Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2009L03054:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2009L03054
Segment Type: other
Provision Reference: 
Character Range: 0–2683

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/B737/278 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B737/278 Amdt 1  Elevator Input Torque Tube Assembly  10/2009 DM

Applicability:  Boeing Model 737 aeroplanes as listed in Table 1 below.

                Table 1: Affected B737 Aeroplanes.
                Boeing aeroplane models -                                     As identified in Boeing
                                                                              Alert Service Bulletin-
                737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series aeroplanes  737-27A1274, dated 17 February 2005, or later FAA approved revision.
                737-600, -700, -700C, -800 and -900 series aeroplanes         737-27A1271, dated 16 December 2004, or later FAA approved revision.

Requirement:    Modify the elevator input torque tube assembly by doing all the actions in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of the applicable service bulletin in Table 1 of this AD.

                Note:  FAA AD 2005-26-03 Amdt 39-14424 refers.
Compliance:     Within 60 months after 16 March 2006.

                The compliance time remains unchanged by this issue of the Directive.
                This Amendment becomes effective on 7 August 2009.
Background:     This AD resulted from a report of a restriction in the pilot's elevator input control system.  Although the cause of the incident was indeterminate, a design review performed on the elevator input torque tube assembly in the course of the investigation discovered possible failure modes that could lead to a jam of the elevator control system.  The actions detailed in this AD are intended to prevent loss of elevator control and consequent reduced controllability of the aeroplane.

   Amendment 1 is issued to allow use of a later FAA approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin, as specified in Table 1, as an alternate method of compliance.

David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

4 August 2009