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[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncaused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (holding that negligence must be the proximate cause of injury", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncaused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (holding iowa code section 63113 which is now section 6317 contains no provision for posttrial motions on appeal from a small claims court judgment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncaused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (holding a common law cause of action exists against a nonlicensee who furnishes alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12347 where the minor subsequently causes the plaintiffs injuries", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncaused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (holding in a case in which negligence was based on the illegal sale of alcohol to a minor in violation of iowa code section 12343 now section 12347 that proximate cause was an issue to be resolved by the finder of fact", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncaused by the intoxication of the dram shop patron. The last sentence of the portion of section 123.92 quoted above provides that the dram shop may assert an affirmative defense that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of the patron’s injurious action. See Gremmel v. Junnie’s Lounge, Ltd., 397 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1986) (defense that intoxication was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries was available upon showing that animosity between combatants and not intoxication precipitated assault). The rise of the claim created by section 123.92 extending liability to liquor purveyors is mirrored by the recent genesis of separate common law actions against those who sell or provide liquor in violation of criminal statutes. See Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977) (holding that a physicians negligence need only be a proximate cause not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nby her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (recognizing that the supreme court maintained the trial courts fact finding authority without setting a new standard in booker", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nby her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (holding that statute could not grant jurisdiction to dis trict courts of appeal over nonfinal arbitration order because the florida constitution reserved to the florida supreme court the power to define the interlocutory jurisdiction of district courts", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nby her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (holding a per curiam affirmance from a florida district court of appeal is not renewable by the florida supreme court", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nby her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (holding that district court opinion which cites controlling authority that is pending review in florida supreme court allows supreme court to exercise jurisdiction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nby her pro bono counsel. 7 . Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (\"AEDPA”) (effective April 24, 1996). 8 . Section 5103 states: § 5103. Transfer of erroneously filed matters (a) General rule. — If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court ... of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the ... matter, the court ... shall not quash ... or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth, where the ... matter shall be treated as if originally filed in a court ... of this Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court ... of this Commonwealth shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court ... where it shall be treated as if orig .2000) (holding florida constitution grants supreme court exclusive authority to set deadlines for postconviction motions therefore legislation setting time limits is unconstitutional" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nEMTALA — they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs’ supplemental state-law claims must also be ÍHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (holding if the legislature had the power to confer upon the county commissioners jurisdiction to hear and determine the question as to whether or not a town was of undue extent and to deprive it of a part of its territory then the proceeding being statutory before a body of limited powers the record must show affirmatively that such a case was brought before them as they were authorized to hear and determine and that all the jurisdictional facts were found to exist where the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine depends upon the existence of a fact that fact must appear or the proceedings are coram non judice and void", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nEMTALA — they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs’ supplemental state-law claims must also be ÍHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that no substantial question of federal law was required to be answered to determine the plaintiffs statelaw legal malpractice negligence and breach of contract claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nEMTALA — they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs’ supplemental state-law claims must also be ÍHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (recognizing a distinction between the power of a federal court to hear statelaw claims and the discretionary exercise of that power", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nEMTALA — they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs’ supplemental state-law claims must also be ÍHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit and the district court has considerable authority whether or not to exercise this power in light of such considerations as judicial economy convenience fairness to litigants and eomity ", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nEMTALA — they knew the essential facts and had both the basic legal and medical knowledge to do so. At this late hour, they shall not be heard to the contrary; specially given the fact that Plaintiffs were twice allowed to amend the complaint after Defendants moved to dismiss but failed to address most of the factual issues discussed here. See Ibarzabal v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., 333 Fed.Appx. 605, 607 (2d Cir.2009) (dismissal affirmed where plaintiff received notice of affirmative defense but failed to address it in an amended complaint). Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ claims under EMTALA are DISMISSED with prejudice. Having so decided, Plaintiffs’ supplemental state-law claims must also be ÍHSMISSED. See Newman v. Bwrgin, 930 F.2d 955, 963 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndegree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich’s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist’s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist’s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist’s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich’s injuries, rendering the motorist’s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to “arising out of the use.” See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (holding that where occupants left uninsured vehicle assaulted a pedestrian pedestrian ran into highway and was struck by a truck no causal connection existed between pedestrians injuries and use of the uninsured vehicle because assaults and fisticuffs are not normal foreseeable occurrences in the use of a vehicle", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndegree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich’s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist’s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist’s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist’s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich’s injuries, rendering the motorist’s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to “arising out of the use.” See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (holding automobile exeeption did not apply to warrantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot police officers surrounded the vehicle and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndegree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich’s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist’s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist’s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist’s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich’s injuries, rendering the motorist’s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to “arising out of the use.” See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (holding that victims injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle when the victim received injuries from a gun fired in the vehicle", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndegree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich’s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist’s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist’s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist’s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich’s injuries, rendering the motorist’s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to “arising out of the use.” See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndegree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich’s injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist’s truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist’s use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist’s intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich’s injuries, rendering the motorist’s use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to “arising out of the use.” See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (Mich. App. Ct. 1975), 235 N.W.2d 42, 50 (holding that under the plain and obvious meaning of the uim statute a prerequisite to the term underinsured motor vehicle is the existence of bodily injury liability insurance coverage which is less than the liability for damages imposed by law and where no such coverage existed tortfeasor was not underinsured under the statute but rather uninsured concluding that terms underinsured and uninsured are mutually exclusive as applied to the same motor vehicle and the combination of these two coverages by the insured was contrary to legislative intent" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct”); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (“[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (“A single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.”); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct”); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (“[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (“A single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.”); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (recognizing hostile work environment discrimination in ada context", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct”); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (“[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (“A single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.”); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (holding that plaintiffs allegation of one incident where supervisor wrapped his arms around her and made sexually explicit statements was not sufficient to establish a claim of a hostile working environment absent the most stringent circumstances courts have refused to hold that one incident in itself was so severe as to create a hostile work environment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct”); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (“[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (“A single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.”); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (holding single incident of sexual harassment was neither sufficiently pervasive nor severe to constitute a hostile work environment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct”); see also Jacob v. ES-O-EN Corp., No. 2:06-CV-740 TC, 2008 WL 474120, at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12742, at *8 (D.Utah Feb. 19, 2008) (“[Plaintiffs] allegations of rape and assault by [an employee] amount to [a] hostile work environment, because these actions could be severe enough to alter [her] conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.”); Grozdanich v. Leisure Hills Health Ctr., Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 953, 970 (D.Minn.1998) (“A single sexual assault has a far greater potential to adversely alter the work environment, and with greater permanence, than would an offensive verbal remark, or a series of such remarks.”); cf. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 230 (2d Cir.2004) (holding in a 42 usc 1981 and 1983 context that although a single incident ordinarily will not give rise to a cognizable claim for hostile work environment where the plaintiff was subjected to a physical assault in which he was punched in the ribs and temporarily blinded by having mace sprayed in his eyes we cannot say that as a matter of law such an incident is not sufficiently severe in all the circumstances to create a hostile work environment" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntrigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that “arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance under § 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under § 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a party that sold a product to another party arranged for disposal of a hazardous substance", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntrigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that “arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance under § 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under § 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntrigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that “arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance under § 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under § 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the party prevailing on the significant issues in the litigation is the party that should be considered the prevailing party for attorneys fees", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntrigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that “arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance under § 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under § 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that arranger liability claim requires proof that defendant arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances owned or possessed by defendant", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntrigger CERCLA liability, nor does actual disposal of hazardous substances. A release must occur or be threatened before CERCLA is triggered. A party that “arranged for disposal” of a hazardous substance under § 9607(a)(3) does not become hable un der CERCLA until there is an actual or threatened release of that substance into the environment. Arranging for disposal of hazardous substances, in itself, is neither regulated under nor prohibited by CERCLA. Further, disposal activities that were legal when conducted can nevertheless give rise to liability under § 9607(a)(3) if there is an actual or threatened release of such hazardous substances into the environment. See Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. United States (Cadillac Fairview/California I), 41 F.3d 562, 565-66 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that in a situation where the police have probable cause to arrest one party and reasonably mistake a second party for that first party the arrest of the second party is still a valid arrest" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (holding that states procedure providing for jury evaluation of voluntariness of a defendants confession violates fourteenth amendment due process", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (recognizing that deference to an agencys interpretation of the written law is appropriate only when that interpretation is within the written laws language", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (holding that upon resentencing providing only a written opinion violates the open court requirement of 3553c", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (holding that school policy prohibiting written material of a religious nature violates the fust amendment", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor issues remanded.” United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595, 597-98 (6th Cir.1997) (internal citations omitted). “[A]bsent explicit limitations in the appellate court’s mandate, an order vacating a sentence and remanding the case for re-sentencing directs the sentencing court to begin anew, so that fully de novo resentencing is entirely appropriate^]” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1422 (6th Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). Accordingly, when no express lim t court violated § 3553(c) when it failed to explain the reasons underlying his sentence “in open court.” Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that upon resentencing, the reasons supporting the sentence must be pronounced by the district court from the bench. See DeMott, 513 F.3d at 58 (holding that 172545hs written notice requirement is mandatory" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (holding that judges have immunity from suit for judicial acts", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (holding that regardless of whether the deferred adjudication was part of a plea bargain recommended by the prosecution imposed by the trial court without objection by the appellant or granted under other circumstances once the trial court proceeds to adjudication it is restricted in the sentence it imposes only by the relevant statutory limits", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (holding that psychiatrists who upon appointment by a court recommended the release of a man acquitted of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect enjoyed judicial immunity from suit for damages by relatives of a woman later killed by the man released", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nof such an evaluation. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17a-582(e). The court then considers both reports as well as any other evidence, including witness testimony, provided by the parties. Section 17a-582 further provides that a person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect may contest a court’s order regarding confinement or conditional release. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a-582(g) (“An order of the court pursuant to subsection (e) of this section may be appealed by the acquittee or the state’s attorney to the Appellate Court. The court shall so notify the acquittee.”) Kalman has appealed his confinement. Furthermore, following entry of the court order committing him to the PSRB’s custody, the PSRB, pursuant to section .Ed.2d 67 (1987); Seibel v. Kemble, 63 Haw. 516, 631 P.2d 173 (1981) (holding that in the absence of a statute providing immunity the defense of sovereign immunity is not available to a municipal corporation in an action for damages alleged to be caused by the tortious conduct of the municipality" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontainers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (holding candidates for judicial office were entitled to preliminary injunction of expenditure limit given likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm and lack of public interest in enforcing a law that curtailed political speech", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontainers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (holding that a court may issue injunctive relief only when the movant demonstrates four factors substantial likelihood of success on the merits irreparable harm no substantial injury to the other party and furtherance of the public interest", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontainers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (holding that the district court erred when it failed to consider the presumption of irreparable harm", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontainers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (holding that a movant that clearly establishes likelihood of success on the merits receives the benefit of a presumption of irreparable harm", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncontainers], which could be utilized in the event that both generators should fail for some reason.” 11 . TransAtlantic’s vice president filed a declaration stating that costs of supplying the clip-on generators required by the solicitation and the fuel to power them is approximately $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year for each container. We have no other evidence on this issue. Defendant responded only that this estimate \"could be wrong.” The vice president also asserted that owning the barge and operating it with the company's own employees cost more than $[REDACTED INFORMATION] per year. 12 . At least one court has ruled that a finding of likely success on the merits creates a presumption of irreparable harm. See CW Gov't Travel, Inc. v. United States, 61 Fed.Cl. 559, 577 (2004) (holding that the movant had to establish both of the first two factors ie likelihood of success and irreparable harm to receive a preliminary injunction" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding the rule of lenity inapplicable where the defendants interpretation failed to give meaning to each statutory provision", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding epas interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision unreasonable where it was inconsistent with the clean air acts purpose", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the epas explanation in five different documents of its interpretation of a specific statutory provision satisfied the apas basisandpurpose requirement", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot necessary. And in its “Technical Support Document,” the EPA explained why it believed the revised MVEB was adequate for conformity purposes. Although the explanations may not have been as detailed as the Petitioner would have liked, we nonetheless conclude that through these documents the EPA adequately addressed the somewhat general comments of the Petitioner and sufficiently explained the basis and purpose of its actions. See Reytblatt v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722-23 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (“Although the NRC did not directly respond to Dr. Reytblatt’s suggested alternatives ..., its explanation was adequate in light of the general nature of Dr. Reyt-blatt’s comments.... ”); National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1252 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that to the extent the petition challenges the application of epas regulatory interpretation to petitioners plants the challenge is unripe" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nburden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (holding party did not waive right to arbitrate despite moving to dismiss and moving for summary judgment on opponents claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nburden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (holding that the moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nburden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (recognizing that the burden on summary judgment shifts to the nonmoving party once the moving party has met its initial responsibility of showing the absence of a triable issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of the case", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nburden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (holding that the party moving for summary judgment waived its argument that the opposing partys affidavit should not be considered because the moving party never objected to the timeliness of the affidavit to the trial court", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nburden to establish prejudice “despite the fact that a delay occurred.” Id. at 188. We concluded employer’s delay of nearly seven months in moving to dismiss after employee’s suit did not prejudice employee. Id. Our holding in Mueller is consistent with prior authority finding delay in seeking to compel arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice. See generally Freeman, 924 F.2d at 158-59 (moving party’s use of judicial process and discovery before demanding arbitration not prejudicial to opponent as no issues litigated and limited discovery unusable in arbitration); Nettleton v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 904 S.W.2d 409, 410-12 (Mo.App.1995) (limited discovery and legal expenses incurred by party opposing arbitration insufficient to establish prejudice); Berhorst, 764 S.W.2d at 662-64 (holding that summary judgment should be denied where the moving party does not show that there is no genuine dispute as to a material fact with respect to each essential element of the claim" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwould have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (holding that miller and its progeny did not work a change in the first gingles inquiry and rejecting the argument that a proposed district that violates miller does not satisfy the first gingles factor per se", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwould have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (holding that the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendants argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwould have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwould have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (holding the government waived its argument on appeal that the defendant did not have standing to challenge a search when it failed to raise the argument to the district court", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwould have a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice, albeit by a small margin. Furthermore, it is appropriate for a district court to consider the substantial increase in turnout of black voters that usually follows the creation of an opportunity district in its effectiveness analysis. See United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F.Supp.2d 740, 765 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (\"[I]t is unreasonable to assume that minority turnout will not increase under a system in which that turnout is made meaningful, relative to a system in which that turnout was entirely ineffective.”) With the boost in turnout of black voters the district becomes substantially more effective. 188 . Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). 189 . Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07 (holding that an argument not raised before the bankruptcy court will not be considered for the first time on appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nresult from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (holding that the analogous predecessor regulation to 29 cfr 541202a did not encompass an employee who made no decisions that affect even the small segment of the companys operations in which his work is performed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nresult from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (holding that the fact that the insurance agents perform functions that are an essential part of the companys normal operations is a decisive factor", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nresult from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (holding that an employer is accountable to a discharged employee for unpaid compensation if the employee was terminated in bad faith and the compensation is clearly connected to work already performed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nresult from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (holding futa after which florida molded its unemployment law is phrased entirely in terms of the nature of the employer and not in terms of the work performed or the place at which the employee works", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nresult from improper performance of the employee’s duties.” Martin, 381 F.3d at 583. Plaintiffs contend that underwriters do not exercise discretion and independent judgment concerning matters of significance because the underwriters do not bear any responsibility for financial loss and do not determine the financial risk that Huntington will take for any given loan. However, while underwriters do not determine Huntington’s overall risk guidelines, they still make decisions that signifi cantly impact the business and do determine the risk Huntington will accept for any particular loan. Underwriters can approve loans between $250,000 and $1,000,000. Their approval of a loan binds Huntington to that risk, and their denial of an application prevents a customer from acquiring credit. Cf (holding that your work exclusion is triggered only where the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you and does not apply to damage caused to original construction of a house during later repair work" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstatement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim’s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine’s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding defendant waived right to challenge incourt identification when he admitted guilt at punishment phase of trial", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstatement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim’s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine’s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that appellant was not lawfully detained for investigation of public intoxication when he gave false identification therefore trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his false identification statements", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstatement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim’s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine’s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that trial court erred when it admitted outofcourt identification of defendant when the witness who made the identification was never asked about defendants identity at trial", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstatement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim’s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine’s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that testimony regarding outofcourt identification was inadmissible where the state failed to ask the witnesses about the identification during its direct examination", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstatement as true at the time she gave it; that she was still consumed with the emotions of the event when talking with police; and that other evidence corroborated her statement, we find that there was sufficient evidence to lay a foundation for admission of the statement under section 90.803(5), even though the declarant herself never confirmed the accuracy of the statement at trial. Admission of Evidence Regarding Victim’s Identification of Polite from a Photo Line-Up Polite next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Levine’s out-of-court identification of him from a photo line-up on grounds that the State failed to inquire into this issue during its direct examination of Ms. Levine. E.g., Deans v. State, 988 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that prior identification is not hearsay when the declarant is available at trial for crossexamination and that it makes no difference whether the witness admits or denies or fails to recall making the prior identification" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do— and indeed should — consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (holding a plaintiff failed to show an actual injury to challenge an epa rule when the plaintiff alleged he would not have purchased a piece of property or would have paid less because the plaintiffs allegations showed only that the property was worth less to him not that the property was in fact worth less", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do— and indeed should — consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (holding that the appropriate remedy for a public trial violation was a new suppression hearing not a new trial because the remedy should be appropriate to the violation", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do— and indeed should — consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (holding that if defendant could establish ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to file petition for review in his direct appeal then appropriate remedy would be to allow filing of petition for review out of time", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do— and indeed should — consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (holding that current titleholder would only have to be joined if the appropriate remedy for the plaintiff would be to reconvey his property", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Indeed, with respect to discretionary issues, the only one that the Court finds it prudent to consider is whether the remaining heirs of von Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, of whom there are apparently around forty, see transcript 3/5/08, should be joined to this lawsuit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a). Although neither party has moved for joinder, courts frequently do— and indeed should — consider the issue sua sponte because a primary purpose of Rule 19 is to protect the rights of an absentee party. See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 471 F.3d 377, 382-383 (2d Cir.2006). As the Museums repeatedly have emphasized, however, they seek in this action declarations of their property rights in the paintings only v (2d Cir.2003) (holding that in light of the defendants failure to engage in the interactive process liability would be appropriate if reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz’s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that defendant must have clearly objected at trial to the matter he is raising on appeal", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz’s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that appellate court could not consider objection to testimony when defendant objected at trial on different grounds", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz’s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that error was preserved when defendant objected to question regarding defendant was under arrest immediately following question about postarrest event sufficient to put trial court on notice of appellants state constitutional grounds for objection", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz’s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin the trial court on the grounds now asserted, defendant is deemed to have waived the objection on appeal. CRE 103; People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983). Kruse, 819 P.2d at 551 (Van Cise, J., dissenting). We agree with Judge Van Cise. The protection provided by section 16-8-107(1) should not have been addressed by the court of appeals. The general rule is that failure to make a timely and sufficient objection during the trial constitutes a waiver of that ground on appeal. Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 160, 493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); People v. Browning, 809 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo.App.1990). Kruse waived his objection to the admission of Ortiz’s testimony under section 16-8-107(1) by failing to properly object at trial. People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965, 966-67 (Colo.App.1983) (holding that claims based on grounds not objected to at trial cannot be considered on appeal" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncorporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.” (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncorporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.” (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (holding that the actual amount of capital employed in the state by a foreign corporation was to be based on the property of the corporation that was within the state and that was used in business transacted within the state", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncorporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.” (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (holding that a public corporation in that case a commission created to provide information about the tva is an entity separate from the state and its acts are not acts of the state within the meaning of the state constitutions prohibition against the state creating new debts", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncorporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.” (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (holding that specific jurisdiction may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum state since it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines thus obviating the need for physical presence within a state in which business is conducted", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncorporations, shall pay annually to the State an annual franchise tax of two dollars on each one thousand of the actual amount of capital employed in this state.” (Emphasis added.) In a series of acts, the Legislature amended the rate of taxation to maintain equality of rate between domestic and foreign corporations. In 1955, the rate for the franchise tax on both domestic and foreign corporations was increased from $2 to $2.50 on each $1,000. Act No. 74, 1955 Ala. Acts 191-92. In 1971, the Legislature again increased the tax rate on both domestic and foreign corporations, raising it from $2.50 to $3 on each $1,000 of capital stock and of capital, respectively. Act No. 103, 1971 Ala. Acts 184-86. 9 . Accord State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 256 Ala. 61, 67-68, 53 So.2d 745, 749-50 (1951) (holding that resident shareholder of s corporation is eligible for tax credit for taxes paid by corporation in another state and noting that this conclusion is consistent with the internal revenue code which provides that shareholders of an s corporation are entitled to a foreign tax credit for their share of foreign income tax paid by an s corporation" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that clause 8 of the nype charter party expressly makes the time charterer hable for the vessels neghgence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that clause eight imposes liability on time charterer for injuries to longshoremen", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nA.M.C. 1578, 1580-81 (E.D.Va.1982); Wyche v. Oldendorff, 284 F.Supp. 575, 576-77 (E.D.Va.1967); Saridis v. S.S. Paramarina, 216 F.Supp. 794, 797 (E.D.Va.1962). Furthermore, although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this issue in any exhaustive opinion, it has rejected the theory that the time charter entitles an injured longshoreman to recovery as a third party beneficiary. See Bernard v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 475 F.2d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (noting that “charter party created no contractual duty to the longshoreman on the part of the United States as time charterer”). Other jurisdictions have also agreed that .Ed.2d 278 (1982) and mandate amended on different grounds, 702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir.1983); Fernandez v. Chios Shipping Co., Ltd., 542 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that jury not required to award noneconomic damages merely because it has awarded economic damages" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that floating barge moored to shore remaining in same place for approximately seven years and used as work platform to clean and strip cargo and gas from barges was not a vessel", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that the natural gas act authorizes acquisition of gas storage easements by eminent domain", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that an individual is presumed to intend the natural consequences of the individuals actions", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nTo issue a certificate, FERC must determine that the public will be well-served by the company’s proposed development; the Commission may also impose terms and conditions it believes the public convenience and necessity require. The Act further provides that [w]hen any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid [for the owner’s property interests] ... it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h); see Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that under fedrcivp 71a federal procedure governs condemnation actions brought under the natural gas act" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (recognizing policy and ruling that person who failed to file counterclaim when childs paternity was being determined in earlier litigation should not be allowed to bring later suit to establish that he was childs natural father as this would not be in the childs best interests", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (holding that it was error to base a tpr decision solely on the childs best interest", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (holding that a modification of custody should not be based on one parents default because it is the childs best interests that are at stake", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (holding that a childs preference regarding parental contact is not determinative of the best interest analysis and that a court must assess a childs best interest in light of all statutory factors", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat the appellant is ... unable to provide now or in the future.” The record demonstrates that S.O. is doing very well in her foster placement. Esser and Jones testified that S.O. has formed a strong bond with her siblings, and that maintaining a relationship with her siblings is in her best interest. But even if maintaining S.O.’s out-of-home placement with her siblings is in her best interest, that is not a sufficient reason to terminate her father’s parental rights. The best interest of the child is a “paramount” concern, but termination of parental rights is contingent upon a finding under MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b), that at least one of the statutory conditions, such as palpable unfitness, is met. MinmStat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2012); see also R.W., 678 N.W.2d at 54-55 (holding that when information which potentially undermines the best interest of the child as well as the interest sought to be protected by the legitimation statutes and the policy of this state it must first be tested in light of the best interest of the child standard" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that attorneys fees awards are available under 1988 for frivolous actions", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that a law clerks time is recoverable as part of attorneys fees under 1988", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that lexis fees are not taxable as costs but reserving ruling on whether such fees are recoverable as attorneys fees", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding attorneys fees not generally recoverable unless party prevails under cause of action for which attorneys fees are recoverable and damages are recovered", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nits general experience as to how much time a case requires. In order to exercise its discretion fairly, a district court needs flexibility in deciding whether to reduce a fee request and, if so, by how much. B. In the instant case, the defendants’ challenge to the amount of time spent by Gross tests the outer limits of the specificity requirement. Although the issue is a close one, we hold that the challenge meets this requirement. We also hold, with less difficulty, that the challenge to the fee award requested by McGahen was raised with sufficient clarity. However, we hold that the district court erred by reducing the fee request for Gross’s law clerk, because it was never challenged by the defendants. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469-70, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that punitive damages are not recoverable against municipalities under 1988" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (holding alj correctly held that officer had reasonable suspicion to make stop based on observation that driver crossed over shoulder stripe and was weaving within his traveling lane", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that observations of a driver swerving from the outside lane straddling the center line and then swerving back to the outside lane gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving under the influence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that there was not reasonable suspicion to justify a stop because a vehicles one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that an officers observations of a vehicle weaving between the center line and the shoulder line four to five times over a distance of approximately five miles created reasonable suspicion that the driver was under the influence", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat [the stop’s] inception,” and then whether the officer’s subsequent conduct “was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.” Id. Pursuant to this standard, we must first determine whether Amundsen’s driving justified the initial stop by providing reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. If so, we then must determine whether the field sobriety tests exceeded the scope of that stop. Our reasonable suspicion determination hinges on the district court’s finding that Amundsen had been weaving between lanes prior to the stop. We have held on multiple occasions that weaving between lanes provides reasonable suspicion of driving under the influence. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1347-48 (10th Cir.1998) (holding officers observations of a vehicle crossing the center double yellow line of a twolane highway four times by less than one half of her car once causing a vehicle in the oncoming lane of traffic to shift right within his lane but without the need for drastic evasive action and crossing the fog line four times over a distance of at least 16 miles established probable cause for a traffic stop" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nto start such a process could also subject the Company to liability, especially where WWL seems to have been seeking to determine whether its obligations to Marks included not only an approval of a technician—as he had requested—but also a covering of the cost of such repairs. Under such a rule, moreover, an employer would apparently be able to avoid liability only by immediately approving every disability-accommodation request that it received, even where there was no reason to believe harm might follow from a brief delay. Defendant, moreover, had no reason to believe that Marks would suffer any imminent harm from a brief negotiation period over the scope of his needed accommodations. Accord Ungerleider v. Fleet Mortg. Grp. of Fleet Bank, 329 F.Supp.2d 343, 355 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding a felony conviction for driving while intoxicated dwi may be a crime of violence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding for the purposes of 18 usc 924e that being a felon in possession of a firearm is not a violent felony as defined in 18 usc 924e2b", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated applied to defendant driving on a private parking lot", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that driving while intoxicated is not a violent felony pursuant to 18 usc 924e2b", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nCURIAM. Petitioner Thomas Alfred Brydon appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition for relief. We affirm. Brydon pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine. At sentencing, the district court applied the career-offender provisions of United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1 & 4B1.2. The court determined that four prior Iowa convictions for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent and one prior Iowa conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated qualified as predicate crimes of violence. Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008) (holding that burglary is violent felony" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nMidland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (holding that defendants failure to renew their motion for judgment as a matter of law which was denied by the district court when they made it at the close of the evidence limited the relief the appellate court could grant to a new trial", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nMidland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (holding that it was proper in determining certification to consider whether certification would foster the settlement of the case with advantage to the parties and with great savings in judicial time and services", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nMidland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (holding that the trial court may not grant summary judgment on a ground not raised in the motion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nMidland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (holding that the court could not in good conscience grant certification under the second implicit requirement when the court was unable to establish membership with objective certainty", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nMidland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 265 F.R.D. 436, 444 (S.D.Iowa 2009) (denying class certification for a proposed subclass finding inter alia the relief sought required extensive individualized inquiry to ascertain the class). b. Whether the Proposed Representatives Satisfy the Definition “The second ‘implicit requirement’ of Rule 23 is that each proposed representative is in fact a member of the proposed class____” In re Teflon, 254 F.R.D. at 363. While Christian necessarily meets the definitions Plaintiffs proffer, as she pre-paid for a documented six months of treatment under the care of Kerkhoff, who was at that time a member of The Masters Circle, for the above-mentioned reasons, the Court finds that the proposed class does not appropriately accommodate Rhiner’s circumstances. See id. (holding rule 54b certification invalid because unaccompanied by any statement of reasons and factors underlying trial courts decision to grant certification" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding federal court is not bound by terms of plea agreement between defendant and state authorities", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the government is no longer bound by its obligations under a plea agreement when a defendant commits a material breach", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that objecting to guidelines calculations as specifically reserved in the plea agreement is not a breach of the plea agreement even if the objection is overruled and thus government is not released from obligation under the agreement to move for acceptance of responsibility", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that when a court accepts a fixed plea agreement it is bound by the agreements terms", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nof the Government’s bargaining power and the fact that the defendant waives his constitutional rights. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. When considering an alleged breach of a plea agreement, we first identify the terms of the agreement. We then determine whether there has been a breach. If so, we fashion a remedy. Id. at 235. In Miller’s case, the Government filed a written 5K1.1 motion, which requested a downward departure of “ ‘3 levels from the parties’ stipulated offense level of 26,’ to ‘offense level 23.’ ” Br. for Appellee 27 (quoting App. 360). Miller asserts that he reasonably understood this to be- a term of the plea agreement and, therefore, that the Government was bound to recommend offense level 23 at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Baird, 218 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the government was bound by an agreement it treated as binding although it preceded the formal plea agreement" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (holding that a condition banning pornography prejudiced the defendant because there was a reasonable probability that the condition would not have been imposed had the district court conducted a sufficiently individualized determination given that the defendants conviction was for a registration offense not a sexual exploitation offense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (holding that a defendant must show reasonable probability that but for the error he would not have entered the plea", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (holding that that the trial court erred when it determined that firstdegree sexual offense was an aggravated offense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (holding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to request a charge on the lesserincluded offense when the evidence showed either the commission of the completed offense as charged or the commission of no offense such that the defendant was not entitled to a charge on the lesser offense", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nsex offenders, Bender, 566 F.3d at 752, whereas the district court here imposed the ban on pornography after a discussion of Demers’s background and characteristics, including his prior child pornography arrests and domestic battery offenses, citing “the need to curb any tendency you might have to further engage in child pornography efforts or abuses.” Moreover, even were we to find that the district court erred in not conducting a sufficiently individualized determination, that error likely would not “affect[ ] substantial rights,” Davis, 452 F.3d at 994, since Demers’s offense and history, including his prior conviction for sexual abuse, make it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event. Cf. Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (recognizing that before a special condition of probation may be imposed there must be an oral pronouncement of the condition at sentencing" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwell as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (holding that where husband had strong familial ties to richmond he was not voluntarily underemployed based on his refusal of a job opportunity requiring him to relocate to a different state", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwell as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (holding that a qualified or conditional consent is tantamount to a refusal except where a driver qualifies a refusal on his having an opportunity to contact an attorney", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwell as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwell as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (holding that the defendants due process rights were violated by refusal to allow him to contact counsel after he was given misleading information on consequences of refusal to take bloodalcohol test", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwell as “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities for the parents and child.” Code § 20-108.1(B)(15). See also Code § 20-108.1(B) (“The court’s decision in any such proceeding shall be rendered upon the evidence relevant to each individual case.”). Further, although the trial court must consider each of the statutory factors for which evidence is presented, the weight, if any, to give any particular factor in the overall decision lies within the trial court’s sound discretion. Robbins, 48 Va.App. at 481, 632 S.E.2d at 622. Thus, we do not hold that the trial court must deviate from the presumptive guidelines because of the income imputed to father. Rather, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to first consider recent past earnings .2d 148, 152-53 (1996) (holding that witness whose life had been threatened forcing him to relocate was not required to disclose true name address or telephone number" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (holding that claim for retaliatory discharge premised on michigans workers compensation statute does not arise under that law because the statute provides neither the mechanisms nor the remedy for this type of suit", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (holding that an atwill employee who alleges retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers compensation claim has stated a cause of action under pennsylvania law", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (recognizing retaliatory discharge tort implied by the workers compensation act", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (holding the retaliation claim did arise under states workers compensation laws", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor f ends on resolution of a substantial question of workmen’s compensation law Harper’s retaliation claim also does not arise under Michigan’s Worker’s Disability Compensation Act according to the second “arising under” definition because the claim does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question under that statute. The retaliation claim does not implicate the administrative or remedial mechanisms of that statutory scheme, require courts to interpret the statute, or seek an award of compensation for personal injury that causes a diminished wage-earning capacity, which is the only type of compensation that the statute affords, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.301(1), (4). See Thornton v. Denny’s Inc., No. 92-1368, 1993 WL 137078, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.29, 1993) (per curiam) (holding that a claim for retaliatory discharge premised on missouris workers compensation law arises under that law for purposes of 1445c because antiretaliation provision also authorized the filing of a civil action for damages the antiretaliation right established by the missouri workers compensation statute is an essential element of plaintiffs claim" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nIsrael, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that “the Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,” id. at 777, it held that the “statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.” Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (holding that the defenses presentation of two psychiatrists testimony constituted an election of the procedure and a waiver of the specific statutory procedures", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nIsrael, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that “the Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,” id. at 777, it held that the “statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.” Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (recognizing that where the juvenile code sets forth specific procedures governing termination actions those procedures apply to the exclusion of the rules of civil procedure", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nIsrael, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that “the Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,” id. at 777, it held that the “statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.” Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under rule 38b", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nIsrael, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that “the Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,” id. at 777, it held that the “statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.” Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (holding that brady does not place any burden upon the government to conduct a defendants investigation or assist in the presentation of the defenses case", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nIsrael, 19 Wn. App. at 779. In Israel, after the prosecutor made a motion for competency determination, the trial judge did not appoint any experts to examine the defendant. Id. at 775. Instead, the court proceeded to ask questions of the defendant and allowed the prosecutor to question her. Id. Defense counsel asked no questions hut asked that the court find her competent at the close of the perfunctory examination. Id. at 775-76. While the court acknowledged that “the Washington statute . . . speak[s] in mandatory language,” id. at 777, it held that the “statutory requirement that two experts be appointed to examine a defendant is not a constitutional right but is statutory and may be waived by counsel.” Id. at 779; see also State v. Brooks, 16 Wn. App. 535, 538, 557 P.2d 362 (1976) (holding that the issue of waiver requires an analysis of the specific facts in each case" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect “procedural right[s]” and “the parties’ substantive rights remain amply protected.” Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties’ substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (holding that collective bargaining agreements cannot compel the arbitration of statutory rights", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect “procedural right[s]” and “the parties’ substantive rights remain amply protected.” Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties’ substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (recognizing that new law did not apply to claims that accrued prior to enactment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect “procedural right[s]” and “the parties’ substantive rights remain amply protected.” Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties’ substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (holding that the fair sentencing act does not apply retroactively to defendants whose criminal conduct occurred before its enactment even if those defendants were sentenced after its enactment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect “procedural right[s]” and “the parties’ substantive rights remain amply protected.” Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties’ substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (holding that because agreements to arbitrate do not affect underlying substantive rights doddfranks ban on arbitration should be applied to conduct that arose prior to its enactment", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nSec. Dealers, Inc., 191 F.3d 198, 205 (2d Cir.1999). This Court reached a similar conclusion in St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company v. Employers Reinsurance Corporation, 919 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Sotomayor, J.), holding that arbitration clauses only affect “procedural right[s]” and “the parties’ substantive rights remain amply protected.” Id. at 139. The right to have a dispute heard in an arbitral forum is a procedural right that affects the forum that will decide the substantive rights of the parties. Therefore, applying the present law to this dispute would not have a disfavored retroactive consequence. Rather, because the parties’ substantive rights remain unaffected by this statute, it is proper to apply the present law to this dispute. See Pezza, 767 F.Supp.2d at 234 (holding that a change of an element of an offense could not be applied retroactively to a crime committed prior to the statutes enactment" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nare the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. “When a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.” Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that a federal court may refuse to exercise continuing jurisdiction even though the parties have agreed to it parties cannot confer jurisdiction by stipulation or consent", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nare the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. “When a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.” Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that parties to a contract which provided that its rates may be approved ordered or set by any valid law order rule or regulation of any regulatory authority having jurisdiction were bound by a ferc rate determination even though they were not directly subject to fercs jurisdiction", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nare the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. “When a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.” Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nare the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. “When a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.” Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that unlike subject matter jurisdiction personal jurisdiction may be waived", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nare the prices charged by suppliers like the BPA and the WAPA to the consumers like PG&E, through the CalPX and ISO. The Memphis clause binds the price charged to FERC determinations; the tariff binds the parties to use the CalPX and ISO for sale/purchase of energy; the parties, conducting sales through the CalPX and ISO to purchase/supply energy amongst themselves, are bound to each other through, their market transactions, the- rules of the tariff, and the FERC regulations. “When a contract provides that its terms are subject to a regulatory body, all parties to that contract are bound by the actions of the regulatory body.” Alliant Energy v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 347 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). See Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 845 F.2d 184, 187 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding issues related to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe obtained’ and the ‘obligations imposed’ reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that where evidence shows that federal funds were expended for installation for warning devices or signs at railroad crossing state law claims based on adequacy of those warning devices are preempted by the federal railroad safety act", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe obtained’ and the ‘obligations imposed’ reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that manual on uniform traffic control devices mutcd standards were admissible", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe obtained’ and the ‘obligations imposed’ reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (holding adoption by secretary of transportation of manual on uniform traffic control devices issued under federal railroad safety act preempted state common law standards of care for grade crossings", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe obtained’ and the ‘obligations imposed’ reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that the government is immune from liability for its choice of traffic protection devices", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe obtained’ and the ‘obligations imposed’ reveal a purpose to preclude state authority.... Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict. Such a conflict arises when ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility/Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when a state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress/Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). — U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2481-82 (citations omitted). Accord Hatfield v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 958 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims are preempted by federal law" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court’s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge’s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (“[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....”) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (holding that the failure to object to a trial courts instruction constitutes waiver", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court’s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge’s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (“[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....”) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (holding that plaintiffs failure to object to the improper comments of defendant during closing arguments resulted in waiver of plaintiffs right to argue the issue on appeal because the trial court was not given an opportunity to rule on the issue", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court’s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge’s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (“[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....”) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (holding that the failure to object to an instruction constitutes a waiver of error", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court’s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge’s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (“[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....”) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (holding that failure to object to trial courts refusal of further instruction to jury during deliberation results in waiver of issue on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequirements. Further, upon review of the record, we find no objection by appellant to the trial court’s response to the jury question. Appellant stated that he was satisfied with the judge’s instruction. See N.T., 9/22/99, at 131-32. Under Pa. R.A.P. 302(a), “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” See also Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160, 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 548 Pa. 116, 695 A.2d 409, 411 (1997) (“[I]f appellate courts were to consider issues not raised in the trial court, then the trial would become a dress rehearsal ....”) (citing Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Company, 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974)); Commonwealth v. Jones, 248 Pa.Super. 214, 375 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1977) (holding failure to object in timely fashion at trial results in waiver of issue for appeal" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nSo.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that officers observation of a known drug dealer approaching the defendants car gave rise to reasonable suspicion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nSo.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding the location of an investigative stop is a factor that contributes to an officers reasonable suspicion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nSo.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding investigative stop based on officers observation of defendant apparently asleep in legally parked car was improper", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nSo.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that even if an officers stop of a defendant who was on foot was unlawful the search of a parked car was justified by a different officer observing a gun magazine in plain view in the car", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nSo.2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993). When a police officer turns on his or her emergency and takedown lights under these circumstances, a reasonable person would expect to be stopped, at a minimum, for a traffic infraction and perhaps for the crime of fleeing and eluding if he or she drove away. See § 316.126, Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. McCune, 772 So.2d 596 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Accordingly, the use of such lights cer who has initiated a consensual encounter may turn on his emergency lights for reasons of traffic safety during the consensual encounter. In this case, there is no dispute that the deputy lacked a well-founded suspicion that Mr. Hrezo had committed or was about to commit a crime when he turned on his emergency lights. See Danielewicz v. State, 730 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson’s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson’s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature’s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson’s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (recognizing that rights under article i section 11 are subject to reasonable limitations", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson’s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson’s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature’s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson’s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the nevada constitution a provision identical to article v section 1 of the utah constitution", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson’s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson’s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature’s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson’s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that refusal to proceed to trial by arbitrarily abating case violates article i section 13 of the texas constitution", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson’s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson’s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature’s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson’s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that the contracts clause article i section 10 clause 1 to the united states constitution does not apply to the actions of the federal government", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. However, if Johnson’s claim rests upon the ineffectiveness of his attorney on appeal, then his cause of action could not have accrued prior to the disposition of his appeal. For these reasons, we find that Johnson’s cause of action for habeas corpus did not accrue until his direct appeal was decided by this court on May 19, 1989. See Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141. Because this decision occurred after the legislature’s deletion of imprisonment as a disability that tolls the statute of limitations under section 78-12-36, the trial court correctly held that Johnson’s claim was time-barred. We recognize that the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to habeas corpus actions has been declared unconstitutional. See Currier, 862 P.2d 1357 (holding that ninetyday statute of limitations on habeas actions is unreasonable limitation that violates article i section 11 of utah constitution" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninterpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as “improper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror’s gold tooth related to case”), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State’s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (holding that a written statement could not be regarded as an affidavit sufficient in law for any purpose because it was not sworn to by any one or before any officer", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninterpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as “improper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror’s gold tooth related to case”), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State’s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (holding explanation need not even be caserelated and stating any statements to the contrary in four identified cases and any other georgia case are hereby disapproved", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninterpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as “improper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror’s gold tooth related to case”), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State’s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (holding an auditors review and approval of quarterly financial statements nonactionable under 10b and stating that because defendant did not actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements but merely reviewed and approved them the statements are not attributable to defendant and thus defendant cannot be found liable for making a material misstatement", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninterpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as “improper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror’s gold tooth related to case”), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State’s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ninterpreted asa holding that a gold tooth equates with a stereotypical belief as a matter of law. See George v. State, 263 Ga. App. 541, 545 (2) (b) n. 13 (588 SE2d 312) (2003) (summarizing our holding in Rector as “improper stereotyping where state failed to explain how prospective juror’s gold tooth related to case”), disapproved on other grounds, Littlejohn v. State, 320 Ga. App. 197, 202 (1) (c) n. 3 (739 SE2d 682) (2013) (noting that George is overruled to the extent it was based upon standard disapproved in Toomer, supra). Clearly, our decision in Rector rested upon the State’s failure to provide a case-related explanation for its peremptory strike. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has now expressly disapproved of that portion of the decision. Toomer, supra, 292 Ga. at 54 (2) (b) (recognizing that subject matter jurisdiction can be questioned at any time and with respect to any claim" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nVeterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne’s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an “emergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the ‘signed’ Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.” Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (holding that a court may grant a writ of mandamus if 1 the petitioner demonstrates that he lacks an adequate alternative 2 the petitioner demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to the writ and 3 the court is convinced that issuing the writ is warranted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nVeterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne’s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an “emergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the ‘signed’ Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.” Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (holding that a trial court had no discretion to enter a writ of replevin after finding that the statutory requirements for issuing the writ had been met even though the statute provided that a circuit court may issue a writ of replevin reasoning that based on the context may implied an imperative obligation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nVeterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne’s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an “emergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the ‘signed’ Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.” Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (holding that common pleas erred in setting aside the writ of execution on the basis that the union erroneously filed a writ of execution instead of filing a writ of mandamus", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nVeterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne’s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an “emergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the ‘signed’ Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.” Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (holding that notice of condemnation and availability of a state court injunction writ of mandamus and writ of certiorari in an eminent domain case satisfied due process", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nVeterans Court, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the NPWE under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Id. In January 2014, the Atlanta VA regional office issued a Statement of the Case regarding Payne’s termination and attached instructions for completing an appeal. Payne immediately filed an “emergency motion for the [Veterans] Court to issue an order declaring the ‘signed’ Statement of the Case ... a legal nullity and does not moot the petition for a writ of mandamus full relief stated and requested.” Id. at *2. On January 28, 2014, the Veterans Court denied the petition. Id. Relying on the standard outlined in Cheney v. United States District Court for District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81, 124 S.Ct. 2576, 159 L.Ed.2d 459 (2004) (holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk’s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (holding that while the computer program at issue was within the subject matter of copyright the right sought under state law pursuant to a license was not equivalent to the exclusive rights under copyright as such copyright preemption did not apply", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk’s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (holding that patents that would disproportionately tie up the use of the underlying natural laws are invalid for lacking patentable subject matter", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk’s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (holding that trial court properly granted motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust remedies available through exclusive grievance procedure", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk’s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (holding that copying occurs when a computer program is transferred from a permanent storage device to a computers random access memory", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat did not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test were rarely granted in earlier eras, especially in the Industrial Age, as explained by Judge Dyk’s thoughtful historical review. See 545 F.3d, at 966-976 (concurring opinion). But times change. Technology and other innovations progress in unexpected ways. For example, it was once forcefully argued that until recent times, “well-established principles of patent law probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable computer program.” Diehr, 450 U.S., at 195, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this fact does not mean that unforeseen innovations such as computer programs are always unpatentable. See id., at 192-193, 101 S. Ct. 1048, 67 L. Ed. 2d 155 (majority opinion) (holding a procedure for molding rubber that included a computer program is within patentable subject matter" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that oshas regulations were admissible as a measure of reasonable care consistent with industry standards", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (holding failure to raise issue of improper measure of damages in trial court waived review of complaints that proper measure of damages was not submitted to jury and that plaintiff failed to present evidence on the proper measure", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that although compliance with administrative safety regulations did not establish due care it was evidence of due care", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a trial on the merits. ¶ 32. The circuit court found that the Appellants’ negligence claim against Barlow Eddy Jenkins, P.A. (Barlow Eddy) failed because the Appellants did not pres ent any competent evidence to demonstrate that Barlow Eddy’s actions were the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of Robert Gary Rogers’s (Rogers) injuries. Although the circuit court correctly pointed out that evidence of OSHA’s regulations are not admissible in Mississippi to show negligence, OSHA’s standards and regulations may be “admissible as a measure to show reasonable care consistent with industry standards.” Wilkins v. Bloodsaw, 850 So.2d 185, 188(¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2003); see also Accu-Fab & Constr., Inc. v. Ladner, 778 So.2d 766, 771(¶ 21) (Miss.2001) (overruled on other grounds) (holding that an experts testimony that a victims symptoms were consistent with administration of a date rape drug were admissible" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (holding that insured cannot demand reimbursement for defense insurer had no opportunity to control if insured does not promptly notify insurer of facts triggering coverage", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (holding that indemnitees could recover their attorneys fees and costs from an indemnitor despite the fact that the fees and costs had been paid directly by an insurer and noting that the indemnitor is not relieved from liability either on the theory that the insurer is entitled to reimbursement out of the indemnitees recovery or that the defendant should not benefit from a contract providently made and paid for by the plaintiff ", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (holding that the plaintiff insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from the mcca", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (holding that insured may recover attorneys fees from insurer where insurer acts in bad faith", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin the state’s insurance market. In addition to this competitive disadvantage, the Legislature considered the practical “business difficulties” confronting all insurers as a result of such possible catastrophic claims, such as the difficulty in determining the amount of reserves to keep on hand. It was thought that the creation of such an association of insurers would alleviate the competitive inequity of these catastrophic claims by spreading their cost throughout the industry, and also increase the statistical basis for prediction of the overall cost of such claims, making the management of these liabilities easier. See House Legislative Analysis, SB 306, March 13,1978. [In re Certified Question, supra at 714 n 2.] 19 T laims Ass’n, 177 Mich App 538 (1989), aff'd 434 Mich 901 (1990) (holding that the insurer was entitled to credit against the owners claim in the amount paid to the mortgagee" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (holding that a creditors reliance under 523a2a need only be subjectively justified and not objectively reasonable", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (holding no justifiable reliance as a matter of law", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (holding standard under section 523a2a is justifiable reliance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (holding that 523a2a requires justifiable but not reasonable reliance", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nv. Dobrayel (In re Dobrayel), 287 B.R. 3, 12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)). As to the second criteria under Section 523(a)(2)(A), false representation requires that the defendant “(1) made a false or misleading statement; (2) with the intent to deceive; and (3) in order for the plaintiff to turn over money or property to the defendant.” In re Chase, 372 B.R. at 129 (citing In re Dobrayel, 287 B.R. at 12). “‘[I]ntent to deceive may be established through circumstantial evidence and inferred from the totality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing H.K. Deposit & Guar. Ltd. v. Shaheen (In re Shaheen), 111 B.R. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). The plaintiff must also establish that his reliance was justifiable. Id.; see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 61, 70-72, 116 S.Ct. 437, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (holding that in fraud and nondisclosure claims a plaintiff must show actual and justifiable reliance" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAgreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that a principal is bound by a contract entered into by the principals agent on her behalf if the agent had authority to bind the principal", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAgreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that questioning of a juvenile by a principal in presence of a police officer did not constitute an interrogation because principal was sole questioner and was not acting as an agent for police", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAgreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that defendant was not an agent because alleged principal did not control means by which the defendants accomplished their duties", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAgreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nAgreement constituted a contract, through which Appellants ratified a prior transaction. Therefore, even if the CFA note and mortgage were in fact invalid, Appellants’ argument would still fail because a ratification of a former transaction is clearly not a transfer within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance statutes. By the time ratification occurs, the unauthorized or voidable transfer transaction has already been completed and, at that point, may only be voided or ratified. See In re Best Prods. Co., Inc., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1994) (“A fraudulent transfer is not void, but voidable; thus, it can be ratified by a creditor who is then estopped from seeking its avoidance.”); see also Cohen v. Treuhold Capital Group, LLC (In re Cohen), 422 B.R. 350, 371 (E.D.N.Y.2010) (holding that an unauthorized property transfer effectuated by an agent and not evidenced by a signed writing could be subsequently ratified by the principal" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwork a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from — and good reason to follow — Judge Berman’s prior decision deeming the respondent’s attorney’s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel’s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (holding 325 per hour reasonable for partner litigating paca case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwork a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from — and good reason to follow — Judge Berman’s prior decision deeming the respondent’s attorney’s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel’s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (recognizing that 90 per hour is a reasonable rate for a paralegal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwork a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from — and good reason to follow — Judge Berman’s prior decision deeming the respondent’s attorney’s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel’s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (holding 350 per hour reasonable for civil rights federal court litigation", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwork a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from — and good reason to follow — Judge Berman’s prior decision deeming the respondent’s attorney’s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel’s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (holding that evidence was insufficient to support conviction for vehicular homicide where the defendant was driving 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone before the collision and a minimum of 50 miles per hour at the time of impact", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwork a manifest injustice.’ ” Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988) (quoting Arizona, 460 U.S. at 618 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1382). There is no reason to deviate from — and good reason to follow — Judge Berman’s prior decision deeming the respondent’s attorney’s rate of $345 per hour reasonable. Counsel’s billing rates are strong evidence of prevailing market rates. See Farbotko, 433 F.3d at 209-10; Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290, 2010 WL 334975, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010); Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 576 F.Supp.2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y.2008). Furthermore, courts in this district and in neighboring districts have found similar rates to be reasonable for attorneys with similar experience. See Coe, 714 F.Supp.2d at 450 (holding that speed alone will not support a conviction but that other factors supported the vehicular homicide conviction where defendant was speeding at 50 to 60 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour residential area with slowchildren playing sign" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that “none of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs’ switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs” and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs’ second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that an argument raised for the first time in a rule 59e motion is waived on appeal", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that “none of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs’ switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs” and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs’ second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (recognizing that rule 59e permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that “none of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs’ switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs” and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs’ second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that a motion to reconsider a section 2255 ruling is available and that it is to be treated asa rule 59e motion if filed within 10 days of entry of the challenged order", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that “none of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs’ switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs” and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs’ second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court cannot extend the time for filing a rule 59e motion by margin order", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor access services they admitted to ordering and receiving. Plaintiffs now argue that the court erred in finding that “none of defendants subscribed to plaintiffs’ switched access services by submitting an Access Order as prescribed in the tariffs” and in failing to consider issues of material fact that may establish that TNCI, Global Crossing, and Sprint are liable under the constructive ordering doctrine. The court will consider plaintiffs’ second contention first. STANDARD The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention motions to reconsider. The Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider such motions either under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 862 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir.1988); see also Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818, 827 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant’s refusal to answer on the state’s right to test defendant’s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state’s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party’s “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (recognizing defendants right to confront witnesses with adequate crossexamination", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant’s refusal to answer on the state’s right to test defendant’s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state’s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party’s “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (recognizing defendants state and federal constitutional rights to testify", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant’s refusal to answer on the state’s right to test defendant’s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state’s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party’s “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (recognizing that criminal defendants right to testify is subject to crossexamination", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant’s refusal to answer on the state’s right to test defendant’s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state’s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party’s “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (holding right to testify was federal constitutional right", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthat defendant did not preserve the question whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction and that, if he did, the trial court acted within its discretion in assessing the effect of defendant’s refusal to answer on the state’s right to test defendant’s testimony on cross-examination. We begin with the state’s preservation argument. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (considering preservation first). In Wyatt, the court explained that a party’s “failure to object to the particular sanction imposed by the judge or, in the alternative, to argue for some other sanction, fails to preserve a claim on appeal that the judge erred in failing to consider the availability of a less onerous sanction.” 331 Or at 343 (footnote omitted S Ct 622, 2 L Ed 2d 589 (1957) (recognizing that a criminal defendants right to a fair trial is fundamental" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination “that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.” 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (recognizing that an ordinary witness may decline to answer only after making the requisite showing of the danger of selfincrimination ", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination “that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.” 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (holding that a trial judges decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite casespecific findings of fact was reversible error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination “that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.” 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (holding that a trial court errs by exempting a witness from sequestration absent the requisite showing", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination “that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.” 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\n731-32 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019). We observed in Haverty that a trial court has the discretion under West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 to determine whether immunity should be extended to a particular witness based on a determination “that the ends of justice may be promoted by compelling such testimony or evidence.” 165 W.Va. at 172, 267 S.E.2d at 732. In this case, the trial court made the determination required by West Virginia Code § 57-5-2 that the interests of justice required a grant of immunity to Ms. Day so that she could freely offer her testimony without fear of additional prosecution for any events associated with the murder of the victim. When Ms. Day refused to testify despite a grant of immunity, th 322, 489 S.E.2d 289, 300 (1997) (holding that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite intent to induce the witness to lie or testify falsely from the defendants statements to the witness" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (holding that citizens united did not implicitly overrule beaumont", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (holding that lawrence did not overrule paris adult theatre i v slaton in which the united states supreme court upheld a georgia statute virtually identical to the texas obscenity statute", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (holding that the commandant of the united states disciplinary barracks and the united states are identical parties", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (holding transfer statute constitutional and noting that revised statute gave greater guidance to trial courts in determining whether juvenile should be tried in adult court than statute upheld in doyal", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nlent for a statutorily-approved purpose. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 741 (5th Cir.2008). The Fifth Circuit determined that the statute impermissibly burdened the individual’s substantive due process right to engage in private intimate conduct of his or her choosing because an individual is unable to legally purchase a device in Texas. Id. The opinion does not include in its analysis any of the Supreme Court cases holding that the constitutionally-protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to receive the materials or to sell or give it to others. We decline to follow Reliable Consultants because we do not read Lawrence as overruling this line of authority. See Ex parte Dave, 220 S.W.3d at 159 (holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (holding that defendants waiver of counsel when pleading guilty was an implied waiver as to any subsequent proceedings including sentencing four days later", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (holding that in order for a waiver of counsel to be valid the trial court must ensure that the defendants waiver of his right to counsel is done knowingly and intelligently so that the record establishes that the defendants choice is made with eyes open", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (holding that a waiver of counsel once made and not retracted is operative throughout the proceedings", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (holding that defendants statements not admissible once he had invoked right to counsel without proof of waiver", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nwhich was believed to be a mitigating factor. The court again asked defendant whether he wished to persist in his plea of guilty or whether he wanted to interpose a defense. Defendant repeatedly answered that he did not want to withdraw his plea, nor was he trying to plead self-defense. At one point during the extended colloquy the defendant made the statement, “I’ve already waived the right for counsel, so I just plead guilty.” The court eventually accepted the plea of guilty and found that it had a factual basis. Defendant subsequently appeared for sentencing on October 21, 1975, indicated h App. 3d 1005; People v. McCaffrey (2d Dist. 1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 1088, overruling People v. Hinkle (2d Dist. 1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 202; and People v. Bobo (3d Dist. 1975), 33 Ill. App. 3d 274 (holding that once the defendant raises the issue of intelligent and voluntary waiver with respect to prior guilty pleas the burden is on the state to establish a valid waiver" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding when a statute defines manner or means of committing an offense indictment need not allege matters beyond the language of the statute", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding although indictment may allege manner and means of committing offense in the conjunctive jury may be charged in the disjunctive and a conviction on any method alleged will be upheld if the evidence supports it", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding that when an indictment charges several acts in the conjunctive the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holdingthat an error in instructing the jury that an offense could be committed by a statutory method not charged in the indictment is cured where the court provides the jury with the indictment and instructs jurors that the burden of proof rests upon the state to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt citation omitted", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhave objected to this statement by the prosecutor and to the use of the word “or” in the jury charge on the ground that appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law was violated because the information alleged one offense, but the State proved another. It is proper for the jury to be charged in the disjunctive even though the indictment (or information) may allege the differing methods of committing the offense in the conjunctive. Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In this connection, alternative theories of committing the same offense are properly submitted to the jury in the disjunctive if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Id; see also Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding that for purposes of 18 usc 924c1 the law is well established that where an indictment charges in the conjunctive several means of violating a statute a conviction may be obtained on proof of only one of the means " ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that court could permit grandparent or other person having substantial past contact with child to intervene in pending sapcr even though original suit requesting possessory conservatorship could not be filed by grandparent or other person and further holding that stepgrandmother had standing to intervene to seek managing conservatorship of child under section 102004b and section 1020039 where natural mother abandoned child after birth parents were divorced natural father remarried father had custody of child after father died child lived first with stepmother then with stepgrandmother and mother first sought custody when child was eleven years old", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding subjective belief of maternal grandparents and their witnesses that child was better off with them and would be emotionally upset if made to go with father did not raise existence of unexpected crises or dire emergency demanding immediate action to protect child", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that maternal grandmother had standing to intervene in pending sapcr to seek managing conservatorship of child pursuant to former section 102004b and section 102004a where she had substantial past contact with child there was evidence of abuse and neglect of child by mother and mother had been arrested and had subsequently engaged in bizarre and dangerous behavior towards child had attacked grandmother with frying pan and hedge clippers and had been involuntarily committed to psychiatric center all of which established serious and immediate concern for welfare of child", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n10, 2008 temporary orders inappropriately modify the 1996 Oklahoma custody order. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Bradshaw to pay the amicus attorney for any work performed pertaining to the habeas corpus matter. We also hold that Judge Rynd did not abuse his discretion by denying Bradshaw’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for attorney fees related to prosecution of the petition. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Brad ates: Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 157.374. 4 . See Brown v. Dixon, 776 S.W.2d 599, 602 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, orig. proceeding) (holding child is entitled to know and be supported financially and emotionally by his or her biological father" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nproximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (holding that a group of men standing with known drug traffickers who fled when officers approached established reasonable suspicion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nproximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (holding that an officers observation of a man holding his hand out with a group of other men looking down at his open palm in an high drug trafficking area late at night constituted reasonable suspicion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nproximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (holding that the police officer had reasonable suspicion when he saw a vehicle moving with its lights off in the parking lot of a closed business in a rural area at 300 am", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nproximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (holding that the fact that a group of men surrounding a car parked in a marked bus stop dispersed upon the approach of investigating officers was relevant to a reasonable suspicion determination", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nproximity to a suspected drug location is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion on the part of police.”), when combined with other factors, the high crime nature of an area may support a stop. See United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d at 149-50. In this ease, the area around Seventh and Jefferson Streets, although considered a high crime area, is also a residential neighborhood. Officer Prado admitted that the area is a residential neighborhood in his testimony. In fact, McCray’s grandmother lived very near the scene of the stop. In addition, although 10:45 p.m. is late, it is not unheard of for neighbors in a community to stand outside and talk late on a summer evening. But see United States v. Dover, Crim A. No. 96-181,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17415, at *11 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 26, 1996) (holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after observing a group of men huddled around a closed store at 2 am" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeen very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that in a 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeen very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (recognizing the cause of action", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeen very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (recognizing the availability of a cause of action by manufacturer against supplier under consumer fraud act", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeen very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (recognizing cause of action", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbeen very emphatic that, except in cases where only one inference can be drawn from the facts, negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability are questions of fact for the jury. See St. Clair v. Denny, 245 Kan. 414, 781 P.2d 1043, 1047 (1989); Baker v. City of Garden City, 240 Kan. 554, 731 P.2d 278, 281 (1987); Gard, 400 P.2d at 1000, 1002; Rowell, 176 P.2d at 595. As might be expected in an area of the law in which so much depends on the factual scenario of the particular case, the holdings of the Kansas cases that address causation are not clearly dispositive of the issue. However, we find that those cases whose facts most closely approximate those of the instant case support the conclusion that the district court improperly granted summary judgment. See Steele, 327 P.2d at 1065 (holding that demurrer improperly granted because dropping bottle of flammable liquid was reasonably probable such that it was not an intervening cause in action against bottle manufacturer" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that lay testimony as to the presence of asbestos in the workplace was competent evidence to support the finding that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that security guards testimony that her job was to monitor students behavior did not amount to competent substantial evidence to support a finding that the guard was a designee of the schools principal for purposes of section 8100972", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that competent substantial evidence did not support the trial courts conclusory finding that husband had the present ability to pay and noting that the presumption of section 61145a florida statutes is rebuttable", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that Officers Gutierrez and Martinez were designees of the school’s principal for purposes of section 810.097(2). A review of the record demonstrates that neither officer testified that he had received either express or implied authorization from the principal to restrict access to school grounds. Although both officers testified to their positions as Miami-Dade County School Police officers and to their jurisdictional assignments, neither officer testified further regarding his duty or authority. The testimony supporting the officers’ designee status in this case is even weaker than the testimony that we held in D.J. II did not support a finding of the warning individual’s designee status. See 67 So.3d at 1035 (holding that transfer rule denying eligibility to students transferring from public to private schools did not violate the students rights to due process or equal protection of the laws as provided by the fourteenth amendment" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npossessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that county law enforcement officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest indian at ballpark located on indian trust land", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npossessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the state did not have jurisdiction over crime committed on land held by the bureau of indian affairs for the use and benefit of a discrete indian community", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npossessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that a nevada state court had no jurisdiction to entertain a civil action filed by a nonindian against an indian for events that occurred on indian land", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npossessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that once congress removes restraints on alienation of indian land the protections of the nonintercourse act no longer apply", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\npossessed by the Secretary of the Interior by reason of the trust and restriction-so that thereafter all questions pertaining to the title were subject to examination and determination by the courts, appropriately those in Nebraska, the land being there.” Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. at 508 n. 19, 106 S.Ct. 2039 (quoting Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S. 431, 439, 48 S.Ct. 366, 72 L.Ed. 640 (1928)). Based on this language in the Indian General Allotment Act, courts have determined that “the protections of the Nonin-tercourse Act do not apply to land which has been rendered freely alienable by Congress, held by private parties, and subsequently acquired by an Indian tribe.” Cass Cnty., 643 N.W.2d at 696; see also Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom Cnty., Wash., 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the arrest of an indian on indian land was illegal because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce its laws including the execution of a search warrant unless congress consented to the states jurisdiction" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (recognizing a presumption that a plea of guilty is final and binding if the plea was made during a properly conducted hearing pursuant to rule 11 of the federal rules of criminal procedure", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding that a courts inquiry as to disputed facts in connection with a prior conviction is limited to the terms of the charging document a plea agreement a transcript of the plea colloquy or a comparable judicial record", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding defendant could validly waive statute of limitations in effort to prevent being indicted during the completion of plea negotiations with the prosecution", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding that the government must be held to a promise made to a defendant during plea negotiations if that promise induced the defendants guilty plea", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis reached, or if the agreement is revoked, rejected by the court, or withdrawn or if the judgment is later vacated or reversed, neither the plea discussion nor any resulting agreement, plea or judgment, nor statements made at a hearing on the plea, shall be admissible against the defendant in any criminal or civil action or administrative proceeding. Both these rules “plainly preclude[ ] the state from using statements a defendant made during ‘the plea discussion,’ that is, statements made in a discussion that precedes the plea agreement and anything in the agreement itself, as well as statements made during a change-of-plea hearing.” State v. Campoy, 220 Ariz. 539, ¶¶ 13-14, 207 P.3d 792, 797-98 (App.2009); see also State v. Vargas, 127 Ariz. 59, 61, 618 P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (holding rules 410 and 174f preclude impeaching defendant with statements made in the expectation of a plea agreement including document signed during plea negotiations" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a negative criticism or performance evaluation unaccompanied by a materially adverse change in the terms or conditions of employment does not constitute adverse employment action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a transfer and job title change from assistant vicepresident and manager of one bank branch to a loan officer position at a different branch alone is not enough to constitute a materially adverse employment action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same rate of pay and benefits and her duties were not materially modified", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a transfer of job duties can constitute an adverse employment action", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nCummings touched Adam’s skin and said “ooh” is entirely ambiguous and does not plausibly allege intent to intimidate or humiliate Adam. Importantly, neither of these incidents plausibly demonstrates a “significant negative alteration in [Adam’s] workplace environment.” Adam’s argues that her alleged demotion from “intern” to “volunteer” damaged to her “career prospects.” Although being given a “less distinguished title” can be an adverse action, “a difference in job title alone—where the positions are identical in terms of work, pay and benefits—is not materially adverse.” Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 678 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 749-50 (7th Cir. 2003)); see also Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that removal of job responsibility did not constitute an adverse employment action because there was no change in the plaintiffs job position grade pay or benefits" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nindividuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (holding that reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nindividuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (holding that michigan reimbursement claims were excise taxes under both lorber and suburban ii", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nindividuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (holding that ohios reimbursement claims met the lorber criteria but were not excise taxes because they were not universally applicable to similarly situated entities and in addition disadvantaged private creditors with like claims", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nindividuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (holding west virginias reimbursement claims were excise taxes under lorber suburban ii and the chateaugay district court decision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nindividuals. See Park, 212 B.R. at 437. 9 . The court did not make clear what choices a nonresidential user had in the disposal of its wastewater. Indeed, the court specifically declined to consider whether nonresidential users had practical alternatives to using the Sanitation District’s sewer system: \"[W]e are not free to consider the practical and economic factors which constrained Lorber to make the choices it did.” Lorber, 675 F.2d at 1066. 10 . The conflicting decisions may result from the failure of some courts employing the four-prong Lorber test to address, in addition, the critical question of whether a grant of priority status to a governmental claim meets the purposes and policy undergirding the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re Hutchinson, 135 B.R. 890 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1992) (holding reimbursement claims were excise taxes under the lorber test without addressing the bankruptcy codes central policy of equal distribution" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nupon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (recognizing that the stated purposes of a contempt sanction alone cannot be determinative", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nupon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (holding that a postjudgment contempt sanction for refusal to obey orders whether it is characterized as a civil or a criminal sanction is immediately appealable as a final order under 1291", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nupon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (holding that monetary sanction was not supportable as a compensatory civil contempt sanction because there was no proof of the amount of loss", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nupon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (recognizing that an order of restitution is available as a freestanding sanction to be imposed alone or in combination with other sanctions", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nupon him a criminal contempt sanction without the requisite due process protections. To resolve this issue, we must first decide whether the contempt orders were criminal or civil in nature, or both. See Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 896 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that a court may impose both civil and criminal sanctions simultaneously, when it wishes to both compel compliance and punish disobedience). The key distinction between civil and criminal contempt is the court’s purpose underlying its exercise of the contempt power. Berne Corp. v. Gov’t of the V.I., 570 F.3d 130, 139, 51 V.I. 1253 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Taberer, 954 F.2d at 896). But see Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 129 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1988) (holding that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed absent a finding by the trial court that the eontemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (holding that an oral compromise and release agreement was unenforceable where there was no written stipulation between the parties", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (holding that a settlement agreement in which the parties failed to agree upon the terms of a release was unenforceable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (holding that an insurer lacked standing to raise the issue of the intent of the parties to the settlement agreement to which it was not a party", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (holding that because the alleged settlement was never approved by the court under rule 9019 the settlement agreement was unenforceable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n85 N.C. App. 281, 290, 354 S.E2.d 746, 751 (citing Fisher v. Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 486, 490, 111 S.E. 857, 860 (1922), and Chew v. Leonard, 228 N.C. 181, 185, 44 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1947)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 638, 360 S.E.2d 107 (1987). As I read the relevant c N.C. App. 402, 406, 626 S.E.2d 755, 758 (2006), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 219, 642 S.E.2d 247 (2007), the agreement at issue here provides for a single standard for use in determining the price to be charged for the provision of heat rather than contemplating the use of multiple appraisals without specifying any means for reconciling the inevitable differences between the opinions devel oped by multiple appraisers. In addition, unlike the situation in Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 693, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001) (holding that the plaintiffs lawsuit which was filed despite a general release in the parties settlement agreement constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (recognizing that pain is a completely subjective phenomenon and that secretary must consider all available evidence in assessing complaints of pain", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (holding threshold not met by subjective complaints of transitory pain unsupported by objective evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (holding that alj may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimants pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimants pain", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (holding that alj properly evaluated credibility where he cited specific instances where claimants complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence of record", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe injury and the disability. The injury by itself does not fulfill the statutory requirement; rather, the resultant loss and disability are the key. As the Appellate Division stated in this case, a plaintiff must show that “the injury had a serious impact on the plaintiff and her life.” 250 N.J.Super. at 470, 595 A.2d 522. That requirement seems to comport with the New York cases. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Tracey, supra, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 783 (requiring plaintiff to establish “ ‘permanent loss’ ” or “ ‘permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member’ ” by “competent medical proof”). The same case holds that “subjective complaints unsupported by credible medical evidence do not suffice.” Ibid.; accord Scheer v. Koubek, 70 N.Y.2d 678, 518 N.Y.S.2d 788, 512 N.E.2d 309 (1987) (holding that alj should have included complaints of pain in hypothetical question" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nregarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that 19 usc 167735a is ambiguous and that offsetting is also a reasonable interpretation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nregarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that agency interpretation which is reasonable is entitled to deference", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nregarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that 19 usc 167735 is ambiguous and that zeroing is a reasonable interpretation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nregarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nregarding issue one and will remand to Commerce on this issue. The Final Results are otherwise affirmed in all respects. Commerce shall have until October 15, 2012 to complete and file its remand redetermination. Plaintiff shall have until October 29, 2012 to file comments. Defendant shall have until November 9, 2012 to file any reply. It is SO ORDERED. 1 . Certain Polyester Staple Fiber From Taiwan, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,955 (Dep' rmal value contribute to the calculation of the dumping margin. In contrast, when using offsetting, \"sales made at less than fair value are offset by those made above fair value. This means that some of the dumping margins used to calculate a weighted-average dumping margin will be negative.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d 1351 at 1355 (Fed.Cir.2010) (holding that when relevant contract language is ambiguous interpretation is turned over to the factfinder" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of § 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding unconstitutional defendants sentence of death based upon the holding in roper supra and remanding for the montgomery circuit court to set aside the defendants death sentence and to sentence him to the only other sentence available life in the penitentiary without the possibility of parole", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of § 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that the defendants sentence was reasonable when the district court considered the parties arguments and provided a reasoned basis for its choice of sentence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of § 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that a sentencing judge who had listened to the defendants arguments in support of a belowguidelines sentence provided sufficient explanation for rejecting those arguments when he found that the defendants circumstances were insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the guidelines range", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of § 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that a sentence imposed for a violation of supervised release will be upheld where 1 the district court considered the applicable policy statements 2 the sentence is within the statutory maximum and 3 the sentence is reasonable", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nand circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the guideline imprisonment range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (4), and (6). In considering the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasoning behind its choice of sentence, this Court has held that the district court need not discuss, or state that it has explicitly considered, each factor of § 3553(a). Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Instead, this Court has held that an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir.2005); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2469, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (holding that the district court which had considered the guidelines but found an upward variant sentence necessary given the defendants previous violations did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a 24month sentence instead of a guidelines range sentence of 3 to 9 months incarceration" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nW. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses’ complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that denial of a postconviction motion without prejudice and with leave to amend is not a final appealable order", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nW. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses’ complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that dismissal with leave to amend is not a final order", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nW. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses’ complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that a district courts dismissal that expressly grants leave to amend is not final and that a final judgment must be obtained before such a case becomes appealable", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nW. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses’ complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that a district court judgment is not a final judgment appealable by the defendant unless it includes the final adjudication and the final sentence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nW. Reginald Rose, Jr., and Laura J. Rose appeal pro se from the district court’s order dismissing their civil rights complaint for failing to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the Roses’ complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend. Rather than filing an amended complaint or obtaining a final order of dismissal from the district court, the Roses filed a notice of appeal. We therefore lack jurisdiction. See WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (holding that when a district court expressly grants leave to amend it is plain that the order is not final" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that summary judgment was improper even though the committee that formally terminated the plaintiff harbored no discriminatory animus the plaintiffs manager who harbored animus had tainted the committees decision by characterizing the plaintiff as a poor performer thereby rendering the committee a conduit of his prejudice", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that the determinative question is whether the plaintiff has submitted evidence that a supervisors animus was a cause of the termination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that cbs could raise the faragherellerth defense because even though the plaintiff was sexually harassed and terminated the evidence showed that plaintiff was terminated for leaving his camera during a live broadcast", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na non-decision-maker’s discriminatory motives “somehow influenced” or “affected” the decision-maker. Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir.1992) (affirming summary judgment for employer because the plaintiff failed to submit evidence that his supervisor’s racial animus had somehow influenced or affected the decision of two other managers to terminate him; the managers’ decision was based on an independent investigation of the plaintiffs conduct); see also Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (“Summary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action.”) (citations omitted); Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that the plaintiff further must demonstrate that the conspiracy was motivated by a class based animus such as race" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe “residual function” test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was “premature” because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was “precluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.” Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that it was proper for court to rely on affidavits of defendants representatives in negotiations because their personal knowledge and competence to testify are reasonably inferred from their positions and the nature of their participation in the matters to which they swore", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe “residual function” test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was “premature” because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was “precluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.” Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that a reasonable jury could find the video clips were intended to be lascivious because the video camera involved in the production of the images was angled and zoomed such that the frame encompassed their nude bodies from their shoulders to below their knees", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe “residual function” test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was “premature” because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was “precluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.” Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (recognizing strong preference that children live in their own homes with their own families", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe “residual function” test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was “premature” because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was “precluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.” Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the substantial percentage reductions 35 89 in the broad range of jobs available to the plaintiffs coupled with their own testimony about the effects of their disabilities on their work as production associates substantially limited them in the major life activity of working", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe “residual function” test used in Social Security Act cases). Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded in DePaoli that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs disability claim was “premature” because the plaintiff presented evidence that she was “precluded from more than merely the Abbott production line job.” Id. at 673. In sum, because working is generally accepted as a major life activity, and be cause the determination whether a claimant is disabled depends on an individualized inquiry, the district court did not err in concluding that Burns was disabled because his back injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs previously available to him. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 676 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that if undisclosed evidence might have affected the disposition of the summary judgment motion the plaintiffs chose not to disclose the basis of their claim and they did so at their own risk" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim’s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors — i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (recognizing that these two factors trigger similar concerns", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim’s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors — i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (holding that disparities in compensation were due to a number of permissible factors including seniority experience and performance", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim’s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors — i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (recognizing a sound economic argument for the totaloffset rule as applied to estimates that exclude these latter factors while only including individual seniority and promotion gains", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim’s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors — i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (recognizing these five factors", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfor a combination of the two methods, permitting enhanced lost-earnings estimates that include expected gains from experience, skill, and industry-wide productivity improvements, while prohibiting any discounting of that larger estimate. See id. at 579, 421 A.2d at 1036. What Kaczkowski failed to realize is that, because safe investments tend to offer a real interest rate that, while low, is above zero, the prospect of having a lump-sum award grow in real terms would approximately compensate for the victim’s lost opportunity to benefit from these other factors — i.e., his increasing value to his employer due to skill and experience, as well as industry-wide productivity gains, presumably due to improved technology and business methods. Accord Pfeifer, 462 U.S. at 549, 103 S.Ct. at 2557 (recognizing same factors" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.”). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (holding that there was no violation in a joint navycoast guard drug interdiction operation on the high seas and inferring in dicta that there is now no such need to deter future violations of 10 usc 375 based on the absence of any ninth circuit case applying the exclusionary rule to such violations", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.”). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (holding where there is no duty to defend there is no duty to indemnify", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.”). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (recognizing that a claim is an assertion of a right and if there is no assertion of a right there is no claim to deduct", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.”). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (recognizing in dicta that where there is a general duty it may be considered as insistent both where the actor is and the subject is as in the case of the duty of a father to support his children and if the duty hals criminal sanetion it may be enforced in either place", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na participant and a plan may agree by contract to a particular limitations period, even one that starts to run before the cause of action accrues, as long as the period is reasonable.” Id. at 610. (In the present case the limitation period began to run in September 2005, Standard completed its administrative review on January 19, 2007, and Wilson did not file her lawsuit until July 28, 2011.) 2 . By the time it reached the Supreme Court, equitable tolling was not at issue in the Heimeshoff case. See 134 S.Ct. at 615 n. 6. (\"Whether the Court of Appeals properly declined to apply those [equitable] doctrines in this case is not before us.”). Even so, we are paying attention to the dicta about the possibility of equitable tolling. See Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir.2006) (recognizing that there is dicta and then there is dicta and then there is supreme court dicta" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnot determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnot determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the statute of limitations begins to run on the date the alleged malpractice is discovered", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnot determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act of 1996 is not jurisdictional", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnot determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the oneyear statute of limitations under the antiterrorism and effective death penalty act aedpa begins to run on the date a prisoner dismisses his direct appeal because his conviction is then final", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nnot determinative of the outcome of the case, we will use the earlier date of June 2012 as the date of filing the petition. 4 . The effective date provision of Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4, allowed a \"person whose conviction became final ... to file a petition for postconviction relief.” Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 136, art. 14, § 13, 2005 Minn. Laws 901, 1097-98. 5 . Moreover, federal courts have held that a voluntary dismissal of a direct appeal brings the direct appeal to an end. See United States v. Outen, 286 F.3d 622, 631 (2d Cir.2002) (explaining that \"withdrawal of an appeal is an expression of the intent of the parties (principally, of course, the appellant) not to pursue the appeal any further and brings the appeal to an end”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it “engages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.” S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a party that engages in protracted litigation waives his right to arbitrate when an order compelling arbitration would result in prejudice to the party opposing arbitration", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it “engages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.” S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a party waives its right to arbitration when it engages in protracted litigation that prejudices the opposing party emphasis added", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it “engages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.” S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it “engages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.” S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that the party demanding arbitration had waived its right to arbitrate by filing eight months earlier a complaint against the other party to the arbitration agreement", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto this litigation, and the instant motion to stay the trial of their claims would not have been ripe. (Chase Reply Mem. at 9-10.) A party may waive its right to arbitration by expressly indicating that it wishes to resolve its claims in court. Gilmore v. Shearson/Amer. Express Inc., 811 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir.1987), overruling on other grounds recognized by McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763-64 (2d Cir.1988). Alternately, a party may impliedly waive its right to enforce a contractual arbitration clause when it “engages in protracted litigation that results in prejudice to the opposing party.” S & R Co. of Kingston v. Latona Trucking, 159 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1998) (citations omitted); Manos v. Geissler, BRG, 321 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that purpose of stay pending arbitration is twofold it relieves the party entitled to arbitrate of the burden of continuing to litigate the issue while the arbitration process is ongoing and it entitles that party to proceed immediately to arbitration without the delay that would be occasioned by an appeal of the district courts order to arbitrate" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox’s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence “would have been helpful to [the] defense” and “consistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.” Where, as here, “counsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a ‘post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct’.” See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that the defendant could not establish prejudice for trial counsels failure to hire an expert when the experts testimony would not have changed the nature of the states evidence", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox’s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence “would have been helpful to [the] defense” and “consistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.” Where, as here, “counsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a ‘post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct’.” See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that counsels strategic decisions were hard to attack", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox’s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence “would have been helpful to [the] defense” and “consistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.” Where, as here, “counsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a ‘post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct’.” See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox’s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence “would have been helpful to [the] defense” and “consistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.” Where, as here, “counsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a ‘post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct’.” See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that the failure to inform the defendant of his right to a sixperson jury and the failure to consult the defendant as to his wishes was an error for which a new trial was the only remedy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe evidence of childhood abuse could have easily raised inferences that evoked sympathy for the eighteen-year-old Cox. Such evidence could have explained why Cox ended up in a gang and how Cox ended up in a position where he was aiding Williams in the perpetration of the murders. Indeed, one of Cox’s attorneys acknowledged that the omitted childhood abuse' evidence “would have been helpful to [the] defense” and “consistent with the themes that [they] presented in mitigation.” Where, as here, “counsel offers no strategic reason for failing to perform what would otherwise constitute the duty of a reasonably competent counsel, we may not invent such a strategy by engaging in a ‘post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct’.” See Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that counsels failure to consult blood experts was not a strategic choice because counsel offered no reasoned explanation for the failure" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe court may consider “whether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order “shall — (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... ” The use of the imperative “shall” leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding limitations period for filing petition for postconviction relief runs from date of final judgment not from date of subsequent order revoking appeal bond", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe court may consider “whether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order “shall — (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... ” The use of the imperative “shall” leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe court may consider “whether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order “shall — (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... ” The use of the imperative “shall” leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe court may consider “whether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order “shall — (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... ” The use of the imperative “shall” leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding under section 1144s predecessor statute that the 180day period runs from the date of the confirmation order even if the fraud is not discovered in the 180day period", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe court may consider “whether revocation of the order of confirmation can or would lead to an outcome that is more equitable than leaving the order intact.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1144.03[4] at 1144-5 (15th ed. rev.2006). In contrast with this discretionary language stands the statutory command that any order revoking a confirmation order “shall — (1) contain such provisions as are necessary to protect any entity acquiring rights in good faith reliance on the order of confirmation.... ” The use of the imperative “shall” leaves no room for discretion. All orders revoking orders of confirmation must protect innocent parties. Under this statutory scheme, if a court cannot fashion a revocation order that protects innocent parties who acquired rights in relian 923 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction and rejecting a continuing violation theory" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.” Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding police officers were entitled to immunity where the officers decided not to arrest an intoxicated driver who subsequently died of hypothermia in his vehicle", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.” Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that police officers were not entitled to immunity under the itca law enforcement immunity provision where the officers violated their statutory duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all individuals while acting within the scope of their employment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.” Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding officers engaged in search entitled to immunity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.” Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that even if the plaintiff had asserted a cause of action under the virginia wrongful death act against the city police officers the police officers would be entitled to sovereign immunity", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMr. Belcher testified that he was able to remove the radio from the van. R.59, Ex. 2 at 50. 6 . Indiana courts have defined false imprisonment as \"the unlawful restraint upon one's freedom of movement or the deprivation of one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Indiana courts have stated also that \"[a] defendant may be liable for false arrest when he or she arrests the plaintiff[s] in the absence of probable cause to do so.” Id. The circumstances of this procedural due process claim do not involve false arrest or false imprisonment under Indiana tort law. Therefore, these exceptions to the law enforcement immunity provision do not apply. 7 . See, e.g., East Chicago Police Dep’t v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity where defendant officers could have reasonably believed that they were given sufficient third party consent to search" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that although legal aid provides services for indigent criminal defendants which governmental agencies otherwise might have to assume it is a private institution in no manner under state or city supervision or control", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that state action is present when the state exercises coercive power over is entwined in the management or control of or provides significant encouragement either overt or covert to a private actor", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that new york city agencies cannot be sued", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (holding that there is no private right of action against a state governmental entity for violations of the texas constitution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n28 (2d Cir.1991). A. The Civil Rights Claims Legal Aid argues that plaintiffs allegations concerning the violation of his civil rights by Legal Aid should be dismissed on the ground that Legal Aid has not acted under color of state law, as required to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff pleading a claim under § 1983 need allege only that “some person acting under color of state law deprived the claimant of a federal right.” Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1016 (2d Cir.1983) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). Legal Aid is correct, as far as it goes, that the Second Circuit expressly has ruled that Legal Aid is not a state actor. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc., 445 F.2d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir.1971) (recognizing that state agencies which are independent of the state are citizens of the state" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (holding union members state law claims for defamation against union preempted", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (recognizing that union members interests are adequately represented by the union", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (holding that the plaintiffs acted on behalf of all union members and reimbursing the attorneys fees from the union treasury such that all union members in effect equally contributed to the costs of litigation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (holding that the breach occurs when the union acts against the interest of its members", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiffs did not know definitively whether MidAtlantic would actually operate as a division of U.S. Airways when the December 2002 agreement was executed, they did know or reasonably should have known that the terms of employment provided therein were negotiated irrespective of MidAtlantic’s corporate form. In other words, the agreement provided plaintiffs actual notice that defendants had rendered a significant bargaining point as to the corporate form as irrelevant and that AFA had taken a negotiating position adverse to their interests. See Palancia v. Roosevelt Raceway, Inc., 551 F.Supp. 549, 553 (E.D.N.Y.1982), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (“[U]nion members are charged with knowledge of the contents of their collective bargaining agreement.”); Ramey, 378 F.3d at 278 (recognizing union members vital concern in preserving jobs for union members" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (recognizing that udja waives sovereign immunity in suit challenging validity of statute", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (holding that when state voluntarily submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding the state waives its sovereign immunity", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (recognizing that section 252061 waives immunity", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (holding that 390uu waives sovereign immunity from contract claims for injunctive relief and specific performance", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntrial court granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Machete’s suit without specifying the jurisdictional ground on which it relied. Machete then perfected this appeal. DISCUSSION In its first issue, Machete advancés three arguments to support its assertion that sovereign immunity did not bar its suit. First, Machete asserts that it alleged valid ultra vires claims against Page and Abbott and, as a consequence, sovereign immunity did not apply to those claims. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-80 (Tex.2009) (explaining ultra vires exception to sovereign immuhity). Next, Machete contends that it asserted valid constitutional claims under the UDJA that are not barred by sovereign immunity. See Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex.2011) (holding that the defense of sovereign immunity is not available in the absence of a statute providing immunity to a municipal corporation in a negligence action" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncounsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (holding that respondents had presented credible and persuasive alibi evidence that they were elsewhere on the date of the robbery and could not have perpetrated this crime and that such evidence is admissible when it negates the existence of probable cause", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncounsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (holding that the admission of unlawfully seized evidence of a crime was admissible if the jury was instructed that the evidence could be considered only in assessing a defendants credibility and not for determining guilt", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncounsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (holding that defendants prior possession of the physical means of committing the crime is some evidence of the probability of his guilt and is therefore admissible", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncounsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (holding that reconsideration may not be based on evidence and legal arguments that could have been presented at the time of the challenged decision", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ncounsel is Respondent’s attempt to “explain away” the evidence of probable cause against him. Evidence that tends to establish an alibi is evidence “that the [accused] was not present at the time or at the place where the [accused] is alleged to have committed the offense charged.... ” United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir.1995); see Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009) (an alibi is a “defense based on the physical impossibility of a defendant’s guilt by placing the defendant in a location other than the scene of the crime at the relevant time”). Definitive evidence of an alibi conclusively placing Respondent in a location other than Las Botellas bar at the time the crime occurred could be sufficient to obliterate probable cause. See Gonzalez, 52 F.Supp.2d at 738^1 (holding that the date of the offense was material to the defense where defendant could not have anticipated from the date specified in the indictment that the state would present evidence that the crime occurred nearly two months later" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as “reports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (holding state department country report on fairness of liberian judicial system admissible", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as “reports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (holding that a department of defense report was inadmissible", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as “reports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (recognizing that a report from the state department is usually the best available source of information on country conditions", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as “reports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (holding that the state department country report constituted substantial evidence to support the agencys finding of changed country conditions in guatemala", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(U.S.A.) Inc. v. Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 612 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (Government-published shipper's guide); Nehus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 328 (W.D.Wash.1981) (United States Pilot publication); Asg Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 82 Cust.Ct. 1, 467 F.Supp. 1187 (Cust.Ct.1979) (U.S. Dept. of Commerce report). Finally, State Department Country Reports concerning the fairness of a foreign country's judicial system are not excludable as hearsay; they are admissible as “reports ... of public ... agencies setting forth ... matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report ... unless ... circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Ev. 803(8). See also Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 142 (2nd Cir.2000) (holding that for purposes of claim 4 another country means a country other than the first and second country explicitly rejecting tpllcs proposed construction" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt also found that the cause of the delay was the government’s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub’s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley’s contentions—that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment— was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding that any confrontation right is found in the fourteenth amendments due process clause not the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt also found that the cause of the delay was the government’s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub’s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley’s contentions—that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment— was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding that confrontation clause protections do not extend to sentencing hearings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt also found that the cause of the delay was the government’s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub’s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley’s contentions—that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment— was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt also found that the cause of the delay was the government’s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub’s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley’s contentions—that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment— was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nCourt also found that the cause of the delay was the government’s failure to follow up on its proposed plea offers and Holub’s failure to communicate his rejections of the offers to the government. Ibid. The Court further found that Holub had not been prejudiced by the delay and that the government had no history of delaying trials in that area. Id. at 30. For those reasons, the Court held that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. Its holding is not an abuse of discretion. VII. Next, the defendants challenge their sentences on various grounds. One of Wiley’s contentions—that hearsay introduced at the sentencing hearing violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment— was disposed of by our decision in United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc) (holding confrontation clause inapplicable at sentencing" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (holding that the trial judge had the power to incorporate a settlement agreement in a decree following the entry of a decree of divorce", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (holding that adjudication of paternity in divorce decree is not binding on the child", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (recognizing a divorce decree which incorporates a property settlement agreement is a final and conclusive adjudication ", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof paternity against a man other than the one signing the paternity acknowledgment. Such distinction is of critical importance to the analysis of the applicability of principles of res judicata since the preclu-sive effect of res judicata attaches only to parties to the original action. In Michael George, once the action was initiated Wyatt, 475 So.2d 1332, 1334 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985) (finding that child not party to first action not barred by res judicata because child and mother are not in privity due to divergent interests); In re M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 130 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982) (finding res judicata inapplicable to child support petition of child because earlier action was not filed by or in the name of the child); Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254-55 (Miss.1987) (holding that a paternity determination in which the child is not made a party and is not represented by a guardian ad litem is not binding on the child" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee’s “frustrating work situation” characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer’s scrutiny of employee’s work, “while unpleasant and annoying” did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that employers conduct including keeping workplace too cold subjecting employee to heightened scrutiny and disclosing information from plaintiffs prior lawsuit to her coworkers did not constitute a hostile work environment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee’s “frustrating work situation” characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer’s scrutiny of employee’s work, “while unpleasant and annoying” did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that coworkers cartoon ridiculing plaintiffs depression does not support a hostile work environment claim", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee’s “frustrating work situation” characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer’s scrutiny of employee’s work, “while unpleasant and annoying” did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that plaintiffs allegation that her professor gave her a brief bear hug was insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee’s “frustrating work situation” characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer’s scrutiny of employee’s work, “while unpleasant and annoying” did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that a plaintiffs psychological distress was not vicarious in a hostile work environment case where she experienced her workplace as hostile by reason of the alleged harassment of other women out of her presence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n626 (8th Cir.2000) (finding that employee’s “frustrating work situation” characterized by her being excluded from the decision-making process, treated with disrespect, subjected to false complaints, and curtailed in her supervisory duties did not amount to hostile work environment), abrogated on other grounds by Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, 1058; Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1159 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding that unfair criticism and being yelled at did not amount to actionable harassment); see also Martinelli v. Penn Miller Ins. Co., 269 Fed.Appx. 226, 228 (3d Cir.2008) (finding that employer’s scrutiny of employee’s work, “while unpleasant and annoying” did not amount to hostile work environment); Harbuck v. Teets, 152 Fed.Appx. 846, 847-48 (11th Cir.2005) (recognizing a hostile work environment claim under section 1983" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (recognizing that there is no litmuspaper test for distinguishing a consensual encounter from a seizure", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (recognizing that deemed consolidation is consensual", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (holding that a conviction is deemed final on the date of sentencing when there is no evidence that notice of appeal was filed", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (holding that a statute violated the federal constitutional right of privacy when applied to heterosexual nonviolent consensual activity between adults in private and pointing out that twentytwo states have decriminalized private consensual sodomy between adults", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsolidation should not defeat the mutuality defense preserved here. III. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgments of the Bankruptcy Court and District Court. 1 . On the date of confirmation, Ferguson's claim for damages against Garden Ridge Management, Inc., and his loan with Garden Ridge, L.P., were at issue between the parties. AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This case turns on the meaning of substantive consolidation, a topic we addressed in In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir.2005). Unlike Owens Coming, here we are not confronted with a dispute over whether such a strong equitable remedy for a reorganization is appropriate, as neither side wants to undo the deemed consolidation contained in the debtors’ Plan of Reorganization. See id. at 211 (recognizing that consensual policecitizen encounters do not implicate constitutional protections" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrelevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (holding that defendant may not complain of error he invited and further holding that reversal cannot be based on such error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrelevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (holding that invited error does not entitle the defendant to any relief and of which he will not be heard to complain on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrelevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrelevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (holding a party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nrelevant post-judgment period from $12,000 to $14,000 per month. We find no merit in this contention, as the trial court did indeed make such a determination as expressly set forth in the final judgment—a determination which Futer-nick and Beber did not contest in their first appeal. 2 . On appeal, Trushina contends that Futer-nick and Beber are not legally entitled to any post-judgment interest. While such a contention may indeed be valid and supported by the Richardson analysis, Tmshina took the position in the trial court that Futemick and Beber were entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate of 1.49%. The trial court agreed with Tmshina, and therefore Trushina could not properly cross-appeal that portion of the trial court’s order. Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (holding that a party failing to make a timely objection to evidence at trial cannot as a matter of law be heard to complain on appeal that its admission is error constituting an irregularity in the proceeding" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (holding that officers detaining a driver who parked and exited his car quickly as they approached in their patrol vehicle did not violate his fourth amendment rights by requiring him to get back in his car before questioning him", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (holding motorist struck by drunk driver had the crime of dui committed against him regardless of defendants intent", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (holding that a passenger in a stopped vehicle was seized when she was escorted from the car to the front of two police cars that had their overhead lights turned on separated from the driver by two officers and separated from her purse which remained in the car", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (holding location of car off highway position of driver slumped over steering wheel and keys in ignition provided reasonable grounds to require breathalyzer test", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nalleges COLT’s liability arises solely from “designating routes and loading and unloading zones” for the bus. The McKinney car would have inflicted the same unfortunate injuries upon minor [appellant] had it pushed her into any static object — a lamppost, a brick wall or a fire hydrant. The car happened to thrust minor [appellant] into a large metal object mounted on tires, called a bus. [Appellant] has not alleged a.Super. 362, 621 A.2d 158 (1993), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 285 (1993) (minor was “occupant” of friend’s truck while minor was unloading hunting rifle in front of truck in preparation to enter truck and was struck by oncoming vehicle); McGilley v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 369 Pa.Super. 547, 535 A.2d 1070 (1987), allocatur denied, 520 Pa. 601, 553 A.2d 964 (1988) (holding taxi cab driver was not occupying his cab when cab driver had parked at cab stand behind several cabs in front of warwick hotel turned off ignition as well as cabs dome light took keys exited cab and walked to cab in front of him to bum a cigarette when he was struck by septa bus" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nat *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (holding that a contract for the installation and implementation of a complex computer system did not constitute a consumer purchase covered by the njcfa and noting that the contract did not provide for simply the installation of a standardized computer software program but rather the design of a custommade program to satisfy the plaintiffs unique needs and the defendants active participation in implementation of this program", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nat *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (holding that a contract for the design manufacture and installation of two furnaces was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods and therefore subject to the uccs fouryear statute of limitations", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nat *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (holding that the implementation of a training program as opposed to the adoption of the program is not a discretionary function under the state tort liability act", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nat *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (holding that a contract for the design construction and installation of a water tank was predominantly a contract for the sale of goods under the ucc", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nat *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82044, at *7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, the plaintiffs argue that they are “consumers” of a “sale of services” contract concerning the management, marketing, and breeding of Ready’s Image as a stud, and that “Walmac Farm marketed itself as the stud farm at which Ready’s Image should be boarded and should stand stud.” [Record No. 110, p. 25] The transactions at the heart of this dispute, however, do not involve simple purchases. An offer of services to manage the stud career of a thoroughbred race horse is certainly not something sold to the general public, but would be a service highly particularized and unique to the particular parties and stallion involved. See, e.g., Princeton Healthcare Sys., 422 N.J.Super. at 473-74, 29 A.3d 361 (holding that the ucc applies to a computer software license with an additional obligation to provide incidental services where the predominant thrust of the contract was the sale and support of the software" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (holding debtors who devoted twothirds of their net disposable income to housing expenses did not propose a chapter 13 plan in good faith", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (holding that the statement of current monthly income was the presumptive amount of projected disposable income but presumption could be rebutted by the debt or upon a showing of substantial change of circumstances", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (holding that net farm income when applied to a producer in the fishing industry means net income from all fishing activity not just that income from a particular commodity and further providing that the regulations make it reasonably clear that the determination of net fishing income is not to be made solely on the basis of tax return information if other information is relevant to determining the producers net income from all fishing sources", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (holding that a chapter 7 debtors duty to file a section 521albv statement of monthly net income can only be fulfilled by filing form b22a", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat the debtors filed the functional equiv alent of a monthly net income statement in the form of Schedule J. This is too little and too late. Schedule J deals with a debtor’s current expenditures. In the process, it responds to a different filing requirement, contained in 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(l)(B)(ii). Although line 20 of Schedule J is called a “Statement of Monthly Net Income” and the advisory committee note to the official bankruptcy forms states that this line was added to Schedule J in 2005 “as required by § 521(a)(l)(B)(v),” there is no reason to think that Schedule J is a proxy for the statement of current monthly income required by section 521(a)(l)(B)(v). In fact, the case law suggests the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Turner, 384 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr.D.Colo.2008) (holding in prebapcpa case that chapter 7 filing was not a substantial abuse simply because debtors made unwise financial decisions that increased their monthly living expenses" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (recognizing that a suit for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable but is determined by the nature of underlying issue", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (holding that an action challenging the validity of a will may not be brought under ohios declaratory judgment act", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (recognizing that issue preclusion brought by a plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action is technically offensive ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (holding that where the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in a pending action it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiff] preemptively brought this action for declaratory judgment, seeking to avoid indemnity liability, does not alter the structural essence of the case.”); Aetna Cos. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 596 A.2d 414, 424 n. 19 (1991) (“Because this is a declaratory judgment action and the plaintiff insurer is invoking [issue preclusion] to avoid providing coverage, the [issue preclusion] invoked here is a hybrid form of offensive [issue preclusion].”); Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth v. Samani, 757 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Ky.Ct.App. 1988) (“Offensive collateral estoppel or issue preclusion may be utilized, as was done herein, by an action for declaratory relief.” (Footnote omitted.)); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill.2d 378, 250 Ill.Dec. 682, 739 N.E.2d 445, 452 (2000) (holding that the declaratory judgment act is remedial only and the party seeking declaratory relief must have an underlying cause of action" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (holding that the automatic stay barred a suit for injunctive relief to prevent postpetition antitrust violations", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (holding that the otherwise harmless violation of the automatic stay did not suffice to deprive the irs of the postpetition interest setoff to which it would have been entitled had it first sought a lifting of the stay from the bankruptcy court", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (holding that a banks claim of irreparable harm through delay of postpetition interest payments was insufficient to lift the automatic stay under the provisions of section 1301 as the debtor proposed to pay 100 of the plan including postpetition interest", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (holding that the automatic stay would be modified so that a credit union could seek payment of postpetition interest from the codebtor", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Bankr.D.Mass.1996) (stating that as the drafters of the Code used the term \"allowed claims” where they saw fit and, as Sections 1141(d)(2) and 523(a) do not limit their exceptions from discharge to \"allowed claims” only, 502(b)(2) should not be read as a limitation on the exceptions from discharge). 2 . In re Harris, 16 B.R. 371 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1982) (agreeing with a series of cases holding that relief from the automatic stay should be granted if the debtor does not propose to pay the full amount of the claim, including post-petition interest but denying relief because the debtor in the case proposed to pay 100% of the claim, including post-petition interest); International Harvester Employee Credit Union, Inc. v. Daniel, 13 B.R. 555 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1981) . 357 (Bankr.D.Conn.1981) (holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and \"the Tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that removal to federal court does not waive tribal sovereign immunity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and \"the Tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar rico suit only after concluding that sue and be sued clause in tribal ordinance unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign immunity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and \"the Tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a controllers signature on a contract containing a forum selection clause was insufficient to waive sovereign immunity in part because the right to waive immunity was reserved to the tribal council", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and \"the Tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a state may waive its sovereign immunity", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nfor purposes of appeal. Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2011). The facts presented here are taken from the operative complaint or are otherwise uncontested. 2 . The operative complaint makes clear that the Chairperson is sued in an official capacity only. 3 . The parties use terms such as \"tribal immunity,” “tribal sovereign immunity,” and \"the Tribe’s sovereign immunity” interchangeably in their briefing, as do we herein. 4 . The district court did, however, dismiss all claims against the Health Program because Bodi failed to controvert evidence that the entity had no legal existence independent of the Tribe and the Health Board. That ruling has not been appealed. 5 . Compare Ingrassia v. Chicken Ranch Bingo & Casino, 676 F.Supp.2d 953, 961 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the ats does not waive the united states sovereign immunity" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a government agency seeking to enforce a prior order regarding prepetition acts of a debt or is not bound by a confirmed plan a if such agency fails to participate in the confirmation of such plan b if the obligations that such agency seeks to impose upon such debtor do not constitute claims c notwithstanding that such plan purports to treat such debtors obligations to such agency and d since it thus is not a named entity within 1141a", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (recognizing such an exception", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that plaintiff must present such evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a litigant who receives ex parte assurances of success from a judge is a state actor under 1983", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nunder Rule 60(b) to vacate a judgment directly with the district court, ■without seeking prior leave from the Court of Appeals. 601 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir.1979). The district courts are required “to review any such motions expeditiously, within a few days of their filing....” Id. at 42. Where the district court considers a motion to have merit, it issues a memorandum so that the movant may petition this Court to remand the case to the district court for the judgment to be vacated. Id.; see also United States v. 6 Fox St., 480 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir.2007). Otherwise, a litigant may not request on appeal that this Court remand a case to a district court for it to consider an argument that the litigant waived before that court. Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 386-87 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a litigant must follow colocotroni in such scenarios" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nequal, pro rata basis.” Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nequal, pro rata basis.” Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that section 1303 does not authorize the chapter 13 debtor to exercise the avoiding powers of a trustee", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nequal, pro rata basis.” Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nequal, pro rata basis.” Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that funds held by chapter 13 trustee become property of the chapter 7 estate upon conversion not subject to exemption", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nequal, pro rata basis.” Id. at 153. The Court recognized that there are limited exceptions to the trustee’s exclusive avoidance powers under Section 522, which is intended to “give limited protection to a debtor’s exemptions.” Id. The Court examined specifically Section 522(h), which provides in pertinent part: The debtor may avoid a transfer of property of the debtor ... to the extent that the debtor could have exempt “no specific statutory provision” authorizes Chapter 13 debtors to “exercise trustees’ avoidance powers”); LaBarge v. Benda (In re Merrifield), 214 B.R. 362, 364 (8th Cir. BAP 1997) (noting lack of a comparable provision applicable Chapter 13 debtors as 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107(a), 1203); Pruitt v. Gramatan Investors Corp. (In re Pruitt), 72 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1987) (holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees avoidance power" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.” Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (holding that a statecourt order providing for severance and separate trials of claims against a diverse defendant and a nondiverse defendant did not permit removal of a plaintiffs claim against the diverse defendant where the claims had not been separately docketed in state court and the plaintiffs claim against the nondiverse defendant had been removed together with the claim against the diverse defendant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.” Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (holding that because there was complete diversity when the action commenced diversity jurisdiction was not defeated by the addition of a nondiverse plaintiff which was not indispensable", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.” Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (holding that were the court to find fraudulent joinder as to a nondiverse defendant on the basis of evidence equally dispositive of the liability of that defendant and a nondiverse defendant a refusal later in the proceedings to give judgment for the diverse defendant on the same grounds in turn would require the court to revisit a ruling that the nondiverse defendant was fraudulently joined", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.” Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (holding that plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined nondiverse defendants where the plaintiffs claims were based on respondeat superior if no cause of action can be stated against the nondiverse defendants for their alleged torts no case exists against defendant new england for example if a statute of limitation has run on a claim against a nondiverse defendant it necessarily has run for new england accordingly the arguments offered by new england to prove fraudulent joinder simultaneously show that no case can be made against the diverse defendant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“[G]iven a widely-recognized looseness in usage of the language” regarding severance, the court held, “[u]se of the word ‘severed’ is insufficient, in itself, to establish a Rule 21 severance.” Id. at 625. Because it was not clear that the plaintiffs claims against the diversity-defeating party were not a part of the case, the court remanded the case to state court. See id. at 626. As Caldwell illustrates, “[federal district courts have ... held that a defendant does not carry the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction where jurisdiction is predicated on a state court order that merely states .that plaintiffs claims are to be ‘severed’ from claims against non-diverse defendants.” Grefer v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 03-0253, 2003 WL 22717716, at *4 (E.D.La. Nov. 18, 2003.) (holding that diversity jurisdiction was not established by a statecourt order that provided only that the plaintiffs claims against a nondiverse defendant be and hereby are severed from this action" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (holding that the claims of the class representative and class members must be based on the same legal or remedial theory", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (holding that the filing of a class action by a class representative without standing tolls the period of limitations with regard to all asserted members of the class and that the amendment of the complaint by the addition of a class member with standing relates back to the original complaint", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (holding that where named plaintiff was employee of class counsel district court did not abuse its discretion by denying class certification", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (holding that to maintain a class action the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some specificity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadvanced by Justice CORRIGAN— limiting MCR 3.501(F) tolling to identical claims that were asserted or may have been asserted in an initial complaint — would frustrate the very purpose of MCR 3.501. Further, we perceive no sound reason for the limitation that Justice CORRIGAN would place on MCR 3.501(F). For example, just as the filing of a class action that does not meet the requirements for class certification generally tolls the period of limitations with respect to all persons within the class described in the complaint, American Pipe, supra, the filing of a class action by a person who does not meet the requirements to serve as the class representative also tolls the period of limitations. See, e.g., Birmingham Steel Corp v Tennessee Valley Auth, 353 F3d 1331, 1333 (CA 11, 2003) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by decertifying the class without permitting class counsel reasonable time to determine whether a new class representative could be substituted" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwe would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (holding that an amendment passed two years into a 10year automatic extension period was not effective until the 10year extension period expired and stating that to hold otherwise would render the extension provision meaningless", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwe would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (holding that extension of a federal grand jurys term was within the discretionary powers of the district court", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwe would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (holding that the extension of meeks by the smith court was inappropriate", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwe would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (holding that an amendment of restrictive covenants passed during the running of an automatic 10year extension period was not effective until the end of the 10year extension period", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nwe would not consider it binding, or even persuasive, in determining whether to grant a writ for habeas corpus. “Section 2254(d) requires us to give state courts’ opinions a respect ful reading, and to listen carefully to their conclusions, but when the state court addresses a legal question, it is the law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ that prevails.’ ” Williams, 529 U.S. at 387, 120 S.Ct. at 1510. We find that the analysis set forth by Johnson is much more compelling. Because the 1997 Amendments do not impose a mandatory minimum sentence, see infra, petitioner’s reliance on Smith is misplaced. Likewise, Meeks does not apply to this case, because it dealt with sentencing statutes and not parole guidelines. See generally Newland, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32 (holding that a district court may not construe an untimely notice of appeal as a motion for extension of time" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontinuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent only with the existence of the alleged oral contract", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontinuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (holding that a delinquency proceeding places a juvenile in jeopardy for purposes of the double jeopardy clause", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontinuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (holding that oral declarations of mistrial which discharge the jury are unlike other oral decisions by the trial court which are not binding and are subject to change until a final written order or judgment is entered", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontinuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ncontinuing. {21} Defendant further argues that this order was an acquittal on the refusal basis for aggravated DWI, apparently under the theory that it somehow finalized or solemnized the trial court’s oral comme implicated in this case. The Ratchford exception is limited to an oral grant of a new trial being effective to defeat automatic denial provisions built into the rules of criminal procedure. 115 N.M. at 570-71, 855 P.2d at 559-60. The cases involving discharge of a jury can be distinguished because in those cases the proceedings were terminated and the fact-finder was discharged by the oral comments of the judge, while here, proceedings were ongoing and the court expressly reserved ruling on the aggravated DWI charge. Rodriguez, 2004-NMCA-125, ¶ 14, 136 N.M. 494, 100 P.3d 200 (holding that oral discharge of jury terminated jeopardy" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (holding that while town counsel had final supervisory authority over the hiring and firing of employees in plaintiffs position it did not have supervisory authority over the mayors constructive discharge of plaintiff", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (holding that defendants supervisory position enabled her to embezzle funds while avoiding detection over a long period of time", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (holding over", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nin question has authority to set policy in that particular area of municipal business. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 245 (3d Cir.2006). This normally involves looking at the specific statutory delegation of authority to the particular official position. See, e.g., McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 368-69 (3d Cir.2005). Second, a court must determine “whether the official’s authority to make policy in that area is final and unreviewable.” 455 F.3d at 245 (3d Cir.2006) (emphasis in original) (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). This second inquiry frequently involves looking to see whether any other official has supervisory authority over the specific action of the official in question. See, e.g., id. at 246 (holding that agent part of title viis definition of employer includes someone who serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over hiring firing or conditions of employment" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\noriginal complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (holding appeal not moot where bankruptcy proceedings involved third parties but unlike robehs farms and rochman v northeast utils serv group in re pub serv co 963 f2d 469 1st cir1992 the reorganization plan is not a complex billiondollar affair that has affected innumerable third parties", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\noriginal complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (holding that hearing officers noting the parties agreement did not constitute a change in the parties legal relationship", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\noriginal complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (holding that insured had not substantially complied with the policys change of beneficiary provisions when the hospitalized insured was physically unable to leave her bed and was unable to retrieve the policy from her lock box at the bank to return to the company for endorsement as required by the terms of the policy", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\noriginal complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (holding error where re cording which was later deemed inadmissible was played during opening statement", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\noriginal complaint. Id. at 468, 470. Following Nicrosi, the Court determined that the circumstances were such as to give Hughes notice that she was being sued and held that the amendment did not change the nature of the action or add any parties to the action. Id. at 470. The Court stated, “there was no question as to the identity of the defendant, because Hughes Realty was merely a name under which Hughes did business.” Id. at 470. The Court further stated: “[W]e affirmatively hold that a judgment entered against a trade name is a judgment against the individual doing business under that trade name, at least so long as the individual was personally served with the complaint.” Id. at 471. See also, Box v. Boilermaker Nat’l Health & Welfare Fund, 47 Ala.App. 266, 253 So.2d 326 (1971) (holding that an amendment from re box steel erection company to re box individually and dba re box construction and equipment co did not add or change the parties but merely sought to accurately describe the named defendant" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (holding without applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel that the plaintiff who made sworn statements of total disability in a social security disability application and then testified at her deposition that she was not totally disabled failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ada", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a plaintiffs bladder infections were connected with her disability of interstitial cystitis", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that employer has notice of limitation when disability manifests itself to the extent that it would be reasonable to infer that her employer actually knew of the disability", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (holding evidence of a 13 permanent partial disability insufficient to establish disability for purposes of ada", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\na broad interpretation of the meaning of the word “disability,” and imposes a “non-onerous” burden on a plaintiff at the prima facie stage. Haley v. Cmty. Mercy Health Partners, 2013 WL 322493 (S.D.Ohio Jan. 28, 2013). Even if an impairment lasts less than six months, it can be considered substantially limiting under the ADAAA. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix). If a plaintiff has a condition that is connected to an underlying disability, this is referred to as a “characteristic manifestation” of the qualifying impairment. Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 780 (6th Cir.1998). The Sixth Circuit has held that a “characteristic manifestation of [the] physical impairment [is] ... part of the underlying impairment.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir.1996) (holding disability discrimination claim barred" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (recognizing this as the general rule", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that the bia rule is unreasonable in this context", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (recognizing this texas rule", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (recognizing this rule", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe Sentencing Commission’s failure to provide for completed distributions, in the application notes. He maintains further that -if we agree that this is a clarifying amendment, we should remand for resentencing so as to give the sentencing court the opportunity to consider the additional clarifying language. Marmolejos’s argument is based on the established principle that a post-sentencing amendment to a sentencing guideline or its comments should be given effect if it “clarifies” the guideline or comment in place at the time of sentencing. If, however, the amendment effects a substantive change in the law, the defendant does not reap the benefit of the new provision. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1998); Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that this is the rule in virtually all circuits" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (holding that evidence that defendants had participated in several prior drug transactions was properly admitted to establish defendants intent to distribute narcotics", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (holding that a prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine is admissible under rule 609", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (holding that prior drug trafficking conviction was admissible to prove intent to distribute", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (holding prior arrest in connection with an undercover drug buy admissible to show intent to distribute narcotics", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin a separate and clear finding,” id. at 95, 113 S.Ct. at 1117, the court may nevertheless make the upward adjustment whenever it finds all three elements of perjury. Here, the district court found that Queen’s testimony was “false” and that Queen gave this false testimony, “knowing it to be false and material.” That, we conclude, is sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm Queen’s conviction and sentence. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have found over 60 published opinions since 1990 addressing the rule. 2 . Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provi efendant's previous sexual advances towards women admissible to show motive in fraudulent scheme to use company funds for personal relationships); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. —, 117 S.Ct. 496, 136 L.Ed.2d 388 (1996) (holding that evidence of a 10yearold drug conviction was properly admitted to show intent in a prosecution for possession with intent to distribute" ]