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[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndefense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta’s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta’s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (holding title company liable for bad faith", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndefense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta’s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta’s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (holding that bad faith includes lack of good faith in investigating the facts of a complaint", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndefense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta’s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta’s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (holding insurer not liable for bad faith when it denied insureds claim based on a good faith dispute regarding the interpretation of a rule", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndefense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta’s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta’s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (holding there can be no claim for bad faith when an insurer has promptly denied a claim that is in fact not covered", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndefense of misrepresentation on the policy application is not proper; he had fully cooperated and satisfied all conditions of the i a-contractual claims was improper because: (1) he needed to conduct additional discovery regarding the reasonableness of the denial; and (2) the issue of whether Farmers breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing was a fact issue. In this case, Farmers had a reasonable basis for denying the claim based on Perrotta’s own breach of the policy. See Betco Scaffolds Co., 29 S.W.3d at 348. As such, Farmers did not breach its duty of good faith and fair dealing to Perrotta with regard to that denial, and Perrotta’s extra-contractual claims fail as a matter of law. See United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 955 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex.1997) (per curiam) (holding that a bad faith claim is a tort" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none of the central issues in this case — if not the central issue in this case — is whether that agreement extends to Google’s current use of Digital Envoy’s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.” License Agreement § 12. Digital Envoy’s claims in this case clearly “regard” the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google’s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (holding that a clause covering any controversy or claim related directly or indirectly to this agreement was a broad arbitration clause", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none of the central issues in this case — if not the central issue in this case — is whether that agreement extends to Google’s current use of Digital Envoy’s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.” License Agreement § 12. Digital Envoy’s claims in this case clearly “regard” the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google’s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none of the central issues in this case — if not the central issue in this case — is whether that agreement extends to Google’s current use of Digital Envoy’s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.” License Agreement § 12. Digital Envoy’s claims in this case clearly “regard” the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google’s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (holding that plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim was subject to mandatory forum selection clause requiring litigation in florida of any claims or disputes arising from employment agreement", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none of the central issues in this case — if not the central issue in this case — is whether that agreement extends to Google’s current use of Digital Envoy’s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.” License Agreement § 12. Digital Envoy’s claims in this case clearly “regard” the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google’s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (holding valid forum selection clause providing that all disputes and matters whatsoever arising under in connection with or incident to this contract shall be litigated if at all in and before a court located in the state of florida quoting underlying contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\none of the central issues in this case — if not the central issue in this case — is whether that agreement extends to Google’s current use of Digital Envoy’s technology. Moreover, the forum selection clause in the license agreement is not limited, as Digital Envoy seems to suggest, to claims that are dependent upon the agreement or to those that allege breach of the agreement. Rather, it encompasses “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this Agreement.” License Agreement § 12. Digital Envoy’s claims in this case clearly “regard” the license agreement, as they regard alleged activities that may or may not be covered by the agreement and, indeed, they will almost certainly fail if Google’s use of its technology is found to be within the scope of the agreement. See also Stewart Org., 810 F.2d at 1070 (holding that a forum selection clause encompassing any case or controversy arising under or in connection with this agreement included all causes of action arising directly or indirectly from the business relationship evidenced by the contract" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nincludes “several transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.” United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that “just as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.” Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that when two underlying offenses are charged in an indictment for capital murder the state need only prove one of the two offenses to support the conviction", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nincludes “several transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.” United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that “just as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.” Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that only one offense should have been charged when four separate packages of the same drug were found", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nincludes “several transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.” United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that “just as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.” Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (recognizing that delay in indictment may sometimes be a basis for a sentencing departure but holding that district court erred when it decreased sentence based on a delay in an indictment where the offenses were separate crimes distinct in time place and victims", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nincludes “several transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.” United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that “just as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.” Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that the policy considerations behind the unanimity requirement suggest that a single count of an indictment should not be found impermissibly duplicitous whenever it contains several allegations that could have been stated as separate offenses but only when the failure to do so risks unfairness to the defendant", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nincludes “several transactions or occur rences, any of which could constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged statutes.” United States v. Beros, 883 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3d Cir.1987). The Beros court noted that “just as the sixth amendment requires jury unanimity in federal criminal cases on each delineated offense that it finds a defendant culpable ... it must also require unanimity regarding the specific act or acts which constitutes that offense. Absent such certainty, the unanimity requirement would provide too little protection in too many instances.” Id. at 461. The Seventh Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case very similar to Holley. See United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 471 (7th Cir.1998). But see United States v. Margiotta, 646 F.2d 729, 733 (2d Cir.1981) (holding unanimity requirement not violated when charge stated two separate counts with two separate and distinct offenses in each case" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond “the conventional experience of judges.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants’ expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts’ claims does not require “the exercise of administrative discretion” or create an administrative need for “uniformity and consistency.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (holding that the question of whether the defendants recording device was an intercepting device was a question of law appropriate for summary judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond “the conventional experience of judges.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants’ expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts’ claims does not require “the exercise of administrative discretion” or create an administrative need for “uniformity and consistency.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond “the conventional experience of judges.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants’ expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts’ claims does not require “the exercise of administrative discretion” or create an administrative need for “uniformity and consistency.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (holding that party that failed to object to instruction that jury not answer a question based on its answer to the prior question waived that partys right to have the jury make findings as to the subsequent question", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond “the conventional experience of judges.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants’ expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts’ claims does not require “the exercise of administrative discretion” or create an administrative need for “uniformity and consistency.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe relative complexity of electrical-distribution systems, resolving the issues of fact presented by the Siewerts is not beyond “the conventional experience of judges.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. The litigants’ expert witnesses will provide sufficient factual information. Minn. R. Evid. 702 (permitting testimony by expert witnesses). And, third, the resolution of fact issues underlying the Siewerts’ claims does not require “the exercise of administrative discretion” or create an administrative need for “uniformity and consistency.” City of Rochester, 483 N.W.2d at 480. Deciding whether specific facts meet the elements of a tort claim is not uniquely suited to an administrative agency, but instead is regularly decided by juries. See Steinbrecher, 392 N.W.2d at 712 (holding that in wrongfuldeath action question of appropriate precautions was one for jury" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndoes not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (recognizing the right to counsel on appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndoes not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (recognizing that a criminal defendants right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndoes not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (recognizing that the sixth amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel and the right to waive counsel", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndoes not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (holding that defendants have a right to counsel in criminal proceedings", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndoes not expressly guarantee any right to counsel as does the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to require that, once a suspect is in custody and subject to interrogation, the police apprise the suspect of his right to contact an attorney, and to have the attorney present during questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-71, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Once a suspect asserts this Fifth Amendment, or Miranda-based, right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel is physically present during the interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (holding that the right to have counsel present means the right to have counsel physically present during the interrogation not merely the right to consult an attorney by telephone" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants” violated his \"equal rights” in violation of § 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are \"insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (holding that the prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies as to each defendant later sued", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants” violated his \"equal rights” in violation of § 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are \"insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust his administrative remedies to bring a retaliation claim", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants” violated his \"equal rights” in violation of § 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are \"insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (holding that a prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies even though his grievance was untimely", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants” violated his \"equal rights” in violation of § 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are \"insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (holding that an alien must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief from detention", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(“The mere assertion by the petitioner that there was insufficient evidence, without more, cannot support a finding of deprivation of due process.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 . In the complaint, in addition to the specific allegation against defendant Knight, Grinter alleges \"defendants” violated his \"equal rights” in violation of § 1981. \"This court has adopted the requirement that a plaintiff allege with particularity all material facts to be relied upon when asserting that a governmental official has violated a constitutional right.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir.2002). Such \"conclusoiy, unsupported statements” are \"insufficient to state a claim.” Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.2001). 3) (holding that a prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not utilize grievance procedures that permitted waiver of the time limit for good cause" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (holding that retaliation against inhouse attorney for refusing to join a scheme to cheat a competitor is covered under cepa", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (holding that a plaintiff can prove illegal retaliation under 1981 in the same manner as he establishes retaliation under title vii", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (holding that interference and retaliation are two separate theories that can be advanced under the fmla and that termination is evidence of retaliation", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (recognizing exceptions for retaliation against whistle blowers and retaliation against filers of workers compensation claims", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nor practice of the employer ... [which] is in violation of a law, or a rule or regulation ...” Abbamont, Barratt and Mehlman clearly involved complaints regarding actions of the employer. In Abbamont, it was the employer’s failure to provide a safe school environment; in Barratt, the employee accused the secondary employer of commercial bribery; in Mehlman, the employer was selling gasoline with an unhealthy benzene content. See also Delran Ed. Ass’n. v. Bd. of Educ., 277 N.J.Super. 538, 543-44, 650 A.2d 7 (App.Div.1994) (suggesting that retaliation against teacher for refusing to obey school superintendent’s order to give confidential pupil records to independent contractor would violate CEPA); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 236 N.J.Super. 451, 460, 566 A.2d 215 (App.Div.1989) (holding that but for standard applied to retaliation case brought under texas law" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nSee id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (holding that downward departure based on defendants restitution was improper because restitution is taken into consideration in assessing whether acceptance of responsibility adjustment should apply and district court abused its discretion in finding defendants restitution was extraordinary", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nSee id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (holding apprendi inapplicable to restitution orders because restitution for harm done is a classic civil remedy", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nSee id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (holding that district court may not depart downward to preserve defendants ability to make restitution", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nSee id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nSee id. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2047-48. A hypothetical illustrates the efficacy of a unitary standard of review. If a district court were to depart upward based upon physical injury pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.2, p.s., we might conclude that it had abused its discretion if the underlying offense were obstruction of justice, because the guideline applicable to that offense, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1), provides for an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved caus[es] ... physical injury to a person.” Our review in such a situation would amount to a de novo review of the applicable guideline to determine whether, as a matter of law, it takes physical injury into account. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that when the determinat (4th Cir.1996) (holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (holding petitioners reliance on remmer misplaced as statement from restaurant cashier to juror expressing cashiers hope that the juror find the defendant not guilty did not refer to the factual evidence not developed at trial", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the district courts dismissal of a juror after five weeks of deliberations violated the defendants right to a unanimous jury because the record evidence suggested the juror found the evidence insufficient for a conviction", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that though judge did not question juror individually note from juror to judge requesting private meeting to ask legal question did not suggest juror would not base verdict on evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that trial courts denial of motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was justified where there was no evidence presented at hearing on motion that juror had knowingly concealed relevant litigation experience during voir dire and identity of juror as county court litigant was not demonstrated", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nnot developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1172, 116 S.Ct. 1263, 134 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996); see United States v. Rodriguez, 367 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir.2004) (“the presumption of prejudice does not apply unless the extrinsic contact relates to factual evidence not developed at trial”); United States v. Hall, 85 F.3d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable where the contact does not relate to factual evidence not developed at trial, or where the contact pertains to purely legal issues), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027, 120 S.Ct. 1437, 146 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000); United States v. Wallingford, 82 F.3d 278, 281 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when the trial judge questioned the juror extensively enough to satisfy itself that the juror was not biased emphasis added" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that the term reverse payment is not limited to a cash payment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that service is not avoided by service on a partys attorney as service on an attorney is ineffective unless he has been authorized to accept such service", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (holding some evidence existed that physician incurred fees because services had been performed on the physicians behalf", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that a successful plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may recover initial fees a plaintiff pays or agrees to pay an attorney for legal services that were negligently performed and corrective fees incurred by the plaintiff for work performed to correct the problem caused by the negligent lawyer but not litigation fees which are legal fees paid by the plaintiff to prosecute the malpractice action against the offending lawyer", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfees are charged is an unearned fee and violates this section.” 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c). Plaintiffs specifically aver that they hired Dolphin, a mortgage brokerage company, and Datro, one of Dolphin’s agents, to find the most favorable financing agreement to fund the improvements to the DeLeon’s house (cplt., ¶ 28), that these defendants did not seek such terms (id., ¶ 32), and defendants charged $3,520, or 8% of the mortgage loan taken by plaintiffs, for rendering this sham service (id., ¶ 42). As we observed in our previous opinion, these allegations are more than sufficient to state a claim that defendants levied a charge for services that were not in fact rendered under § 2607(b). See DeLeon, 998 F.Supp. at 864; United States v. Gannon, 684 F.2d 433, 437-438 (7th Cir.1981) (holding that 2607b prevents payment of fees to individuals who performed no service" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that an order to disgorge funds was final even though the order did not distribute the funds", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that kentucky high school athletic association was an indirect recipient of federal funds because it was created by state law its functions were determined by the kentucky board of education and it received dues from member schools who received federal funds", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that ncaa was not an indirect recipient of federal funds even though it received dues from schools that received federal funds", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that a college received federal funds where the funds were granted to its students as financial aid rather than directly to the college", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nin Homer as an agent of its member institutions merely because it lacks statutory authority for its activities. The NCAA is a voluntary organization created by and comprised of the educational institutions which essentially acts as their surrogate with respect to athletic rules. In its construction of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which contains language identical to that of Title IX in 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) regarding receipt of federal assistance, the Supreme Court has indicated that Congress, as in Title IX, did not distinguish between direct and indirect financial assistance. See United States Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 606-07, 106 S.Ct. 2705, 2711-12, 91 L.Ed.2d 494 (1986) (citing Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564, 104 S.Ct. at 1216 (holding that kentucky high school athletic associa tion qualified as agent of the state and as recipient of federal funds so as to be subject to title ix when association received dues from member schools which received federal funds" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that for purposes of determining whether the roadblock worked a fourth amendment seizure the controlling considerations are whether 1 the motorist was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock and 2 the motorist was so stopped", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that where police officers had stopped a vehicle because they suspected that the motorist was intoxicated irrespective of whether the deputies were justified in detaining the motorist after he showed no signs of intoxication and even if they had not after approaching the motorist observed conditions raising a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot they were entitled to ask the motorist for permission to search his vehicle", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that a fleeing motorist was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until the law enforcement officers were successful in stopping the motorist at a roadblock", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nto the stop and subsequent search of Scott Brooks’s car and person. Because of his vehicular flight prior to arriving at the checkpoint, Scott Brooks was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes by the show of police authority by virtue of the checkpoint signs or the checkpoint itself. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626-29, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes when a defendant did not acquiesce in the show of police authority); id. at 629, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (“Assuming that [the officer’s] pursuit ... constituted a ‘show of authority’ in enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tackled.”); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (holding that where the police roadblock was intended to stop brower by physical impact and did so a seizure occurred" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (holding accrual of cause of action for purposes of statute of limitations occurs on the date on which the right to institute and maintain a suit first arises", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (holding that the cause of action accrued on the date of sale", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (holding that a single cause of action arises out of the same set of facts", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (holding that for statute of limitations purposes the injury in a section 10b action occurs at the time of plaintiffs entry into purchase agreement not on later date when plaintiffs failed to receive expected payment", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Plaintiffs Complaint is untimely. As already noted, it is undisputed that the Union convened plant employees at a meeting on December 20, 2001 to discuss the two-year extension to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Plaintiff did not attend that meeting. On May 17, 2002, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB asserting a claim arising out of the same facts alleged here. Obviously, then, Plaintiff was aware of the facts giving rise to this cause of action by May 17th at the latest. The present Complaint, however, was filed on August 9, 2004, well over two years after that date. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2) are untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. See Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 149 N.J.Super. 20, 30, 372 A.2d 1355 (App.Div.1977) (holding that accrual date begins to run on the date the employee is notified unambiguously of the adverse employment action" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n“good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding trial court acted within its discretion in excluding expert testimony", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n“good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding that it was within the trial courts discretion to refuse any additional discovery and that the courts refusal to allow additional discovery was not an abuse of discretion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n“good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding that a trial courts determination that additional viewing of a videotape of an accident scene would overemphasize that such evidence was reasonable and that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to allow the videotape to go into the jury room during deliberations", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n“good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of the juiy trial waiver", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n“good cause” is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. See State v. Price, 385 Md. 261, 276-77, 868 A.2d 252 (2005) (dealing with good cause for a postponement of trial); ... Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 345-56, 703 A.2d 1267 (1998) (whether to permit filing of a belated insanity plea). Id. at 205, 960 A.2d at 1224-25 (one citation omitted). I agree with the majority that subpart (b) of Rule 4-326 applies, and so there must be “good cause” to exclude particular evidence from the jury room. See Majority Op. at 599-602, 4 A.3d 507-09. But videotapes are a special kind of evidence, and certainly replaying one in the jury room runs the risk of overemphasis. See Wright, 72 Md.App. at 218, 528 A.2d at 500; see also Brooks v. Holtz, 661 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2003) (holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding that criticism of judicial action already taken even though the cases were still pending on other points or might be revived by rehearings was not enough to satisfy the clearandpresentdanger standard", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding the dismissed defendant was not precluded from obtaining its reasonable attorney fees under 1317201 even though the action was still pending against another defendant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding that even if the standard for waiver is clear the standard was not met", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding that a remand should be limited to cases in which further action must be taken by the district court or in which the appellate court has no way open to it to affirm or reverse the district courts action under review", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n331 U.S. at 376. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on two theories in concluding that Kendall’s opinion was a clear and present danger to the fairness of the Ford case. Neither passes muster. According to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Kendall’s opinion was punishable because it “called the very integrity of [its mandamus] decision into question” by “blatantly accusing], without proof, the Justices ... of gross dereliction of their sworn duties and of committing illegal acts.” Yet Kendall’s criticism of the decision to issue mandamus — even if it unfairly impugned the Justices’ motives — is simply not enough. His after-the-fact critique “could not affect [the Justices’] ability to [fairly] decide” how to rule on the petition for a writ of mandamus. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 348 (holding that reinstatement is prospective even though it contemplated changing the result of an action already taken" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. “Direct evidence for these purposes includes evidence of ‘remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ as well as ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.’ ” Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that direct evidence is evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action ", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. “Direct evidence for these purposes includes evidence of ‘remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ as well as ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.’ ” Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that the relevant issue is whether the evidence could support a reasonable factfinders conclusion that a discriminatory animus served as the basis for the employers decision", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. “Direct evidence for these purposes includes evidence of ‘remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ as well as ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.’ ” Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that if a reasonable fact finder could make a particular finding on the administrative record then the finding is supported by substantial evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. “Direct evidence for these purposes includes evidence of ‘remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ as well as ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.’ ” Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bass, 418 F.3d at 872 (citing Dorsey v. Pinnacle Automation Co., 278 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir.2002)). Despite her assertion to the contrary, Owens did not present any direct evidence of discrimination. “Direct evidence for these purposes includes evidence of ‘remarks of the employer that reflect a discriminatory attitude,’ as well as ‘comments which demonstrate a discriminatory animus in the decisional process or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment decisions.’ ” Roberts v. Park Nicollet Health Servs., 528 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir.2002)); accord Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028, 1034 (8th Cir.2007) (holding causal link between alleged discriminatory remarks and adverse employment action insufficient" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (holding that the defendant may not state one ground at trial and another on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (holding party may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal where appellant did not object to testimony at trial on the grounds raised on appeal that it was improper character evidence but objected only on the basis of relevancy issue was not preserved for review", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (recognizing that a defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (holding to preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must have been raised to and ruled upon by trial court and a party may not argue one ground for objection at trial and another ground on appeal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhearsay rule. In resolving this issue, we initially observe that a trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will reverse only when the trial court has abused its discretion. Jones v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 626-27 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. at 627. Although Davis contends on appeal that the police report should have been excluded because it was not properly authenticated, we note that Davis objected to the admission of the report at trial only on the grounds that the report constituted hearsay. As a result, Davis has waived this argument. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind.2000) (holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). “To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant’s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). “To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant’s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (holding that the cppa does not apply to landlordtenant relations", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). “To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant’s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (holding that the confrontation clause does not apply to the sentencing hearing", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). “To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant’s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (holding that 1447c does not apply to counsel", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nin favor of the plaintiff[ ].” Id, (quoting Hillbroom v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 17 A.3d 566, 572 (D.C.2011)). “To pass muster,” a complaint must “allege the elements of a legally viable claim, and its factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id, (quoting OneWest Bank, FSB v. Marshall, 18 A.3d 715, 721 (D.C.2011)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). B. CPPA With respect to appellant’s CPPA claims, this court has previously addressed the question whether the CPPA applies to landlord-tenant relations. See Gomez v. Independence Mgmt. of Delaware, Inc., 967 A.2d 1276, 1286 (D.C.2009) (holding that title ii does not apply to the states" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nGonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (holding that the four year sentence imposed by the district court was appropriate as it was comparable to the five year sentence for perjury or obstruction of justice", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nGonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (holding that a sentence of 25 years to life imposed for felony grand theft under californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nGonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (holding fifteen year hfo mandatory minimum sentences on the three robbery convictions were required to run concurrently with the twentyfive year nonhfo mandatory minimum on the murder sentence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nGonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (holding that the fifteen year minimum sentence imposed under section 924e does not violate the eighth amendment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nGonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991). We are dubious whether this is such a case. However, even upon scrutiny, we find no basis to conclude that section 924(e)(1) violates the Eighth Amendment. Although Mitchell’s sentence is a severe punishment for felony gun possession, when viewed in the context of his three burglaries, it is no more severe than that found acceptable in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1145, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (upholding a mandatory life sentence with the eligibility of parole after twelve years for a defendant who had obtained $120.75 by false pretenses, and who had previously committed two similar crimes), and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Accord United States v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 27 (1st Cir.1988) (holding in a five to four decision that a twentyfive year minimum sentence for stealing three golf clubs pursuant to californias threestrikes law did not violate the eighth amendment and that any criticism for the statute is properly directed at the legislature" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthen assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthen assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that a contractor must provide the contracting officer with adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthen assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that the contracting officer effectively made a final decision on the government claim for set off by declining to pay the contractor the balance due on the contract", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthen assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that the finality of a contracting officers determination was suspended during his review of a request by the contractor to reconsider the final decision", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthen assessed liquidated damages against plaintiff by unilaterally modifying the contract to reduce the total contract price. Plaintiff subsequently submitted a claim to the contracting officer seeking the remission of the liquidated damages in the Coast Guard’s possession, which the contracting officer denied. In such circumstances, there is both a government claim against plaintiff for liquidated damages and a claim by plaintiff against the government for the remission of retained liquidated damages. See K-Con Bldg. Sys., Inc., 107 Fed.Cl. at 587-88 (citing Sun Eagle Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 465, 480-82 (1991)). And, there is both a final decision on the government’s claim for liquidated damages, see Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that jurisdiction over an appeal of a contracting officers decision is lacking unless the contractors claim is first presented to the contracting officer and that officer renders a final decision on the claim " ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (holding that income and expense statement did not constitute substantial evidence to support maintenance award when wife conceded her lack of knowledge about actual expenses", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (holding that an award for medical expenses is proper when the expenses have been incurred but not paid", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (holding a wife liable for necessary medical expenses incurred by her husband under the doctrine even though the wife did not sign as a guarantor and did not request that her husband be admitted nor anticipate that her husband would be admitted", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (holding trial court erred in finding purported wife unavailable to testify and admitting her sworn prior statements in lieu of her live testimony where record did not support courts ruling in light of its own finding that remarriage of wife and defendant was fraudulent and wife did not refuse to testify if claim of privilege was denied", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand tops that conclusion with the assumption that the judge determined the amount “as somewhat larger.” The term “underproved” appears to be another way of saying that Wife has proved her reasonable needs to a certain extent but failed to prove any need beyond that point. As such, the trial court would be engaging in speculation as to Wife’s needs beyond the expenses she had been able to prove. An award of maintenance cannot stand without evidence to support it. Wofford v. Wofford, 858 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1993). Because Wife testified that she did not know how much she would incur for electricity, car maintenance, or rental insurance, the trial court could not have considered these expenses in determining maintenance. M.A.Z. v. F.J.Z., 943 S.W.2d 781, 790 (Mo.App.1997) (holding that a wife could be held liable for the negligent failure to prevent or warn the victims about her husbands sexually abusive behavior when the wife had actual knowledge or special reason to know that the husband was likely to abuse a particular person or persons" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law \"Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that under the eaja a litigant did not incur fees when his former employer agreed to pay his legal fees and expenses", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law \"Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that under the eaja a prevailing party with an unconditional right to be indemnified for his legal expenses by a solvent third party had not incurred attorneys fees", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law \"Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that bank was entitled to attorney fees on appeal when agreement did not prohibit such fees", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law \"Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that the buckhannon rule governs an application for fees under the eaja", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe EAJA for determining whether a party is entitled to fees. Id. at 456. Accordingly, in Claro, we discussed at length when a party has “incurred” fees for purposes of the EAJA. Id. Because the EAJA does not provide a definition of the term “incurred,” we examined the term’s ordinary meaning. 579 F.3d at 464. After examining the definition of “incurred” in Webster’s Dictionary — “to become liable or subject to,” or to “bring down upon oneself’ — and Black’s Law \"Dictionary — “to suffer to bring on oneself a liability or expense,” id. at 456 (citations and brackets omitted), we concluded that the general rule is that fees are incurred “when the litigant has a legal obligation to pay them.” Id. at 464-65 (citing Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Comserv Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1414-15 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that a court has broad discretion in awarding attorney fees under the eaja but is not required to make an award in all cases where a party seeks supplemental or increased fees" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLife Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (“Within the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’ of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(holding that a single offensive racist comment was not sufficient to establish a hostile work environment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLife Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (“Within the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’ of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(holding that the plaintiff failed to state an agebased hostile work environment claim where the plaintiffs proffered evidence was nothing more than a collection of unrelated and infrequent incidents of conduct by the defendants that the plaintiff subjectively construe as acts motived by agerelated animus and which was devoid of the agerelated comments or ridicule that are hallmarks of hostile work environment claims", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLife Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (“Within the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’ of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(holding that an isolated comment is not direct evidence of discrimination even if a plaintiff interpreted it as motivated by a discriminatory animus", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLife Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (“Within the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’ of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(holding that isolated remarks are insufficient to prove discriminatory intent", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nLife Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 674 (7th Cir.1993) (“Within the totality of circumstances, there is neither a threshold ‘magic number’ of harassing incidents that gives rise, without more, to liability as a matter of law nor a number of incidents below which a plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a claim.”) (emphasis added); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1274 n. 4 (7th Cir.1991) (recognizing that single, isolated incident of harassment can give rise to employer liability for racial harassment under Title VII). 119 F.3d at 873. While there is no minimum number of incidents, where a plaintiff alleges few incidents, they must be severe to establish a hostile work environment. See, e.g., Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.1996)(holding that one isolated comment and the use of the term girlie although regrettable do not demonstrate that the work environment was permeated with discriminatory intimidation ridicule and insult " ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nheld that the “standard Severance” referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan’s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the “standard Severance” to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (holding that an employees claim against plan administrator for denied benefits is preempted", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nheld that the “standard Severance” referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan’s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the “standard Severance” to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (holding that an employees claim for breach of a letter agreement was preempted by erisa where the agreement did not specify the amount or other terms of the employees retirement benefits and the court would have to refer to the employers erisagoverned retirement plan to determine the employees retirement benefits and calculate the damages claimed", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nheld that the “standard Severance” referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan’s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the “standard Severance” to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (holding that an employees claim for wrongful discharge based on the employers desire to avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employees pension fund is preempted by erisa even though the claims are asserted under tort theories not erisa and seek damages only in the form of lost wages mental anguish and punitive damages not benefits under the plan", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nheld that the “standard Severance” referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan’s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the “standard Severance” to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (holding that retirement benefits are accrued benefits under erisa", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nheld that the “standard Severance” referenced in the RIAs was the West Gulf Bank Schedule and that these two documents could be analyzed independently of the ERISA Plan. But as discussed above, the West Gulf Bank Schedule was an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan’s schedule of benefits, which was subsequently incorporated by formal amendment to the Plan. Accordingly, even if the “standard Severance” to which the RIAs refer is the severance benefit described in the West Gulf Bank Schedule, that Schedule itself relates to and is an improper attempt to amend the ERISA Plan. See 365 S.W.3d at 777 (Mas-sengale, J., concurring). In turn, any benefits must be calculated pursuant to the ERISA Plan, which, as amended, sets out the 6-and-26 schedule described above. See Epps, 7 F.3d at 45 (holding that military retirement benefits are current pay and thus significantly different than other retirement benefits" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (“From beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and the logic of that precedent ....”). Courts make one exception to this strict rule — when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that experts testimony that defendants engaged in fraud and deceit was admissible because the words were used in colloquial fashion but statement that defendants violated federal regulations was inadmissible as a legal conclusion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (“From beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and the logic of that precedent ....”). Courts make one exception to this strict rule — when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (holding an affidavit statement referring to the notice required for a binding contract was inadmissible as a legal conclusion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (“From beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and the logic of that precedent ....”). Courts make one exception to this strict rule — when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that engineers testimony that defendant was negligent was an improper legal conclusion", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (“From beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and the logic of that precedent ....”). Courts make one exception to this strict rule — when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that although defendants voluntarily given initial statement was inadmissible because of miranda violation subsequent statement made after careful miranda warnings were given and waiver was obtained was admissible", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n807 F.2d 359, 368 (4th Cir.1986) (“From beginning to end, it is obvious that Appellants proffered [the person] as an expert witness to testify in substantial part to the meaning and applicability of [law]. This flies squarely in the face of the precedent — and the logic of that precedent ....”). Courts make one exception to this strict rule — when interpreting foreign law, expert legal opinion may be allowed. See Nieves-Villanueva, 133 F.3d at 99; Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 510. Experts may also give limited testimony on mixed questions of law and fact, but the testimony must remain focused on helping the jury or judge understand particular facts in issue and not opine on the ultimate legal conclusion. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 826-27 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that the victims statement was inadmissible when made two to three hours after victim was allegedly raped because the victims testimony supported the conclusion that her statement was made with conscious reflection" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively to claims raised in a 2255 motion", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to 2241 petitions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that because apprendi does not apply retroactively neither does blakely", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that blakely does not apply retroactively to 2255 motions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nCANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that any violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), or Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), would be harmless error in this case. I write to express my belief that whether Apprendi and Blakely can even be applied at the resentencing of a defendant whose conviction and original sentence became final before those cases were decided depends on whether a new jury can be empaneled to decide facts relevant to sentencing. We already have held that Apprendi does not apply retroactively. See Hughes v. State, 901 So.2d 837 (Fla.2005). Presumably, neither does its offspring, Blakely. See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 905 So.2d 990, 991 (Fla. 3d DCA) (holding that apprendi does not retroactively apply to 2255 motions" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nLankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC’s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that when the insurer is also the plan administrator we have recognized something akin to a rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nLankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC’s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that plan administrator that was also insurer operated under conflict of interest", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nLankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC’s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that when an entity both funds and administers the plan there is a rebuttable presumption that a palpable conflict of interest exists", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nLankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC’s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that a structural conflict of interest exists when an insurer acts as both the plan administrator and the funding source", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nLankford was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, the Court will not address the merits of the summary judgment motions between Webco and HCC as the issue of HCC’s payment of the claim under the stop-loss policy is now moot. V. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Webco, Inc. and the Plan Administrator for the Webco Employee Group Health Plan Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 63) is GRANTED, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 56) is DENIED, and the remaining motions are DENIED AS MOOT: Third-Party Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 61) and Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 65). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1 . In accordance with Local Rule 56.1(a), \"[a]ll facts set forth in the statement o 947-48 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest from the fact that the plan administrator is also the insurer" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nraised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an “actual conflict.” Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that a formal offer of proof was not required to challenge an evidentiary ruling because the substance of excluded testimony was apparent from the context", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nraised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an “actual conflict.” Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that proof of an explicit agreement is not required", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nraised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an “actual conflict.” Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that an adequate offer of proof is normally required to preserve error when a trial court excludes evidence", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nraised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an “actual conflict.” Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that an evidentiary hearing is not required when the petitioner relies solely upon conclusory unsworn statements unsupported by any proof or offer or proof", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nraised in state court that McGee labored under a conflict because he hoped to secure a new trial in which Wisdom likely would be a witness. In any event, Beaty's claim is without merit. Beaty has not shown that McGee labored under an “actual conflict.” Specifically, Beaty has not demonstrated how these circumstances inhibited McGee from zealously advocating the award of a new trial. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, -, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir.1995). 8 . While Beaty contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he has not shown with any specificity that the factual record is inadequately developed to assess whether he was interrogated. See, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that an unsworn letter is not proper summary judgment proof" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat continued to fall for the duration of the storm” and “a pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.” (Gould Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 7; PL’s Opp’n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties’ textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute “water damage” as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes “surface water,” which the policy included under its definition of “water damage.” (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that “surface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.” City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (holding issues of fact in dispute are solely for the jury", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat continued to fall for the duration of the storm” and “a pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.” (Gould Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 7; PL’s Opp’n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties’ textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute “water damage” as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes “surface water,” which the policy included under its definition of “water damage.” (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that “surface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.” City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (holding that driver exclusions which are clear unambiguous and supported by consideration are enforceable and do not violate public policy or compulsory insurance laws", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat continued to fall for the duration of the storm” and “a pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.” (Gould Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 7; PL’s Opp’n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties’ textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute “water damage” as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes “surface water,” which the policy included under its definition of “water damage.” (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that “surface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.” City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (holding funds received by plaintiff from an insurance policy that was procured by the defendant and for which a premium was paid are not a collateral source", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat continued to fall for the duration of the storm” and “a pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.” (Gould Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 7; PL’s Opp’n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties’ textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute “water damage” as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes “surface water,” which the policy included under its definition of “water damage.” (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that “surface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.” City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (holding in an insurance policy dispute case that surface waters are those which are produced by rainfall melting snow or springs", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nthat continued to fall for the duration of the storm” and “a pool of rain that had gathered at the bottom of the stairwell.” (Gould Aff. ¶ 8; Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 7; PL’s Opp’n Mem. at 2, 5.) Liberty does not dispute that these were the causes. (Def.’s Reply at 2.) Accordingly, the parties’ textual arguments center around whether these sources of water constitute “water damage” as defined in the policy. Liberty argues persuasively that a pool of rainwater constitutes “surface water,” which the policy included under its definition of “water damage.” (Id. at 2-3.) Maryland courts have held that “surface wa ter [is] caused by rain or melting snow.” City of Cumberland v. Willison, 50 Md. 138, 1878 WL 6579 at *6 (1878); see also Mateer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 247 Md. 643, 233 A.2d 797, 799 (1967) (holding that under minnesota law an insurance policy or provision not filed with the commissioner of insurance is unenforceable" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncitation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (holding that the commission is a commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncitation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (holding that plaintiffs claim was not barred by sovereign immunity because he sought specific relief against a government official", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncitation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (holding that sovereign immunity was implicated and violated by the bankruptcy courts criminal contempt citation against a government agency the irs", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncitation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (holding that district courts award of monetary sanctions for contempt violated the sovereign immunity of the united states but also reversing on other grounds", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncitation with a .demand for more trial-like procedures, much less a jury trial. . The point, rather, seems to have been that while.fhe Cabinet acquiesced in the court’s informal manner of proceeding, it did, so only with the- understanding that such proceedings could not give rise to a \"serious” penalty. ... 15 . The Cabinet provides no authority for this assertion, but the claim is certainly plausible. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (“In order ' for a state to be eligible for payments under this Part [Part E of Title 42, Chapter 7, Sub-chapter IV, Federal Payments for Foster Care and Adoption Assistance], it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which ... provides that ... reasonable efforts shall be made to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the perma (holding that sovereign immunity barred claim for compensatory sanctions against the government" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlife and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that the right to crossexamine adverse witnesses applies to capital sentencing hearings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlife and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlife and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that the confrontation clause applies only to trials and not to sentencing hearings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlife and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (holding no right to crossexamine in grand jury proceedings", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlife and death for Fields. Beyond Officer January’s and Tichenor’s testimony, the list goes on and on. III. Conclusion Sherman Lamont Fields was sentenced to death based on testimony that he was never able to confront. That is precisely the evil that the Confrontation Clause was meant to protect against. That troubling fact cannot be remedied by categorizing the testimony as speaking to selection as opposed to eligibility factors. The jury’s difficulty in agreeing on a sentence and the number of mitigating factors found highlight how artificial that distinction can be. I would find that the Confrontation Clause applies to capital sentencing as it is structured under the FDPA and remand this case for resentencing. 1 . Compare Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir.1982) (holding that the right applies at capital sentencing in particular" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRichard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (holding 404b evidence admissible under intent exception but not motive exception where motive not contested", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRichard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRichard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (holding that evidence of prior criminal misconduct is admissible under rule 404b to prove motive opportunity intent preparation plan knowledge identity or absence of mistake or accident", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRichard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (holding that rule 404b evidence is admissible in rebuttal", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nRichard Sumpter, his co-defendant, go to trial immediately, and made reference to some “thing” in his past where he “fought for 18 months,” but a “guy” got caught with an ounce of pot and “screwed everything up.” Through Diana’s assistance, the government taped this conversation and offered the conversation as evidence at trial. Prior to trial, the district court denied Free’s motion in limine to strike the conversation, concluding the tape “[did not] say he got convicted,” and thus presented no Rule 404(b) issue. Assuming the taped conversation presents evidence of a prior criminal act, the evidence is nonetheless admissible under Rule 404 to demonstrate Free’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and not his prior misconduct. United States v. Ailstock, 546 F.2d 1285, 1289 (6th Cir.1976) (holding other acts evidence that was permissible to demonstrate a plan to defraud was also admissible to establish intent knowledge and absence of mistake" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nremoval and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (holding that persecution was on account of political opinion because petitioners prosecutorial investigation into acts of political corruption was by its very nature political", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nremoval and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (holding that refusal to join guerrilla group is itself not affirmative expression of political opinion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nremoval and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (holding that guerrilla groups attempt to recruit alien did not establish persecution based on political opinion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nremoval and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (holding that attempted conscription by a guatemalan guerrilla group did not constitute persecution on account of a political opinion where petitioner failed to show that the group was motivated by his political opinion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nremoval and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Any mistreatment that petitioner received from his classmates at school who harassed him in a ‘joking way’ and pressured him to join the Shining Path did not rise to the level of past persecution or establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-82, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (holding that a guerrilla organizations attempt to coerce a person into performing military service does not necessarily constitute persecution on account of political opinion " ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not “words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b) (“In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.”); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (holding that statutory words must be given their ordinary contemporary meaning", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not “words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b) (“In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.”); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (holding that unless otherwise defined words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning at the time congress enacted a statute and reviewing dictionaries from the era of the statutes enactment to assist in determining its meaning citation omitted", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not “words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b) (“In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.”); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (holding that bribery must be given its ordinary meaning at the time of the enactment of the relevant statute", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not “words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b) (“In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.”); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (holding that courts give the words of a statute their ordinary contemporary common meaning absent an indication congress intended them to bear some different import", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nprovides: (a) A person commits the offense of distributing material ere are not “words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter,” we look to the ordinary meaning of those words at the time the General Assembly enacted the statute in deciding whether the sending of an intangible text message comes within the scope of the statute. See OCGA § 1-3-1 (b) (“In all interpretations of statutes, the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, which shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade or with reference to such subject matter.”); Collins, 198 Ga. at 22. See also Sandifer v. U. S. Steel Corp.,_U. S._,__ (134 SCt 870, 187 LE2d 729, 738) (2014) (recognizing that undefined words in a statute ordinarily should be interpreted as taking their ordinary contemporary common meaning" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. “The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (holding plaintiff failed to establish selfrealization acquired secondary meaning because members of the american hinduyoga community believed the mark was a spiritual state of mind and did not automatically associate a selfrealization product with plaintiff", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. “The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (holding limited use of a mark did not constitute prior use in commerce sufficient to establish rights in the mark", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. “The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (holding that mark had not acquired secondary meaning even with advertisements costing 4400000 over five years because it did not lead consumers to associate plaintiffs mark with its products", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. “The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (holding that plaintiff failed to establish pretext where plaintiff was terminated after the employer conducted an investigation into a subordinates allegations of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff and believed the allegations to be true even though plaintiff presented evidence in the lawsuit that the allegations may have been false", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n287 F.3d at 873; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If a trademark that is descriptive lacks secondary meaning, it is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1970). To acquire secondary meaning, section 1052(f) requires that the mark must have become “distinctive of the applicant’s goods.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f); Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1147. “The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers’ and potential buyers’ minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1980). A mark has acquired secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate the mark with Plaintiff. Self-Realization Fellowship, 59 F.3d at 911-12 (holding that copying is only evidence of secondary meaning if the defendants intent in copying is to confuse consumers and pass off his product as the plaintiffs in that situation the defendants belief that plaintiffs trade dress has acquired secondary meaning so that his copying will indeed facilitate his passing off is some evidence that the trade dress actually has acquired secondary meaning" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge’s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as “testimony.” Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1—21.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (holding that there is no federal or colorado constitutional right to postconviction counsel but there is a limited statutory right", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge’s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as “testimony.” Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1—21.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (recognizing tjhere is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge’s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as “testimony.” Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1—21.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (holding that it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge’s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as “testimony.” Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1—21.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (holding that there is no federal constitutional right to a bifurcated criminal trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ncannot remember from one moment to the next what has previously transpired in the proceeding can not fairly preside over the cause. It is the intuitive recognition of this precept that frequently generates alarm among the parties when a substitution of judges occurs during or immediately after trial. Thus, a judge’s recollection of previous proceedings in the cause cannot be characterized as “testimony.” Third, Tyler dealt with a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus which rests directly upon a constitutional foundation. Here, the trial judge was presiding over a motion for new trial derived from rules of appellate procedure. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.1—21.9; see also Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Fuentes v. State, 960 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (holding that there is no constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirst-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined “crime of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding that we need not remand to the bia so that it may apply the categorical approach", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirst-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined “crime of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding that the categorical approach applies to 924c", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirst-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined “crime of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding that the proper inquiry for the categorical approach is whether the conduct covered by the crime presents the requisite risk of injury in the ordinary case", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirst-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined “crime of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding that application of the modified categorical approach did not establish a covered conviction where the judgment of conviction did not contain the factual basis for the crime", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nfirst-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459 is categorically a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) because the crime inherently involves a substantial risk of physical force: Any time a burglar enters a dwelling with felonious or larcenous intent there is a risk that in the course of committing the crime he will encounter one of its lawful occupants, and use physical force against that occupant either to accomplish his illegal purpose or to escape apprehension. Id. at 571. Although Becker involved a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines, at the time the relevant Guidelines section defined “crime of violence” by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 16. Becker, 919 F.2d at 569; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (holding that the categorical approach applies to the identical definition of crime of violence in 18 usc 16" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.”). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr’g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu’s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that the federal expert witness compensation rules are in direct conflict with the state rules even when the state rules allow for a greater recovery", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.”). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr’g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu’s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that a violation of the rules of professional conduct may not be used as evidence and citing terry cove north for the proposition that the sole remedy for a violation of the rules of professional conduct was the imposition of disciplinary measures", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.”). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr’g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu’s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that there is neither a violation of the applicable discovery rules nor sanetionable conduct in the submission of a supplemental expert report to rebut the daubert motion", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.”). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr’g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu’s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nin support of my June 1, 2009 Medico-Legal Report concerning Robert T. Pritchard, Sr. ----, by way of rebuttal to the reports and testimony of Marshall Lichtman, M.D., Seymour Grufferman, M.D. and Michael I. Greenberg, M.D.”). More importantly, counsel were also advised at the outset of this case and upon the finalization of the Fourth Amended Case Management Order that the Court would permit live testimony of experts at any Daubert hearing. (Docket No. 142, Tram. Hr’g 9/22/09 at 25). Instead of proceeding in this fashion, Plaintiffs have submitted the declaration of Dr. Omalu for the purpose of rebutting the assertions of the defense experts regarding Dr. Omalu’s opinions. See Fisher v. Clark Aiken Matik, Inc., Civ. A. No. 99-1976, 2005 WL 6182824, at *1 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 26, 2005) (holding that designation is neither a sentence nor a punishment" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (holding statements that a church was a cult and its pastor a cult recruiter were not factual statements capable of being proven true or false and therefore could not support a defamation action", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (holding that prosecutors statements were not evidence and could not support restitution order", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (holding analysts statements insufficient to satisfy particularity requirements because plaintiffs failed to identify with specificity the statements made by a particular defendant or describe how those statements were false or misleading", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (holding that false statements are constitutionally protected", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbe subject to legal issues\" is unverifiable. 70 . See Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.1986) (\"A statement regarding a potentially provable proposition can be phrased so that it is hard to establish, or it may intrinsically be unsuited to any sort of quantification.\"); Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Insofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, a reasonable reader will not believe that the statement has specific factual content.\"). 71 . See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 48, 51-52 (Alaska 2007) (reasoning that sexual insults made during a radio show known for its lewdness \"were not factually verifiable\" and therefore, although \"offensive to any rational person,\" the statements \"were not defamatory\"); Sands, 34 P.3d at 960 (holding that statements in proof of loss are not conclusive claimant could explain statements" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJ. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (holding that where a district court clearly indicates that an alternative sentence would be identical to the sentence imposed under the guidelines any error that may attach to a defendants sentence under booker is harmless", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJ. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJ. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (holding that motion raising heggs claim was insufficient because it failed to allege sentence imposed could not have been imposed under 1994 guidelines", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJ. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nJ. Christopher Merkt appeals the order revoking his community control and the sentence imposed under the 1995 guidelines. We affirm the order revoking community control. However, we remand for reconsideration of sentencing in accordance with Heggs v. State, 759 So.2d 620 (Fla.2000) (holding that persons challenging a sentence imposed under the 1995 sentencing guidelines have standing to do so if the relevant criminal offense occurred on or after october 1 1995 and before may 25 1997" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate’s assistance in using the Consulate’s mail system to facilitate Father’s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge “CYFD’s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,” id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, ¶ 14 (holding preparation and administration of service plan showed that department made reasonable efforts at reunification", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate’s assistance in using the Consulate’s mail system to facilitate Father’s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge “CYFD’s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,” id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, ¶ 14 (holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate’s assistance in using the Consulate’s mail system to facilitate Father’s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge “CYFD’s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,” id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, ¶ 14 (holding that the district court should consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the patentee acted in subjective bad faith and should consider whether circumstantial evidence would support an inference of bad faith", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate’s assistance in using the Consulate’s mail system to facilitate Father’s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge “CYFD’s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,” id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, ¶ 14 (holding that the human services department failed to make reasonable efforts and acted in bad faith when it disregarded the mothers efforts and rejected a favorable home study", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthe psychological evaluation and home study, obtain documentation of their completion, and translate the results. CYFD also argues that it sought the Consulate’s assistance in using the Consulate’s mail system to facilitate Father’s communication with Child and that CYFD for nine months at the time CYFD moved for termination, and CYFD ended its contact with Father less than twelve months after CYFD took custody of Child. This time period expired well before the fifteen-month period of time-limited reunification services established by ASF A. We acknowledge “CYFD’s duty to expeditiously handle [termination] cases,” id., but its actions suggest that it did not properly assist Father in ameliorating the causes and conditions of Child’s neglect. See Natural Mother, 1981-NMCA-103, ¶ 14 (holding that in case where child was removed from mothers care and placed in the custody of the cabarrus county department of social services under north carolina law the reasonable efforts and best interest determinations are conclusions of law because they require the exercise of judgment" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntime in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to “address new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that arguments raised for the first time in the reply briefs on appeal were deemed waived", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntime in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to “address new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (holding a party waives an argument made for the first time on reply", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntime in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to “address new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntime in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to “address new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that we do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ntime in their reply papers that all claims against them under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed and that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim in Count 11 of the Complaint should be dismissed as against Doe 1 because he is not a final policy maker for the City. The purpose of reply papers is to “address new material issues raised in the opposition papers so as to avoid giving unfair advantage to the answering party.” Bayway Ref. Co. v. Oxygenated Mktg. & Trading A.G., 215 F.3d 219, 226-227 (2d Cir.2000). Accordingly, the court is within its discretion to disregard such arguments submitted with Defendant’s reply papers. See Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., No. 05-CV-1260, 2008 WL 5423262, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2008) (citing Knipe v. Skinner, 999 F.2d 708, 711 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that arguments cannot be made for the first time in reply papers" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is “divorced or otherwise single women parents.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Scott Losciuto’s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that police officer was not required to eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before effectuating arrest for animal cruelty", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is “divorced or otherwise single women parents.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Scott Losciuto’s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that police officer is not required to explore and eliminate all theoretically plausible claims of innocence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is “divorced or otherwise single women parents.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Scott Losciuto’s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (holding police officer is a public official", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is “divorced or otherwise single women parents.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Scott Losciuto’s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that petitioners challenge to jury instructions in light of some new cases did not demonstrate his actual innocence because petitioner only asserts legal innocence not actual innocence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, is limited to conspiracies based upon racial or some other class-based invidious discrimination. See Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir.1996). There is no evidence of any such conspiracy here. The class for which the plaintiff claims protection is “divorced or otherwise single women parents.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def. Scott Losciuto’s Reply Mem. at 6. That is not a recognized class. To the extent that the plaintiff is stating a separate claim against Scott or Janet Losciuto under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (the Complaint is unclear), it fails for lack of state action on the part of Scott or Janet Losciuto, who are private parties. See Gonzalez-Morales v. Hernandez-Arencibia, 221 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2000). Town Of Windham And Pol 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997) (holding police are not required to explore and eliminate every potentially plausible claim of innocence as part of their prearrest investigation" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“charges,” “amount”, and “balance due.” The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to “track[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions”; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether “assessment,” “late fees,” “legal fees,” “mowing,” etc. We therefore hold Wilson’s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court’s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that an affidavit consisting entirely of inadmissible hearsay is not sufficient to survive summary judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“charges,” “amount”, and “balance due.” The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to “track[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions”; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether “assessment,” “late fees,” “legal fees,” “mowing,” etc. We therefore hold Wilson’s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court’s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding affidavit by bank president was sufficient to support summary judgment where it established plaintiff bank owned the note and the amount due on the note and defendant failed to offer controverting evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“charges,” “amount”, and “balance due.” The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to “track[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions”; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether “assessment,” “late fees,” “legal fees,” “mowing,” etc. We therefore hold Wilson’s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court’s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that affidavit setting forth total balance due on note is generally sufficient to sustain summary judgment and detailed proof of balance not required", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“charges,” “amount”, and “balance due.” The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to “track[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions”; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether “assessment,” “late fees,” “legal fees,” “mowing,” etc. We therefore hold Wilson’s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court’s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that bank employees affidavit setting forth total balance due sufficient to support summary judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n“charges,” “amount”, and “balance due.” The Owners argue this evidence is insufficient to establish either the property class used to allocate assessments or whether they are special or annual assessments. However, Wilson specifically states in his affidavit that he calculated the amounts due and owing in the course of his duties to “track[ ] assessments owed by various commercial entities within the Sonterra and Stone Oak subdivisions”; and the schedules list the nature of the charges, whether “assessment,” “late fees,” “legal fees,” “mowing,” etc. We therefore hold Wilson’s affidavit is sufficient to support the trial court’s summary judgment on the amount of past due assessments. See FFP Mktg. Co. v. Long Lane Master Trust IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 411 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that trial court may not grant summary judgment by default when the movants summary judgment proof is legally insufficient" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who “will engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,” Iowa Code §§ 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest— protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a “mental abnormality,” are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. § 229A.2(3), (8) (defining “mental abnormality” and “sexually violent predator”). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren’s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (holding transfer rule did not violate federal equal protection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who “will engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,” Iowa Code §§ 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest— protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a “mental abnormality,” are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. § 229A.2(3), (8) (defining “mental abnormality” and “sexually violent predator”). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren’s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (holding that doctrine does not violate equal protection", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who “will engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,” Iowa Code §§ 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest— protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a “mental abnormality,” are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. § 229A.2(3), (8) (defining “mental abnormality” and “sexually violent predator”). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren’s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (holding that discrimination based on religion is subjected to strict scrutiny whether a claim arises under the establishment clause the free exercise clause of equal protection clause", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who “will engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,” Iowa Code §§ 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest— protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a “mental abnormality,” are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. § 229A.2(3), (8) (defining “mental abnormality” and “sexually violent predator”). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren’s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (holding that nearly identical kansas statute did not violate equal protection clause when subjected to strict scrutiny", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nis narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.” City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989). We think the confinement of sexually violent predators who “will engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility,” Iowa Code §§ 229A.2(8), .7, serves a compelling state interest— protection of the public. In addition, the statute is narrowly drawn to encompass only those individuals who, because of a “mental abnormality,” are predisposed to sexually violent behavior. See id. § 229A.2(3), (8) (defining “mental abnormality” and “sexually violent predator”). Therefore, chapter 229A does not violate Garren’s right to the equal protection of the law under the state or federal constitutions. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675 (holding that the cap does not violate equal protection" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors’ rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (holding that an anticipated tax refund was property of the bankruptcy estate as of the date the bankruptcy case was filed", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors’ rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors’ rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (holding that the trial court lacked authority to order a refund where the defendants case did not meet the specific statutory requirements authorizing a refund", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors’ rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (holding that a refund may include additional taxes paid after the filing of a refund claim so long as the total does not exceed the portion of tax paid prior to the administrative claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe debtors to several different federal government agencies against the debtors’ rights to IRS excise tax refunds); In re Turner, 84 F.3d 1294, 1296, 1298 (10th Cir.1996) (permitting setoff of a debt owed by the debtors to the SBA against the debtors' right to payments owed to them by the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service). 5 . See Alexander v. Commission, Internal Rev. Serv. (In re Alexander), 225 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1998) (listing cases and siding with the majority position); but see In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752-54 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2001) (listing cases on both sides of the issue). 6 . See In re Bourne, 262 B.R. 745, 752 (Bankr. E.D.Tenn.2001). 7 . Id. (citations omitted). 8 . 262 B.R. at 756; see also In re Shortt, 277 B.R. 683, 692 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2002) (holding that a taxpayer only has a refund right after the irs has credited the refund to other underpaid taxes therefore the refund was not part of the bankruptcy estate" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npremised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was “abridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona’s new law “make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that state may not compel political party to allow nonmembers to vote in its primary elections", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npremised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was “abridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona’s new law “make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that a state may not condition voting in state elections on payment of a tax", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npremised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was “abridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona’s new law “make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that ujnder the plain meaning of the voting rights act the state of south dakota is an entity that must secure preclearance from the attorney general or bring a declaratory judgment action for review of a law passed by the state legislature that impacts voting in covered counties", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npremised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was “abridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona’s new law “make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that state may not compel political parties to allow nonmembers to vote in primary elections", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\npremised on the requirement that some voters pay a poll tax. Id. The Court emphasized that the issue was not whether Virginia could require all voters to file a certificate of residency each year, but that voters were required to file such certificate only if they refused to pay a poll tax. Id. at 542, 85 S.Ct. 1177. Thus, their right to vote was “abridged ... by reason of failure to pay the poll tax.” Id. Here, voters do not have to choose between paying a poll tax and providing proof of citizenship when they register to vote. They have only to provide the proof of citizenship. Nor does Arizona’s new law “make[ ] the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.” Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (holding that the twentyfourth amendment abolished the poll tax as a requirement for voting in federal elections" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nselling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (recognizing strict product liability actions", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nselling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nselling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nselling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (holding that strict liability did not apply to the isolated sale of a gallon of wood stain by a merchant that sells cabinets", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nselling airplanes. Id. at 448. Citing comment f to section 402A, the court held that Ozark Airlines was an intermediate owner engaged in the business of providing scheduled commercial air transportation. Id. As such, its sale of surplus aircraft was merely incidental to its business. Id. at 448-49. See also Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., et al., 680 F.Supp. 1343, 1347 (E.D.Mo.1988), aff'd 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir.1988) (section 402A liability does not extend to occasional seller). Other jurisdictions that have codified or adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have routinely found that the isolated sale of a product by an occasional seller is not subject to the rule of strict liability. See Lancaster v. W.A. Hartzell & Associates, Inc., 54 Or.App. 886, 637 P.2d 150 (1981) (holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective" ]

[ "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexplanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (recognizing that an applicants failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexplanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (recognizing distinction made in maynard that one accomplices outofcourt statement may corroborate the incourt testimony of another accomplice but outofcourt testimony of a testifying accomplice cannot be used to corroborate his own testimony", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexplanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that a failure to corroborate ones testimony with supporting evidence cannot form the sole basis for an adverse credibility determination", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexplanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that when the ij has reason to question an aliens credibility material and easily available corroboration may be required", "In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nexplanation that any such discrepancy was a result of miscommunication with his lawyer. See Majid,i v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005). Hariyanto argues that he corrected the error regarding his religion with the asylum officer during his asylum interview, but he failed to exhaust this contention before the BIA and the Government has raised this failure to exhaust in its brief; we therefore decline to consider this issue. See Lin Zhang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-20 (2d Cir.2007) (describing the issue exhaustion requirement as an “affirmative defense subject to waiver”). The adverse credibility finding was also based on Hariyanto’s failure to submit sufficient evidence corroborating his claim. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2007) (holding that an ij may not use general information contained in a state department report to discredit specific testimony regarding an applicants personal experience" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n— a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (holding agencies of state government are part of the state for purposes of sovereign immunity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n— a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (holding that foia exemptions are not mandatory bars to disclosure because the purpose of foia is to provide broad disclosure of government documents", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n— a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (holding that the duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor but the government as a whole including its investigative agencies", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n— a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (holding that state and local government agencies were not persons under the fca", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\n— a variety of their people to get all the documents for — reference the fish pond together. And it took some time. I mean, he’s not — he’s not the only reporter that we end up having to do work for. Although MacPherson testified that the reason for the delay was that assembly of the eleven pages “took some time,” she could not remember when she first asked that the documents be assembled or when she received the assembled documents. In the 108 days it took to fill the request, she only remembers making three phone calls to two people in an effort to get the request filled. ¶ 31 Although a request for voluminous documents that are not all located in the same place might justify some delay in responding to a document request, cf. Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F.Supp. 174, 175-76 (D.D.C.1976) (holding that the failure of two government agencies to process a disclosure request within the time provisions of the foia was not in effect a denial of the request because those agencies were faced with an unpredictable backlog of requests that were being processed in chronological order" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that treating a defendants failure to appear as a waiver not only of the right to be present but of the right to have a hearing on the motion was error", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that the defendant waived the right to challenge a suppression ruling on appeal", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that nonminority employees had the right to intervene to challenge the promotional remedy but not to contest the existence of past discrimination", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that if no notice was given prior to the institution of an action a condition precedent to the right to bring the action does not exist and the buyerplaintiff has lost the right of his remedy", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat 605. The district court found this and similar statements sufficient to support its conclusion that, “[i]n essence, the Seipels wish merely to have a voice in controlling the timing and processing of this lawsuit (which is no concern of theirs) in the hope that, if they succeed in obtaining a judgment in the Territorial Court, they can satisfy it by recourse to the $250,000.” Mountain Top, slip op. at 4. This argument- fails to recognize the scope of interests encompassed in Rule 24(a)(2). Proposed inter-venors need not have an interest.in every aspect of the litigation. They are entitled to intervene as to specific issues so long as their interest in those issues is significantly pro-tectable. See, e.g., Harris 820 F.2d at 599; Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 962 (11th Cir.1986) (holding that in order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment based on a plea of guilty or no contest a defendant must bring forward a full statement of facts including a transcription of the plea proceedings" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMorris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting testimony to only one witness where additional witnesses would have provided the same testimony", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMorris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (holding that a district court was entitled to accept or reject testimony on the basis of the witnesses demeanor and candor or lack thereof and contradictions in the witnesses testimony", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMorris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (holding that strength of testimony is not the result of a calculus of witnesses", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMorris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (holding that material for witnesses need not be produced to defendant where the witnesses were not called as government witnesses at trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nMorris intriguingly argues that he could not have been guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because Mississippi does not permit an instruction defining the limits of reasonable doubt. Morris argues that by not requiring the court to define the limits of reasonable doubt, Mississippi is in effect trampling upon the requirement that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Mississippi however has a longstanding policy of relying upon jurors to determine whether their doubt is reasonable, and prohibits any instruction that would presume to define the nature of reasonable doubt. Isaacks v. State, 337 So.2d 928, 930 (Miss.1976). ¶ 9. We find no error in the refusal of the requested instruction. III. IS THE VERDICT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVID 03, 806 (1957) (holding that selfinterested witnesses can be reliable when they provide detailed testimony that is corroborated by other witnesses or facts" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nFed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding that a period of paid leave does not qualify as a suspension", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nFed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding that the defendants evidence did not qualify as newly discovered evidence", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nFed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding that the spraying of an overabundance of wastewater onto irrigation fields may qualify as a point source", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nFed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding negligence on the part of the attorney does not qualify for such relief", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nFed.Reg. 68,722 at 68,724-25 (“Although water quality problems also can occur from agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture, this area of concern is statutorily exempted from regulation as a point source under the Clean Water Act.”). Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the Clean Water Act’s exemptions for irrigated agriculture are inapplicable to defendant’s operations because defendant’s possible over-application of fruit processing wastewater to its crops is more akin to industrial, non-agricultural activities. The only case to support this position was decided seven years before Congress added the exemption for agricultural runoff to the Clean Water Act. United States v. Oxford Royal Mushroom Products, Inc., 487 F.Supp. 852, 854 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding that the department of transportation may be enjoined from diverting water flow onto a landowners property" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclass actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (holding that advertising and selling expenses incurred by a manufacturer clearly fall within the class of charges which congress intended to be included in the tax base as they enter into the composition of the wholesale selling price", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclass actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (recognizing cause of action by class member against class counsel for negligence in providing notice", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclass actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (recognizing that wjithout the class action mechanism corporations selling smallvalue items for which it is unlikely that consumers would keep receipts are free to engage in false advertising overcharging and a variety of other wrongs without consequence", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclass actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (holding that facilitating small claims is the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nclass actions because of the concept’s novelty. Aseertainability, as defined by defendant, is particularly misguided when applied to a case where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defendant’s own acts or omissions. Had defendant obtained the identities of consumers when giving out $25 gift cards, the problems it now offers as grounds for upending certification would not exist. Allowing a defendant to escape responsibility for its alleged wrongdoing by dint of its particular recordkeeping policies — an outcome admittedly un-troubling to some federal courts — is not in harmony with the principles governing class actions. See Byrd, supra, 784 F.3d at 176, 2015 WL 1727613, at *14, 2015 U.S.App. LEXIS 6190, at *50 (Rendell, J., concurring) (recognizing a narrow class of cases in which the termination of the class representatives claim for relief does not moot the claims of the class members" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nN.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (holding that a plaintiff must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nN.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (holding that defendant has initial burden to establish link between fourth amendment violation and challenged evidence", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nN.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (holding that an intervening act of misconduct by the plaintiff can break the causal link between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nN.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (recognizing that where plaintiff is from the forum state and defendant is from an alternate forum each forum can claim a connection to one of the parties", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nN.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000). In many ways, plaintiffs seek to base jurisdiction for their claims against these defendants on the in-forum contacts of plaintiffs own subsidiary, C & F. By this logic, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which plaintiff had a subsidiary. Imposing jurisdiction on such “random” and “fortuitous” grounds would undermine the due process considerations on which the minimum contacts analysis is based. See Waste Mgmt., supra, 138 N.J. at 121, 649 A.2d 379; see also Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1698, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 142 (1978). Indeed, such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is precluded by well-established due process principles. Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at 15, 134 S.Ct. at 1122, 188 L.Ed.2d at 21 (holding that plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndemonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the preindictment delay was a due process violation because actual prejudice was shown and the state had shown absolutely no need for any investigative delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndemonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that delay in prescription was not eighth amendment violation because delay was inadvertent and quickly rectified", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndemonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that a twoday delay was insufficient to establish deliberate indifference and citing cases where no deliberate indifference was found after a sixteenday delay a sixday delay and a threemonth delay", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndemonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that prescription delay was not violation because plaintiff could not establish detrimental effect of delay in treatment", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndemonstrate that \"the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.\" Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). It is not enough that an official \"fail[s] to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not.\" Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The proposition that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs can amount to a constitutional violation has been well-settled since Estelle in 1976. Moreover, numerous decisions have involved the withholding or delayed administration of medication. See, e.g., Canady v. Wilkinson, 90 Fed.Appx. 863 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that twoyear delay was not reasonable" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (holding that motions for summary judgment in patent cases must be considered with unusual caution", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (holding that unsworn statements may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate because no genuine issue of material fact existed and no expert testimony was required to explain the nature of the patented invention but observing that district courts should approach summary judgment motions in patent cases with great care", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (holding that the trial court grants or denies motions for summary judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motions for summary judgment and the responses thereto", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAND ORDER DISPOSING OF ALL PENDING MOTIONS McMAHON, District Judge. The various pending motions are disposed of as follows: 1. TM’s motion for Leave to Rely on the Statement of Ethan Miller is granted, and IBM’s cross-motion to strike the statement is denied. 2. IBM’s motion for summary judgment relating to the ’342 patent is denied, on the ground that there are myriad disputed issues of material fact, almost all of them concerning the question of substantial equivalence under the Doctrine 985). See also, e.g., C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 262 F.Supp. 213 (E.D.N.Y.1966) (recognizing that summary judgment must be approached with special caution in discrimination cases" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (recognizing that oath taken to honor state constitution makes it the justices duty to apply the state constitution when it does not conflict with the federal constitution", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (holding that montanas constitution does not create a right to welfare", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (holding that rcw 1040200 does not create a constitutional right to be advised of immigration consequences therefore failure to comply with statute does not create constitutional harm", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (holding that the employer intended to create a new employee welfare benefit plan", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhile not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution, the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right to pursue life’s basic necessities.” Wadsworth v. Montana, 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1172 (1996). In Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held “that the opportunity to pursue employment, while not specifically enumerated as a fundamental constitutional right under Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution is, notwithstanding, necessarily encompassed within it and is itself a fundamental right because it is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 219 Mont. 426, 430, 712 P.2d 1309, 1311-13 (1986) (holding that the constitution does not encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (recognizing the existence of the special relationship", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant requirement", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (holding that imposing the traditional warrant and probablecause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the illinois probation system because the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officers ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer and would facilitate the probationers evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (recognizing the searchincidenttoarrest exception to the warrant requirement", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In all “special needs” cases, the nature of the need addressed makes particularized suspicion impossible or otherwise renders the warrant requirement impractical. For example, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court noted that requiring a warrant before a search of a probationer’s home would “interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system,” and would “reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.” Similarly, the Burger Court noted that “surprise is crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at remedying this major social problem is to function at all.” 482 U.S. at 710, 107 S.Ct. 2636; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (recognizing that the special need articulated must make the warrant and probablecause requirement impracticable before waiving those requirements" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthis court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that even if the calculation commenced on the date of the first indictment the defendants right to a speedy trial was not violated", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthis court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that the fourth amendment does not mandate the payment of money by the united states", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthis court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that where a defendant acquiesces in a continuance that time is excluded from the speedy trial calculation", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthis court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that party who sought stay after mandate had issued first had to show that mandate ought to be recalled and then had to show that recalled mandate should be stayed", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthis court to read § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii) as requiring “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions from sources in the nonattainrrient area.” Under this interpretation, EPA would need to determine that the Cincinnati area has achieved attainment status solely because sources within the confines of the nonattainment area have sufficiently reduced their emissions; improvements in Cincinnati air quality due to emissions reductions from anywhere else would be ignored. EPA and the Intervenors respond that the statutory text is silent on the location of the reductions and that k regional foc Cir.2008) (rejecting a “regionwide approach to CAIR” where § 7410(a)(2)(D)© required a focus on sources “within the State”); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 382 F.3d 575, 585-87 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that epa violated the mandate of 7511ablb which requires calculation of baseline emissions from all anthropogenic sources in the area" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (holding that a deposition that was not presented to the trial court could not be considered on appeal", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (holding that we cannot properly receive and consider evidence that was not presented to and considered by the trial court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (holding that appellate court may only review issues actually presented to and considered by the trial court", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (holding that the trial court properly added a party defendant to conform to the evidence presented at the trial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand Ek sold the vessel with the anchor, rope, and chain still on it. Even if Ek did misappropriate these items, Peterson does not have standing to assert the claim of a third party. Standing in this court is a rule of judicial self-restraint that asks whether the person raising a particular claim is a \" 'proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue.' ” Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 23 n. 25 (Alaska 1976) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). We cannot consider the purported transfer of the materials lien from Dockery to Peterson because it was not in the record before the superior court and was improperly included in Peterson's excerpt of record. Alaska R.App. P. 210. See also B.B. v. D.D., 18 P.3d 1210, 1214 (Alaska 2001) (holding that an issue not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (holding that the plaintiffs mere failure to execute on a judgment the only allegedly fraudulent act is not fraudulent concealment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (holding allegation of fraudulent concealment did not affect the running of the survival statute", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (holding that engle established the conduct elements of a fraudulent concealment cause of action", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nF.2d 460, 461 (6th Cir.1980). However, because of this statutory provision, creditors may continue to pursue their remedies against a dissolved corporation despite its formal nonexistence if the action is commenced within two years from the date of dissolution. Lottman v. Piper Indus., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y.1989) (applying Tennessee law, dismissing claim pursuant to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 which was filed more than two years after dissolution). Statutes similar to T.C.A. § 48-1-1013 have been described as survival statutes rather than statutes of limitation. 19 Am. Jur.2d Corporations § 2897 (1986) (discussing the provision found in the Model Business Corporations Act). The Supreme Court of South Dakota explained ., 448 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1978), aff'd 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.1979) (holding that the concealment of ones identity does not toll the running of the statute of limitations" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfurther supported the government’s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with “reckless disregard for the truth.” In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with “reckless disregard for the truth”we are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (holding evidence insufficient to support finding of implied contract", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfurther supported the government’s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with “reckless disregard for the truth.” In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with “reckless disregard for the truth”we are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (holding that the evidence presented at a factfinding hearing was sufficient to support the chins finding", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfurther supported the government’s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with “reckless disregard for the truth.” In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with “reckless disregard for the truth”we are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (holding evidence sufficient to support trial courts finding in aggravation that the offense was planned", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfurther supported the government’s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with “reckless disregard for the truth.” In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with “reckless disregard for the truth”we are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (holding that the wiretap application as corrected was sufficient to support a finding of necessity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfurther supported the government’s position. After reviewing the evidence in the record-especially the Franks hearing testimony regarding the states of mind of the government agents-and applying the correct understanding of reckless disregard, we conclude that the record does not support the finding that the omission of the SEC investigation in the Title III wiretap application was made with “reckless disregard for the truth.” In any event, even if we were to assume, arguendo, the opposite conclusion-that government officials omitted information about the SEC investigation with “reckless disregard for the truth”we are persuaded that this omission was not material, substantially for the reasons stated in the District Court’s analysis on that issue. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *21-24 (holding that the testimony of an obligor as to amount of payments was sufficient evidence to support findings of actual support paid" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. “A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the “totality of the circumstances” there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding warrant valid where search warrant application affidavit was signed and probable cause existed for issuance of warrant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. “A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the “totality of the circumstances” there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding that eyewitness accounts and an officers observations established probable cause", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. “A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the “totality of the circumstances” there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding affiant entitled to rely upon observations of investigators as basis for probable cause for search warrant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. “A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the “totality of the circumstances” there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding that observations made a during prior illegal search should not have been included in the affidavit for the search warrant", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(same). Hames may nevertheless be liable for the damage caused by the search if, as Sosa asserts, Hames made material misstatements and omissions in the Affidavit supporting the Warrant. “A search warrant may be voided if the affidavit supporting the warrant contains deliberate falsity or reckless disregard for the truth ... and this rule includes material omissions.” Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). “Nonetheless, the warrant is valid if, absent the misstatements or omissions, there remains sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause.” Id. (allegedly misstated or omitted facts did not alter determination that considering the “totality of the circumstances” there was a sufficient basis 11, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965) (holding that under fourth amendment standards for determining probable cause for arrest and probable cause for search and seizure are same" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMerkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [¶ 42.] It is a “well established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.” Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely letter with the irs that requested a refund and subsequently filed a formal refund claim", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMerkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [¶ 42.] It is a “well established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.” Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (holding that the statute of limitations is tolled during a malicious prosecution suit when a timely complaint is filed", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMerkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [¶ 42.] It is a “well established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.” Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (recognizing that 2244dlds statute of limitations can be tolled", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMerkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [¶ 42.] It is a “well established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.” Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (holding under section 7422a that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a taxpayers refund claim because the taxpayer failed to file a refund claim before the statute of limitations had run", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nMerkwan v. Leckey, 376 N.W.2d 52, 53 (S.D.1985); Burke v. Foss, 334 N.W.2d 861, 864 (S.D.1983); Chipperfield v. Woessner, 84 S.D. 13, 14, 166 N.W.2d 727, 728 (1969)). The statute of limitations in workers compensation cases is jurisdictional in nature, as making a timely claim is an essential element of the right to compensation. Klein v. Menke, 83 S.D. 511, 517, 162 N.W.2d 219, 222 (1968) (citation omitted). [¶ 42.] It is a “well established principle that statutes of limitation applicable to suits [or claims] against the government are conditions attached to the sovereign’s consent to be sued and must be strictly construed.” Kreiger v. United States, 539 F.2d 317, 320 (3rd Cir.1976) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306, 311 (1957)) (holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (holding that an order imposing sanctions against an attorney for one of the parties in a pending case is final and therefore immediately appealable by the attorney", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (holding suspended attorney in contempt of rule 217j and ordering attorney to immediately cease and desist from all activities in connection with representation of claimants and employers in unemployment compensation proceedings and comply with all provisions of rule 217", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a suspended attorney should not be permitted to have contact with clients", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (holding that in a case where a suspended attorney commingled funds between his attorney trust account and attorney business account and the funds could not be traced claimants state of new jersey and clients security fund reached an amicable agreement to divide the funds equally", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthe Disciplinary Enforcement Rules for its contrary decision because, in its view, enforcement of the Disciplinary Enforcement Rules falls within the exclusive authority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Board. Id. at 321, citing Pa.R.D,E. 201(a) (exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Disciplinary Board under these rules extends to attorney admitted to practice law in Commonwealth and formerly admitted attorney). The court acknowledged this Court previously held a suspended attorney in contempt for violation of Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 217(j) for representing claimants in unemployment proceedings. Powell, 128 A.3d at 321, citing In the Matter of David Louis Bargeron, No. 1073 DD3, 2011 Pa. LEXIS 1695, at *1 (Pa. July 27, 2011) (per curiam) (holding that the trial judge must comply with rule 3172c8 and advise all defendants in all cases that the plea may subject him or her to deportation " ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\non a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (holding that courts should address a procedural unconscionability defense to the enforcement of an arbitration provision", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\non a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\non a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (holding in the context of a forumselection provision that the balancing of procedural and substantive unconscionability requires courts to consider each questionable forumselection clause on a casebycase basis and precludes the development of a brightline rule", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\non a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (holding that procedural unconscionability is properly evaluated at the time a contract is negotiated", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\non a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, and, consequently, the Fourth Circuit held, it was premature to resolve the issue of unconscionability without allowing the parties to “present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the original consummation of their contractual relationship,” including the existence of meaningful alternatives. See Carlson, 883 F.2d at 292-93 (observing, “unconscionability generally ... include[s] an absence of meaningful choice”) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). As discussed, plaintiffs have submitted no evidence to support a finding that Smith lack a reasonable alternative, or any other evidence to support a finding of procedural unconscionability. See Aron, 143 Cal. App.4th at 808, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 555 (holding claim of unconscionability requires showing of both procedural and substantive elements" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIn his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding that trial court properly granted directed verdict when plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to state cause of action under the dtp a", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIn his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIn his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIn his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (holding insufficient the plaintiffs generic allegations", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nIn his pleadings, Ordonez alleged that Johnson had been negligent per se based on his failure to maintain an assured clear distance between the two vehicles as required by statute. At the close of Ordo-nez’s case, McCurdy moved for a directed verdict on that claim, alleging that Ordonez failed to present any evidence supporting a finding of negligence per se. The trial court entered a directed verdict on Ordonez’s negligence per se claims. At the charge conference, Ordonez requested an instruction on the negligence per se issue, which the trial court refused. To survive a directed verdict, it is axiomatic that a party must state a theory of recovery recognized at law. See Group Hosp. Servs. Inc. v. One & Two Brookriver Center, 704 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1986, no writ) (recognizing that a motion for directed verdict should be granted when there is no reasonable evidence upon which a jury could legally predicate a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncheckpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (holding a county and a road district had standing to sue state highway commission and county tax collector based on their interest in and control over the public roads of the county", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncheckpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (recognizing county officers as those whose general authority and jurisdiction are confined within the limits of the county in which they are appointed who are appointed in and for a particular county and whose duties apply only to that county and through whom the county performs its usual political functions ", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncheckpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (holding that evidence demonstrates that the checkpoints were modeled after the successful program in phelps county that evidence shows that the particular checkpoints at issue here were planned in such a way as to increase the likelihood of actually capturing drug traffickers that evidence also demonstrated that phelps county law enforcement officials who helped texas county officials operate the checkpoint had been told by drug couriers that they had been warned to avoid 144 a quick glance at a missouri road map reveals that us 60 is the other major westtoeast roadway across southern missouri", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncheckpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (holding that defendants successful completion of pretrial intervention program in one county and the entry of a nolle prosequi as to the relevant charges in that county barred subsequent prosecution in a separate county for charges arising out of the same conduct", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncheckpoints are inherently unconstitutional, the checkpoints the Court sanctions today are designed in such a way as to engender fright and concern in law-abiding motorists. Also, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, demonstrate neither empirical evidence of checkpoint effectiveness, nor that explicit, neutral guidelines for police conduct were issued and followed. The trial courts had sufficient evidence to hold that the checkpoints were conducted in an unreasonable fashion, and therefore, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 . State v. Rodriguez, 877 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Mo. banc 1994). 2 . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 3 . See State v. Miller, 894 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Mo. banc 1995). 4 . See, e.g. Op. at 573-574 (holding that both saline county and grant county had jurisdiction to try the appellant for murder where the actual killing occurred in one county but the acts requisite to the consummation of the murder and the subsequent disposal of the body occurred in the other county" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that before denying petition trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and state specific reasons for denying the petition", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that an appeal denying a petition for what was essentially a petition for a new trial to reopen the criminal process was not separately appealable", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that the trial court must consider these factors in denying appellants petition to transfer prior to trial", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that untimely petition for postconviction petition divests trial court of jurisdiction", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n-activity to which the petition to seal pertains. Once the applicant receives the certificate of eligibility, he or she then petitions the court to seal the record. § 943.059, Fla. Stat. (2016). However, criminal records that “relate to” certain enumerated offenses, such as violations listed in section 907.041, Florida Statutes, which includes an act of domestic violence, cannot be sealed by the court. Id Here, the FDLE should have issued the certificate because Lazard satisfied the conditions of section 943.059(2). Then, upon a petition to seal, it would be for the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Lazard’s offense “related, to” an act of domestic violence precluding his record from being sealed. See J.A.H. v. State, 198 So.3d 884, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding that district court error was not clear error in denying petition for mandamus" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nnotice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that “[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect ” the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court’s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (holding that a timely filed motion for sanctions which specifically requested modification of judgment extended trial courts plenary power", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nnotice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that “[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect ” the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court’s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (holding that any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable but only a motion seeking a substantive change will extend the appellate deadlines and the trial courts plenary power", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nnotice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that “[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect ” the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court’s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (recognizing plenary power of district court to alter interlocutory orders", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nnotice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that “[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect ” the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court’s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (holding that appellate timetable is extended by filing postjudgment motion or other instrument that is 1 timely filed and 2 assails the trial courts judgment", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nnotice has been provided to the interested parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 316; see Jenkins v. Jenkins, 16 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Rule 329b(h) provides that “[i]f a judgment is modified, corrected or reformed in any respect ” the appellate timetable runs from the date of the new judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(h)(emphasis added); Lane Bank Equipment Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313. Any change to a judgment made by the trial court while it retains plenary jurisdiction will restart the appellate timetable under Rule 329b(h). Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313. Since Appellants timely filed a motion for new trial seeking a substantive change in the judgment, the court signed the judgment nunc pro tunc during the court’s plenary power. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e); Lane Bank, 10 S.W.3d at 313 (holding that a nonpartys motion for new trial and petition for intervention filed after the trial court signed a final judgment did not extend the courts plenary jurisdiction" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when “ ‘on the entire evidence’ the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that the states rule dates the beginning of the discovery period only from the filing of the answer", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when “ ‘on the entire evidence’ the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that requests for admissions are subject to discovery cutoff dates", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when “ ‘on the entire evidence’ the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that plaintiff need not have submitted requests for admissions by the august 15 discovery motion cutoff date or by the discovery cutoff date of september 15 because requests for admissions are distinct from other general discovery devices and are not subject to discovery cutoff dates", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when “ ‘on the entire evidence’ the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that a discovery exception to a statute of limitation applies only to the discovery of facts not discovery of the law", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n289, 292 (D.D.C.2000); Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 126 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1989). Such a finding is proper when “ ‘on the entire evidence’ the court ‘is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Neuder, 194 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 365, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)); see also Arakeli-an, 126 F.R.D. at 2. I. Protective Order Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission ... of any m have treated requests for admissions as being subject to discovery cutoff dates. See Coram Health Care Corp. of Ill. v. MCI Worldcom Communications, Inc., No. 01 C 1096, 2001 WL 1467681, at *3 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that a request for admission is a tool of discovery subject to discovery cutoff dates" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the claim.” Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred “during the investigation and evaluation.” See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (“These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during ‘the investigation and evaluation of the claim’ and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that higher rate would not be awarded for supplemental fees because there was no showing that any special factor justifies an increased rate for litigating the attorney fees motion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the claim.” Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred “during the investigation and evaluation.” See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (“These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during ‘the investigation and evaluation of the claim’ and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the claim.” Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred “during the investigation and evaluation.” See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (“These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during ‘the investigation and evaluation of the claim’ and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that fees may be awarded for litigating amount of fees only where language of statute supports such conclusion", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the claim.” Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred “during the investigation and evaluation.” See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (“These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during ‘the investigation and evaluation of the claim’ and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that such fees are discretionary but routinely awarded", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nof the claim.” Here the court has tacked on fees for litigating the issue of presuit noncompliance, as well as for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Under the plain text of the statute, however, the liability is only for the narrow purpose specified and therefore the amount awarded should have been limited to those incurred “during the investigation and evaluation.” See Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1996) (“These provisions for sanctions focus on the presuit period during ‘the investigation and evaluation of the claim’ and apparently contemplate the imposition of sanctions for the expense and effort that one party may have unnecessarily caused the other to incur during that presuit period.”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993) (holding that where a state statute provides for the award of attorneys fees those fees can be considered as part of the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal diversity jurisdiction" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding that error in omitting requisite mental state from application paragraph of charge did not result in egregious harm", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding that charge error that allowed jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense caused egregious harm", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding jury charge error consisting of disjunctive submission of three separate sexual assault offenses without unanimity instruction caused egregious harm to defendant", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding egregious harm standard applied where appellant failed to object to lack of instruction on accomplice witness testimony", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas to whether this error resulted in egregious harm under Almanza. See Trejo, 280 S.W.Bd at 261. The author of the concurring opinion in Teal expressly distinguished the situation in the case at hand from the situation in Teal. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 183-84. Therefore, the concurring opinion in Teal does not support the State’s argument that the charge error in this case did not result in egregious harm. We do not find any other information revealed by the record relevant to the egregious-harm analysis. Conclusion Having considered the factors set forth in Almanza, we hold appellant was egregiously harmed by the trial court’s submission of a charge authorizing the jury to convict appellant for an unindicted offense. See Daniels v. State, 754 S.W.2d 214, 222-23 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (holding charge error which authorized jury to convict without finding every requisite element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt was egregious based on the entirety of the charge the contested evidence and the arguments of counsel" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that misrepresentation was essential to plaintiffs claim", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that it is not an appellate courts function to make findings of fact", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that coming to work regularly is an essential function", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding that imposition of punishment is a judicial function", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nTree. 10 . Under the ADA, a reasonable accommodation may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 11 . While there appears to be some issue as to whether Susie's frequent absences prevent her from meeting the statutory requirement that she is a \"qualified individual with a disability,\" 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8), the parties have failed to adequately develop this issue in the summary judgment record before the court. The court does note, however, that federal courts have frequently held that \"[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADEA.” Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d at 213. See also Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C.Cir.1994) (holding it is not reasonable to require an employer to hire a helper to do overhead work for a miner who cannot perform this essential job function alone" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (holding that the commission exercises substantial discretion in selecting the appropriate ratemaking methodology and this is especially true where as here the issues involve complex factual determinations peculiarly within the expertise of the commission", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (holding that the legislature granted exclusive authority over ratemaking to the public service commission", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (holding that the commission on remand can set the effective date of a rate to be the effective date of the original commission activity", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat Gorman was not a credible witness or that the Commission erred by considering Gorman’s testimony, that argument fails because this court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Darkenwald v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 182 Wn. App. 157, 172, 328 P.3d 977 (2014), aff’d, 183 Wn.2d 237, 350 P.3d 647 (2015). 32 It is reasonable that, because the various parties disagreed about the best approach, the parties would submit competing evidence and proposals. And because competing evidence was presented, the Commission would have used its discretion to make complex factual determinations and select a proposal. It is precisely in this sort of circumstance that we defer to the Commission’s discretion and authority. See US W. Commc’ns I, 134 Wn.2d at 56 (quoting Cole, 79 Wn.2d at 309 (holding that the language of the statute is mandatory and the commission must act within 180 days" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequest for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (holding that the absence in the notice of removal of copies of the summonses served on the defendants uncorrected until after the thirty 30 day removal period had expired violates 28 usc 1446a and bars removal", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequest for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (holding that oneyear period runs from the discovery of the transfer", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequest for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (holding that the thirty day removal period runs from the date of fdics plea in intervention and notice of substitution", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequest for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (recognizing that while defendants may freely amend their notice of removal within thirty days of service they may not add new grounds for removal after the thirty day period has expired", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nrequest for an award of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees. This case is hereby REMANDED to the 193rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas. SO ORDERED. 1 . 12 U.S.C. § 1819 was amended by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (\"FIRREA”), with the effective date of amendment August 9, 1989. FIRREA's removal provisions became effective as of that date. Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Svc. Corp., 884 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir.1989). 2 . The Court agrees with Plaintiff that it need not decide whether the FDIC must remove a case within thirty days of its appointment as receiver for a failed thrift where the thrift is already a party to litigation. See, e.g., FDIC v. Brooks, 652 F.Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.Tex.1985) (\"Brooks I\") (Woodward, J.) (holding that the limitations period in section 1640e runs from the date of consummation of the transaction" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nit may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nit may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial includes the right to a reasonably prompt sentencing", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nit may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (holding that trial courts limited findings were insufficient to allow determination of whether trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion to dismiss his indictment on constitutional speedy trial grounds", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nit may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (holding that delay resulting from prior incompetence to stand trial does not violate speedy trial guarantee", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nit may ‘skew[] the fairness of the entire system.’ ” Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 600 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S.Ct. 2686). In this case, the delay did not cause Ashburn any pretrial incarceration because Ashburn was already in prison for another offense. Thus, while Ashburn argues on appeal that “[w]here a defendant is incarcerated during delay, like Mr. Ash-burn, ‘he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense,’ ” it was not the delay which caused this prejudice. Ash-burn also does not claim any actual prejudice to his defense. In fact, the government claims that the delay, if anything, harmed its case because one of the witnesses (an individual who had found the body), died prior to trial. Ashburn, though, h Cir.2013) (holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (holding based on similar facts and a delay of three and onehalf years that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have held that these circumstances resulted in laches", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (holding abuse of discretion is established if district court decision was based on an error of law", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (holding that delay for three and onehalf years was unreasonable under rule 60b6", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (holding a three and onehalf year delay was unreasonable", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nas the starting date for calculating Gasser’s delay in filing suit. Thus, although the court credited Gasser’s testimony at least to the extent that this meeting took place, it failed to draw reasonable inferences in favor of Gasser about what took place during this encounter. Given Gasser’s testimony that at the conclusion of the meeting he felt that Infanti would comply with the agreement, and that he saw no evidence that Infanti was not complying with the agreement until 1986, a reasonable inference would be that Gasser had no reason to sue until at least 1986, a difference in the delay period that might well have made a difference in the final outcome. See, e.g., Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia s.p.a., 944 F.2d 870, 878-79, 20 USPQ2d 1045, 1052 (Fed.Cir.1991) (holding district court abused discretion in denying leave to amend complaint to add count when no prejudice resulted from two and onehalf year delay and facts underlying new and old counts were similar" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (holding that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates constitutional rights the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (holding that pma process is not specific regulation because the requirements are not contained in formal regulation", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (holding that perfection not required for regulation to be reasonable courts task is simply to determine whether regulation is reasonably related to agencys statutory mandate", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (holding that the challenge to a university regulation was moot because the regulation had been substantially amended", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nId. at 94-95. 12 . Id. 13 . Id. at 95. 14 . Id. 15 . Id. 16 . AS 18.70.080(a)(2). 17 . AS 08.40.240. 18 . O’Callaghan, 996 P.2d at 94. 19 . AS 18.70.080. 20 . AS 08.40.240-250. 21 . See AS 08.40.210; Ch. 132, § 9, SLA 1988. 22 . See H. Fin. Comm. Minutes (March 22, 1988) (comments of Eugene R. Rutland, Executive Director, Mechanical Contractors of Fairbanks). 23 .Id. 24 . See 13 AAC 50.020(12)(b) (1988) (adopting Uniform Mechanical Code by reference to Uniform Building Code). 25 . 858 P.2d 621, 624 n. 1 (Alaska 1993). 26 . Stepovak—Shumagin Set Net Ass’n v. State, Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632, 637 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Gilbert v. State, Dep't of Fish & Game, 803 P.2d 391, 398 (Alaska 1990)). 27 . O'Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). See also Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 397 (holding that where a regulation could not fairly be read to have spoken at all on an issue an agencys proposed interpretation of the regulation as it pertained to that issue was not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (holding the family court has jurisdiction to join third parties when property is alleged to be marital but is owned by a third party", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (holding in addition to the requirements in 23a and 23b the plaintiff must also show that the class is indeed identifiable as a class", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (recognizing that either party to a divorce action may bring in third parties who claim an interest in the property alleged to be community or third parties themselves may intervene and have their rights therein determined", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (holding that a plaintiff must allege either an interference with specific third parties or an identifiable class of third persons", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe party with whom the plaintiff expects to do business.” Schuler v. Abbott Laboratories, 265 Ill.App.3d 991, 203 Ill.De\\c. 105, 639 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1993). Because Cook did not name any particular third party with whom he had a reasonable expectation of a business relationship, or toward whom Winfrey directed her interfering actions, the court concluded that the complaint was inadequate. Cook responds to this dismissal by identifying Illinois cases holding that the plaintiff may point to an identifiable “class” of third parties with whom he had a business expectancy (and toward whom the defendant directed her interfering actions), rather than a single third party. See, e.g., River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 281 Ill.App.3d 154, 217 Ill.Dec. 410, 667 N.E.2d 499, 507 (1996) (holding there is no duty to third parties on the part of a premises owner who could not have foreseen the criminal acts of third parties" ]

[ "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nothers] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen” without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that municipal ordinance was preempted by frsa and void under supremacy clause", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nothers] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen” without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (holding city ordinance preempted by state law because ordinance prohibited act specifically allowed under state law", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nothers] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen” without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (holding preempted municipal housing ordinance that would effectively remove persons from the city based on a snapshot of their current immigration status rather than based on a federal order of removal", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nothers] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen” without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution", "In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nothers] under the age of 30 ... who came to the United States under the age of sixteen” without authorization and meet certain other criteria. Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secy of Homeland Security, to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Imm. Servs.; and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Imm. & Customs Enforcement, at I (June 15, 2012), and citing Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. Times, June 16, 2012, at Al). 4 . Courts considering similar enactments prior to Arizona likewise held them unconstitutional. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that a local ordinance prohibiting rental housing for illegal aliens was not field preempted and did not conflict with the federal removal process and where the ordinance specified it did not prohibit conduct expressly permitted by federal law did not conflict with federal antiharboring law" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncredibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch’s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch’s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, “the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.” 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was “completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.” 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the failure to disclose evidence known to the defense cannot form the basis of a brady violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncredibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch’s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch’s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, “the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.” 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was “completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.” 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding as brady violation prosecutions failure to disclose to defense that prosecution had agreed not to prosecute key witness in exchange for his testimony at trial", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncredibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch’s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch’s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, “the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.” 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was “completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.” 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding impeachment evidence falls within the brady rule", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncredibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch’s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch’s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, “the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.” 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was “completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.” 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the alleged brady material was merely cumulative to the significant impeachment that already occurred during trial so there was no prejudice for a brady violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ncredibility for different reasons. The withheld evidence went to Storch’s sophistication and motivation in his capacity as a prosecution informant and not, like the other evidence produced at trial, to his general propensity for dishonesty. Even if the lies did not provide a novel angle of attack on Storch’s credibility, which we believe they do, as we explained in Killian, “the finders of fact were deprived of the fundamental inference that if [the government informant] lied about X, Y, and Z, it is quite likely that he lied about Q, R, and S.” 282 F.3d at 1209. The evidence withheld revealed that Storch, like the witness in Bern, was “completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system.” 283 F.3d at 1059 (holding that the prosecutions failure to disclose multiple pieces of critical impeachment evidence that could have been used to undermine credibility of the jailhouse informant who testified that defendant admitted committing the murders was sufficient to violate brady" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.”); Code § 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused”). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (holding the government has an affirmative duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.”); Code § 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused”). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (holding defendant was improperly denied potentially exculpatory evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.”); Code § 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused”). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (holding that once probable cause is developed officers have no constitutional obligation to conduct further investigation in the hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.”); Code § 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused”). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (holding that record must show that evidence is exculpatory for defendant to establish brady violation", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(\"The court or jury trying the case involving a violation of clause (ii), (iii) or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or § 18.2-266.1, or 18.2-272 shall determine the innocence or guilt of the defendant from all the evidence concerning his condition at the time of the alleged offense.”); Code § 18.2-268.10(A) (providing that the \"court shall, regardless of the result of any blood or breath tests, consider other relevant admissible evidence of the condition of the accused”). 6 . See also Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 376, 379, 437 S.E.2d 242, 244 (1993) (reversing trial court's admission of certificate because appellant was not given a chance to elect between blood and breath test as required under predecessor statute); Snead v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.App. 372, 374, 437 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1993) (holding that the state has no affirmative duty to seek out and gain possession of potentially exculpatory evidence" ]

[ "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwrit denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that partys consent to the trial courts entry of judgment waives any error except for jurisdiction error contained in the judgment ", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwrit denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that a grant of summary judgment in favor of one party creates a final judgment allowing appellate review of denial of opposing partys summary judgment motion", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwrit denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding where record plainly indicated party disagreed with verdict and record contained no evidence of actual agreement between parties partys submission of proposed judgment conforming to trial courts intended judgment and containing notation that party approved it as to both form and substance did not create consent judgment", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwrit denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding the intent of parties can be inferred from sufficient details contained within the consent judgment indicating the parties understood the consent judgment operated as a final adjudication of the factual issues", "Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwrit denied). However, “[t]he phrase ‘Approved as to Form and Substance’, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a consent judgment.” Id.; Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1997, no pet.). In the absence of some indication in the record the case was settled or something in the body of the judgment indicating it was rendered by consent, that phrase above a signature on the form of judgment “is too indefinite to justify declaring as a matter of law that the judgment was a consent judgment” and that the right of appeal has been voluntarily relinquished. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Adams, 829 S.W.2d 356, 364 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied); see Andrew Shebay & Co. v. Bishop, 429 S.W.3d 644, 647-48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that failure to move for judgment after verdict entitled party only to a new trial not a judgment in its favor" ]

[ "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (holding that the married parents of their deceased son could not stack two separate um policies under which they and their son were each insureds because the antistacking statute reference to the insured contemplates the person who suffers the bodily injury or bodily injury resulting in death", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (holding that the fatal injury to a murder victim may be considered as satisfying the bodily injury component of the capital felony of kidnapping with bodily injury", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (holding that a divorced parent of a deceased child may chose to recover wrongful death damages under either her um policy or her exhusbands um policy which ever is more favorable but is prohibited by the antistacking statute from recovering under both policies", "Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nunder the anti-stacking statute. The majority does not analyze the statute and resolve this critical issue, although it admits that Andrea, as the “injured insured,” would have been limited to only one UM policy had she lived. The very reason she would be limited is because she, not her parents, is the “insured” under the anti-stacking statute. The observation that a wrongful death action is a “separate and independent” cause of action from Andrea’s personal injury action, although true, is immaterial. Op. p. 744. The Boullts are not attempting to “stack” their policies covering Andrea’s wrongful death on top of policies covering Andrea for personal injury damages. They are attempting to “stack” two UM policies providing evelopment, 94-0735 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/30/94), 646 So.2d 1242 (holding that divorced parent could not stack their separate um policies for the wrongful death of their son because the insured referred to in the antistacking statute is the person who suffers bodily injury or bodily injury which results in death" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was normally a question of law that the district court was still entitled to deference because its determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility of the witnesses", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (holding it is a question of fact", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (holding that whether or not claimant would have returned to work at all was a question of fact", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (holding the question of whether insurance companys requests were reasonable under policy language was a fact question", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand “demeaning” and testified that, in response to her supervisor’s remarks and conduct, she felt “intimidated,” “embarrassed,” and “stressed.” Fuchs also presented evidence that coworkers enlisted to assist Fuchs given her disability felt intimidated and threatened by the Employer’s comments. Plainly, Fuchs has alleged conduct by the Employer that subjectively caused her “intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Palesch, 233 F.3d at 566. As it was bound to do in ruling the Employer’s summary judgment motion, the trial court treated Fuchs’s factual assertions about the Employer’s conduct and her subjective reaction to same as true. However, harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive both as viewed subjectively by the plaintiff and as vie 88, 503 (Mo.App.E.D.1990) (holding that whether appearing in a television report about in vitro fertilization would bring shame or humiliation to a reasonable person was a question of fact for the jury" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (holding that defendants voluntary consent to search his car dissipated taint of officers illegal entry", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (holding that officers request for defendants name during an illegal entry constituted exploitation of the illegal entry under hall", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (recognizing difference in elements between offense of actual entry and attempted entry", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (holding in an impliedconsent case that a warrantless police entry was unlawful in part because the police did not request entry", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nplate. 308 Or at 93. But, when the officer approached the defendant’s car, he saw a temporary registration sticker in the window. At that point, the officer’s reason for the stop evaporated. Id. Nevertheless, the officer proceeded to ask the defendant for his driver’s license and proof of registration. The defendant’s responses to those requests led to the discovery of evidence that the defendant’s license was suspended and he was driving uninsured. The Supreme Court held that, once the reason for the stop evaporated, the officer did not have authority to ask the defendant for his license and registration, and the court affirmed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence resulting from those requests. Id. at 94; see also State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129, 134, 158 P3d 1081 (2007) (holding that a confession obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest is not admissible" ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njudgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(holding grant of authority to an agency to adopt rules necessary to carry out this chapter clearly vested in the agency authority to interpret a statute", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njudgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(holding that when congress has implicitly delegated legislative authority to an agency a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njudgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(holding that although the court has the authority to review facts not before the plan administrator the court should use that authority sparingly", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njudgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of rule 8038c", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\njudgment on a take-nothing jury verdict against plaintiffs. Appellant challenges three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, which excluded evidence relating to crashworthiness and unreasonable dangerousness. We affirm. I. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 988 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir.1993). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, we may not set aside a verdict based on an error in the exclusion of evidence, “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. To vacate a judgment based on such an error, we “must find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.” Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. (2d Cir.1981)(recognizing a trial courts common law authority to enter an interim rather than permanent parenting plan at the time of entry of a dissolution decree even in the absence of express statutory authority" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court had jurisdiction to impose rule 11 sanctions regardless of the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that an award of sanctions under rule 11 survives despite a later determination that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court could constitutionally impose rule 11 sanctions in a case in which was later determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that rule 11 sanctions imposed by district court remained in effect after case was remanded to state court upon a finding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (emphasizing the inherent power of federal courts to “manage their own affairs” and stating that “Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence.”). Furthermore, the mandates of Rule 11 are not absolute. and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits. Rather, it requires determining a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process and, if so, the appropriate sanction. Lefley v. United States, No. 259-89, 1997 WL 718468, at *11-12, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 309, at *34-35 (Ct.Cl. July 31, 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131,137-38, 112 S.Ct. 1076,117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992) (holding that a district court may impose sanctions for abuse of judicial process pursuant to rule 11 even after it is determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claims" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that filing of rule 11 agreement and hearing of jurisdictionrelated discovery dispute did not waive special appearance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that defendant did not waive his special appearance by filing a motion for new trial subject to the special appearance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that party waived special appearance", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that the defendant did not waive his special appearanee by filing a motion for sanctions that was made subject to and in the alternative to his special appearance and where the motion for sanctions was not heard or ruled upon", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof the rights of litigants.” Esty v. Beal Bank S.S.B., 298 S.W.3d 280, 297 (Tex.App.-Dal las 2009, no pet.). Interrogatories and requests for admission are not pleas, pleadings, or motions. See Exito, 142 5.W.3d at 305 n. 11 (noting that the “pleadings” in a suit are the petition and answer, and a “motion” is an “ ‘application requesting a court to make a specified rule or order’ ”) (citing Tex.R. Civ. P. 45 and quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1031 (7th ed.1999)). Further, Horowitz did not waive her special appearance by filing a motion to compel discovery. By its express terms, the motion was made subject to Horowitz’s special appearance and her motion to dismiss for forum, non conveniens. See Puri v. Mansukhani, 973 S.W.2d 701, 707 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (holding that defendant does not waive special appearance by engaging in discovery regarding merits of plaintiffs claims" ]

[ "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndo so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding a contract was divisible in its nature if the intention is expressly stated in the contract", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndo so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding new york law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions but erisa statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndo so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that noncompete provisions survived the expiration of an employment agreement where 1 the contract expressly provided that the provisions would continue to apply if the employee continued working and 2 the noncompete clause expressly stated it would continue to be in effect after the expiration or termination of employment", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndo so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding even though idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts erisa statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of erisas minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses", "In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndo so.”). Further, it is well-settled that “[a] party is bound by, and a court is powerless to rewrite, the clear and unambiguous terms of a voluntary contract.” Brooks v. Green, 993 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). This principle applies even where the terms of the contract are “harsh” or “out of the ordinary.” Id. at 61. (citations omitted). In addition, to give proper meaning to a specific contract provision, a court must consider it in the context of the entire contract. Hand, 983 So.2d at 687. When an employment agreement contains a noncompete covenant, the restriction survives the termination of the agreement if the agreement contains express language demonstrating that the parties intended its survival. Brenner v. Barco Chems. Div., Inc., 209 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that under arkansas law maximum duration of noncompete clause incident to employment agreement is three years" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nevidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative’s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (holding that parol evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual term that is ambiguous", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nevidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative’s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (holding parol evidence is admissible to show mistake", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nevidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative’s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (holding that parol evidence is admissible to establish a condition precedent to the existence of a contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nevidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative’s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (holding that parol evidence is admissible to show that an individual who signed a contract but is not named in the body is a party to the contract", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nevidence of damages. Thus we remand the case to the trial court for additional testimony limited to the damages, if any, caused by the changes in the project as envisioned by the August 18 1993 plan and as referenced in the deed from Brenco to SCDOT, and the final project as built. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. BEATTY and SHORT, JJ., concur. 1 . Breneo contends the trial court erred in finding the parol evidence rule barred its representative’s testimony regarding their belief sur rounding the access of the property to Highway 501. We agree, but even considering the testimony, we find Brenco failed to prove the deed should be rescinded due to unilateral or mutual mistake. See S. Realty & Constr. Co. v. Bryan, 290 S.C. 302, 309, 350 S.E.2d 194, 198 (Ct.App.1986) (holding that parol evidence is admissible to determine intent of parties" ]

[ "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence ", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (holding that district court must resolve all claims for relief premised on alleged constitutional violations which are raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus whether habeas relief is granted or denied", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (holding that absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single timely petition for writ of habeas corpus successive andor untimely petitions will be summarily denied", "Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthat when he interviewed Lewis she never mentioned anyone besides Slovik throwing pool balls, but she did state that Featherstone pushed Slovik to the ground and then kicked him, and that Buckley-Stoffel and Featherstone did not plan to inform the police about either that or the parking lot fight. 4 . After briefing, oral argument, and publication of an opinion in this case, the State argued for the first time in a petition for rehearing that Slovik did not sufficiently raise a Confrontation Clause argument in state court proceedings. Moreover, Slovik apparently cannot return to state court to raise a Confrontation Clause claim because he failed to raise the argument in his original state habeas petition. See In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (1993) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to review the weight of evidence " ]

[ "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nno evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo’s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code § 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed’n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (holding that judicial is review available in the absence of an agreement for arbitration or some other form of final resolution of a dispute", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nno evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo’s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code § 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed’n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is narrow in scope", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nno evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo’s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code § 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed’n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (holding that explanations of arbitration awards are not required", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nno evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo’s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code § 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed’n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (recognizing such a ground for judicial review of arbitration awards in this circuit", "Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nno evidence of fraud on the face of the arbitration award. As to Piceo’s claim that GE breached the 1994 settlement agreement by relocating his position, the district court said that Picco was bound by the settlement agreement to arbitrate that claim. Because he had not arbitrated that particular claim, the district court refused to consider it in the first instance. On appeal Picco primarily challenges the district court’s conclusion that he failed to point to fraud on the face of the arbitration award. Indiana law provides limited grounds for vacating an arbitration award, and those grounds are listed in the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act. See Ind.Code § 34-57-2-13; Sch. City of E. Chi, Ind. v. E. Chi. Fed’n of Teachers, Local No. 511, A.F.T., 622 N.E.2d 166, 168 (Ind.1993) (holding that minnesotas arbitration statutes govern appraiser decisions and appraisal awards are to be treated as arbitration awards" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (holding that evidence was sufficient where there was testimony that appellant was seen threatening the victim and that other people were afraid", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (holding that evidence was sufficient to establish aggravated assault where appellant was seen pointing and firing a gun at two women", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (holding that evidence was sufficient where appellant verbally threatened victim and pointed gun at him and then at a group of people causing everyone to scatter", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (holding that evidence that victims body was found naked that victim had been seen pushing the defendant away before she was shot and that there were possible finger marks on one of the victims thighs was insufficient evidence to support attemptedrape conviction", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nJudge. Devin Lavonne Bryant appeals his judgment and sentence for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as against victim Leugim Freytes-Calderon. We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Bryant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and we therefore affirm. Bryant argues that bec 5th DCA 2003) (holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed" ]

[ "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding due process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included in the definition of the charged offense and new york law that requires the defendant in a second degree murder prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter when no element of the charged offense is presumed does not violate the due process clause", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding the proper unit of prosecution for indecent liberties is the number of discrete acts", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the statute was ambiguous because it provides no definition of the term violation and provides no specific direction as to the proper unit of prosecution", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the structuring itself and not each individual deposit is the unit of prosecution in a structuring offense", "Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ncategory of II, the probation officer set Peterson’s sentencing range at 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. At the sentencing on January 23, 2009, Peterson challenged the USSG § 2S1.3(b)(2) enhancement, contending that the enhancement did not apply because her structuring offense did not involve “a pattern of unlawful activity,” which is defined as “at least two separate occasions of unlawful activity ..., without regard to whether any such occasion occurred during the course of the offense or resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” USSG § 2S1.3, comment, (n.3). According to Peterson, if the structured money came from one source, here her safe deposit box, there could be only one offense, see United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that test for whether two offenses are not the same is whether each offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not" ]

[ "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it gave aggravating factors considerable weight", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding that the relative weight or value assignable to aggravating and mitigating factors properly found is not subject to review for abuse of discretion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding that a trial courts weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding that trial court retains wide discretion to apply or reject mitigating and aggravating factors as well as to interpret meaning of individual factors and its determination must be upheld absent abuse of discretion", "Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nand acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. See Sensback, 720 N.E.2d at 1164-1165. 2. Lack of Criminal History Page argues that the trial court gave no weight to his lack of criminal history. We disagree. The trial court recognized Page’s lack of criminal history as a miti-gator but discounted the value of this miti-gator. Specifically, the trial court stated, “The court finds as mitigating circumstances that he has some criminal history, arguably it’s not significant, but a weapons charge and another pending crime of violence along with these three crimes of violence, I don’t think the mitigators are worth much.” Transcript at 34. Page asks us to review the weight given to this mitigating factor for abuse of discretion, which we cannot do. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (holding imposition of the death penalty proportionate where the trial court found two aggravating circumstances ccp and contemporaneous murder two statutory mitigating factors and a number of nonstatutory mitigating factors" ]

[ "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimplies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (holding that trustees fiduciary duty exists independent of any clause in trust agreement", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimplies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (holding that trustees did not breach their fiduciary duty by deciding to set independent contribution rates for each local union", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimplies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (holding that cotrustees cannot act independent of one another and the disagreement between the trustees in this case renders the act of each a nullity", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimplies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective", "Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimplies that the trustees hold title to the Trust as joint tenants, a provision consistent with the rule that co-trustees must act in unison. Other jurisdictions have recognized the principle that co-trustees must not act independently of one another. See, e.g., Colburn v. Grant, 181 U.S. 601, 606, 21 S.Ct. 737, 739, 45 L.Ed. 1021 (1901) (recognizing the principle that “cotrustees may not act independently of one another, nor ignore each other in the management of the trust”); Union Bank & Trust Co. of Helena v. Penwell, 99 Mont. 255, 42 P.2d 457, 462 (1935) (stating “it is clear that both under our statutes and the general rule under the common law the act of one only of the trustees is not sufficient”); Cooper v. Federal Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 175 Okla. 610, 53 P.2d 678, 682 (1936) (holding that trustees act of conveying entire corpus terminated the trust" ]

[ "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of 1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under 1983", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state is not a person within the meaning of 1983", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a police department is not a person within the meaning of section 1983", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding state university is not a person under 1983", "Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(Doc. # 1-6 at 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Plaintiff brought this suit, accusing seven Defendants of eight causes of action— three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five under state law. Plaintiff has since abandoned three of her state law claims; she maintains her claims for violations of the Alabama Constitution (Count IV) and for the tort of misrepresentation (Count VI). IV. DISCUSSION A. The State and its agencies are immune from suit. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits brought against unconsenting states. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that a state is not a person under 42 usc 1983" ]