picklescan & ModelScan bypass: .npz ZIP-container with an object-dtype member carrying an INT-opcode desync
Benign PoC for the huntr Model File Format program. Payload writes only a nonce marker — no real harm.
Vulnerability
A NumPy .npz is a ZIP of .npy members. Both scanners RECURSE into the .npz and scan each member (positive control: a plain malicious object-.npy inside the .npz is CAUGHT by BOTH). This PoC's object-dtype member carries the INT-opcode desync prefix "I0x10\n": genops parses base-10 and aborts before the payload, while np.load(..., allow_pickle=True)[member] parses "0x10" base-0 and executes the embedded reduce payload. Distinct ZIP-recursion code path + real npz member-access loader ($1500 non-pickle tier).
Measured (2026-07-24): picklescan 1.0.5 exit 0; ModelScan 0.8.8 no issue; np.load(...,allow_pickle=True) fires the benign marker.
Reproduce
import numpy as np
z = np.load("model.npz", allow_pickle=True); z[z.files[0]] # fires the benign marker
picklescan -p model.npz # exit 0
modelscan -p model.npz # no issue
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