Document ID: 02017D1775-20230404
Language: ENG

02017D1775 — EN — 04.04.2023 — 010.001
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<table><col/><col/><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;B</a></p></td><td><p>                        COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/1775</p><p>of 28 September 2017</p><p><a>concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali</a></p><p>(OJ L 251 29.9.2017, p. 23)</p></td></tr></table>
Amended by:
<table><col/><col/><col/><col/><col/><tr><td><p>&#160;</p></td><td><p>&#160;</p></td><td><p>Official Journal</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>&#160;&#160;No</p></td><td><p>page</p></td><td><p>date</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M1</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2019/29&#160;of 9&#160;January 2019</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;8</p></td><td><p>30</p></td><td><p>10.1.2019</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#160;M2</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2019/1216&#160;of 17&#160;July 2019</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;192</p></td><td><p>26</p></td><td><p>18.7.2019</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#160;M3</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2020/9&#160;of 7 January 2020</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;4I</p></td><td><p>7</p></td><td><p>8.1.2020</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M4</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2020/118&#160;of 27 January 2020</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;22</p></td><td><p>55</p></td><td><p>28.1.2020</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M5</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2021/2208&#160;of 13&#160;December 2021</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;446</p></td><td><p>44</p></td><td><p>14.12.2021</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#160;M6</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP)&#160;2022/157&#160;of 4&#160;February 2022</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;25I</p></td><td><p>7</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M7</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING DECISION (CFSP) 2022/2187&#160;of 8&#160;November 2022</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;288</p></td><td><p>82</p></td><td><p>9.11.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M8</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2022/2440&#160;of 12&#160;December 2022</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;319</p></td><td><p>68</p></td><td><p>13.12.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M9</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/431&#160;of 25&#160;February 2023</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;59I</p></td><td><p>434</p></td><td><p>25.2.2023</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;M10</a></p></td><td><p><a>                              COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2023/726&#160;of 31&#160;March 2023</a></p></td><td><p>&#160;&#160;L&#160;94</p></td><td><p>48</p></td><td><p>3.4.2023</p></td></tr></table>
Corrected by:
<table><col/><col/><col/><col/><col/><tr><td><p><a>&#9658;C1</a></p></td><td><p><a>Corrigendum, OJ&#160;L&#160;047I, 20.2.2020, p. &#160;9&#160;(2020/118)</a></p></td></tr></table>
COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2017/1775
of 28 September 2017
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Mali
Article 1
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of persons designated by the Sanctions Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:
(a) engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (the ‘Agreement’);
(b) actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;
(c) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of, or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in points (a) and (b), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;
(d) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
(i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces;
(ii) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of Experts;
(iii)
international security presences, including the Force Conjointe des États du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), European Union Missions and French forces;
(e) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
(f) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
(g) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
(h) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions.
The designated persons referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex I .
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.
4. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that:
(a) entry or transit is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;
(b) an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region.
5. In cases where, pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through, its territory of persons listed in Annex I , the authorisation shall be limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons concerned by the authorisation.
Article 1a
1. Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories of natural persons:
(a) being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as those actions or policies referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1;
(b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or
(c) being associated with natural persons referred to in points (a) or (b).
The designated persons referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex II.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not oblige a Member State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory.
3. Paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the cases where a Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely:
(a) as a host country of an international intergovernmental organisation;
(b) as a host country to an international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations;
(c) under a multilateral agreement conferring privileges and immunities; or
(d) pursuant to the 1929 Treaty of Conciliation (Lateran Pact) concluded by the Holy See (Vatican City State) and Italy.
4. Paragraph 3 shall also apply in cases where a Member State is host country of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
5. The Council shall be duly informed in all cases where a Member State grants an exemption pursuant to paragraphs 3 or 4.
6. Member States may grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where travel is justified on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need, or on grounds of attending intergovernmental meetings or meetings promoted or hosted by the Union, or hosted by a Member State holding the Chairmanship in office of the OSCE, where a political dialogue is conducted that directly promotes the policy objectives of restrictive measures.
7. Member States may also grant exemptions from the measures imposed under paragraph 1 where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process.
8. A Member State wishing to grant exemptions referred to in paragraphs 6 or 7 shall notify the Council in writing. The exemption shall be deemed to be granted unless one or more Member States raises an objection in writing within two working days of receiving notification of the proposed exemption. Should one or more Member States raise an objection, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may decide to grant the proposed exemption.
9. Where, pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 6 or 7, a Member State authorises the entry into, or transit through its territory of persons listed in Annex II, the authorisation shall be strictly limited to the purpose for which it is given and to the persons directly concerned thereby.
Article 2
1. All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by persons or entities designated by the Sanctions Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:
(a) engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement;
(b) actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;
(c) acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of, or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in points (a) and (b), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;
(d) involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against:
(i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces;
(ii) MINUSMA peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of experts;
(iii)
international security presences, including the FC-G5S, European Union Missions and French forces;
(e) obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;
(f) planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;
(g) the use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;
(h) knowingly facilitating the travel of a listed person in violation of the travel restrictions;
or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, shall be frozen.
The designated persons or entities referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex I .
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the persons or entities listed in Annex I .
3. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to funds and economic resources which the relevant Member State has determined to be:
(a) necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services; or
(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
after notification by the relevant Member State to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to authorise, where appropriate, access to such funds or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Sanctions Committee within five working days of such notification.
4. The measures referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to funds or economic resources which the relevant Member State has determined to be:
(a) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the Member State to the Sanctions Committee and has been approved by the Sanctions Committee;
(b) the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien was entered into or judgment delivered prior to the date on which the person or entity was included in Annex I , the lien or judgment is not for the benefit of a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and has been notified by the Member State concerned to the Sanctions Committee.
5. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply where the Sanctions Committee determines, on a case-by-case basis, that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region.
6. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making a payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant Member State has determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity referred to in paragraph 1 and after notification by the relevant Member State to the Sanctions Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorise, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds or economic resources for that purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorisation.
7. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts; or
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the restrictive measures provided for in this Decision;
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to paragraph 1.
8. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services, which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:
(a) the United Nations, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
(b) international organisations;
(c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
(d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
(e) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities mentioned in points (a) to (d) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities; or by,
(f) appropriate other actors as determined by the Sanctions Committee.
Article 2a
1. All funds and economic resources owned or controlled directly or indirectly by natural or legal persons, entities or bodies:
(a) being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged directly or indirectly, in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali, such as those actions or policies referred to in Article 2, paragraph 1;
(b) obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, including by obstructing or undermining the holding of elections or the handover of power to elected authorities; or
(c) being associated with natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in points (a) or (b),
shall be frozen.
The designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in this paragraph are listed in Annex II.
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II.
3. By way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the funds or economic resources concerned are:
(a) necessary to satisfy the basic needs of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II and dependent family members of such natural persons, including payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges;
(b) intended exclusively for the payment of reasonable professional fees and the reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services;
(c) intended exclusively for the payment of fees or service charges for the routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or economic resources;
(d) necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that the competent authority has notified the competent authorities of the other Member States and the Commission of the grounds on which it considers that a specific authorisation should be granted, at least two weeks prior to the authorisation; or
(e) to be paid into or from an account of a diplomatic or consular mission or an international organisation enjoying immunities in accordance with international law, insofar as such payments are intended to be used for official purposes of the diplomatic or consular mission or international organisation.
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.
4. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a) the funds or economic resources are the subject of an arbitral decision rendered prior to the date on which the natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1 was listed in Annex II, or of a judicial or administrative decision rendered in the Union, or a judicial decision enforceable in the Member State concerned, prior to or after that date;
(b) the funds or economic resources will be used exclusively to satisfy claims secured by such a decision or recognised as valid in such a decision, within the limits set by applicable laws and regulations governing the rights of persons having such claims;
(c) the decision is not for the benefit of a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex II; and
(d) recognition of the decision is not contrary to public policy in the Member State concerned.
The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisation granted under this paragraph within two weeks of the authorisation.
5. Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a natural or legal person, entity or body listed in Annex II from making a payment due under a contract or agreement entered into, or an obligation that arose, prior to the date on which such natural or legal person, entity or body was listed therein, provided that the Member State concerned has determined that the payment is not, directly or indirectly, received by a natural or legal person, entity or body referred to in paragraph 1.
6. Paragraph 2 shall not apply to the addition to frozen accounts of:
(a) interest or other earnings on those accounts;
(b) payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that were concluded or arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the measures provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2; or
(c) payments due under judicial, administrative or arbitral decisions rendered in the Union or enforceable in the Member State concerned;
provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments remain subject to the measures provided for in paragraph 1.
7. Without prejudice to paragraph 8, by way of derogation from paragraphs 1 and 2, the competent authorities of the Member States may authorise the release of certain frozen funds or economic resources, or the making available of certain funds or economic resources, under such conditions as they deem appropriate, after having determined that the provision of such funds or economic resources is necessary for humanitarian purposes, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, or the transfer of humanitarian workers and related assistance or for evacuations from Mali. The Member State concerned shall inform the other Member States and the Commission of any authorisations granted under this Article within two weeks of the authorisation.
8. Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or to the provision of goods and services, which are necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that support basic human needs where such assistance and other activities are carried out by:
(a) the United Nations, including its programmes, funds and other entities and bodies, as well as its specialised agencies and related organisations;
(b) international organisations;
(c) humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and members of those humanitarian organisations;
(d) bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plans, Refugee Response Plans, other United Nations appeals or humanitarian clusters coordinated by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);
(e) the employees, grantees, subsidiaries, or implementing partners of the entities mentioned in points (a) to (d) while and to the extent that they are acting in those capacities; or by,
(f) appropriate other actors as determined by the Council.
Article 3
1. The Council shall establish the list in Annex I and shall amend it in accordance with determinations made by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee.
2. The Council, acting by unanimity upon a proposal from a Member State or from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’), shall establish and amend the list in Annex II.
Article 4
1. Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee designates a person or entity, the Council shall include that person or entity in Annex I. The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the person or entity concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that person or entity with an opportunity to present observations.
2. The Council shall communicate the decision referred to in Article 3(2), including the grounds for the listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing that natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.
3. Where observations are submitted, or where substantial new evidence is presented, the Council shall review its decision and inform the person or entity concerned accordingly.
Article 5
1. Annex I shall include the grounds for listing the persons and entities as provided by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee.
2. Annex I shall also include, where available, information provided by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee necessary to identify the persons or entities concerned. With regard to persons, such information may include names, including aliases, date and place of birth, nationality, passport and identity card numbers, gender, address if known, and function or profession. With regard to entities, such information may include names, place and date of registration, registration number and place of business.
3. Annex II shall include the grounds for listing the natural and legal persons, entities and bodies referred to therein.
4. Annex II shall also include, where available, the information necessary to identify the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies concerned. With regard to natural persons, such information may include: names and aliases; date and place of birth; nationality; passport and identity card numbers; gender; address, if known; and function or profession. With regard to legal persons, entities or bodies, such information may include: names; place and date of registration; registration number; and place of business.
Article 5a
1. The Council and the High Representative shall process personal data in order to carry out their tasks under this Decision, in particular:
(a) as regards the Council, for preparing and making amendments to Annexes I and II;
(b) as regards the High Representative, for preparing amendments to Annexes I and II.
2. The Council and the High Representative may process, where applicable, relevant data relating to criminal offences committed by listed natural persons, and to criminal convictions or security measures concerning such persons, only to the extent that such processing is necessary for the preparation of Annexes I and II.
3. For the purposes of this Decision, the Council and the High Representative are designated as ‘controller’ within the meaning of Article 3, point (8) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ), in order to ensure that the natural persons concerned can exercise their rights under that Regulation.
Article 5b
No claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Decision, including claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, in particular a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, in particular a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, of whatever form, shall be satisfied, if they are made by:
(a) designated natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in Annex II;
(b) any natural or legal person, entity or body acting through or on behalf of one of the natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in point (a).
Article 6
1. This Decision shall be amended or repealed as appropriate, in accordance with determinations made by the Security Council.
2. The measures referred to in Article 1a, paragraph 1, and Article 2a, paragraphs 1 and 2 shall apply until 14 December 2023 and shall be kept under constant review. They shall be renewed, or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.
Article 7
This Decision shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union .
ANNEX I
A. List of persons referred to in Article 1(1)
1. AHMOUDOU AG ASRIW (alias: a) Amadou Ag Isriw b) Ahmedou c) Ahmadou d) Isrew e) Isereoui f) Isriou
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1982
Nationality: Mali
Address: a) Mali b) Amassine, Mali (previous location)
Date of UN designation: 20 Dec. 2018
Other information: Gender: male. Possibly arrested in Niger in October 2016. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban). Webpage: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCu2efaIUosqEu1HEBs2zJIw
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Additional information
Ahmoudou Ag Asriw was listed on 20 December 2018 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of resolution 2374 (2017) for engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement; and acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property.
Ahmoudou Ag Asriw is a senior commander of the Groupe autodéfense touareg Imghad et allies (GATIA) and has in this capacity been involved in leading drug convoys in northern Mali at least since October 2016, as well as ceasefire violations in Kidal region in July 2017 and April 2018.
In April 2018 Asriw led a convoy, together with a member of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) Plateforme, trafficking four tons of cannabis resin from Tabankort, via Ammasine, Kidal region, towards Niger. The convoy was attacked by Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad members and unidentified assailants from Niger. Three combatants were killed during clashes that followed.
As such, motivated by competition over drug convoys, Asriw has engaged in hostilities in violation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. In turn, Asriw’s involvement in drug trafficking is highly likely to finance his military operations, including ceasefire violations.
2. Mahamadou AG RHISSA (alias: Mohamed Talhandak)
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1983
Nationality: Mali
Address: Kidal, Mali
Date of UN designation: 20 Dec. 2018
Other information: Gender: male. On 1 October 2017 French forces raided his house, arresting Ag Rhissa and six family members.
Additional information
Mahamadou Ag Rhissa was listed on 20 December 2018 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement; acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 8 of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property; and planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge.
Mahamadou Ag Rhissa, alias Mohamed Talhandak, is an influential businessman in Kidal region and member of the Haut conseil pour l'unicité de l'Azawad (HCUA). In 2016, he represented the Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA) during meetings in Bamako concerning the implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation.
Ag Rhissa evolved in trafficking petrol between Algeria and Kidal and came to control migrant smuggling through the border town Talhandak. Migrants testified about the abusive practices of Ag Rhissa, including forced labour, corporal punishment and imprisonment. Ag Rhissa has held and facilitated sexual exploitation of at least two women, releasing them only after payments of CFA 150 000 -175 000 (USD 300-350).
On 1 October 2017, Barkhane forces raided two of his house in the Kidal area on suspicion having relations with terrorist networks. Ag Rhissa was briefly arrested. On 4 November 2017, he allegedly participated in a terrorist armed group meeting in the Mali-Algeria border area.
As official representative of the CMA in the peace process, Ag Rhissa's involvement in terrorism, organised crime and human rights abuses threatens the implementation of the Agreement and damages the credibility of the HCUA as negotiating partner.
3. MOHAMED OUSMANE AG MOHAMEDOUNE (alias: a) Ousmane Mahamadou b) Mohamed Ousmane)
Title: Cheikh
Date of birth: 16 Apr. 1972
Place of birth: Mali
Nationality: Mali
Address: Mali
Date of UN designation: 20 Dec. 2018
Other information: Gender: male. Physical description: eye colour: brown; hair colour: black. Telephone number: +223 60 36 01 01. Languages spoken: Arabic and French. Distinguishing marks: eyeglasses. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban).
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Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune was listed on 20 December 2018 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 3 of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement; and his involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against: (i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defence forces; (ii) MINUSMA peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of experts; (iii) international security presences, including the FC-G5S, European Union Missions and French forces.
Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune (refer to as Mohamed Ousmane) is the secretary general of the Coalition pour le Peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), created in 2014 as a splinter group from the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA). Mohamed Ousmane took over the leadership of the CPA in June 2015 and has established since 2016 several military bases and check-points in the Timbuktu region, notably in Soumpi and Echel.
In 2017 and 2018, the military chief of staff of Mohamed Ousmane, and other armed elements of the CPA, have been involved in deadly attacks against Malian security and armed forces in the area of Soumpi. Those attacks were claimed by the Jamaat Nosrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a terrorist group led by Iyad Ag Ghali, listed in the ISIL/Al-Qaida sanctions list established and maintained pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267/1989/2253.
Mohamed Ousmane also founded in 2017 and presided a broader alliance of splinter groups, the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME). Mohamed Ousmane organised the first convention of the CME in Tinaouker (Gao region) on 30 April 2018, during which he was appointed as spokesperson of the CME. During its founding convention, the CME openly threatened in an official statement the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.
The CME has been also involved in obstructions delaying the implementation of the Agreement, by pressuring the Malian government and the international community with the aim to impose the CME in the different mechanisms established by the Agreement.
4. AHMED AG ALBACHAR (alias: Intahmadou Ag Albachar)
Designation: President of the Humanitarian Commission of the Bureau Regional d’Administration et Gestion de Kidal
Date of birth: 31 Dec. 1963
Place of birth: Tin-Essako, Kidal region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 1 63 08 4 01 001 005E
Address: Quartier Aliou, Kidal, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information : Ahmed Ag Albachar is a prominent businessman and, since early 2018, a special advisor to the Governor of Kidal region. An influential member of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), belonging to the Ifoghas Tuareg community, Ahmed Ag Albachar also mediates relations between the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and Ansar Dine (QDe.135). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Ahmed Ag Albachar is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement; and paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 2374 (2017) for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
In January Ag Albachar uses his influence to control and choose which humanitarian and development projects take place in the Kidal region, who implements them, where and when. No humanitarian action can be undertaken without his knowledge and approval. As self-proclaimed president of the humanitarian commission, Ag Albachar is in charge of granting residence and work permits of aid workers in exchange for money or services. The commission also controls which companies and individuals can participate in bids for projects that NGOs advertise in Kidal, granting Ag Albachar the power to manipulate humanitarian action in the region and choose those who work for NGOs. Aid distributions can only be conducted under his oversight, thereby influencing who benefits from the distributions.
Additionally, Albachar uses unemployed youths to intimidate and extort NGOs, severely hindering their work. The humanitarian community at large works in fear in Kidal, but especially national staff who are more vulnerable.
Ahmed Ag Albachar is also the co-owner of Timitrine Voyage transport company; one of the few transport companies that NGOs are authorised to use in Kidal. Ag Albachar, together with a dozen of other transport companies owned by a small clique of influential Ifoghas Tuareg notables, usurps a significant share of humanitarian aid in Kidal. Moreover, the monopoly position maintained by Ag Albachar, renders aid delivery in certain communities more difficult than others.
Albachar is manipulating humanitarian aid to fulfil his personal interests and the political interests of the HCUA by exercising terror, threatening NGOs and controlling their operations, all of which results in obstruction and hindrance of aid affecting beneficiaries in need in the region of Kidal. Therefore, Ahmed Ag Albachar obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
His actions also violate article 49 of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali that commits parties to respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence which guide humanitarian action, to prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and to facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel. Therefore, Albachar obstructs or threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
5. HOUKA HOUKA AG ALHOUSSEINI (alias: a) Mohamed Ibn Alhousseyni b) Muhammad Ibn Al-Husayn c) Houka Houka)
Title: Cadi
Date of birth: a) 1 Jan. 1962 b) 1 Jan. 1963 c) 1 Jan. 1964
Place of birth: Ariaw, Tombouctou region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was appointed by Iyad Ag Ghaly (QDi.316) as the Cadi of Timbuktu in April 2012 after the establishment of the jihadist caliphate in northern Mali.
Houka Houka used to work closely with the Hesbah, the Islamic police headed by Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, jailed at the Detention Centre of the International Criminal Court in The Hague since September 2016. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
After the French forces intervention in January 2013, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was arrested on 17 January 2014 but subsequently released by Malian authorities on 15 August 2014, a liberation denounced by human rights organisations.
Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini has been since based in Ariaw, in the area of Zouéra, a village located west of Timbuktu (Essakane commune), on the bank of the lake Faguibine going towards the Mauritanian border. On 27 September 2017, he was officially reinstated here as a teacher by the Governor of Timbuktu, Koina Ag Ahmadou, this after lobbying by sanctioned individual Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamidoune (MLi.003), leader of the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), listed on 20 December 2018 by the Security Council Committee on Mali for reasons including actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement. Mohamed Ousmane founded in 2017 and presided a broader alliance of splinter groups, the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME). During its founding convention, the CME openly threatened in an official statement the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The CME has been also involved in obstructions delaying the implementation of the Agreement, by pressuring the Malian government and the international community with the aim to impose the CME in the different mechanisms established by the Agreement.
Houka Houka and Mohamed Ousmane have been instrumental to each others’ rise, the latter facilitating meetings with government officials, and the first playing a key role in the expansion of Ousmane’s influence over the region of Timbuktu. Houka Houka has participated in most of the community gatherings organised by Mohamed Ousmane since 2017, contributing to Ousmane’s notoriety and credibility in the region, as well as to the founding ceremony of the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME) to which he gave his public blessing.
The area of influence of Houka Houka has recently expanded further east, to the Ber region (stronghold of the Bérabich Arabs located 50 kilometres east of Timbuktu), and northern Timbuktu. Even though he is not from a lineage of Cadis and that he started only in 2012, Houka Houka was able to extend his authority as a Cadi and his capacity to maintain public security in certain areas by using Al-Furqan assets and the fear that this terrorist organisation instigates in the Timbuktu region through complex attacks against international and Malian defence and security forces and targeted assassinations.
Therefore, through his support for Mohamed Ousmane and his obstruction of the Agreement, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini threatens its implementation, as well as the peace, security, and stability in Mali at large.
6. MAHRI SIDI AMAR BEN DAHA (alias: a) Yoro Ould Daha b) Yoro Ould Daya c) Sidi Amar Ould Daha d) Yoro)
Designation: Deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1978
Place of birth: Djebock, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 11262/1547
Address: Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information: Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is a leader of the Lehmar Arab community of Gao and military chief of staff of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze). Reportedly deceased in February 2020.
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Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
Ben Daha was a high-ranking officer of the Islamic police operating in Gao when the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134) controlled the town from June 2012 to January 2013. Ben Daha currently is deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as Member of Parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
From 14 to 18 November 2018, dozens of MAA-Plateforme combatants together with those of the CMFPR factions obstructed the holding of regional consultations. Operating under the instruction and with the participation of Ben Daha, at least six pick-up truck vehicles from the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-Plateforme) were positioned in front of the Gao governorate and its vicinity. Two MOC vehicles attributed to MAA-Plateforme were also observed at the scene.
On 17 November 2018, an incident took place between armed elements blocking access to the governorate and a FAMa patrol passing by the area, but was diffused before it could escalate and constitute a cease-fire violation. On 18 November 2018, a total of twelve vehicles and armed elements lifted the blockade of the governorate following a latest round of negotiations with the governor of Gao.
On 30 November 2018, Ben Daha organised an inter-Arab meeting in Tinfanda to discuss security and administrative restructuring. The meeting also included sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001) whom Ben Daha supports and defends.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ben Daha has obstructed the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In addition, Ben Daha supports an individual identified as threatening the implementation of the Agreement through his involvement in ceasefire violations and organised criminal activity.
7. MOHAMED BEN AHMED MAHRI (alias: a) Mohammed Rougi b) Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya c) Mohamed Ould Mahri Ahmed Daya d) Mohamed Rougie e) Mohamed Rouggy f) Mohamed Rouji)
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1979
Place of birth: Tabankort, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: a) AA00272627 b) AA0263957 c) AA0344148, issued on 21 March 2019 (date of expiration: 20 March 2024)
Address: Bamako, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information : Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is a businessman from the Arab Lehmar community in Gao region who previously collaborated with the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017) for acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property.
Between December 2017 and April 2018, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commanded a trafficking operation of over 10 tons of Moroccan cannabis, moved in cooling trucks through Mauretania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In the night of 13 to 14 June 2018 a quarter of the shipment was confiscated in Niamey, while a rival group had allegedly stolen the remaining three quarters during the night of 12 and 13 April 2018.
In December 2017, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri was in Niamey with a Malian national to prepare the operation. The latter was arrested in Niamey after he had flown in from Morocco with two Moroccan and two Algerian Nationals on 15 and 16 April 2018 to try and recuperate stolen cannabis. Three of his associates were also arrested, including a Moroccan national, who had been sentenced in Morocco in 2014 to five months imprisonment for drug trafficking.
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commands trafficking of cannabis resin to Niger straight through northern Mali, making use of convoys led by members of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs allies (GATIA), including sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001). Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri compensates Asriw for the use of these convoys. These convoys frequently generate clashes with competitors associated with the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA).
Using his financial gains made in narcotics trafficking, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri lends his support to terrorist armed groups, notably the sanctioned entity Al-Mourabitoun (QDe.141), attempting to bribe officials to release arrested combatants and facilitating fighters to integrate in the Mouvement Arabe pour l’Azawad (MAA) Plateforme.
Therefore, through the proceeds from organised crime, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri supports an individual identified under paragraph 8(b) of resolution 2374 (2017) as threatening the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in addition to a terrorist group designated under resolution 1267.
8. MOHAMED OULD MATALY
Designation: Member of Parliament
Date of birth: 1958
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: a) D9011156, b) AA0260156, issued on 3 August 2018 (date of expiration: 2 August 2023)
Address: a) Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali b) Almoustarat, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019, 14 Jan. 2020, 5 Oct. 2022)
Other information : Mohamed Ould Mataly is the former Mayor of Bourem and current Member of Parliament for Bourem’s constituency, part of the Rassamblement pour le Mali (RPM, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s political party). He is from the Lehmar Arab community and an influential member of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Mohamed Ould Mataly is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as Member of Parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
His close associate Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha, alias Yoro Ould Daha, who resides in his property in Gao, participated in the blockade of the venue of the consultation at the Governor’s office during this period.
Furthermore, on 12 July 2016 Ould Mataly was also one of the instigators of demonstrations hostile to the implementation of the Agreement.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ould Mataly has obstructed and caused delays to the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
Lastly, Ould Mataly has pleaded for the release of members of his community captured in counter-terrorist operations. Through his involvement in organised crime and association with terrorist armed groups, Mohamed Ould Mataly threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
B. List of persons and entities referred to in Article 2(1)
1. AHMED AG ALBACHAR (alias: Intahmadou Ag Albachar)
Designation: President of the Humanitarian Commission of the Bureau Regional d’Administration et Gestion de Kidal
Date of birth: 31 Dec. 1963
Place of birth: Tin-Essako, Kidal region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 1 63 08 4 01 001 005E
Address: Quartier Aliou, Kidal, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information : Ahmed Ag Albachar is a prominent businessman and, since early 2018, a special advisor to the Governor of Kidal region. An influential member of the Haut Conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad (HCUA), belonging to the Ifoghas Tuareg community, Ahmed Ag Albachar also mediates relations between the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA) and Ansar Dine (QDe.135). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Ahmed Ag Albachar is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement; and paragraph 8 (e) of resolution 2374 (2017) for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
In January Ag Albachar uses his influence to control and choose which humanitarian and development projects take place in the Kidal region, who implements them, where and when. No humanitarian action can be undertaken without his knowledge and approval. As self-proclaimed president of the humanitarian commission, Ag Albachar is in charge of granting residence and work permits of aid workers in exchange for money or services. The commission also controls which companies and individuals can participate in bids for projects that NGOs advertise in Kidal, granting Ag Albachar the power to manipulate humanitarian action in the region and choose those who work for NGOs. Aid distributions can only be conducted under his oversight, thereby influencing who benefits from the distributions.
Additionally, Albachar uses unemployed youths to intimidate and extort NGOs, severely hindering their work. The humanitarian community at large works in fear in Kidal, but especially national staff who are more vulnerable.
Ahmed Ag Albachar is also the co-owner of Timitrine Voyage transport company; one of the few transport companies that NGOs are authorised to use in Kidal. Ag Albachar, together with a dozen of other transport companies owned by a small clique of influential Ifoghas Tuareg notables, usurps a significant share of humanitarian aid in Kidal. Moreover, the monopoly position maintained by Ag Albachar, renders aid delivery in certain communities more difficult than others.
Albachar is manipulating humanitarian aid to fulfil his personal interests and the political interests of the HCUA by exercising terror, threatening NGOs and controlling their operations, all of which results in obstruction and hindrance of aid affecting beneficiaries in need in the region of Kidal. Therefore, Ahmed Ag Albachar obstructs the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali.
His actions also violate article 49 of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali that commits parties to respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence which guide humanitarian action, to prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and to facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel. Therefore, Albachar obstructs or threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
2. HOUKA HOUKA AG ALHOUSSEINI (alias: a) Mohamed Ibn Alhousseyni b) Muhammad Ibn Al-Husayn c) Houka Houka)
Title: Cadi
Date of birth: a) 1 Jan. 1962 b) 1 Jan. 1963 c) 1 Jan. 1964
Place of birth: Ariaw, Tombouctou region, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was appointed by Iyad Ag Ghaly (QDi.316) as the Cadi of Timbuktu in April 2012 after the establishment of the jihadist caliphate in northern Mali.
Houka Houka used to work closely with the Hesbah, the Islamic police headed by Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, jailed at the Detention Centre of the International Criminal Court in The Hague since September 2016. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
After the French forces intervention in January 2013, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini was arrested on 17 January 2014 but subsequently released by Malian authorities on 15 August 2014, a liberation denounced by human rights organisations.
Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini has been since based in Ariaw, in the area of Zouéra, a village located west of Timbuktu (Essakane commune), on the bank of the lake Faguibine going towards the Mauritanian border. On 27 September 2017, he was officially reinstated here as a teacher by the Governor of Timbuktu, Koina Ag Ahmadou, this after lobbying by sanctioned individual Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamidoune (MLi.003), leader of the Coalition du peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), listed on 20 December 2018 by the Security Council Committee on Mali for reasons including actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement. Mohamed Ousmane founded in 2017 and presided a broader alliance of splinter groups, the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME). During its founding convention, the CME openly threatened in an official statement the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. The CME has been also involved in obstructions delaying the implementation of the Agreement, by pressuring the Malian government and the international community with the aim to impose the CME in the different mechanisms established by the Agreement.
Houka Houka and Mohamed Ousmane have been instrumental to each others’ rise, the latter facilitating meetings with government officials, and the first playing a key role in the expansion of Ousmane’s influence over the region of Timbuktu. Houka Houka has participated in most of the community gatherings organised by Mohamed Ousmane since 2017, contributing to Ousmane’s notoriety and credibility in the region, as well as to the founding ceremony of the Coalition des Mouvements de l’Entente (CME) to which he gave his public blessing.
The area of influence of Houka Houka has recently expanded further east, to the Ber region (stronghold of the Bérabich Arabs located 50 kilometres east of Timbuktu), and northern Timbuktu. Even though he is not from a lineage of Cadis and that he started only in 2012, Houka Houka was able to extend his authority as a Cadi and his capacity to maintain public security in certain areas by using Al-Furqan assets and the fear that this terrorist organisation instigates in the Timbuktu region through complex attacks against international and Malian defence and security forces and targeted assassinations.
Therefore, through his support for Mohamed Ousmane and his obstruction of the Agreement, Houka Houka Ag Alhousseini threatens its implementation, as well as the peace, security, and stability in Mali at large.
3. MAHRI SIDI AMAR BEN DAHA (alias: a) Yoro Ould Daha b) Yoro Ould Daya c) Sidi Amar Ould Daha d) Yoro)
Designation: Deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1978
Place of birth: Djebock, Mali
Nationality: Mali
National identification no: 11262/1547
Address: Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is a leader of the Lehmar
Arab community of Gao and military chief of staff of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
Ben Daha was a high-ranking officer of the Islamic police operating in Gao when the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134) controlled the town from June 2012 to January 2013. Ben Daha currently is deputy chief of staff of the regional coordination of the Mécanisme opérationnel de coordination (MOC) in Gao.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as Member of Parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
From 14 to 18 November 2018, dozens of MAA-Plateforme combatants together with those of the CMFPR factions obstructed the holding of regional consultations. Operating under the instruction and with the participation of Ben Daha, at least six pick-up truck vehicles from the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA-Plateforme) were positioned in front of the Gao governorate and its vicinity. Two MOC vehicles attributed to MAA-Plateforme were also observed at the scene.
On 17 November 2018, an incident took place between armed elements blocking access to the governorate and a FAMa patrol passing by the area, but was diffused before it could escalate and constitute a cease-fire violation. On 18 November 2018, a total of twelve vehicles and armed elements lifted the blockade of the governorate following a latest round of negotiations with the governor of Gao.
On 30 November 2018, Ben Daha organised an inter-Arab meeting in Tinfanda to discuss security and administrative restructuring. The meeting also included sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001) whom Ben Daha supports and defends.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ben Daha has obstructed the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. In addition, Ben Daha supports an individual identified as threatening the implementation of the Agreement through his involvement in ceasefire violations and organised criminal activity.
4. MOHAMED BEN AHMED MAHRI (alias: a) Mohammed Rougi b) Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya c) Mohamed Ould Mahri Ahmed Daya d) Mohamed Rougie e) Mohamed Rouggy f) Mohamed Rouji)
Date of birth: 1 Jan. 1979
Place of birth: Tabankort, Mali
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: a) AA00272627 b) AA0263957
Address: Bamako, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is a businessman from the Arab Lehmar community in Gao region who previously collaborated with the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) (QDe.134). Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of resolution 2374 (2017) for acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) of resolution 2374 (2017), including through the proceeds from organised crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property.
Between December 2017 and April 2018, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commanded a trafficking operation of over 10 tons of Moroccan cannabis, moved in cooling trucks through Mauretania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In the night of 13 to 14 June 2018 a quarter of the shipment was confiscated in Niamey, while a rival group had allegedly stolen the remaining three quarters during the night of 12 and 13 April 2018.
In December 2017, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri was in Niamey with a Malian national to prepare the operation. The latter was arrested in Niamey after he had flown in from Morocco with two Moroccan and two Algerian Nationals on 15 and 16 April 2018 to try and recuperate stolen cannabis. Three of his associates were also arrested, including a Moroccan national, who had been sentenced in Morocco in 2014 to five months imprisonment for drug trafficking.
Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri commands trafficking of cannabis resin to Niger straight through northern Mali, making use of convoys led by members of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs allies (GATIA), including sanctioned individual Ahmoudou Ag Asriw (MLi.001). Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri compensates Asriw for the use of these convoys. These convoys frequently generate clashes with competitors associated with the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA).
Using his financial gains made in narcotics trafficking, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri lends his support to terrorist armed groups, notably the sanctioned entity Al-Mourabitoun (QDe.141), attempting to bribe officials to release arrested combatants and facilitating fighters to integrate in the Mouvement Arabe pour l’Azawad (MAA) Plateforme.
Therefore, through the proceeds from organised crime, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Mahri supports an individual identified under paragraph 8(b) of resolution 2374 (2007) as threatening the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, in addition to a terrorist group designated under resolution 1267.
5. MOHAMED OULD MATALY
Designation: Member of Parliament
Date of birth: 1958
Nationality: Mali
Passport no: D9011156
Address: Golf Rue 708 Door 345, Gao, Mali
Date of UN designation: 10 July 2019 (amended on 19 Dec. 2019)
Other information: Mohamed Ould Mataly is the former Mayor of Bourem and current Member of Parliament for Bourem’s constituency, part of the Rassamblement pour le Mali (RPM, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita’s political party). He is from the Lehmar Arab community and an influential member of the pro-governmental wing of the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA), associated to the Plateforme des mouvements du 14 juin 2014 d’Alger (Plateforme) coalition. Listed pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 of Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) (Travel Ban, Asset Freeze).
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Additional information
Mohamed Ould Mataly is being listed pursuant to paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 2374 (2017) for actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement.
On 12 November 2018, the Plateforme in Bamako declared not to participate in forthcoming regional consultations, scheduled to be held from 13 to 17 November in accordance with the March 2018 roadmap agreed upon by all parties to the Peace and reconciliation Agreement in March 2018. The next day, in Gao, a coordination meeting was held by the military chief of staff of the Ganda Koy component of Coordination des mouvements et fronts patriotiques de résistance (CMFPR)-Plateforme, with representatives the MAA-Plateforme, to prevent the consultations to take place. The blockade was coordinated with Plateforme leadership in Bamako, the MAA-Plateforme, as well as member of parliament Mohamed Ould Mataly.
His close associate Mahri Sidi Amar Ben Daha, alias Yoro Ould Daha, who resides in his property in Gao, participated in the blockade of the venue of the consultation at the Governor’s office during this period.
Furthermore, on 12 July 2016 Ould Mataly was also one of the instigators of demonstrations hostile to the implementation of the Agreement.
Therefore, through effectively blocking discussions on key provisions of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement related to the reform of the territorial structure of northern Mali, Ould Mataly has obstructed and caused delays to the implementation of the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement.
Lastly, Ould Mataly has pleaded for the release of members of his community captured in counter-terrorist operations. Through his involvement in organised crime and association with terrorist armed groups, Mohamed Ould Mataly threatens the implementation of the Agreement.
ANNEX II
A. List of natural persons referred to in Article 1a(1)
<table><col/><col/><col/><col/><col/><tbody><tr><td><p>&#160;</p><div/></td><td><p>Name</p></td><td><p>Identifying information</p></td><td><p>Reasons</p></td><td><p>Date of listing</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>1.</p></td><td><p>DIAW, Malick</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: S&#233;gou</p><p>Date of birth: 2.12.1979</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: B0722922 valid until&#160;13.8.2018</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Colonel</p></td><td><p>Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta&#8217;s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the&#160;18&#160;August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233;, Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Kon&#233;.</p><p>Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p><p>Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since&#160;December&#160;2020.</p><p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the &#8216;missions&#8217; enshrined in the Transition Charter of&#160;1&#160;October&#160;2020 (&#8216;Transition Charter&#8217;) and that should have been completed within&#160;18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17&#160;June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24&#160;June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p><p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>2.</p></td><td><p>WAGU&#201;, Isma&#235;l</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Bamako</p><p>Date of birth: 2.3.1975</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until&#160;15.2.2023</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel-Major</p></td><td><p>Colonel-Major Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is a key member of Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta&#8217;s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the&#160;18&#160;August&#160;2020 coup, alongside Colonel Go&#239;ta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Kon&#233; and Colonel Malick Diaw.</p><p>On&#160;19&#160;August&#160;2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (<span>Comit&#233; national pour le salut du people</span>, CNSP).</p><p>Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p><p>As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since&#160;October&#160;2020, Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in&#160;October&#160;2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<span>Cadre Strat&#233;gique Permanent,</span> CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<span>Comit&#233; de suivi de l&#8217;accord</span>, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October&#160;2021 to September 2022. That situation has obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which is one of the &#8216;missions&#8217; of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article&#160;2 of the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233;) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, as well as for obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>3.</p></td><td><p>MA&#207;GA, Choguel</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali</p><p>Date of birth: 31.12.1958</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Prime Minister</p></td><td><p>As Prime Minister since&#160;June&#160;2021, Choguel Ma&#239;ga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of&#160;24&#160;May&#160;2021.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in&#160;June&#160;2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la refondation</span>, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in&#160;December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Ma&#239;ga) in&#160;November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Ma&#239;ga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>4.</p></td><td><p>MA&#207;GA, Ibrahim Ikassa</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p><p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Minister of Refoundation</p></td><td><p>Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<span>Mouvement du&#160;5 juin</span> -<span>Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</span>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p><p>As Minister of Refoundation since&#160;June&#160;2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la Refondation</span>, ANR announced by Prime Minister Choguel Ma&#239;ga.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in&#160;December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On&#160;3&#160;July&#160;2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>5.</p></td><td><p>DIARRA, Adama Ben</p><p>(a.k.a. Ben Le Cerveau)</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Kati, Mali</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Member of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali)</p></td><td><p>Adama Ben Diarra, known as Camarade Ben Le Cerveau, is one of the young leaders of the M5-RFP (<span>Mouvement du&#160;5 Juin</span> -<span>Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques</span>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. Adama Ben Diarra is also the leader of Y&#233;r&#233;wolo, which is the main organisation supporting the Transition Authorities, and a member of the National Transition Council (CNT) since&#160;3&#160;December&#160;2021.</p><p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the &#8216;missions&#8217; enshrined in the Transition Charter and that were supposed to be completed within&#160;18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organisation of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on&#160;17&#160;June&#160;2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on&#160;24&#160;June&#160;2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p><p>Adama Ben Diarra has been actively advocating for and supporting the prolongation of the political transition of Mali during political rallies and on social networks, stating that the five-year extension of the transition period decided by the Transition Authorities following the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la Refondation</span>,ANR) was a deep aspiration of the Malian people.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable of reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government, as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Adama Ben Diarra) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Adama Ben Diarra is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9660;M9</a></p></td></tr><tr><td><p>6.</p></td><td><p>Ivan Aleksandrovitch MASLOV</p><p>&#1048;&#1074;&#1072;&#1085; &#1040;&#1083;&#1077;&#1082;&#1089;&#1072;&#1085;&#1076;&#1088;&#1086;&#1074;&#1080;&#1095; &#1052;&#1040;&#1057;&#1051;&#1054;&#1042;</p></td><td><p>Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980</p><p>Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory</p><p>Nationality: Russian</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Function: Head of the Wagner Group in Mali</p><p>Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to &#8216;All eyes on Wagner&#8217;</p></td><td><p>Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov is the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021.</p><p>Wagner&#8217;s presence in Mali poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extrajudicial killings, such as the &#8216;Moura massacre&#8217; at the end of March 2022.</p><p>As the local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses.</p></td><td><p>25.2.2023</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9660;M8</a></p></td></tr></tbody></table>
B. List of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies referred to in Article 2a(1)
<table><col/><col/><col/><col/><col/><tbody><tr><td><p>&#160;</p><div/></td><td><p>Name</p></td><td><p>Identifying information</p></td><td><p>Reasons</p></td><td><p>Date of listing</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>1.</p></td><td><p>DIAW, Malick</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: S&#233;gou</p><p>Date of birth: 2.12.1979</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: B0722922 valid until&#160;13.8.2018</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: President of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali), Colonel</p></td><td><p>Malick Diaw is a key member of Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta&#8217;s inner circle. As chief of staff of the third military region of Kati, he was one of the instigators and leaders of the&#160;18&#160;August 2020 coup alongside Colonel-Major Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233;, Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta, Colonel Sadio Camara and Colonel Modibo Kon&#233;.</p><p>Malick Diaw is therefore responsible for actions or policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p><p>Malick Diaw is also a key actor in the context of the political transition of Mali, as President of the National Transition Council (CNT) since&#160;December&#160;2020.</p><p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the &#8216;missions&#8217; enshrined in the Transition Charter of&#160;1&#160;October&#160;2020 (&#8216;Transition Charter&#8217;) and that should have been completed within&#160;18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organization of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on 17&#160;June 2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on 24&#160;June 2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p><p>The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Malick Diaw) in November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Malick Diaw is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>2.</p></td><td><p>WAGU&#201;, Isma&#235;l</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Bamako</p><p>Date of birth: 2.3.1975</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport AA0193660 valid until&#160;15.2.2023</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Minister for Reconciliation, Colonel-Major</p></td><td><p>Colonel-Major Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is a key member of Colonel Assimi Go&#239;ta&#8217;s inner circle and was one of the main actors responsible for the&#160;18&#160;August&#160;2020 coup, alongside Colonel Go&#239;ta, Colonel Sadio Camara, Colonel Modibo Kon&#233; and Colonel Malick Diaw.</p><p>On&#160;19&#160;August&#160;2020, he announced that the army had taken power, and he then became spokesperson for the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (<span>Comit&#233; national pour le salut du people</span>, CNSP).</p><p>Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali.</p><p>As Minister for Reconciliation in the Transition Government since&#160;October&#160;2020, Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is in charge of the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali. Through his statement in&#160;October&#160;2021 and his perpetual disagreements with the members of the Permanent Strategic Framework (<span>Cadre Strat&#233;gique Permanent,</span> CSP), he contributed to the blocking of the Monitoring Committee of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (<span>Comit&#233; de suivi de l&#8217;accord</span>, CSA), which led to the suspension of CSA meeting from October&#160;2021 to September 2022. That situation has obstructed the implementation of that Agreement, which is one of the &#8216;missions&#8217; of the political transition of Mali, as provided for in Article&#160;2 of the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233;) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Isma&#235;l Wagu&#233; is therefore responsible for actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, as well as for obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>3.</p></td><td><p>MA&#207;GA, Choguel</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Tabango, Gao, Mali</p><p>Date of birth: 31.12.1958</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport DA0004473, issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Prime Minister</p></td><td><p>As Prime Minister since&#160;June&#160;2021, Choguel Ma&#239;ga leads the Transition Government of Mali established following the coup of&#160;24&#160;May&#160;2021.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, he announced in&#160;June&#160;2021 the organisation of the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la refondation</span>, ANR) as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga himself, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in&#160;December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Choguel Ma&#239;ga) in&#160;November 2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>In his position as Prime Minister, Choguel Ma&#239;ga is directly responsible for postponing the elections foreseen in the Transition Charter, and he is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>4.</p></td><td><p>MA&#207;GA, Ibrahim Ikassa</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Tondibi, Gao region, Mali</p><p>Date of birth: 5.2.1971</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Minister of Refoundation</p></td><td><p>Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga is a member of the strategic committee of M5-RFP (<span>Mouvement du&#160;5 juin</span> -<span>Rassemblement des forces patriotiques</span>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita.</p><p>As Minister of Refoundation since&#160;June&#160;2021, Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga was entrusted with planning the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la Refondation</span>, ANR announced by Prime Minister Choguel Ma&#239;ga.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable for reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in&#160;December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On&#160;3&#160;July&#160;2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>In his position as Minister of Refoundation, Ibrahim Ikassa Ma&#239;ga is obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p>5.</p></td><td><p>DIARRA, Adama Ben</p><p>(a.k.a. Ben Le Cerveau)</p></td><td><p>Place of birth: Kati, Mali</p><p>Nationality: Malian</p><p>Passport number: diplomatic passport issued by Mali, Schengen visa issued</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Position: Member of the National Transition Council (legislative organ of the political transition of Mali)</p></td><td><p>Adama Ben Diarra, known as Camarade Ben Le Cerveau, is one of the young leaders of the M5-RFP (<span>Mouvement du&#160;5 Juin</span> -<span>Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques</span>), which played a key role in the overthrow of President Keita. Adama Ben Diarra is also the leader of Y&#233;r&#233;wolo, which is the main organisation supporting the Transition Authorities, and a member of the National Transition Council (CNT) since&#160;3&#160;December&#160;2021.</p><p>The CNT failed to deliver in good time on the &#8216;missions&#8217; enshrined in the Transition Charter and that were supposed to be completed within&#160;18 months, as illustrated by the CNT's delay in adopting the draft electoral bill. That delay contributed to delaying the organisation of the elections and thus the successful completion of the political transition of Mali. In addition, the new electoral bill, as eventually adopted by the CNT on&#160;17&#160;June&#160;2022 and published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Mali on&#160;24&#160;June&#160;2022, allows the Transition President and Vice-President and the members of the Transition Government to be candidates for the presidential and legislative elections, in contradiction with the Transition Charter.</p><p>Adama Ben Diarra has been actively advocating for and supporting the prolongation of the political transition of Mali during political rallies and on social networks, stating that the five-year extension of the transition period decided by the Transition Authorities following the National Consultations for Refoundation (<span>Assises nationales de la Refondation</span>, ANR) was a deep aspiration of the Malian people.</p><p>Contrary to the timetable of reform and elections previously agreed with ECOWAS in line with the Transition Charter, the ANR were announced by the Transition Government, as a pre-reform process and a precondition to the organisation of the elections scheduled for&#160;27&#160;February&#160;2022.</p><p>As announced by Choguel Ma&#239;ga, the ANR were then postponed several times and the elections delayed. The ANR, which were eventually held in December&#160;2021, were boycotted by multiple stakeholders. On the basis of the final recommendations of the ANR, the Transition Government presented a new timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in December&#160;2025, thus allowing the Transition Authorities to stay in power for more than&#160;five years. In June 2022, the Transition Government presented to ECOWAS a revised timetable providing for the holding of presidential elections in&#160;March 2024, which is more than two years after the deadline established in the Transition Charter.</p><p>ECOWAS adopted individual sanctions against the Transition Authorities (including Adama Ben Diarra) in&#160;November&#160;2021 for their delay in organising the elections and the completion of the political transition of Mali. ECOWAS underlined that the Transition Authorities have used the need to implement reforms as a pretext to justify the extension of the political transition of Mali and to maintain themselves in power without democratic elections. On 3&#160;July 2022, ECOWAS decided to maintain those individual sanctions.</p><p>Adama Ben Diarra is therefore obstructing and undermining the successful completion of the political transition of Mali, in particular by obstructing and undermining the holding of elections and the handover of power to elected authorities.</p></td><td><p>4.2.2022</p></td></tr><tr><td><p><a>&#9660;M9</a></p></td></tr><tr><td><p>6.</p></td><td><p>Ivan Aleksandrovitch MASLOV</p><p>&#1048;&#1074;&#1072;&#1085; &#1040;&#1083;&#1077;&#1082;&#1089;&#1072;&#1085;&#1076;&#1088;&#1086;&#1074;&#1080;&#1095; &#1052;&#1040;&#1057;&#1051;&#1054;&#1042;</p></td><td><p>Date of birth: 11.7.1982 or 3.1.1980</p><p>Place of birth: Arkhangelsk / Chuguevka village, Chuguev district, Primorsky territory</p><p>Nationality: Russian</p><p>Gender: male</p><p>Function: Head of the Wagner Group in Mali</p><p>Address: Unknown, registered in the town of Shatki, in the Nizhni Novgorod region according to &#8216;All eyes on Wagner&#8217;</p></td><td><p>Ivan Aleksandrovitch Maslov is the head of the Wagner Group in Mali, whose presence in the country has expanded since late 2021.</p><p>Wagner&#8217;s presence in Mali poses a threat to the peace, security and stability of the country. In particular, Wagner mercenaries have been involved in acts of violence and multiple human rights abuses in Mali, including extrajudicial killings, such as the &#8216;Moura massacre&#8217; at the end of March 2022.</p><p>As the local head of the Wagner Group, Ivan Maslov is therefore responsible for the actions of Wagner Group that threaten the peace, security and stability of Mali, in particular involvement in acts of violence and human rights abuses.</p></td><td><p>25.2.2023</p></td></tr></tbody></table>
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( 1 ) Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ L 295, 21.11.2018, p. 39).
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