Search is not available for this dataset
stringlengths 1
4
| disposition
stringclasses 10
values | facts
stringlengths 25
6.2k
| first_party_winner
stringclasses 3
values | ID
stringlengths 5
5
| facts_len
stringlengths 2
4
| majority_vote
stringclasses 7
values | decision_type
stringclasses 11
values | docket
stringlengths 1
9
| first_party
stringlengths 0
223
| name
stringlengths 10
148
| issue_area
stringclasses 15
values | minority_vote
stringclasses 5
values | second_party
stringlengths 0
193
| term
stringclasses 70
values | href
stringlengths 33
45
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
200 | affirmed | <p>Roger C. Redhail, a Wisconsin minor, fathered a child. A court ordered him to pay child support. Two years later, he applied for a marriage license in Milwaukee County. His application was denied by County Clerk Thomas E. Zablocki who declined to issue the license under a state statute on the ground that Redhail owed more than $3,700 in child support.. Redhail filed a class action in federal district court against Zablocki and all Wisconsin county clerks. The court ruled in Redhail's favor. Zablocki appealed to the United States Supreme Court.</p> | False | 51727 | 557 | 8 | majority opinion | 76-879 | Zablocki | Zablocki v. Redhail | Civil Rights | 1 | Redhail | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-879 |
201 | reversed | <p>The petitioners, a class of female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York, sued their employers for depriving them of their constitutional rights. The employers required pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absence before there was any medical reason to do so. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the forced leaves of absence in the future, as well as back pay for those that had already occurred.</p>
<p>The district court found that such policies were unconstitutional but held that the city had immunity from paying the back wages. The district court also held that the motion for an injunction was moot because the organizations removed the policy in the intervening time. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p> | True | 51732 | 785 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-1914 | Jane Monell, et al. | Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York | Civil Rights | 2 | Department of Social Services of the City of New York, et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/75-1914 |
202 | reversed | <p>In 1972, the Alaska Legislature passed the Local Hire Under State Leases Act which required "all oil and gas leases [and other activities related to this industry] to which the state is a party" include provisions for the preferential hiring of Alaska residents over non-residents. To administer the law, residents were issued residency cards which they were to present to potential employers when seeking jobs. Hicklin and others did not qualify for employment under the Alaska residency standard.</p> | True | 51729 | 506 | 9 | majority opinion | 77-324 | Hicklin | Hicklin v. Orbeck | Civil Rights | 0 | Orbeck | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-324 |
203 | reversed | <p>Paul Lewis Hayes was charged with forgery, an offense which carried a two-to-ten-year prison sentence. During plea negotiations, the prosecutor offered to pursue a five year sentence if Hayes would plead guilty. However, the prosecutor also stated that he would seek an indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Crime Act if the defendant did not register this plea. (Hayes had two prior felony convictions on his record.) If found guilty under this law, Hayes would be imprisoned for life. Hayes did not plead guilty and the prosecutor followed through on his promise.</p> | True | 51731 | 574 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1334 | Bordenkircher | Bordenkircher v. Hayes | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Hayes | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1334 |
204 | reversed/remanded | <p>A Landmark Communications newspaper, <em>The Virginian Pilot,</em> published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. Landmark was indicted by a grand jury, had its motion to dismiss denied by the trial court, convicted without a jury trial and fined. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Landmark's conviction.</p> | True | 51736 | 515 | 7 | majority opinion | 76-1450 | Landmark Communications Inc. | Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia | First Amendment | 0 | Virginia | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1450 |
205 | reversed/remanded | <p>This case arose when two Philadelphia police officers pulled over the defendant, Harry Mimms, for driving with an expired license plate. After asking Mimms to exit the car, the officers noticed an unusual bulge underneath his jacket. One of the officers searched Mimms and discovered a loaded .38-caliber revolver. Mimms was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. He was convicted on both counts at trial after his motion to suppress the revolver was denied.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the officers' request for Mimms to exit the vehicle was an unlawful "seizure" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officer could not point to any "objective observable facts to support a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot or that the occupants of the vehicle posed a threat to police safety" sufficient to warrant ordering Mimms to step out of the car. Therefore, the officers should never have noticed the bulge and the search should never have taken place.</p> | True | 51734 | 1111 | 6 | per curiam | 76-1830 | Commonwealth of Pennsylvania | Pennsylvania v. Mimms | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Harry Mimms | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1830 |
206 | reversed/remanded | <p>During school hours on January 23, 1974, the principal of the Chicago Vocational High School saw Jarius Piphus, then a freshman, standing on school property sharing an irregularly shaped cigarette with another student. The principal saw a pack of the cigarettes change hands and believed he smelled marijuana. When the principal approached, the students immediately discarded the cigarette. The students were suspended for the customary 20 days for violation of the school drug policy, despite their protests that they had not been smoking marijuana. A few days later, Piphus, his mother and sister, school officials, and representatives from a legal aid clinic met to discuss the suspension, not to determine whether or not Piphus had violated the school drug policy. Piphus and his mother sued the school official in federal district court for violating Piphus’ Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $3000 in damages.</p>
<p>On September 11, 1973, Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at Clara Barton Elementary School in Chicago, received a 20-day suspension for wearing an earring to school in violation of school policy. The previous year, the school principal had enacted a policy banning earrings, as he believed they were associated with gang affiliation. When asked to remove the earring, Brisco refused and stated it was a symbol of black pride. Brisco and his mother sued the school officials in federal district court for violating Brisco’s right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and $5000 in damages.</p>
<p>The two cases were consolidated for trial and the district court held that their suspensions violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the schools were not entitled to immunity, but the court did not award damages. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to reconsider questions of relief and damages. </p> | True | 51735 | 1979 | 8 | majority opinion | 76-1149 | John D. Carey, et al. | Carey v. Piphus | Civil Rights | 0 | Jarius Piphus, et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1149 |
207 | reversed | <p>During a Writers Guild of America strike, certain supervisor union-member employees continued to work as representatives for collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustments for their employers, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. These union members undertook no writing functions, as the writing contract was the basis for the strike. The union charged those members for violating several strike rules for crossing the picket line, issued threats to get them to stop working and imposed hefty penalties. The National Labor Relations Board (Board) found that the National Labor Relations Act (Act) protected the actions of the union members and that the union violated the Act by disciplining members. The Board ordered the union to cease and desist its actions against said members. The Administrative Law Judge held that unions cannot discipline a representative responsible for collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment during a strike. Respondents applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for review, and the Board applied to enforce its order. The Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s ruling that only supervisory tasks were undertaken and denied enforcement of the Board’s order.</p> | True | 51746 | 1219 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1121 | American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. | American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. | Unions | 4 | Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1121 |
208 | affirmed | <p>On January 21, 1970, Tyler’s Auction, a furniture store in Oakland County, Michigan, caught fire shortly before midnight. The building was leased to Loren Tyler, who ran the business with Robert Tompkins. When Fire Chief See arrived on the scene, he was informed that two plastic containers of flammable liquid were found in the building. After determining that arson possibly caused the fire, See called Police Detective Webb. Webb arrived and took pictures, but the smoke and steam forced him to postpone his investigation. Around 4 a.m., the fire was extinguished and the personnel left the premises. The containers were turned over to Webb. Webb did not have a warrant for any of the entries into the building or the removal of the containers.</p>
<p>The next morning, See returned to the scene with Assistant Chief Somerville, whose job was to determine the “origin of all fires that occur in the Township.” They conducted a cursory examination and left. An hour later, Somerville returned with Webb, and the two discovered evidence of arson. The men did not have warrants for these entrances or seizures of evidence. Over the course of multiple visits beginning on February 16, Sergeant Hoffman of the Michigan State Police Arson Section conducted an investigation and secured further evidence of arson that played an important role in the trial.</p>
<p>At trial, the respondents objected to the introduction of this evidence, but the judge admitted it, and they were convicted. The Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan held that the constitutional protections against illegal searches and seizures did not pertain to arson investigations of burned premises and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Michigan held that the illegal searches and seizures had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.</p> | False | 51754 | 1890 | 7 | majority opinion | 76-1608 | Michigan | Michigan v. Tyler | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Loren Tyler and Robert Tompkins | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1608 |
209 | affirmed | <p>Maryland observed oil producer-operated stations receiving favorable rates from producers and refiners. In response, Maryland passed a statute prohibiting oil producers or refiners from operating gasoline stations within the state and requiring producers and refiners extend temporary price cuts to the stations they supplied. Exxon challenged the statute in Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, which ruled the statute invalid. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the ruling.</p> | False | 51759 | 485 | 7 | majority opinion | 77-10 | Exxon Corporation et al. | Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland | Economic Activity | 1 | Governor of Maryland et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-10 |
210 | vacated/remanded | <p>Following a failed attempt by the Department of Agriculture to revoke or suspend his commodity futures commission company's registration, Arthur Economou sought damages against Earl Butz and several other federal administrative officials for wrongful initiation of administrative proceedings. On appeal from an adverse district court finding of absolute immunity for state officials, the New York Court of Appeals reversed as it found that federal administrators were only entitled to qualified immunity. Butz appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> | True | 51756 | 568 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-709 | Butz | Butz v. Economou | Economic Activity | 4 | Economou | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-709 |
211 | affirmed | <p>Edmund Foley applied for a position as a New York state trooper. Although Foley was a legally admitted resident alien, state officials refused to permit him to take the examination. New York authorities relied on a statute providing that "no person shall be appointed to the. . .state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States."</p> | False | 51763 | 357 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-839 | Foley | Foley v. Connelie | Civil Rights | 3 | Connelie | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-839 |
212 | reversed/remanded | <p>Ballew was found in violation of a misdemeanor for exhibiting an obscene motion picture film. In the Criminal Court of Fulton County, a jury of five persons was selected and sworn to hear the case.</p> | True | 51767 | 205 | 9 | plurality opinion | 76-761 | Ballew | Ballew v. Georgia | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Georgia | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-761 |
213 | affirmed | <p>In 1967, Congress appropriated funds to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam. In 1973 Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), which protected certain species classified as “endangered”. The Secretary of the Interior declared the Snail Darter endangered. The area of the Tellico Dam was its “critical habitat”. Although the multi-million dollar project was almost completed, the project predated the ESA, and Congress continued to appropriate funds to the project after the ESA passed, Hiram Hill sued to enjoin the completion of the Dam in order to protect the Snail Darter. He argued that completing and opening the dam would violate the ESA by causing the extinction of the snail darter. The district court refused to grant the injunction and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent injunction against any activities that would modify or destroy the Snail Darter’s critical habitat.</p> | False | 51775 | 1028 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-1701 | Tennessee Valley Authority | Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill | Economic Activity | 3 | Hiram G. Hill | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1701 |
214 | affirmed | <p>In 1970, Congress imposed an annual registration tax on all civil aircraft that fly in the navigable airspace of the United States. The state of Massachusetts owned and utilized a helicopter for the purpose of patrolling highways and fulfilling other police duties. When Massachusetts refused to pay the tax, the federal government collected it from the state's accounts, plus interest and penalties. Massachusetts then sought a refund of the money collected.</p> | False | 51778 | 467 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-1500 | Massachusetts | Massachusetts v. United States | Federalism | 2 | United States | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1500 |
215 | reversed | <p>Several faculty members of the University of Missouri-Kansas City Medical School expressed dissatisfaction with the clinical performance of Charlotte Horowitz, a medical student. The Council of Evaluation (Council), a faculty-student body that recommends various actions including probation and dismissal, recommended Horowitz only advanceto her last year on a probationary status. In the middle of the following academic year, the Council concluded that Horowitz should not be considered for graduation at the end of the year and would be dropped as a student unless the Council saw a radical improvement. Horowitz failed to show improvement, her surgery rotations rated “low satisfactory,” and the Council recommended dismissal from the university. A committee composed solely of faculty members and the Dean, the final decision-makers, approved the decision. Horowitz sued and claimed that the procedure leading to her dismissal violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court concluded that Horowitz had been afforded all the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision by holding that Horowitz had not been afforded procedural due process prior.</p> | True | 51784 | 1264 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-695 | Board of Curators of the University of Missouri | Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz | Due Process | 3 | Charlotte Horowitz | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-695 |
216 | reversed/remanded | <p>An Ohio law required that individuals found guilty of aggravated murder be given the death penalty. The death penalty was mandatory unless: 1) the victim had induced the offense, 2) the offense was committed under duress or coercion, or 3) the offense was a product of mental deficiencies. Sandra Lockett, who had encouraged and driven the getaway car for a robbery that resulted in the murder of a pawnshop owner, was found guilty under the statute and sentenced to death.</p> | True | 51786 | 481 | 7 | plurality opinion | 76-6997 | Lockett | Lockett v. Ohio | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Ohio | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-6997 |
217 | affirmed | <p>The New York City Landmarks Preservation Law of 1965 empowered the city to designate certain structures and neighborhoods as "landmarks" or "landmark sites." Penn Central, which owned the Grand Central Terminal (opened in 1913), was not allowed to construct a multistory office building above it.</p> | False | 51789 | 304 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-444 | Penn Central Transportation Company | Penn Central Transportation Company v. New York City | Due Process | 3 | New York City | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-444 |
218 | affirmed | <p>Litigation challenging the conditions in the Arkansas prison system began in 1969. In evaluating the diet and sleeping arrangements of the inmates, the physical condition of cells, and the behavior of prison guards (some of whom were inmates who had been issued guns), a District Court called the conditions which inmates were forced to face "a dark and evil world completely alien to the free world." This case involved a challenge to the practice of "punitive isolation" in Arkansas prisons which was often done for indiscriminate periods of time in crowded windowless cells.</p> | False | 51793 | 585 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1660 | Hutto | Hutto v. Finney | Attorneys | 4 | Finney | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1660 |
219 | affirmed | <p>Beth Israel Hospital, a nonprofit hospital, had a rule that prohibited employees from soliciting and distributing literature except in sanctioned areas such as certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. An employee distributing a pro-union newsletter in the employee cafeteria was informed that she had violated the rule and was warned of possible dismissal if she continued. The union filed a claim against the hospital under the National Labor Relations Act, which in 1974 was extended to employees of nonprofit healthcare institutions. After a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Administrative Law Judge, who resolves disputes between government agencies and persons affected by the decision of the agencies, held that the hospital cannot interfere with the employees' rights and must rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop. The hospital appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which affirmed the part of the lower court's ruling that called for rescinding the rule that excluded union activity in eating facilities.</p> | False | 51790 | 1164 | 9 | majority opinion | 77-152 | Beth Israel Hospital | Beth Israel Hospital v. National Labor Relations Board | Unions | 0 | National Labor Relations Board | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-152 |
220 | reversed | <p>A catalytic converter is a device that removes pollutants during the refining of oil. In order to function effectively, it must operate within certain temperature and pressure ranges (“alarm limits”) that fluctuate during the conversion process. Dale R. Flook applied for a patent on a method of adjusting alarm limits in response to changes that occur during the catalytic conversion process.. Because the only novel feature of the method was a mathematical formula, the patent examiner determined that the method did not amount to a discovery eligible for patent protection and rejected the application. The Board of Appeals for the Patent and Trademark Office sustained the rejection. On appeal, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed and held that the limited application of the method did not “wholly pre-empt” the formula from the public domain, and therefore it was eligible for patent protection.</p> | True | 51798 | 922 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-642 | Lutrelle F. Parker, Acting Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks | Parker v. Flook | Economic Activity | 3 | Dale R. Flook | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-642 |
221 | affirmed | <p>In its licensing system for elk-hunters, the state of Montana required nonresidents to pay a substantially higher fee than residents for a hunting permit.</p> | False | 51797 | 162 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-1150 | Baldwin | Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana | Civil Rights | 3 | Fish and Game Commission of Montana | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1150 |
222 | reversed/remanded | <p>Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention. Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the statute.</p> | True | 51800 | 840 | 8 | plurality opinion | 76-1427 | Paul A. McDaniel | McDaniel v. Paty | First Amendment | 0 | Selma Cash Paty, et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1427 |
223 | <p>Channel Islands National Monument is a nationally designated area off the coast of California, including Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands. In 1949, President Harry S Truman issued a proclamation that extended the boundary of the National Monument within one nautical mile of the islands.</p> | 51803 | 296 | 5 | majority opinion | 5-orig | United States | United States v. California | 3 | California | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/5-orig |
|||
224 | reversed | <p>In 1971, officers of the Palo Alto, California, Police Department obtained a warrant to search the main office of The Stanford Daily, the student newspaper at the university. It was believed that The Stanford Daily had pictures of a violent clash between a group of protesters and the police; the pictures were needed to identify the assailants. The officers searched The Daily's photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks, and waste paper baskets, but no materials were removed from the office. This case was decided together with Bergna v. Stanford Daily, involving the district attorney and a deputy district attorney who participated in the obtaining of the search warrant.</p> | True | 51804 | 692 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1484 | Zurcher | Zurcher v. Stanford Daily | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Stanford Daily | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1484 |
225 | <p>Estelle Jacobs was accused of threatening to harm a man who owed a substantial gambling debt to her employer, a collections agency. Unbeknownst to her, the phone call in which she made the threat was recorded. The Federal Bureau of Investigations contacted Jacobs and informed of her Miranda rights during questioning about the incident. About nine months later, Jacobs was called before a grand jury via a subpoena regarding the threatening statements she had previously made. She did not have an attorney present, but she was read her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. During her trial, Jacobs denied having made the phone call, the tape of the recorded phone call was played, and she was subsequently indicted. The district court dismissed the indictment and held that a witness in a trial who is a potential defendant should be informed of that potential upon taking the witness stand and is entitled to full Miranda warnings under those circumstances.</p> | False | 51811 | 964 | 9 | per curiam | 76-1193 | United States | United States v. Jacobs | Judicial Power | 0 | Estelle Jacobs (aka Mrs. Kramer) | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1193 |
|
226 | reversed | <p>During a mid-afternoon weekly broadcast, a New York radio station aired George Carlin's monologue, "Filthy Words." Carlin spoke of the words that could not be said on the public airwaves. His list included shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. The station warned listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." The FCC received a complaint from a man who stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son.</p> | True | 51820 | 514 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-528 | Federal Communications Commission | Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation | First Amendment | 4 | Pacifica Foundation | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-528 |
227 | reversed/remanded | <p>KQED Inc., owner of a number of licensed television and radio broadcasting stations, requested permission to inspect and take pictures of the Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. KQED sought to investigate a recent suicide that had occurred at the facility. Houchins, the Sheriff of Alameda County, denied access to the media.</p> | True | 51823 | 332 | 4 | plurality opinion | 76-1310 | Houchins | Houchins v. KQED Inc. | First Amendment | 3 | KQED Inc. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1310 |
228 | reversed | <p>On June 13, 1973, Shirley Brooks and her family were evicted from their apartment in Mount Vernon, New York. The city marshal arranged for Flagg Bros., Inc. to store the Brooks' furniture in their warehouse, and informed Ms. Brooks of the cost. Although she objected, she allowed the workers to remove her furniture to the warehouse. On August 25, 1973, after a series of disputes about the charges, Ms. Brooks received a letter from Flagg Bros., Inc. informing her that her furniture would be sold if she did not settle her account within 10 days. </p>
<p>Ms. Brooks initiated a class action in district court and alleged that such a sale as allowed by a New York statute would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The American Warehousemen’s Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, and the Attorney General of New York intervened as defendants to defend the statute in question. The district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals reversed.</p> | True | 51831 | 994 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-25 | Flagg Bros., Inc., et al. | Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks | Civil Rights | 3 | Shirley Herriott Brooks, et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-25 |
229 | reversed | <p>In 1974, Minnesota adopted legislation which required private employers to pay a fee if they terminated employee pension plans or if they moved their offices from the state, leaving insufficient funds to cover pensions for ten-year employees. This law affected Allied Structural Steel as the company began closing offices in Minnesota. Even though the employees affected by the closing were not entitled to pensions under the terms of their employment with the company, according to the Minnesota law, they were. The company was ordered to pay approximately $185,000 to comply with the statute's provisions.</p> | True | 51833 | 615 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-747 | Allied Structural Steel Company | Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus | Economic Activity | 3 | Spannaus | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-747 |
230 | reversed | <p>A New Jersey law prohibited the importation of most "solid or liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State."</p> | True | 51844 | 162 | 7 | majority opinion | 77-404 | City of Philadelphia | City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey | Economic Activity | 2 | New Jersey | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-404 |
231 | affirmed | <p>In 1972, twenty one states were members of the Multistate Tax Compact, a body formed by states to assist them in formulating and administering tax law relating to multistate businesses. The Compact had not received congressional approval.</p> | False | 51849 | 246 | 7 | majority opinion | 76-635 | United States Steel Corporation | United States Steel Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission | Federalism | 2 | Multistate Tax Commission | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-635 |
232 | reversed/remanded | <p>On June 1, 1975, three men entered a restaurant in Little Rock, Arkansas, and proceeded to rob and terrorize the five employees. The two female employees were raped. The ensuing police investigation resulted in the arrest of the Winston Holloway, Ray Lee Welch, and Gary Don Campbell. On July 29, 1975, the three defendants were each charged with one count of robbery and two counts of rape. On August 5, the trial court appointed Harold Hall to serve as counsel for all three defendants, and the date was set for their consolidated trial. Prior to the trial, Hall moved for the court to appoint separate counsel for each defendant because he felt, based on information from the defendants, that there would be a conflict of interest in representing their cases together. The trial court declined to appoint separate counsel. Hall renewed the motion before the jury was empaneled, and the court again denied it. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.</p> | True | 51852 | 1005 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-5856 | Winston M. Holloway, et al. | Holloway v. Arkansas | Civil Rights | 3 | State of Arkansas | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-5856 |
233 | affirmed | <p>Allan Bakke, a thirty-five-year-old white man, had twice applied for admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis. He was rejected both times. The school reserved sixteen places in each entering class of one hundred for "qualified" minorities, as part of the university's affirmative action program, in an effort to redress longstanding, unfair minority exclusions from the medical profession. Bakke's qualifications (college GPA and test scores) exceeded those of any of the minority students admitted in the two years Bakke's applications were rejected. Bakke contended, first in the California courts, then in the Supreme Court, that he was excluded from admission solely on the basis of race.</p> | False | 51853 | 725 | 5 | plurality opinion | 76-811 | Regents of the University of California | Regents of the University of California v. Bakke | Civil Rights | 4 | Allan Bakke | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/76-811 |
234 | vacated/remanded | <p>A class of female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power sued the department because they were forced to make larger contributions to the employee pension plan than their male colleagues. The department determined that, because women live longer than men, the women cost the company more in retirement benefits than the men and so must pay more into the plan. Since the employee contribution was taken directly out of the employee’s paycheck, the female employees brought home less than the men.</p>
<p>The women sued the company for violating the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sought an injunction against future payments as well as restitution for the past contributions. While this action was pending in district court, the California legislature passed a law prohibiting companies from forcing women to contribute to the retirement fund more than men. The department changed its payment plan effective January 1, 1975. The district court, however, found that the original plan violated the Civil Rights Act and ordered a refund for the excess payment. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51873 | 1149 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-1810 | City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, et al. | City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart | Civil Rights | 2 | Marie Manhart, et al. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1810 |
235 | affirmed | <p>Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL) allegedly distributed false and misleading press releases regarding its business activities. In response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercised its authority ostensibly under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, suspending the trading of securities of the company for 10 days. The SEC exercised this authority repeatedly, resulting in suspension of the trading of the stock of CJL for over a year.</p>
<p>Samuel H. Sloan owned 13 shares of CJL and was engaged in "substantial" purchases and short sales of the stock when it was suspended. He filed a lawsuit against the SEC alleging, among other claims, that it exceeded its authority under § 12(k) to issue consecutive suspension orders. Notably, Sloan represented himself in the courts below, as well as before the US Supreme Court.</p> | False | 51874 | 849 | 9 | majority opinion | 76-1607 | Securities and Exchange Commission | Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sloan | Economic Activity | 0 | Samuel H. Sloan | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1607 |
236 | affirmed | <p>In February 1974, 18-years-olds Carol McClintock and Wanda Lou Holbert were seriously injured when an uninsured motorist hit the vehicle McClintock was driving in their hometown of Montville, Ohio. When Albert Ohralik, a local attorney, learned of the accident, he visited McClintock in the hospital and offered to represent her in exchange for a portion of the proceeds collected from her insurer. Ohralik also approached Holbert at her home and obtained her oral assent to representation, which he secretly tape-recorded. Both women eventually discharged Ohralik and filed grievances with the local bar association, which in turn filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio (Board). The Board found that Ohralik violated provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that banned a lawyer’s in-person solicitation of employment to a non-lawyer and publicly reprimanded him. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected Ohralik’s claim that his conduct was protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and increased the sanction against Ohralik to indefinite suspension.</p> | False | 51875 | 1186 | 8 | majority opinion | 76-1650 | Albert Ohralik | Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn. | Attorneys | 0 | Ohio State Bar Assn. | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1650 |
237 | reversed | <p>Susan Norwick and Tarja Dachinger were both foreign nationals who had resided in the United States for many years and were married to United States citizens. Both were eligible for citizenship, but had refused to apply. Both had applied for certification as public school teachers in New York State. New York law prohibited the certification of non-citizen teachers who had not sought citizenship. Both applications were denied certification solely on that ground. Norwick filed suit in federal district court, which Dachinger later joined. The three-judge district court ruled in their favor, arguing that the statute as "overbroad."</p> | True | 51878 | 642 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-808 | Gordon M. Ambach | Ambach v. Norwick | Civil Rights | 4 | Susan M. W. Norwick and Tarja U. K. Dachinger | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/76-808 |
238 | reversed | <p>On December 9, 1977, El Paso Police Officers Venegas and Sotelo were cruising in a patrol car. At 12:45 p.m., they observed Zackary C. Brown and another man leaving an alley in opposite directions. The alley was in an area known for a high incidence of drug traffic. The officers believed the situation was suspicious and stopped Brown for questioning. They asked Brown to identify himself, and he refused and asserted that they had no cause to stop him. When the officers frisked him, they did not find any drugs or other suspicious material on Brown. He was arrested for violation of a Texas statute that made it illegal for a person to refuse to identify himself when a police officer lawfully requests it. Brown was taken to the county jail, where he did identify himself, and was charged with the violation. </p>
<p>Brown was convicted in municipal court and fined. He then exercised his right to a trial in the county court and moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Texas statue was unconstitutional under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The motion was denied and he was convicted. </p> | True | 51882 | 1123 | 9 | majority opinion | 77-6673 | Zackary C. Brown | Brown v. Texas | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Texas | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-6673 |
239 | reversed | <p>Anthony Herbert was a retired Army officer who served in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he accused superior officers of covering up atrocities that American troops had committed. The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) produced and broadcast a documentary of the petitioner's story. Herbert sued for libel arguing that the program falsely and maliciously portrayed his character, causing him financial loss. In order to prove libel under the "actual malice" standard, Herbert's attorneys deposed Lando as well as the producer and the editor of the documentary, attempting to deduce the editorial decisions that were made during the production of the program.</p> | True | 51884 | 661 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-1105 | Herbert | Herbert v. Lando | First Amendment | 3 | Lando | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1105 |
240 | affirmed | <p>Scott was convicted in a bench trial of shoplifting and fined $50. The statute applicable to his case set the maximum penalty at a $500 fine and/or one year in jail.</p> | False | 51886 | 173 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-1177 | Scott | Scott v. Illinois | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Illinois | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1177 |
241 | affirmed | <p>A West Virginia statute made it a crime for a newspaper to publish, without approval of juvenile court, the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender.</p> | False | 51889 | 165 | 8 | majority opinion | 78-482 | Smith | Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company | First Amendment | 0 | Daily Mail Publishing Company | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-482 |
242 | reversed/remanded | <p>A New York State police investigator bought two films from Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.’s Adult Store. After viewing the videos, he took them to the Town Justice, who determined that the films violated state obscenity laws. The Justice issued a warrant authorizing a search of the store and seizure of other copies of the two films. Because the investigator said that more obscene materials would be found and asked the Justice to accompany him to the search, the Justice included in the warrant, “the following items which the Court independently has determined to be possessed in violation” and left it open ended so any items found at the store could be added later. During the search, the store’s clerk was arrested. The Justice viewed several videos, books, and other materials and determined that they were obscene. The police seized all of these materials, took and inventory of the items and then filled out the open ended warrant. Before trial, the store owner moved to suppress the seized evidence as violating the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The judge denied the motion and the store owner plead guilty. The Supreme Court of the State of New York affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals of New York denied leave to appeal.</p> | True | 51888 | 1250 | 9 | majority opinion | 78-511 | Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. | Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York | Criminal Procedure | 0 | New York | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-511 |
243 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>Burch was found guilty by a nonunanimous six-member jury of showing obscene films. The court imposed a suspended prison sentence of two consecutive seven-month terms and fined him $1,000.</p> | True | 51897 | 195 | 9 | majority opinion | 78-90 | Burch | Burch v. Louisiana | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Louisiana | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-90 |
244 | reversed/remanded | <p>After he collided with a motorcycle in Acton, Massachusetts, Donald Montrym was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”). A state court later dismissed the DUI charges, but the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles suspended Montrym’s driver’s license for ninety days because Montrym had refused to take a breathalyzer test at the time of his arrest. Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in federal district court alleging that the statute that required drivers to submit to breathalyzer tests violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not provide for a pre-suspension hearing. The district court found in favor of Montrym and ordered the Registrar to return the plaintiffs’ licenses. The Registrar appealed directly to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51902 | 802 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-69 | Mackey | Mackey v. Montrym | Due Process | 4 | Montrym | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-69 |
245 | affirmed | <p>Local police in Little Rock, Arkansas received a tip that an individual would be arriving at the airport with a suitcase containing a significant quantity of marijuana. Upon arriving, the suspect retrieved his suitcase and left in a taxi. The police officers pursued and stopped the taxi, and ordered the driver to open the trunk which revealed the suitcase in question. The police opened the suitcase without obtaining permission from its owner and found nearly ten pounds of marijuana.</p> | False | 51912 | 495 | 7 | majority opinion | 77-1497 | Arkansas | Arkansas v. Sanders | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Sanders | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1497 |
246 | reversed/remanded | <p>New York City police suspected Theodore Payton of murdering a gas station manager. The police forcibly entered Payton's home thinking he was there (he was not) and found evidence connecting Payton to the crime, which was introduced at Payton's trial. The police lacked an arrest warrant when they entered his home. However, they acted under a New York law allowing police to enter a private residence to make a felony arrest without a warrant. At trial, Payton unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence as the fruit of an illegal search. State courts upheld. In the companion case, victims identified Obie Riddick in June 1973 for robberies in 1971. Police learned of his whereabouts in 1974. Without a warrant, they knocked on his door, entered his residence and arrested him. A search for weapons revealed illegal drugs. He was indicted on narcotics charges but sought the suppression of the evidence based on a warrantless entry. The trial judge concluded that the entry was authorized by the New York law and that the search was therefore permissible. Riddick was convicted. The appeals court affirmed.</p> | True | 51913 | 1119 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-5420 | Payton | Payton v. New York | Criminal Procedure | 3 | New York | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5420 |
247 | vacated/remanded | <p>On December 12, 1976, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell Moore allegedly raped and murdered Teresa Allen outside Macon, Georgia. Green and Moore were tried separately, and each was convicted and sentenced to death. At Green's trial, the defense introduced the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified at Moore's trial. According to Pasby, Moore admitted to him that he had killed Allen alone. The trial court refused to allow Pasby's testimony, considering it to be hearsay under Georgia law. On appeal, Green argued the refusal to allow Pasby's testimony constituted a violation of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court of Georgia denied his claim.</p> | True | 51917 | 700 | 8 | per curiam | 78-5944 | Roosevelt Green, Jr. | Green v. Georgia | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Georgia | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5944 |
248 | vacated/remanded | <p>This case supplements <i>Elkins v. Moreno</i>, in which Juan Carlos Moreno and other nonimmigrant aliens residing in Maryland sued the University of Maryland for failing to grant them in-state status for the purpose of tuition. They alleged violations of various federal laws and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found in favor of Moreno and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In <i>Elkins v. Moreno</i>, the Supreme Court held that, since the University of Maryland policy is based on showing proof of domicile in the state, the University has no reason to deny in-state tuition if the proper proof can be shown. </p>
<p>On June 23, 1978, two months after the decision in Elkins, the University of Maryland adopted a resolution affirming their denial of the in-state tuition rate. The Attorney General of Maryland then requested that the Supreme Court put the case back on the docket for further argument given the new resolution.</p> | True | 51916 | 995 | 9 | per curiam | 77-154 | John S. Toll, President of the University of Maryland | Toll v. Moreno | Judicial Power | 0 | Juan Carlos Moreno, et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-154 |
249 | affirmed | <p>Curtis Parham's child and the child's mother were killed in a car accident. Parham was never married to the child's mother, but he signed the child's birth certificate and provided financial support. Parham never legitimated his child as available under Georgia law. After the child's death, Parham attempted to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of his illegitimate child. A Georgia statute barred fathers from bringing wrongful death actions on behalf of illegitimate children. The trial court held that the law violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, finding that the classification involved was reasonably related to legitimate state interests.</p> | False | 51925 | 737 | 5 | plurality opinion | 78-3 | Parham | Parham v. Hughes | Civil Rights | 4 | Hughes | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-3 |
250 | reversed/remanded | <p>William and Lillian Orr were divorced in February 1974. William Orr was ordered to pay monthly alimony of $1,240. Lillian Orr sued William Orr for lack of payments in July 1976. Alabama's alimony statutes only required husbands to pay alimony, but not wives. William Orr challenged these statutes as unconstitutional. The Lee County Circuit Court ruled against him. The Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama affirmed this ruling. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted a writ of certiorari that was later dismissed.</p> | True | 51927 | 517 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-1119 | Willam Orr | Orr v. Orr | Civil Rights | 3 | Lillian Orr | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1119 |
251 | reversed/remanded | <p>In early 1975, Senator William Proxmire implemented what he called the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." The award was given out to governmental agencies which sponsored programs and research that Proxmire found to be a waste of tax dollars. One Golden Fleece went to federal agencies sponsoring the research of Ronald Hutchinson, a behavioral scientist. Proxmire detailed the "nonsense" of Hutchinson's research on the floor of the Senate, in conferences with his staff, and in a newsletter sent to over 100,000 of his constituents. Hutchinson sued for libel, arguing that Proxmire's statements defamed his character and caused him to endure financial loss.</p> | True | 51930 | 668 | 8 | majority opinion | 78-680 | Hutchinson | Hutchinson v. Proxmire | First Amendment | 1 | Proxmire | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-680 |
252 | reversed/remanded | <p>A class action lawsuit challenged the legality of conditions facing pretrial detainees in a New York City correctional facility. Petitioners claimed that double-bunking, restrictions on reading materials that inmates were allowed to receive, and required cavity searches and shakedowns amounted to punishment before conviction.</p> | True | 51944 | 335 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-1829 | Bell | Bell v. Wolfish | Due Process | 3 | Wolfish | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1829 |
253 | reversed/remanded | <p>The Texas Department of Human Resources took custody of the children of John and Mary Sims after a teacher suspected child abuse. The Sims moved to modify the Harris County court order granting custody to the state. When they were not able to obtain and immediate hearing, the Sims filed a writ of habeas corpus. The court transferred the matter to Montgomery County. Rather than proceeding with the case in Montgomery County, the Sims sued in Federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of Texas’ child custody laws.</p>
<p>The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Texas from prosecuting any state suit under the child custody laws. The court held that abstention under <i>Younger v Harris</i> was improper because of the multifaceted nature of the litigation. The federal court addressed the constitutional issues in their decision. Under <i>Younger v Harris</i>, a federal court must abstain from ruling in a case where there are pending related claims in state court. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p> | True | 51948 | 1074 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-6 | Hilmar G. Moore, Raul Jimenez, Jaime Clements | Moore v. Sims | Judicial Power | 4 | John Pleasant Sims, Mary Carter Sims, Sabrina Marie Sims, Paul Edward Sims, Shawna Evette Sims | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-6 |
254 | reversed/remanded | <p>A Massachusetts law gave hiring preference to honorably discharged veterans applying for state civil service positions. Feeney, a woman who scored high on certain competitive civil service examinations, was ranked below male veterans who had lower scores.</p> | True | 51953 | 263 | 7 | majority opinion | 78-233 | Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts | Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney | Civil Rights | 2 | Feeney | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-233 |
255 | reversed/remanded | <p>Police arrested Michael C., a 16 year old, on suspicion of murder. Michael was already on probation and had a long history of criminal offenses. Before questioning, policed informed Michael of his Fifth Amendment rights under <i>Miranda v Arizona</i>, 384 U.S. 436(1966). Michael asked for his parole officer, but police said he was not available. Police offered Michael an attorney, which he refused. During questioning, Michael made incriminating statements that linked himself to the murder.</p>
<p>At trial, Michael moved to suppress statements and sketches he drew during police questioning. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Michael’s request for his probation officer automatically invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination just as if Michael had asked for an attorney.</p> | True | 51954 | 881 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-334 | Kenneth F. Fare, Acting Chief Probation Officer | Fare v. Michael C. | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Michael C. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-334 |
256 | reversed/remanded | <p>These are two consolidated cases. For 77-1546, in 1972, U. S. Attorney William Stafford, Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Florida Stuart Carrouth, and Department of Justice Attorney Guy Goodwin conducted a grand jury investigation into a conspiracy to cause a riot in Florida. Respondents were among the group subpoenaed to appear and testify. During the course of the proceedings, Goodwin stated under oath that there were no government agents in the witness lineup called by respondents’ counsel. Respondents later sued Stafford, Carrouth, Goodwin, and FBI Agent Claude Meadow in their individual and official capacities for falsely testifying and conspiring to deprive the respondents of statutory rights. Respondents sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where Goodwin resided. The petitioners requested a transfer to the Northern District of Florida or a dismissal based on improper venue. The district court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that the venue was proper because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia.</p>
<p>For 78-393, from 1953 until 1973, CIA agents regularly opened and photocopied mail going through the International Airport in New York to and from the Soviet Union. In 1975, respondents sued on their behalf and on the behalf of others whose mail had been opened by the CIA. Respondents sued in the district court of Rhode Island and alleged that the interference with their mail constituted a violation of their constitutional rights. Petitioners moved to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient service of process. The district court denied these motions but certified the case for an immediate appeal. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the denial of the motions as they relate to petitioners employed by the CIA at the time of filing, but reversed as to the officials who had left their government positions at the time of filing. The Court of Appeals held that the venue was proper because one of the petitioners resided in Rhode Island.</p> | True | 51958 | 2204 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-1546 | William H. Stafford, Jr., et al. | Stafford v. Briggs | Judicial Power | 2 | John Briggs, et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1546 |
257 | reversed | <p>Mary Jane Martin, a tenured teacher at Harrah Independent School District, was required to earn five college credits every three years as continuing education. Martin refused to comply with this requirement and did not receive a pay increase each year her contract was renewed. The Oklahoma legislature passed a law requiring a mandatory pay increase every year regardless of compliance with the continuing education. Looking for an alternative consequence, the school board warned Martin that they would not renew her contract the following year if she did not complete her continuing education. Martin refused, and the school board voted to terminate her for “willful neglect of duty”.</p>
<p>After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain administrative relief, Martin sued the school district for Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the termination violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> | True | 51966 | 1054 | 9 | per curiam | 78-443 | Harrah Independent School District, et al. | Harrah Independent School District v. Martin | Civil Rights | 0 | Mary Jane Martin | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-443 |
258 | affirmed | <p>A Delaware patrolman stopped William Prouse's car to make a routine check of his driver's license and vehicle registration. The officer had not observed any traffic violation or suspicious conduct on the part of Prouse. After stopping the car, the officer uncovered marijuana. The marijuana was later used to indict Prouse.</p> | False | 51975 | 331 | 8 | majority opinion | 77-1571 | Delaware | Delaware v. Prouse | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Prouse | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1571 |
259 | reversed/remanded | <p>Davis, a former employee of Louisiana Congressman Otto Passman, charged Passman with violating her Fifth Amendment right to due process. Prior to the time of her firing Passman wrote a note explaining that, even though he knew Davis as an "able, energetic, and a hard, hard worker", he preferred a man to work in her position. The Court of Appeals ruled that Davis had no civil remedies under the Fifth Amendment due process requirement.</p> | True | 51977 | 445 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-5072 | Davis | Davis v. Passman | Civil Rights | 4 | Passman | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5072 |
260 | affirmed | <p>On March 5, 1976, Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland. She was able to give the police a description of the robber and the 1975 Monte Carlo she thought the robber was driving. Within a few days, she began receiving threatening phone calls that culminated in the caller telling her to stand on her porch, from where she observed the same Monte Carlo drive past. On March 16, the police observed the car in McDonough's neighborhood. By running a search on the license plate number, the police learned the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith. The police contacted the telephone company and requested that a pen register, a device that only records numbers dialed, record the numbers dialed from the telephone at Smith's home. On March 17, the pen register recorded a call from Smith's phone to McDonough's home, so the police obtained a warrant to search Smith's house. During the search, police discovered a phone book with the corner turned down on the page on which McDonough's name was found. Smith was arrested and placed in a line-up where McDonough identified him as the man who robbed her.</p>
<p>In pretrial, Smith filed a motion to suppress the information derived from the installation of the pen register because it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, Smith waived a jury, and the case was submitted to the court with an agreed-upon statement of facts. The court convicted Smith and sentenced him to six years in prison. Smith appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but the Maryland Court of Appeals intervened by issuing a writ of certiorari. That court affirmed the conviction and held that there was no expectation of privacy to cover the numbers dialed into a telephone system, so there was no Fourth Amendment violation of the warrant requirement.</p> | False | 51980 | 1833 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-5374 | Michael Lee Smith | Smith v. Maryland | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Maryland | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5374 |
261 | reversed | <p>The United Steelworkers of America and the Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program. Weber claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. These cases (United Steelworkers v. Weber and Kaiser Aluminum v. Weber) were also decided together with United States v. Weber.</p> | True | 51994 | 545 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-432 | United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC | United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber | Civil Rights | 2 | Weber | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-432 |
262 | vacated/remanded | <p>An FBI officer read Willie Thomas Butler his rights under <i>Miranda v Arizona</i> after arresting him on a federal warrant. At Butler’s interrogation, the officer gave Butler an “Advice of Rights” form and asked him to sign it to indicate that he understood his rights. Butler refused to sign the waiver portion of the form, but indicated that he would like to talk to the officer. Butler did not ask for an attorney. Butler proceeded to make incriminating statements, which were introduced as evidence at trial. Butler moved to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied the motion. The court held that Butler had effectively waived his right to an attorney when he spoke with the FBI officer after indicating that he understood his rights. The jury found Butler guilty of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial, holding that statements made under interrogation are not admissible without an express waiver of rights.</p> | True | 51997 | 1049 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-354 | North Carolina | North Carolina v. Butler | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Willie Thomas Butler | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-354 |
263 | vacated/remanded | <p>Vineville Presbyterian Church was organized in 1904 and first incorporated in 1939. Its property was purchased using funds contributed entirely by local church members. The year it was organized, Vineville was established as a member of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (“PCUS”). Under the PCUS’s hierarchical structure, the actions of the government of a local church were subject to the review and control of the higher church courts: the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly. The powers and duties of each court were set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order. </p>
<p>On May 27, 1973, 164 members of Vineville’s congregation voted to separate from the PCUS and join the Presbyterian Church in America; ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate and resolve the dispute. This commission eventually ruled that the minority faction at Vineville was the true congregation of Vineville, withdrawing all authority from the majority faction, which took no part in the commission’s inquiry.</p>
<p>The minority faction brought a class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of Vineville’s property. The trial court, relying on Georgia’s “neutral principles of law” approach to church property disputes, found for the majority faction. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the ruling, holding that the trial court correctly applied Georgia law and rejecting the minority faction’s claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.</p> | True | 52008 | 1657 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-91 | R. W. Jones, Sr., et al. | Jones v. Wolf | First Amendment | 4 | Charles T. Wolf et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-91 |
264 | reversed/remanded | <p>The Nebraska Board of Parole (Parole Board) procedure to determine whether an inmate was eligible for release is based on a yearly review of each inmate’s record and an informal interview in which the inmate could present letters and statements in support of his release on parole. The Parole Board would then determine whether the inmate was a good candidate for release and, if so, schedule a final hearing. Inmates scheduled for a final hearing were informed in advance of the month in which the hearing would take place, but did not receive notice of the specific date until the morning of the hearing. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex filed a class action in federal district court alleging that the discretionary parole procedures used by the Parole Board violated their rights to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the procedures did not satisfy due process and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals instructed the Parole Board to modify its procedures to provide each inmate eligible for parole with a full formal hearing and, in the event of an adverse decision, a statement of evidence relied on by the Board.</p> | True | 52014 | 1252 | 5 | majority opinion | 78-201 | John B. Greenholtz | Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex | Due Process | 4 | Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-201 |
265 | reversed/remanded | <p>Wiley L. Bolden and other residents of Mobile, Alabama brought a class action on behalf of all black citizens in Mobile. They argued that the practice of electing the City Commissioners at-large unfairly diluted the voting strength of black citizens. A district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of Bolden.</p> | True | 52017 | 353 | 6 | plurality opinion | 77-1844 | City of Mobile | City of Mobile v. Bolden | 3 | Bolden | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1844 |
|
266 | reversed/remanded | <p>A jury convicted Billy Duren of first degree murder and first degree robbery. Duren alleged that the selection of this jury violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. Specifically, Jackson County allowed an automatic exemption from jury service for women upon request. While women made up 54% of the population in the Jackson County, only 26.7% of people summoned from the jury wheel were women. Defendant had an all-male jury selected from a panel of 48 men and 5 women. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, questioning the validity of Duren’s statistics. The court also held that even if women were disproportionally excluded from jury service, the amount of women who participated in the process was well above constitutional standards.<br /> | True | 52019 | 849 | 8 | majority opinion | 77-6067 | Billy Duren | Duren v. Missouri | Civil Rights | 1 | Missouri | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-6067 |
267 | reversed | <p>Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 required that members of the Foreign Service retirement system retire at 60. No mandatory retirement age was specified for employees covered by the Civil Service retirement system. Holbrook Bradley, a member of the Foreign Service retirement system, challenged the statute in United States District Court for the District of Columbia and prevailed. The government appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 52021 | 449 | 8 | majority opinion | 77-1254 | Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State et al. | Vance v. Bradley | Civil Rights | 1 | Holbrook Bradley et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1254 |
268 | reversed | <p>Carl Beazer and Jose Reyes were employees of the New York Transit Authority (NYTA). Both were heroin addicts undergoing methadone treatment. NYTA maintained a policy against hiring anyone using narcotics. Methadone was considered a narcotic, and both Beazer and Reyes were terminated after NYTA learned of their methadone use. Beazer and Reyes filed a class action against the Transit Authority, alleging that NYTA's policy discriminated against blacks and Hispanics. They cited a statistic showing that 81 percent of suspected violations of NYTA's policy were black or Hispanic. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled for Beazer, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision.</p> | True | 52025 | 762 | 6 | majority opinion | 77-1427 | New York City Transit Authority | New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer | Civil Rights | 3 | Carl Beazer et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1427 |
269 | reversed | <p>On March 26, 1971, the proprietor of a Rochester, New York pizza parlor was killed in an attempted robbery. On August 10, 1971, the police received a lead implicating Irving Dunaway, but the lead did not provide enough information to arrest him. Nevertheless, the police brought him in for questioning. He was not told he was under arrest, but he would be physically restrained if he attempted to leave. After being informed of his Miranda rights, Dunaway waived his right to counsel and made statements and a drawing that incriminated himself.</p>
<p>At trial, Dunaway filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his confession and drawing. The motion was denied and he was convicted. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department and the New York Court of Appeals both affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of <i>Brown v. Illinois</i>.</p>
<p>The Monroe County Court determined that the motion to suppress should have been granted under <i>Brown</i>. The Appellate Division of the Fourth Department reversed and held that suspects can be detained and questioned without violating Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals dismissed Dunaway’s application for leave to appeal.</p> | True | 52028 | 1290 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-5066 | Irving Jerome Dunaway | Dunaway v. New York | Criminal Procedure | 2 | State of New York | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5066 |
270 | reversed/remanded | <p>Frances Davis sought admission to the nursing program at Southeastern Community College, which received federal funds. Davis also suffered from a hearing disability, and was unable to understand speech without lip-reading. Davis' application was denied. She asked for reconsideration, and her application was again denied. Davis filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, which ruled against her. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overturned that decision.</p> | True | 52031 | 532 | 9 | majority opinion | 78-711 | Southeastern Community College | Southeastern Community College v. Davis | Civil Rights | 0 | Frances Davis | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-711 |
271 | vacated/remanded | <p>Frank Addington was charged with “assault by threat” of his mother. His mother then filed a petition for his permanent confinement in a mental health facility. At trial, evidence was presented that Addington suffered from serious delusions, and two physicians testified that he was a psychotic schizophrenic. The jury was instructed to decide Addington’s mental state and whether he was a possible threat to himself and others by weighing the “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.” The jury determined the evidence was sufficient, and Addington was sentenced to Austin State Hospital for an indefinite amount of time. He appealed on the grounds that the jury should have been instructed to evaluate the evidence using the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The state appellate court remanded his case stating that his rights had been violated when the jury was improperly instructed on the burden of proof. The Supreme Court of Texas overturned the appellate court’s decision and reinstated the trial court’s finding by holding that the standard of proof used in the initial jury instructions was adequate for a civil proceeding and did not violate Addington’s due process rights.</p> | True | 52035 | 1198 | 8 | majority opinion | 77-5992 | Frank O’Neal Addington | Addington v. Texas | Due Process | 0 | Texas | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-5992 |
272 | reversed | <p>In 1957 and 1958, Ilya Wolston’s aunt and uncle, Myra and Jack Soble, were the subject of an investigation to find Soviet intelligence agents in the United States. On one occasion, Wolston failed to respond to a subpoena and pleaded guilty to a contempt charge. The incident was publicized in newspapers, but Wolston succeeded in returning to life as a private citizen. In 1974, Reader’s Digest Association published a book by John Barron about the KGB and Soviet agents in the United States. The book and its index identified Wolston as a Soviet agent.</p>
<p>Wolston sued the author and publishers for libel in district court. The district court granted summary judgment for the Association and held that Wolston was a “public figure” and had to prove the Association acted with actual malice to prevail in a libel suit. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 52039 | 898 | 8 | majority opinion | 78-5414 | Ilya Wolston | Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. | First Amendment | 1 | Reader's Digest Association, Inc., et al. | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-5414 |
273 | affirmed | <p>A Massachusetts law required minors to gain parental consent before having an abortion. However, if either or both of the parents refused, a judge of the superior court could allow a minor to have the procedure "for good cause shown."</p> | False | 52043 | 242 | 8 | plurality opinion | 78-329 | Bellotti | Bellotti v. Baird | Privacy | 1 | Baird | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/78-329 |
274 | affirmed | <p>Two suspects charged with murder, robbery, and grand larceny requested that the public be excluded from a pre-trial hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence. They argued that an "unabated buildup" of adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial. The request was granted by the judge, and no objections were made at the time. The judge then denied press access to the pre-trial hearing and refused to immediately release the transcript of the proceedings. The case was argued and decided with Marshall, Secretary of Labor v. American Petroleum Institute et al.</p> | False | 52047 | 602 | 5 | majority opinion | 77-1301 | Gannett Company, Inc. | Gannett Company, Inc. v. DePasquale | Criminal Procedure | 4 | DePasquale | 1978 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1978/77-1301 |
275 | reversed | <p>Herman Raddatz was indicted for unlawfully receiving a firearm. Before trial, he moved to suppress incriminating statements he made to police and FBI officers. The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing as authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act (FMA). The Magistrate made findings of fact and recommended dismissal of the motion to suppress. The district court accepted the recommendation and denied Raddatz’s motion to suppress. A jury found Raddatz guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison and four and half years of probation. On appeal, Raddatz argued that the FMA violates Article III of the Constitution, and the district court denied him due process by not personally hearing disputed testimony. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the referral provisions of the FMA do not violate Constitution because the district court makes the final determination. The court reversed, however, because Raddatz was denied due process when the district court failed to hear the disputed testimony where credibility is crucial to the outcome.</p> | True | 52060 | 1130 | 5 | majority opinion | 79-8 | United States | United States v. Raddatz | Due Process | 4 | Herman Raddatz | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-8 |
276 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1965, Congress established the Medicaid program, via Title XIX of the Social Security Act, to provide federal financial assistance to states that chose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons. Beginning in 1976, Congress passed a number of versions of the "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. Cora McRae, a pregnant Medicaid recipient, challenged the Amendment and took action against Patricia R. Harris, Secretary of Health and Human Services.</p> | True | 52078 | 571 | 5 | majority opinion | 79-1268 | Harris | Harris v. McRae | Privacy | 4 | McRae | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-1268 |
277 | reversed | <p>Petitioner Vincent Chiarella worked in the composing room of Pandick Press (Pandick), a financial printer. An acquiring corporation hired Pandick to produce announcements of corporate takeover bids. Although the identities of the acquiring and target corporations were concealed, Chiarella was able to deduce the names of the target companies. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were made public. Chiarella realized slightly more than $30,000 in profits from his trading activities. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) then investigated Chiarella's trading activities. Chiarella entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return the profits he made to the sellers of the shares. A few months later, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen counts of violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe." Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Chiarella was convicted at trial and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction.</p> | True | 52079 | 1522 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-1202 | Chiarella | Chiarella v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 3 | United States | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1202 |
278 | reversed | <p>After a series of mistrials in a murder case in the state of Virginia, a trial judge closed the trial to the public and the media. Defense counsel brought the closure motion; the prosecution did not object. Two reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. challenged the judge's action.</p> | True | 52092 | 288 | 7 | plurality opinion | 79-243 | Richmond Newspapers Inc. | Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia | First Amendment | 1 | Virginia | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-243 |
279 | affirmed | <p>After genetically engineering a bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, Ananda Chakrabarty sought to patent his creation under Title 35 U.S.C. Section 101, providing patents for people who invent or discover "any" new and useful "manufacture" or "composition of matter." On appeal from an application rejection by a patent examiner the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that living things are not patentable under Section 101. When this decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, Diamond appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p> | False | 52098 | 590 | 5 | majority opinion | 79-136 | Diamond | Diamond v. Chakrabarty | Economic Activity | 4 | Chakrabarty | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-136 |
280 | reversed/remanded | <p>Crown Simpson Pulp Company and Louisiana-Pacific Corporation operated two bleached craft pulp mills in California. The mills were granted permits by the California State Water Resources Control Board with variances from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards for effluent discharge. The EPA, however, denied the variances. The mill companies sought review directly in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Act allows direct appeal of EPA actions either “issuing or denying any permit”. The court of appeals dismissed the review, holding that because the State granted the permits and the EPA merely objected the variances, this case did not fall under the Act.</p> | True | 52095 | 749 | 9 | per curiam | 79-797 | Crown Simpson Pulp Company, et al. | Crown Simpson Pulp Company v. Costle | Economic Activity | 0 | Douglas M. Costle | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-797 |
281 | reversed | <p>On January 13, 1972, Randal Rush and Jeffrey Savchuk were involved in a single-car crash outside of Elkhart, Indiana. The passenger, Savchuk, was injured in the crash. In June 1973, Savchuk moved to Minnesota with his parents. He sued Rush in Minnesota district court and attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the fact that State Farm, the agency that insured Rush’s car, operates in Minnesota. Rush and State Farm moved to dismiss, but the trial court denied the petition and allowed Savchuk to proceed. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Rush appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. The Minnesota Supreme Court again found in favor of Savchuk.</p> | True | 52096 | 743 | 7 | majority opinion | 78-952 | Randal Rush, et al. | Rush v. Savchuk | Due Process | 2 | Jeffrey Savchuk | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-952 |
282 | affirmed | <p>In the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the United States granted the Sioux Indian Nation the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills of South Dakota. Congress reneged in 1877, passing an act that reclaimed the Black Hills. The Sioux Nation requested compensation in 1920. The United States Court of Claims ruled against the Sioux Nation in 1942. Congress then established the Indian Claims Commission in 1946. The Commission ruled that the Sioux Nation was not barred by the Court of Claims decision and ruled that Congress used its powers of eminent domain in 1877 and the Sioux were therefore entitled to compensation. The Court of Claims maintained that the Sioux were barred by their first case. Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act in 1978, removing the judicial bar. The Court of Claims then held that the Sioux were entitled to $17.1 million.</p> | False | 52112 | 878 | 8 | majority opinion | 79-639 | United States | United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians | Civil Rights | 1 | Sioux Nation of Indians | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-639 |
283 | reversed | <p>New York residents purchased a car from a Volkswagen retailer in New York. On a drive to Arizona, the residents got in a car accident while driving through Oklahoma. A defective gas tank in the car allegedly caused the accident. The residents sued the retailer and its New York based wholesale distributor in Oklahoma state court. The retailer and distributor asserted that Oklahoma could not properly have jurisdiction. The trial court rejected this claim. The retailer and distributor then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to prevent the trial court from exercising in personam jurisdiction. The court denied the writ because jurisdiction was authorized by Oklahoma’s long-arm statute, which allowed jurisdiction over defendants who caused tortious injury within the state.</p> | True | 52119 | 821 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-1078 | World Wide Volkswagen Corp., Seaway Volkswagen Inc. | World-Wide Volkwagen Corporation v. Woodson | Due Process | 3 | The Honorable Charles Woodson, District Judge of Creek County, State of Oklahoma; Key Eloise Robinson; Eva May Robinson; Harry Robinson; George Samuel Robinson | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1078 |
284 | affirmed | <p>The Village of Schaumburg Illinois adopted an ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting contributions in public areas without a permit. Permits were only granted to organizations that could demonstrate that 75 percent of their receipts were applied towards "charitable purposes." Citizens for Better Environment, a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, was denied a permit because it did not satisfy the 75-percent requirement. CBE sued in federal district court, which ruled in their favor. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this ruling.</p> | False | 52125 | 602 | 8 | majority opinion | 78-1335 | Village of Schaumburg | Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment | First Amendment | 1 | Citizens for Better Environment | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1335 |
285 | vacated/remanded | <p>After a picture identification by the victim of a robbery, Thomas J. Innis was arrested by police in Providence, Rhode Island. Innis was unarmed when arrested. Innis was advised of his Miranda rights and subsequently requested to speak with a lawyer. While escorting Innis to the station in a police car, three officers began discussing the shotgun involved in the robbery. One of the officers commented that there was a school for handicapped children in the area and that if one of the students found the weapon he might injure himself. Innis then interrupted and told the officers to turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was located.</p> | True | 52127 | 663 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-1076 | Rhode Island | Rhode Island v. Innis | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Innis | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1076 |
286 | reversed | <p>On September 25, 1975, 12 packages containing 871 boxes of films depicting homosexual activities were shipped from St. Petersburg, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia. Though addressed to Leggs, Inc., the boxes were mistakenly delivered to the address of L’Eggs Products, Inc. Employees of L’Eggs Products opened the boxes and found the boxes of films, which contained suggestive drawings on one side and descriptions on the other. One of the employees opened one of the boxes of films and unsuccessfully attempted to view portions of the film. The FBI became involved on October 1, 1975 and, without making any effort to obtain a warrant, projected and viewed the films.</p>
<p>On April 6, 1977, William Walter, Arthur Randall Sanders, Jr., and Gulf Coast News Agency, Inc. were indicted on obscenity charges relating to the interstate transportation of the boxes of films. Petitioners filed a motion to suppress use of the films as evidence. The motion was denied, and the petitioners were convicted. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 52135 | 1061 | 5 | plurality opinion | 79-67 | William Walter | Walter v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 4 | United States | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-67 |
287 | vacated/remanded | <p>These are three consolidated cases.</p>
<p>Jasper F. Williams and Eugene F. Diamond, doctors who perform medically necessary abortions, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, a woman in poverty who needed an abortion for medical reasons but not to save her life, brought a class action suit against the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid in federal district court. The appellants challenged an Illinois statute that prohibited state medical assistance from paying for abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother. The appellants alleged that the Medicaid Act required the state to cover the cost of all medically necessary abortions. They also alleged that the denial of funding for certain abortions is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.</p>
<p>Initially, the district court refused to consider the case until the state courts had reached a decision on the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded the case to the district court to for consideration on the merits. The district court held that the Medicaid Act required a state to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. The district court also held that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of federal funds for certain abortions, does not exempt the state from fulfilling the Medicaid requirements. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the Hyde Amendment allows a state to limit funding to the type of abortions the Amendment specifies. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to consider the constitutional issues. The district court held that both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment were unconstitutional.</p> | True | 52139 | 1783 | 5 | majority opinion | 79-4 | Jasper F. Williams, et al. | Williams v. Zbaraz | Privacy | 4 | David Zbaraz, et al. | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-4 |
288 | reversed/remanded | <p>Upon accepting employment in the CIA in 1968, Snepp signed an agreement with the Agency that he would not publish any information during or after his term of employment relating to the Agency's activities without first obtaining Agency approval. Snepp published a book about CIA activities in South Vietnam without first submitting his manuscript to the Agency for review. A lower court denied Snepp royalties from his book for his failure to secure approval.</p> | False | 52142 | 467 | 6 | per curiam | 78-1871 | Snepp | Snepp v. United States | First Amendment | 3 | United States | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1871 |
289 | affirmed | <p>Richard Thomas was convicted of attempted murder and committed to a mental institution for a suggested one to twenty years. The parole officials released him after five months. Five months after his release on parole, he murdered Mary Ellen Martinez, a fifteen-year-old girl. Her family, sued the parole official for negligence, but the district court dismissed the case because a California statute states that a parole officer cannot be liable for injury resulting from the decision to revoke parole or release a parolee. The California Supreme Court also dismissed the case and the Martinez family appealed by arguing the statute of immunization of parole officials violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> | False | 52140 | 737 | 9 | majority opinion | 78-1268 | Martinez | Martinez v. California | Civil Rights | 0 | California | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1268 |
290 | affirmed | <p>The County of Los Angeles imposed an ad valorem tax on manufactured items stored in warehouses. Sears, Roebuck and Co. paid this tax under protest and claimed an exemption from that tax for items manufactured outside the United States and imported into the United States. These items were intended for sale both in and out of the State of California. Sears sued for a refund of the tax in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The court granted Sears’ motion for summary judgment and awarded the refund. The Court of Appeal of California reversed, holding that giving exemptions to foreign goods intended for interstate commerce provided a competitive advantage over domestic goods. This made the county tax an unconstitutional regulation on interstate commerce.</p> | False | 52147 | 780 | 4 | equally divided | 78-1577 | Sears, Roebuck and Co. | Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles and City of Compton | 4 | County of Los Angeles and City of Compton | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1577 |
|
291 | reversed | <p>The Public Service Commission of New York (PSC), in the interest of conserving energy, enacted a regulation that prohibited electric utilities from promoting electricity use. The PSC's regulation distinguished promotional advertising from informational advertising, which was permitted. Central Hudson Gas and Electric challenged the regulation in a New York State Supreme Court, which upheld the regulation. The Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court affirmed the decision, as did the New York Court of Appeals.</p> | True | 52149 | 536 | 8 | majority opinion | 79-565 | Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation | Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York | First Amendment | 1 | Public Service Commission of New York | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-565 |
292 | <p>Rincon Island is artificial island off the coast of Ventura County, California and is connected to the mainland via a causeway. Additionally, there are 15 piers on the coastline. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 granted to California all land and resources within three miles of the coastline. California and the United States disputed over whether the island and piers were included in this coastline. A special master was appointed to resolve this dispute. The Special Master found that the island and piers did not affect the shoreline, and were therefore not extensions of the coastline. California filed an exception to the Master's finding.</p> | True | 52151 | 653 | 8 | majority opinion | 5-orig | United States | United States v. California | 0 | California | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/5_orig |
||
293 | affirmed | <p>The state of South Dakota operated a cement plant. A substantial percentage of the plant's production was sold to buyers outside the state. One such customer was Reeves, Inc., a concrete distributor in Wyoming that obtained over 90 percent of its cement from the state-run plant. In 1978, for economic reasons, the South Dakota plant began supplying in-state customers before honoring other commitments. Reeves, Inc. challenged South Dakota's "hoarding" of resources.</p> | False | 52162 | 475 | 5 | majority opinion | 79-677 | Reeves Inc. | Reeves Inc. v. Stake | Economic Activity | 4 | Stake | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-677 |
294 | affirmed | <p>In 1977, Congress enacted legislation requiring that at least 10 percent of federal funds granted for local public works programs had to be used to obtain services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. H. Earl Fullilove and other contractors filed suit, claiming they had been economically harmed by the enforcement of the statute. The defendant was Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce.</p> | False | 52164 | 424 | 6 | plurality opinion | 78-1007 | Fullilove | Fullilove v. Klutznick | Civil Rights | 3 | Klutznick | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-1007 |
295 | vacated/remanded | <p>While working for his father’s broker-dealer firm, Peter E. Aaron was in charge of supervising sales of securities made by other employees and maintaining files on the companies that issued the securities sold by the firm. In the fall of 1974, two of Aaron’s employees began telling prospective investors that they should buy shares of the Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-Mat) because the company planned to manufacture a new type of small car within the next six weeks. An attorney for Lawn-A-Mat contacted Aaron twice and informed him that the company had no plans to manufacture a car, but Aaron did not ensure that the employees would stop making those statements in promoting the Lawn-A-Mat stock. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed a complaint against Aaron in district court and alleged that he had violated, and aided and abetted violations of, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), and Rule 10b-5, which is a rule promulgated by the SEC to implement Section 10(b). The district court found that Aaron had violated the securities laws in question through his “intentional failure” to stop the fraudulent practices of the employees working under him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment but declined to reach the question of whether Aaron’s conduct amounted to an intent to “deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Instead the Court of Appeals held that proof of negligence is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5.</p> | True | 52169 | 1662 | 6 | majority opinion | 79-66 | Peter E. Aaron | Aaron v. SEC | Economic Activity | 3 | Securities and Exchange Commission | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-66 |
296 | reversed/remanded | <p>On January 7, 1975, police arrested Herschel Roberts in Lake County, Ohio. Roberts was charged with forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and of possessing stolen credit cards belonging to Amy Isaacs. At the preliminary hearing on January 10, Roberts’ lawyer called the Isaacs’ daughter, Anita, as a witness to testify that she knew Roberts and allowed him to use her apartment while she was away. The attorney attempted to elicit testimony from Anita that she gave Roberts the checks and credit cards without telling him that she did not have permission to do so. Ms. Isaacs would not admit to these actions, and Roberts’ attorney did not ask the court to declare her a hostile witness or place her on cross-examination. When Ms. Isaacs failed to respond to five subpoenas to appear at Roberts’ subsequent criminal trial, the state entered the transcript of her earlier testimony into evidence, as allowed by an Ohio Statute. </p>
<p>After being convicted by the trial court, Roberts appealed on the grounds that the admission of the prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed.</p> | True | 52183 | 1214 | 6 | majority opinion | 78-756 | Ohio | Ohio v. Roberts | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Herschel Roberts | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/78-756 |
297 | affirmed | <p>Gilberto Alvez was a seaman on vacation from his regular trade. He was moonlighting for Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. as a harbor worker on the SS <i>Export Builder</i>, a vessel owned by American Export Lines, Inc (“AELI”). On October 13, 1972, while the SS <i>Export Builder</i> was in New York waters, the handle of a defective tension jack struck Alvez in the eye. He completely lost his right eye in the accident. He also suffered from depression as a result of the accident and his injuries.</p>
<p>Alvez sued AELI in New York, claiming damages resulting from AELI’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of their ship. Alvez then moved to add his wife, Juanita Alvez, as a party plaintiff, claiming that his injuries deprived her of the benefits of their marriage.</p>
<p>The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (“Jones Act”) created several classes of sea workers, allowing a wider breadth of causes of action for those injured within the United States’ territorial waters. It did not, however, specifically provide a cause of action for loss of consortium for spouses. Similarly, the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920 (“DOHSA”) did not create a specific right to a cause of action for loss of consortium. The district court denied the claim for loss of consortium. The appellate court reversed, noting that while such motions were not available in some maritime law cases, the Supreme Court in <i>Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet</i> allowed a decedent’s dependents to recover for loss of society in a wrongful death maritime law claim. Thus, there is no clear precedent prohibiting claims of loss of consortium from nonfatal injuries.</p>
<p>New York’s Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. It rejected AELI’s use of <i>Igneri v. Cie. De Transports Oceaniques</i>, a U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit decision holding that the spouse of an injured longshoreman had no cause of action for loss of consortium. It noted that most states now allowed a spouse to state a cause of action for loss of consortium. It also reasoned that the heavy burden now placed on Juanita Alvez as a marriage partner justified allowing her to sue for damages.</p> | False | 52185 | 2172 | 6 | plurality opinion | 79-1 | American Export Lines, Inc. | American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez | Economic Activity | 3 | Gilberto Alvez, Joseph Vinal Ship Maintenance, Inc. | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-1 |
298 | vacated/remanded | <p>President Jimmy Carter acted without congressional approval in ending a defense treaty with Taiwan.</p> | False | 52186 | 107 | 6 | per curiam | 79-856 | Barry Goldwater et al. | Goldwater v. Carter | 3 | James Earl Carter, President of the United States, et al. | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-856 |
|
299 | affirmed | <p>High school students seeking support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against Zionism set up a table in PruneYard to distribute literature and solicit signatures for a petition. A security guard told them to leave since their actions violated the shopping center's regulations against "publicly expressive" activities.</p> | False | 52187 | 345 | 9 | majority opinion | 79-289 | PruneYard Shopping Center | PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins | Due Process | 0 | Robins | 1979 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1979/79-289 |