Daily Papers

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

C-to-Rust transpilation is essential for modernizing legacy C code while enhancing safety and interoperability with modern Rust ecosystems. However, no dataset currently exists for evaluating whether a system can transpile C into safe Rust that passes a set of test cases. We introduce CRUST-Bench, a dataset of 100 C repositories, each paired with manually-written interfaces in safe Rust as well as test cases that can be used to validate correctness of the transpilation. By considering entire repositories rather than isolated functions, CRUST-Bench captures the challenges of translating complex projects with dependencies across multiple files. The provided Rust interfaces provide explicit specifications that ensure adherence to idiomatic, memory-safe Rust patterns, while the accompanying test cases enforce functional correctness. We evaluate state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) on this task and find that safe and idiomatic Rust generation is still a challenging problem for various state-of-the-art methods and techniques. We also provide insights into the errors LLMs usually make in transpiling code from C to safe Rust. The best performing model, OpenAI o1, is able to solve only 15 tasks in a single-shot setting. Improvements on CRUST-Bench would lead to improved transpilation systems that can reason about complex scenarios and help in migrating legacy codebases from C into languages like Rust that ensure memory safety. You can find the dataset and code at https://github.com/anirudhkhatry/CRUST-bench.

Rewriting C code in Rust provides stronger memory safety, yet migrating large codebases such as the 32-million-line Linux kernel remains challenging. While rule-based translators (e.g., C2Rust) provide accurate yet largely unsafe Rust programs, recent Large Language Model (LLM) approaches produce more idiomatic, safe Rust programs but frequently exhibit "laziness", omitting significant portions of the target code. To address the issue, in this paper, we present LLMigrate, an LLM-based C-to-Rust translation tool that splits modules into discrete functions, translating them individually, and then reintegrating them. LLMigrate uses static analysis to retain necessary context, pairs GPT-4o (a state-of-the-art LLM) with compiler-driven translation and program-repair techniques for complex core functions, and leverages call-graph-guided translation to ensure consistent interfaces. Evaluations on three representative Linux kernel modules (math, sort, and ramfs) show that LLMigrate requires modifying less than 15\% of the target code, significantly outperforming a pure GPT-4o-based migration.

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

Large language models (LLMs) are routinely used by physicians and patients for medical advice, yet their clinical safety profiles remain poorly characterized. We present NOHARM (Numerous Options Harm Assessment for Risk in Medicine), a benchmark using 100 real primary care-to-specialist consultation cases to measure frequency and severity of harm from LLM-generated medical recommendations. NOHARM covers 10 specialties, with 12,747 expert annotations for 4,249 clinical management options. Across 31 LLMs, potential for severe harm from LLM recommendations occurs in up to 22.2% (95% CI 21.6-22.8%) of cases, with harm of omission accounting for 76.6% (95% CI 76.4-76.8%) of errors. Safety performance is only moderately correlated (r = 0.61-0.64) with existing AI and medical knowledge benchmarks. The best models outperform generalist physicians on safety (mean difference 9.7%, 95% CI 7.0-12.5%), and a diverse multi-agent approach improves safety compared to solo models (mean difference 8.0%, 95% CI 4.0-12.1%). Therefore, despite strong performance on existing evaluations, widely used AI models can produce severely harmful medical advice at nontrivial rates, underscoring clinical safety as a distinct performance dimension necessitating explicit measurement.

Despite the effort in vulnerability detection over the last two decades, memory safety vulnerabilities continue to be a critical problem. Recent reports suggest that the key solution is to migrate to memory-safe languages. To this end, C-to-Rust transpilation becomes popular to resolve memory-safety issues in C programs. Recent works propose C-to-Rust transpilation frameworks; however, a comprehensive evaluation dataset is missing. Although one solution is to put together a large enough dataset, this increases the analysis time in automated frameworks as well as in manual efforts for some cases. In this work, we build a method to select functions from a large set to construct a minimized yet representative dataset to evaluate the C-to-Rust transpilation. We propose C2RUST-BENCH that contains 2,905 functions, which are representative of C-to-Rust transpilation, selected from 15,503 functions of real-world programs.

Rust's compile-time safety guarantees make it ideal for safety-critical systems, creating demand for translating legacy C codebases to Rust. While various approaches have emerged for this task, they face inherent trade-offs: rule-based solutions face challenges in meeting code safety and idiomaticity requirements, while LLM-based solutions often fail to generate semantically equivalent Rust code, due to the heavy dependencies of modules across the entire codebase. Recent studies have revealed that both solutions are limited to small-scale programs. In this paper, we propose EvoC2Rust, an automated framework for converting entire C projects to equivalent Rust ones. EvoC2Rust employs a skeleton-guided translation strategy for project-level translation. The pipeline consists of three evolutionary stages: 1) it first decomposes the C project into functional modules, employs a feature-mapping-enhanced LLM to transform definitions and macros and generates type-checked function stubs, which form a compilable Rust skeleton; 2) it then incrementally translates the function, replacing the corresponding stub placeholder; 3) finally, it repairs compilation errors by integrating LLM and static analysis. Through evolutionary augmentation, EvoC2Rust combines the advantages of both rule-based and LLM-based solutions. Our evaluation on open-source benchmarks and six industrial projects demonstrates EvoC2Rust's superior performance in project-level C-to-Rust translation. On average, it achieves 17.24% and 14.32% improvements in syntax and semantic accuracy over the LLM-based approaches, along with a 96.79% higher code safety rate than the rule-based tools. At the module level, EvoC2Rust reaches 92.25% compilation and 89.53% test pass rates on industrial projects, even for complex codebases and long functions.

Migrating existing C programs into Rust is increasingly desired, as Rust offers superior memory safety while maintaining C's high performance. However, vastly different features between C and Rust--e.g., distinct definitions and usages of pointers and references--pose significant challenges beyond mere syntactic translation. Existing automated translation tools, such as C2Rust, may rely too much on syntactic, template-based translation and generate unsafe Rust code that is hard for human developers to read, maintain, or even compile. More semantic-aware translation that produces safer, idiomatic, and runnable Rust code is much needed. This paper introduces a novel dependency-guided and large language model (LLM)-based C-to-Rust translation approach, RustMap, based on three key ideas: (1) Utilize LLM capabilities to produce idiomatic Rust code from given small pieces of C code, (2) Mitigate LLM limitations in handling large codebases by breaking project-scale C programs into smaller units for translation according to their usage dependencies and composing them into a runnable Rust program, and (3) Enhance the correctness of the translated Rust program by using test cases to check input/output equivalence, isolate faulty code when execution states deviate, and iteratively refine the translation using feedback from compilation and test errors. We empirically evaluate RustMap on 126 real-world programs, including 125 from Rosetta Code and a 7000+ line bzip2 implementation using GPT-4o as the LLM. RustMap shows promising results, guiding GPT-4o to produce idiomatic, readable, and functional Rust code with significantly less unsafe code than other tools, and revealing non-trivial translation patterns reusable for future research.

As Rust gains traction for developing safer systems software, a reality check for the microcontroller hardware segment becomes necessary. How ready is the Rust ecosystem for this segment? Can Rust compete with C in practice? This paper reports on an IoT industrial case study that contributes to answering these questions. Two teams concurrently developing the same functionality (one in C, one in Rust) are analyzed over a period of several months. A comparative analysis of their approaches, results, and iterative efforts is provided. The analysis and measurements on hardware indicate no strong reason to prefer C over Rust for microcontroller firmware on the basis of memory footprint or execution speed. Furthermore, Ariel OS is shown to provide an efficient and portable system runtime in Rust whose footprint is smaller than that of the state-of-the-art bare-metal C stack traditionally used in this context. It is concluded that Rust is a sound choice today for firmware development in this domain.

Translating software written in legacy languages to modern languages, such as C to Rust, has significant benefits in improving memory safety while maintaining high performance. However, manual translation is cumbersome, error-prone, and produces unidiomatic code. Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated promise in producing idiomatic translations, but offer no correctness guarantees as they lack the ability to capture all the semantics differences between the source and target languages. To resolve this issue, we propose SACTOR, an LLM-driven C-to-Rust zero-shot translation tool using a two-step translation methodology: an "unidiomatic" step to translate C into Rust while preserving semantics, and an "idiomatic" step to refine the code to follow Rust's semantic standards. SACTOR utilizes information provided by static analysis of the source C program to address challenges such as pointer semantics and dependency resolution. To validate the correctness of the translated result from each step, we use end-to-end testing via the foreign function interface to embed our translated code segment into the original code. We evaluate the translation of 200 programs from two datasets and two case studies, comparing the performance of GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Llama 3.3 70B and DeepSeek-R1 in SACTOR. Our results demonstrate that SACTOR achieves high correctness and improved idiomaticity, with the best-performing model (DeepSeek-R1) reaching 93% and (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5, DeepSeek-R1) reaching 84% correctness (on each dataset, respectively), while producing more natural and Rust-compliant translations compared to existing methods.

We present kornia-rs, a high-performance 3D computer vision library written entirely in native Rust, designed for safety-critical and real-time applications. Unlike C++-based libraries like OpenCV or wrapper-based solutions like OpenCV-Rust, kornia-rs is built from the ground up to leverage Rust's ownership model and type system for memory and thread safety. kornia-rs adopts a statically-typed tensor system and a modular set of crates, providing efficient image I/O, image processing and 3D operations. To aid cross-platform compatibility, kornia-rs offers Python bindings, enabling seamless and efficient integration with Rust code. Empirical results show that kornia-rs achieves a 3~ 5 times speedup in image transformation tasks over native Rust alternatives, while offering comparable performance to C++ wrapper-based libraries. In addition to 2D vision capabilities, kornia-rs addresses a significant gap in the Rust ecosystem by providing a set of 3D computer vision operators. This paper presents the architecture and performance characteristics of kornia-rs, demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world computer vision applications.

Safety-aligned language models often exhibit fragile and imbalanced safety mechanisms, increasing the likelihood of generating unsafe content. In addition, incorporating new knowledge through editing techniques to language models can further compromise safety. To address these issues, we propose SafeInfer, a context-adaptive, decoding-time safety alignment strategy for generating safe responses to user queries. SafeInfer comprises two phases: the safety amplification phase, which employs safe demonstration examples to adjust the model's hidden states and increase the likelihood of safer outputs, and the safety-guided decoding phase, which influences token selection based on safety-optimized distributions, ensuring the generated content complies with ethical guidelines. Further, we present HarmEval, a novel benchmark for extensive safety evaluations, designed to address potential misuse scenarios in accordance with the policies of leading AI tech giants.

We describe a verification pipeline that takes production Rust cryptographic code and produces machine-checked correctness proofs in Lean 4. The pipeline combines three components: symbolic extraction tools (Charon and Aeneas, or Hax) that lift Rust into Lean 4; formal cryptographic specification libraries (ArkLib and CompPoly, from the Verified zkEVM project) that provide the mathematical targets; and AI provers (Aristotle from Harmonic AI and Aleph from Logical Intelligence) that close the resulting proof obligations. Every proof is checked by the Lean kernel, so AI output cannot compromise soundness. Within the scope of the Ethereum Foundation's zkEVM Verification Project, we applied the pipeline to cryptographic primitives in Plonky3 (FRI folding, Mersenne31 and KoalaBear field arithmetic, Horner polynomial evaluation) and RISC Zero (Merkle inclusion verification). In addition, Aleph authored proofs of two bounds-style theorems in Plonky3's compute_log_arity_for_round that previously stood as sorry. The paper describes the architecture, walks through a running example based on Aleph's two proofs, reports which classes of proof obligations AI closed and which required manual work, and discusses the engineering gaps we encountered: Lean 4 toolchain drift across tools and specific Aeneas/Hax extraction limits. We also document concrete missing lemmas, tactic gaps, and code-generation friction points discovered during proof development. We hope this contribution lowers the barrier to adoption of formal verification and facilitates more effective use of AI in this pipeline. The result is a working pipeline for formal verification of Rust, with kernel-checked proofs and reproducible artefacts.

Current approaches to LLM safety fundamentally rely on a brittle cat-and-mouse game of identifying and blocking known threats via guardrails. We argue for a fresh approach: robust safety comes not from enumerating what is harmful, but from deeply understanding what is safe. We introduce Trust The Typical (T3), a framework that operationalizes this principle by treating safety as an out-of-distribution (OOD) detection problem. T3 learns the distribution of acceptable prompts in a semantic space and flags any significant deviation as a potential threat. Unlike prior methods, it requires no training on harmful examples, yet achieves state-of-the-art performance across 18 benchmarks spanning toxicity, hate speech, jailbreaking, multilingual harms, and over-refusal, reducing false positive rates by up to 40x relative to specialized safety models. A single model trained only on safe English text transfers effectively to diverse domains and over 14 languages without retraining. Finally, we demonstrate production readiness by integrating a GPU-optimized version into vLLM, enabling continuous guardrailing during token generation with less than 6% overhead even under dense evaluation intervals on large-scale workloads.

As large reasoning models (LRMs) grow more capable, chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning introduces new safety challenges. Existing SFT-based safety alignment studies dominantly focused on filtering prompts with safe, high-quality responses, while overlooking hard prompts that always elicit harmful outputs. To fill this gap, we introduce UnsafeChain, a safety alignment dataset constructed from hard prompts with diverse sources, where unsafe completions are identified and explicitly corrected into safe responses. By exposing models to unsafe behaviors and guiding their correction, UnsafeChain enhances safety while preserving general reasoning ability. We fine-tune three LRMs on UnsafeChain and compare them against recent SafeChain and STAR-1 across six out-of-distribution and five in-distribution benchmarks. UnsafeChain consistently outperforms prior datasets, with even a 1K subset matching or surpassing baseline performance, demonstrating the effectiveness and generalizability of correction-based supervision. We release our dataset and code at https://github.com/mbzuai-nlp/UnsafeChain

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

We introduce SafeWork-R1, a cutting-edge multimodal reasoning model that demonstrates the coevolution of capabilities and safety. It is developed by our proposed SafeLadder framework, which incorporates large-scale, progressive, safety-oriented reinforcement learning post-training, supported by a suite of multi-principled verifiers. Unlike previous alignment methods such as RLHF that simply learn human preferences, SafeLadder enables SafeWork-R1 to develop intrinsic safety reasoning and self-reflection abilities, giving rise to safety `aha' moments. Notably, SafeWork-R1 achieves an average improvement of 46.54% over its base model Qwen2.5-VL-72B on safety-related benchmarks without compromising general capabilities, and delivers state-of-the-art safety performance compared to leading proprietary models such as GPT-4.1 and Claude Opus 4. To further bolster its reliability, we implement two distinct inference-time intervention methods and a deliberative search mechanism, enforcing step-level verification. Finally, we further develop SafeWork-R1-InternVL3-78B, SafeWork-R1-DeepSeek-70B, and SafeWork-R1-Qwen2.5VL-7B. All resulting models demonstrate that safety and capability can co-evolve synergistically, highlighting the generalizability of our framework in building robust, reliable, and trustworthy general-purpose AI.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

Offline safe reinforcement learning (RL) seeks reward-maximizing policies from static datasets under strict safety constraints. Existing methods often rely on soft expected-cost objectives or iterative generative inference, which can be insufficient for safety-critical real-time control. We propose Safe Flow Q-Learning (SafeFQL), which extends FQL to safe offline RL by combining a Hamilton--Jacobi reachability-inspired safety value function with an efficient one-step flow policy. SafeFQL learns the safety value via a self-consistency Bellman recursion, trains a flow policy by behavioral cloning, and distills it into a one-step actor for reward-maximizing safe action selection without rejection sampling at deployment. To account for finite-data approximation error in the learned safety boundary, we add a conformal prediction calibration step that adjusts the safety threshold and provides finite-sample probabilistic safety coverage. Empirically, SafeFQL trades modestly higher offline training cost for substantially lower inference latency than diffusion-style safe generative baselines, which is advantageous for real-time safety-critical deployment. Across boat navigation, and Safety Gymnasium MuJoCo tasks, SafeFQL matches or exceeds prior offline safe RL performance while substantially reducing constraint violations.

While vision-language-action models (VLAs) have shown promising robotic behaviors across a diverse set of manipulation tasks, they achieve limited success rates when deployed on novel tasks out-of-the-box. To allow these policies to safely interact with their environments, we need a failure detector that gives a timely alert such that the robot can stop, backtrack, or ask for help. However, existing failure detectors are trained and tested only on one or a few specific tasks, while VLAs require the detector to generalize and detect failures also in unseen tasks and novel environments. In this paper, we introduce the multitask failure detection problem and propose SAFE, a failure detector for generalist robot policies such as VLAs. We analyze the VLA feature space and find that VLAs have sufficient high-level knowledge about task success and failure, which is generic across different tasks. Based on this insight, we design SAFE to learn from VLA internal features and predict a single scalar indicating the likelihood of task failure. SAFE is trained on both successful and failed rollouts, and is evaluated on unseen tasks. SAFE is compatible with different policy architectures. We test it on OpenVLA, pi_0, and pi_0-FAST in both simulated and real-world environments extensively. We compare SAFE with diverse baselines and show that SAFE achieves state-of-the-art failure detection performance and the best trade-off between accuracy and detection time using conformal prediction. More qualitative results can be found at https://vla-safe.github.io/.

We present Synergy Aware Forgetting Ensemble (SAFE), a method to adapt large models on a diverse collection of data while minimizing the expected cost to remove the influence of training samples from the trained model. This process, also known as selective forgetting or unlearning, is often conducted by partitioning a dataset into shards, training fully independent models on each, then ensembling the resulting models. Increasing the number of shards reduces the expected cost to forget but at the same time it increases inference cost and reduces the final accuracy of the model since synergistic information between samples is lost during the independent model training. Rather than treating each shard as independent, SAFE introduces the notion of a shard graph, which allows incorporating limited information from other shards during training, trading off a modest increase in expected forgetting cost with a significant increase in accuracy, all while still attaining complete removal of residual influence after forgetting. SAFE uses a lightweight system of adapters which can be trained while reusing most of the computations. This allows SAFE to be trained on shards an order-of-magnitude smaller than current state-of-the-art methods (thus reducing the forgetting costs) while also maintaining high accuracy, as we demonstrate empirically on fine-grained computer vision datasets.

Given the growing concerns around the safety and risks of Large Language Models (LLMs), it is essential to develop methods for mitigating these issues. We introduce Safe and Responsible Large Language Model (SR_{LLM}) , a model designed to enhance the safety of language generation using LLMs. Our approach incorporates a comprehensive LLM safety risk taxonomy and utilizes a dataset annotated by experts that align with this taxonomy. SR_{LLM} is designed to identify potentially unsafe content and produce benign variations. It employs instruction-based and parameter-efficient fine-tuning methods, making the model not only effective in enhancing safety but also resource-efficient and straightforward to adjust. Through our testing on five benchmark datasets and two proprietary datasets, we observed notable reductions in the generation of unsafe content. Moreover, following the implementation of safety measures, there was a significant improvement in the production of safe content. We detail our fine-tuning processes and how we benchmark safety for SR_{LLM} with the community engagement and promote the responsible advancement of LLMs. All the data and code are available anonymous at https://github.com/shainarazavi/Safe-Responsible-LLM .

Recent advancements in large language model (LLM) agents have significantly accelerated scientific discovery automation, yet concurrently raised critical ethical and safety concerns. To systematically address these challenges, we introduce SafeScientist, an innovative AI scientist framework explicitly designed to enhance safety and ethical responsibility in AI-driven scientific exploration. SafeScientist proactively refuses ethically inappropriate or high-risk tasks and rigorously emphasizes safety throughout the research process. To achieve comprehensive safety oversight, we integrate multiple defensive mechanisms, including prompt monitoring, agent-collaboration monitoring, tool-use monitoring, and an ethical reviewer component. Complementing SafeScientist, we propose SciSafetyBench, a novel benchmark specifically designed to evaluate AI safety in scientific contexts, comprising 240 high-risk scientific tasks across 6 domains, alongside 30 specially designed scientific tools and 120 tool-related risk tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeScientist significantly improves safety performance by 35\% compared to traditional AI scientist frameworks, without compromising scientific output quality. Additionally, we rigorously validate the robustness of our safety pipeline against diverse adversarial attack methods, further confirming the effectiveness of our integrated approach. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/SafeScientist. red{Warning: this paper contains example data that may be offensive or harmful.}

The success of large language models (LLMs) in scientific domains has heightened safety concerns, prompting numerous benchmarks to evaluate their scientific safety. Existing benchmarks often suffer from limited risk coverage and a reliance on subjective evaluation. To address these problems, we introduce SafeSci, a comprehensive framework for safety evaluation and enhancement in scientific contexts. SafeSci comprises SafeSciBench, a multi-disciplinary benchmark with 0.25M samples, and SafeSciTrain, a large-scale dataset containing 1.5M samples for safety enhancement. SafeSciBench distinguishes between safety knowledge and risk to cover extensive scopes and employs objective metrics such as deterministically answerable questions to mitigate evaluation bias. We evaluate 24 advanced LLMs, revealing critical vulnerabilities in current models. We also observe that LLMs exhibit varying degrees of excessive refusal behaviors on safety-related issues. For safety enhancement, we demonstrate that fine-tuning on SafeSciTrain significantly enhances the safety alignment of models. Finally, we argue that knowledge is a double-edged sword, and determining the safety of a scientific question should depend on specific context, rather than universally categorizing it as safe or unsafe. Our work provides both a diagnostic tool and a practical resource for building safer scientific AI systems.

Safety alignment in Large Language Models is critical for healthcare; however, reliance on binary refusal boundaries often results in over-refusal of benign queries or unsafe compliance with harmful ones. While existing benchmarks measure these extremes, they fail to evaluate Safe Completion: the model's ability to maximise helpfulness on dual-use or borderline queries by providing safe, high-level guidance without crossing into actionable harm. We introduce Health-ORSC-Bench, the first large-scale benchmark designed to systematically measure Over-Refusal and Safe Completion quality in healthcare. Comprising 31,920 benign boundary prompts across seven health categories (e.g., self-harm, medical misinformation), our framework uses an automated pipeline with human validation to test models at varying levels of intent ambiguity. We evaluate 30 state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-5 and Claude-4, revealing a significant tension: safety-optimised models frequently refuse up to 80\% of "Hard" benign prompts, while domain-specific models often sacrifice safety for utility. Our findings demonstrate that model family and size significantly influence calibration: larger frontier models (e.g., GPT-5, Llama-4) exhibit "safety-pessimism" and higher over-refusal than smaller or MoE-based counterparts (e.g., Qwen-3-Next), highlighting that current LLMs struggle to balance refusal and compliance. Health-ORSC-Bench provides a rigorous standard for calibrating the next generation of medical AI assistants toward nuanced, safe, and helpful completions. The code and data will be released upon acceptance. red{Warning: Some contents may include toxic or undesired contents.}

Large language models are increasingly deployed as coding agents, shifting safety from individual responses to action sequences. Existing benchmarks, however, primarily assess whether models refuse unsafe prompts, leaving impacts on stateful workspaces largely unexamined. We present SABER, a benchmark for environment-aware operational safety that places models in realistic agent-style projects and evaluates safety from the final environment state after a sequence of actions. Beyond binary safety-violation reports, SABER categorizes violations by cause, enabling analysis of model-specific safety profiles. Our evaluations show that even the best-performing model has more than a 54% harmful safety-violation rate (HSR), suggesting that current alignment remains insufficient for realistic project environments. SABER further reveals distinct safety profiles across models. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/sssr-lab/saber.

Recent advances in diffusion models have significantly enhanced their ability to generate high-quality images and videos, but they have also increased the risk of producing unsafe content. Existing unlearning/editing-based methods for safe generation remove harmful concepts from models but face several challenges: (1) They cannot instantly remove harmful concepts without training. (2) Their safe generation capabilities depend on collected training data. (3) They alter model weights, risking degradation in quality for content unrelated to toxic concepts. To address these, we propose SAFREE, a novel, training-free approach for safe T2I and T2V, that does not alter the model's weights. Specifically, we detect a subspace corresponding to a set of toxic concepts in the text embedding space and steer prompt embeddings away from this subspace, thereby filtering out harmful content while preserving intended semantics. To balance the trade-off between filtering toxicity and preserving safe concepts, SAFREE incorporates a novel self-validating filtering mechanism that dynamically adjusts the denoising steps when applying the filtered embeddings. Additionally, we incorporate adaptive re-attention mechanisms within the diffusion latent space to selectively diminish the influence of features related to toxic concepts at the pixel level. In the end, SAFREE ensures coherent safety checking, preserving the fidelity, quality, and safety of the output. SAFREE achieves SOTA performance in suppressing unsafe content in T2I generation compared to training-free baselines and effectively filters targeted concepts while maintaining high-quality images. It also shows competitive results against training-based methods. We extend SAFREE to various T2I backbones and T2V tasks, showcasing its flexibility and generalization. SAFREE provides a robust and adaptable safeguard for ensuring safe visual generation.

Jailbreak attacks pose a serious threat to the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) by crafting adversarial prompts that bypass alignment mechanisms, causing the models to produce harmful, restricted, or biased content. In this paper, we propose SafeLLM, a novel unlearning-based defense framework that unlearn the harmful knowledge from LLMs while preserving linguistic fluency and general capabilities. SafeLLM employs a three-stage pipeline: (1) dynamic unsafe output detection using a hybrid approach that integrates external classifiers with model-internal evaluations; (2) token-level harmful content tracing through feedforward network (FFN) activations to localize harmful knowledge; and (3) constrained optimization to suppress unsafe behavior without degrading overall model quality. SafeLLM achieves targeted and irreversible forgetting by identifying and neutralizing FFN substructures responsible for harmful generation pathways. Extensive experiments on prominent LLMs (Vicuna, LLaMA, and GPT-J) across multiple jailbreak benchmarks show that SafeLLM substantially reduces attack success rates while maintaining high general-purpose performance. Compared to standard defense methods such as supervised fine-tuning and direct preference optimization, SafeLLM offers stronger safety guarantees, more precise control over harmful behavior, and greater robustness to unseen attacks. Moreover, SafeLLM maintains the general performance after the harmful knowledge unlearned. These results highlight unlearning as a promising direction for scalable and effective LLM safety.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Diffusion models have been widely studied for removing unsafe content learned during pre-training. Existing methods require expensive supervised data, either unsafe-text paired with safe-image groundtruth or negative/positive image pairs, making them impractical to scale. Furthermore, offline reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning approaches that generate synthetic data offline suffer from catastrophic forgetting, degrading generation quality. We propose a novel online reinforcement learning framework that addresses both data scarcity and model degradation through post-training with Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) on both negative and positive text prompts. To eliminate the need for fine-tuning specialized safe/unsafe reward models, we introduce a steering reward mechanism that exploits an inherent property of CLIP embeddings: steering text representations toward positive safety directions and away from negative ones in the embedding space. Our online-policy approach enables the model to learn from diverse prompts, including explicit unsafe content, without catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method reduces inappropriate content to 18.07\% (vs. 48.9\% for SD v1.4) and nudity detections to 15 (vs. 646 baseline) while improving compositional generation quality from 42.08\% to 47.83\% on GenEval. Remarkably, these safety gains generalize to out-of-domain unsafe prompts across seven harm categories, achieving state-of-the-art performance without supervised paired data or reward tuning. Github: https://github.com/MAXNORM8650/SafeDiffusion-R1.

As the use of large language model (LLM) agents continues to grow, their safety vulnerabilities have become increasingly evident. Extensive benchmarks evaluate various aspects of LLM safety by defining the safety relying heavily on general standards, overlooking user-specific standards. However, safety standards for LLM may vary based on a user-specific profiles rather than being universally consistent across all users. This raises a critical research question: Do LLM agents act safely when considering user-specific safety standards? Despite its importance for safe LLM use, no benchmark datasets currently exist to evaluate the user-specific safety of LLMs. To address this gap, we introduce U-SAFEBENCH, the first benchmark designed to assess user-specific aspect of LLM safety. Our evaluation of 18 widely used LLMs reveals current LLMs fail to act safely when considering user-specific safety standards, marking a new discovery in this field. To address this vulnerability, we propose a simple remedy based on chain-of-thought, demonstrating its effectiveness in improving user-specific safety. Our benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/yeonjun-in/U-SafeBench.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) introduce a new generation paradigm of explicitly reasoning before answering, leading to remarkable improvements in complex tasks. However, they pose great safety risks against harmful queries and adversarial attacks. While recent mainstream safety efforts on LRMs, supervised fine-tuning (SFT), improve safety performance, we find that SFT-aligned models struggle to generalize to unseen jailbreak prompts. After thorough investigation of LRMs' generation, we identify a safety aha moment that can activate safety reasoning and lead to a safe response. This aha moment typically appears in the `key sentence', which follows models' query understanding process and can indicate whether the model will proceed safely. Based on these insights, we propose SafeKey, including two complementary objectives to better activate the safety aha moment in the key sentence: (1) a Dual-Path Safety Head to enhance the safety signal in the model's internal representations before the key sentence, and (2) a Query-Mask Modeling objective to improve the models' attention on its query understanding, which has important safety hints. Experiments across multiple safety benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly improve safety generalization to a wide range of jailbreak attacks and out-of-distribution harmful prompts, lowering the average harmfulness rate by 9.6\%, while maintaining general abilities. Our analysis reveals how SafeKey enhances safety by reshaping internal attention and improving the quality of hidden representations.