Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2008L03487:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2008L03487
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 0–2250

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Parachute Equipment
AD/PARA/19  Emergency Parachute  12/2008 DM

Applicability:  SPEKON Sächsische Spezialkonfektionen GmbH RE-5L Emergency Parachutes series 4 and 5 from serial number (s/n) 72245up to 72369 inclusive and s/n 72371.

                Note:  These parachutes have been manufactured between 21 April 2008 and
                21 August 2008.
Requirement:       1. Unless accomplished previously, replace the drogue parachute with a serviceable one as instructed in the SPEKON Safety Bulletin No. 01/2008 Issue 2.

                   2. Drogue parachutes removed in accordance with the requirement (1) of this AD must not be installed on any parachute.

                Note:  SPEKON Sicherheitsmitteilung (Safety Bulletin) No. 01/2008 Issue 2 or later EASA approved revision refers.
Compliance:         1. Within 15 days after the effective date of this AD.

                    2. From the effective date of this AD.
                This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 18 September 2008.
Background:     This directive mandates the replacement of the identified drogue parachutes.

                One case of a cracked grommet has been found on the pilot chute of a RE-5L parachute.  An internal process review has revealed that the identified drogue parachutes may present some crack initiations.  This condition, if left uncorrected, could create an obstruction of the closing loop and prevent the main parachute from being pulled out of its storage pack.

David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

17 September 2008