Document ID: chunk:federal_register_of_legislation:F2006B09649:body:0
Version: federal_register_of_legislation:F2006B09649
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
 SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

 For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

 Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes

AD/F100/47 Thrust Reverser Operating Lever 9/2001

Applicability: All Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) series aircraft.

            Requirement: Carry out a one time inspection of the thrust reverser (T/R) control system to check the over centre force of the T/R operating Lever and to verify the correct setting of the T/R selector switch (S9) in accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F100-76-015.

Note: Dutch RLD AD (BLA) 2001-040 refers.

            Compliance: Unless previously accomplished, within 6 months after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive.

            This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 6 September 2001.

            Background: This Directive is prompted by advice that an F100 aircraft experienced an in-flight thrust reverser deployment. The incident was attributed to an incorrectly adjusted S9 switch in the LH thrust reverser lever switch box. The LH T/R Operating Lever was also found to have insufficient over centre force. These conditions resulted in unintentional actuation of the S9 switch when the thrust lever was firmly retarded to the IDLE position, and consequent deployment of the thrust reverser.

 Eugene Paul Holzapfel
 Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 26 July 2001

 The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 15 August 2001.

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