Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2005L01764:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2005L01764
Segment Type: other
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Character Range: 0–2067

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998.  The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters
AD/BELL 222/33  Main Rotor Pendulum Weight Support  8/2005

Applicability:  Model 222 helicopters, serial numbers 47006 through 47089,

                Model 222B helicopters, serial numbers 47131 through 47156,

                Model 222U helicopters, serial numbers 47501 through 47574, and,

                Model 230 helicopters, serial numbers 23001 through 23038;

                equipped with main rotor pendulum weight supports part number 222-011-114-101 and -103, excluding those with serial numbers FN-363 and subsequent.
Requirement:    Action in accordance with Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Alert Service Bulletin 222-02-92, 222U-02-63, or 230-02-25, as applicable.

                Note:  Transport Canada AD CF-2002-33 refers.
Compliance:     Within 50 hours time in service after 4 August 2005, unless already accomplished.
                This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 4 August 2005.
Background:     A report was received of an incident on a Model 230 helicopter where a part number 222-011-114-103 main rotor pendulum weight support failed, shedding the pendulum weight set in flight.  Investigation revealed the failed support had manufacturing discrepancies, and had a serial number with the prefix "FN".

David Villiers
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority

24 June 2005