index int64 9 6.02k | vul_code stringlengths 10 6.2k | is_vulnerable bool 1
class | programming_language stringclasses 1
value | method_name stringlengths 3 120 | file_name stringlengths 5 45 | repo_url stringclasses 187
values | repo_owner stringclasses 177
values | committer stringclasses 179
values | committer_date stringdate 2007-08-06 16:21:45+0100 2023-08-02 20:46:44+0100 | commit_msg stringlengths 8 4.07k | cwe_id stringclasses 80
values | cwe_name stringclasses 80
values | cwe_description stringclasses 80
values | cwe_url stringclasses 79
values | cve_id stringlengths 13 16 | patch stringlengths 21 6.86k |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
9 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... | true | C++ | em_fxsave | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned short sel; struct desc_struct new_desc; u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2); rc = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl, X86_TRANSFER_CALL_JMP, &new_desc); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) r... |
10 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... | true | C++ | em_fxsave | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-416 | Use After Free | Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned long eip, cs; int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); struct desc_struct new_desc; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (... |
11 | static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*get)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *ptr)) { struct desc_ptr desc_ptr; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->op_bytes = 8; get(ctxt, &desc_ptr); if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) { ctxt->op_bytes = 4; desc_ptr.address &= 0x00ffffff; }... | true | C++ | emulate_store_desc_ptr | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... |
12 | static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*get)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *ptr)) { struct desc_ptr desc_ptr; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->op_bytes = 8; get(ctxt, &desc_ptr); if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) { ctxt->op_bytes = 4; desc_ptr.address &= 0x00ffffff; }... | true | C++ | emulate_store_desc_ptr | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-416 | Use After Free | Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... |
13 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctxt->o... | true | C++ | em_fxrstor | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... |
14 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctxt->o... | true | C++ | em_fxrstor | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2017-01-12 14:34:58+01:00 | KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std
Introduces segemented_write_std.
Switches from emulated reads/writes to standard read/writes in fxsave,
fxrstor, sgdt, and sidt. This fixes CVE-2017-2584, a longstanding
kernel memory leak.
Since commit 283c95d0e389 ("KVM: x86: emulate FXSAVE and FXRSTOR",
2016-11-09), which ... | CWE-416 | Use After Free | Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html | CVE-2017-2584 | static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; size_t size; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt); rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state)); ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt... |
28 | static inline void jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel) { assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->_eip + rel); } | true | C++ | jmp_rel | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*get)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *ptr)) { struct desc_ptr desc_ptr; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->op_bytes = 8; get(ctxt, &desc_ptr); if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) { ctxt->op_bytes = 4; desc_ptr.address &= 0x00ffffff; }... |
30 | static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG; ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip; ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes; return em_pop(ctxt); } | true | C++ | em_ret | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int emulate_store_desc_ptr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*get)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *ptr)) { struct desc_ptr desc_ptr; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->op_bytes = 8; get(ctxt, &desc_ptr); if (ctxt->op_bytes == 2) { ctxt->op_bytes = 4; desc_ptr.address &= 0x00ffffff; }... |
32 | static int em_grp45(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE; switch (ctxt->modrm_reg) { case 2: { long int old_eip; old_eip = ctxt->_eip; ctxt->_eip = ctxt->src.val; ctxt->src.val = old_eip; rc = em_push(ctxt); break; } case 4: ctxt->_eip = ctxt->src.val; break; case 5: rc = em_jmp_far(ctxt); break; ... | true | C++ | em_grp45 | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctx... |
33 | static inline void assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) { switch (ctxt->op_bytes) { case 2: ctxt->_eip = (u16)dst; break; case 4: ctxt->_eip = (u32)dst; break; case 8: ctxt->_eip = dst; break; default: WARN(1, "unsupported eip assignment size\n"); } } | true | C++ | assign_eip_near | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctx... |
34 | static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; ctxt->dst.type = OP_REG; ctxt->dst.addr.reg = &ctxt->_eip; ctxt->dst.bytes = ctxt->op_bytes; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->dst.val, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } | true | C++ | em_ret_near_imm | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctx... |
36 | static int em_jcxz(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0) jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } | true | C++ | em_jcxz | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { struct fxregs_state fx_state; int rc; rc = check_fxsr(ctxt); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = segmented_read_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, 512); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (fx_state.mxcsr >> 16) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctx... |
40 | static int em_call(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { long rel = ctxt->src.val; ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->_eip; jmp_rel(ctxt, rel); return em_push(ctxt); } | true | C++ | em_call | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static inline int jmp_rel(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int rel) { return assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->_eip + rel); } |
45 | static int em_loop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { register_address_increment(ctxt, reg_rmw(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX), -1); if ((address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) != 0) && (ctxt->b == 0xe2 || test_cc(ctxt->b ^ 0x5, ctxt->eflags))) jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } | true | C++ | em_loop | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. Th... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_ret(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned long eip; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; return assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip); } |
50 | static int load_state_from_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct tss_segment_16 *tss) { int ret; u8 cpl; ctxt->_eip = tss->ip; ctxt->eflags = tss->flag | 2; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->ax; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->cx; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->dx; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_R... | true | C++ | load_state_from_tss16 | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_grp45(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE; switch (ctxt->modrm_reg) { case 2: { long int old_eip; old_eip = ctxt->_eip; rc = assign_eip_near(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) break; ctxt->src.val = old_eip; rc = em_push(ctxt); break; } case 4: rc = assign_eip_near(ct... |
51 | static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned short sel; memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2); rc = load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; ctxt->_eip = 0; memcpy(&ctxt->_eip, ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->op_bytes); return X86EMUL_CONTI... | true | C++ | em_jmp_far | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static inline int assign_eip_near(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong dst) { return assign_eip_far(ctxt, dst, ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64); } |
54 | static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { u16 sel, old_cs; ulong old_eip; int rc; old_cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS); old_eip = ctxt->_eip; memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2); if (load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS)) return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; ctxt->_eip = 0; memc... | true | C++ | em_call_far | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_ret_near_imm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned long eip; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &eip, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rc = assign_eip_near(ctxt, eip); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; rsp_increment(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); return X86EMUL_CONTINUE; } |
57 | static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct tss_segment_32 *tss) { int ret; u8 cpl; if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3)) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctxt->_eip = tss->eip; ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->e... | true | C++ | load_state_from_tss32 | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_jcxz(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE; if (address_mask(ctxt, reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX)) == 0) rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, ctxt->src.val); return rc; } |
60 | static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned long cs; int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &ctxt->_eip, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; if (ctxt->op_bytes == 4) ctxt->_eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip; rc = emulate_pop(ctxt, &cs, ctxt->op_bytes); if (rc != X86EM... | true | C++ | em_ret_far | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2014-10-24 13:21:16+02:00 | KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during... | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2014-3647 | static int em_call(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; long rel = ctxt->src.val; ctxt->src.val = (unsigned long)ctxt->_eip; rc = jmp_rel(ctxt, rel); if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) return rc; return em_push(ctxt); } |
63 | armv6pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev) { unsigned long pmcr = armv6_pmcr_read(); struct perf_sample_data data; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc; struct pt_regs *regs; int idx; if (!armv6_pmcr_has_overflowed(pmcr)) return IRQ_NONE; regs = get_irq_regs(); armv6_pmcr_write(pmcr); perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0); cpuc = &__... | true | C++ | armv6pmu_handle_irq | perf_event_v6.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Ingo Molnar | 2011-07-01 11:06:35+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or ... | CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | CVE-2011-2918 | static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, u16 selector, int seg) { u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false, NULL); } |
65 | static int intel_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { struct perf_sample_data data; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc; int bit, loops; u64 status; int handled; perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0); cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events); apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI); intel_pmu_disable_all(); handled = intel_pmu_drain_bts_bu... | true | C++ | intel_pmu_handle_irq | perf_event_intel.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Ingo Molnar | 2011-07-01 11:06:35+02:00 | perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or ... | CWE-400 | Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html | CVE-2011-2918 | static int load_state_from_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct tss_segment_16 *tss) { int ret; u8 cpl; ctxt->_eip = tss->ip; ctxt->eflags = tss->flag | 2; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->ax; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->cx; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->dx; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_R... |
70 | static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; struct desc_struct cs, ss; u64 msr_data; u16 cs_sel, ss_sel; u64 efer = 0; ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer); if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32) ... | true | C++ | em_sysenter | emulate.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Paolo Bonzini | 2015-01-23 13:57:15+01:00 | KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSE... | CWE-269 | Improper Privilege Management | The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/269.html | CVE-2015-0239 | static int em_jmp_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned short sel, old_sel; struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc; const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_sel, &old_desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS); memcpy(... |
72 | compat_mpt_command(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_command32 karg32; struct mpt_ioctl_command32 __user *uarg = (struct mpt_ioctl_command32 __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_command karg; MPT_ADAPTER *iocp = NULL; int iocnum, iocnumX; int nonblock = (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); ... | true | C++ | compat_mpt_command | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { u16 sel, old_cs; ulong old_eip; int rc; struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc; const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); old_eip = ctxt->_eip; ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS); memcpy(&sel, ctxt->s... |
73 | mptctl_gettargetinfo (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; VirtDevice *vdevice; char *pmem; int *pdata; int iocnum; int numDevices = 0; int lun; int maxWordsLeft; int numBytes; u8 port; struct scsi_device *sdev; if (copy... | true | C++ | mptctl_gettargetinfo | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct tss_segment_32 *tss) { int ret; u8 cpl; if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3)) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); ctxt->_eip = tss->eip; ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax; *reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->e... |
75 | mptctl_eventreport (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; int iocnum; int numBytes, maxEvents, max; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventrepo... | true | C++ | mptctl_eventreport | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | static int em_ret_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { int rc; unsigned long eip, cs; u16 old_cs; int cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt); struct desc_struct old_desc, new_desc; const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ops->get_segment(ctxt, &old_cs, &old_desc, NULL, VCPU_SREG_CS); r... |
79 | mptctl_readtest (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_test __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_test karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; int iocnum; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_test))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_readtest - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioctl_test struct @ %p\n", ... | true | C++ | mptctl_readtest | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | armv6pmu_handle_irq(int irq_num, void *dev) { unsigned long pmcr = armv6_pmcr_read(); struct perf_sample_data data; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc; struct pt_regs *regs; int idx; if (!armv6_pmcr_has_overflowed(pmcr)) return IRQ_NONE; regs = get_irq_regs(); armv6_pmcr_write(pmcr); perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0); cpuc = &__... |
82 | mptctl_eventquery (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; int iocnum; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventquery))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventquery - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioctl... | true | C++ | mptctl_eventquery | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | static int intel_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) { struct perf_sample_data data; struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc; int bit, loops; u64 status; int handled; perf_sample_data_init(&data, 0); cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events); apic_write(APIC_LVTPC, APIC_DM_NMI); intel_pmu_disable_all(); handled = intel_pmu_drain_bts_bu... |
83 | mptctl_hp_targetinfo(unsigned long arg) { hp_target_info_t __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; SCSIDevicePage0_t *pg0_alloc; SCSIDevicePage3_t *pg3_alloc; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; MPT_SCSI_HOST *hd = NULL; hp_target_info_t karg; int iocnum; int data_sz; dma_addr_t page_dma; CONFIGPARMS cfg; ConfigPageHeader_t hdr; int tmp, np... | true | C++ | mptctl_hp_targetinfo | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | static int em_sysenter(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) { const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops; struct desc_struct cs, ss; u64 msr_data; u16 cs_sel, ss_sel; u64 efer = 0; ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_EFER, &efer); if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL) return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0); if ((ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ... |
84 | mptctl_getiocinfo (unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) { struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo *karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; struct pci_dev *pdev; int iocnum; unsigned int port; int cim_rev; struct scsi_device *sdev; VirtDevice *vdevice; if (data_size == sizeof(struct m... | true | C++ | mptctl_getiocinfo | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | compat_mpt_command(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_command32 karg32; struct mpt_ioctl_command32 __user *uarg = (struct mpt_ioctl_command32 __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_command karg; MPT_ADAPTER *iocp = NULL; int iocnum, iocnumX; int nonblock = (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); ... |
87 | mptctl_mpt_command (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_command __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_command karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; int iocnum; int rc; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_command))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_mpt_command - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioct... | true | C++ | mptctl_mpt_command | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | mptctl_gettargetinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_targetinfo karg; VirtDevice *vdevice; char *pmem; int *pdata; int numDevices = 0; int lun; int maxWordsLeft; int numBytes; u8 port; struct scsi_device *sdev; if (copy_from_user(&... |
89 | mptctl_replace_fw (unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw karg; MPT_ADAPTER *ioc; int iocnum; int newFwSize; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_replace_fw - " "Unable to re... | true | C++ | mptctl_replace_fw | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | mptctl_eventenable (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable karg; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventenable))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventenable - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioctl_evente... |
91 | mptctl_fw_download(unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_fw_xfer __user *ufwdl = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_fw_xfer kfwdl; if (copy_from_user(&kfwdl, ufwdl, sizeof(struct mpt_fw_xfer))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::_ioctl_fwdl - " "Unable to copy mpt_fw_xfer struct @ %p\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, ufwdl); return -EFAULT;... | true | C++ | mptctl_fw_download | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | mptctl_eventreport (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport karg; int numBytes, maxEvents, max; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_eventreport))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_eventreport - " "Unab... |
96 | __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { mpt_ioctl_header __user *uhdr = (void __user *) arg; mpt_ioctl_header khdr; int iocnum; unsigned iocnumX; int nonblock = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); int ret; MPT_ADAPTER *iocp = NULL; if (copy_from_user(&khdr, uhdr, sizeof(khdr))) { printk(KERN_... | true | C++ | __mptctl_ioctl | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | mptctl_readtest (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_test __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_test karg; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_test))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_readtest - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioctl_test struct @ %p\n", __FILE__, __... |
104 | compat_mptfwxfer_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_fw_xfer32 kfw32; struct mpt_fw_xfer kfw; MPT_ADAPTER *iocp = NULL; int iocnum, iocnumX; int nonblock = (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); int ret; if (copy_from_user(&kfw32, (char __user *)arg, sizeof(kfw32))) return -EFAULT; iocnumX... | true | C++ | compat_mptfwxfer_ioctl | mptctl.c | https://github.com/torvalds/linux | torvalds | Martin K. Petersen | 2020-01-15 23:05:52-05:00 | scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctl
Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called
functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again.
The problem that could cause is:
drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c
674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or
675 ... | CWE-362 | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | CVE-2020-12652 | mptctl_getiocinfo (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg, unsigned int data_size) { struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_iocinfo *karg; struct pci_dev *pdev; unsigned int port; int cim_rev; struct scsi_device *sdev; VirtDevice *vdevice; if (data_size == sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_ioc... |
110 | YCPBoolean IniAgent::Write(const YCPPath &path, const YCPValue& value, const YCPValue& arg) { if (!parser.isStarted()) { y2warning("Can't execute Write before being mounted."); return YCPBoolean (false); } bool ok = false; YCPBoolean b (true); if (0 == path->length ()) { if (value->isString() && value->asString()->valu... | true | C++ | IniAgent::Write | IniAgent.cc | https://github.com/yast/yast-core | yast | Martin Vidner | 2012-01-05 17:03:40+00:00 | - ini-agent: added Write(.section_private.SECTION, BOOLEAN) (bnc#713661, CVE-2011-3177)
- system agent: added Write(.target.string, [filename, mode], content)
svn merge -r66758:66764 http://svn.opensuse.org/svn/yast/branches/SuSE-Code-11-SP2-Branch/core
svn path=/trunk/core/; revision=67117 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2011-3177 | mptctl_mpt_command (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_command __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_command karg; int rc; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_command))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_mpt_command - " "Unable to read in mpt_ioctl_command st... |
111 | int IniSection::setSectionProp (const YCPPath&p,const YCPValue&in, int what, int depth) { string k = ip->changeCase (p->component_str (depth)); pair <IniSectionIdxIterator, IniSectionIdxIterator> r = isections.equal_range (k); IniSectionIdxIterator xi = r.first, xe = r.second; if (depth + 1 < p->length()) { IniIterator... | true | C++ | IniSection::setSectionProp | IniFile.cc | https://github.com/yast/yast-core | yast | Martin Vidner | 2012-01-05 17:03:40+00:00 | - ini-agent: added Write(.section_private.SECTION, BOOLEAN) (bnc#713661, CVE-2011-3177)
- system agent: added Write(.target.string, [filename, mode], content)
svn merge -r66758:66764 http://svn.opensuse.org/svn/yast/branches/SuSE-Code-11-SP2-Branch/core
svn path=/trunk/core/; revision=67117 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2011-3177 | mptctl_replace_fw (MPT_ADAPTER *ioc, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw __user *uarg = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw karg; int newFwSize; if (copy_from_user(&karg, uarg, sizeof(struct mpt_ioctl_replace_fw))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::mptctl_replace_fw - " "Unable to read in mpt_io... |
116 | void operator = (const IniSection &s) { if (&s == this) { return; } IniBase::operator = (s); ip = s.ip; end_comment = s.end_comment; rewrite_by = s.rewrite_by; container = s.container; reindex (); } | true | C++ | IniSection::operator = | IniFile.h | https://github.com/yast/yast-core | yast | Martin Vidner | 2012-01-05 17:03:40+00:00 | - ini-agent: added Write(.section_private.SECTION, BOOLEAN) (bnc#713661, CVE-2011-3177)
- system agent: added Write(.target.string, [filename, mode], content)
svn merge -r66758:66764 http://svn.opensuse.org/svn/yast/branches/SuSE-Code-11-SP2-Branch/core
svn path=/trunk/core/; revision=67117 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2011-3177 | mptctl_fw_download(MPT_ADAPTER *iocp, unsigned long arg) { struct mpt_fw_xfer __user *ufwdl = (void __user *) arg; struct mpt_fw_xfer kfwdl; if (copy_from_user(&kfwdl, ufwdl, sizeof(struct mpt_fw_xfer))) { printk(KERN_ERR MYNAM "%s@%d::_ioctl_fwdl - " "Unable to copy mpt_fw_xfer struct @ %p\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, ufwd... |
122 | IniSection (const IniSection &s) : IniBase (s), ip (s.ip), end_comment (s.end_comment), rewrite_by (s.rewrite_by), container (s.container) { reindex (); } | true | C++ | IniSection::IniSection | IniFile.h | https://github.com/yast/yast-core | yast | Martin Vidner | 2012-01-05 17:03:40+00:00 | - ini-agent: added Write(.section_private.SECTION, BOOLEAN) (bnc#713661, CVE-2011-3177)
- system agent: added Write(.target.string, [filename, mode], content)
svn merge -r66758:66764 http://svn.opensuse.org/svn/yast/branches/SuSE-Code-11-SP2-Branch/core
svn path=/trunk/core/; revision=67117 | CWE-200 | Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor | The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/200.html | CVE-2011-3177 | __mptctl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { mpt_ioctl_header __user *uhdr = (void __user *) arg; mpt_ioctl_header khdr; int iocnum; unsigned iocnumX; int nonblock = (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK); int ret; MPT_ADAPTER *iocp = NULL; if (copy_from_user(&khdr, uhdr, sizeof(khdr))) { printk(KERN_... |
134 | void CIRCNetwork::SetEncoding(const CString& s) { m_sEncoding = s; if (GetIRCSock()) { GetIRCSock()->SetEncoding(s); } } | true | C++ | CIRCNetwork::SetEncoding | IRCNetwork.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2019-03-22 00:22:00+00:00 | Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2019-9917 | void operator = (const IniSection &s) { if (&s == this) { return; } IniBase::operator = (s); ip = s.ip; end_comment = s.end_comment; is_private = s.is_private; rewrite_by = s.rewrite_by; container = s.container; reindex (); } |
137 | void CUser::SetClientEncoding(const CString& s) { m_sClientEncoding = s; for (CClient* pClient : GetAllClients()) { pClient->SetEncoding(s); } } | true | C++ | CUser::SetClientEncoding | User.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2019-03-22 00:22:00+00:00 | Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2019-9917 | IniSection (const IniParser *p, string n) : IniBase (n), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(0), container(), ivalues (), isections () {} |
139 | CString CZNC::FixupEncoding(const CString& sEncoding) const { if (sEncoding.empty() && m_uiForceEncoding) { return "UTF-8"; } return sEncoding; } | true | C++ | CZNC::FixupEncoding | znc.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2019-03-22 00:22:00+00:00 | Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2019-9917 | IniSection (const IniParser *p) : IniBase (-1), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(-1), container (), ivalues (), isections () {} |
141 | void CZNC::ForceEncoding() { m_uiForceEncoding++; #ifdef HAVE_ICU for (Csock* pSock : GetManager()) { if (pSock->GetEncoding().empty()) { pSock->SetEncoding("UTF-8"); } } #endif } | true | C++ | CZNC::ForceEncoding | znc.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2019-03-22 00:22:00+00:00 | Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2019-9917 | IniSection (const IniSection &s) : IniBase (s), ip (s.ip), end_comment (s.end_comment), is_private(s.is_private), rewrite_by (s.rewrite_by), container (s.container) { reindex (); } |
144 | ModHandle CModules::OpenModule(const CString& sModule, const CString& sModPath, CModInfo& Info, CString& sRetMsg) { sRetMsg.clear(); for (unsigned int a = 0; a < sModule.length(); a++) { if (((sModule[a] < '0') || (sModule[a] > '9')) && ((sModule[a] < 'a') || (sModule[a] > 'z')) && ((sModule[a] < 'A') || (sModule[a] > ... | true | C++ | CModules::OpenModule | Modules.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2019-06-15 02:00:42+01:00 | Fix remote code execution and privilege escalation vulnerability.
To trigger this, need to have a user already.
Thanks for Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us> for finding and reporting this.
CVE-2019-12816 | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2019-12816 | IniSection (const IniParser *p, string n) : IniBase (n), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(0), container(), ivalues (), isections () {} |
151 | TEST_F(ZNCTest, AwayNotify) { auto znc = Run(); auto ircd = ConnectIRCd(); auto client = ConnectClient(); client.Write("CAP LS"); client.Write("PASS :hunter2"); client.Write("NICK nick"); client.Write("USER user/test x x :x"); QByteArray cap_ls; client.ReadUntilAndGet(" LS :", cap_ls); ASSERT_THAT(cap_ls.toStdString(),... | true | C++ | znc_inttest::TEST_F | core.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2020-03-29 08:45:10+01:00 | Fix echo-message for *status
Close #1705 | CWE-476 | NULL Pointer Dereference | A NULL pointer dereference occurs when the application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically causing a crash or exit. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html | CVE-2020-13775 | IniSection (const IniParser *p) : IniBase (-1), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(-1), container (), ivalues (), isections () {} |
152 | void CClient::EchoMessage(const CMessage& Message) { CMessage EchoedMessage = Message; for (CClient* pClient : GetClients()) { if (pClient->HasEchoMessage() || (pClient != this && (m_pNetwork->IsChan(Message.GetParam(0)) || pClient->HasSelfMessage()))) { EchoedMessage.SetNick(GetNickMask()); pClient->PutClient(EchoedMe... | true | C++ | CClient::EchoMessage | Client.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2020-05-31 11:45:40+01:00 | Fix null pointer dereference in echo-message
The bug was introduced while fixing #1705. If a client did not enable
echo-message, and doesn't have a network, it crashes.
Thanks to LunarBNC for reporting this | CWE-476 | NULL Pointer Dereference | A NULL pointer dereference occurs when the application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but is NULL, typically causing a crash or exit. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/476.html | CVE-2020-13775 | IniSection (const IniSection &s) : IniBase (s), ip (s.ip), end_comment (s.end_comment), is_private(s.is_private), rewrite_by (s.rewrite_by), container (s.container) { reindex (); } |
155 | void CConfig::Write(CFile& File, unsigned int iIndentation) { CString sIndentation = CString(iIndentation, '\t'); for (const auto& it : m_ConfigEntries) { for (const CString& sValue : it.second) { File.Write(sIndentation + it.first + " = " + sValue + "\n"); } } for (const auto& it : m_SubConfigs) { for (const auto& it2... | true | C++ | CConfig::Write | Config.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2018-07-14 07:05:57+01:00 | Don't let attackers inject rogue values into znc.conf
Because of this vulnerability, existing ZNC users could get Admin
permissions.
Thanks for Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us> for finding and reporting this. | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2018-14055 | IniSection (const IniParser *p, string n) : IniBase (n), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(0), container(), ivalues (), isections () {} |
158 | void CClient::ReadLine(const CString& sData) { CLanguageScope user_lang(GetUser() ? GetUser()->GetLanguage() : ""); CString sLine = sData; sLine.TrimRight("\n\r"); DEBUG("(" << GetFullName() << ") CLI -> ZNC [" << CDebug::Filter(sLine) << "]"); bool bReturn = false; if (IsAttached()) { NETWORKMODULECALL(OnUserRaw(sLine... | true | C++ | CClient::ReadLine | Client.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2018-07-14 07:08:50+01:00 | Better cleanup lines coming from network.
Thanks for Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us> for finding and reporting this. | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2018-14055 | IniSection (const IniParser *p) : IniBase (-1), ip (p), end_comment (), is_private(false), rewrite_by(-1), container (), ivalues (), isections () {} |
159 | void CIRCSock::ReadLine(const CString& sData) { CString sLine = sData; sLine.TrimRight("\n\r"); DEBUG("(" << m_pNetwork->GetUser()->GetUserName() << "/" << m_pNetwork->GetName() << ") IRC -> ZNC [" << sLine << "]"); bool bReturn = false; IRCSOCKMODULECALL(OnRaw(sLine), &bReturn); if (bReturn) return; CMessage Message(s... | true | C++ | CIRCSock::ReadLine | IRCSock.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2018-07-14 07:08:50+01:00 | Better cleanup lines coming from network.
Thanks for Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us> for finding and reporting this. | CWE-20 | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | CVE-2018-14055 | IniSection (const IniSection &s) : IniBase (s), ip (s.ip), end_comment (s.end_comment), is_private(s.is_private), rewrite_by (s.rewrite_by), container (s.container) { reindex (); } |
161 | CString CWebSock::GetSkinPath(const CString& sSkinName) { CString sRet = CZNC::Get().GetZNCPath() + "/webskins/" + sSkinName; if (!CFile::IsDir(sRet)) { sRet = CZNC::Get().GetCurPath() + "/webskins/" + sSkinName; if (!CFile::IsDir(sRet)) { sRet = CString(_SKINDIR_) + "/" + sSkinName; } } return sRet + "/"; } | true | C++ | CWebSock::GetSkinPath | WebModules.cpp | https://github.com/znc/znc | znc | Alexey Sokolov | 2018-07-14 07:09:26+01:00 | Don't let web skin name ../../../../ access files outside of usual skins directories.
Thanks for Jeriko One <jeriko.one@gmx.us> for finding and reporting this. | CWE-22 | Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') | The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the... | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html | CVE-2018-14056 | int IniParser::write() { int bugs = 0; if (!inifile.isDirty()) { y2debug ("File %s did not change. Not saving.", multiple_files ? files[0].c_str () : file.c_str ()); return 0; } if (read_only) { y2debug ("Attempt to write file %s that was mounted read-only. Not saving.", multiple_files ? files[0].c_str () : file.c_str ... |
171 | void APE::Properties::analyzeCurrent() { d->file->seek(2, File::Current); ByteVector descriptor = d->file->readBlock(44); uint descriptorBytes = descriptor.mid(0,4).toUInt(false); if ((descriptorBytes - 52) > 0) d->file->seek(descriptorBytes - 52, File::Current); ByteVector header = d->file->readBlock(24); d->channels ... | true | C++ | APE::Properties::analyzeCurrent | apeproperties.cpp | https://github.com/taglib/taglib | taglib | Lukáš Lalinský | 2012-03-04 11:51:05+01:00 | Make sure to not try dividing by zero | NVD-CWE-noinfo | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | CVE-2012-1107 | void CIRCNetwork::SetEncoding(const CString& s) { m_sEncoding = CZNC::Get().FixupEncoding(s); if (GetIRCSock()) { GetIRCSock()->SetEncoding(m_sEncoding); } } |
172 | ByteVector ByteVector::mid(uint index, uint length) const { ByteVector v; if(index > size()) return v; ConstIterator endIt; if(length < 0xffffffff && length + index < size()) endIt = d->data.begin() + index + length; else endIt = d->data.end(); v.d->data.insert(v.d->data.begin(), ConstIterator(d->data.begin() + index),... | true | C++ | ByteVector::mid | tbytevector.cpp | https://github.com/taglib/taglib | taglib | Lukáš Lalinský | 2012-03-10 08:46:20+01:00 | Avoid uint overflow in case the length + index is over UINT_MAX | CWE-189 | Numeric Errors | Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/189.html | CVE-2012-1584 | void CUser::SetClientEncoding(const CString& s) { m_sClientEncoding = CZNC::Get().FixupEncoding(s); for (CClient* pClient : GetAllClients()) { pClient->SetEncoding(m_sClientEncoding); } } |
195 | SilenceMessage(const std::string& mask, const std::string& flags) : ClientProtocol::Message("SILENCE") { PushParam(mask); PushParamRef(flags); } | true | C++ | SilenceMessage::SilenceMessage | m_silence.cpp | https://github.com/inspircd/inspircd | inspircd | Peter Powell | 2019-05-17 09:50:54+01:00 | Copy the silence flags when sending update notifications.
This fixes a crash bug in the silence module on some versions of GCC. | CWE-416 | Use After Free | Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/416.html | CVE-2019-20918 | void CZNC::ForceEncoding() { m_uiForceEncoding++; #ifdef HAVE_ICU for (Csock* pSock : GetManager()) { pSock->SetEncoding(FixupEncoding(pSock->GetEncoding())); } #endif } |
200 | Pong(const std::string& cookie, const std::string& server = "") : ClientProtocol::Message("PONG", ServerInstance->Config->GetServerName()) { PushParamRef(ServerInstance->Config->GetServerName()); if (!server.empty()) PushParamRef(server); PushParamRef(cookie); } | true | C++ | ClientProtocol::Messages::Pong::Pong | clientprotocolmsg.h | https://github.com/inspircd/inspircd | inspircd | Sadie Powell | 2021-05-14 13:56:32+01:00 | Fix sending malformed pong messages in some cases. | CWE-732 | Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource | The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html | CVE-2021-33586 | ModHandle CModules::OpenModule(const CString& sModule, const CString& sModPath, CModInfo& Info, CString& sRetMsg) { sRetMsg.clear(); if (!ValidateModuleName(sModule, sRetMsg)) { return nullptr; } ModHandle p = dlopen((sModPath).c_str(), RTLD_NOW | RTLD_GLOBAL); if (!p) { const char* cDlError = dlerror(); CString sDlErr... |
202 | CmdResult HandleLocal(LocalUser* user, const Params& parameters) CXX11_OVERRIDE { size_t origin = parameters.size() > 1 ? 1 : 0; if (parameters[origin].empty()) { user->WriteNumeric(ERR_NOORIGIN, "No origin specified"); return CMD_FAILURE; } ClientProtocol::Messages::Pong pong(parameters[0], origin ? parameters[1] : ""... | true | C++ | CommandPing::HandleLocal | core_user.cpp | https://github.com/inspircd/inspircd | inspircd | Sadie Powell | 2021-05-14 13:56:32+01:00 | Fix sending malformed pong messages in some cases. | CWE-732 | Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource | The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/732.html | CVE-2021-33586 | TEST_F(ZNCTest, AwayNotify) { auto znc = Run(); auto ircd = ConnectIRCd(); auto client = ConnectClient(); client.Write("CAP LS"); client.Write("PASS :hunter2"); client.Write("NICK nick"); client.Write("USER user/test x x :x"); QByteArray cap_ls; client.ReadUntilAndGet(" LS :", cap_ls); ASSERT_THAT(cap_ls.toStdString(),... |
206 | bool CTransaction::DisconnectInputs(CTxDB& txdb) { if (!IsCoinBase()) { BOOST_FOREACH(const CTxIn& txin, vin) { COutPoint prevout = txin.prevout; CTxIndex txindex; if (!txdb.ReadTxIndex(prevout.hash, txindex)) return error("DisconnectInputs() : ReadTxIndex failed"); if (prevout.n >= txindex.vSpent.size()) return error(... | true | C++ | CTransaction::DisconnectInputs | main.cpp | https://github.com/sipa/bitcoin | sipa | Pieter Wuille | 2012-03-03 18:26:36+01:00 | Do not allow overwriting unspent transactions (BIP 30)
Introduce the following network rule:
* a block is not valid if it contains a transaction whose hash
already exists in the block chain, unless all that transaction's
outputs were already spent before said block.
Warning: this is effectively a network rule ... | CWE-16 | Configuration | Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/16.html | CVE-2012-1909 | TEST_F(ZNCTest, StatusEchoMessage) { auto znc = Run(); auto ircd = ConnectIRCd(); auto client = LoginClient(); client.Write("CAP REQ :echo-message"); client.Write("PRIVMSG *status :blah"); client.ReadUntil(":nick!user@irc.znc.in PRIVMSG *status :blah"); client.ReadUntil(":*status!znc@znc.in PRIVMSG nick :Unknown comman... |
214 | bool HTTPAuthorized(map<string, string>& mapHeaders) { string strAuth = mapHeaders["authorization"]; if (strAuth.substr(0,6) != "Basic ") return false; string strUserPass64 = strAuth.substr(6); boost::trim(strUserPass64); string strUserPass = DecodeBase64(strUserPass64); return strUserPass == strRPCUserColonPass; } | true | C++ | HTTPAuthorized | bitcoinrpc.cpp | https://github.com/Ziftr/primecoin | Ziftr | Gavin Andresen | 2013-08-20 12:19:40+10:00 | Make RPC password resistant to timing attacks
Fixes issue#2838; this is a tweaked version of pull#2845 that
should not leak the length of the password and is more generic,
in case we run into other situations where we need
timing-attack-resistant comparisons. | CWE-203 | Observable Discrepancy | The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/203.html | CVE-2013-10006 | void CClient::ReadLine(const CString& sData) { CLanguageScope user_lang(GetUser() ? GetUser()->GetLanguage() : ""); CString sLine = sData; sLine.Replace("\n", ""); sLine.Replace("\r", ""); DEBUG("(" << GetFullName() << ") CLI -> ZNC [" << CDebug::Filter(sLine) << "]"); bool bReturn = false; if (IsAttached()) { NETWORKM... |
220 | void CLASS panasonic_load_raw() { int row, col, i, j, sh = 0, pred[2], nonz[2]; pana_bits(0); for (row = 0; row < height; row++) { #ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD checkCancel(); #endif for (col = 0; col < raw_width; col++) { if ((i = col % 14) == 0) pred[0] = pred[1] = nonz[0] = nonz[1] = 0; if (i % 3 == 2) sh = 4 >> (3 - ... | true | C++ | panasonic_load_raw | dcraw.c | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2017-12-02 12:01:40+03:00 | SECUNIA advisory 76000 #1 (wrong fuji width set via tiff tag | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | CVE-2017-16909 | void CIRCSock::ReadLine(const CString& sData) { CString sLine = sData; sLine.Replace("\n", ""); sLine.Replace("\r", ""); DEBUG("(" << m_pNetwork->GetUser()->GetUserName() << "/" << m_pNetwork->GetName() << ") IRC -> ZNC [" << sLine << "]"); bool bReturn = false; IRCSOCKMODULECALL(OnRaw(sLine), &bReturn); if (bReturn) r... |
222 | void CLASS panasonic_load_raw() { int row, col, i, j, sh = 0, pred[2], nonz[2]; pana_bits(0); for (row = 0; row < height; row++) { #ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD checkCancel(); #endif for (col = 0; col < raw_width; col++) { if ((i = col % 14) == 0) pred[0] = pred[1] = nonz[0] = nonz[1] = 0; if (i % 3 == 2) sh = 4 >> (3 - ... | true | C++ | panasonic_load_raw | dcraw_common.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2017-12-02 12:01:40+03:00 | SECUNIA advisory 76000 #1 (wrong fuji width set via tiff tag | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | CVE-2017-16909 | CString CWebSock::GetSkinPath(const CString& sSkinName) { const CString sSkin = sSkinName.Replace_n("/", "_").Replace_n(".", "_"); CString sRet = CZNC::Get().GetZNCPath() + "/webskins/" + sSkin; if (!CFile::IsDir(sRet)) { sRet = CZNC::Get().GetCurPath() + "/webskins/" + sSkin; if (!CFile::IsDir(sRet)) { sRet = CString(... |
229 | int crxSetupSubbandData(CrxImage *img, CrxPlaneComp *planeComp, const CrxTile *tile, uint32_t mdatOffset) { long compDataSize = 0; long waveletDataOffset = 0; long compCoeffDataOffset = 0; int32_t toSubbands = 3 * img->levels + 1; int32_t transformWidth = 0; CrxSubband *subbands = planeComp->subBands; for (int32_t subb... | true | C++ | crxSetupSubbandData | crx.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2020-04-26 18:49:36+03:00 | CR3 decoder: use mempool for memory | CWE-770 | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html | CVE-2020-35534 | void Ogg::XiphComment::parse(const ByteVector &data) { int pos = 0; int vendorLength = data.mid(0, 4).toUInt(false); pos += 4; d->vendorID = String(data.mid(pos, vendorLength), String::UTF8); pos += vendorLength; uint commentFields = data.mid(pos, 4).toUInt(false); pos += 4; if(commentFields > (data.size() - 8) / 4) { ... |
236 | int crxSetupImageData(crx_data_header_t *hdr, CrxImage *img, int16_t *outBuf, uint64_t mdatOffset, uint32_t mdatSize, uint8_t *mdatHdrPtr) { int IncrBitTable[32] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}; img->planeWidth = hdr->f_width; img->planeHeight = hdr->f_... | true | C++ | crxSetupImageData | crx.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2020-04-26 18:49:36+03:00 | CR3 decoder: use mempool for memory | CWE-770 | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html | CVE-2020-35534 | void APE::Properties::analyzeCurrent() { d->file->seek(2, File::Current); ByteVector descriptor = d->file->readBlock(44); uint descriptorBytes = descriptor.mid(0,4).toUInt(false); if ((descriptorBytes - 52) > 0) d->file->seek(descriptorBytes - 52, File::Current); ByteVector header = d->file->readBlock(24); d->channels ... |
237 | int crxReadImageHeaders(crx_data_header_t *hdr, CrxImage *img, uint8_t *mdatPtr, uint32_t mdatSize) { int nTiles = img->tileRows * img->tileCols; if (!nTiles) return -1; if (!img->tiles) { img->tiles = (CrxTile *)malloc( sizeof(CrxTile) * nTiles + sizeof(CrxPlaneComp) * nTiles * img->nPlanes + sizeof(CrxSubband) * nTil... | true | C++ | crxReadImageHeaders | crx.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2020-04-26 18:49:36+03:00 | CR3 decoder: use mempool for memory | CWE-770 | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html | CVE-2020-35534 | ByteVector ByteVector::mid(uint index, uint length) const { ByteVector v; if(index > size()) return v; ConstIterator endIt; if(length < size() - index) endIt = d->data.begin() + index + length; else endIt = d->data.end(); v.d->data.insert(v.d->data.begin(), ConstIterator(d->data.begin() + index), endIt); v.d->size = v.... |
239 | int crxFreeImageData(CrxImage *img) { CrxTile *tile = img->tiles; int nTiles = img->tileRows * img->tileCols; if (img->tiles) { for (int32_t curTile = 0; curTile < nTiles; curTile++, tile++) if (tile[curTile].comps) for (int32_t curPlane = 0; curPlane < img->nPlanes; curPlane++) crxFreeSubbandData(img, tile[curTile].co... | true | C++ | crxFreeImageData | crx.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2020-04-26 18:49:36+03:00 | CR3 decoder: use mempool for memory | CWE-770 | Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling | The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated, in violation of the intended security policy for that actor. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/770.html | CVE-2020-35534 | SilenceMessage(const std::string& mask, const std::string& flags) : ClientProtocol::Message("SILENCE") { PushParam(mask); PushParam(flags); } |
242 | void LibRaw::parseSonySR2(uchar *cbuf_SR2, unsigned SR2SubIFDOffset, unsigned SR2SubIFDLength, unsigned dng_writer) { unsigned c; unsigned entries, tag_id, tag_type, tag_datalen; INT64 sr2_offset, tag_offset, tag_data, tag_dataoffset; int TagProcessed; int tag_dataunitlen; float num; int i; int WBCTC_count; entries = s... | true | C++ | LibRaw::parseSonySR2 | sony.cpp | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2020-05-10 21:22:49+03:00 | additional checks in parseSonySRF
parseSonySR2: buffer size check | CWE-125 | Out-of-bounds Read | The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | CVE-2020-35535 | CmdResult HandleLocal(LocalUser* user, const Params& parameters) CXX11_OVERRIDE { size_t origin = parameters.size() > 1 ? 1 : 0; if (parameters[origin].empty()) { user->WriteNumeric(ERR_NOORIGIN, "No origin specified"); return CMD_FAILURE; } ClientProtocol::Messages::Pong pong(parameters[0], origin ? parameters[1] : Se... |
268 | int CLASS parse_jpeg(int offset) { int len, save, hlen, mark; fseek(ifp, offset, SEEK_SET); if (fgetc(ifp) != 0xff || fgetc(ifp) != 0xd8) return 0; while (fgetc(ifp) == 0xff && (mark = fgetc(ifp)) != 0xda) { order = 0x4d4d; len = get2() - 2; save = ftell(ifp); if (mark == 0xc0 || mark == 0xc3 || mark == 0xc9) { fgetc(i... | true | C++ | parse_jpeg | dcraw.c | https://github.com/LibRaw/LibRaw | LibRaw | Alex Tutubalin | 2017-03-04 21:27:39+03:00 | Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns | CWE-119 | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. | https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | CVE-2017-6886 | void CLASS panasonic_load_raw() { int row, col, i, j, sh = 0, pred[2], nonz[2]; pana_bits(0); for (row = 0; row < raw_height; row++) { #ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD checkCancel(); #endif for (col = 0; col < raw_width; col++) { if ((i = col % 14) == 0) pred[0] = pred[1] = nonz[0] = nonz[1] = 0; if (i % 3 == 2) sh = 4 >> (... |
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