Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2007L04229:body:0:p2
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2007L04229
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 2859–4547

and the fuel drain solenoid valve, combined with fuel hoses contact, could cause arcing in the main fuel cell which may in turn cause an explosion and resultant fire.

             The original issue of this Directive required a one time inspection to ensure correct grounding and, if necessary the disconnection and stowage of the engine fuel purge hose.

             Since Canadian Airworthiness Directive CF-2005-10 was issued, Transport Canada has determined that the purge hose relocation as per instructions provided in Part II of ASB 206-05-103, could cause an engine flameout in a low fuel, boost pump off, condition.  Amendment 1 revoked, Requirement 2 of the initial issue of this Directive and required the helicopter fuel purge hose to be returned to its previous configuration.

             Further investigation revealed that the engine flameout was caused by absence of restrictor, part number 206-061-637-001 or 206-061-655-001.  Amendment 2 mandated purge hose installation and boost pump positioning in addition to verification of installation of a fuel restrictor and filter.

             Amendment 3 changes the applicability section of this Directive to list Model 206 helicopters by serial number range disregarding the suffix of "A" or "B".  This is due to some Model 206A helicopters being converted to Model 206B helicopters.

             The original issue of this Directive became effective on 16 June 2005.

             Amendment 1of this Directive became effective on 2 December 2005.

             Amendment 2 of this Directive became effective on 25 October 2006.

David Punshon
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

12 October 2007