Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2018L01065:schedule:3:p5
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2018L01065
Segment Type: schedule
Provision Reference: sch 3 (pt 5/6)
Character Range: 187352–190067

of winning assignment bids for a product or group of products do not overlap; and
(c)      if relevant, the frequency range of any unallocated lots of a product is assigned in accordance with subclause 4(3); and
(d)      if relevant, subclause 4(4) is applied.
(3) Subject to the constraints in subclause (2), the assignment bids selected must maximise the sum of the assignment bid prices.
(4) If more than one combination of assignment bids meets the criterion in subclause (3), the winning combination must be selected by a pseudorandom process.
          Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.

8 Determination of assignment prices
(1) The auction manager must determine the assignment price for each winning assignment bid in an assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment price.
(2) If there is only one bidder in an assignment round, then the assignment price must be zero. Otherwise, the auction manager must determine the assignment price in accordance with the following subclauses.
(3) The assignment price must be no more than the assignment bid price.
(4) The assignment price may be zero.
(5) Subject to the constraint in subclause (3), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
(a)      there is no alternative bidder, or group of bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any winning assignment round bidder or group of winning assignment round bidders; and
(b)      if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
(c)      if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – it is the solution to the formula in subclause (6).
(6) For paragraph (5)(c), the formula is:
      subject to  satisfying paragraphs (5)(a) and (5)(b),
where:
  is a set of assignment prices.
  is the index of each bidder (j) in the set of all bidders participating in the assignment round (J).
  is the set of prices the bidders' assigned lots would have had at the starting prices for the lots.
  is the set of Vickrey prices for the bidders, the price for each bidder j being:
       (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subclause 7(3) if bidder j had submitted assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less
       (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.

          Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(d) of this instrument.
(7)