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In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff’s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor’s orders to save a woman’s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental “right to privacy” that protects a pregnant woman’s choice whether to have an abortion. However, this right is balanced against the government’s interests in protecting women's health and protecting “the potentiality of human life.” The Texas law challenged in this case violated this right. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 7-2 majority of the Court. First, the Court considered whether the case was moot, concluding that it was not. When the subject of litigation is “capable of repetition yet evading review,” a case need not be dismissed as moot. Pregnancy is a “classic justification for a conclusion of nonmootness.” The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against state action the right to privacy, and a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion falls within that right to privacy. A state law that broadly prohibits abortion without respect to the stage of pregnancy or other interests violates that right. Although the state has legitimate interests in protecting the health of pregnant women and the “potentiality of human life,” the relative weight of each of these interests varies over the course of pregnancy, and the law must account for this variability. In the first trimester of pregnancy, the state may not regulate the abortion decision; only the pregnant woman and her attending physician can make that decision. In the second trimester, the state may impose regulations on abortion that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the third trimester, once the fetus reaches the point of “viability,” a state may regulate abortions or prohibit them entirely, so long as the laws contain exceptions for cases when abortion is necessary to save the life or health of the mother.

Joan Stanley had three children with Peter Stanley. The Stanleys never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, the State of Illinois took the children. Under Illinois law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit parents regardless of their actual fitness and their children became wards of the state. Peter appealed the decision, arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because unwed mothers were not deprived of their children without a showing that they were actually unfit parents. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley’s Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual fitness as a parent was irrelevant because he and the children’s mother were unmarried.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-2 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that it could consider the constitutionality of the Illinois law even though Peter might have regained custody of his children through adoption or guardianship proceedings. The Illinois law violated the Due Process clause because an unwed father was stripped of his parental rights without a hearing. Justice William O. Douglas joined in this part of the opinion. A four justice plurality went on to write that the Illinois law also violated the Equal Protection Clause because it denied a fitness hearing to certain parents, while granting one to others. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the majority exceeded its authority by raising the Due Process issue when the lower court had not. The Equal Protection question was the only one properly before the court, and it was not violated because the state was merely recognizing the legal relationships of fathers whether through marriage or adoption. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate.

John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio’s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that it promised a key witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony against Giglio. The district court denied Giglio’s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a unanimous court, reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that evidence of the agreement was relevant to the witness’ credibility. Because the new evidence affected the witness’ credibility and the prosecution’s case rested almost entirely on this witness’ testimony, the original trial violated due process and entitled Giglio to a new trial. Justice Lewis F. Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate.

The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the law's dissimilar treatment of men and women was unconstitutional. The Court argued that "[t]o give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .[T]he choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex."

Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene materials did not enjoy First Amendment protection. The Court modified the test for obscenity established in <em>Roth v. United States</em> and <em>Memoirs v. Massachusetts</em>, holding that "[t]he basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test of the Memoirs decision.

Ernest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel’s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mandel temporarily. The Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel’s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel’s ineligibility. Mandel’s address to the conference was delivered by telephone. Mandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States.

No and no. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not obligate Kleindienst to grant a waiver to Mandel. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the First Amendment protected the scholars and students’ right to listen to and engage with Mandel in person --and that Mandel’s participation via telephone was not a good replacement-- but held that the implication of First Amendment rights was not dispositive here. Justice Blackmun noted Congress’ longstanding power to exclude aliens from the United States, and to set the terms and conditions of their entry. Through the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress legitimately delegated to the executive the authority to waive a finding of inadmissibility. He described the historical pattern of increasing federal control on the admissibility of aliens, particularly regarding individuals with Communist affiliation or views. Justice Blackmun held that the Court would not intervene so long as the executive used its waiver power on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason. This test did not balance the First Amendment interests of persons seeking to communicate with the applicant. Justice William Douglas dissented. He argued that Kleindienst had no clear interest in preventing Mandel from entering the country, given that Mandel posed no threat to national security. He described Kleindienst’s use of his delegated authority as an act of censorship, an unacceptable executive interpretation of congressional intent. Justices Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan also dissented, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall. He pointed to the Court’s longstanding protection of the right to receive information and ideas, arguing that the government had no power to interrupt the process of free discussion. Justice Marshall questioned the precedential validity of the majority’s “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” test, as well as the truthfulness of the Kleindienst’s stated reasons for excluding Mandel.

The Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a "juice loan" or "loan shark" racket. On February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. On March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court cited its own decision in <em> Kastigar v. United States</em>, and held that testimony may be compelled from an unwilling witness over a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by the grant of immunity. The Court further determined that any questions regarding the scope of protection under the Illinois immunity statute was best left to the courts of Illinois, meaning that the writ of certiorari was improperly granted. The Supreme Court dismissed the Writ. Justice William O. Douglas dissented for the reasons state in his dissenting opinion in <em>Kastigar v. United States</em>. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in <em>Kastigar v. United States</em>. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of this case.

Jon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.

In Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the Court found that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments required states to provide an attorney to indigent defendants in cases involving serious crimes. In this case, a unanimous Court extended that right to cover defendants charged with misdemeanors who faced the possibility of a jail sentence. Justice Douglas's plurality opinion described the intricacies involved in misdemeanor charges and the danger that unrepresented defendants may fall victim to "assembly-line justice." Thus, in order to guarantee fairness in trials involving potential jail time, no matter how petty the charge, the Court found that the state was obligated to provide the accused with counsel.

William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. Withholding that right to single persons without a rational basis proved the fatal flaw. Thus, the Court did not have to rely on Griswold to invalidate the Massachusetts statute. "If the right of privacy means anything, wrote Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for the majority, "it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."

A Georgia state court convicted Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional. With Justice William J. Brennan writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Quoting <em>Speiser v. Randall</em>, the Court noted that "the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than (Georgia) has supplied." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented. He disagreed with not only the manner in which the majority reached its decision, but also its conclusion. Ultimately, he argued that the statute was narrowly tailored and did not suppress or deter "important protected speech." Justice Harry A. Blackmun also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He found it implausible that a state could not restrict speech that was as wildly offensive as in this case.

Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).

Yes. The Court's one-page per curiam opinion held that the imposition of the death penalty in these cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. In over two hundred pages of concurrence and dissents, the justices articulated their views on this controversial subject. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall believed the death penalty to be unconstitutional in all instances. Other concurrences focused on the arbitrary nature with which death sentences have been imposed, often indicating a racial bias against black defendants. The Court's decision forced states and the national legislature to rethink their statutes for capital offenses to assure that the death penalty would not be administered in a capricious or discriminatory manner.

K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action."

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Moose Lodge's refusal to serve food and beverages to Irvis because he was black did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that the state action doctrine did not necessarily apply to all private entities that received benefits or services from the government; otherwise, the Court reasoned, all private associations that received electricity, water, and fire protection would be subject to state regulation. The Court found that the Moose Lodge "a private social club in a private building," and thus not subject to the Equal Protection Clause.

After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.

No. The Court found that requiring reporters to disclose confidential information to grand juries served a "compelling" and "paramount" state interest and did not violate the First Amendment. Justice White argued that since the case involved no government intervention to impose prior restraint, and no command to publish sources or to disclose them indiscriminately, there was no Constitutional violation. The fact that reporters receive information from sources in confidence does not privilege them to withhold that information during a government investigation; the average citizen is often forced to disclose information received in confidence when summoned to testify in court.

William Shard reported to the Chicago police that two men stole his wallet. The wallet contained traveler’s checks and his social security card, among other things. The next day, two police officers stopped Thomas Kirby and his friend, Ralph Bean. When asked for identification, Kirby produced Shard’s wallet. The officers arrested Kirby and Bean and brought them to the Maxwell Street Police Station. Once there, the officers learned about Shard’s robbery and sent a car to pick up Shard and bring him to the station. Without an attorney present, police asked Shard if Kirby and Bean were his robbers. Shard instantly gave a positive identification. Kirby and Bean were not indicted until almost 6 weeks later. At trial, Kirby unsuccessfully attempted to suppress Shard’s identification. The jury found Kirby guilty and the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District affirmed.

No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a four justice plurality, delivered the judgment of the court. The plurality expressed that there is no constitutional right to counsel for an identification that takes place before the accused is indicted or formally charged. For this reason, the Exclusionary Rule does not apply, and the identification can be admitted at trial. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred, emphasizing that the right to counsel does not attach until an accused is formally charged. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in the judgment, agreeing that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, arguing that prior Supreme Court Exclusionary Rule precedent just happened to cover post-indictment identifications, but the reasons for using the Rule are the same in pre-indictment cases. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Byron R. White dissented, arguing that the Exclusionary Rule applies in this case.

Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.

The Court held that individual's interests in the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment outweighed the State's interests in compelling school attendance beyond the eighth grade. In the majority opinion by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court found that the values and programs of secondary school were "in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion," and that an additional one or two years of high school would not produce the benefits of public education cited by Wisconsin to justify the law. Justice William O. Douglas filed a partial dissent but joined with the majority regarding Yoder. Justices Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

David Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.

In an opinion by Justice Potter Stewart, the court held 5-3 that Roth had no protected interest in continued employment, as he had completed his contracted term, and therefore was no Fourteenth Amendment protection.

Mississippi Chemical Corp. and Costal Chemical Corp. were “cooperate associations” within the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Act. The associations qualified for membership in a “bank for Cooperatives”, which allowed them to borrow money. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 required that the associations buy Class “C” stocks valued at $100. The associations claimed a $99 interest deduction on their taxes for every stock purchased. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, the associations paid the deficiency and then sued for a refund. The district court found for the associations and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

No. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court and remanding. Looking at the legislative scheme involved, the Supreme Court held that the stock was a capitol asset with long-term value, so it was not deductible. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate.

In 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense. After several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello’s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor’s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello’s crime. Despite Santobello’s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the appellate court affirmed his conviction."

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 4-3 majority, vacated the judgment and remanded. The opinion emphasized that the plea bargaining process is a crucial part of the criminal justice system. In the interests of justice, agreements between prosecutors and defendants must be upheld. Even though the trial judge claimed that the prosecutor’s recommendation did not influence his sentencing decision, the prosecutor had a duty to uphold the original agreement. The Court remanded the case so that the lower court could determine the appropriate relief for Santobello. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that the Court must allow Santobello to withdraw his guilty plea entirely, instead of leaving the decision to the trial court. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Potter Stewart joined in his opinion.

On January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey’s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal. On April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher’s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher. Neither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man’s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 <i>en banc</i> ruling.

Yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Court held that due process required Iowa to include a preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for the parole revocations of Morrissey and Booker. Chief Justice Burger described the purpose of parole in the correctional process, focusing on the notion that a parolee was entitled to his liberty so long as he substantially abided by the conditions of his parole. He determined that Morrissey and Booker were entitled to some form of due process before Iowa could revoke their paroles. Chief Justice Burger wrote that Iowa had no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees, while acknowledging Iowa’s interest in imposing extensive restrictions on parolees and in returning violators to prison without the burden of a new trial. Chief Justice Burger wrote that due process required someone not directly involved in a parolee’s case to determine whether reasonable ground existed for revocation. He outlined the basic requirements for the official in charge of a parole revocation hearing, including notice to the parolee, disclosure of evidence, and a written determination by the officer based on the information presented at the hearing. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that parolees had a right to a final hearing prior to revocation held within two months after the parolee was taken into custody. This hearing must give a parolee an opportunity to show that he did not violate the conditions of his parole, and to show mitigating circumstances. Chief Justice Burger declined to decide whether a parolee was entitled to the assistance of counsel if he was indigent. He remanded the case for the district court to make findings on the procedures actually followed by the Board of Parole. Justice William Brennan concurred, emphasizing that a parolee was clearly allowed to retain an attorney, leaving open the question of whether counsel must be provided if a parolee was indigent. Justice William Douglas dissented in part. He argued that where only a violation of a parole condition was involved, procedural due process required that the state should not arrest a parolee. He wrote that parolees were entitled to counsel, and emphasized that a parolee was entitled to his freedom until the revocation was final.

Several indigent California state prisoners filed complaints attacking the constitutionality of the regulations which forbade California prisons from having more than twelve law books in a prison library. On January 10, 1967, the district court consolidated the multiple cases because they contained common questions of law and fact. The California prisoners moved for the convening of a three-judge district court, but their motion was denied. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's order denying a three-judge panel. On May 28, 1970, a three-judge district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the regulation limiting the number of law books in prison libraries. The defendants appealed the district court's decision.

In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court initially postponed the question of jurisdiction pending the hearing of the case on the merits. After hearing the case on its merits, the Court determined that it had jurisdiction and affirmed the lower court's opinion.

In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.

Yes. The Court held that because the work of aides was critical to the performance of legislative tasks and duties, they were nothing less than legislators' "alter egos" and thus immune from subpoenas by the Speech and Debate Clause. Aides were exempted from grand jury questioning so long as Senators invoked the privilege on their behalf. Moreover, the Court held that the protections of the Speech and Debate Clause did not extend beyond the legislative sphere, ruling that Senator Gravel's arrangements with the Beacon Press were not constitutionally protected.

During the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from Williams’ waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin. After the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside.  

Yes. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the informant’s tip permitted the officer to approach Williams’ car and make a limited search of Williams’ waistband for the officer’s own protection. The Court further held that the discovery of the weapon gave the officer probable cause to arrest Williams’ for illegal possession of a firearm. Because the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle was permissible, the narcotics he discovered were admissible at Williams’ trial. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in which he argued that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Williams’ for illegal possession of a firearm because Connecticut’s “free-and-easy” gun laws allow individuals to carry concealed weapons so long as they have a permit. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. expressed concern that the unnamed informant gave no information that the officer could not have readily manufactured after seizing the weapon. Therefore, Justice Brennan argued that police officers should not be permitted to arrest and search individuals on the basis of an informant’s tip alone. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the prosecutors failed to meet their burden to prove that the informant’s information was reliable and sufficient to justify the arrest and search of Williams. Justice Douglas joined in the dissent.

Donald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Tanner was not entitled to distribute handbills within Lloyd Center. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell contrasted this case with <em>Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza</em>, which allowed protestors to picket a shopping center when their picketing was "directly related" to the shopping center and no "reasonable opportunities to convey their message…were available." Here, Tanner's were unrelated to the operations of the mall, and the protestors had an alternative on the sidewalks immediately outside the mall, which were owned by the City of Portland. Powell characterized equating public property with private property intended for public use – such as the mall – as "reach[ing] too far." Therefore, Tanner and the protestors did not have a First Amendment right to distribute their handbills within the mall.

Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; the law made an exception for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting "black discrimination." Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.

The exemption for labor picketing violated the equal protection clause. Government regulation of message content is presumed unconstitutional unless there are compelling justifications. And regulations that selectively exclude speakers from a public forum must undergo careful judicial examination to ensure the minimal degree of furthering an important government interest. Mosley fashions an important principle from the values of freedom and equality: equal freedom of expression.

Gaines Ted Huson suffered a back injury while working on a fixed oil rig, owned by Chevron Oil Company, off the coast of Louisiana. More than two years after the injury, Huson sued Chevron for damages in United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Huson alleged that it took several months for him to realize the severity of his injury. The District Court relied on <em>Rodrigue v Aetna Casualty &amp; Surety Co.</em>, 395 U.S. 352 (1969), holding that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations applied instead of the admiralty laches doctrine so Huson's claim was barred. <em>Rodrigue</em> held that state law, not admiralty law, applied in these situations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Huson argued that because he filed this case before the <em>Rodrigue</em> decision, applying its ruling would have an unfair retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Louisiana statute of limitations was inconsistent with the admiralty laches doctrine and, therefore, was not applicable.

No, No. In a 7-0 decision, Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a majority unanimous court, affirmed the Appeals Court's decision, but rejected their analysis. The Supreme Court held that Louisiana's statute of limitations was applicable under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act because the Lands Act specifically adopted relevant state laws as federal laws. There was no federal statute of limitations specified in the Lands Act so, state law was not inconsistent. Although applying Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations was proper as a general rule, the Court held that applying it in this case would unfairly deprive Huson of a remedy on the basis of an unforeseeable change in legal doctrine.

Curtis C. Flood was a professional baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League. Flood was a consistent, above-average hitter and a well-regarded outfielder, playing one full season without an error in 1966, an unusual achievement. Flood played twelve seasons for the Cardinals, participating in three World Series, and was the co-captain of the team between 1965 and 1969. Despite this, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in October 1969. The Cardinals did not consult him before the trade, and management only informed him about the trade after it was finalized. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, requesting that the league make him a free agent. Kuhn denied his request, relying on baseball’s “reserve clause,” which maintained a given team’s rights to a player even after that player’s contract expired. Flood then filed an antitrust suit against Kuhn, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. He declined to play for the Phillies in 1970 despite a $100,000 salary offer. Flood alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights laws, state statutes, the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and several federal laws. The trial court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment, relying on <i>Federal Baseball Club v. National League</i> and <i>Toolson v. New York Yankees</i>, which established a long-standing antitrust exemption for professional baseball clubs. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed.

No and no. In a 5-3 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court affirmed that professional baseball and its reserve clause were immune from antitrust laws at the state and federal levels. Justice Blackmun described the background of <i>Federal Baseball</i>, emphasizing that antitrust violations against professional baseball were consistently rejected on that case’s authority. He also cited <i>Toolson</i>, where the Court specifically held that the business of holding public baseball games for profit between professional clubs was not within the scope of federal antitrust laws. Justice Blackmun also noted that <i>Federal Baseball</i> and <i>Toolson</i> were frequently and favorably cited in other cases to establish the uniqueness of baseball’s exemption. He also noted that it was within Congress’ power to remedy this inconsistency. Finally, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Second Circuit that the Commerce Clause precluded the application of state antitrust laws to professional baseball. Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred, but agreed with Justice William Douglas that congressional inaction was not a solid basis to affirm the antitrust exemption for professional baseball. Justice William Douglas dissented, joined by Justice William Brennan. He argued that the ruling in <i>Federal Baseball</i> was a derelict, and that the reserve system was clearly an unreasonable restraint of trade. He also questioned the majority’s reliance on congressional inaction as evidence of Congress’ intent.</i> Justice Thurgood Marshall also dissented, joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Marshall compared baseball’s reserve system to involuntary servitude. He also questioned the significance of congressional inaction. Justice Marshall argued that the Court should remand the case to determine whether Flood could state a claim despite the existence of a collective bargaining agreement between the teams and the players. Justice Lewis Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Perry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, stating that "a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding." Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances.

Yes, they can. In a 5-4 majority opinion written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the federal statute barring the use of evidence obtained through illegally intercepted communications also serves as a valid defense to civil contempt charges. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, expressing his belief that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures provided enough protection in and of itself to suppress the illegally obtained communications even without the federal wiretapping statute. In a separate concurrence, Justice Byron White suggested that courts should look for a way other than suppression hearings, which are time consuming and can interrupt the flow of grand jury hearings, to resolve such conflicts. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Harry Blackmun and Lewis Powell, dissented. Rehnquist argued that the clear language of the statute in question, combined with its legislative history, prohibited its use as a defense to civil contempt charges arising from grand jury proceedings. To apply it in that situation would represented a "sharp break" with the "historical <em>modus operandi</em> of the grand jury."

Francis Haines was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days because he hit another inmate over the head with a shovel during a confrontation. Haines was 66 years old and suffered from a foot disability. He claimed his foot disability worsened due to being kept in solitary confinement, where he had to sleep on the floor with only blankets for support. Haines sued the State of Illinois and argued that the conditions of his solitary confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State of Illinois moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Haines failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the dismissal, and stated that courts can only intercede with the internal operations of state prisons under exceptional circumstances. The district court also found that Haines had failed to show that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal and determined that state penitentiaries were entitled to their own discretion when punishing inmates.

Before a case is dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the plaintiff should be allowed to offer evidence supporting his claims. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Haines had a right to present evidence of the alleged harm he suffered before his case was dismissed. Without such an opportunity, there could be no certainty that there was no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s claims that would entitle him to relief. Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Kastigar cited his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in refusing to testify before a grand jury, even though prosecutors had granted him immunity from the use of his testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was found in contempt of court for failing to testify.

The Court found that compelled testimony is legitimate given the grant of immunity. Justice Powell found that the protections of immunity that a congressional statute provided were "coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination" and "sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege."

In 1966, D.H. Overmyer Co. entered into a contract with Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation of a $223,000 automatic refrigeration system for a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio. The agreement established a promissory note with monthly payment obligations. Overmyer began to fall behind on the monthly payments. Frick filed three mechanic's liens against the Toledo warehouse, and the two companies negotiated a new payment agreement in February 1967. Overmyer again fell behind on payments, and the two companies established a new note which contained a confession-of-judgment provision. In June of 1968, Overmyer stopped making monthly payments under the new note and brought a claim against Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged breaches of the original contract. The District court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any likelihood that it would prevail on the merits. Frick came before the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and asked the court to enter a judgment against Overmyer for the remaining balance of the note plus interest. Overmyer did not receive notice prior to the entry of the judgment because the confession-of-judgment provision waived the issuance and service of process and confessed judgment. After the entry of the adverse judgment, Overmyer filed several motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment due to a lack of notice. After a hearing was held, the court denied the motions. Overmyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio, asserting deprivation of due process in violation of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the subsequent appeal, and Overmyer appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court and held that contractual clause waiving a party's rights to prejudgment notice and hearing is not unconstitutional per se. Since Overmyer agreed to the provision for consideration and with full awareness of the legal consequences, enforcement of the waiver was not a violation of Overmyer's constitutional rights. Justice William O. Douglas, with whom Justice Thurgood Marshall joined, wrote a concurring opinion. Douglas agreed that the heavy burden against the waiver of constitutional rights had been effectively overcome by the evidence presented. However, he emphasized the fact that a trial judge is duty-bound to vacate judgments obtained through clauses waiving due process rights whenever debtors present jury questions is a minimal obstacle, and complete answer to the contention that unbridled discretion governs the disposition of petitions to vacate. Justice Lewis Powell and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

On July 20, 1958, intruders beat an elderly couple to death in Christian County, Kentucky. Shortly afterward, police arrested Silas Manning and Willie Barker for the crime. Both were indicted on September 15 and assigned counsel on September 17. Barker’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, but the state believed it had a stronger case against Manning and that Manning’s testimony would be essential to convict Barker. The state obtained a series of continuances on Barker’s trial, as Manning was tried five times and finally convicted in 1962. Beginning in June 1959, Barker was out of prison on bail, and did not contest the continuances. Barker’s trial was set for March 19, 1963, and when the state requested further continuances, Barker unsuccessfully objected. At his trial beginning on October 9, 1963, Barker was convicted. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Barker sought habeas corpus relief in district court, by arguing that the long trial delay violated his right to a speedy trial, which the district court denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the right to a speedy trial differs from other constitutionally guaranteed rights because it is often more in the interest of society and the justice system as a whole than it is in the interest of the accused. Additionally, there is no way to create a firm distinction between what is and is not a speedy trial, since the circumstances surrounding each trial are unique. The Court held that the consideration of whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial should be based on the length of the delay, the reason for it, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice towards the defendant. The Court held that, while the delay was long, Barker faced negligible prejudice and did not want a speedy trial, as evidenced by the many continuances that went uncontested. In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White described the many reasons that a speedy trial is essential to prevent an unconstitutional infringement on the liberty of the defendant. He argued that the right could not be compromised by a state’s backlog of cases and limited resources. Given the facts of this case, however, he agreed that Barker acquiesced to the delays without state pressure. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the concurrence.

A Tennessee law required a one-year residence in the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently moved to Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court.

In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court held that the law was an unconstitutional infringement upon the right to vote and the right to travel. Applying a strict equal protection test, the Court found that the law did not necessarily promote a compelling state interest. Justice Marshall argued in the majority opinion that the durational residency requirements were neither the least restrictive means available to prevent electoral fraud nor an appropriate method of guaranteeing the existence of "knowledgeable voters" within the state.

In 1954, Allen Generes and his son-in-law William Kelly formed Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. Generes and Kelly each owned 44% of the stock, with the remaining 12% owned by Generes’ son and another son-in-law. Generes was the president of the corporation and did not deal with the day-to-day running of the business. In addition to his position as president, he held another full-time position as the president of a savings and loan association. In 1958, Generes and Kelly signed an indemnity agreement for the corporation. In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two contracts and went deeply into debt. Generes loaned the corporation money, but it went bankrupt, and he was unable to receive reimbursement. On his 1962 tax return, Generes claimed the money the corporation lost as business bad debt and his direct loans to the corporation as nonbusiness bad debt. He filed a claim for a refund on the business bad debt. This claim was the subject of a jury trial in which the jury was asked to determine whether Generes’ signing of the indemnity agreement was “proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee “of the corporation. The government requested a jury instruction to clarify that “significant” motivation satisfies the requirement, but the court refused and instructed the jury that “dominant” motivation was sufficient. The jury found in favor of Generes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the significant motivation standard was acceptable.  

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 4-3 plurality. The Supreme Court held that the significant motivation standard did not provide sufficient guidance to the trier of fact and that the dominant motivation standard should have been used. Under this standard, Generes’ actions were in his own interest and not those of the corporation, so he cannot claim the corporation’s loss as business bad debt. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the congressional intent behind the statute distinguishing nonbusiness bad debt from business bad debt was to prevent family members from loaning money they knew they would not get back and getting tax refunds for it. He argued that the dominant motivation standard best protects Congress’ interests. Justice Byron R. White wrote a partial concurrence and partial dissent in which he argued that the plurality should not have ruled on the merits of the case but should have remanded the case for a new trial under the new standard. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. In his dissenting opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the wording of the statute does not require proof of a dominant motivation. He also argued that there was sufficient evidence that Generes’ actions were “proximately related” to his business interests. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.  

The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.

The Sierra Club did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because it failed to show that any of its members had suffered or would suffer injury as a result of the defendants’ actions. Justice Potter Stewart wrote the opinion for the 4-3 majority, in which the Court held that, in order to have standing to sue under the APA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they had directly suffered an injury as a result of the actions that led to the suit. Although building roads and high voltage power lines through the wilderness upsets the beauty of the area and the enjoyment of some, such “general interest” in a potential problem is not sufficient to establish that a plaintiff has been injured in the manner that standing doctrine requires. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the standing doctrine should allow environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club to sue on behalf of inanimate objects such as land. There is precedent for inanimate objects to have legal personality for the purpose of lawsuits, and “[t]hose who have that intimate relation with the inanimate object about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled are its legitimate spokesmen.” In his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun argued that, when faced with new issues of potentially enormous and permanent consequences, such as environmental issues, the Court should not be quite so rigid about its legal requirements. Justice Blackmun proposed two alternatives for how to proceed in this case: either the Sierra Club’s request for preliminary injunction should be granted while it is given time to amend its complaint to comport with the requirements of the standing doctrine, or the Court should expand the traditional standing doctrine to allow this type of litigation. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which he agreed with Justice Blackmun regarding the Sierra Club’s standing and argued that the Court should have considered the case on its merits. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Justice William H. Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Investigating three people it suspected of conspiring to destroy government property and bombing a Central Intelligence Agency office, officials used electronic surveillance to record suspects' conversations. The wiretapping was conducted without a search warrant.

The Court held government officials were obligated to obtain a warrant before beginning electronic surveillance even if domestic security issues were involved. The "inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept" and the potential for abusing it to quell political dissent made the Fourth Amendment protections especially important when the government engaged in spying on its own citizens.

Maryland trial courts convicted Albert Murel and the other petitioners of various crimes and sentenced them to fixed terms of imprisonment. The petitioners were “defective delinquents,” so each was committed to the Patuxent Institution, a mental health facility, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law. The petitioners sought a federal habeas corpus in district court. They challenged the conditions of their confinement and the procedures that led to their commitment. They also argued that Maryland's statutory standard for the commitment of "delinquent defendants" was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.

Dismissed. In a per curiam opinion, the Court wrote that it had decided to hear the case in order to consider whether constitutional protections apply to the commitment process set forth in the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law. After briefing and oral argument, the Court concluded that the case did not present those issues in a manner that warranted the review of the Supreme Court. The Court also concluded that pending changes to the Maryland law made it an inopportune time for the Court to issue a comprehensive order concerning the Defective Delinquency Law. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that whenever a State moves to deprive an individual of liberty, the Constitution requires the state to meet a more rigorous burden of proof than Maryland employed to commit defective delinquents. Justice Douglas would have reversed the lower courts’ judgments.

Robert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.

Yes and yes. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and held that Sindermann was entitled to a full trial in federal District Court and a hearing before the Board of Regents. The Court acknowledged that Sindermann did not have a contractual or tenure-based right to continued employment by Odessa Junior College. However, this lack was "immaterial to [Sindermann's] free speech claim." Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart relied on <em>Shelton v. Tucker</em> and <em>Keyishian v. Board of Regents</em> in emphasizing that nonrenewal of a one-year teaching contract "may not be predicated on [a teacher's] exercise of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." However, the Court stopped short of invalidating Sindermann's termination, as the Board of Regents' reasoning had not been established. While Sindermann had yet to "show that he has been deprived of an interest that could invoke procedural due process," the Court stated that his claim did "raise a genuine issue." While Odessa College did not have a formal tenure system, the Court recognized the possibility of a college having an "unwritten 'common law'" "in practice" that would grant "the equivalent of tenure." Given the policies of Odessa College, Sindermann was entitled to a hearing before the Board of Regents as well.

A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.

Yes, No answer. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed. The Supreme Court held that whether consent is voluntary can be determined from the totality of the circumstances. It is unnecessary to prove that the person who gave consent knew that he had the right to refuse. The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not require a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Because the Fourth Amendment claims had no merit, the Court did not reach the second question. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the main question should be whether Bustamonte had a fair opportunity to raise his Fourth Amendment claims. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, agreeing with the majority and noting it was unnecessary to reach the issue discussed by Justice Powell. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the Ninth Circuit made the correct decision. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, stating that a person cannot waive their Fourth Amendment rights when he is unaware that his rights would be constitutionally protected if he did not waive those rights. Justice Thurgood Marshall arguing that the prosecution cannot rely on consent to a search if the person who gave consent did not know he could refuse consent.

Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well.

The Court modified and remanded the lower court decision and held that when part of a school system is found to be segregated, a "prima facie case of unlawful [systematic] segregative design" becomes apparent. The school district involved assumes the burden of proving that it operated without "segregative intent" on a system-wide basis. This case is significant because it represents one of the first instances in which the Court identified segregation in northern schools.

Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.

Yes. The Court held that the statute in question clearly commanded "dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated," violating the Due Process Clause and the equal protection requirements that clause implied. A majority could not agree on the standard of review, however. The plurality opinion written by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., applying a strict standard of review to the sex-based classification as it would to racial classification, found that the government's interest in administrative convenience could not justify discriminatory practices. But a concurring opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell and joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry A. Blackmun would not go so far as to hold sex discrimination to the same standard as race, choosing instead to argue that statutes drawing lines between the sexes alone necessarily involved the "very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution," an approach employed in the Court's prior decision in Reed v. Reed. Justice Potter Stewart concurred separately that the statutes created invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented affirming the reasoning of the lower court opinion.

In 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4 percent, compared to the ideal 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of "one person, one vote." This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard.

The Court found that the plan was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause as described in Reynolds v. Sims. The Virginia plan is not to be judged by the more stringent congressional standards in Section 2 of Article I. The Equal Protection Clause requires a state to make an "honest and good faith effort" to construct districts of as nearly equal population as practicable. Some deviations from the equal population principle are valid if based on legitimate considerations of a "rational state policy." The Virginia plan advanced the policy of reapportionment without sacrificing substantial equality.

Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust &amp; Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-3 majority, reversed the court of appeals and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel for photographic displays held for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. A photographic display is different from a line up, because the accused is not present and is not in danger of being misled or overpowered by the opposing attorney. Justice Potter Stewart concurred in the judgment, stating that pretrial photographic displays are not a critical stage of prosecution. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented, arguing that there is no meaningful difference between a pretrial lineup and a pretrial photo identification, so the right to counsel should extend in both circumstances. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

A Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer’s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station “show up”. The “show up” was similar to a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had “no doubt” that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court. Biggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the “show up” procedure was so suggestive that it violated due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

No, No. In a 5-3 decision Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote the majority opinion reversing in part and remanding. The entire court joined in the first part of the opinion, holding that affirming by an equally divided court did not constitute an “actual adjudication” of the issue. The habeas corpus proceeding could continue. Only five justices joined in the second part of the opinion, holding that the “show up” procedure was suggestive, but given the totality of the circumstances, there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that the decision on the “show up” procedure broke from the long established practice of affirming findings of fact concurred in by two lower courts. Justices William O. Douglas and Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate.

Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. She then attended Yale Law School and applied to take the Connecticut Bar in 1970. Despite the County Bar Association finding her qualified in every aspect, she was denied the chance to sit for the exam due to the fact that she was not a U.S. citizen, which Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book of 1963 required. Griffiths requested judicial relief and argued that the rule was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court of Connecticut denied her request for judicial relief and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed.

A requirement that applicants to the state bar be United States citizens violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, while it is within a state’s rights to carefully select who may practice law, to deny an immigrant solely on their immigrant status is unconstitutional. A lawfully admitted resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Because classifications based on nationality are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny, the state must meet a high burden to justify such a classification. In this case, the state bar association did not meet that burden because there is no meaningful connection between citizenship and the qualifications for being a lawyer. The United States has always “welcomed and [drawn] strength from the immigration of aliens,” and their social and economic contributions to the country have been innumerable. Additionally, there is precedent to support the proposition that citizenship does not matter in reference to practicing law in the US. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the government should be justified in requiring certain jobs to be held by citizens, as the government has a vested interest in ensuring that specialized positions such as lawyers are held by citizens to, among other things, ensure their “moral character.” In his separate dissent, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that, as an “officer of the court,” states retain the right to exclude aliens from practicing the law. The Constitution grants states the right to determine who is appropriate for representing the state in court, even if that should mean excluding anyone who isn’t a U.S. citizen. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

To prevent gender discrimination, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) created an ordinance that forbids newspapers to advertise employment opportunities in gender-designated column. The National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburg Press) violated the ordinance by allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns when the jobs advertised do not have occupational qualifications or exceptions. The Commission had a hearing and concluded Pittsburg Press violated the ordinance. The Pittsburg Press appealed and contended the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed. 

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the Pittsburg ordinance, which forbids newspapers to carry gender-designated advertising columns for job opportunities, does not violate their First Amendment rights. This clause in the ordinance does not deny the newspapers freedom of expression, nor does it hinder the newspapers’ financial profits. The First Amendment does not protect advertisements for purely commercial reasons.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority broadens the “commercial speech” doctrine to include the layout and organizations decisions of a newspaper, which violates the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he argued that the First Amendment protects commercial advertisements and that newspapers should be able to print whatever they want because of the freedom of the press. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the First Amendment protects all freedoms of the press and that any expression should be unrestrained by government. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in this dissent. 

Engineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal "decimal" type of numbers (base 10) into true "binary" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time knew very little about computers.)

No and no. The Supreme Court held that a patent cannot cover all possible uses of a mathematical procedure or equation within a computer. That would be tantamount to granting the inventor a patent on the mathematical procedure itself, and this was no more acceptable than granting Samuel Morse a patent covering all possible uses of magnetism to communicate, rather than a narrower patent covering only the specific way in which Morse actually used magnetism to communicate in his telegraph. The court then said that "[i]f these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage ...." This decision was accepted as a final determination that computer programs were not patentable, and the Patent Office immediately ceased examining all computer program inventions. Very few patent applications directed to computer programs were filed until after the Supreme Court readdressed this issue in Diamond v. Diehr some nine years later. During these nine years, alternative ways of protecting computer programs were developed under the laws of copyright and trade secret which remain part of our law today.

At the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.

Not always. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that law enforcement officers may participate in the procedural commission of certain crimes such as drug manufacturing, so long as they do not implant criminal designs in the minds of the accused. In Russell's case, the investigated drug operations were in place long before undercover agents infiltrated them. Moreover, the ingredients contributed by the agents could have been acquired independently by Russell and his co-conspirators. As such, none of the agents' participatory activities amounted to entrapment.

After pleading guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, which was later reduced to probation. Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois and was supervised by the Adult Probation Department of Illinois. Shortly after, Scarpelli was caught committing burglary with an accomplice. After being informed of his Constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted to committing the felony, an admission he later claimed was made under extreme duress. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections revoked Scarpelli’s probation because of the violation and imprisoned him. He was not given a hearing. Two years later, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court held that revoking Scarpelli’s probation without a hearing and an attorney was a denial of his Constitutional right of due process. Gagnon, the warden of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, appealed and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. Gagnon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

Yes, no. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1majority. The Court held a previously sentenced probationer is entitled to a hearing when his probation is revoked. While a probation hearing is not part of the criminal prosecution process, the results of the hearing could cause the defendant to suffer a substantial loss of liberty, and therefore the defendant has the right to due process. However, the Constitution does not require that the defendant be provided proper representation. Rather, the court appointment of an attorney should be applied on a case-by-case basis. The Court concluded there was no need to create a new rule of appointing an attorney, and the lower courts should use their discretion when deciding if a court-appointed attorney was necessary. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in which he argued that court-appointed counsel was necessary to ensure the defendant was afforded due process

After receiving reports of the type of sexual activity occurring on the premises of licensed liquor sellers, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control promulgated a series of regulations pertaining to the conduct on such licensed premises. The appellees, a group of holders of various liquor licenses, sought discretionary review of the new regulations. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally limited freedom of expression.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that states have the right to regulate expression that consists of “conduct or action” especially in the absence of a particular message. Since the California regulations did not prohibit all such behavior and performances but only those in certain locations that hold liquor licenses, the regulations did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that states have the authority to regulate where and under what conditions alcohol is sold. The exercise of that authority does not violate the constitutional rights of the proprietors and employees of alcohol-serving establishments. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that constitutional questions the case presents should not have been addressed until the regulations had been applied and the state courts had decided how strictly they should be construed. In his separate dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. argued that the regulations required the owner of a nightclub to curtail First Amendment expression to obtain a liquor license. States do not have the power to impose an unconstitutional condition on the granting of a license. Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a separate dissent where he argued that the regulations were too broad and lacked the precision necessary to avoid violating constitutional rights. The California regulations create even stricter standards than the Supreme Court’s ruling in regards to obscenity. He argued that the state’s authority to regulate the sale of alcohol does not allow it to override the protections of the First Amendment. "

New York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, 4, and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5.

Yes to all sections. In a 6-3 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court on maintenance grant and tuition reimbursement and reversed the District Court on income tax relief. The Court cited earlier decisions that established that under the Establishment Clause, a law must "first, reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion." Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. acknowledged that New York's interest in creating a positive educational environment was a clearly secular purpose. Section 1, however, did not limit the use of the grants towards maintaining facilities used for secular purposes. This distinguished Section 1 from other aid programs approved by the Court in the past in <em>Board of Education v. Allen</em> and <em>Tilton v. Richardson</em>. Since "all or practically all" of the schools that qualified were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, the maintenance grants would "subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian schools" in violation of the Establishment Clause. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred in this part of the judgment. The Court also struck down Section 2, as the tuition reimbursements did not "guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions." While the Court recognized the possibility that reimbursement money would not end up in the hands of religious schools, the grants would attempt to "enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education," which would advance religion. Lastly, the Court reversed the District Court with regard to Sections 3, 4, and 5, ruling that effect of tax relief was similar to that of the tuition reimbursement and therefore unconstitutional. The Court in <em>Walz v. Tax Commission</em> upheld New York's property tax exemptions for religious organizations. However, the tax exemption was designed to prevent government oppression of religion through taxation, not for the promotion of religion.

Patrick Dougall was a federally registered resident alien. He was employed by a nonprofit organization that was absorbed into the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of New York City's Human Resources Administration. He was ineligible for employment by the city under Section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law because he was a noncitizen. He was terminated for this reason alone. Dougall and other noncitizens who were terminated under Section 53 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which held the statute unconstitutional. New York appealed the decision.

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court and held the statute unconstitutional. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized New York's "interest in establishing its own form of government" and having civil servants "of undivided loyalty." However, Section 53's citizenship restriction was imprecise and "swep[t] indiscriminately." Since it could prohibit noncitizens from jobs in a way that did not further the state interest, the distinction it made between citizens and aliens violated the Equal Protection Clause under <em>Graham v. Richardson</em>.

Leon Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder, in addition to confession to third parties, and was taken into custody. One month later, McDonald denied the confession and was released from custody. At trial, Chambers tried to prove McDonald admitted to the crime several times and confessed to third parties. The district court found the evidence of the confessions was inadmissible because of the voucher rule – a common-law rule that prohibits the defense from cross-examining a witness when the prosecution failed to do so – and the fact that the statements were hearsay. Chambers’ appealed and argued that the district court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to admit the evidence.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district court denied Chambers a fair trial and violated his right to due process. The voucher rule prevented Chambers from discovering the circumstances of McDonald’s oral confession and challenging his repudiated written confession, which deprived Chambers of the right to contradict testimony offered against him. Under the Due Process Clause, defendants have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses on their own behalf. The Court also held that the hearsay statements were not untrustworthy evidence but were a crucial part of Chambers’ defense and could have led the jury to a different decision. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction over this case because Chambers did not properly raise the issue of the violation of due process in the Mississippi courts before appealing to the Supreme Court.

The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional. Lemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.

No. Announcing the Judgment of the Court, Justice Warren E. Burger affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Court held that permitting payment of allocated funds for 1970-1971 school year would not substantially undermine constitutional interest at stake. The Court also recognized that the denial of payment would have serious financial consequences on private schools which relied on the statute and the funds allocated for the 1970-1971 school year. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment. Justice William O. Douglas, joined by Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Potter Steward, dissented. The dissent held that the First Amendment was violated whether the payment from public funds to religious schools involved the prior year, the current year, or the next year. Justice Thurgood Marshall took no part in consideration of this case.

Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the District Court and maintained that amended Section 3 violated the Fifth Amendment in creating two types of households – one in which all members were related and one in which at least one member was unrelated. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the majority, acknowledged the interest of Congress in preventing abuse of the Food Stamp program. However, the statute did not fulfill Congress' stated purpose of preventing "hippies" and "hippie communes" from enrolling the food stamp program. Additionally, there existed other measures within the Food Stamp Act that were specifically aimed at preventing abuse of the program. Since the statute "simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of fraud," the distinction between households with related members and households with unrelated members did not further the state interest and therefore violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.

State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that obscene films did not acquire constitutional protection simply because they were exhibited for consenting adults only. Conduct involving consenting adults, the Court argued, was not always beyond the scope of governmental regulation. The Court found that there were "legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity," including the community's quality of life and public safety. The Court also noted that conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene materials was not necessary to justify the Georgia law. The Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider its decision in light of the obscenity standard spelled out in <em>Miller v. California</em>. The Georgia Supreme Court found that the works in question were obscene and directed the trial judge to issue an order permanently enjoining the theatre from exhibiting the films.

Rosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review.

No. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the decision of the Arizona Court of Appeals and held that Arizona did not have the right to tax McClanahan. In an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized the long-standing status of Indian reservations as exempt from state authority. While the Navajo Treaty signed between the Navajo nation and the United States did not explicitly exempt the nation from state laws, Arizona entered the Union on the explicit condition that it would lose its authority over Indian tribes and reservations within the state, including taxation powers. Consistent with its decision in <em>Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission</em>, the Court ruled that Arizona "had no jurisdiction to impose" state income tax on McLanahan.

Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests. Green filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge.

No, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the findings of the EEOC could not bar a suit that meets the jurisdictional requirements for suing in federal district court. The Court also held that Congress meant to prevent discriminatory hiring practices, not guarantee jobs, so that the complainant in an employment discrimination lawsuit carries the initial burden to present a prima facie case for racial discrimination. The burden then shifts to the company to prove that there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring and/or firing practice. In this case, while Green presented a prima facie case, the Court held that McDonnell Douglas Corporation was not compelled to rehire him after his deliberately unlawful activities. On remand, Green must show that the corporation’s reasons regarding the unlawful activity were merely a pretext.

In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.

No. The Court refused to examine the system with strict scrutiny since there is no fundamental right to education in the Constitution and since the system did not systematically discriminate against all poor people in Texas. Given the similarities between Texas' system and those in other states, it was clear to the Court that the funding scheme was not "so irrational as to be invidiously discriminatory." Justice Powell argued that on the question of wealth and education, "the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages."

In October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano’s pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano’s motion to suppress the government’s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General’s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government’s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the Executive Assistant’s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Congress intended only the Attorney General or a specifically designated Assistant Attorney General to have the power to authorize wiretap applications. Consequently, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act required the Court to suppress any evidence obtained from a wiretap that was issued in response to an application with insufficient authorization. Additionally, because the original wiretap application was invalid, the government could not rely on any contested evidence obtained from the properly authorized extension of the original wiretap. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he maintained that the Court should not have suppressed the evidence obtained from the extension of the original wiretap orders. Justice Powell argued that the probable cause for the properly authorized extensions was only partially obtained form the illegal wiretap; therefore, the Court did not need to suppress the evidence gathered from the extensions. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.

No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly after the release of the tapes.

A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that "[w]ith no showing of significant violation by the 53 outlying school districts and no evidence of any interdistrict violation or effect," the district court's remedy was "wholly impermissible" and not justified by Brown v. Board of Education. The Court noted that desegregation, "in the sense of dismantling a dual school system," did not require "any particular racial balance in each 'school, grade or classroom.'" The Court also emphasized the importance of local control over the operation of schools.

Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash. At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.

Yes, No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court held that police can obtain consent for a search from a third party if that third party has common authority over the premises. The woman’s statements should not have been excluded at the suppression hearing because evidentiary burdens are lower for suppression hearings than the actual trial. On remand, the court must determine whether the woman had authority to consent to the search. Justice William O. Douglas dissented, arguing that the search was invalid because police officers failed to obtain a warrant when they had multiple opportunities to do so. The woman letting police officers into the house violated Matlock’s and her parents' privacy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate dissent, writing that, on remand, the court should determine whether the woman knew she did not have to consent to the search of the house. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

In 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion.  

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that states may not interfere with the right to associate with the political party of one’s choice without proof that the political party was inciting immediate lawless action. Such action on the parts of the states prevented the effective casting of ballots, which violated basic civil and political rights, and was not in the best interests of the states. In his opinion concurring in judgment, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the facts of the case showed that Indian did not require affidavits from the two main political parties. Because the policy represented a discriminatory preference without any justification, it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.  

An inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.

Yes. In a 6-3 vote Justice Byron R. White wrote for the majority reversing in part and affirming in part. The Supreme Court held that while prisoners are not entitled to full due process protections, disciplinary proceedings must include written notice to the defendant of the charges, a written statement of evidence, and the opportunity for an inmate to call witnesses and present evidence. The Court allowed for discretion by officials to deny a prisoner the right to present evidence or call witnesses if it would be "unduly hazardous to institutional safety." The Court also held that prison official's opening of privileged letters in the presence of other inmates was not unconstitutional. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented in part, stating that the inmate's right to present evidence and call witnesses is constitutionally protected and should not be abridged. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. joined. Justice Douglass wrote a dissent, saying that prisoners are entitled to all due process protections when they are faced with an substantial deprivation of liberty in the prison.

Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.

No. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed the District Court and upheld the statute. In an opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court accepted California's interest in keeping the Disability Fund program solvent and maintaining the low contribution rate from program members. Insuring disability resulting from pregnancy complications would be "extraordinarily expensive" and make the program "impossible to maintain." As in <em>Dandridge v. Williams</em>, California was not obligated by the Equal Protection Clause to "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Therefore, California could constitutionally choose which disabilities to insure through the Disability Fund in order to maintain the solvency and contribution level of the program.

A federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in grand jury proceedings. The purpose of a grand jury is to determine whether a crime was committed and whether to charge someone in connection with that crime. Using the exclusionary rule would interfere with that purpose. The exclusionary rule is also meant to deter police misconduct, not provide a new constitutional right. Justice William J. Brennan dissented, writing that application of the exclusionary rule should not depend on whether it deters police misconduct. The exclusionary rule gives meaning to the Fourth Amendments protection against unlawful search and seizure. Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent.

Richardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures.

The Court held that Richardson did not have standing to sue. Using the two-pronged standing test of Flast v. Cohen (1968), Chief Justice Burger found that there was no "logical nexus between the status asserted [by Richardson as a taxpayer] and the claim sought to be adjudicated." It was clear to Burger that Richardson was not "a proper and appropriate party to invoke federal judicial power" on this issue.

An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film "Carnal Knowledge." The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.

A unanimous Court held that the Georgia Supreme Court misapplied the obscenity test announced in Miller v. California (1973). Justice Rehnquist argued that Miller did not give juries "unbridled discretion" to determine what is patently offensive. Only material that displays "hard core sexual conduct" is prohibited. Since "Carnal Knowledge" did not contain scenes of that nature it merited constitutional protection.

Carol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old. Ann Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. Susan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school board denied Cohen's request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.

Yes, yes and no. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Potter Stewart held that the school boards' regulations requiring pregnant teachers to stop working after the fifth month of their pregnancies violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Justice Stewart emphasized that the Court extends strong protection to individuals' freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life. He pointed to both boards' requirements that pregnant teachers provide advance notice of their condition, arguing that this was in itself sufficient to preserve continuity in classroom instruction. Justice Stewart then turned to the school boards' claim that the rules were required because some pregnant teachers became physically incapable of teaching. He reasoned that these rules amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that every teacher in her fourth or fifth month of pregnancy was incapable of teaching. He also rejected the boards' argument that the rules were necessary for administrative convenience, concluding that administrative efficiency was not a sufficiently important interest to validate what was otherwise a violation of due process. Justice Stewart also held that the Cleveland School Board's eligibility restriction based on the age of the newborn child violated the due process clause because the board failed to show a reasonable justification for this regulation. In contrast, the Chesterfield School Board only required that teachers demonstrate good health, guaranteeing them re-employment by the beginning of the next school year. This was a reasonable and narrow method of protecting the school's interest in teacher fitness. Justice Louis Powell concurred in the result. He questioned the majority's conclusion that some of the maternity leave requirements amounted to an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. Instead, Justice Powell argued that the board's classifications violated the female teachers' right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they were not rationally related to the school's legitimate interest in fostering continuity of teaching. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger, dissented. He argued that while the school boards' rules may have been arbitrary in particular cases, this was not enough to show that the rules themselves were unconstitutional. He noted that both parties conceded that the probability of physical impairment increased as a pregnancy advanced, and suggested that the line drawn by the boards was not irrational.

Since 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that the gender classification had a “fair and substantial relation” to the purpose of the legislation.

No. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that single women face significantly more hardship in the job market than single men, and the disparity is particularly true for surviving spouses. While widowers can generally continue in the job they held previously, many widows find themselves entering the job market for the first time or after an extended absence. Based on these differences, the Court held that the gender classification in the Florida statute has a “fair and substantial relation” to the legislation’s purpose of softening the financial impact of the loss of a spouse. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued classifications based on characteristics over which individuals have no control, such as gender, must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. In such cases, the government must prove not only that such classifications serve a compelling government interest, but also that the interest cannot be served by any other classification. In this case, he argued that the purpose of the legislation could be achieved without gender-based discrimination. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Byron R. White wrote that gender-based classifications require significant justification that Florida did not provide.

On October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested. Steffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes, yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the case presented an actual controversy, as the Georgia statute could interfere with Steffel’s exercise of his constitutional rights even if he was not arrested. Because the United States’ involvement in Vietnam, which Steffel was protesting, was reduced, the issue of whether or not the case still presented an active controversy would be decided by the lower court on remand. The Court also held that awarding declaratory relief would not interfere with the state’s prosecution, and therefore is not precluded. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion and argued that plaintiffs in such constitutional cases must prove that the state’s actions represented a “genuine threat” to their constitutional liberties, which he predicts will be rare. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence. In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that it would not be improper to issue declaratory or injunctive relief in state courts on issues that have already been decided by federal courts. He also argues that such measures should not be necessary because the decisions of federal courts carry more weight than precedents in state courts. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion and argued that issuing declaratory relief does not allow a plaintiff to avoid prosecution under state law. He also argued that this opinion does not provide support for the ability of federal courts to grant injunctive relief just because declarative relief was appropriate. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurrence.

Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it had a vendor's lien on the property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana law.

No. Justice Byron R. White wrote the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Louisiana's procedure for sequestering property provided both the buyer and the seller with a fair opportunity to secure and defend their respective interests in the challenged property. W. T. Grant Company provided a sworn statement documenting proof of the debt, the lien, and delinquency, all of which showed the judge that Mitchell's title to the property was encumbered. Additional safeguards in the Louisiana law required creditors to place a bond down at the time of sequestration to secure the buyer's interests should the proceedings show that sequestration was wrongful. The Court held that these safeguards, coupled with Louisiana's interest in preventing the buyer from transferring or concealing the property to the detriment of the creditor, justified sequestration without notice or a hearing. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the majority opinion overturned the rule established in <em>Fuentes v. Shevin</em>. In that case, the Court held that procedural due process required "an adversary hearing before an individual may be temporarily deprived of any possessory interest in . . . property." Justice Powell argued that the <em>Fuentes</em> rule was unnecessarily broad and that the narrower grounds the majority set forth represented a better balance of the interests of creditors and debtors. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court should adhere to the <em>Fuentes</em> rule. According to this rule, the Louisiana procedures violated due process by allowing the government to deprive a person of property with no advance notice or opportunity to be heard. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined the dissent.

Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.

No and no. The Court reversed the District Court. The 1972 Act did not explicitly repeal Section 472. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, cited the long history of Indian employment preference as exceptions to prohibitions against employment discrimination. Congress had also passed two Indian preference statutes after the 1972 Act, showing that Congress did not intend implicitly to repeal Section 472. In addition, the Court held that Section 472 did not constitute discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Again, Justice Blackmun cited the history of "special treatment" granted to Indians. The preference for Indians in Section 472 was not "a 'racial' preference", but rather "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government." Section 472 went towards the "fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation towards the Indians," and was therefore not in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

In 1964, the federal government sued several corporations for rigging prices of concrete and steel pipes in violation of the Sherman Act. That case reached a final judgment in May 1968, when all parties agreed to terms that prevented the companies from engaging in future violations of anti-trust laws. Eleven days short of one year after this agreement, the State of Utah, on behalf of several agencies and local governments, filed a class action lawsuit against the same corporations. The lawsuit claimed that the corporations’ previous price fixing schemes had directly injured the State and other plaintiffs. Six months later, the corporations successfully argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit could not be maintained as a class action because it was not impractical for the plaintiffs to each have individual representation. Eight days following this ruling, over 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts within the State of Utah immediately filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit. The court denied their motions because they had failed to argue them within the one-year time statute of limitations required under federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, that court held that, by filing lawsuit as a class action, all of the claims were adequately before the trial court before the statute of limitations was reached. However, because the judge dismissed the class action after the statute of limitations ran, the parties were unable to re-file their claims against the corporations. That court held that the trial judge could not leave the plaintiff’s without recourse after the time to file the lawsuit had passed. Instead, the plaintiffs should have the eleven days that remained under the statute of limitations when the initial lawsuit was filed in order to intervene or otherwise file individual claims. The corporations appealed. 

No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the Ninth Circuit.The Supreme Court held that commencing a class action suspends all applicable statutes of limitations against members of that class who would have been parties had the suit been allowed to continue as a class action. Justice Stewart noted that the policies behind statutes of limitations are to ensure fairness to defendants by “preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Those policies, however, are satisfied when a plaintiff initiates a class action lawsuit because defendants know a named plaintiff and the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs. Finally, the Court noted that eleven days remained under the statute of limitations when the class action was initially filed. Therefore, the motions to intervene that were filed within eight days of the judge’s dismissal were valid.

Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed "acceptable for service" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided <em>Gutknecht v. United States</em>. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by <em>Gutknecht</em>. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in <em>United States v. Fox</em>. <em>Fox</em> involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in <em>Fox</em> changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that Davis could challenge his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart quoted the government's acknowledgment that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was "not consonant with this Court's holding in <em>Sanders v. United States</em>." The Court rejected the government's suggestion that Section 2255 did not apply because Davis' challenge was not grounded in the Constitution. Since "new law has been made...since the trial and appeal" through the Ninth Circuit's later holding in <em>Fox</em>, Davis was entitled to a challenge under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in part and dissented in part.

Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The <em>Miami Herald</em> published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the <em>Herald</em> publish his responses to the editorials. When the <em>Herald</em> refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The <em>Herald</em> challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and held that Florida's "right to reply" statute violated the freedom of press found in the First Amendment. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the Court recognized the risks posed to the "true marketplace of ideas" by media consolidation and barriers to entry in the newspaper industry. However, even in that context, "press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and…cannot be legislated." The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on <em>New York Times v. Sullivan</em> in that the "right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. authored a concurring statement. Justice Byron R. White authored a concurring opinion.

Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence’s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court held that that statute, as applied, violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, writing that Spence’s display was symbolic speech entitled to constitutional protection. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred in the result. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that each state should decide how the American flag should be protected. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, expressing that states have an interest in protecting the American flag as an important symbol of national unity. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined in the dissent.

Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in <em>New York Times v. Sullivan</em> (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.

The Court reversed the lower court decision, holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a new trial. Justice Powell argued that the application of the New York Times v. Sullivan standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was neither a public official nor a public figure. In the context of the opinion, Powell advanced many lines of reasoning to establish that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. First, the recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public figures or public officials. Second, even for private individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news media. And third, any standard of fault less then recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. Justice Harry A. Blackmun write a concurring opinion signing on to the reasoning and outcome of the majority. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and William O. Douglas dissenting, arguing that the failure to apply the New York Times v. Sullivan standard to private persons involved in public matters would stifle "free and robust debate." Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Byron R. White joined the majority in reversing the Court of Appeals ruling but would have simply reinstated the jury verdict and damage award. They disagreed with the majority's refashioning of state libel laws involving private individuals and the news media.

The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.

An ordinance restricting land use to “one-family” dwellings did not involve a procedural disparity, did not deprive any group of a fundamental right, and is rationally related to a permissible government objective. Justice William O. Douglas delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the Village of Belle Terre’s ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not arbitrary, did not unreasonably apply to some individuals and not others, and was reasonably related to a rational state objective. The Court also held that the ordinance did not violate the Due Process Clause because it did not deny anyone a fundamental right such as the rights to travel, association, and privacy. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that this case was moot because the unrelated tenants to whom the homeowners leased were no longer living in the house when this case was decided. There was no case or controversy as Article III of the Constitution requires. Justice Brennan explained that he would vacate and remand the judgment, and if the lower court determined that the case was moot, as he suggested, then the case should be dismissed. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote that the ordinance “unnecessarily burdens” the lessor appellees’ right to privacy and First Amendment right to freedom of association. The Village’s legitimate interests in controlling land use could be fulfilled by limiting the number of people dwelling in a single residence without specifying that they need to be related or unrelated.

A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.

The Court upheld the search. Distinguishing between searches done to discover concealed weapons and those conducted coextensive with an arrest, Justice Rehnquist argued since the officer did not conduct the search in an abusive or extreme manner, and because he acted consistent with the authority vested in a police officer when making an arrest, his actions were legitimate.

Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances. Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court’s prescribed procedures.

Yes, yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for a unanimous court affirmed in part and reversed in part remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment entitles a person arrested without a warrant and charged by information to a timely preliminary hearing on probable cause. The prosecutor’s decision to file an information does not provide sufficient protection. Five members of the court agreed that the district court’s prescribed procedures were not required by the Fourth Amendment. The case was remanded for reconsideration of these procedures. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, writing that it was unnecessary to specify which procedural protections do not need to be provided to suspects awaiting trial. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence.

Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.

No. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Ohio and found no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice Harry A. Blackmun asserted that "no First Amendment forum is here to be found," as the streetcars did not qualify as a "public thoroughfare." Accordingly, the city "need not accept every proffer of advertising." The city could reject certain types of advertising as long as the policies were not "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious." Given the "reasonable legislative objectives" of minimizing "chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience," Shaker Heights' policy was not unconstitutional.

Robert Martinez was a prisoner in the California State Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates. Martinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed.

No and Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote for a unanimous Court and affirmed the lower court's opinion. The Court held that it was proper for the district court to refuse to abstain from deciding the constitutionality of the regulations. The Court further held that the censorship of direct personal correspondence created incidental restrictions on the right to free speech for both prisoners and their correspondents. Therefore, the speech could only be restricted if it furthered a substantial government interest and was narrowly tailored to further that interest. Under this rule, the policy censoring mail was unconstitutional. Justice Thurgood Marshall filed a concurring opinion, which Justice William J. Brennan joined. Justice Marshall emphasized his opinion that the prison authorities did not have a general right to open and read all incoming and outgoing prison mail. Justice William O. Douglas wrote separately that prisoners were still entitled to all constitutional rights which were not curtailed by procedures that satisfied all the requirements of due process.

In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English. Lau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote for a unanimous court. The Court determined that the school system's failure to provide supplemental English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who spoke no English constituted a violation of the California Education Code in the SFUSD Handbook and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it deprived those students of an opportunity to participate in the public education program. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Harry Blackmun. He discussed the appropriateness of the statutory guidelines mandating affirmative remedial efforts for linguistically deprived children. Justice Harry Blackmun also wrote an opinion concurring with the result, which was joined by Justice Burger. The justice stressed that 1,800 children were being deprived of meaningful schooling in this matter. He limited the Court's holding by stating that, if only a few children spoke a language other than English, the Court's decision would not necessarily require supplemental language instruction.

Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.

In a plurality opinion written by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court held that the procedures established for the purpose of determining whether there is "cause" for Kennedy's dismissal satisfied the requirements of procedural due process. The court also held that standard of employment protection imposed by was not impermissibly vague or overbroad in its regulation of the speech of federal employees. The statute in question was not unconstitutional on its face.

In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.

Yes. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that federal law such as the National Labor Relations Act supports an environment for robust labor debate that allows for “intemperate, abusive, or insulting language” if it effectively makes a point. The Court also held that such language could not be interpreted as a false representation of fact and so maintained their First Amendment protection. In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the First Amendment and its application to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit both the states and the federal government from limiting speech in federal labor disputes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the majority unnecessarily extended the reach of federal labor law. He wrote that state libel laws represented the overriding state interest in allowing individuals redress for harms to their reputations. In this case, the individuals in question did not represent an economic threat to the union, so the speech should not be protected from state libel laws. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.  

DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.

In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that because the University of Washington Law School had agreed to allow DeFunis to enroll and to earn a diploma, the case in question was moot. DeFunis would be able to complete his legal studies irrespective of any Supreme Court decision. The controversy between parties had thus "clearly ceased to be 'definite and concrete' and no longer 'touch[ed] the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.'"

Respondents alleged that a section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act. The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits. The Social Security Act contained no such requirement. A three-judge district court in the Northern District of New York agreed and ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. The court noted that since the district court's decision, the Social Security Act was amended to almost mirror that section of the New York welfare statute. The amendment would become effective just over three months after the Supreme Court's decision so the Court declined to deliver an extended opinion. Justices Lewis F. Powell and William Rehnquist dissented.

Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims.

The Court held that the Georgia statute violated the Constitution. Justice White recognized the primacy of issues of privacy and press freedom, but he also identified compelling reasons why the press should not be restricted in this case. First, the news media is an important resource for citizens which allows them to scrutinize government proceedings. The commissions and adjudication of crimes are issues relevant to the public interest. Second, in the development of the privacy right, the Court has held that the interests of privacy "fade" in cases where controversial "information already appears on the public record." Restricting the media as the Georgia law did was a dangerous encroachment on press freedom, argued White, as it "would invite timidity and self-censorship."

Colonial Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum. Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate. Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.

No. Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court 7-1. The Supreme Court held that the tax was justified because Colonial had voluntarily qualified to do business in Louisiana, and gained benefits and protections from Louisiana. The Court also held that the tax was not discriminatory or unfairly apportioned. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence stating that the tax did not threaten state commerce by being discriminatory. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, asserting that Louisiana’s tax was solely on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce, making it unconstitutional. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.

The Court held that the Virginia law infringed upon Bigelow's First Amendment rights and violated the Constitution. Citing prior holdings such as New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), Justice Blackmun denied the Supreme Court of Virginia's ruling that commercial speech is not afforded First Amendment protection. Furthermore, the advertisement in question contained important information in the "public interest" which went beyond merely informing readers of a commercial service. Finally, the Court feared that the Virginia statute had the potential to "impair" national and interstate publications which might choose to carry similar advertisements.

In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.

Congress may not regulate the labor market of state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which protects the states' traditional activities.

In 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the “Star of India,” a rare precious sapphire that was housed at the New York Museum of Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname “Murph the Surf” in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the “Whiskey Creek Murders.” Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

National news coverage of the defendant’s previous crimes was not sufficient to establish a presumption of jury prejudice in violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that because the jury selection process was sufficiently thorough to exclude prejudice of the jurors, the petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated. The Court looked at other cases involving jury prejudice because of previous media attention and determined that they did not control the outcome in this case, as the jury members who were selected only had brief exposure to Murphy’s previous crimes and stated that they did not think the previous crimes influenced his guilt in this case. Although there was precedent that stated that certain circumstances could create a high potential for prejudice, the Court determined that precedent applied only in federal courts as an exercise of the Court’s supervisory powers over federal courts rather than as a constitutional rule that applied to state courts as well. In his concurrence in the judgment, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that, while the trial judge should have shown more discretion in jury selection, the circumstances of the trial in this case did not rise to the level of violating the defendant’s rights to fair trial and due process. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that Murphy’s request for venue change should have been granted because some of the jurors did show prejudice regarding Murphy’s previous convictions, and therefore that he had been denied a fair trial.

Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.

No. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for a 6-3 majority, vacated the state court judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has the constitutional right to defend himself when he voluntarily and intelligently wants to do so. In this case, Faretta was deprived of that constitutional right. Farretta’s knowledge of the hearsay rule and court procedure was irrelevant to whether he voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, arguing that the Constitution provides no basis for a right to self-representation. Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the text of the Sixth Amendment does not support the right to self-representation, and such a right will lead to procedural confusion without providing any benefit to the accused. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree. Jones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger delivered the opinion of the court vacating the lower court decision and remanding. The unanimous Supreme Court held that the criminal trial put Jones in jeopardy for a second time. The Court suggested that juvenile courts make determinations about whether to try a juvenile as an adult at a preliminary hearing before any adjudication is made. This would avoid any double jeopardy and allow juveniles to be tried as adults when appropriate.

Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine. Another state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the unanimous majority opinion, holding that Maness could not be held in contempt for giving advice in good faith. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the client should have produced the magazines and then appealed the decision to let them in as evidence. The Court noted that sometimes it is impossible to “unring the bell” and Maness took the proper course to protect his client. The Court also noted that the record showed no evidence of willfully disobedient conduct by Maness or his client. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurrence, stating that punishing an attorney for acting in good faith would violate due process as an arbitrary interference with a client’s right to the advice of counsel. Justice Bryon R. White also wrote a concurrence, noting that the trial court gave no assurance that the client would not be convicted based on the magazines. Justice White would have vacated the contempt judgment and given the client another opportunity to answer the questions with those assurances.

Julian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship. This caused damage to Vella’s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance. Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable. A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury. The district court denied the ship owner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible. The appellate court reversed.

Yes. In a unanimous decision, Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the ship owner must pay maintenance and cure from the time of the injury through the time the injury was deemed permanent. The Court felt that not requiring payment would lead to unwanted situations where a worker had to pay back maintenance and cure once his injury was diagnosed as incurable.

On March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce’s car based on the fact that the occupant’s appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted. While Brignoni-Ponce’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.  

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required there to be reasonable suspicion for border patrol agents to stop a vehicle and question its occupants. This requirement allows the government to act in the public interest of ensuring legal immigration without infringing on the rights of legal immigrants and others. Because the border patrol agents in this case did not have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing when they stopped Brignoni-Ponce’s vehicle, the motion to suppress any testimony gained from that illegal seizure should have been suppressed. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the majority’s decision only pertains to roving patrols and that there are many other cases in which stopping a vehicle would not be constitutionally suspect. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment required the police to show probable cause to stop a vehicle, and any lower standard unreasonably weakened the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a separate opinion concurring in judgment in which he argued that the idea of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment must take all the circumstances into account when weighing the public interest against the rights of the individual. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. In his separate opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority’s opinion strains the requirements of the Fourth Amendment in an attempt to solve the immigration problem that could be better handled by legislative action. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the opinion concurring in the judgment.  

These are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to work. The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not intend to reside in the U.S. permanently. This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote for the majority affirming the lower court as to daily workers, but reversing as to seasonal workers. The Supreme Court held that even if workers did not intend to reside in the U.S., they were still entitled to the ability to do so. The Court noted that the practice was longstanding and had since Congress had impliedly approved it. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the plain meaning of the statute did not allow foreign commuters to be considered “permanent residents”. Justice White felt the statute was not ambiguous so the administrative practice was not authoritative.

These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No. In a unanimous decision, Justice William O. Douglas wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the ICC based its decisions on consideration of relevant factors. While the ICC could have explained its reasoning more clearly, the Court did not feel the decisions were arbitrary and capricious. The Court also remanded the case to determine whether Bowman should receive the excess authority the ICC granted.