Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2020L01453:schedule:3:p5
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2020L01453
Segment Type: schedule
Provision Reference: sch 3 (pt 5/12)
Character Range: 198641–201383

bids

(1) After an assignment round has ended, the auction manager must determine the winning assignment bids for each product or group of products bid for in the assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment bid.

(2) The winning assignment bids must be a combination of valid assignment bids such that:
(a)      exactly one assignment bid (whether a submitted assignment bid or an assignment bid of zero dollars taken to have been made under subclause 5(5) or 5(6)) is selected from each bidder; and
(b)      the frequency ranges included in any pair of winning assignment bids for a product or group of products do not overlap; and
(c)      if relevant, the frequency range of any unallocated lots of a product is assigned in accordance with subclause 4(3);
(d)      if relevant, subclause 4(4) is applied.
(3) Subject to the constraints in subclause (2), the assignment bids selected must maximise the sum of the assignment bid prices.
(4) If more than one combination of assignment bids meets the criterion in subclause (3), the winning combination must be selected by a pseudorandom process.
          Note: This clause relates to Division 2 of Part 6 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.

      8 Determination of assignment prices

(1) The auction manager must determine the assignment price for each winning assignment bid in an assignment round and tell each winning assignment round bidder its winning assignment price for the frequency range.

(2) If there is only one bidder in an assignment round, then the assignment price must be zero. Otherwise, the auction manager must determine the assignment price in accordance with the following subclauses.

(3) The assignment price must be no more than the assignment bid price.

(4) The assignment price may be zero.

(5) Subject to the constraint in subclause (3), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
(a)      there is no alternative bidder, or group of bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any winning assignment round bidder or group of winning assignment round bidders; and
(b)      if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
(c)      if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – it is the solution to the formula in subclause (6).

(6) For paragraph (5)(c), the formula is:
      subject to  satisfying paragraphs (5)(a) and (5)(b),
where:
  is a set of assignment prices.
  is the index of each bidder (j) in the set of all bidders participating in the assignment