Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2006B10566:body:0
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
 SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

 For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

 British Aerospace (Hawker Siddeley) HS 748 Series Aeroplanes

 AD/HS 748/30 Electrical Cable Chafing 12/2002
TX

 Applicability: All HS 748 series aeroplanes.

              Requirement: 1. Inspect the wing dry areas in accordance with BAe Systems Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) HS748-A28-44 dated 26 September 2002.

              2. If any discrepancies are detected during the Requirement 1 inspections, accomplish any necessary repairs or replacements in accordance with ASB HS748-A28-44.

           Note: This Alert Service Bulletin has been classified as 'Mandatory' by the CAA(UK).

           Compliance: For Requirement 1 - Within 48 hours after the effective date of this Directive or immediately on reaching a maintenance base capable of carrying out the inspection.

           For Requirement 2 - Before further flight.

           This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 2 October 2002.

           Background: BAe Systems has advised of receiving a report from an ATP operator of a fire in the dry area of the wing. The fire has been attributed to chafe damage between an electrical cable and a fuel cross feed drainpipe. The chafe damage was severe enough to cause fuel leakage from the pipe; electrical sparks from the damaged cable probably ignited the fuel.

           As ATP and HS 748 aeroplanes are similar, this condition could also exist on HS 748 aeroplanes. This Directive requires the inspection of the wing dry areas to ensure the fuel and electrical systems are safe.

 Barry James Reid McKay
 Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 30 September 2002

 The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 2 October 2002.

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