertinent delaware rules of evidence concerning admission of scientific testimony or evidence ie dre 401 402 403 702 and 703 and be relevant and reliable" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding that the court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding that the united states court of federal claims lacked jurisdiction over claims arising from the violation of a criminal statute", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding that a court cannot entertain claims arising from incidents omitted from an eeo complaint unless those incidents were within the scope of the investigation that would have followed the initial eeo charge", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding plaintiffs claims could not succeed without proof that the city had knowledge of prior incidents", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nat *3-5 (D.D.C. February 16, 2006) (entering judgment in favor of the defendant where a plaintiff failed to file an EEO complaint regarding her claims of retaliation, and explicitly rejecting the argument that “a claimant need not exhaust her administrative remedies for a claim based on retaliation when that retaliation claim arises after an administrative complaint has already been filed”). A more recent view is that acts of alleged retaliation occurring after an EEO charge is filed need not be separately exhausted where they necessarily would have come within the “scope of any investigation that reasonably could have been expected to result from [the] initial [EEO] charge[.]” Hazel, 2006 WL 3623693, at *8 (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Lewis, 535 F.Supp.2d at 7 (holding that 8 incidents of assault theft robbery or burglary on the premises and 80 similar incidents within a 2bloek area within the prior 3 years did not constitute special circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (holding that the federal habeas courts task is to determine if the state courts decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the supreme court of the united states", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (holding that the federal constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to decisions to impose consecutive sentences", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (holding that a california state courts affirmance of two consecutive 25 years to life sentences for petty theft was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder California’s “three strikes” law for perjury on a Department of Motor Vehicles driver’s license application. Reyes had filled out a license application and attempted to take the written portion of the exam under the name of his cousin Miguel Soto. At trial, Reyes testified that he tried to take the exam for Soto because Soto was illiterate and had failed to pass. Because the perjury conviction was Reyes’s third strike, he was sentenced to 26 years to life. Reyes is married and has two children who were one and three years old at the time of sentencing. Reyes contends that his 26 years to life sentence is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This argument is foreclosed by Lockyer v. An-drade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1172-75, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (holding that 25 years to life sentence under the california three strikes law did not violate the eighth amendments prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nId. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (recognizing requirement of knowing intelligent waiver", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nId. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nId. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (holding that trial court has no duty to establish waiver on record", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nId. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nId. at 262-63, 102 S.Ct. 2421 (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Coe says that because Tennessee’s waiver practice has not been consistent in cases with similar circumstances, it cannot serve as the basis for a procedural bar. The state responds by citing numerous eases that establish waiver, and it has the better of the argument. Coe’s eases are mostly either adverse, or too old to constitute current “strict and regular” practice. The few that remain are isolated and unpublished, and so are also insufficient to defeat an otherwise “strict and regular” practice. See Delbridge v. State, 742 S.W.2d 266 (Tenn.1987) (not mentioning waiver); Moore v. State, No. 03C01-9212-CR-00445, 1994 WL 17864, at *3 (Tenn.Crim.App. Jan. 25, 1994) (holding that record did not establish knowing waiver" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that injunctive relief was unwarranted when the jurys award already included prospective relief", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that a court may award injunctive relief against a state officer", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that concerted refusals to work overtime fell within the proscriptions of a cba nostrike clause and were subject to injunctive relief under boys markets", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that lack of subject matter jurisdiction precluded court from awarding injunctive relief as well as damages", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto agree are subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA.” In the more common case in which Boys Markets injunctions have been issued, the strike is occurring at the time of suit or is imminent. See 1 John E. Higgins, Jr., The Developing Labor Law 1461 (5th ed. 2006). Boys Markets itself concerned an ongoing violation of a no-strike clause. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 239-40, 90 S.Ct. 1583. In theory, questions may arise as to the application of Boys Markets to job actions short of actual strikes. But we have held that activities short of an actual strike may also violate no-strike clauses, including work slowdowns and concerted refusals to work overtime. Natl Elevator Indus., 776 F.2d 374; see also Avco Corp. v. Local Union # 787, UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 974 (3d Cir.1972) (holding that injunctive relief is a form of equity which is generally subject to the courts discretion" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstatus of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood’s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant’s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (holding that even when employee was driving employers vehicle employee was not acting within the scope of his employment absent evidence that he had undertaken a special mission at his employers direction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstatus of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood’s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant’s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (holding that a civilian employee injured when her automobile was hit by a military vehicle while she was driving on a road on the employers premises the military base to report to work sustained a compensable injury under the federal employees compensation act", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstatus of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood’s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant’s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (holding that injury incurred when employee returned to retrieve paycheck six days after employment had been terminated occurred in course of employment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstatus of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood’s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant’s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (holding that notwithstanding fact that employer brought suit in its own name pursuant to ocga 349111 c only for the liquidated amount that had been paid to the employee in workers compensation benefits after employee failed to file his own tort action within one year of injury employee was not precluded from bringing his own separate action to recover for personal injuries and loss of consortium but noting that employee received notice of employers suit only after filing his own action suggesting that court in which employers action was pending had wrongly denied the employees motion to intervene to which motion employer had objected noting that if employee had not moved to intervene in other action employees separate action would have been barred by laches and holding that thirdparty tortfeasor could move for mandatory joinder of the employer in the employees action", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstatus of a business invitee. It is not easy to reconcile this concession with Sherwood’s argument that, at the moment of the terminal ion of the claimant’s employment, he ceased being an employee. 7 The decision of the Appellate Court in Fulco was codified by the 1993 enactment of § 31-275 (16) (B) (iii). 8 The facts of this case do not require us to consider the more difficult question of whether an injury is compensable if it is incurred when a discharged employee returns to the job site. There is authority for the proposition that such an injury is compensable if industry custom allows a discharged employee to return to pick up his or her paycheck on a designated day, or to retrieve his or her personal belongings. See Nails v. Market Tire Co., 29 Md. App. 154, 347 A.2d 564 (1975) (holding compensable injuries sustained when employee returned to employers premises two days after employment had been terminated in order to retrieve personal tools and tool box" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea’s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that the press and public can be constitutionally excluded from a pretrial suppression hearing", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea’s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea’s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under 3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under 3161h7", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea’s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under 3161h7a", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTrial clock if they are to count as excluda-ble days from her own Speedy Trial clock. Maryea is correct that the case law in this Circuit has not addressed head on whether the Co-Defendant Clause as a general matter is subject to a reasonableness limitation, and we decline to do so here. However, the court agrees with the government that, under the facts of this particular case, the district court did not err when it denied Maryea’s motion to dismiss. In line with the principles outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloate as well as the reasoning of our sister circuits, the Court will assume without deciding, for the purposes of this case, that a reasonableness requirement applies, and that the requirement may be met through a factors-based assessment. See Bloate, 130 S.Ct. 1345 (holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under 3161h7" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe rule allows such a safe harbor.” Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company’s explanation “plainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.” Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule’s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule’s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (holding that it is not", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe rule allows such a safe harbor.” Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company’s explanation “plainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.” Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule’s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule’s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (holding that employees failure to comply with employers rule requiring employees to notify employer when a temporary job placement ended did not constitute gross misconduct because the violation was an isolated incident and employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious or indeed any consequences as a result of employees unavailability", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe rule allows such a safe harbor.” Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company’s explanation “plainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.” Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule’s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule’s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (holding that an employer must establish all three elements of the defense with regard to its employees in order to prevail", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe rule allows such a safe harbor.” Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company’s explanation “plainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.” Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule’s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule’s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (holding that an employer must show that it clearly communicated to all the employees to whom the presumptively invalid rule was disseminated that the rule did not mean what it said", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe rule allows such a safe harbor.” Id. Although Guardsmark explained the safe harbor to some employees, the Board found the company’s explanation “plainly insufficient to avoid a violation of the Act [because] narrowing interpretations of overly broad rules must be communicated to the entire work force covered by the rule.” Id. at *5. Guardsmark argues that nothing in the rule explicitly prohibits off-duty solicitation and that employees would not reasonably so construe it, especially after the company clarified the rule’s safe harbor. We disagree. To begin with, because Guardsmark failed to communicate the safe harbor clarification to all employees who had received the handbook, the Board properly focused on the rule’s language. See Ichikoh Mfg., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1022 (1993) (holding that the hospital failed to show how it was harmed by failure to verify the rule to show cause" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (holding lessor entitled to full months rent when rent due on first of month and lease rejected on second", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (recognizing and applying rule that lessee who breaches a lease is entitled to a rent credit for any proceeds gained by the landlord from reletting during the period of the original lease term", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that where the rent payments during the original and extended terms were the same the lessees payment of rent and continued occupation of the leased premises standing along was insufficient to establish that they had exercised their option to renew the lease for an additional term", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that tenants interest in a sublease terminated upon the landlords termination of the lease and affirming order that landlord entitled to receive 12 months of rent deposited by subtenant with court subsequent to termination of lease and prior to denial of petition for relief from forfeiture", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin relevant part: The trustee shall timely perform all the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in section 365(b)(2), arising from and after the order for relief under any unexpired lease of nonresidential real property, until such lease is assumed or rejected, notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3) (emphasis added). The purpose of § 365(d)(3) is to protect landlords by requiring debtors to timely perform their obligations arising under the lease. With regard to rent, courts generally agree that § 365(d)(3) requires debtors to pay rent obligations in full and without proration as they come due in the pre-rejection period. See Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse Road Co. (In re Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc.), 203 F.3d 986 (6th Cir.2000) (recognizing two lines of eases regarding calculation of administrative claims for rent one based on reasonable value of portion of demised premises actually used and occupied and one on the reasonable value without regard to amount of space used holding that landlords were entitled to full rental payments not warehouse value of premises until lease assumed or rejected" ]