Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2007L02367:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2007L02367
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 0–2123

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Cirrus Design SR20 and SR22 Series Aeroplanes
AD/CIRRUS/7  CAPS Collar Support Modification  9/2007

Applicability:  All Model SR20 airplanes, serial numbers (SN) 1005 through 1798, and Model SR22 airplanes, SN 0002 through 2437.
Requirement:    Unless previously incorporated, modify the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) by replacing the pick-up collar support and the two nylon screws with parts of improved design, in accordance with Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Alert Service Bulletin No. SB A2X-95-10 R1 or later FAA approved amendment.

                The modification shall be carried out by a person appropriately trained in CDC parachute systems and certified for by an appropriately endorsed LAME.

                Note:  FAA AD 2007-14-03 Amendment 39-15125 refers.
Compliance:     Within the next 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) after August 16, 2007 or within 60 days after August 16, 2007 whichever occurs first.
                This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 30 August 2007.
Background:     The FAA received a report where the Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS) was properly activated during an in-flight emergency, but the parachute failed to successfully deploy.  This unsafe condition, if not corrected, could result in the parachute systems of identical configuration failing to successfully deploy (CAPS failure).

David Punshon
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

19 July 2007