Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2006B10375:body:0:p2
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2006B10375
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 3966–6075

BACH5R0110YP                   extinguishing   2002.
                  BACH5S0110XN                   bottles.
                  No Number     109422
 (5) 757-300      S312N512-1    113701-1         Engine and      757-26A0044,
 aeroplanes       S312N512-2    113701-2         cargo           Revision 1,
                  S312N512-3    113701-3         compartment     dated
                  S312N512-4    113701-4         fire            November 14,
                  BACH5R0110YP                   extinguishing   2002.
                  BACH5S0074XN                   bottles.
                  Optional
                  453N2240-33
 (6) 767-200, -   BACH5R0085YU                   Cargo           767-26A0121,
 300, and -       BACH5R0140YU   compartment     dated
 300F             BACH5S0077XT   fire            December 19,
 aeroplanes.      BACH5S0140XT   extinguishing   2001.
                  BACH5S0184XX   bottles.
                  BACH5R0127YY

            Note: FAA AD 2003-23-05 Amdt 39-13369 refers.

            Compliance: For Requirements 1, 2, and 3: Unless previously inspected in accordance with ASB 737-26A1108, dated November 15, 2001, ASB 737-26A1109, dated November 15, 2001, ASB 737-26A1109, Revision 1, dated November 7, 2002, ASB 747-26A2269,
            dated November 1, 2001, ASB 757-26A0043, dated November 15, 2001, and ASB 757-26A0044, dated November 15, 2001, within 24 months from the effective date of this Directive.

            For Requirement 4: Before further flight following the inspections detailed in Requirement 3 of this Directive.

            This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 8 July 2004.

            Background: Certain Titeflex Corporation hoses discovered with incorrect heat treatment of B-nuts prompt this Directive that is issued to prevent fire extinguishing system and fuel system hose failure due to improperly heat-treated aluminium B-nuts.

 James Coyne
 Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 28 May 2004

 The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 16 June 2004.