Papers
arxiv:1812.09920

Divide et Impera: MemoryRanger Runs Drivers in Isolated Kernel Spaces

Published on Dec 24, 2018
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Abstract

One of the main issues in the OS security is to provide trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. During executing, kernel-mode drivers allocate and process memory data: OS internal structures, users private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this data and the drivers code can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Microsoft security experts integrated new features to fill this gap, but they are not enough: allocated data can be stolen and patched and the drivers code can be dumped without any security reaction. The proposed hypervisor-based system (MemoryRanger) tackles this issue by executing drivers in separate kernel enclaves with specific memory attributes. MemoryRanger protects code and data using Intel VT-x and EPT features with low performance degradation on Windows 10 x64.

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