Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2023L00865:reg:144
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2023L00865
Segment Type: reg
Provision Reference: reg 144
Character Range: 203168–205563

144  Determination of assignment price for an assignment round
 (1) After the end of an assignment round, the auction manager must tell each assignment winner in the round the assignment price for its winning assignment bid.
Note: This section relates to Division 7 of Part 5 of this instrument for the purposes of section 294 of the Act, and is disallowable under section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003.
 (2) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid is the price determined by the auction manager in accordance with this section.
 (3) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid:
 (a) must not exceed the bid price for the bid; and
 (b) may be zero; and
 (c) if there is only one assignment bidder in the assignment round—must be zero.
 (4) Subject to paragraphs (3)(a) and (c), a set of assignment prices in the assignment round must be selected so that:
 (a) there is no alternative assignment bidder, or group of assignment bidders, who (based on their assignment bids) would pay more than any assignment winner or group of assignment winners, disregarding any assignment bids that could not form part of a combination of assignment bids that satisfies subsection 143(2); and
 (b) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraph (a)—the sum of the assignment prices is also minimised; and
 (c) if more than one set of assignment prices satisfies paragraphs (a) and (b)—it is the solution to the formula in subsection (5).
 (5) For paragraph (4)(c), the formula is:
subject to satisfying paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(b),
where:

  is a set of assignment prices.
  is the index of each assignment bidder (j) in the set of all assignment bidders participating in the assignment round (J).
  is the set of prices the assignment bidders' allocated lots would have had at the starting prices for the lots.
  is the set of Vickrey prices for the assignment bidders, the price for each bidder j being:
  (a) the sum of bid prices for the combination of assignment bids that would have been selected under subsection 143(2) if bidder j had made assignment bids of zero dollars for every frequency range option; less
  (b) the sum of bid prices for all other winning assignment bids in the assignment round.

Note: For starting prices, see paragraphs 22(d) and 25(1)(a).
 (6) The assignment price for a winning assignment bid must be rounded to the nearest hundred dollars.