Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2005L02055:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2005L02055
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 0–2165

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes
AD/F100/70  Windshield Anti-Icing  9/2005

Applicability:  F28 Mark 0070 and Mark 0100 aeroplanes.
Requirement:    Unless previously accomplished, modify the wiring distribution of the AC Bus Transfer Power System and the RH and LH Windshield Anti-Icing System, as applicable, in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of Fokker Service Bulletin (SB) F100-30-027 dated 9 May 2005 or later revision approved by CAA-NL.
                Note:  CAA-NL AD NL-2005-009 (EASA Approval A.AD.01024) refers.
Compliance:     Within the next three years after the effective date of this Directive.
                This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 1 September 2005.
Background:     The Netherlands CAA has received a report of electrical sparks coming from a panel behind the pilot's seat on a Fokker 70 (F28 Mark 0070) shortly after take-off.  The crew noticed a strong electrical smell without the presence of visible smoke.  Investigation revealed that several contacts of connector J 4222A/P 4222B showed signs of being affected by heat which was determined to be caused by degraded contact and resulted in high current flow.
                This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of electrical overload, causing failure of sliding window heating element(s) and creating the potential for arcing, smoke and fire in the cockpit area.

David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

21 July 2005