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The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.

Yes. In a 7-2 decision Justice William J. Brennan wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the legal responsibility for the tax fell on the military and so upon the U.S. federal government. This made the tax unconstitutional per <i>McCulloch v. Maryland</i>. The Court also held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not abolish federal immunity from taxes on the sale of liquor. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that both the Twenty-First Amendment and the Buck Act authorized the regulation. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others. The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.

No answer. In an 8-1 decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding to the district court. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have answered the state law questions and abstained from the federal question. Because of the unsettled nature of the state law question, the Court felt it was possible to modify or avoid the equal protection issue depending on how the court interpreted the state constitution. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, stating that the question of whether to decide the state law issues should have been left to the district court.

Six maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there. The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen. Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented the loading and unloading of ships. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The courts held that the picketing did not “affect commerce” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have jurisdiction. The courts also held that enjoining the picketing did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.

No, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction. The Supreme Court held that the NLRB did not have jurisdiction because the affected ship was not “in” or “affecting” commerce as defined by the NLRA. This case was not distinguishable from <i>Windward v. American Radio Assn.</i>, which involved owners of the foreign ships. The Court also held that the injunction did not violate the First Amendment. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent, agreeing with Justice Stewart and emphasizing the importance of the public interest in keeping marine traffic safe. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that this dispute was within the sole jurisdiction of the NLRB. Justices Douglas, William J. Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.

Maybe. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit relied on a rule that the Supreme Court later overturned. Since the district court ruling, the Supreme Court held that pending or bad faith prosecution was not necessary for declaratory relief. The Court remanded for the district court to reassess the case based on the new precedent. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, asserting that it was correct to remand the case to the district court. Justice Byron R. White wrote a partial concurrence, stating that he would affirm the dismissal of Ellis and Love’s request for equitable relief. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, stating that equitable relief was barred by the nolo contendere pleas and the deliberate choice to forgo state appellate remedies. Justice Potter Stewart joined in this part of the dissent. Justice Powell also expressed that he would affirm the dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the ordinance. Justice Stewart and Justice Warren Burger joined in this part of the dissent.

Nine students at two high schools and one junior high school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The school principals did not hold hearings for the affected students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that because Ohio had chosen to extend the right to an education to its citizens, it could not withdraw that right "on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d] occurred." The Court held that Ohio was constrained to recognize students' entitlements to education as property interests protected by the Due Process Clause that could not be taken away without minimum procedures required by the Clause. The Court found that students facing suspension should at a minimum be given notice and afforded some kind of hearing.

Billy J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women’s jury service did not violate federal law.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that a jury made up of a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment. The article, while not actively disqualifying women from serving on the jury, systematically prevented many women from serving. Given the passage of the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 that guarantees a fair cross-section of the population for juries in federal courts, the Court held that Congress clearly considered a representative jury necessary for a fair trial. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in the result. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the Sixth Amendment only prevented the use of jury selection procedures that were likely to result in an unfair or biased jury. Since there was no evidence that the article in the Louisiana state constitution undermined jury fairness or that Taylor’s trial was biased, the Court should not overturn the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court.  

Plumbers &amp; Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Maybe. Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. wrote the 5-4 majority opinion affirming on state law pre-emption, but reversing on federal antitrust exemption. The Supreme Court held that the agreement was not exempt because it imposed a direct restraint on competition. The Court remanded because the question of whether the agreement violated the Sherman Act was not fully briefed or argued. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, stating that Congress did not intend to impose antitrust sanctions for this type of activity. Justice William O. Douglas, Justice William J. Brennan, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice William O. Douglas also wrote a dissent, asserting that only federal labor law applied because Connell based its argument on the fact that they were coerced into signing the agreement.

In an effort to investigate the "administration, operation, and enforcement" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.

The Court held that the Senate Subcommittee's actions were legitimate and did not violate the Fund's First Amendment rights. Chief Justice Burger argued that the power to investigate, even through a compulsory mechanism like a subpoena, is "inherent in the power to make laws." Furthermore, the investigation was related to and aided in furthering a "legitimate task of Congress," namely, the investigation of the Internal Security Act. Burger disregarded the Fund's claim that the investigation was being conducted to expose its beliefs, many of which were "unorthodox or unpopular." He reasoned that the legitimacy of a congressional investigatory action is not derived from the motives of the members or by the information that the investigation uncovers.

The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the Jacksonville ordinance. While individuals did have a right to not be exposed to offensive films, the ordinance singled out "some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others," Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for the majority. Since the "offended viewer readily can avert his eyes" from the films shown, Jacksonville's distinction between films with nudity and films without nudity was unconstitutional. Under <em>Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley</em>, "government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The ordinance was "broader than permissible" in trying to protect children from exposure to nudity and "invalid" as an attempt to prevent traffic accidents. Justice William O. Douglas authored a concurring opinion.

Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice William H. Rehnquist, the court affirmed the Third Circuit and held that Metropolitan Edison's termination of Jackson's service did not qualify as state action. Rehnquist reiterated that private actions are "immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court acknowledged that Metropolitan Edison was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, but this regulation did not make Metropolitan Edison part of the state. Additionally, the Court cited <em>Nebbia v. New York</em> in declining to rule on whether all actions by businesses that provided essential public services qualified as state action.

Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request. Strickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the common law doctrine of immunity for public school officials provided immunity from liability if the school board acted in good faith. To impose a penalty of liability for such a decision would make the board vulnerable to intimidation. The Court also held that, to prove the board acted in bad faith, the evidence must show that the school board members knew or should have known that their actions would violate the constitutional rights of the students. Given the information available to the school board at the time of the decision, the Court found that the school board acted in good faith. The Court also held the United States Court of Appeals went beyond its purview by reinterpreting the school board statute. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote on opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed that the case should be remanded but argued that the majority’s opinion placed too high a burden on school board officials by equating ignorance of the law with malicious intent. He cited recent split decisions on the part of the Court as evidence that even knowledge of the law did not necessarily lead to an understanding of a clear course of action. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Stephen Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married in 1970. Polatschek had worked as a teacher for the five years prior to their marriage and continued teaching after they were married. Her salary was the principle source of the couple’s income, and social security contributions were regularly deducted from her salary. In 1972, Polatschek died in childbirth, which left Wiesenfeld with the care of their newborn son. Wiesenfeld applied for social security benefits for himself and his son, and was told that his son could receive them but that he could not. Social Security Act provides benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father that are available to both the children and the widow. The benefits for a deceased wife and mother, however, are only available to the children. In 1973, Wiesenfeld sued on behalf of himself and similarly situated widowers. He claimed that the relevant section of the Social Security Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex and sought summary judgment. A three-judge panel of the district court granted Wiesenfeld’s motion for summary judgment

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the social security benefits for the surviving spouse and children is to enable the surviving spouse to properly care for the children, regardless of the gender of the parent. Gender-based discrimination regarding these benefits is therefore both illogical and counter-productive.  Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the gender-based classification of the social security benefits does not serve any legitimate government interest. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the concurring opinion. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that the majority’s opinion overreached the bounds of the question by ruling on whether the statute violated the Fifth Amendment. He argued that the statute does not serve a valid legislative purpose and could be overturned on that basis alone. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate in either the discussion or the decision of this case.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 impliedly repealed any applicable antitrust laws. The Act authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission as the sole regulator for the New York Stock Exchange. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurrence, stating that the SEC has actively exercised its authority so commission rates are monitored in the way Congress intended. Justice Potter Stewart also wrote a concurrence, emphasizing that rules fixing commission rates are only immune from antitrust laws if the rules are necessary to make the Securities and Exchange Act work.

The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay. At trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests.

Yes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that backpay should be awarded based on a court’s discretion. The decision in this case should be considered in light of the goals of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Because the prospect of a backpay award could ensure the use of equal employment practices, it serves the purposes of the Act and should be awarded in this case. Finding that the employer did not act in bad faith is not a sufficient reason to deny backpay. The Court also held that district courts have the authority to award backpay based on the legislative history surrounding the Act, regardless of when the demand was added to the action. The Court held that nothing in the Act precluded the use of employment tests, but only if they can be proven to be reasonable measures of job performance. Based on the Guidelines issued by the EEOC, the Albemarle tests do not reasonably measure job performance. Because Albemarle has been revising their testing procedures throughout the appellate process, the Court left determining the appropriate relief to the lower court on remand. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that there was no legal bar to awarding backpay under Title VII of the Act, and only extremely unusual circumstances would prevent the awarding of backpay when liability has been established. He also argued that, although the backpay demand can be added to the action at any point, the district court can consider whether adding it later prejudiced Albemarle’s case in any way. In his concurring opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote that, in most cases, the awarding of backpay is at the discretion of the trial judge and should be governed by equity considerations. He also wrote that a lack of “bad faith” was not enough evidence to refuse to award backpay, though there are situations where the refusal would be appropriate. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in judgment. He argued that an employer’s good faith was a relevant issue in a court’s discretionary decisions. He also argued that the Guidelines were theories regarding employment testing and its accuracy, and they should not be considered too rigidly. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that, under the majority opinion’s standard, awarding backpay was unnecessary in this case, as Albemarle was already changing their policies. He also argued that the use of the EEOC Guidelines to determine whether the employment tests were constitutional was unreasonable because the Guidelines carry no legislative weight. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus’ murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder. Prior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State’s argument that the arrest was legal.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that Miranda warnings are not sufficient to remove the taint of an illegal arrest from statements made in custody. The Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were meant to work together, so that even if a statement is found to be voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment, it could still be the result of an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and therefore inadmissible. Because Brown’s arrest was illegal and the statements clearly stemmed from that arrest, the Court held that the statements were inadmissible. Justice Byron R. White concurred in the judgment and wrote that the Miranda warnings do not circumvent the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part. He argued that the admissibility of Brown’s statements should be considered in the context of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. He also argued that the case should be remanded because the trial court made no determination regarding probable cause for the original arrest. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in part.

On August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties. At trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that, given the legislative history of the statute, Congress clearly intended it to afford “maximum protection” to federal officers. This purpose was best satisfied with a looser understanding of intent. The Court held that this ruling was not unfair to the defendant because it did not make a previously legal action illegal. Intent to assault is criminal, regardless of the intended victim. The Court also held that the burden for proving conspiracy was not any higher than the burden for proving the element of the crime itself. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent where he argued that the precedent established by state laws makes the knowledge of an officer’s identity an essential element of the crime of assaulting one. Without such knowledge, the crime should be treated as an assault on a private citizen. He also argued that the statute’s specification regarding an assault on a federal agent during the “performance of his official duties” requires that the perpetrator be aware of the federal agent’s official status. Justice William O. Douglas joined the dissent.

Schick, a master sergeant in the Army, was convicted of murder in a military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to life imprisonment without parole.

The Court dismissed Schick's claim that Eisenhower's action was invalid because it imposed a condition not authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Tracing the development and Court's interpretation of the President's powers to commute sentences, Chief Justice Burger argued that since the pardoning power is an enumerated one, any limit on it must be found in the Constitution. Thus, its use does not depend on statutes such as those found in the military code.

In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home. Margaret Cantrell and her children sued under the “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.

No. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the district judge adequately instructed the jury that liability could only be imposed if the jury determined that the false statements were made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Because no one objected to the instructions, the Court held that it did not have to consider whether this was an acceptable standard for “false light” cases. The Court held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred in overturning the case. The Court of Appeals based its analysis on the concept of “actual malice” as defined in <i>New York Times v. Sullivan</i>, while the district judge based his analysis on the common law standard of malice. The Court held that the district judge should not have directed a verdict for Forest City Publishing Co. because there was sufficient evidence in the case to prove Forest City Publishing Co. was aware of the falsehoods. Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent and argued that the imposition of legal analysis differentiating common law malice from actual malice infringes on the freedom of the press by making that freedom contingent upon a jury’s opinion. He argued that such a stance could result in a more timid press that would not report stories accurately for fear of facing a libel suit.

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice William O. Douglas wrote the unanimous opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the ICC did have the power to issue the order in an emergency and the order was in line with the ICC’s purpose. The order and tariff were not an unreasonable means of expediting movement of rail cars.

The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

No, Undecided. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court. The Supreme Court held that the legislative history surrounding the Social Security Act did not provide a basis for including unborn children in the definition of “dependent children”. While some states had adopted welfare plans that included unborn children, it was not required in order to comply with federal law. The Court also remanded the case for consideration of the Fourteenth Amendment issues. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the legislative history is inconclusive. Also, the long-standing administrative practice of providing unborn children with AFDC benefits when a state legislates for it prove that unborn children are included in the definition of “dependent children”. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan wrote for the 6-3 majority, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that, while it was a departure from prior precedent, the NLRB ruling was permissible. Denying her a union representative interfered with her individual rights as a union employee. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a dissent, stating that the NLRB had not explained its decision to depart from precedent so he would remand to the NLRB for further explanation. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, asserting that representation in meetings was a matter Congress left to decide during the bargaining process. Justice Potter Stewart joined Justice Powell’s dissent.

On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years. When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation. In February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.

No. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court vacated the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. While the trial court properly instructed the jury on the relevance of O’Connor’s good faith intentions, Justice Stewart held that the Fifth Circuit must determine if the trial court properly instructed the jury on O’Connor’s reliance on state law. Justice Stewart acknowledged that the state cannot constitutionally confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill person capable of living outside of a mental health facility. He noted, however, that neither the trial court nor the Fifth Circuit acted with knowledge of the Court’s most recent decision on the scope of state officials’ qualified immunity, <i>Wood v. Strickland</i>. Under that decision, the relevant question for the jury was whether O’Connor knew his actions would deprive Donaldson of his constitutional rights, or whether he maliciously deprived him of his constitutional rights. The Court remanded the case back to the Fifth Circuit to be reconsidered with this test in mind. Chief Justice Warren Burger concurred. He argued that the Fifth Circuit should consider Donaldson’s consistent refusal of medical treatment to be taken into account in considering the respondent’s good faith defense. Chief Justice Burger also would have ordered the Fifth Circuit to consider the hospital staff’s potential reliance on Donaldson’s repeated unsuccessful attempts to seek release through the Florida court system.

In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an “act of state” so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower judgment. The Supreme Court held that the record contained no evidence to support an act of state. There was no statute, decree or order by the Cuban Government refusing to pay, only a statement by the interventor’s counsel during trial. The interventors did not possess governmental power just because the Cuban government appointed them. The affirmative judgment for the one purchaser was restored. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a concurrence, expressing that even in cases involving purely political matters, the courts must decide for themselves whether abstention is necessary, and it was not necessary in this case. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the act of state doctrine did not bar the judgment in favor of the purchasers. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that the interventor’s refusal to pay over the mistaken funds was an act of state regardless of the lack of an express decree by the Cuban government. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.

Gurley Oil Co. owned five gas stations in Mississippi and purchased gas tax-free out of state. Gurley added both federal and state excise taxes on to the retail price of the gasoline. Mississippi imposed an additional 5% tax on the “gross proceeds” of all gas sales. Mississippi did not permit Gurley to deduct the state and federal excise taxes from the “gross proceeds” before calculating the 5% tax. Gurley paid the tax under protest, but sued for a refund. They alleged that not allowing a pretax deduction of the excise taxes was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Gurley argued that the company was just a collector of taxes paid by the consumer, so those taxes were not actually part of his gross receipts. The chancery court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.

No. Justice William J. Brennan wrote the unanimous opinion. The Supreme Court held that the 5% tax is on Gurley, not the consumer. Retailers traditionally pass the economic burden of taxes on to consumers, but that does not mean the legal responsibility for the tax has shifted. Because the tax fell on Gurley, he was not unconstitutionally deprived of his property. The court also held that the 5% tax did not violate equal protection because there was no claim of discriminatory enforcement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this "rule of divided damages" in <em>The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson,</em> 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855). On a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed <em>per curiam.</em> Abstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that in such cases liability should be allocated with reference to the comparative degrees of fault on the part of each party. "We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault."

Earl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military. The district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.

No, Maybe. In a unanimous decision, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the majority opinion affirming the lower court. The Supreme Court held that Foster was not entitled to full vacation benefits because the benefit did not accrue automatically as a result of continued employment. The Court also held that the MSSA does not guarantee partial vacation benefits for time worked, but Foster’s collective bargaining agreement may. The court of appeals properly remanded the case to district court to determine whether Foster is entitled to partial vacation benefits under his collective bargaining agreement. Justice William O. Douglas did not participate.

Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical "Hair." "Hair" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Chattanooga's denial of the Southeastern's request was a "prior restraint," an attempt to censor speech and prevent it from reaching the public. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, stated that though prior restraints were not necessarily unconstitutional, "the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable." Chattanooga's "procedural safeguards were lacking" in dealing with those risks and placed the burden on Southeastern to ensure that the musical could be produced. This was inconsistent with <em>Freedman v. Maryland</em>, and therefore unconstitutional. Justice William O. Douglas dissented in part and concurred in the result in part.

Using marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered "Mom Santana's" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant.

The Court upheld the search. Relying on the the Court's decision in United States v. Watson (1976), Justice Rehnquist argued that by standing on her porch when the officers arrived, Santana was "not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy." Since the police had probable cause to arrest and search her at that point, their behavior was consistent with the Court's Watson precedent.

A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that Davis had not been deprived of any constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. The Court also emphasized that constitutional privacy interests did not cover Davis's claims. The Court argued that the constitutional right to privacy was limited to matters relating to "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education." The publication of records of official acts, such as arrests, did not fall under the rubric of privacy rights.

A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.

Yes. The Court agreed with the trial judge that the murder case would generate "intense and pervasive pretrial publicity." However, the unanimous court held that the practical problems associated with implementing a prior restraint on the press in this case would not have served the accused's rights. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that"a whole community cannot be restrained from discussing a subject intimately affecting life within it."

Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.

Yes. By mandating the death penalty's imposition for certain crimes, Louisiana's sentencing scheme fails to afford juries the constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating factors presented either by the circumstances of the crime or the individual offender's character. The Supreme Court also held that by requiring jurors to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second-degree murder, even if no evidence exits to support such verdicts, Louisiana's sentencing scheme encourages them to disregard their oaths by recommending a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel that the death penalty is inappropriate.

A 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding “only seminarian or theological degrees.” The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions. Four Maryland taxpayers sued to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from <em>Lemon v. Kurtzman </em>― which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn’t excessively entangle the state in church affairs ― and determined that the statute was constitutional.

A 1971 statute that allocated Maryland taxpayer money to private religiously-affiliated schools for “nonsectarian” purposes did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the 5-4 majority opinion. The Court held that the law passed the “Lemon Test” from the Court’s decision in <em>Lemon v. Kurtzman</em>. The majority concluded that funds given to private, religiously-affiliated schools would not become wrapped up in religious uses simply because they were presented to a religious school. As such, there was no violation of the First Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he argued that the three-part test the Court established in <em>Lemon v. Kurtzman</em> was unnecessary to determine whether a statute violates the First Amendment. As long as there was a secular legislative purpose and the primary effect of the statute was not to advance or inhibit religion, there was no need to examine whether the statute would lead to an excessive entanglement of the state with religion. In this case, everyone agreed that the purpose of the legislation was secular and that the primary effect was not to promote religion, so the statute was constitutional. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence in the judgment. In his dissent, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that, because the funds were not “ear-marked” at payment, they were essentially general subsidies of public funds to religious institutions, which was precisely the type of entanglement between religion and the state that the First Amendment was enacted the prevent. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that government funds provided to religious institutions could incentivize such institutions to alter their missions and therefore act as a deterrent to the goals of the religious institution.

The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale.

The Court affirmed the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court, finding the tax to be valid. The Court stated that the Framers of the Constitution had adopted the Import-Export Clause to give the federal government a source of revenue and the superior position to regulate such foreign trade. This was to overcome the problems under the Articles of Confederation where states lacked uniformity in import regulation, burdening inter-state trade. The property tax was consistent with the Import-Export Clause because it did not (1) interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce (2) deprive the Federal Government of its exclusive right to revenues from imposts and duties on imports (3) interfere with the free flow of goods between the states. It taxed the use of the property and was not based on the origin of the goods.

On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

No. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that postal inspectors have the power to execute an arrest without a warrant when there is probable cause. Congress has granted this power to several federal agencies, not just the postal service. Because Watson’s arrest was constitutional, the search of his car was not the product of an illegal arrest. The Court held that there was no evidence that Watson was coerced into agreeing to the car search. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote that there was established historical precedent for warrantless arrests. He also argued that interpreting the Fourth Amendment as always requiring a warrant prior to arrest would severely and negatively impact effective law enforcement. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a concurring opinion where he argued that the arrest occurred with probable cause, in broad daylight, in a public place and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. He also held that the majority’s decision in this case does not set any precedent regarding under what circumstances an officer may make a warrantless arrest in a private place. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the majority’s opinion grants police broad powers to make warrantless arrests and breaks with precedents already set regarding the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the majority’s opinion goes beyond the bounds of the case in question and misinterprets common law history. He wrote that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect people, not places, and that the interests of the people would be best served with a warrant requirement. The warrant requirement would not unduly burden the police because there is no reason to assume that it would cause any delay in an arrest, unless exigent circumstances are present, in which case the arrest may be made without a warrant. He also argued that the government did not meet its burden to show that Watson’s consent was not coerced. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the discussion or decision in this case.

Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens &amp; Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.

No. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that Miller had no right to privacy in his bank records. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell asserted that the "documents subpoenaed are not [Miller's] 'private papers'," but instead, part of the bank's business records. Consistent with <em>Hoffa v. United States</em>, Miller's rights were not violated when a third party - his bank - transmitted information that he had entrusted them with to the government.

Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone’s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

No. In a 6-2 vote, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion vacating the lower judgment and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the actual malice standard for media reports on public figures did not apply. Firestone was not a public figure as defined by prior precedent. The Court also held the Florida judgment invalid because the court awarded damages without determining fault. Justice Lewis Powell wrote a concurrence, stating that the ultimate question is whether Time exercised reasonably prudent care in light of the ambiguous divorce decree. Justice Potter Steward joined in the concurrence

George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing.

No. In an 6-to-2 decision, the Court held that the initial termination of Eldridge's benefits without a hearing did not violate due process. The Court noted that due process was "flexible" and called for "such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." The Court found that there were numerous safeguards to prevents errors in making decisions to terminate disability benefits and argued that "[a]t some point the benefit or an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society, in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."

Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.

Yes. In a 7-to-1 opinion, the Court held that the First Amendment protects willing speakers and willing listeners equally. The Court noted that in cases of commercial speech, such as price advertising, freedom of speech protections apply just as they would to noncommercial speech. Even speech that is sold for profit, or involves financial solicitations, is protected. The Court concluded that although the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy has a legitimate interest in preserving professionalism among its members, it may not do so at the expense of public knowledge about lawful competitive pricing terms.

In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.

In this complicated case, the Court arrived at two important conclusions. First, it held that restrictions on individual contributions to political campaigns and candidates did not violate the First Amendment since the limitations of the FECA enhance the "integrity of our system of representative democracy" by guarding against unscrupulous practices. Second, the Court found that governmental restriction of independent expenditures in campaigns, the limitation on expenditures by candidates from their own personal or family resources, and the limitation on total campaign expenditures did violate the First Amendment. Since these practices do not necessarily enhance the potential for corruption that individual contributions to candidates do, the Court found that restricting them did not serve a government interest great enough to warrant a curtailment on free speech and association.

Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in <em>Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth</em>. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the Court held that the District Court should have abstained and vacated the judgment. There was ambiguity in whether the Massachusetts statute created a "parental veto," which under <em>Planned Parenthood v. Danforth</em> affected the constitutionality of the statute. Since the Supreme Judicial Court's ruling would have resolved the ambiguity, the District Court should have abstained.

In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence. Transamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.

No. Justice Harry Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the indemnification provision did not contravene ICC regulations designed to prevent motor carriers from sharing operating authority in order to evade safety requirements and limit each carrier’s liability to the public. The Court noted that the indemnity clause likely increases public safety as it holds the lessor accountable for its own negligence. Justice William O. Douglas concurred in the judgment, but declined to write separately.

After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the procedures and written personnel test did not constitute racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the Clause was designed to prevent official discrimination on the basis of race; laws or other official acts that had racially disproportionate impacts did not automatically become constitutional violations. The Court reasoned that the D.C. Police Department's procedures did not have discriminatory intent and were racially neutral measures of employment qualification.

Following his Florida conviction for first-degree murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Proffitt challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and Florida's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging is was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it permitted judges rather than juries to act as sole sentencing authorities. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.

No and no. The Court held that the death penalty was not a "cruel and unusual" punishment per se, and that Florida's capital-sentencing procedure was not unconstitutionally arbitrary and/or capricious. Although empowering trial judges with sole sentencing authority, the statutory procedure tightly prescribed their relevant decision-making process. The procedure requires sentencing judges to focus on both the crime's circumstances and the defendant's character by weighing eight statutory aggravating factors against seven statutory mitigating factors. Furthermore, sentencing judges are required to submit a written explanation of their death-sentence finding for the purpose of automatic review by Florida's Supreme Court. Such strict requirements sufficiently safeguard against the presence of any constitutional deficiencies arising from an arbitrary and/or capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TGPL) proposed a plan for gas allocation among its customers to deal with a gas shortage. Under the plan, customers who used over the system-wide average would have to pay extra, and those who used less would receive a rebate. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) rejected the plan, stating it violated the Natural Gas Act, which prohibits discrimination among customers. The TGPL sought review of the FPC decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court directed the FPC to conduct a review of TGPL’s records to determine the extent of the gas shortage. The FPC refused, arguing that the court overstepped its bounds by interfering with an independent administrative agency. The FPC also argued that the extent of the gas shortage was not material to the issues in the litigation.

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals order. The Supreme Court held that the appeals court overstepped its bounds by not reviewing the FPC’s decision based on the information given. The Court remanded the case so the FPC could use its discretion to decide how to best develop their evidence going forward. Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Potter Stewart did not participate.

American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.

No and no. In a 5-4 opinion, the court reversed the Sixth Circuit and held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. Justice John Paul Stevens doubted that Voltaire's observation – "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" – applied to pornographic films. This prompted a stinging rebuke from Justice Potter Stewart who maintained that the free expression is neither defined nor circumscribed by popular opinion.

Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.

Yes and no. In a 7-2 opinion, the Court held that Section 1981 prohibited the racially discriminatory policies of the schools. While the schools were private, <em>Jones v. Alfred Meyer Co.</em> held that Section 1981 applied to "purely private acts of racial discrimination." Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart described the school's admission policies as "classical violation[s] of Section 1981." While the Court acknowledged the right to free association of parents to send their children to schools that "promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable," it was not entitled the constitutional protection. Additionally, the Court cited <em>Pierce v. Society of Sisters</em> and the right of the State "reasonably to regulate all schools."

Jules Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton replied that he would find a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.

No. In a 5-3 decision, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. Writing for the majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist relied on the Court's earlier opinion in <em>United States v. Russell</em> in that the "defense of entrapment was not available where…a Government agent supplied a necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug." While Hampton's case involved distribution and not manufacture, Hampton was still "predisposed to commit the crime." As opposed to the Government inducing Hampton to commit the crime, "the police, the Government informant, and [Hampton] acted in concert." Therefore, no violation of due process occurred.

The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

No. Mr. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger delivered opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that police can inventory a vehicle that has been lawfully impounded, even without a warrant. Inventory procedures for impounded vehicles are taken in order to protect the owner’s property and to protect police from claims of stolen items as well as potential danger. Therefore, the search of an impounded vehicle is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the Constitution allows inventory searches, as long as the search is not done in order to find evidence that could lead to criminal charges. Justice Thurgood Marshall, with whom Justice William J. Brennan Jr. and Justice Potter Stewart join, wrote a dissent arguing that the search of an automobile without a warrant clearly violates the Fourth Amendment. A routine inventory is no excuse to violate the privacy of the automobile’s owner.

Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.

No, these routine stops with brief questioning do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the 7-to-2 majority, said: "The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure.... But the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Prepared by Michael Brandow.

Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that where states had provided opportunities for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, the Constitution did not require the granting of federal habeas corpus relief. The Court also held that any additional benefits from considering search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review would be small in relation to the costs. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment values protected by the exclusionary rule would not be significantly enhanced in such situations and that deterrence of police misconduct was unlikely to increase.

The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the North Carolina law was unconstitutional. The Court found three problems with the law: First, the law "depart[ed] markedly from contemporary standards" concerning death sentences. The historical record indicated that the public had rejected mandatory death sentences. Second, the law provided no standards to guide juries in their exercise of "the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die." Third, the statute failed to allow consideration of the character and record of individual defendants before inflicting the death penalty. The Court noted that "the fundamental respect for humanity" underlying the Eighth Amendment required such considerations.

After his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and "freakish" imposition of the death penalty. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.

The Court held that the death penalty was not per se a "cruel and unusual" punishment. Furthermore, the capital sentencing procedure in Texas was not unconstitutional on the theory that it would result in arbitrary and freakish impositions of the death penalty. While death penalty sentencing systems which permit juries to consider only aggravating, and no mitigating, circumstances are unconstitutional, Texas' sentencing system is not like this. Under its sentencing scheme, Texas juries may consider whatever evidence of mitigating circumstances there may be - thus allowing them to ponder not only why the death penalty should be imposed, but also why it should not. These options sufficiently focus the juries' attention on the defendant's unique circumstances and character, thus meeting constitutional requirements of particularity.

In 1961, Morris Hasson, a Los Angeles grocery store manager, was shot and killed during a robbery attempt. Paul Imbler was convicted of the murder after three eyewitnesses identified him as the gunman. After the trial, the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California and described newly discovered evidence that undermined the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. In light of the letter, Imbler challenged his incarceration in state court, where his petition was denied, and later in federal court. The federal district court found that Pachtman had knowingly used false testimony during the trial and suppressed evidence favorable to Imbler, so the district court ordered Imbler released from prison. Imbler then filed an action against Pachtman in federal court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows a party to recover damages from any person who acts “under color of state law” to deprive another of a constitutional right. The district court held that Pachtman was immune for civil liability for acts done in his capacity as prosecutor and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that prosecutors have the same absolute immunity under Section 1983 that they had under common law in malicious prosecution suits. In both situations, there are similar public policy concerns related to the need for prosecutorial independence. The Court declined to consider whether a prosecutor was entitled to similar level of immunity for actions taken in the role of an administrator or investigator. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for the knowing or reckless presentation of false testimony, but that absolute immunity should not shield claims against a prosecutor for the unconstitutional suppression of evidence. Justice White argued that the denial of immunity would encourage prosecutors to turn over more information than necessary, which would be beneficial to the judicial process overall. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined the opinion concurring in the judgment.  

Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that the right of governmental employment was not per se fundamental, and that uniformed state police officers over 50 did not constitute a suspect class under the Clause. Applying a rational relationship test, the Court reasoned that the statute was sufficiently justified as a means of protecting the public "by assuring physical preparedness of [the] uniformed police." The Court noted that while the law may not have been the best means to accomplish this purpose, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment merely because of its imperfections.

Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced. The fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for a 6-3 majority, reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause did not guarantee the teachers an independent review of the decision to terminate them. The fact that the school district had negotiated with the teachers earlier and had knowledge of the events surrounding the strike did not make them incapable of giving the teachers due process. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, arguing that the case should be remanded for a determination of whether the school board must consider the reasonableness of the strike considering its own actions, or whether it is free to exercise its discretion when deciding to terminated teachers. Justice William J. Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

On April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s statement was a per se violation of Mosley’s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.

The re-initiation of interrogation after a suspect has invoked his right to silence is not a per se violation of Miranda rights, as long as the suspect’s invocation of his rights is honored. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the decision for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the Miranda rule, which requires an immediate cessation of questioning if the individual in custody wishes not to speak, does not clearly establish the circumstances under which questioning may be resumed. The Miranda rule could bar the police from questioning the individual again in regards to any subject, or it could require a complete break from any current questioning but allow for re-initiation of another round of questioning at a later time. The Court held that Miranda only required that the suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions be honored. In this case, the Court held that Mosley’s invocation of his right to silence had been honored because the interrogation ceased as soon as he stated he did not wish to continue, he was read his rights again before interrogation was re-initiated, and a significant amount of time passed between the two interrogations. In his concurring opinion, Justice Byron R. White wrote that, to keep from unnecessarily hindering the fact-finding process, only confessions made as “the result of involuntary waivers” of judgment should be excluded in regards to a trial. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that the majority’s ruling degraded the protection of self-incrimination rights that the Miranda decision represented because it allowed for police officials to sidestep the Miranda protections. Justice Brennan also noted that individual states have the power to establish greater protections of the Miranda rights than those set by the majority opinion. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

General Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that employers have the right to exclude any condition from a disability plan with a reasonable basis. The Court referred to a previous decision, Geduldig v. Aniello, which dealt with a similar case under the Equal Protection Clause. In that case, the Court held that the pregnancy exclusion divided the employees into two groups, one that was solely female and the other that contained both sexes, so the distinction is not primarily sex-based. The Court applied the same analysis to this case. Because the disability plan was not worth more to men than it was to women, it did not discriminate based on sex. In his concurring opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that this particular case had no impact on the general evidence necessary to prove a discrimination case under Title VII. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part where he argued that he agreed with the majority’s opinion on the merits of this case but did not agree in any inference that this case would affect overall Title VII decisions. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that the majority examined the policy in isolation, when it should have considered the policy in light of General Electric Co.’s history of downgrading the role of women in the workforce. Under that framework, the policy was clearly not gender-neutral. He also argued that the political background for this issue indicated that pregnancy exclusions in disability pay drastically affected women’s abilities to remain in the workforce. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the Geduldig case should not be the basis for this decision, because the Equal Protection Clause did not contain the word “discrimination.” He found that the language of Title VII required a different analysis than the one the majority used.  

Seven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners’ files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision to compel discovery, but the appellate court denied the petition because the prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.

No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that since less extreme alternatives for modification of the challenged discovery orders were available, the writ of mandamus was inappropriate. A writ of mandamus should only be issued in extraordinary circumstances when there are no other adequate means to secure relief. In this case, adequate alternatives existed, such as the prison officials’ opportunity to assert a separate privilege more specifically and have their request for in camera review considered. Justice John Paul Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.

No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

About a year after the Supreme Court decided <em>Roe v. Wade</em>, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions. The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.  

Yes in part. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the majority opinion, reversing in part and remanding. The Court followed the three-trimester framework laid out in <em>Roe v. Wade</em>. The Supreme Court held that provisions 1, 2 and 8 were constitutional. Provisions 3 and 4 were unconstitutional because the state cannot delegate the authority to prevent an abortion to anyone but the physician and the woman during the first trimester of pregnancy. Provision 5 was unconstitutional because it required physicians to preserve the life of the fetus at any stage of pregnancy. Provision 7 was unconstitutional because it failed to regulate in reference to the mother’s health, and instead was designed to prohibit most abortions after 12 weeks. The Court refused to consider provision 6. Justice Potter Stewart concurred, expressing that the mother’s consent provision was constitutional because not prevents a state from ensuring that the abortion decision is made knowingly and voluntarily. The parental consent provision was unconstitutional places a potential prohibition on abortion for women under 18. The spousal consent provision was also unconstitutional because the woman’s right to make the decision outweighed a father’s right to associate with his offspring. Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the physician care provision was constitutional because the state can require a physician to preserve the life of a fetus once it is viable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in Justice White’s opinion. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that prohibiting saline amniocenteses was unconstitutional because it essentially prohibited abortions after the first trimester. The parental consent provision was constitutional because the state has an interest in protecting the welfare of its young citizens.  

A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto "Live Free or Die." George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words "or Die" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that New Hampshire could not constitutionally require citizens to display the state motto upon their vehicle license plates. The Court found that the statute in question effectively required individuals to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideological message." The Court held that the State's interests in requiring the motto did not outweigh free speech principles under the First Amendment, including "the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster. . .an idea they find morally objectionable."

In _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within the Detroit school district, and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.

Yes and yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the District Court order, emphasizing "equitable principles" in the construction of desegregation plans set forth in <em>Brown v. Board of Education (1955) _. The Court relied on _United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education</em> in that "matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of prior segregation" and numerous lower court decisions providing for remedial programs. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger asserted that the District Court order "does no more than" what was accepted in <em>Ex Parte Young</em>. The burden to eliminate the effects of segregation rested on state officials, consistent with <em>Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Board of Education</em>. Therefore, the District Court's order did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall authored a concurring opinion. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. concurred in the judgment.

Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon’s California home; this agreement also specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon’s discretion. Shortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator to take custody of Nixon’s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials. The day after President Ford signed the act into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon’s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon’s privacy interests, 4) Nixon’s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon’s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.

" No, no, no, no, and no. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice William Brennan, the Court held that the act did not violate any of Nixon’s relevant constitutional rights. Justice Brennan first determined that the district court correctly limited the scope of its review to the constitutional consequences of the archival screenings because the Administrator had not yet promulgated any regulations. Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that the act violated the constitutional separation of powers, focusing on whether the act prevented the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. He noted that the act placed custody of the materials in officials also of the executive branch, and that the materials could only be released if that action was not barred by some applicable executive privilege. Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s claim that presidential privilege barred archival scrutiny of the materials. He noted that presidential immunity was generally qualified, and that the screening constituted a very limited intrusion by executive branch personnel into executive matters. Moreover, the intrusion was justified by a clear public interest in preserving materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes. Justice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to privacy. He weighed the potential intrusion into Nixon’s privacy against the public interest in subjecting the materials to archival screening. He noted that only a small fraction of the materials in question related to personal matters, and that the act provided procedures for the expressed purpose of minimizing intrusions into Nixon’s private and personal matters. Justice Brennan held that the act did not violate Nixon’s right to associational privacy under the First Amendment. He acknowledged that Nixon as President was the head of the national Republican Party and that the First Amendment closely protects involvement in partisan polities. Here, however, archival screening was apparently the least restrictive means of meeting the compelling government interests promoted by the act. Finally, Justice Brennan rejected Nixon’s argument that the act was a bill of attainder that legislatively determined guilt and inflicted punishment on Nixon without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. He concluded that the act did not impose any punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the bill of attainder clause, that the act was justified by Nixon’s plan to eventually destroy some of the materials, and that the legislative history did not indicate an intent to punish Nixon. Justice Byron White concurred in part and in the judgment. With respect to the bill of attainder issue, Justice White argued that it was sufficient to demonstrate that the act did not impose any punishment on Nixon. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the government’s interest in historical preservation could be important enough in itself to entitle it to Nixon’s private communications. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He outlined the history of bill of attainders, pointing out that they were generally directed at formerly powerful political actors. Here, however, the facts provided a legitimate justification for the specificity of the act. Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He described his posture as essentially similar to that of Justice Louis Powell, but did not share his view that the President Carter’s agreement with the position of the Administrator was dispositive of the separation-of-powers issue. Justice Louis Powell concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Powell emphasized the uniqueness of the situation leading to the act’s signing, and the importance of safeguarding the materials. Regarding the separation of powers issue, Justice Powell considered it dispositive that President Carter represented through his Solicitor General that the act serves the executive. Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He argued that the act was an unconstitutional congressional violation of separation of powers. He highlighted the historical importance of presidential freedom from control or coercion by Congress, and characterized the act as an attempt by Congress to exercise the executive power to control executive materials, some of which were confidential. Justice William Rehnquist dissented, characterizing the question as whether congress has the right to seize the official papers of an outgoing president as he is leaving the inaugural stand. He emphasized the importance of candid and open discourse in the executive branch and the potential effect of the act on the free flow of information to and from the President. He rejected the majority’s balancing of the violation of separation of powers against the public interests allegedly furthered by the act.

East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of "family" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.

The four justices in the plurality held that the ordinance violated Moore's rights as it constituted "intrusive regulation of the family" without accruing some tangible state interest. Justice Stevens joined in the judgment and argued that the ordinance was invalid because, by regulating who could live with Moore, it constituted a taking of property without just compensation.

On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder. The defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 9-0 majority. The Court held that the law and the courts have treated American Indian tribes as unique entities, and this treatment has been upheld against claims of racial discrimination. The Court also held that Congress has the authority to legislate over reservation territory, and as long as the Congressional legislation is fair, it does not violate Equal Protection to try individuals under the federal laws rather than the state.

The North Carolina Department of Correction (“DoC”) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC’s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request. The plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the constitution required the North Carolina Department of Correction to provide prisoners with legal assistance as part of prisoners’ right of access to the courts. Justice Marshall emphasized that prisoners have a well-established right of adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts. He wrote that this access generally required states to shoulder affirmative obligations to provide meaningful access, including paying for trial counsel for indigent clients. Justice Marshall acknowledged that habeas corpus and civil rights complaints only needed to set forth facts giving rise to the complaint, but rejected North Carolina’s argument that law libraries or legal assistance were not essential to frame those complaints. A typical client would expect any lawyer preparing either complaint to research the law to determine whether an actionable claim existed. Justice Marshall rejected the state’s argument that inmates were ill-equipped to use the tools of the trade of the legal profession. Justice Marshall also rejected North Carolina’s interpretation of <i>Ross v. Moffitt</i>, where the Court held that prisoners’ right to appointed counsel in appeals to criminal cases was limited. Here, the Court was concerned with prisoners seeking new trials, release from confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights. Justice Marshall noted that adequate law libraries were only one constitutionally acceptable method of assuring meaningful access to the courts. Finally, he rejected the state’s argument that the district court exceeded its powers by ordering North Carolina to devise a remedy for the violation. Justice Louis Powell concurred, emphasizing that the majority’s holding did not pass on the kinds of claims that state or federal courts were constitutionally required to hear. Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. He could not determine the source of the constitutional right of access to the courts, or of the requirement that the states foot the bill for assuring that access for prisoners. Chief Justice Burger noted that the right of prisoners to collaterally attack convictions was derived from federal statutes and not from the constitution itself. Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Chief Justice Burger. He characterized the majority’s opinion as a reiteration of the reasoning in <i>Younger v. Gilmore</i>, where the Court also failed to identify a constitutional source for prisoners’ right of access to the courts. He emphasized that lawful imprisonment properly resulted in a retraction of prisoners' rights.

An Oregon state police officer suspected Carl Mathiason of burglary and asked him to come to the police station for questioning. Mathiason came freely, spoke with the officer, and was not arrested at the time. He was arrested later and a trial court used evidence obtained during the questioning to convict him. Mathiason moved to suppress the evidence since he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning. The court admitted the evidence since Mathiason was not in custody during the questioning. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed since it found that Matianson was in a "coercive environment" when questioned and therefore deserved to hear his Miranda rights.

Yes. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that its decision in <em>Miranda v. Arizona</em> only required law enforcement officials to recite a suspect's rights when suspect had been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The Court determined that in this case there was "no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to depart was restricted in any way." Even if the police coercively pressured Mathiason during the interview, he came to the police station freely and was free to leave at any time. Therefore Miranda rights did not apply.

Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

Yes, No. In a 7-2 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion affirming in part and reversing in part. The Supreme Court held that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII because Rawlinson showed that the requirement excluded 41% of females in the nation, and the Department was unable to show that the requirement was job-related. The “contact position” ban was a bona fide occupational qualification, however, so Title VII did not prohibit it. The Court held that having women in these positions would create substantial security and safety problems. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a concurrence, agreeing that the “contact position” ban relates to a bona fide occupational qualification, but stating that the district court should have analyzed the height and weight requirement in more depth. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a partial dissent, agreeing that the height and weight requirements violated Title VII, but expressing that the ban on women in “contact positions” is also prohibited. Justice William J. Brennan joined in the concurrence. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that showing that the general height and weight statistics do not establish a valid case. Rawlinson also hadn’t proved she was denied employment under the “contact position” rule because she didn’t meet the height and weight requirement in the first place.

A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.

No. The Court held that St. Louis could enact a "policy choice" to refuse to provide publicly financed hospitals for nontherapeutic abortions even though it provided facilities for childbirth. Relying on its reasoning in Maher v. Roe (1977), the Court distinguished between a state interfering with a protected activity and simply encouraging an alternative activity. Since the state did not deny women the right to have an abortion, the law was consistent with the Constitution.

A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.

Perhaps and not addressed. In a 5-4 per curiam opinion, the Court held that the pre-emption question "should be resolved before the constitutional issue." Since that question "depends primarily on statutory and not constitutional interpretation" of the 1976 Act, the case was remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court.

In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.

In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the death penalty was a "grossly disproportionate" punishment for the crime of rape. The Court noted that nearly all states at that time declined to impose such a harsh penalty, with Georgia being the only state that authorized death for the rape of an adult woman. Because rape did not involve the taking of another human life, the Court found the death penalty excessive "in its severity and revocability."

In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees.

The Court found that the rule violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun argued that commercial speech does merit First Amendment protection given the important functions it serves in society, such as providing consumers with information about services and products, and helping to allocate resources in the American system of free-enterprise. The Court held that allowing attorneys to advertise would not harm the legal profession or the administration of justice, and, in fact, would supply consumers with valuable information about the availability and cost of legal services.

In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.

No. The Court held that states could exclude nontherapeutic abortions from coverage under their Medicaid programs. Justice Powell argued that in its provisions, Title XIX of the Social Security Act made no specific reference to abortion nor did it require states to fund every medical procedure which could possibly fall under its umbrella. Powell made clear however that the federal statute did give states the option to fund therapeutic abortions if they chose to do so.

In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception."

The Court voted unanimously that the North Carolina regulation was an unconstitutional exercise of the state's power over interstate commerce. Although the regulation was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory impact on the Washington growers while shielding the local growers from the same burden. The regulation removed the competitive advantage gained by the Washington apples from stricter inspection standards. The regulation produced a leveling effect that works to the local advantage by "downgrading" apples from other states unjustly. Therefore, the regulation places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.

The U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located.

Yes, yes. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for an 8-1 majority, vacated the Eighth Circuit judgment. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals used the correct statistical comparison, but erred in determining the relevant labor market. The court of appeals also failed to consider that Hazelwood may have been able to rebut some of the statistics with evidence of its hiring practices post Title VII. The Court remanded the case for further consideration of the relevant labor market. Justice William J. Brennan concurred, stating that the case was properly remanded so the parties could address the statistical data with more care. Justice Byron R. White also concurred, writing that the government should have produced evidence of the racial makeup of Hazelwood’s applicant pool to compare with the racial makeup of those hired. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that the government proved discrimination through statistical data, historical evidence, and evidence relating to specific acts. The school district failed to rebut that proof.

In 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania’s new location restrictions. When Sylvania ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near Continental’s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement. Continental sued in district court and alleged that Sylvania’s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found that Sylvania’s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in <em>United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, &amp; Co.</em> that prohibited manufacturers from “restrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.” Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from <em>Schwinn</em>, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania’s restrictions “had less potential for competitive harm than” other invalidated restrictions.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the per se rule established in <em>Schwinn applied to this case. However, the Court found that the <em>Schwinn rule was outdated and overbroad; therefore, the Court overturned the rule in favor of a reasonableness standard. That standard considered whether the franchise agreement was an unreasonable restriction of competition and whether it had any redeeming virtue. The Court ruled that the appellate court properly applied this reasonableness rule and upheld Sylvania’s restrictions.</em></em> Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment but arguing that the Court should not have gone as far as to overturn the per se rule. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Court should not have overturned the per se rule and should have rejected Sylvania’s restrictions. Justice William H. Rehnquist did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

Hugo Zacchini performed a "human cannonball" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a cause of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.

No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Byron R. White, the Court held that Scripps-Howard's constitutionally privileged free speech did not extend to broadcasting Zacchini's entire performance without his permission. Noting that Zacchini's interest in the case was similar to a patent or copyright, in which he was seeking to obtain the benefit of his work, the Court emphasized that the broadcast of an entire act was categorically different from reporting on an event in so far as it posed a substantial threat to the economic value of the performance. "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent," wrote Justice White. Justice Louis F. Powell, Jr., joined by Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall, dissented, arguing that the recording was genuinely treated as news and as such Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented.

Robert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother’s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two “skinny and white” legs in it. The next day, police found Williams’ abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl’s family wanted to give her a “Christian burial” and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl’s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder. At trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Yes, No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion, affirming the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held police denied Williams his Sixth Amendment rights because the adversary proceeding had already began. The detective’s statements eliciting incriminating statements amounted to an interrogation, entitling Williams to counsel. The Court also held that Williams had not waived his right to counsel. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred, writing that the detective who gave the "Christian burial" speech knowingly set out to violate Williams’ constitutional rights. The nature of the crime was not an excuse for the detective’s behavior. Justice Lewis F. Powell also concurred, stating that the record clearly showed that Williams had not waived his rights. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a concurrence, expressing that the state had promised not to question Williams before he reached Des Moines, and the state could not dishonor that promise made to Williams’ lawyer. : Chief Justice Warren E. Burger dissented, writing that Williams validly waived his right to counsel, and even if he had not, the disclosures he made were voluntary and uncoerced. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent, stating that the record showed Williams knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, stating that there was no interrogation, and he would remand the case to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Williams made the incriminating statements voluntarily. Justices Byron R. White and William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary." An indigent woman ("Susan Roe") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut law placed no obstacles in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion, and that it did not "impinge upon the fundamental right recognized in Roe." The Court noted that there was a distinction between direct state interference with a protected activity and "state encouragement of alternative activity consonant with legislative policy." Holding that financial need alone did not identify a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that the law was "rationally related" to a legitimate state interest and survived scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.

On March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973—more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.

No. No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion for the 8-1 majority. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies only after a person has been accused of a crime and that the pre-indictment delay did not deprive Lovasco of due process, though the lapse of time somewhat prejudiced his defense. The Court held that the deaths of the witnesses did not outweigh the government’s interest in fully investigating crimes before bringing charges against the accused. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court should have accepted the lower court’s finding that the delay was unnecessary and unreasonable rather than accept as fact the government’s unsworn statements that the delay was due to good-faith investigative efforts.

In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age.

The Court held that the requirements of the Act did not on its face violate a "constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy.'" The Court found that the statutory scheme evidenced "a proper concern with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy" and that the "remote possibility" of potential abuses of data accumulation and disclosure were not sufficient to establish an invasion of any rights or liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the "privilege of doing business" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce.

A unanimous Court found the tax valid. Businesses involved in interstate commerce should assume a just share of the state tax burden. The Court's decision established four criteria to be met for a state tax to be valid and not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The tax must be (1) on an activity connected to the state, (2) fairly apportioned to be based on intrastate commerce, (3) nondiscriminatory, and (4) related to state services provided. These criteria are only valid if Congress has not imposed conflicting regulations.

The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist ("Nazi") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with "Jewish names", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community. Collin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions. The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that Illinois must provide strict procedural safeguards, including appellate review, to deny a stay for an injunction depriving the Nazi Party of protected First Amendment rights. The Court treated the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a stay as a final judgment for the purposes of Supreme Court jurisdiction because it involved a right separable from and collateral to the merits of the Nazi Party's case. Hence, the Court also treated the Nazi Party's application for a stay as a petition for certiorari. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice William Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Potter Stewart, dissented. He disagreed that the refusal of the Illinois Supreme Court to stay an injunction could be described as a final judgment or decree by the highest court of a state. He noted that no Illinois appellate court had heard or decided the merits of the Nazi Party's federal claim.

In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.

Yes, yes, yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the language of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act unambiguously allowed the EPA to enact regulations creating categorical limits on pollution, while allowing existing plants to vary slightly from the prescribed limit. The Court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the EPA must create a limit for each individual plant via a permit system because such a system would impose a heavy burden on the EPA to be intimately familiar with the circumstances of more than 42,000 manufacturing plants. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction to review the pollution restrictions as a whole and was not limited to reviewing only the individual variance allowed for each plant. Although the restrictions for existing plants allowed for variance from the prescribed pollution limit, the Court held that the language of the Act showed a clear congressional intention to charge the EPA with setting absolute prohibitions on pollution. Therefore, the EPA could set exacting pollution standards for newly constructed plants that did not allow for any variance. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration of these cases.  

On October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck. On October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James Ingraham and several other disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham’s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma. Ingraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews’ case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school’s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.

No and no. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Lewis Powell, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent corporal punishment in public schools. While acknowledging the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a means of punishing criminals, Justice Powell looked to the common law history of similar punishment in schools and discerned no trend towards its elimination. Rather, common law suggested that teachers could legally impose reasonable, non-excessive force on their students. He also noted that the Court previously limited the application of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language to criminal punishment. Justice Powell reasoned that Ingraham and Andrews had less need for similar Eighth Amendment protection because they attended an open institution subject to more public scrutiny. Justice Powell also held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of procedural due process was satisfied by Florida law. Florida recognized students’ common law right to be free from excessive corporal punishment in school, mandating that teachers and administrators exercise prudence and restraint in administering physical punishment. Unreasonable or excessive punishment could result in criminal or civil liability for the responsible teacher or administrator. Justice Byron White dissented, joined by Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. Justice White rejected the majority’s holding and reasoned that if some types of extreme corporal punishment violate the Eighth Amendment when used against criminals, similar punishment cannot be imposed on students for obviously lesser infractions.

Leon Goldfarb was a widower who applied for survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.

Yes. In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the District Court in holding the statute unconstitutional. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. described this situation as "indistinguishable" from the one in <em>Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld</em>, where a similar statute was invalidated. In this case, a female worker's family was less protected than the family of a male worker. The court rejected the "archaic and overbroad" generalizations that a wife is more likely to be dependent on her husband than a husband on his wife. These "old notions" of gender roles were not sufficient to justify the different treatment of widows and widowers, and which was therefore in violation of the Due Process Clause.

Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Section 12 was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. Applying the "rational relationship" test under the Clause, the Court emphasized that such a standard was not a "toothless" one. The Court then rejected the argument "that a State may attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships." The Court also noted that it was likely that Trimble would have inherited a substantial part of Gordon's estate had he written a will before his death.

The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari.

Perhaps. After finding that MHDC had proper federal standing, since it acted on behalf of black plaintiffs who stood to suffer direct and measurable injuries from Arlington's denial, the Court held that it failed to establish Arlington's racially discriminatory intent or purpose. While indicating that Arlington's zoning denial may result in a racially disproportionate impact, the evidence did not show that this was Arlington's deliberate intention. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.

Congress provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District of Columbia for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent. A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a racial basis.

The Court found that the reapportionment plan was valid under the Constitution. Neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment prohibit per se use of racial factors in districting and apportionment. Also, a reapportionment plan does not violate the same Amendments by using numerical quotas to establish a certain number of black majority districts. Although New York deliberately increased nonwhite majorities in several districts, there was no "fencing out" of the white population in the county from electoral participation. The reapportionment did not underrepresent the whites relative to their share of the population. The Court found that New York could use apportionment plans to attempt to prevent racial minorities from being repeatedly outvoted at the expense of the white populations.

New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.

The repeal violated the Constitution. Justice Blackmun argued that the states could have implemented a less drastic solution to encourage people to use commuter train services in lieu of driving their cars. (State leaders thought the increase in bridge fares that would occur with the agreement's repeal would cause this to occur.) Furthermore, since the need to facilitate mass transportation in the New York metropolitan area had been a concern long before 1962, the states could not justify their action as a response to unforeseen circumstances.

In 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion” and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail and a $200 fine. While Ward’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided <em>Miller v. California</em>, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation should only cover “works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward’s conviction. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.

No. Justice Byron R. White, writing for a 5-4 majority, affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the Illinois statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ward because an earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision made it clear that the statute reached sadomasochistic materials. Sadomasochistic materials could be prohibited under a state obscenity statute, even though they were not in the examples of sexually explicit representations made in the <em>Miller</em> decision, because those examples were not intended to be an exhaustive list. The Illinois statute was not overbroad because previous Illinois Supreme Court decisions provided guidelines in line with <em>Miller</em>. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr dissented, arguing that the Illinois statute was overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. Justice Potter Stewart joined in the dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented, writing that the majority opinion abandoned the specificity prong of the <em>Miller</em> test. Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.  

In the spring of 1972, Ernest Dobbert’s son was found wandering outside a Holiday Inn in Jacksonville, Florida, with apparent signs of a beating. He told a circuit court judge that his injuries were the result of beatings from his father, that his brother and one of his sisters had been killed by his father, and that his other sister was kept locked in a closet at home. The judge issued a warrant for Dobbert’s arrest, and Dobbert fled Jacksonville. In October 1973, Dobbert was arrested in Texas and extradited to Florida for trial. The Florida death penalty law in place when the children were killed, which gave the jury ultimate authority in deciding to impose the penalty, was found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial. It was replaced by a new law where the jury gave an advisory recommendation, but the judge made the ultimate decision. Before his trial, Dobbert applied to the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial, arguing that applying the new death penalty law violated the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. His application was denied. Dobbert also moved for a change of venue from Duval County based on the publicity his trial was receiving. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Dobbert was convicted of the first-degree murder of his daughter, second-degree murder of his son, and the torture and abuse of his two other children. At his sentencing hearing, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge, acting under the authority granted to him by the Florida statute governing the death penalty, overruled the jury and sentenced Dobbert to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, despite the fact that the Florida laws governing the death penalty changed during the time period the crimes in question were committed, the changes were procedural and better for the sentencing system. The Court also held that Florida’s previous death penalty statutes, although found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial, served as a warning to Dobbert’s that Florida could impose the death penalty. Additionally, Dobbert failed to provide evidence that his trial was affected by the trial judge’s dismissal of his motion for a change in venue. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion and argued that the changes in the Florida death penalty statutes altered the system in favor of defendants, and therefore Dobbert’s constitutional rights were not violated. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment in all circumstances. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. In a separate dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that, since the previous Florida death penalty statutes were found to be constitutionally invalid, they cannot be considered a fair warning. He also argued that Dobbert would not have faced the death penalty if tried slightly earlier, and it showed “capricious action” on the part of the government to subject him to the death penalty. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell. That same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times. On February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a <i>pro se</i> complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.

No and yes. In an 8-1 decision written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held that the prison’s treatment of Gamble did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Justice Marshall acknowledged that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required the Texas government to provide medical care for prisoners; he also determined, however, that a negligent or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care did not constitute medical mistreatment under the Constitution. Justice Marshall then considered whether Gamble’s complaint stated a claim, construing the pleadings of his inartfully written <i>pro se</i> complaint liberally. He focused on the fact that medical personnel treated Gamble on seventeen occasions in a three-month period. Justice Marshall argued that the form of medical treatment was a classic example of a matter for medical judgment; as a consequence, the doctor’s decision not to order an X-ray or provide additional medication did not constitute cruel or unusual punishment. Thus, the Fifth Circuit erred in reversing the district court’s dismissal of Gamble’s claim. Justice Harry Blackmun concurred in the Court’s judgment. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He argued that Court should have asked whether it could say with assurance and beyond any doubt that no set of facts could be proved that would entitle Gamble to relief. He questioned the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, noting that any constitutional questions presented by Gamble’s case were already resolved by other circuit courts. Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the majority improperly considered the defendants’ subjective motivations in determining whether or not their actions were crude or unusual.

An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer’s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for a 7-2 majority, reversed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that a suggestive identification procedure does not automatically require excluding the evidence if the identification is reliable, considering the totality of the circumstances. With the circumstances in this case, the identification was reliable. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred, writing that rules to protect against convictions based on unreliable identifications are better developed by the legislative process. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented, arguing for a per se exclusionary rule for unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent.

An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.

Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case. In striking down the Oklahoma law, the Court established a new standard for review in gender discrimination cases. More demanding than the lowest standard for review -- rational basis -- but less demanding than the highest standard -- strict scrutiny, the majority articulated an in-between standard -- intermediate scrutiny.

Fred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers’ Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher’s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item. One month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle’s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent’s recommendations. In response to Doyle’s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a “lack of tact in handling professional matters,” and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a § 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board’s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. While the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle’s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board’s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.

No and no. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity, which generally extended to the states themselves and to state officials in their official capacities. He reasoned that the board was more akin to a municipal corporation, given its independent power to issue bonds and levy taxes. While acknowledging that Doyle’s claims were not defeated by the fact that he lacked tenure and that his call to the station was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the board’s consideration of the call in itself violated Doyle’s rights. He questioned the “substantial part” rule used by the district court, expressing concern that it might prevent employers from properly and thoroughly assessing employees’ performance when employers are aware of protected conduct. Instead, Justice Rehnquist held that the district court should have also determined whether the board showed by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision if it had not considered Doyle’s phone call to the radio station. Finally, although the school district argued that it was not a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 claim, Justice Rehnquist declined to answer whether Doyle’s § 1331 federal question claim was limited by the terms of § 1983. He noted that Doyle demonstrated a proper federal question and claimed more than $10,000 in damages, given the potential value of his reinstatement.

In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.

Yes. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the law vested the district court judge with the power to entertain and act upon the petition for sterilization, and he is therefore immune from damages liability even if his approval of the petition was in error. The Court held that a judge could only be deprived of immunity when he acted in clear absence of jurisdiction. In this case, the court had general jurisdiction over the petition for sterilization, therefore, Judge Stump’s approval was a judicial act, and he was immunized from liability. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent, in which he argued that the scope of judicial immunity was a limited liability for judicial acts. Because approval of a petition for sterilization is not a function normally performed by a judge, it is not a judicial act. In a separate dissent, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that a judicial officer acted in a manner that precluded all resort to appellate or other judicial remedies and that the judge should not be entitled to immunity. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of the case.

The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the right to attempt to influence the outcomes of elections is one of the primary rights the First Amendment was meant to protect. If this form of speech came from a person rather than a corporation, there would be no question about whether it was protected speech. The Court also held that its previous decisions regarding the First Amendment rights of corporations emphasized the role that such speech played in creating public discussion. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote that the Massachusetts risked stifling the speech of organizations who use the corporate form to ensure mass communication with the public. He also argued that the statute could easily interfere with the First Amendment protection of the freedom of speech, since many newspapers and other news sources are part of large media conglomerations. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the majority’s opinion vastly underestimates the importance of state regulation of competing First Amendment interests, especially given the disproportionate economic power of corporations. Since corporations are funded by the money of investors, Justice White argued that it was the state’s duty to ensure that shareholder money was being used for its primary purpose: to make money, not pursue unrelated political objectives. The statute ensured that shareholders’ money is not funding political initiatives they would not individually support. He pointed out that the statute did not prevent the individuals who make up the corporations from communicating their views to the public on an individual basis. In his dissenting opinion, Justice William H. Rehnquist argued that corporations are, and had always been, considered artificial persons under the law, and therefore not granted the rights of natural persons. Since the right of political expression is not necessary for a corporation to function economically and could be detrimental to the overall political sphere, he argued that the statute was justified.<br /> <p />

Edna Smith Primus was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue. A few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board’s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that South Carolina’s application of disciplinary action for the attorney’s solicitation activity violated the First Amendment’s protection of political expression and association as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, Primus’ actions were an expression of the political beliefs and civil liberty objectives of the ACLU, rather than actions personal financial gain. Therefore, reaching out to the sterilization victim was not a misrepresentation or invasion of privacy. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the states should decide which lawyers shall be admitted to or released from the Bar, and that the disciplinary action in this case does not violate the Constitution.

On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later. The other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant. The state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds.

Yes and yes. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart, the Court held that the extensive, warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Stewart wrote that warrantless searches were <i>per se</i> unreasonable with a few specific exceptions, and rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of a homicide scene was one of these exceptions. Justice Stewart rejected Arizona’s contention that Mincey forfeited his right to privacy in his home by shooting Officer Headricks. He pointed out that this argument assumed Mincey’s guilt, also writing that the fact of Mincey’s arrest did not remove his right to privacy in his home. Justice Stewart also rejected Arizona’s argument that the search of the homicide scene was justified by emergency circumstances or by vital public interest in prompt investigation of the scene. He wrote that there were no exigent circumstances allowing the search, and held that the seriousness of the alleged crime did not create those circumstances. Justice Stewart also held that Mincey’s statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. He looked to the circumstances, focusing on Mincey’s physical state during Detective Hust’s interrogation. Mincey was in the intensive care unit, barely conscious, heavily encumbered by medical equipment, and completely at Detective Hust’s mercy. Justice Stewart also focused on Mincey’s repeated statements that he did not want to speak without a lawyer. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred, joined by Justice William Brennan. Justice Marshall emphasized the practical difficulties created by denying petitioners a federal habeas remedy for Fourth Amendment violations arising out of state criminal convictions. Justice William Rehnquist concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that the warrantless search was unconstitutional, but argued that the majority failed to defer to the trial court’s determination that Mincey’s statements were voluntary.