aslein1413/poc-mlflow-loader-module-rce

PoC — code execution when loading an MLflow model with pyfunc.load_model()

mlflow.pyfunc.load_model() on an untrusted model directory runs code straight from the model, with no pickle involved. The MLmodel file names a loader_module and a code directory. On load MLflow prepends the model's code/ dir to sys.path and imports the named loader_module, so the module's top-level code runs before you ever call the model.

Here MLmodel points loader_module: evil_loader at code/evil_loader.py, whose import runs id and drops /tmp/PWNED_mlflow.txt.

Files

• model/MLmodel — the model manifest (loader_module + code dir).
• model/code/evil_loader.py — imported on load; runs id at import time.
• verify.py — calls load_model("model") and prints the marker.

Reproduce

pip install mlflow
python verify.py
# marker after : True
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Confirmed on a clean python:3.12-slim container with stock mlflow 3.14.0.

Why it matters

There is no pickle here, so a scanner that only looks for pickle opcodes (ModelScan reports this dir as clean) sees nothing, yet loading the model runs attacker code as the host process. Any pipeline that loads a user-supplied MLflow model is affected. It fires on the default load_model call with no flags or environment variables.