Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:C2024C00562:schedule:3:p3
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:C2024C00562
Segment Type: schedule
Provision Reference: sch 3 (pt 3/26)
Character Range: 158274–161406

responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.
      (ii) Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if Australia agrees thereto.

       Article 6
   (a) The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost‑effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguard under this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits.
   (b) In order to ensure optimum cost‑effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of such means as:
          (i) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes;
          (ii) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; and
          (iii) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verfication procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the implementation of this Agreement.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF MATERIALS CONTROL
Article 7
   (a) Australia shall establish and maintain a national system (hereinafter referred to as Australia's system) of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
   (b) The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of Australia's system. The Agency's verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of Australia's system.

    PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY
    Article 8
    (a) In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement, Australia shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.
    (b) (i)  The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.
     (ii)  Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
    (c) If Australia so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on premises of Australia design information which Australia