Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2021L01155:reg:8:p1
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2021L01155
Segment Type: reg
Provision Reference: reg 8 (pt 1/2)
Character Range: 252445–255134

8  Assignment of frequencies and determination of assignment prices
Generally
 (1) After the end of an assignment round, the auction manager must tell each assignment winner in the assignment round its assignment price for the frequency range assigned to the lots of the product.
 (2) If there is only one assignment bidder in an assignment round, then for that bidder the assignment price for a frequency range for the product the subject of that assignment round is zero.
 (3) If there is more than one assignment bidder in an assignment round, then for each bidder the assignment price for a frequency range for the product the subject of that assignment round is worked out in accordance with subclauses (4) to (7).
Assignment price where more than one assignment bidder in an assignment round
 (4) For an assignment bidder, the assignment price for a frequency range must be no more than the bid price in the assignment bid for that frequency range made by that winner.
 (5) For an assignment bidder, the assignment price for a frequency range may be zero.
 (6) Subject to subclause (4), the set of assignment prices in an assignment round must be such that:
 (a) there is no alternative assignment bidder, or group of assignment bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any assignment winner or group of assignment winners for the assignment round; and
 (b) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a) – the sum of the assignment prices is minimised; and
 (c) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b) – the set of assignment prices is the solution to the formula in subclause (7).
 (7) For paragraph (6)(c), the formula is:
      subject to  satisfying paragraphs (6)(a) and (6)(b);
where:
  is a set of assignment prices.
  is the index of each assignment bidder (j) in the set of all assignment bidders participating in the assignment round (J).
  is the set of prices the assignment bidders' assigned lots would have had at the starting prices for the lots.
  is the set of Vickrey prices for the assignment bidders, the price for each bidder j being:
       (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subclause 7(3) if bidder j had made assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less
       (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.

Note: For starting prices, see paragraph 28(1)(a) or 43(1)(a).
Assignment winners and total assignment price
 (8) An assignment bidder who has assignment prices for winning assignment bids in an assignment round is an assignment winner