Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2016L01970:reg:65
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2016L01970
Segment Type: reg
Provision Reference: reg 65
Character Range: 71592–73209

65  Simplified outline of this Part

      This Part deals with the procedures to be undertaken after conducting the auction.
      After the winning bidder for each lot has been identified, the ACMA must notify the unsuccessful bidders and applicants who were not registered as bidders that their confidentiality obligations have ended.  The ACMA must give each winning bidder information about the other winning bidders; each winning bidder must then make a statement about whether it is affiliated with any other winning bidder, or a previous successful bidder.
      If there is such an affiliation, and if issuing spectrum licences to the winning bidders would breach the allocation limits, the ACMA must not issue spectrum licences to the winning bidders for all the lots won.  Instead, the ACMA must only issue spectrum licences that would not result in a breach of the allocation limits.
      Each winning bidder will have the choice of paying an upfront winning price, which is the sum of the winning prices for the lots to be included in the spectrum licence, or a delayed winning price, which is the sum of the winning prices for the lots to be included in the spectrum licence plus an additional percentage of that sum, to be paid in three instalments.  The first instalment is to be accompanied by a bank guarantee that secures 5 per cent of the second and third instalments.
      If a winning bidder fails to pay the upfront winning price or the first auction instalment of the delayed winning price, the winning bidder is not entitled to be issued the licence.

Division 2—Application of this Part