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Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Wisconsin's statute violated the Equal Protection Clause and reaffirmed that marriage was a fundamental right. In the majority opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court emphasized marriage as part of the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth Amendment as identified in <em>Griswold v. Connecticut.</em> While the state has an interest in ensuring that child support obligations were fulfilled, this statute only regulated those who wished to be married and did not justify the restriction on the right to marriage as found in <em>Loving v. Virginia.</em>

The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred. The district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and specifically the Sherman Amendment, indicated that municipalities could be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights. Additionally, by 1871 there was a clear legislative and precedent-based history for municipal corporations — such as a school board — to be considered a “person” for the purpose of lawsuits and liability. The Court held that this liability only existed when the constitutional infringement was the direct result of an official policy. In his concurring opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote that the Court’s decision to overrule <i>Monroe v. Pape</i> was an unusual but crucial one. The Court was able to rely on the precedents that established the liability of school boards for suits dealing with civil rights issues such as segregation. Given these precedents, the decision in this case allowed the Court to correct an error and create a more consistent stance on municipal liability. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the sections of the Court’s opinion that explain the decision and not in those that serve purely as background. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that there were too many precedents that supported the immunity of municipalities to summarily dismiss with this decision. Since this decision represents such a huge departure from the previous understanding of municipal immunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Court should require evidence “beyond doubt” that the previous decision was incorrect. The majority based its decision primarily on the debate surrounding a rejected amendment to the Act, which he argued is not strong enough evidence to overrule <i>Monroe v. Pape</i>. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent.

In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required "all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.

The unanimous Court held that the Alaska Local Hire Act violated the Constitution. Citing past decisions of the Court, Justice Brennan argued that the Alaska law did not meet the strict standard of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, namely, that discrimination against non-citizens of a state is only allowed when those non-citizens "constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute is aimed." Since no evidence indicated that non-residents were the major cause of state unemployment or any other evil, there was no justification for the law.

Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.

No. The Court held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated in this case. Justice Stewart spent some time describing the important role that plea bargaining plays in the nation's legal system, a role that has been accepted by the Supreme Court in cases such as Blackledge v. Allison (1977) and Brady v. United States (1970). This acceptance, in turn, implies that the prosecutor has a legitimate interest in persuading a defendant to relinquish his or her right to plead not guilty. Threatening a stiffer sentence is permissible and part of "any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas," Stewart declared.

A Landmark Communications newspaper, <em>The Virginian Pilot,</em> published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.

Yes. The Court ruled 7-0 reversing the Supreme Court of Virginia. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger authored the majority opinion. Speaking for six members of the Court, Burger recognized the need for confidentiality in the Commission's proceedings. However, the disclosure of information from the Commission hearing by the <em>Pilot</em> served a public interest consistent with <em>New York Times v. Sullivan.</em> Therefore, the state interest did not "justify encroaching on First Amendment guarantees" in the form of the criminal punishment. Justice Potter Stewart wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.

This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an unlawful "seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any "objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place.

No. In a 6-3 per curiam decision, the Court held that the search did not violate Mimms' rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that the officers had already detained Mimms in order to issue him a traffic summons and felt that asking him to exit the vehicle was a minimal and reasonable intrusion of his freedom. Whether the search occurred inside or outside the car was irrelevant to the Court: the officers had stopped Mimms for a legitimate reason and, upon observing the bulge in his jacket, any person of reasonable caution would have conducted the search. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that such searches, in order to conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, must relate to the reason for the stop. Because the officers had detained Mimms for an expired license plate, searching him for concealed weapons was not within the scope of the stop and therefore made it an unlawful search. Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, filed a separate dissent arguing that the majority opinion gave too much discretion to police officers, allowing them to search detainees whenever they could invent any basis for concern.

During school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages. On September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco’s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages. The two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages.

Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-0 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is to compensate people for injuries caused by the deprivation of civil rights, which means that compensation cannot occur without proof of injury. However, the definition of injury must be adapted to fit the civil rights in question. The Court held that due process could cause distress even when conducted properly, so there must be evidence of an actual injury to justify compensation. The Court also held that proof of actual injury was not required to award nominal damages not to exceed one dollar. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the result. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board’s order.

Yes, if the sanctions imposed may adversely affect the supervisor’s performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and coerce or restrain the employer. Justice Byron R. White delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Supreme Court held that the Act may intrude upon the union’s right to resort to sanctions to effectuate a strike, but it provides for a level playing field for both negotiators during a strike..The Court also held that no writing-related work was undertaken, so the union had violated the Act by disciplining the union members in question. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that barring a union from imposing sanctions against members weakens a collective strike and upsets the balance between labor and management in management’s favor. Therefore, the majority’s opinion is inconsistent with the structure of the Act. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.  

On January 21, 1970, Tyler’s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers. The next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the “origin of all fires that occur in the Township.” They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial. At trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.

Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 7-1 majority. The Court held that any search for administrative purposes, such as to find evidence of a crime, requires a warrant. There are circumstances that require law enforcement agents to act without a warrant, such as when firemen enter a burning building. Once in the building for that purpose, the firemen may seize evidence of arson that is in plain view without obtaining a warrant. The Court also held that determining the cause of the fire is part of a fireman’s job, so firemen may remain in a building without a warrant after a fire has been extinguished for “a reasonable amount of time” to investigate. The Court held that the initial entry and the investigation on the following morning were constitutional, but the subsequent entries and seizures of evidence were not. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the Court’s finding that the entries of February 16 and beyond were illegal searches, but disagreed with the Court on the meaning of the Warrant Clause. He argued that a warrant is necessary when there is probable cause and the search must be unannounced to be effective. If there is no reason for such a confrontation, the Warrant Clause requires that the property owner be given fair warning of the search. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the Court applied the “reasonable amount of time” criterion too broadly in this case. He argued that there was no reason to consider the reentry of the premises the following morning a continuation of the original warrantless entry. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion where he argued that reasonable searches of commercial premises do not require a warrant. The record showed that Tyler did not object to the searches as they were occurring, and therefore obviously considered them reasonable. Since Tyler no longer used the building after the fire, providing him fair notice would not have served a purpose either. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.

Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.

No and no. In a 7-1 decision, the Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals. Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited <em>Ferguson v. Skrupa</em> establishing that the purpose of the judiciary is not to "weigh the wisdom of legislation," and therefore did not concern due process. Additionally, since all gasoline sold in Maryland came from out-of-state refineries, Maryland's statute did not discriminate against interstate commerce. The court acknowledged that while the price-cut provision conflicted with the purposes of the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts, the hypothetical situations of price discrimination presented were "speculative" and insufficient to invalidate the act. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not take part in consideration or decision of this case.

Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

In a 4-to-5 opinion, the Court began by noting that absent exceptional circumstances federal executive officials are only entitled to qualified immunity, since such officials must abide by constitutional and statutory scope-of-power limitations. Federal officials who perform adjudicatory, or other similar prosecutorial functions, cannot, however, be held liable for mere "good faith" judgment errors. The Court reasoned that the risk of making unconstitutional determinations is outweighed by the need to preserve independent judgement, through grants of absolute immunity to judges and other similarly situated decision makers. The Court concluded that the similarity between the type of decision-making required of federal prosecutors and other administrative agents is sufficiently strong to warrant an extension of absolute immunity to the latter for decisions made in the course of their official conduct.

Edmund Foley applied for a position as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was a legally admitted resident alien, state officials refused to permit him to take the examination. New York authorities relied on a statute providing that "no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States."

In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the states had an "historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions" and that the New York statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Noting that states need only to show some rational relationship between a valid state interest and a classification involving aliens, the Court held that the police function was "one of the basic functions of government" and thereby the province of actual United States citizens.

Ballew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.

Yes. The Court found that a trial by jury of less than six members violated the accused's right to a trial by jury as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Justice Blackmun reasoned that small juries foster poor group deliberation. Group memory of the details of testimony, the ease with which group compromises can be made, and the desire of the group to be self-critical and reflective are all hindered as the size of the jury decreases. Blackmun also relied on statistical studies to claim that the risk of jury error increased with smaller juries.

In 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as “endangered”. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its “critical habitat”. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the dam would violate the ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter’s critical habitat.

Yes, Yes. In a 6-3 decision, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion affirming the injunction. The Supreme Court held that Congress’ continued appropriation of funds did not imply that the Dam project was exempt from the ESA. The operation of the Tellico Dam would wipe out the Snail Darter's habitat, so an injunction was the proper remedy. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a dissent, stating that the ESA does not apply to any project that is completed or substantially completed when the threat to the endangered species arose. Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that the ESA did not prohibit the district court from refusing to grant an injunction.

In 1970, Congress imposed an annual registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States. The state of Massachusetts owned and utilized a helicopter for the purpose of patrolling highways and fulfilling other police duties. When Massachusetts refused to pay the tax, the federal government collected it from the state's accounts, plus interest and penalties. Massachusetts then sought a refund of the money collected.

No. The Court held that so long as charges did not discriminate against state functions, were based on fair approximations of uses of the system of navigable airspace, and were structured to produce revenues that did not exceed the total cost of the benefits to be supplied to national airsystem, there could be no basis for claims that the National Government was "using its taxing powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy" Massachusetts' ability to perform "essential services." The Court emphasized its reluctance to enlarge the scope of state immunity from federal taxation.

Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The court held that the procedures leading to the Horowitz’s dismissal for academic deficiencies did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Horowitz was fully informed of the faculty dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the threat of postponing her graduation and continued enrollment. The Court held that a hearing before the school’s decision-making body is not required for dismissals for academic deficiencies. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote a concurring opinion in which he added that Horowitz was dismissed for academic deficiencies rather than for disciplinary reasons, and that in these circumstances she was accorded due process. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the various meetings about Horowitz’s academic performance met the standards of procedural due process. However, the procedure of dismissal for academic reasons, rather than disciplinary reasons was arbitrary. In his separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Harry A. Blackmun, with whom Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined, wrote that Horowitz received the procedural process due under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Court should not decide what the further appropriate procedures are required in graduate school dismissals.

An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.

Yes. The Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required, in all but the rarest capital cases, that sentencers not be precluded from considering a range of mitigating factors before imposing the death penalty. These factors included any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense proffered as a reason for a sentence less than death. The Court held that the Ohio statute did not permit the type of individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Constitution.

The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as "landmarks" or "landmark sites." Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.

No. The Court held that the restrictions imposed did not prevent Penn Central from ever constructing above the terminal in the future. New York's objection was to the nature of the proposed construction and not to construction in general implemented to "enhance" the Terminal. Preventing the construction of a 50-plus story addition above the station was a reasonable restriction substantially related to the general welfare of the city.

Litigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in 1969. In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had been issued guns), a District Court called the conditions which inmates were forced to face "a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world." This case involved a challenge to the practice of "punitive isolation" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.

The Court held that punitive isolation for longer than thirty days in Arkansas prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Constitution. Justice Stevens conceded that isolation in and of itself was not necessarily unconstitutional and may in fact serve an important, legitimate interest in administering a prison. However, when taken as a whole, continued Stevens, the conditions in Arkansas's prisons, combined with the severe risks to an inmate's health and safety which accompanied confinement in isolation, did constitute cruel and unusual punishment. "A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of 'gruel' might be tolerated for a few days and be intolerably cruel for weeks or months," Stevens concluded.

Beth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, held that the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 9-0 majority. The Court held that, since 1974, the Act provided employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions with the right to self-organize and bargain collectively, including the right to communicate about the topic at the jobsite. However, an employer may curb that right by showing that special circumstances necessitate the prohibition of communication in order to maintain production or discipline. In this case, the Court held that the communication and organizing in the cafeteria and the coffee shop did not interfere with patient care sufficiently to justify enforcement of the hospital's rule. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the Board's broad order may not fully appreciate the delicate nature of a hospital's communal space and the patients' need to recover in a stress-free environment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice Lewis F. Powell joined in the concurrence. In his separate concurrence, Justice Powell criticized the Board's use of the precedent case, <em>Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB</em>, in reaching its decision. He asserted that Republic's holding that solicitation during work hours were presumptively invalid was inapplicable in the context of this case given the distinct nature of a hospital as a recovery place and also that the employees lacked meeting space within the hospital. Chief Justice Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the concurrence.

A catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that, absent some other novel or inventive concept in the individual’s application for a patent, activity that results from the solution of a formula or algorithm cannot transform the formula from an unpatentable principle into a patentable process. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that the method for updating alarm limits did not lose its eligibility for patent protection merely because one step in the method was not patentable. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissenting opinion.  

In its licensing system for elk-hunters, the state of Montana required nonresidents to pay a substantially higher fee than residents for a hunting permit.

The Court affirmed the right of Montana to charge higher fees for out-of-state elk hunters. Justice Blackmun found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only applied to activities which bear "on the vitality of the Nation as a single entity." Since elk hunting is a recreational activity and not fundamental to the survival of nonresidents of Montana, Blackmun argued that it did not fall within the scope of the protections guaranteed by the Constitution. "Equality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union," he concluded.

Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Court held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of religious rights and therefore violated the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to strike down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee could not prove that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern political processes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the Tennessee statute essentially established a test of religious conviction in order to be eligible for office that disqualified anyone with a strong enough belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the burden to choose between one’s religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that the Establishment Clause does not give the government the power to discriminate against religious persons seeking or holding office. Justice Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment. Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that this case was covered by the ruling in <i>Torcaso v. Watkins</i>, where the Court held that states may not condition public office on any type of religious belief. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He argued that, rather than violating the First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers, it implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering with their governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able to prove the necessity of this restriction. Justice Harry A. Blackmun did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Channel Islands National Monument is a nationally designated area off the coast of California, including Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. In 1949, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation that extended the boundary of the National Monument within one nautical mile of the islands.

Yes. Writing for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart determined that under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 after the 1947 <em>United States v. California</em> decision, Congress specified that the lands in dispute were under California's control.

In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.

In a 5-to-3 decision, the Court held that the "third party" search of the newsroom did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that such searches, accompanied by warrants, were legitimate when it had been "satisfactorily demonstrated to the magistrate that fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime is located on the premises." The Court also found that the Framers of the Constitution "did not forbid warrants where the press was involved."

Estelle Jacobs was accused of threatening to harm a man who owed a substantial gambling debt to her employer, a collections agency. Unbeknownst to her, the phone call in which she made the threat was recorded. The Federal Bureau of Investigations contacted Jacobs and informed of her Miranda rights during questioning about the incident. About nine months later, Jacobs was called before a grand jury via a subpoena regarding the threatening statements she had previously made. She did not have an attorney present, but she was read her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. During her trial, Jacobs denied having made the phone call, the tape of the recorded phone call was played, and she was subsequently indicted. The district court dismissed the indictment and held that a witness in a trial who is a potential defendant should be informed of that potential upon taking the witness stand and is entitled to full Miranda warnings under those circumstances.

Unanswered. In a per curiam decision, the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.

During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.

No. The Court held that limited civil sanctions could constitutionally be invoked against a radio broadcast of patently offensive words dealing with sex and execration. The words need not be obscene to warrant sanctions. Audience, medium, time of day, and method of transmission are relevant factors in determining whether to invoke sanctions. "[W]hen the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."

KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media.

No. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court held that the First Amendment granted no special right of access to the press to government-controlled sources of information. The Court reasoned that the importance of acceptable prison conditions and the media's role of providing information afforded "no basis for reading into the Constitution a right of the public or the media to enter these institutions. . .and take moving and still pictures of inmates for broadcast purposes."

On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days. Ms. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that the decision of the storage facility to sell the goods could not be considered a state action, and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. To show that they had a claim worthy of relief, the respondents must have given evidence that they were denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and that Flagg Bros., Inc. was operating as the State of New York. The Court held that there was no deprivation of a Constitutional right, as the Constitution only protects against state seizure of property, not that of private actors. The Court also held that the statute that allows the sale to happen does not imply any state action, so Flagg Bros., Inc. was not acting on behalf of the state. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent and argued that the statute allowed for unconstitutional discrimination against the poor, who were unable to pay the required fee in order to prevent the sale of their belongings. He also argued that the Court’s determination ignored the realities of the state’s role in eviction and subsequent legal procedures. In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the company’s right to conduct the sale derived from the state, and not the original property owners, so the sale must be held to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that state authorization of a “nonconsensual resolution of conflict between debtor and creditor” is the type of action that the Due Process Clause was meant to prevent. Justice Byron R. White and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not take part in the consideration or decision of the case.

In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.

The Court found that the Minnesota law did violate the Constitution as it "substantially altered" the provisions of pension agreements which Allied Steel had with its employees. Citing the importance that the Framers placed on private contracts in the conduct of business, Justice Stewart found that the act's effect was "severe" as it nullified terms of t he company's obligations to its employees and imposed an "unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Furthermore, the law was narrowly targeted at employers who had decided to establish employee pension plans, and it did not seek to deal with broad economic and social problems.

A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."

Yes. The Court held that the law violated the principle of nondiscrimination as it treated out-of-state waste differently than waste produced within the state. Since New Jersey could not demonstrate a legitimate reason for distinguishing between foreign and domestically produced waste, it was clear to the Court that the state had "overtly moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons."

In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.

The Court found no constitutional violation. The Compact did not enhance state political power at the expense of the United States; it not confer to states powers which they did not already possess; it did not involve any delegation of state power to the Commission. Furthermore, argued Justice Powell, each state was free to withdraw from the group at any time.

On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Supreme Court held that a single lawyer representing multiple defendants does not automatically deprive the defendants of their rights, but it does if there is a conflict of interest. Because Hall showed that a conflict of interest was present, the trial court should have taken steps to appoint separate counsel or ensured that the risk of conflict was not great enough to require such action. The trial court did neither, so the defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights. The Court also held that, in such situations, the reversal of the conviction is automatic. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. argued that the trial court’s failure to investigate the defense counsel’s claim that the interests of his clients conflict does not rise to level of a constitutional violation requiring reversal of the verdict. He argued that the majority’s opinion is based on the assumption that the jury will be prejudiced rather than on any evidence of a conflict. Justice Harry A. Blackmun and Justice William H. Rehnquist joined in the dissent.

Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.

No and yes. There was no single majority opinion. Four of the justices contended that any racial quota system supported by government violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., agreed, casting the deciding vote ordering the medical school to admit Bakke. However, in his opinion, Powell argued that the rigid use of racial quotas as employed at the school violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. Powell joined that opinion as well, contending that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria. So, the Court managed to minimize white opposition to the goal of equality (by finding for Bakke) while extending gains for racial minorities through affirmative action.

A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men. The women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Yes, no. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Court held that the company’s policy was based on aggregate numbers that are not necessarily true for individuals, which violates the Civil Rights Act prohibition of individual discrimination based purely on gender. Although the department argued that that the policy was based on longevity rather than gender, the Court held that many different factors influence longevity and the payment differential was solely gender-based. The Court held that the department was not liable for back pay because the potential that such a holding would influence other companies to change their policies did not offset the potential negative impact on the economy. In his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the decision of the majority departed from the precedents set by <i>Geduldig v. Aiello</i> and <i>General Electric Co. v. Gilbert</i> without sufficient reasoning. He concurred in the part of the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger concurred in part and dissented in part. He argued that Congress did not intend the Civil Rights Act to impede a business’ ability to create policies based on statistically sound longevity data. Since any individual woman is statistically likely to live longer than any individual man, the policy did not discriminate against individuals solely on the basis of sex but rather based on the likelihood of longevity. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held the department not liable for back pay. Justice William H. Rehnquist joined the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part. He concurred in the majority’s decision that held that the department’s policy violated the Civil Rights Act, but he argued that the department should be held liable for back pay. The district court held the department liable, and the majority’s decision did not find any flaws in the district court’s reasoning. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year. Samuel H. Sloan owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in "substantial" purchases and short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under § 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.

The issue presented is not moot because the source of the injury "is capable of repetition, yet evading review." On the merits, § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 does not grant the Commission authority to issue a series of summary orders that would suspend trading in a stock beyond the initial 10-day period, absent additional circumstances warranting such action. Justice William Rehnquist delivered the opinion that was unanimous as to the judgment. As to the question of mootness, the Court's precedent provides that a case is not moot when "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Because of the historic practices of CJL, of which Sloan still owns stock, it remains likely that the SEC will again suspend trading of its shares, creating a "reasonable expectation of recurring injury" to Sloan. As to the merits, the Court first looked to the language of § 12(k), which provides that the SEC may "summarily to suspend trading in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten days." The Court found that the SEC's interpretation of this provision as permitting redetermination every 10 days under a single set of circumstances was "not the most logical or logical one." Moreover, the power to suspend, effectively indefinitely, the trading of a company's stock is "an awesome power, with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other investors." Such power may only arise from a "clear mandate from Congress," which § 12(k) does not provide. The Court concluded that "Congress did not intend the Commission to have the power to extend the length of suspensions under § 12(k) at all, much less to repeatedly extend such suspensions without any hearing." Justice William Brennan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thurgood Marshall joined. Justice Harry Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

In February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for a portion of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik’s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a state may constitutionally discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person and for financial gain under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent. The Court further held that the state need not show actual harm or injury to the solicited clients to sustain a disciplinary action. Unlike other forms of advertising concerning the terms and availability of legal services, in-person solicitation often exerts pressure upon and requires an immediate response from the recipient, without providing time for comparison or reflection. Because the Court held that a state has a particularly strong interest in preventing aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, and overreach, a state may adopt an outright ban in order to maintain standards in the legal profession. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt as to whether the state’s interest in prohibiting even honest, unpressured commercial solicitation justified the restriction on the free flow of information. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in which he agreed that Ohio acted within the limits prescribed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but argued that the Court should grant even greater leeway in the ability of state bar associations to regulate the conduct of their members.

Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as "overbroad."

No. In a 5-4 opinion, the Court reversed the District Court and held that states could be justified in barring aliens from certain positions in government. Justice Lewis F. Powell's majority opinion asserted the state's interest in charging teachers with "an obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes, regardless of the subject taught." The statute furthered this interest, in that it affected only non-citizens who did not want to seek citizenship. This interest satisfied the "rational relationship" required by _Foley v. Connelie

On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation. Brown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted.

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment covers all police seizures, even those as brief as preventing a person from walking away. The Fourth Amendment requires that such seizures be based on specific and objective facts that create a compelling public interest in the seizure that outweighs the individual’s expectation of privacy. In this case, the Court held that the police officers lacked any reasonable suspicion based on objective fact to allow them to detain Brown and question him. Since the seizure was not lawful, the Texas statute requiring Brown to identify himself did not apply.

Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program.

The Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and held that the privilege not to answer editorial inquiries is not absolute. Justice White argued that shielding editorial decision-making from inquiry would "substantially enhance the burden of proving actual malice," a burden which was already substantial in the Court's view. White was confident that investigations into this process for falsehood or libelous reporting would not lead to self-censorship of stories that are documented and true; "only reckless error will be discouraged," which would not threaten the constitutionally protected freedom of the press.

Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.

A plurality held that Illinois had not violated the Constitution. Writing for four of the justices, Rehnquist clarified the Court's holding in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) and argued that states could only sentence a convicted criminal to imprisonment if that person had been represented by counsel. Since Scott was not sentenced to imprisonment, even though the applicable statute allowed for it, the state was not obligated to provide counsel. Rehnquist called that line of reasoning "the central premise of Argersinger."

A West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.

Yes. Chief Justice Burger reasoned that governmental attempts to restrict the publication of truthful information "seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." As long as the information is lawfully obtained, as it was in this case involving a shooting at a junior high school, the state cannot restrict a newspaper from publishing a juvenile offender's name unless the restriction serves a substantial state interest. No such interest was present in this case.

A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.

Yes as to the Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of a unanimous court, reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not permit a search with an open-ended warrant that left the determination of what was obscene fully in the discretion of the officials conducting the search. The Court also held that the search was not justified under the theory that the store owner had no legitimate expectation of privacy because the items were displayed at a store open to the general public. Merely inviting the public to enter does not give consent to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to the Fourth Amendment.

Burch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.

The Court found that convictions by the nonunanimous six-member jury violated the Constitution. Tracing the development of the Court's considerations of this issue, Justice Rehnquist indicated that Burch's case sat at the "intersection of our decisions concerning jury size and unanimity." Rehnquist relied on the Court's holding in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) and the practices in several of the states to find against convictions by nonunanimous juries of six members. Only two of the states that used six-member juries in trials for petty offenses allowed verdicts to be less than unanimous. This "near uniform judgment of the Nation" of the inappropriateness of this jury arrangement, argued Rehnquist, provided the Court with a "useful guide" in determining constitutionally allowable jury practices.

After he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym’s driver’s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Yes. Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the lower court erred in finding that the Massachusetts statute deprived Montrym of his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process. In the Court’s view, Massachusetts’ interest in highway safety and administrative efficiency outweighed Montrym’s interest in his driver’s license. Furthermore, the possibility for a prompt, post-suspension hearing before the Registrar minimized the risk of erroneous deprivation. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he characterized the statute as inducing drivers to submit to a breath analysis test, which in turn provided the police with credible evidence of drunk driving. He argued that the interest in preventing drunk driving did not trump an individual’s right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the suspension of his driver’s license. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent.  

Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.

Yes. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile. In this case, Justice Powell applied the principle which the Court had identified in United States v. Chadwick (1977), namely, that a locked footlocker which had been loaded into a vehicle could not be opened without a warrant. Since the Little Rock police officers had exclusive control of the luggage at the time of their search, there was no danger that its contents could have been tampered with or removed before a valid warrant could have been obtained. Powell concluded that since "luggage is a common repository of one's personal effects" it is "associated with the expectation of privacy."

New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6 to 3 majority, held that the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." Warrantless arrests and searches went to the core of the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy in a citizen's dwelling. This protection was too important to be violated on the basis of a police officer's on-the-spot decision regarding probable cause. In the absence of special circumstances, a search of a residence is permissible only after a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate issuing a search warrant. Justice Byron R. White, joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William H. Rehnquist, dissented. White maintained that common law and practice prior to and at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted did not limit a police officer's inherent power to arrest or search.

On December 12, 1976, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell Moore allegedly raped and murdered Teresa Allen outside Macon, Georgia. Green and Moore were tried separately, and each was convicted and sentenced to death. At Green's trial, the defense introduced the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified at Moore's trial. According to Pasby, Moore admitted to him that he had killed Allen alone. The trial court refused to allow Pasby's testimony, considering it to be hearsay under Georgia law. On appeal, Green argued the refusal to allow Pasby's testimony constituted a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied his claim.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that Pasby's testimony was "highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial" and "substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability." Primarily, the Court noted that Georgia had permitted Pasby's testimony at Moore's trial. Thus, the state had already deemed the testimony reliable and valid.

This case supplements <i>Elkins v. Moreno</i>, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In <i>Elkins v. Moreno</i>, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown. On June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution.

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that the University of Maryland’s resolution effectively changed the constitutional basis for consideration. In the previous case, the issue was linked to whether the nonimmigrant aliens could be domiciled in the state. In view of the new resolution, the domicile issue is no longer paramount. The Court held that there were new issues that must be considered by a district court before the case makes its way to the Supreme Court docket.

Curtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.

No. In a 5-4 decision the Court held that the law does not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clause. Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority deciding that the statute did not invidiously discriminate because legitimacy is not an immutable characteristic. The law is also rationally related to the state interest in avoiding the difficulties in proving paternity of illegitimate children in wrongful death actions. Justice Lewis F. Powell concurred in the judgment but felt the proper level of scrutiny was that a law must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. Justice Byron R. White wrote a dissent stating that the statute discriminates on the basis of sex by requiring unmarried fathers to take additional measures not required of unwed mothers in order to prove the legitimacy of his parenthood. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall, and Justice Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent.

William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.

Yes and yes. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court established its jurisdiction over the question and ruled that Alabama's statutes were unconstitutional. In writing for the majority, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. maintained that under the Equal Protection Clause, "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives." The Court rejected several objectives proposed by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, holding that gender was not an "accurate proxy" for financial need. Justices Harry A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens each wrote concurring opinions.

In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the "nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss.

No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and held that Proxmire's statements in his newsletters and press releases were not protected by the Speech and Debate Clause. However, in upholding this ruling, the Court also found that Proxmire's statements were not made with "actual malice" and thus, were not libelous. Chief Justice Burger, relying on the Court's finding in Doe v. McMillan (1973), concluded that while speeches in Congress and discussions with staff were protected by Section 6, statements in newsletters and press releases were not because they were not "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" nor were they part of the legislature's "deliberative process."

A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.

No. The Court found that that the conditions of confinement did not infringe upon a pretrial detainee's rights. Justice Rehnquist's opinion argued that the issue of prison management is ripe with "judgment calls" which rest outside the jurisdiction of the judiciary. As long as administrative practices are implemented in the genuine interest of "safeguarding institutional security" then they do not warrant judicial scrutiny and are consistent with the Constitution.

The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The court held that abstention under <i>Younger v Harris</i> was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under <i>Younger v Harris</i>, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion reversing the district court. The Supreme Court held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction while the state law claims were pending. There was no indication that the state court would be unable to reach the constitutional issues themselves. Also allowing the state case to constitute did not cause any irreparable injury to the Sims, so there was no reason for ignoring <i>Younger</i>. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent, stating that the Sims clearly did not have the opportunity to pursue their constitutional claims in state court, so there the district court acted properly. Justice William J. Brennan, Justice Potter Stewart, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent.

A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores.

No. The Court held that the law was enacted to serve "legitimate and worthy purposes" and not to discriminate on the basis of sex. Even though few women benefitted from the scheme, Justice Stewart argued that "veteran status is not uniquely male." Furthermore, the law placed many men who were not veterans at a disadvantage as well. The distinction in the law was clearly between veterans and nonveterans, not between men and women.

Police arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under <i>Miranda v Arizona</i>, 384 U.S. 436(1966). Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder. At trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.

No. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the majority opinion reversing the state court. The Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s request for a probation officer does not invoke the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. A court must look at the totality of the circumstances in each case to determine whether a juvenile waived that right. In this case, Michael knowingly waived his right to remain silent, so all evidence obtained during the police questioning is admissible in court. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that <i>Miranda</i> requires police questioning to stop whenever a juvenile requests an adult who represents his interests. The case-by-case approach does not provide police with adequate guidance for future procedure. Justices William J. Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a dissent, expressing that police subjected Michael to a coercive interrogation.<br />

These are two consolidated cases. For 77-1546, in 1972, U. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to cause a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents’ counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia. For 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island.

No. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion of the 5-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the language of the statute clearly indicated that Congress meant to restrict the applicability of the statute to employees currently employed by the government at the time of filing. Additionally, the legislative history of the statute shows Congress’ desire to restrict civil actions against governmental officials to those acting in their official capacity. Congress only allowed governmental officials to be sued nominally in their individual capacity in order to circumvent some vestiges of sovereign immunity. The Court held that, regardless of the venue, the case must be essentially against the United States government, rather than against officers in their individual capacities. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent and argued that the Act unambiguously allowed civil suits to be brought against government employees in their individual capacities to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. He argued that the legislative history supported a broader reading of what the Act allows in civil suits against government officers. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. Justice Byron R. White did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case. Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the decision of this case.

Mary Jane Martin, a tenured teacher at Harrah Independent School District, was required to earn five college credits every three years as continuing education. Martin refused to comply with this requirement and did not receive a pay increase each year her contract was renewed. The Oklahoma legislature passed a law requiring a mandatory pay increase every year regardless of compliance with the continuing education. Looking for an alternative consequence, the school board warned Martin that they would not renew her contract the following year if she did not complete her continuing education. Martin refused, and the school board voted to terminate her for “willful neglect of duty”. After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain administrative relief, Martin sued the school district for Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the termination violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

No. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Supreme Court held that school board did not deny Martin substantive due process since there was no fundamental interest involved. The court also held that equal protection did not apply because the school district did not apply the continuing education rule differently to different groups.

A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.

Yes. In an 8-to-1 decision, the Court held that the privacy interests of travelers outweighed the state interests in discretionary spot checks of automobiles. The Court found that random checks made only marginal contributions to roadway safety and compliance with registration requirements; less intrusive means could have been used to serve the same ends. Officers must be held to a "probable cause" standard for searches, otherwise individuals would be subject to "unfettered governmental intrusion" each time they entered an automobile.

Davis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an "able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement.

Yes. Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (1971) and Butz v. Economou (1978), the Court reversed the lower court's conclusions. Both cases affirmed a citizen's right to bring suit against federal officers for constitutional violations. In this case, Passman violated Davis's rights through sexual discrimination. The Court added that Passman's actions and words did not constitute protected speech and that a damage remedy provided a ready mechanism for remedial action.

On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her. In pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.

No. Justice Harry A. Blackmun delivered the opinion for the 5-3 majority. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protections are only relevant if the individual believes that the government has infringed on the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonable expectation of privacy does not apply to the numbers recorded by a pen register because those numbers are used in the regular conduct of the phone company's business, a fact of which individuals are aware. Because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to information that is voluntarily given to third parties, the telephone numbers that are regularly and voluntarily provided to telephone companies by their customers do not gain Fourth Amendment protections. Justice Potter Stewart wrote a dissent in which he argued that a person who uses a telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of call. Because the telephone numbers dialed also contain information relating to the content of the call, that information is also protected by the Fourth Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that the majority opinion's analysis depends on an individual's choice to voluntarily turn over information, but that choice is not valid if no practical alternative exists. He wrote that no citizen should be forced to accept government monitoring of the phone numbers he dials simply by registering a phone with a telephone company. Such government intrusion on telephone records could impede the exercise of free speech or political affiliation. Therefore phone records should be subject to the Fourth Amendment's protections. Justice Brennan also joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.

No. The Court held that the training scheme was legitimate because the 1964 Act "did not intend to prohibit the private sector from taking effective steps" to implement the goals of Title VII. Since the program sought to eliminate archaic patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy while not prohibiting white employees from advancing in the company, it was consistent with the intent of the law.

An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under <i>Miranda v Arizona</i> after arresting him on a federal warrant. At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice of Rights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney. Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights.

No. In a 5-3 decision, Justice Potter Stewart wrote the majority opinion reversing and remanding. The Supreme Court held that <i>Miranda</i> did not require adopting an inflexible per se rule. Also, 10 of 11 U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that express waiver is not necessary. It is up to the lower court to determine whether Butler impliedly waived his rights. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a concurrence, stating that he assumed the court did not rely on the “intentional relinquishment of a known right” formula from earlier Supreme Court precedent. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent, stating that an express waiver is required under Miranda. Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell did not participate.

Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order. On May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry. The minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

No. In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Harry Blackmun, the Court held that the First Amendment did not require Georgia state courts to defer to the Augusta-Macon Presbytery commission’s ruling in the Vineville church property dispute. Justice Blackman examined the history of Georgia’s approach to church property litigation. Georgia eventually arrived at a “neutral principles of law” method for resolving church property disputes. As applied to the PCUS, this required examining the deeds to the properties in question, state statutes dealing with implied trusts, and the Book of Church Order. The trial court would then determine whether there was a basis for a trust in favor of the general church. Here, the trial court did not discover any language in the Book of Church Order implying a trust in favor of the general church. While acknowledging that the First Amendment severely limits the role civil courts play in resolving property disputes, Justice Blackmun held that Georgia’s approach was constitutional. The neutral principles of law approach required courts to use objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law, leaving courts free from entanglement in religious doctrinal questions. While Georgia’s approach was constitutional on its face, Justice Blackmun could not determine from the facts whether Georgia courts applied the method constitutionally. While the respondent argued that Georgia applied a presumptive rule of majority representation -- as opposed to a rule of deference to church governments -- neither the Supreme Court of Georgia nor the trial court explicitly stated that it was using this rule. Consequently, Justice Blackmun remanded the case so that the Supreme Court of Georgia could definitively determine whether this rule was the law of Georgia. Justice Louis Powell dissented, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White. He characterized the dispute not as one over the ownership of property but rather over which faction in Vineville’s congregation has the right to control the use of that property. Justice Powell argued that disputes over church property almost invariably arise out of disagreements regarding doctrine and practice. Consequently, state courts should defer to decisions made within the structure of church governments in any case involving an intrachurch dispute, even when the dispute is over church property.

The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.

Yes and yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that, although there is no constitutional right to an inmate’s release from prison prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, the specific wording of the Nebraska statute created a constitutionally protected expectation of parole. The Court further held that the Parole Board’s procedures were adequate and reversed the prescribed modifications from the Court of Appeals. In his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. reasoned that a state’s establishment of a parole problem, regardless of the specific wording of the statute, triggered a right to procedural due process. Justice Powell agreed that the Court of Appeal’s recommendations were unnecessary, but he argued that the Parole Board should provide inmates with at least 72 hours notice of their hearing date. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that all prisoners potentially eligible for parole have a right to due process. In his view, the Parole Board should provide the inmates with reasonable notice of their hearing dates and a written statement of the reasons underlying adverse decisions.  

Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.

No. The Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment did not entail "the right to have Negro candidates elected," and that only purposefully discriminatory denials of the freedom to vote on the basis of race demanded constitutional remedies. The Court also found that multimember legislative districts were not unconstitutional per se; such legislative apportionments only violated the Fourteenth Amendment if they were "conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial. . .discrimination." In short, the Court held that facially neutral actions were unconstitutional only if motivated by discriminatory purposes.

A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.<br />

Yes. Justice Byron R. White, writing for an 8-1 majority, reversed the state court and remanded. The Supreme Court held that Duren’s statistical evidence sufficiently proved that Jackson County’s jury selection process violated his constitutional rights. Duren showed an underrepresented “distinctive” group resulting from Jackson County’s practice of exempting women. Also, there was no significant state interest to justify exempting women from jury service. Justice William H. Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the majority incorrectly used an combination of the Due Process clause and Equal Protection clause to make their decision.

Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.

No. In an 8-1 opinion written by Justice Byron R. White, the Court emphasized the distinction between the Civil Service and Foreign Service, and the "special attention" paid to the Foreign Service by Congress. The Court interpreted the purpose of Section 632 to be the encouragement of the "highest performance in the ranks of the Foreign Service by assuring that opportunities for promotion would be available," a legitimate interest that justified the distinction. The Court also recognized the possibility that service in the Foreign Service would be more rigorous than service in the Civil Service. Given that possibility, Congress had a "reasonable basis" for enacting the statute, satisfying the rationality standard set forth in <em>Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia</em>.

Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.

No and no. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Transit Authority's policy was not unconstitutional or illegal under the Civil Rights Act. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described Beazer's statistical argument as "weak", as the 81 percent statistic did not relate to methadone users specifically. The Court recognized the public safety interest in keeping narcotics users from working for NYTA. The narcotics rule was an allowable policy choice made by NYTA, and any specific exemption for methadone users from the narcotics rule would have been "costly" and "imprecise." Justice Lewis Powell wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself. At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of <i>Brown v. Illinois</i>. The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under <i>Brown</i>. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.

Yes. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 6-2 majority. The Supreme Court held that the police violated Dunaway’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by picking him up and taking him to the police station to be questioned without probable cause. Because picking someone up for questioning involves an intrusion on par with that of an arrest, it is held to the standard of “probable cause” rather than the lower standard of “reasonable suspicion.” The Court also held that the confession stemmed directly from the illegal questioning, and without an intervening event, the confession should have been considered tainted evidence and not allowed into evidence at trial. Justice Byron R. White wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued that the key principle of the Fourth Amendment was the balancing of competing interests. He wrote that, while there must be general rules for police conduct, cases should be considered based on their individual facts. In this case, the questioning was too close to an arrest to fit any other criteria. In his concurring opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that an illegal arrest is only relevant to determining the voluntariness of a confession if it can be shown that the conduct of the illegal arrest was what motivated the confession. Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote a dissent, arguing that not all interactions between citizens and police officers are seizures of persons. Because Dunaway willingly accompanied officers to the police station, his time at the police station could not be deemed a seizure. He also argued that, because the police acted in good faith and gave Dunaway the Miranda warnings, his statements and drawings should be considered voluntary and admissible. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger joined in the dissent. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case.

Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.

No. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote for a unanimous court that an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" specified by the Act meant one who meets all the program's requirements "in spite of his handicap" as opposed to "in every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap." Even with an improved hearing aid, Davis still required lip-reading to understand speech, and therefore was not "otherwise qualified." Since Davis could not be admitted to Southeastern's program without substantial changes to admission requirements, Davis' rejection did not constitute unlawful discrimination.

Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.

The standard of proof in a civil confinement case requires a burden of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence, but not as high as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court, which held that the use of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence standard in a jury instruction in a civil commitment case was proper. Because of the importance of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard set forth in criminal proceedings, the Court was weary of requiring the same standard for civil proceedings. Furthermore, this case involved psychiatric evaluation, which was not considered reliable evidence. A “beyond a reasonable doubt” requirement in cases involving mental diagnosis may be too high a burden for the state to reach. Therefore, the middle ground of requiring a “clear and convincing” standard of proof was appropriate. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. took no part in the consideration or or decision of the case.

In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent. Wolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.

No. Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority. The Supreme Court held that Wolston met neither of the requirements to be considered a public figure. Wolston was not a figure of “persuasive power and influence,” nor did he thrust himself to the forefront of popular controversy. The Court held that an individual does not become a public figure merely by attracting public attention, and such individuals should not lose the protection afforded to private individuals. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote that the majority’s decision defined “public figure” too narrowly, but the intervening years between Wolston’s publicity and the libelous statement sufficed to consider him a private citizen. Blackmun argued that the timing of the potentially libelous statement relative to the event that brought about public scrutiny of an individual is relevant in libel cases. Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the concurrence. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissent and argued that, because the issue of Soviet espionage remained a relevant issue in 1974, the intervening years did not diminish Wolston’s status as a public figure. He also wrote that the district court erred in granting summary judgment.

A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."

The Court found the statute unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it allowed judicial authorization for an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is mature and competent enough to make the decision independently. Second, it required parental notification in all cases (parents were required to be notified if their daughter initiated proceedings in superior court) without allowing the minor to seek an independent judicial assessment of her competence to decide the abortion issue.

Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.

The Court held that members of the public had no right to attend criminal trials under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court noted that judges had "an affirmative constitutional duty" to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and that closure of pretrial proceedings was an effective method to do so. The Court found that the Sixth Amendment, while granting defendants the right to a public trial, did not imply a public right of access to trials. The Court added that since the suppression of the transcript was only temporary, no violation of the First Amendment had occurred.

Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.

No. Chief Justice Warren Burger, in a 5-4 decision, wrote the majority opinion reversing the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the FMA did not did not require the district court to independently review disputed testimony. Also, the FMA did not violate the Constitution. Justice Harry A. Blackmun concurred, writing that the statute in question does not threaten judicial power or independence in judicial decision making. Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote a partial dissent, stating that a district court must rehear evidence when credibility is at issue. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, writing that the FMA clearly requires a district court to rehear evidence when a party objects to a magistrate’s recommendation. Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a separate dissent, expressing that use of the the FMA was impermissible in this case under the Fifth Amendment and Article III.

In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.

No. The Court held that states participating in the Medicaid program were not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions under Title XIX. The Court found that a woman's freedom of choice did not carry with it "a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choices." The Court ruled that because the Equal Protection Clause was not a source of substantive rights and because poverty did not qualify as a "suspect classification," the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that the coincidence of the funding restrictions of the statute with tenets of the Roman Catholic Church did not constitute an establishment of religion.

Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.

No. A duty to disclose information arises if there is a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to the transaction. Chiarella had no such duty. He was not a corporate insider in the acquiring corporation and he did not receive confidential information from the target company. He also had no fiduciary relationship with the shareholders of the target company: he was not their agent; they placed no trust or confidence in him; indeed, they had no prior dealings with him. A duty to disclose under Section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.

After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.

In a 7-to-1 decision, the Court held that the right to attend criminal trials was "implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment." The Court held that the First Amendment encompassed not only the right to speak but also the freedom to listen and to receive information and ideas. The Court also noted that the First Amendment guaranteed the right of assembly in public places such as courthouses. The Court emphasized that "certain unarticulated rights" were implicit in enumerated guarantees and were often "indispensable to the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined."

After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Yes. In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court explained that while natural laws, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, or newly discovered minerals are not patentable, a live artificially-engineered microorganism is. The creation of a bacterium that is not found anywhere in nature, constitutes a patentable "manufacture" or "composition of matter" under Section 101. Moreover, the bacterium's man-made ability to break down crude oil makes it very useful.

Crown Simpson Pulp Company and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation operated two bleached craft pulp mills in California. The mills were granted permits by the California State Water Resources Control Board with variances from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for effluent discharge. The EPA, however, denied the variances. The mill companies sought review directly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Act allows direct appeal of EPA actions either “issuing or denying any permit”. The court of appeals dismissed the review, holding that because the State granted the permits and the EPA merely objected the variances, this case did not fall under the Act.

Yes. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the EPA’s action in denying the variances was effectively the same as denying a permit under the Act. The Court held that to allow the court of appeals view to proceed would produce arbitrary results depending on whether the state or the EPA granted permits in a particular location.

On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.

No. Justice Thurgood Marshall delivered the opinion of the 7-2 majority. The Court held that there must be a certain amount of minimum contacts between the defendant and the state in which the suit occurs. The fact that Rush’s insurance company does business in Minnesota is not a sufficient link between him and the state, especially since he owns no property there and has no other connection. Rush had no reason to suspect that having an insurance contract with State Farm would subject him to the possibility of a lawsuit in all states where State Farm does business. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the insurance company could be sued in Minnesota under Rush’s policy. As long as it is understood that the Minnesota court has jurisdiction over the policy and State Farm, rather than the defendant, Justice Stevens argued that the suit could be continued.  

In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.

No and yes. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held that Congress did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers and affirmed the Court of Claims decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A. Blackmun noted a similar situation in <em>Nock v. United States</em>, where a congressional exemption from a judicial bar was ruled not to be in violation of separation of powers and upheld by the Court. Additionally, since Congress "had not made a good-faith effort to give the Sioux the full value of the Black Hills," Congress' 1877 action qualified as use of its eminent domain power under <em>Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States</em>. Therefore, the Sioux were entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.

New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.

No. In a 6-3 decision, Justice Byron R. White wrote the majority opinion reversing the lower court judgment. The Supreme Court held that a state court could only exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has “minimum contacts” with the state. In this case, the only contact with Oklahoma was the accident. The Volkswagen retailer and distributor had taken advantage of none of the benefits of Oklahoma law, had not solicited business in Oklahoma, and did not regularly sell cars that reached Oklahoma directly or indirectly. Justice William J. Brennan wrote a dissent expressing the view that the retailer and distributor had purposely entered their goods into the stream of commerce and had gained benefits from other states through the nature of their product. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote a dissent, stating that a local car retailer makes itself a part of a national network of retailers and can reasonably expect that its product may cause injury in other states. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent stating that cars were intended for local and long-distance travel, so it was not unreasonable for Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction when the accident happened there.

The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards "charitable purposes." Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court held that charitable solicitation is not purely commercial speech and is closely related to forms of protected speech such as advocacy. Justice Byron R. White, who authored the majority opinion, argued that "it is clear" that charitable solicitations are protected. While Schaumburg had an interest in preventing fraud, the ordinance did not fully serve that interest, which could be accomplished through alternate means. The ordinance in question also barred legitimate organizations from soliciting contributions. Schaumburg's interest did not justify the ordinance's "interference with protected speech,",which was therefore unconstitutional.

After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.

No. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the Miranda safeguards came into play "whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent," noting that the term "interrogation" under Miranda included "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." The Court then found that the officers' conversation did not qualify as words or actions that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit such a response from Innis.

On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films. On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Yes. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that projection and viewing of the films constituted a search, and there were no exigent circumstances to justify the lack of a warrant. The fact that the FBI was lawfully in possession of the boxes did not grant them the authority to view the films without a warrant. The Court also held that the fact that the boxes had been opened by a third party, which placed information about the content of the films in plain view, did not alter the owner’s legitimate expectation of privacy. Justice Thurgood Marshall concurred in the judgment. Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment. He argued that even if the films had been viewed by a third party before the FBI viewed them, the government could not consider the films to be in plain view and warrants unnecessary. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote a dissent and argued that the Fourth Amendment only prevented unlawful searches and seizures by the government. Because the FBI received the films after the boxes had been opened to the point that the suggestive material was visible, the FBI’s viewing of the films did not violate Fourth Amendment rights.

These are three consolidated cases. Jasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.

No, Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, since none of the parties to the case challenged the Amendment. The opinion referenced <i>Harris v. McCrae</i>, another opinion filed the same day, which upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The Court also held that a state is not obligated to pay for abortions through Medicaid when there will be no federal reimbursement because of the restrictions of the Hyde Amendment. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. dissented and argued that a state’s interest in protecting the life of a fetus could not come at the cost of denying poor women medically necessary abortions. He also argued that, in upholding the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the Court allowed a state to yield undue influence over a woman’s decision whether or not to go through with a pregnancy; this influence disproportionally affects poor women. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry A. Blackmun joined in the dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall dissented and argued that the Hyde Amendment essentially denies women in poverty the ability to have a legal abortion that protects their health but not their lives. Because the burden falls exclusively on poor women who cannot afford an abortion, he disagreed with the Court’s finding that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his a dissenting opinion, Justice Harry A. Blackmun expressed that the Court refused to recognize the realities of poverty. He argued that such actions by the government wrongfully punish those living in poverty. Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a dissenting opinion. He argued that, since the government provides Medicaid on the basis of expressed financial and medical need, it could not deny assistance when both of those needs have been shown. If a woman has a constitutional right to choose to protect her own health rather than the potential life of the fetus, the government cannot deny her assistance to which she would otherwise be entitled.

Upon accepting employment in the CIA in 1968, Snepp signed an agreement with the Agency that he would not publish any information during or after his term of employment relating to the Agency's activities without first obtaining Agency approval. Snepp published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without first submitting his manuscript to the Agency for review. A lower court denied Snepp royalties from his book for his failure to secure approval.

No. The Court upheld the lower court's ruling and agreed that Snepp had breached the "constructive trust" between him and the government. That was especially significant in this case since this type of violation by a former agent "impairs the CIA's ability to perform its statutory duties" and potentially jeopardizes the safety of current government operatives and Snepp himself. The Court reached this decision without hearing oral argument by the parties.

Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

No. Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Court held that a state statute immunizing parole officials from injuries resulting from parole decisions does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute does not condone the killing of a human being, but rather it protects parole officials who are required to make a difficult decision. There is always a risk involved in releasing a prisoner, and the parole officer must use his discretion in making the decision. The state has a parole program to promote rehabilitation and it is the duty of the state legislature, not the courts, to decide if that program is rational. Therefore, the suit against the parole officials by the family of a parolee’s murder victim is not actionable.

The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.

Yes. In a two-sentence unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate.

The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.

Yes. In an 8-1 opinion, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals of New York and held that the New York's ban violated the right to commercial speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Lewis F. Powell cited the protections for "commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation" set forth in <em>Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council</em>. The Court recognized New York's interest in promoting energy conservation and accepted that the PSC's regulation would directly further that interest. However, since the regulation restricted all promotional advertising regardless of its effect on electricity use, it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment under <em>First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti</em>. Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Harry A. Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens each wrote opinions concurring in part and in the judgment.

Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.

No. In a unanimous 8-0 decision, the Court held that the special master's determination was correct. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger acknowledged the ambiguity in the Submerged Lands Act. However, since the piers and island in dispute did not provide protection, they did not qualify as "harbor works" that would have extended the coastline.

The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.

In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. and found that "'[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'" The Court found that South Dakota was acting as a "market participant" rather than a "market regulator," and was capable of withdrawing from the interstate market if an in-state shortage arose. The Court rejected arguments that cement was a "natural resource" to which South Dakota had sought to limit outside access.

In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.

No. The Court held that the minority set-aside program was a legitimate exercise of congressional power. The Court found that Congress could pursue the objectives of the minority business enterprise program under the Spending Power. The plurality opinion noted that Congress could have regulated the practices of contractors on federally funded projects under the Commerce Clause as well. The Court further held that in the remedial context, Congress did not have to act "in a wholly 'color-blind' fashion."

While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical &amp; Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.

Yes. Justice Potter Stewart delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that plain language and the legislative history of the statutes required the SEC to establish defendant’s intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud” for violations of Section 10(b) and the part of Section 17(a) that specifically refers to the use of a device, scheme, or artifice with intent to defraud. Employing the same textual and legislative history analysis, the Court further held that the parts Section 17(a) that deal with false statements, omissions of fact, and transactions or practices that operate as fraud do not contain an intent requirement. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he urged those critical of the public policy implications to voice their complaints to Congress. He also argued that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the ruling on the ground that Aaron “intentionally failed” to terminate the fraudulent statements about Lawn-A-Mat stock. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which he argued that the SEC should not be required to prove the defendants intent to establish a violation of Section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, or Section 17(a). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  

On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute. After being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.

No. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to restrict the admission of unreliable hearsay into evidence. Generally, face-to-face confrontation is preferred as it allows the accused to probe the memory of the witness and allows the jury to take the demeanor of the witness into account when assessing the reliability of the testimony. The Court held that the opportunity for face-to-face interaction with, and cross-examination of, the witness at the previous hearing satisfied the requirements of the Confrontation Clause for the later trial. Although Ms. Isaacs was not officially cross-examined, the questions she answered had the proper form and intent to satisfy the purpose of cross-examination and establish the reliability of the testimony. The Court also held that a witness may be declared officially unavailable if a good-faith effort was made to locate her, as was the case with Ms. Isaacs. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that the state did not meet its burden to show a diligent effort to locate Ms. Isaacs. The state sent subpoenas to the home of Ms. Isaacs’ parents, although there was evidence that she no longer resided there, and made no further effort to locate her new residence. Without evidence of a diligent effort to locate the witness, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause could not be circumvented. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice John Paul Stevens joined the dissent.

Gilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS <i>Export Builder</i>, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (“AELI”). On October 13, 1972, while the SS <i>Export Builder</i> was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries. Alvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (“Jones Act”) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States’ territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (“DOHSA”) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in <i>Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet</i> allowed a decedent’s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries. New York’s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI’s use of <i>Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques</i>, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.

Yes. In a 6-3 decision with two concurrences, Justice William Brennan held that maritime law authorizes Juanita Alvez to maintain an action for damages against AELI resulting from the loss of her husband’s society. He rejected AELI’s argument that the Jones Act and DOHSA represented Congress’ intention to preclude actions for loss of consortium or society. He noted that DOHSA centered on relief for fatal injuries on the high seas, not nonfatal injuries within terrestrial waters, and that the Jones Act does not exhaustively regulate the claims of longshoremen or seamen. Justice Brennan agreed with the lower courts that the Court’s recent maritime law decisions eroded the justification for denying claims used in <i>Igneri</i>. He also pointed to the contemporary state of the law, where a clear majority of states permitted a wife to recover damages for loss of consortium from personal injuries to her husband. Justice Lewis Powell concurred, writing that there was no rational basis for drawing a distinction between fatal and nonfatal injuries in loss of consortium cases. Justice Thurgood Marshall, joined by Justices Potter Stewart and William Rehnquist, dissented. He questioned the majority’s assumption that the federal question at hand would necessarily survive AELI’s appeals in state court. He warned against the practice of granting review to non-final lower court orders, and recommended denying certiorari to such cases in the future.

President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan.

Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case was not justiciable. Rehnquist led a group of four others who believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how the President and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs. Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. He reasoned that since Congress had not formally challenged Carter's authority, technically there was no conflict for the Court to resolve. The dissenters were prepared to hear the case.

High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.

Yes. Since the California Constitution protected "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the shopping centers are privately owned," PruneYard could not prevent the students from soliciting on its property. The Court argued that it was within California's power to guarantee this expansive free speech right since it did not unreasonably intrude on the rights of private property owners.