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0 | reversed | <p>In 1970, Jane Roe (a fictional name used in court documents to protect the plaintiff’s identity) filed a lawsuit against Henry Wade, the district attorney of Dallas County, Texas, where she resided, challenging a Texas law making abortion illegal except by a doctor’s orders to save a woman’s life. In her lawsuit, Roe alleged that the state laws were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.</p> | True | 50606 | 501 | 7 | majority opinion | 70-18 | Jane Roe | Roe v. Wade | 2 | Henry Wade | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-18 |
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1 | reversed/remanded | <p>Joan Stanley had three children with Peter Stanley. The Stanleys never married, but lived together off and on for 18 years. When Joan died, the State of Illinois took the children. Under Illinois law, unwed fathers were presumed unfit parents regardless of their actual fitness and their children became wards of the state. Peter appealed the decision, arguing that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because unwed mothers were not deprived of their children without a showing that they were actually unfit parents. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Stanley’s Equal Protection claim, holding that his actual fitness as a parent was irrelevant because he and the children’s mother were unmarried.</p> | True | 50613 | 757 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-5014 | Peter Stanley, Sr. | Stanley v. Illinois | Civil Rights | 2 | Illinois | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5014 |
2 | reversed/remanded | <p>John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders. While his appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, Giglio’s counsel discovered new evidence. The evidence indicated that the prosecution failed to disclose that it promised a key witness immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony against Giglio. The district court denied Giglio’s motion for a new trial, finding that the error did not affect the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> | True | 50623 | 495 | 7 | majority opinion | 70-29 | John Giglio | Giglio v. United States | Due Process | 0 | United States | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-29 |
3 | reversed/remanded | <p>The Idaho Probate Code specified that "males must be preferred to females" in appointing administrators of estates. After the death of their adopted son, both Sally and Cecil Reed sought to be named the administrator of their son's estate (the Reeds were separated). According to the Probate Code, Cecil was appointed administrator and Sally challenged the law in court.</p> | True | 50632 | 378 | 7 | majority opinion | 70-4 | Sally Reed | Reed v. Reed | Civil Rights | 0 | Cecil Reed | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-4 |
4 | vacated/remanded | <p>Miller, after conducting a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, was convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. Some unwilling recipients of Miller's brochures complained to the police, initiating the legal proceedings.</p> | True | 50643 | 305 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-73 | Marvin Miller | Miller v. California | First Amendment | 4 | California | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-73 |
5 | reversed | <p>Ernest E. Mandel was a Belgian professional journalist and editor-in-chief of La Guache, a Belgian Left Socialist weekly publication. He described himself as a revolutionary Marxist, advocating the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world Communism. Previously, the United States twice allowed Mandel to temporarily visit the United States -- once as a working journalist in 1962 and once as a lecturer in 1968. Both times and without Mandel’s knowledge, the State Department found him ineligible, but the attorney general used his discretionary power under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to admit Mendel temporarily.</p>
<p>The Graduate Student Association at Stanford University invited Mandel to the United States for six days to participate in a conference. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Counsel in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States. Other persons invited Mandel to additional events, and Mandel filed a second visa application in October detailing a more extensive itinerary. On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that the State Department -- headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers -- refused his first application. The State Department later recommended to Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October application. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service stated that Mandel’s 1968 activities far exceeded the scope of that visa and concluded that the Attorney General should not waive Mandel’s ineligibility. Mandel’s address to the conference was delivered by telephone.</p>
<p>Mandel, along with various United States citizens who invited Mandel to speaking engagements, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge district court panel held in a 2-1 decision that citizens of the United States have a First Amendment right to have Mandel enter the country and to hear him speak. The court entered a declaratory judgment ruling that the portions of the statute delegating the waiver power to the attorney general were invalid as applied to Mandel; it also enjoined Rogers and Kleindienst from denying Mandel admission to the United States.</p> | True | 50644 | 2282 | 6 | majority opinion | 71-16 | Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General of the United States; William P. Rogers, Secretary of State | Kleindienst v. Mandel | First Amendment | 3 | Ernest E. Mandel, et al. | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-16 |
6 | <p>The Illinois Crime Investigating Commission was created to investigate organized crime in Illinois. Albert Sarno and Chris Cardi were police officers. The Commission wanted the officers to testify pursuant to an investigation of a "juice loan" or "loan shark" racket.</p>
<p>On February 8, 1968, the presiding judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County entered an order requiring the petitioners to appear before the commission under a grant of immunity pursuant to an Illinois statute. On February 24, 1968, the officers appeared, but they refused to answer any questions pleading their right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.</p>
<p>On March 21, 1968, the Commission filed a motion in the Circuit court, and moved the court to enter an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and answer the questions. The officers filed a motion to dismiss or to strike the foregoing motion. The officers' motion was denied, and the court entered an order directing the petitioners to appear before the Commission and to answer the questions. The officers refused to obey this subsequent order, still pleading the Fifth Amendment. The officers were found in contempt of court and sentenced to serve a period of six months in the County Jail. The decision of the trial court was appealed and subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court. The officers appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | False | 50655 | 1424 | 5 | per curiam | 70-7 | Sarno | Sarno v. Illinois Crime Investigating Commission | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Illinois Crime Investigating Commission | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-7 |
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7 | reversed | <p>Jon Argersinger was an indigent charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor in the State of Florida. The charge carried with it a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. During the bench trial in which he was convicted and sentenced to serve ninety days in jail, Argersinger was not represented by an attorney.</p> | True | 50656 | 347 | 9 | majority opinion | 70-5015 | Argersinger | Argersinger v. Hamlin | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Hamlin | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5015 |
8 | affirmed | <p>William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of contraceptives.</p> | False | 50657 | 420 | 6 | majority opinion | 70-17 | Eisenstadt | Eisenstadt v. Baird | Privacy | 1 | Baird | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-17 |
9 | affirmed | <p>A Georgia state court convicted Johnny Wilson of violating a state statute. The statute provided that "[a]ny person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the argument. Mr. Wilson successfully sought habeas corpus relief from a Georgia federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> | False | 50663 | 612 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-26 | Gooding | Gooding v. Wilson | First Amendment | 2 | Wilson | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-26 |
10 | reversed/remanded | <p>Furman was burglarizing a private home when a family member discovered him. He attempted to flee, and in doing so tripped and fell. The gun that he was carrying went off and killed a resident of the home. He was convicted of murder and sentenced to death (Two other death penalty cases were decided along with Furman: Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas. These cases concern the constitutionality of the death sentence for rape and murder convictions, respectively).</p> | True | 50671 | 477 | 5 | per curiam | 69-5003 | Furman | Furman v. Georgia | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Georgia | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5030 |
11 | reversed/remanded | <p>K. Leroy Irvis, a black man who was a guest of a white member of the Moose Lodge No. 107, was refused service at the club's dining room because of his race. The bylaws of the Lodge limited membership to white male Caucasians. Irvis challenged the club's refusal to serve him, arguing that the action of the Pennsylvania liquor board issuing the Lodge a license made the club's discrimination "state action."</p> | True | 50683 | 415 | 6 | majority opinion | 70-75 | Moose Lodge No. 107 | Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis | Civil Rights | 3 | Irvis | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-75 |
12 | affirmed | <p>After observing and interviewing a number of people synthesizing and using drugs in a two-county area in Kentucky, Branzburg, a reporter, wrote a story which appeared in a Louisville newspaper. On two occasions he was called to testify before state grand juries which were investigating drug crimes. Branzburg refused to testify and potentially disclose the identities of his confidential sources. Similarly, in the companion cases of In re Pappas and United States v. Caldwell, two different reporters, each covering activity within the Black Panther organization, were called to testify before grand juries and reveal trusted information. Like Branzburg, both Pappas and Caldwell refused to appear before their respective grand juries.</p> | False | 50688 | 745 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-85 | Branzburg | Branzburg v. Hayes | First Amendment | 4 | Hayes | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85 |
13 | affirmed | <p>William Shard reported to the Chicago police that two men stole his wallet. The wallet contained traveler’s checks and his social security card, among other things. The next day, two police officers stopped Thomas Kirby and his friend, Ralph Bean. When asked for identification, Kirby produced Shard’s wallet. The officers arrested Kirby and Bean and brought them to the Maxwell Street Police Station. Once there, the officers learned about Shard’s robbery and sent a car to pick up Shard and bring him to the station. Without an attorney present, police asked Shard if Kirby and Bean were his robbers. Shard instantly gave a positive identification. Kirby and Bean were not indicted until almost 6 weeks later. At trial, Kirby unsuccessfully attempted to suppress Shard’s identification. The jury found Kirby guilty and the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District affirmed.</p> | False | 50689 | 897 | 5 | plurality opinion | 70-5061 | Thomas Kirby | Kirby v. Illinois | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Illinois | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5061 |
14 | affirmed | <p>Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to their religious beliefs.</p> | False | 50692 | 424 | 7 | majority opinion | 70-110 | Wisconsin | Wisconsin v. Yoder | First Amendment | 0 | Yoder | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-110 |
15 | reversed/remanded | <p>David Roth was hired under a one-year contract to teach political science at Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh. He was informed that he would not be rehired at the end of his contract. No reasons were given for this decision. Roth brought suit against the university claiming that (1) the real reason for his non-retention was his criticism of the university administration violating his right to free speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the university's failure to advise him of the reason for its decision violated his right to procedural due process. Roth won on the second claim. It was upheld on appeal.</p> | True | 50695 | 635 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-162 | Board of Regents of State Colleges | Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth | Due Process | 3 | David Roth | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-162 |
16 | reversed/remanded | <p>Mississippi Chemical Corp. and Costal Chemical Corp. were “cooperate associations” within the meaning of the Agricultural Marketing Act. The associations qualified for membership in a “bank for Cooperatives”, which allowed them to borrow money. The Farm Credit Act of 1955 required that the associations buy Class “C” stocks valued at $100. The associations claimed a $99 interest deduction on their taxes for every stock purchased. When the Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction, the associations paid the deficiency and then sued for a refund. The district court found for the associations and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 50707 | 678 | 8 | majority opinion | 70-52 | United States | United States v. Mississippi Chemical Corporation | Federal Taxation | 0 | Mississippi Chemical Corporation, Costal Chemical Corp | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-52 |
17 | vacated/remanded | <p>In 1969, the State of New York indicted Rudolph Santobello on two felony counts. After Santobello pled not guilty to both counts, the prosecutor offered him a plea deal. In order to receive a lighter sentence, Santobello could plead guilty to a lesser offense. The prosecutor further agreed not to recommend a sentence to the judge. Santobello accepted the deal and entered a plea of guilty to the lesser offense.</p>
<p>After several months, Santobello still had not been sentenced. By the time the court considered his sentencing, both Santobello’s defense counsel and the original prosecutor had been replaced. The new prosecutor, unaware of the previous prosecutor’s plea offer, recommended the maximum one-year sentence for Santobello’s crime. Despite Santobello’s objections, the court issued the maximum sentence. Santobello appealed, but the appellate court affirmed his conviction."</p> | True | 50709 | 899 | 4 | majority opinion | 70-98 | Rudolph Santobello | Santobello v. New York | Criminal Procedure | 3 | State of New York | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-98 |
18 | reversed/remanded | <p>On January 4, 1967, John J. Morrissey entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with false uttering of a check. After serving part of his seven-year sentence, the Iowa Board of Parole granted Morrissey parole, and he was released from Iowa State Penitentiary on June 20, 1968. On January 24, 1969, however, Morrissey was arrested in Cedar Rapids for violating his parole. The Board of Parole entered an order revoking his parole and returning Morrissey to prison. Morrissey filed several habeas corpus actions in Iowa state courts between June 1969 and August 1969, but soon exhausted his state remedies. On September 12, 1969, Morrissey filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court, which was denied; the court also denied his notice of appeal, considered as an application for certificate of probable cause. The United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted Morrissey’s application and appointed counsel to represent Morrissey on appeal.</p>
<p>On April 29, 1968, G. Donald Booher entered a guilty plea to an information charging him with forgery. On November 14, 1968, the Board of Parole granted his parole, releasing Booher from his ten-year sentence at Iowa State Penitentiary. On August 28, 1969, Booher allegedly violated his parole, and the Board of Parole revoked his parole on September 13. Booher filed several petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in state district court between November 1969 and March 1970; the district court dismissed all of Booher’s petitions. He then filed an application for certificate of probable cause in federal district court on June 16, 1970. The district court denied his application, but the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, granted it on appeal, appointing counsel and consolidating the claims of Morrissey and Booher. </p>
<p>Neither Morrissey nor Booher was granted a hearing or other opportunity to question, challenge, or become aware of the facts which formed the basis of each man’s parole violation. Neither man was granted the opportunity to present evidence on his own behalf, or to confront or cross-examine those providing testimony against him. The Eighth Circuit, however, affirmed the denials of the petitions of Morrissey and Booher in a 4-3 <i>en banc</i> ruling.</p> | True | 50715 | 2281 | 9 | majority opinion | 71-5103 | Morrissey | Morrissey v. Brewer | Due Process | 0 | Brewer | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-5103 |
19 | affirmed | <p>Several indigent California state prisoners filed complaints attacking the constitutionality of the regulations which forbade California prisons from having more than twelve law books in a prison library. On January 10, 1967, the district court consolidated the multiple cases because they contained common questions of law and fact. </p>
<p>The California prisoners moved for the convening of a three-judge district court, but their motion was denied. On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's order denying a three-judge panel. On May 28, 1970, a three-judge district court granted the plaintiffs relief from the regulation limiting the number of law books in prison libraries. The defendants appealed the district court's decision. </p> | False | 50719 | 796 | 7 | per curiam | 70-9 | Evelle J. Younger, et al. | Younger v. Gilmore | Due Process | 0 | Robert O. Gilmore, Jr., et al. | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-9 |
20 | vacated/remanded | <p>In 1971, Senator Mike Gravel received a copy of the Pentagon Papers: a set of classified documents concerning U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. Gravel then introduced the study, in its entirety, into the record of a Senate Subcommittee meeting. Gravel also arranged for the private publication of the papers by the Beacon Press. A federal grand jury subpoenaed Leonard Rodberg, one of Gravel's aides, to testify about his role in the acquisition and publication of the papers.</p> | True | 50721 | 487 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-1017 | Gravel | Gravel v. United States | First Amendment | 4 | United States | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-1017 |
21 | reversed | <p>During the early morning hours of October 30, 1966, an individual approached a police officer in a gas station parking lot in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and informed him that another individual in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer approached the vehicle on foot and asked the occupant, Robert Williams, to open the door. When Williams rolled down the window instead, the officer reached into the car and removed a gun from Williams’ waistband, though the gun was not visible from outside the vehicle. The officer then arrested Williams for unlawful possession of a firearm and proceeded to search his vehicle, where he found heroin. Williams was convicted in a Connecticut state court of possession of a handgun and heroin.</p>
<p>After the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the conviction, Williams filed a claim against the prison warden, Frederick Adams, in which he alleged that the state of Connecticut continued to detain him unlawfully as a prisoner. Williams argued that the handgun and drugs were discovered through an unlawful search and should not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. The district court denied his petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sided with Williams and ordered that his conviction be set aside.</p>
<p> </p> | True | 50722 | 1336 | 6 | majority opinion | 70-283 | Frederick E. Adams | Adams v. Williams | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Robert Williams | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-283 |
22 | reversed/remanded | <p>Donald Tanner was a Vietnam War protestor who was distributing anti-war handbills inside Lloyd Center Mall in Portland, Oregon. The handbills were unrelated to the operations of Lloyd Center. Lloyd Center was privately owned by Lloyd Corporation, which prohibited the distribution of handbills inside the mall. While distributing handbills, Tanner and other protestors were informed by mall security that they should stop their distribution or be subject to arrest. The protestors ended their distribution, left the mall, and filed suit against Lloyd Corporation in United States District Court for the District of Oregon alleging their First Amendment right to free speech had been violated. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p> | True | 50723 | 799 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-492 | Lloyd Corp. Ltd. | Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner | First Amendment | 4 | Donald Tanner et al. | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-492 |
23 | affirmed | <p>Chicago adopted an ordinance prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of a school during school hours; the law made an exception for peaceful labor picketing. Mosley had been picketing near a public high school; he was protesting "black discrimination." Mosley sought a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.</p> | False | 50724 | 327 | 9 | majority opinion | 70-87 | Police Department of the City of Chicago | Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley | First Amendment | 0 | Mosley | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-87 |
24 | affirmed | <p>Gaines Ted Huson suffered a back injury while working on a fixed oil rig, owned by Chevron Oil Company, off the coast of Louisiana. More than two years after the injury, Huson sued Chevron for damages in United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division. Huson alleged that it took several months for him to realize the severity of his injury. The District Court relied on <em>Rodrigue v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.</em>, 395 U.S. 352 (1969), holding that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations applied instead of the admiralty laches doctrine so Huson's claim was barred. <em>Rodrigue</em> held that state law, not admiralty law, applied in these situations under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Huson argued that because he filed this case before the <em>Rodrigue</em> decision, applying its ruling would have an unfair retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Louisiana statute of limitations was inconsistent with the admiralty laches doctrine and, therefore, was not applicable.</p> | False | 50725 | 1139 | 7 | majority opinion | 70-11 | Chevron Oil Company | Chevron Oil Company v. Huson | Economic Activity | 0 | Huson | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-11 |
25 | affirmed | <p>Curtis C. Flood was a professional baseball player for the St. Louis Cardinals of the National League. Flood was a consistent, above-average hitter and a well-regarded outfielder, playing one full season without an error in 1966, an unusual achievement. Flood played twelve seasons for the Cardinals, participating in three World Series, and was the co-captain of the team between 1965 and 1969.</p>
<p>Despite this, Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in October 1969. The Cardinals did not consult him before the trade, and management only informed him about the trade after it was finalized. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball, Bowie K. Kuhn, requesting that the league make him a free agent. Kuhn denied his request, relying on baseball’s “reserve clause,” which maintained a given team’s rights to a player even after that player’s contract expired. Flood then filed an antitrust suit against Kuhn, the presidents of the two major leagues, and the twenty-four major league clubs. He declined to play for the Phillies in 1970 despite a $100,000 salary offer.</p>
<p>Flood alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws, civil rights laws, state statutes, the common law, and the imposition of a form of peonage and involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment and several federal laws. The trial court granted the defense’s motion for summary judgment, relying on <i>Federal Baseball Club v. National League</i> and <i>Toolson v. New York Yankees</i>, which established a long-standing antitrust exemption for professional baseball clubs. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed.</p> | False | 50745 | 1656 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-32 | Curtis C. Flood | Flood v. Kuhn | Economic Activity | 3 | Bowie K. Kuhn, Commissioner of Baseball, et al. | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-32 |
26 | reversed/remanded | <p>Perry Paul, an alleged bookmaker, and Jerome Zarowitz, a former executive of a Las Vegas casino, had their telephones tapped by federal agents. The agents recorded conversations between Paul and David Gelbard and between Zarowitz and Sidney Parnas. Gelbard and Parnas were called before a federal grand jury convened to investigate possible violations of federal gambling laws. When the government pressed Gelbard and Parnas to testify about these conversations, however, they refused to do so. Instead, they claimed that the wiretaps were illegal and argued that they should not be required to testify until given an opportunity to challenge the legality of the taps. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found Gelbard and Parnas in contempt of court and committed them to custody until they agreed to testify.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court, stating that "a witness in a grand jury proceeding has no right to resort to a court to secure authoritative advance determination concerning evidentiary matters that arise, or may arise, or to exclude evidence to be used in such a proceeding." Gelbard and Parnas then sought certiorari from the Court, pointing to a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacating contempt charges against a witness under similar circumstances.</p> | True | 50742 | 1403 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-110 | David Gelbard | Gelbard v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 4 | United States | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-110 |
27 | reversed/remanded | <p>Francis Haines was placed in solitary confinement for 15 days because he hit another inmate over the head with a shovel during a confrontation. Haines was 66 years old and suffered from a foot disability. He claimed his foot disability worsened due to being kept in solitary confinement, where he had to sleep on the floor with only blankets for support. Haines sued the State of Illinois and argued that the conditions of his solitary confinement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State of Illinois moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that Haines failed to state a cause of action. The district court granted the dismissal, and stated that courts can only intercede with the internal operations of state prisons under exceptional circumstances. The district court also found that Haines had failed to show that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal and determined that state penitentiaries were entitled to their own discretion when punishing inmates.</p> | True | 50749 | 1156 | 7 | per curiam | 70-5025 | Francis Haines | Haines v. Kerner | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Otto J. Kerner, former Governor of Illinois | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5025 |
28 | affirmed | <p>Kastigar cited his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination in refusing to testify before a grand jury, even though prosecutors had granted him immunity from the use of his testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings. He was found in contempt of court for failing to testify.</p> | False | 50753 | 297 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-117 | Kastigar | Kastigar v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 2 | United States | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-117 |
29 | affirmed | <p>In 1966, D.H. Overmyer Co. entered into a contract with Frick Co. for the manufacture and installation of a $223,000 automatic refrigeration system for a warehouse under construction in Toledo, Ohio. The agreement established a promissory note with monthly payment obligations. Overmyer began to fall behind on the monthly payments. Frick filed three mechanic's liens against the Toledo warehouse, and the two companies negotiated a new payment agreement in February 1967. Overmyer again fell behind on payments, and the two companies established a new note which contained a confession-of-judgment provision.</p>
<p>In June of 1968, Overmyer stopped making monthly payments under the new note and brought a claim against Frick in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York for alleged breaches of the original contract. The District court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show any likelihood that it would prevail on the merits.</p>
<p>Frick came before the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County, Ohio and asked the court to enter a judgment against Overmyer for the remaining balance of the note plus interest. Overmyer did not receive notice prior to the entry of the judgment because the confession-of-judgment provision waived the issuance and service of process and confessed judgment.</p>
<p>After the entry of the adverse judgment, Overmyer filed several motions, including a motion to vacate the judgment due to a lack of notice. After a hearing was held, the court denied the motions. Overmyer appealed to the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, Ohio, asserting deprivation of due process in violation of the Ohio and Federal Constitutions. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed the subsequent appeal, and Overmyer appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | False | 50754 | 1848 | 7 | majority opinion | 69-5 | D. H. Overmyer Company, Inc., of Ohio | D. H. Overmyer Company, Inc., of Ohio v. Frick | Civil Rights | 0 | Frick | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5 |
30 | affirmed | <p>On July 20, 1958, intruders beat an elderly couple to death in Christian County, Kentucky. Shortly afterward, police arrested Silas Manning and Willie Barker for the crime. Both were indicted on September 15 and assigned counsel on September 17. Barker’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, but the state believed it had a stronger case against Manning and that Manning’s testimony would be essential to convict Barker. The state obtained a series of continuances on Barker’s trial, as Manning was tried five times and finally convicted in 1962. Beginning in June 1959, Barker was out of prison on bail, and did not contest the continuances. Barker’s trial was set for March 19, 1963, and when the state requested further continuances, Barker unsuccessfully objected. At his trial beginning on October 9, 1963, Barker was convicted.</p>
<p>The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Barker sought habeas corpus relief in district court, by arguing that the long trial delay violated his right to a speedy trial, which the district court denied. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. </p> | False | 50756 | 1163 | 9 | majority opinion | 71-5255 | Willie Mae Barker | Barker v. Wingo | Criminal Procedure | 0 | John W. Wingo, Warden | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/71-5255 |
31 | affirmed | <p>A Tennessee law required a one-year residence in the state and a three-month residence in the county as a precondition for voting. James Blumstein, a university professor who had recently moved to Tennessee, challenged the law by filing suit against Governor Winfield Dunn and other local officials in federal district court.</p> | False | 50775 | 333 | 6 | majority opinion | 70-13 | Dunn | Dunn v. Blumstein | Civil Rights | 1 | Blumstein | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-13 |
32 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1954, Allen Generes and his son-in-law William Kelly formed Kelly-Generes Construction Co., Inc. Generes and Kelly each owned 44% of the stock, with the remaining 12% owned by Generes’ son and another son-in-law. Generes was the president of the corporation and did not deal with the day-to-day running of the business. In addition to his position as president, he held another full-time position as the president of a savings and loan association. In 1958, Generes and Kelly signed an indemnity agreement for the corporation. In 1962, the corporation seriously underbid two contracts and went deeply into debt. Generes loaned the corporation money, but it went bankrupt, and he was unable to receive reimbursement.</p>
<p>On his 1962 tax return, Generes claimed the money the corporation lost as business bad debt and his direct loans to the corporation as nonbusiness bad debt. He filed a claim for a refund on the business bad debt. This claim was the subject of a jury trial in which the jury was asked to determine whether Generes’ signing of the indemnity agreement was “proximately related to his trade or business of being an employee “of the corporation. The government requested a jury instruction to clarify that “significant” motivation satisfies the requirement, but the court refused and instructed the jury that “dominant” motivation was sufficient. The jury found in favor of Generes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the significant motivation standard was acceptable.</p>
<p> </p> | True | 50779 | 1543 | 6 | majority opinion | 70-28 | United States | United States v. Generes | Federal Taxation | 1 | Allen H. Generes and Edna Generes | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-28 |
33 | affirmed | <p>The Mineral King Valley was an undeveloped part of the Sequoia National Forest that was mostly used for mining until the 1920s. In the late 1940s, developers began to make bids on the land for recreational developments. Walt Disney Enterprises won a bid to start surveying the valley in the hopes of developing an 80-acre ski resort. The size of the proposed resort would require the construction of a new highway and massive high voltage power lines that would run through the Sequoia National Forest. The Sierra Club kept track of this project for years and hoped to stop it to protect the undeveloped land. The Sierra Club filed preliminary and permanent injunctions against federal officials to prevent them from granting permits for the development of the Mineral King Valley. The district court granted these injunctions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the injunctions on the grounds that the Sierra Club did not show that it would be directly affected by the actions of the defendants and therefore did not have standing to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act. Alternatively, the appellate court also held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury or likelihood of their success on the merits of the case.</p> | False | 50783 | 1289 | 4 | majority opinion | 70-34 | Sierra Club | Sierra Club v. Morton | Economic Activity | 3 | Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior of the United States | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-34 |
34 | affirmed | <p>Investigating three people it suspected of conspiring to destroy government property and bombing a Central Intelligence Agency office, officials used electronic surveillance to record suspects' conversations. The wiretapping was conducted without a search warrant.</p> | False | 50784 | 272 | 8 | majority opinion | 70-153 | United States | United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Criminal Procedure | 0 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-153 |
35 | <p>Maryland trial courts convicted Albert Murel and the other petitioners of various crimes and sentenced them to fixed terms of imprisonment. The petitioners were “defective delinquents,” so each was committed to the Patuxent Institution, a mental health facility, pursuant to the Maryland Defective Delinquency Law. </p>
<p>The petitioners sought a federal habeas corpus in district court. They challenged the conditions of their confinement and the procedures that led to their commitment. They also argued that Maryland's statutory standard for the commitment of "delinquent defendants" was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's opinion. The petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court. </p> | False | 50786 | 801 | 8 | per curiam | 70-5276 | Albert Delanor Murel, et al. | Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court | Judicial Power | 1 | Baltimore City Criminal Court, et al. | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-5276 |
|
36 | affirmed | <p>Robert Sindermann had been a professor at Odessa Junior College for four years, working under one-year contracts. After his election as president of the Texas Junior College Teachers Association, he had several public disagreements with the Odessa Junior College Board of Regents. In May 1969, after the expiration of his teaching contract, Sindermann was not offered a new contract and terminated by the college's Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents did issue a press release accusing him of insubordination, they did not provide official reasons for his termination or the option of a hearing for him to challenge his termination. Sindermann filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. He alleged that his termination was due to his disagreements with the Board of Regents, a violation of his First Amendment right to free speech, and that the lack of a hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The District Court ruled for the Board of Regents without a full trial. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which held that his termination would have been unconstitutional if it was based on his exercise of free speech or if he had a reasonable expectation of continued employment. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court.</p> | False | 50790 | 1353 | 5 | majority opinion | 70-36 | Charles R. Perry et al. | Perry v. Sindermann | Due Process | 3 | Robert P. Sindermann | 1971 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-36 |
37 | reversed | <p>A police officer stopped a car that had a burned out license plate light and headlight. There were six men in the car, including Robert Clyde Bustamonte. Only one passenger had a drivers license, and he claimed that his brother owned the car. The officer asked this man if he could search the car. The man said, “Sure, go ahead.” Inside the car, the officer found stolen checks. Those checks were admitted into evidence at Bustamonte’s trial for possessing checks with the intent to defraud. A jury convicted Bustamonte, and the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District affirmed. The court reasoned that consent to search the car was given voluntarily, so evidence obtained during the search was admissible. The California Supreme Court denied review. Bustamonte filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that consent is not voluntary unless it is proven that the person who consented to the search knew he had the right to refuse consent.</p> | True | 50805 | 1079 | 6 | majority opinion | 71-732 | Merle R. Schneckloth | Schneckloth v. Bustamonte | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Robert Clyde Bustamonte | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-732 |
38 | vacated/remanded | <p>Petitioners proved that for nearly ten years since 1960 the Denver, Colorado school system implemented an unconstitutional policy of racial discrimination by operating a segregated school system. The defense argued, and the District Court held, that even though one part of the Denver system was guilty of segregation, it did not follow that the entire system was segregated as well.</p> | True | 50808 | 391 | 7 | majority opinion | 71-507 | Keyes | Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado | Civil Rights | 1 | School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-507 |
39 | reversed | <p>Sharron Frontiero, a lieutenant in the United States Air Force, sought a dependent's allowance for her husband. Federal law provided that the wives of members of the military automatically became dependents; husbands of female members of the military, however, were not accepted as dependents unless they were dependent on their wives for over one-half of their support. Frontiero's request for dependent status for her husband was turned down.</p> | True | 50816 | 452 | 8 | plurality opinion | 71-1694 | Sharron Frontiero | Frontiero v. Richardson | Civil Rights | 1 | Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1694 |
40 | reversed in-part | <p>In 1971, the Virginia legislature reapportioned itself. The plan for the House of Representatives provided for 100 representatives from 52 districts with each House member representing an average of 46,485 constituents(with a variance between largest and smallest being 16.4 percent, compared to the ideal 3.89 percent). Henry Howell challenged the plan as unconstitutional because its population deviations were too large to satisfy the principle of "one person, one vote." This case was decided together with City of Virginia Beach v. Howell and Weinberg v. Prichard.</p> | True | 50821 | 577 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-364 | Mahan | Mahan v. Howell | Civil Rights | 3 | Howell | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-364 |
41 | reversed/remanded | <p>Charles J. Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C. Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in court identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present for the photo identifications before trial. The court of appeals opinion expressed doubt that the in court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.</p> | True | 50834 | 857 | 6 | majority opinion | 71-1255 | United States | United States v. Ash | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Charles J. Ash Jr. | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1255 |
42 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>A Tennessee state court convicted Archie Biggers in the rape of Margaret Beamer. The only major evidence against him was Ms. Beamer’s identification several weeks after the incident at a police station “show up”. The “show up” was similar to a line up, but contained the suspect alone. The police officer also had the suspect say phrases Ms. Beamer heard her attacker say on the night of the rape. Ms. Beamer said she had “no doubt” that Biggers was her attacker. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided court.</p>
<p>Biggers then filed a writ of habeas corpus, which the district court granted, holding that the Supreme Court affirming by an equally divided court did not bar the writ. The court also held that the “show up” procedure was so suggestive that it violated due process. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 50844 | 922 | 8 | majority opinion | 71-586 | William S. Neil, Warden of the Tennessee State Penitentiary | Neil v. Biggers | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Archie Nathaniel Biggers | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-586 |
43 | reversed/remanded | <p>Fre Le Poole Griffiths, a citizen of the Netherlands, came to the United States in 1965 as a visitor. In 1967, she married a U.S. citizen and became a resident of Connecticut. She then attended Yale Law School and applied to take the Connecticut Bar in 1970. Despite the County Bar Association finding her qualified in every aspect, she was denied the chance to sit for the exam due to the fact that she was not a U.S. citizen, which Rule 8(1) of the Connecticut Practice Book of 1963 required. Griffiths requested judicial relief and argued that the rule was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Superior Court of Connecticut denied her request for judicial relief and the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed.</p> | True | 50842 | 781 | 7 | majority opinion | 71-1336 | Fre Le Poole Griffiths | In re Griffiths | Civil Rights | 2 | State Bar Examining Committee of Connecticut | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1336 |
44 | affirmed | <p>To prevent gender discrimination, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations (the Commission) created an ordinance that forbids newspapers to advertise employment opportunities in gender-designated column. The National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. (Pittsburg Press) violated the ordinance by allowing employers to place advertisements in the male or female columns when the jobs advertised do not have occupational qualifications or exceptions. The Commission had a hearing and concluded Pittsburg Press violated the ordinance. The Pittsburg Press appealed and contended the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting its editorial judgment. The Commonwealth Court affirmed. </p> | False | 50847 | 773 | 5 | majority opinion | 72-419 | Pittsburgh Press Company | Pittsburgh Press Company v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations | First Amendment | 4 | Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-419 |
45 | reversed | <p>Engineers Gary Benson and Arthur Tabbot invented a faster and more efficient mathematical procedure for transforming the normal "decimal" type of numbers (base 10) into true "binary" numbers (base 2) which are simpler to process within computers. Their mathematical procedure was somewhat akin to long division, albeit with different steps. Their attorney argued before the patent examiner that the inventors were entitled to a broad patent covering any use of their new mathematical procedure, even use of it by a human using pencil and paper. The examiner rejected their invention. An appellate court overruled the examiner and ordered a patent to issue. The Commissioner of Patents then petitioned successfully to have the Supreme Court review this decision. Before the Supreme Court, the inventors' attorney backed down from his earlier position and argued that the inventors were entitled to a patent covering all uses of their new mathematical procedure in computers, but not necessarily to its use by humans using pencil and paper. (The members of the Supreme Court at that time knew very little about computers.)</p> | True | 50877 | 1128 | 6 | majority opinion | 71-485 | Gottschalk | Gottschalk v. Benson | Economic Activity | 0 | Benson | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-485 |
46 | reversed | <p>At the conclusion of an undercover drug investigation, Richard Russell was arrested by Washington police and eventually convicted in a district court for drug manufacturing crimes. Russell challenged his conviction as the result of unconstitutional entrapment practices, since an undercover agent supplied him with an essential ingredient of his drug manufacturing operation. On appeal from an adverse Court of Appeals decision, the Supreme Court granted the government certiorari.</p> | True | 50900 | 489 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-1585 | United States | United States v. Russell | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Russell | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1585 |
47 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>After pleading guilty to armed robbery in Wisconsin, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, which was later reduced to probation. Scarpelli signed an agreement allowing him to reside in Illinois and was supervised by the Adult Probation Department of Illinois. Shortly after, Scarpelli was caught committing burglary with an accomplice. After being informed of his Constitutional rights, Scarpelli admitted to committing the felony, an admission he later claimed was made under extreme duress. The Wisconsin Department of Corrections revoked Scarpelli’s probation because of the violation and imprisoned him. He was not given a hearing. Two years later, Scarpelli filed a writ of habeas corpus and the district court held that revoking Scarpelli’s probation without a hearing and an attorney was a denial of his Constitutional right of due process. Gagnon, the warden of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, appealed and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment. Gagnon appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.</p> | True | 50931 | 1098 | 8 | majority opinion | 71-1225 | John R Gagnon | Gagnon v. Scarpelli | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Gerald Scarpello | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1225 |
48 | reversed | <p>After receiving reports of the type of sexual activity occurring on the premises of licensed liquor sellers, the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control promulgated a series of regulations pertaining to the conduct on such licensed premises. The appellees, a group of holders of various liquor licenses, sought discretionary review of the new regulations. The district court held that the regulations unconstitutionally limited freedom of expression.</p> | True | 50940 | 470 | 6 | majority opinion | 71-36 | California, et al. | California v. LaRue | First Amendment | 3 | Robert LaRue, et al. | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-36 |
49 | reversed | <p>New York enacted Chapter 414 of its Education and Tax Laws, which created aid programs for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. These amendments included Section 1, which provided a grant for the maintenance and repair of schools that served many low-income students; Section 2, which provided tuition reimbursement for low-income parents; and Sections 3, 4, and 5, which provided tax relief for parents who did not qualify for tuition reimbursement. After the institution of these amendments, the Campaign for Public Education and Religious Liberty challenged the amendments in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that these amendments violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The District Court held that Sections 1 and 2 violated the Establishment Clause, but not Sections 3, 4, and 5.</p> | True | 50941 | 861 | 6 | majority opinion | 72-694 | Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty | Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist | First Amendment | 3 | Ewald B. Nyquist, Commissioner of Education of New York | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-694 |
50 | affirmed | <p>Patrick Dougall was a federally registered resident alien. He was employed by a nonprofit organization that was absorbed into the Manpower Career and Development Agency (MCDA) of New York City's Human Resources Administration. He was ineligible for employment by the city under Section 53 of the New York Civil Service Law because he was a noncitizen. He was terminated for this reason alone. Dougall and other noncitizens who were terminated under Section 53 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which held the statute unconstitutional. New York appealed the decision.</p> | False | 50944 | 638 | 8 | majority opinion | 71-1222 | Jule M. Sugarman, Administrator, New York City Human Resources Administration et al. | Sugarman v. Dougall | Civil Rights | 1 | Patrick McL. Dougall et al. | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1222 |
51 | reversed/remanded | <p>Leon Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder, in addition to confession to third parties, and was taken into custody. One month later, McDonald denied the confession and was released from custody. At trial, Chambers tried to prove McDonald admitted to the crime several times and confessed to third parties. The district court found the evidence of the confessions was inadmissible because of the voucher rule – a common-law rule that prohibits the defense from cross-examining a witness when the prosecution failed to do so – and the fact that the statements were hearsay. Chambers’ appealed and argued that the district court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to admit the evidence.</p> | True | 50946 | 792 | 8 | majority opinion | 71-5908 | Leon Chambers | Chambers v. Mississippi | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Mississippi | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-5908 |
52 | affirmed | <p>The Pennsylvania legislature passed Act 109, which reimbursed nonpublic religious schools for certain secular educational services. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court held that Act 109 violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The case was remanded, and on remand the district court entered an order which permitted the State to reimburse nonpublic religious schools for services provided before Act 109 was declared unconstitutional.</p>
<p>Lemon and others challenged the district court's opinion, asserting that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin payment of around $24 million set aside by the State to compensate nonpublic religious schools for educational services rendered during the 1970-1971 school year.</p> | False | 50949 | 749 | 5 | plurality opinion | 71-1470 | Lemon | Lemon v. Kurtzman | First Amendment | 3 | Kurtzman | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1470 |
53 | affirmed | <p>Jacinta Moreno lived with Ermina Sanchez, who was not related, and Sanchez's three children. Sanchez provided care to Moreno, who contributed to household living expenses. Moreno satisfied the income requirements for the federal food stamp program, but was denied under Section 3 of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, amended in 1971, which prohibited households with unrelated members from receiving food stamp benefits. Sanchez's food stamp benefits were also to be terminated. Moreno and other households who were denied benefits under Section 3 challenged the statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The District Court held that Section 3 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States appealed.</p> | False | 50954 | 761 | 7 | majority opinion | 72-534 | U.S. Department of Agriculture et al. | United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno | Civil Rights | 2 | Jacinta Moreno et al. | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-534 |
54 | vacated/remanded | <p>State officials in Georgia sought to enjoin the showing of allegedly obscene films at the Paris Adult Theatre. The Theatre clearly warned potential viewers of the sexual nature of the films and required that patrons be at least 21 years of age. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the films were "hard core" pornography unprotected by the Constitution.</p> | True | 50961 | 360 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-1051 | Paris Adult Theatre I | Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton | First Amendment | 4 | Slaton | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1051 |
55 | reversed | <p>Rosalind McClanahan was a member of the Navajo Indian nation who lived on the Navajo Reservation in Apache County, Arizona. Her employer withheld $16.20 in 1967 for Arizona state income taxes. McClanahan sought the return of her withheld income. She claimed that since she was a Navajo Indian residing on the reservation and since her income was derived completely on the reservation, she was exempt from state taxation. When her request was denied, she filed suit in Apache County Superior Court. The Superior Court dismissed her claim. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court of Arizona rejected her petition for review.</p> | True | 50979 | 664 | 9 | majority opinion | 71-834 | Rosalind McClanahan | McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission | Civil Rights | 0 | Arizona State Tax Commission | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-834 |
56 | vacated/remanded | <p>Percy Green, a black civil rights activist, was a mechanic working for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a St. Louis-based aerospace and aircraft manufacturer, from 1956 until August 28, 1964, when he was laid off. Green protested his discharge by saying that the company’s hiring and firing practices were racially motivated. As part of his protest, he and other members of the Congress on Racial Equality illegally parked their cars to block the main roads to the plant during the morning shift change. On July 2, 1965, there was a lock-in, in which workers were unable to leave, though the extent of Green’s involvement in this incident was unclear. On July 25, 1965, McDonnell Douglas Corporation advertised for qualified mechanics and Green reapplied, only to be turned down due to his involvement in the protests. </p>
<p>Green filed a petition with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and alleged that he was denied his position because of his race and civil rights activism. The Commission did not make any finding on the racial bias charge, but did conclude that Green was denied his job upon reapplication due to his involvement in civil rights protests. When the situation could not be resolved outside the courts, Green sued McDonnell Douglas Corporation. The district court dismissed the racial discrimination charge and held that the McDonnell Douglas Corporation refused to rehire Green because of his participation in illegal demonstrations rather than legitimate civil rights issues. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the holding that illegal protests were not protected activities but remanded the case to reconsider the racial discrimination charge. </p> | True | 50985 | 1717 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-490 | McDonnell Douglas Corporation | McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green | Civil Rights | 0 | Percy Green | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/72-490 |
57 | reversed | <p>In addition to being funded through a state-funded program designed to establish a minimum educational threshold in every school, Texas public elementary and secondary schools rely on local property taxes for supplemental revenue. Rodriguez, acting on behalf of students whose families reside in poor districts, challenged this funding scheme by arguing that it underprivileged such students because their schools lacked the vast property tax base that other districts utilized. The reliance on assessable property, the school districts claimed, caused severe inter-district disparities in per-pupil expenditures.</p> | True | 50984 | 621 | 5 | majority opinion | 71-1332 | San Antonio Independent School District | San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez | Civil Rights | 4 | Rodriguez | 1972 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1332 |
58 | affirmed | <p>In October 1970, an Assistant United States Attorney filed an application for a wiretap with a federal judge. According to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Act), every application for the interception of wire or oral communications had to be authorized by the Attorney General or by an Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. The application in this case apparently contained all of the proper authorizations and signatures, was approved, and was used to arrest and charge Dominic Giordano with a drug crime. At Giordano’s pre-trial hearing, it came to light that the Assistant Attorney General had allowed an Executive Assistant in his office to authorize this and other applications. The district court granted Giordano’s motion to suppress the government’s evidence because it had misidentified the approving officer. The government appealed and argued that the court should not have suppressed the evidence because the Assistant Attorney General’s delegation to the Executive Assistant was not inconsistent with the Act and because the government’s conduct did not violate the Constitution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision and held that the Executive Assistant’s approval violated the Act, which required the suppression of the evidence in question.</p> | False | 50993 | 1376 | 5 | majority opinion | 72-1057 | United States | United States v. Giordano | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Dominic Nicholas Giordano et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1057 |
59 | affirmed | <p>A grand jury returned indictments against seven of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other government branches to preserve confidential communications within the executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together with Nixon v. United States.</p> | False | 50995 | 566 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1766 | United States | United States v. Nixon | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Richard M. Nixon, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-1766 |
60 | reversed/remanded | <p>A suit charging that the Detroit, Michigan public school system was racially segregated as a result of official policies was filed against Governor Milliken. After reviewing the case and concluding the system was segregated, a district court ordered the adoption of a desegregation plan that encompassed eighty-five outlying school districts. The lower court found that Detroit-only plans were inadequate. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the metropolitan plan. This case was decided together with Allen Park Public Schools v. Bradley and Grosse Pointe Public School System v. Bradley.</p> | True | 51007 | 617 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-434 | Milliken | Milliken v. Bradley | Civil Rights | 4 | Bradley | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-434 |
61 | reversed/remanded | <p>Police arrested William Earl Matlock, a bank robbery suspect, in the front yard of the house where he lived. Police did not ask Matlock which room he occupied in the house or whether they could conduct a search. A woman, who gave them permission to search the house, including the bedroom where Matlock lived, let the officers inside. The woman’s parents leased the house and Matlock paid them rent for his room. In that room, police found $4,995 in cash.</p>
<p>At trial, Matlock moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search. He argued that the unwarranted search of his room was illegal. At the suppression hearing, the woman who agreed to the search testified that she lived with Matlock in his room. This gave her sufficient authority to lawfully consent to the search. The district court held that those statements were inadmissible hearsay and granted the motion to suppress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Affirmed.</p> | True | 51017 | 966 | 6 | majority opinion | 72-1355 | United States | United States v. Matlock | Criminal Procedure | 3 | William Earl Matlock | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1355 |
62 | reversed | <p>In 1972, the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party, wished to place its candidates for President and Vice President of the United States on the ballot. The Indiana State Election Board rejected its application to do so until the officers of the party had filed an affidavit stating that the party did not advocate the overthrow of local, state, or national government by force or violence. The Communist Party of Indiana sued State Election Board and its members and sought an injunction that would require the Board to place the candidates on the ballot. The district court found the policy constitutional and required the Communist Party of Indiana to submit an affidavit to that effect. The Board found the Party’s affidavit unsatisfactory and again rejected it. The Party sought an injunction requiring the Board to accept the affidavit, and the district court denied the motion.</p>
<p> </p> | True | 51026 | 912 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-1040 | Communist Party of Indiana, et al. | Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb | First Amendment | 0 | Edgar D. Whitcomb, etc., at al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1040 |
63 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>An inmate of a Nebraska state prison started a class action lawsuit, on behalf of himself and other inmates, alleging that prison disciplinary proceedings violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The suit also objected to the prison's inspection of privileged mail between inmates and their attorneys. The district court rejected the disciplinary proceeding claims, but held that the inspection of mail violated the prisoners' right of access to the courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the disciplinary proceeding claims, holding that prisons should use the procedures used in probation and parole hearings for disciplinary proceeding. The court also affirmed the district court as to the inspection of mail.</p> | True | 51029 | 769 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-679 | Wolff | Wolff v. McDonnell | Due Process | 3 | McDonnell | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-679 |
64 | reversed | <p>Carolyn Aiello experienced disability as a result of complications during her pregnancy. She was ineligible for benefits from California's Disability Fund under Section 2626 of California's Unemployment Insurance Code. Section 2626 denied benefits to women whose disabilities resulted from pregnancy. Aiello and other disabled women who were denied benefits under Section 2626 challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held the statute unconstitutional. The state appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51031 | 631 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-640 | Geduldig, Director, Department of Human Resources Development | Geduldig v. Aiello | Civil Rights | 3 | Carolyn Aiello et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-640 |
65 | reversed | <p>A federal grand jury questioned John P. Calandra in connection with loan sharking activities. The questions were based on evidence obtained during a search of Calandra’s business, Royal Machine and Tool Company. Calandra refused to answer any questions, arguing that the search of Royal Machine unlawfully violated the Fourth Amendment. The government attempted to grant Calandra immunity in district court, but he asked the court to suppress evidence obtained during the search. The district court granted the suppression order and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied. Under the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained during an unlawful search and seizure cannot be used against the victim of that search in a criminal proceeding.</p> | True | 51033 | 828 | 6 | majority opinion | 72-734 | United States | United States v. Calandra | Criminal Procedure | 3 | John P. Calandra | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-734 |
66 | reversed | <p>Richardson, a taxpayer interested in activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, sued the government to provide records detailing the CIA's expenditures.</p> | True | 51035 | 164 | 5 | majority opinion | 72-885 | United States | United States v. Richardson | Judicial Power | 4 | Richardson | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-885 |
67 | reversed | <p>An Albany, Georgia theater manager was convicted under a Georgia obscenity law when he showed the critically acclaimed film "Carnal Knowledge." The film explored social conceptions of sexuality and starred Jack Nicholson and Ann Margaret.</p> | True | 51039 | 246 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-557 | Jenkins | Jenkins v. Georgia | First Amendment | 0 | Georgia | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-557 |
68 | affirmed | <p>Carol Jo LaFleur was a teacher at Patrick Henry Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio. She was forced to discontinue her duties on March 12, 1971 because the Cleveland School Board required every teacher to take maternity leave without pay five months before the expected date of birth. The board also ruled that a teacher could not return from maternity leave until 1) the next school semester began, 2) the teacher obtained a certificate from her physician showing good medical health, and 3) the newborn child was three months old.</p>
<p>Ann Elizabeth Nelson was a French teacher at Central Junior High School, also in Cleveland. She reported her pregnancy to the school's principal on January 29, 1971, and applied for maternity leave. Both LaFleur and Nelson wanted to continue teaching until the end of the school year, but were forced to leave in March 1971. LaFleur and Nelson filed separate suits in district court challenging the constitutionality of the school boards' maternity leave rules; the court tried their cases together, and held that the board's policies were constitutional. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed, concluding that the mandatory leave policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause.</p>
<p>Susan Cohen was a social studies teacher at Midlothian High School in Chesterfield County, Virginia. Cohen notified the Chesterfield School Board that she was pregnant on November 2, 1970. The board's rule required pregnant teachers to go on maternity leave at the end of their fifth month, but allowed re-employment the next school year upon submission of a medical certificate from the teacher's physician. Cohen's obstetrician believed that she was fit to continue working, but the school board denied Cohen's request for an extension. Cohen challenged the constitutionality of Chesterfield County's rule in district court, which held that the regulation violated the equal protection clause. The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but on rehearing en banc, the court upheld the constitutionality of the regulation.</p> | False | 51062 | 2138 | 7 | majority opinion | 72-777 | Cleveland Board of Education, Chesterfield County School Board, Dr. Robert F. Kelly | Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur | Civil Rights | 2 | Jo Carol LaFleur, Ann Elizabeth Nelson, Susan Cohen | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-777 |
69 | affirmed | <p>Since 1941, Florida has granted a $500 property tax exemption for widows but no similar exemption for widowers. Widower Mel Kahn applied to the Dade County Tax Assessor’s Office for the property tax exemption, which was denied. He sued in circuit court and sought a declaratory judgment. The circuit court held that the statute was gender-based and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and held that the gender classification had a “fair and substantial relation” to the purpose of the legislation.</p> | False | 51071 | 580 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-78 | Mel Kahn, etc. | Kahn v. Shevin | Civil Rights | 3 | Robert L. Shevin, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-78 |
70 | reversed/remanded | <p>On October 8, 1970, Richard Guy Steffel and other individuals were distributing flyers protesting American involvement in the Vietnam War on the exterior sidewalk of the North DeKalb Shopping Center. Employees asked them to stop, but they did not, so the employees called the police. The police informed them that they would be arrested under a Georgia criminal statute if they did not stop, so they left. The next day Steffel and another individual returned to hand out flyers. The police were called again, and Steffel left to avoid arrest. The other individual, however, was arrested. </p>
<p>Steffel sued and argued that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because his fear of being arrested kept him from distributing flyers. The district court dismissed the action and denied all relief after it found no evidence that the state acted in bad faith and therefore there was no active controversy. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51075 | 986 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-5581 | Richard Guy Steffel | Steffel v. Thompson | Judicial Power | 0 | John R. Thompson, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-5581 |
71 | affirmed | <p>Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo, and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company and fell behind on payments. W. T. Grant sued Mitchell in state court to recover the $574.17 balance. Pursuant to Louisiana law, W. T. Grant offered proof that it had a vendor's lien on the property and that Mitchell owed a balance and asked the court to issue a writ of sequestration to retain and hold the property pending the outcome of the suit. The trial court approved the writ without notifying Mitchell or allowing him an opportunity to defend his right to the property at a hearing. Mitchell moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration and argued that seizing his property without notice or an opportunity to defend his interest in the property violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The trial court, the appellate court, and the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected Mitchell's argument and held that W. T. Grant's course of conduct ensured Mitchell's due process by proceeding according to Louisiana law.</p> | False | 51081 | 1039 | 5 | majority opinion | 72-6160 | Mitchell | Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company | Civil Rights | 4 | W. T. Grant Company | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-6160 |
72 | reversed/remanded | <p>Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. The Act included a provision in 25 U.S.C. Section 472 that gave hiring preference Native Americans for positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Congress then passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment. In June 1972, the BIA extended Indian preference to both hiring and promotion decisions. C.R. Mancari was a non- Indian employee of the BIA. He and other non-Indian employees of the BIA filed a class action in United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. They claimed that Section 472 was repealed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. They also claimed that Section 472 violated the Fifth Amendment and their right to property without due process. The District Court ruled in their favor. The United States appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51084 | 901 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-362 | Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior et al. | Morton v. Mancari | Civil Rights | 0 | C. R. Mancari et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-362 |
73 | affirmed | <p>In 1964, the federal government sued several corporations for rigging prices of concrete and steel pipes in violation of the Sherman Act. That case reached a final judgment in May 1968, when all parties agreed to terms that prevented the companies from engaging in future violations of anti-trust laws. Eleven days short of one year after this agreement, the State of Utah, on behalf of several agencies and local governments, filed a class action lawsuit against the same corporations. The lawsuit claimed that the corporations’ previous price fixing schemes had directly injured the State and other plaintiffs. Six months later, the corporations successfully argued that, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the lawsuit could not be maintained as a class action because it was not impractical for the plaintiffs to each have individual representation. Eight days following this ruling, over 60 towns, municipalities, and water districts within the State of Utah immediately filed motions to intervene in the lawsuit. The court denied their motions because they had failed to argue them within the one-year time statute of limitations required under federal law. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, that court held that, by filing lawsuit as a class action, all of the claims were adequately before the trial court before the statute of limitations was reached. However, because the judge dismissed the class action after the statute of limitations ran, the parties were unable to re-file their claims against the corporations. That court held that the trial judge could not leave the plaintiff’s without recourse after the time to file the lawsuit had passed. Instead, the plaintiffs should have the eleven days that remained under the statute of limitations when the initial lawsuit was filed in order to intervene or otherwise file individual claims. The corporations appealed. </p> | False | 51096 | 1922 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-1195 | American Pipe and Construction Company, et al | American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah | Judicial Power | 0 | State of Utah, et al | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1195 |
74 | reversed/remanded | <p>Joseph Anthony Davis was classified as I-A by a draft board and ordered to report for a physical examination. He failed to report several times. The draft board declared him a delinquent, and issued an order that he be inducted into the Armed Forces. Under 32 CFR Section 1631.7, a draftee could only be ordered to report for induction if he was deemed "acceptable for service" after a physical examination and if the board had mailed him a statement of his status with three weeks' notice. The statute provided an exception for draftees that were declared delinquent, accelerating the process. Davis was convicted in United States District Court for the Central District of California for his failures to report, and he appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. While his case was pending, the Supreme Court decided <em>Gutknecht v. United States</em>. Gutknecht involved a similar situation, in which a draftee's induction was accelerated by his delinquent status. The Supreme Court declared Gutknecht's conviction invalid. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which held that Davis' case was not impacted by <em>Gutknecht</em>. This ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Davis petitioned for certiorari. During this process, the Ninth Circuit ruled in <em>United States v. Fox</em>. <em>Fox</em> involved a situation similar to Davis'. Fox's conviction was reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, Davis' petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Davis then challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. Davis asserted that in the process of his conviction, the Ninth Circuit's ruling in <em>Fox</em> changed the law. The District Court ruled against him. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that it had already ruled against him on the same issue. Davis then appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51107 | 1928 | 7 | majority opinion | 72-1454 | Joseph Anthony Davis | Davis v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 2 | United States | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1454 |
75 | reversed | <p>Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida. The <em>Miami Herald</em> published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded that the <em>Herald</em> publish his responses to the editorials. When the <em>Herald</em> refused, Tornillo sued in Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms published. The <em>Herald</em> challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Florida reversed this decision.</p> | True | 51114 | 796 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-797 | Miami Herald Publishing Company | Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo | First Amendment | 0 | Pat Tornillo | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-797 |
76 | reversed | <p>Harold Omand Spence displayed an American flag with a peace symbol made out of removable tape on it outside of his home in Seattle, WA. When officers came to his house he offered to take the flag down, but was arrested, charged, and convicted under a Washington statute that forbade the display of an American flag to which figures symbols or other extraneous material is attached or superimposed. Spence was not charged under the state flag desecration statute. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, but the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. The state supreme court rejected Spence’s argument that the statute violated the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague.</p> | True | 51113 | 720 | 6 | per curiam | 72-1690 | Harold Omond Spence | Spence v. Washington | First Amendment | 3 | Washington | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1690 |
77 | reversed/remanded | <p>Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in <em>New York Times v. Sullivan</em> (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's ruling.</p> | True | 51121 | 646 | 7 | majority opinion | 72-617 | Gertz | Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. | First Amendment | 2 | Robert Welch Inc. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-617 |
78 | reversed | <p>The Village of Belle Terre in New York had an ordinance restricting land use to one-family dwellings. The statute’s meaning of “family” was one or more related persons or not more than two unrelated people. The appellees owned a house and leased it to unrelated people, in violation of the Village’s ordinance. When the Village asked the respondents to remedy the violation, the homeowners sued the Village seeking a judgment that declared the ordinance unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with the right to travel and by expressing impermissible social preferences. The district court held the ordinance was constitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court determined that the ordinance was an attempt to ensure that residents conformed to social preferences of living style and had no relevance to public health, safety, or welfare.</p> | True | 51130 | 987 | 7 | majority opinion | 73-191 | Village of Belle Terre, et al. | Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas | Economic Activity | 2 | Bruce Boraas, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-191 |
79 | reversed | <p>A police officer pulled over and arrested Robinson for operating an automobile without a valid permit. The officer then frisked Robinson and discovered a crumpled cigarette package containing fourteen vials of heroin in his pocket.</p> | True | 51132 | 239 | 6 | majority opinion | 72-936 | United States | United States v. Robinson | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Robinson | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-936 |
80 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>Robert Pugh and Nathanial Henderson were arrested in Florida and charged with felony and misdemeanor charges not punishable by death. Pugh was denied bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond, so both remained in custody. Florida law only required indictments for capitol offenses, so Pugh and Henderson were charged only by information, without a preliminary hearing and without leave of the court. Florida courts previously held that filing an information foreclosed an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing, and that habeas corpus could not be used except in exceptional circumstances.</p>
<p>Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials, claiming a constitutional right to a preliminary hearing on the issue of probable cause. The district court certified the class and held that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information the right to a preliminary hearing. The Florida Supreme Court adopted new rules in an attempt to fix the problem, but on remand, the district court held the rules still violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court also prescribed detailed procedures to protect that right. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, modifying minor portions of the district court’s prescribed procedures.</p> | True | 51142 | 1358 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-477 | Richard E. Gerstein, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida | Gerstein v. Pugh | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Robert Pugh, Nathaniel Henderson, Thomas Turner, Gary Faulk on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly situated | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-477 |
81 | affirmed | <p>Harry Lehman was running for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 56th District, which included the city of Shaker Heights. Lehman wanted to have his campaign advertisements placed on the side of Shaker Heights' streetcars. Metromedia, Inc. was designated by the city to manage that advertising space. Metromedia's contract with the city prohibited it from placing political advertisements on the streetcars. It was allowed, however, to place advertisements from businesses and public service groups. Lehman's request was denied, and he sued in the Ohio Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County alleging that Shaker Heights' policy violated his free speech rights. The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled for the city. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision.</p> | False | 51145 | 767 | 5 | plurality opinion | 73-328 | Harry Lehman | Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights | First Amendment | 4 | City of Shaker Heights | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-328 |
82 | affirmed | <p>Robert Martinez was a prisoner in the California State Prison in San Quentin, California. The California Department of Corrections had regulations which censored mail and which prohibited law students and legal paraprofessionals from conducing interviews with the inmates. </p>
<p>Martinez and other prisoners in the California corrections system filed suit against officials in the California Department of Corrections in federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the aforementioned regulations. The district court decided in favor of the prisoners, and the officials from the department of corrections appealed. </p> | False | 51143 | 633 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-1465 | Raymond K. Procunier, Director, California Department of Corrections, et al. | Procunier v. Martinez | First Amendment | 0 | Robert Martinez, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1465 |
83 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1971, the San Francisco, California school system was integrated. As a result, the San Francisco school system absorbed over 2,856 students of Chinese ancestry who were not proficient in English. Of these students, the school system only provided about 1,000 with supplemental English language courses. Classes were taught exclusively in English. </p>
<p>Lau and other students of Chinese descent who did not speak English and received no supplemental English courses brought a class action suit against the officials in the San Francisco Unified School District. The students claimed that the failure to provide supplemental English classes constituted an unequal educational opportunity in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. </p>
<p>The district court denied relief, holding that the policies of the school system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and a hearing en banc was denied. The students appealed the appellate court's decision. </p> | True | 51150 | 1085 | 9 | majority opinion | 72-6520 | Kinney Kinmon Lau, et al. | Lau v. Nichols | Civil Rights | 0 | Alan H. Nichols, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-6520 |
84 | reversed/remanded | <p>Wayne Kennedy was a nonprobationary employee of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. He was dismissed from his position after allegedly making recklessly false and defamatory statements about other OEO employees. Though he had the right under federal regulations to reply to the charges, he chose instead to sue the agency for interfering with his freedom of expression and denying him due process. A three-judge District Court agreed with Kennedy on the due process claim.</p> | True | 51151 | 488 | 5 | plurality opinion | 72-1118 | Arnett | Arnett v. Kennedy | Due Process | 4 | Kennedy | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1118 |
85 | reversed | <p>In the spring of 1970, Old Dominion Branch No. 496 of the National Association of Letter Carriers was recognized by postal authorities as the exclusive local collective-bargaining representative of the letter carriers of the Richmond, Virginia, area. Although already representing the majority of letter carriers, the Branch was involved in an ongoing campaign to convince the remaining letter carriers to join the organization. As part of this effort, the Branch’s monthly newsletter published a list of those who had not yet joined the union under the heading “List of Scabs.” After his name appeared twice in the list, Henry Austin complained to the Richmond Postmaster and the President of the Branch. Several weeks later, the list appeared again accompanied by a well-known piece of trade literature describing the despicable nature of a scab. Austin and the other appellees sued for defamation. The appellants moved to dismiss and argued that the publication was protected speech under the First Amendment and federal libel laws. The trial court judge instructed the jury that state libel laws were applicable to such speech if the jury found that the statements were made with actual malice. The jury found in favor of the appellees and awarded damages. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed.</p> | True | 51152 | 1308 | 6 | majority opinion | 72-1180 | Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO | Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. Austin | First Amendment | 3 | Henry M. Austin, et al. | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/72-1180 |
86 | vacated/remanded | <p>DeFunis was denied admission to the University of Washington Law School despite test scores that were higher than some of the minorities admitted. DeFunis then successfully asked a trial court to require the school to admit him. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, upholding the school's decision to deny DeFunis admission. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case as DeFunis was entering his final year of school.</p> | True | 51161 | 438 | 5 | per curiam | 73-235 | DeFunis | DeFunis v. Odegaard | Civil Rights | 4 | Odegaard | 1973 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-235 |
87 | affirmed | <p>Respondents alleged that a section the New York welfare statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the Social Security Act. The New York statute required recipients to cooperate in a support action against a missing parent or they would not receive benefits. The Social Security Act contained no such requirement. A three-judge district court in the Northern District of New York agreed and ruled in favor of the respondents. The Supreme Court heard the case on direct appeal.</p> | False | 51163 | 501 | 6 | per curiam | 73-1016 | John Lascaris, Commissioner, Dept. of Social Services of Onondaga County | Lascaris v. Shirley | Civil Rights | 3 | Sylvia Shirley, Elizabeth Anderson, Jane Doe | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1016 |
88 | reversed | <p>Martin Cohn was the father of a seventeen-year old girl who was raped and killed in Georgia. After obtaining information from the public record, a television station broadcast the name of Cohn's daughter in connection with the incident. This violated a Georgia privacy statute which prevented members of the media from publicizing the names or identities of rape victims.</p> | True | 51167 | 379 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-938 | Cox Broadcasting Corporation | Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn | First Amendment | 1 | Cohn | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938 |
89 | affirmed | <p>Colonial Pipeline Company is a Delaware corporation that operates a pipeline running from Texas to New York carrying petroleum. Colonial challenged a Louisiana corporation franchise tax, stating that all of their business in Louisiana was interstate. Colonial maintained no offices in Louisiana and delivered no petroleum intrastate, but they did have several employees in Louisiana. The Louisiana Court of Appeal held the tax unconstitutional as a state regulation on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, holding that the tax was not on interstate commerce, but on corporate business done in Louisiana.</p> | False | 51171 | 640 | 7 | majority opinion | 73-1595 | Colonial Pipeline Company | Colonial Pipeline Company v. Traigle | Economic Activity | 1 | Joseph N. Triagle, Collector of Revenue of Louisiana | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1595 |
90 | reversed | <p>A Virginia statute made it a misdemeanor for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." Bigelow, director and managing editor of the Virginia Weekly, was convicted under this law when his newspaper ran an advertisement for an organization which referred women to clinics and hospitals for abortions.</p> | True | 51170 | 468 | 7 | majority opinion | 73-1309 | Bigelow | Bigelow v. Virginia | First Amendment | 2 | Virginia | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1309 |
91 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.</p> | True | 51172 | 323 | 5 | majority opinion | 74-878 | National League of Cities | National League of Cities v. Usery | Unions | 4 | Usery | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-878 |
92 | affirmed | <p>In 1970, Jack Roland Murphy was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to commit robbery while armed and/or assault, and was sentenced to life in prison. Murphy filed for change of venue because of media coverage of his previous crimes. Murphy was made famous by his involvement in the 1964 jewel heist of the “Star of India,” a rare precious sapphire that was housed at the New York Museum of Natural History. Murphy was given the nickname “Murph the Surf” in national media coverage. Murphy had also been arrested and indicted for the double murder of two women in Florida, which was nationally known as the “Whiskey Creek Murders.” Murphy contends that the national publicity surrounding these two convictions tainted the jury and that his right to fair trial was violated. The motion was denied, and Murphy was convicted. After his conviction, Murphy petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the denial of his request to change venue resulted in a violation of his right to a fair trial. The district court held that the jury was properly screened for prejudice and dismissed his petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.</p> | False | 51173 | 1209 | 8 | majority opinion | 74-5116 | Jack Roland Murphy | Murphy v. Florida | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Florida | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-5116 |
93 | vacated/remanded | <p>Anthony Pasquall Faretta was charged with grand theft. He filed a request to represent himself in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judge initially accepted the request, but later called Faretta back in to question him about his knowledge of the hearsay rule and other court procedures. Based on Faretta’s answers, the judge determined that Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel and the judge appointed a public defender. The jury convicted Faretta. On appeal, the California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judge’s ruling that Faretta had no constitutional right to represent himself. The California Supreme Court denied review.</p> | True | 51175 | 692 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-5772 | Anthony Pasquall Faretta | Faretta v. California | Criminal Procedure | 3 | California | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5772 |
94 | affirmed | <p>A juvenile court found 17-year-old Gary Jones guilty of acts that would constitute robbery if he were tried as an adult. After the hearing, the court determined that Jones should be prosecuted as an adult. Jones filed for habeas corpus, arguing that the criminal trial put him in double jeopardy. The trial court, court of appeal, and Supreme Court of California denied the writ. The case went to trial and the court found Jones guilty of robbery in the first degree.</p>
<p>Jones again filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal district court. The court denied the petition, holding that hearings before juvenile court and criminal trials are so different that double jeopardy did not apply. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court reasoned that the application of double jeopardy would not impede the juvenile courts. The court also held that allowing the criminal verdict to stand would destroy confidence in the judicial system.</p> | True | 51192 | 979 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-1995 | Allen F. Breed, Director of California Your Authority | Breed v. Jones | Civil Rights | 0 | Gary Steven Jones | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1995 |
95 | reversed | <p>Michael Maness, a lawyer, represented a client convicted of selling obscene magazines in violation of a city ordinance. The city attorney requested a subpoena to produce 52 such magazines in order to obtain an injunction to prevent their further sale. Maness advised his client not to produce the magazines and invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The judge ordered the production of the magazines, accepting the city clerk’s argument that the Fifth Amendment privilege did not apply in a civil proceeding. When Maness’ client still refused to produce the magazines, the judge held Maness and his client in contempt of court and sentenced them to 10 days in jail and a $200 fine.</p>
<p>Another state district judge reviewed and affirmed the contempt conviction, but changed the penalty to a $500 fine and no jail time. The Texas appeals courts and the Supreme Court of Texas refused to review the judgment. Maness filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of himself and his client in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which granted the petition. The district court noted that civil and criminal charges in this case would arise under the same Texas statute, so the Fifth Amendment applied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held its judgment pending Supreme Court review of the contempt conviction.</p> | True | 51196 | 1394 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-689 | Michael Anthony Maness | Maness v. Meyers | Criminal Procedure | 0 | The Honorable James R. Meyers | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-689 |
96 | reversed/remanded | <p>Julian Vella, a seaman on the SS Robert MacNamara, suffered a severe head injury while doing a repair on the ship. This caused damage to Vella’s inner ear, making it difficult for him to balance. Doctors ruled the condition permanent and incurable. A jury awarded Vella maintenance and cure for his injury. The district court denied the ship owner’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The ship owner argued that because the injury was permanent, maintenance and cure was not permissible. The appellate court reversed.</p> | True | 51202 | 547 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-1994 | Julian Vell | Vella v. Ford Motor Company | Economic Activity | 0 | Ford Motor Company | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1994 |
97 | affirmed | <p>On March 11, 1973, border patrol agents stopped Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce’s car based on the fact that the occupant’s appeared to be of Mexican descent. Upon questioning the passengers, the agents determined that they were illegal immigrants. The agents arrested everyone, and Brignoni-Ponce was charged with two counts of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. At trial, Brignoni-Ponce moved to suppress the statements of the passengers as the fruits of an illegal seizure. The trial court denied the motion, and Brignoni-Ponce was convicted.</p>
<p>While Brignoni-Ponce’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment prevents roving patrols from searching vehicles without warrant or probably cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the principles of Almeida-Sanchez applied to this case and held that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress.</p>
<p> </p> | False | 51203 | 985 | 9 | majority opinion | 74-114 | United States | United States v. Brignoni-Ponce | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-114 |
98 | reversed | <p>These are two consolidated cases involving the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) practice of allowing aliens from Canada and Mexico to immigrate daily or seasonally to the U.S. to work. The practice granted the aliens “special immigrant” status and authorized them to be “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” even though the workers did not intend to reside in the U.S. permanently. This “special” status, authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act, exempted the workers from normal documentation requirements. The United Farmworkers Organizing committee sued for injunctive relief from the practice. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that special status was permissible for daily workers, but not for seasonal workers.</p> | True | 51210 | 835 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-300 | William B. Saxbe, United Farm Workers Organizing Committee | Saxbe v. Bustos | Civil Rights | 4 | Robert Bustos, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-300 |
99 | reversed/remanded | <p>These are five consolidated cases involving 13 motor carriers who filed for certificates with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in order to conduct business between the southwestern and southeastern United States. The ICC rejected all but three applications. Bowman Transportation, Inc., one of the approved applicants, asked for more authority than initially set out in their application. The ICC granted that authority, and the competing motor carriers sued in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas to annul the certificate. The district court found the ICC’s actions arbitrary and capricious. The court voided the certificates and permanently enjoined the ICC from issuing them. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p> | True | 51212 | 773 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-1055 | Bowman Transportation, Inc., et al. | Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. | Economic Activity | 0 | Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1055 |
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