Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2015L01373:body:0:p22
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2015L01373
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 52876–55536

each withdrawn applicant that the applicant's confidentiality obligations under section 3.2 have ended.

Note   Eligibility payments made by withdrawn applicants are refundable under section 4.17.

7.3 Winning bidder to make statement about affiliations

 (1) As soon as practicable after the end of the auction period, the ACMA must:
 (a) give each winning bidder details about the identity of all other winning bidders; and
 (b) ask the bidder to make a statement whether the bidder is an affiliate of another winning bidder and, if so, identifying the other bidder and giving details of the affiliation.

 (2) The ACMA must state a deadline, at least 8 working days after the date of the request, before which the statement must be received by the ACMA.

 (3) A winning bidder must give the ACMA the statement by the deadline.

Note 1   Giving false or misleading information is a serious offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code.

Note 2   Section 136.1 of the Criminal Code also makes it an offence to make a false or misleading statement in connection with an application for a spectrum licence.

7.4 Notification that winning bidders are affiliated

  If the ACMA is satisfied that 2 or more winning bidders have become affiliated after the end of the auction period (but were not affiliated during the auction period), the ACMA must notify the bidders in writing and tell them the basis on which the ACMA is satisfied the bidders are affiliated.

7.5 Consequences of affiliation

 (1) If the ACMA notifies 2 or more winning bidders under section 7.4 that it is satisfied the bidders are affiliated, the ACMA must not issue spectrum licences to the bidders that would exceed the allocation limits.

 (2) If the issue of spectrum licences to the affiliated bidders for all the lots the bidders won at auction would exceed the allocation limits, the bidders may give a direction to the ACMA specifying how spectrum is to be allocated between the bidders up to the allocation limits.

 (3) The direction must be given jointly by the bidders and must be given to the ACMA within 5 working days after the bidders received notification under section 7.4.

 (4) If the ACMA does not receive a direction within 5 working days, the ACMA may, for any part of the spectrum where the lots won by the bidders exceed the allocation limits, choose at its discretion how to allocate spectrum to each bidder up to the allocation limits.

 (5) A frequency range can be assigned to a bidder under this section from any of the frequency ranges of the lots won at auction by any of the affiliated bidders.

 (6) Spectrum in excess of the allocation limits that is