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100 | reversed | <p>The Mississippi Tax Commission (MTC) passed a regulation requiring out-of-state liquor distributors to collect a tax for liquor sold on Mississippi military installations. The tax resulted in a price mark-up for liquor sold on military installations. The MTC sent a letter to liquor distributors advising that if the tax was not collected directly from the military, the distributors could face criminal charges. The United States paid the tax and sought summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The United States argued that the mark-up was an unconstitutional tax on the federal government. The district court upheld the regulation, ruling that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed the tax. The Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the tax was a permissible sales tax on the liquor distributors and not a tax on the federal government. Two of the military installments had concurrent jurisdiction with both the federal and Mississippi government.</p> | True | 51219 | 1066 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-548 | United States | United States v. Tax Commission of Mississippi | Federalism | 2 | Mississippi Tax Commission, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-548 |
101 | reversed/remanded | <p>The Harris County Commissioners Court voted to redistrict and consolidate several small districts. This left several justices of the peace and constables without positions before the end of their terms. The justices of the peace and constables sued to enjoin the redistricting, alleging equal protection and state constitutional violations. Under the Texas state constitution, a justice of the peace could only be removed from office before the end of an elected term if given notice and a jury trial. A three-judge federal district court held that the redistricting violated the Equal Protection Clause because it removed some officials but not others. The court did not decided the state constitutional issue.</p> | True | 51225 | 724 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1475 | Harris County Commissioners Court, et al. | Harris County Commissioners Court v. Moore | Judicial Power | 1 | Richard E. Moore, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1475 |
102 | affirmed | <p>Six maritime unions, including American Radio Association, picketed docks in Mobile, Alabama, asking the public not to patronize foreign vessels docked there. The unions were opposed to the low wages paid to foreign seamen. Mobile Steamship Association sued to enjoin the picketing because it prevented the loading and unloading of ships. The circuit court granted a temporary injunction and the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. The courts held that the picketing did not “affect commerce” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), so the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not have jurisdiction. The courts also held that enjoining the picketing did not violate the First Amendment because the picketing resulted in a work stoppage, not just the expression of ideas.</p> | False | 51229 | 810 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-748 | American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO, et al. | American Radio Assn., AFL-CIO v. Mobile Steamship Assn., Inc. | Federalism | 4 | Mobile Steamship Association, Robert Malone | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-748 |
103 | reversed/remanded | <p>Tom Ellis and Robert Love plead nolo contendere to charges of violating a city loitering ordinance. The court fined each man $10. Rather than seeking a trial in the county court and risking a harsher punishment, the men sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. They sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, and equitable relief in the form of removal of their arrest and conviction records. The district court denied relief and dismissed the claim, holding that declaratory relief was unavailable because there was no pending criminal prosecution or allegation of bad faith prosecution. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed without an opinion.</p> | True | 51234 | 741 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-130 | Tom E. Ellis and Robert D. Love | Ellis v. Dyson | Judicial Power | 3 | Frank M. Dyson, Alex Bickley, Scott McDonald, Hugh Jones, Wes Wise | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-130 |
104 | affirmed | <p>Nine students at two high schools and one junior high school in Columbus, Ohio, were given 10-day suspensions from school. The school principals did not hold hearings for the affected students before ordering the suspensions, and Ohio law did not require them to do so. The principals' actions were challenged, and a federal court found that the students' rights had been violated. The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | False | 51240 | 438 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-898 | Goss | Goss v. Lopez | Due Process | 4 | Lopez | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-898 |
105 | reversed/remanded | <p>Billy J. Taylor was indicted on kidnapping charges by the grand jury of St. Tammany Parish. The day before his trial was supposed to start, he filed a motion to quash the petit jury that was selected for his trial because he argued that women were systematically excluded, which denied him a right to trial by a jury of his peers. Although 53% of eligible jurors in his district were female, only 10% of the jury wheel was female. This discrepancy was due to an article of the Louisiana Constitution that specifies that a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously submitted a written declaration of her desire to serve. The trial court dismissed Taylor’s motion, and he was tried and found guilty. He appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which held that the article regulating women’s jury service did not violate federal law.</p> | True | 51239 | 867 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-5744 | Billy J. Taylor | Taylor v. Louisiana | Civil Rights | 1 | State of Louisiana | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5744 |
106 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 100 picketed Connell Construction Co., a local building contractor. The union wanted Connell to sign an agreement promising only to subcontract mechanical work to Union members. Connell sued to enjoin the picketing. Connell signed the agreement with the union under protest, and amended its complaint to allege antitrust violations. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from federal antitrust laws under a provision of the National Labor Relations Act. Also, federal labor laws pre-empted state antitrust laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51247 | 634 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-1256 | Connell Construction Company, Inc. | Connell Constr. Company, Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO | Unions | 4 | Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices of the plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1256 |
107 | reversed/remanded | <p>In an effort to investigate the "administration, operation, and enforcement" of the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security subpoenaed a bank for the financial records of the United States Servicemen's Fund. This nonprofit organization had actively published newsletters and sponsored coffeehouses in which discussions critical of the Vietnam War took place. The Fund challenged the subpoena arguing that its enforcement would violate the organization's First Amendment rights since the bank records contained information about the Fund's membership.</p> | True | 51244 | 594 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1923 | Eastland | Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund | First Amendment | 1 | United States Servicemen's Fund | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1923 |
108 | reversed | <p>The University Drive-In Theater in Jacksonville, Florida had a screen that was visible from nearby public streets. The theater showed an R-rated film containing female nudity, which violated a Jacksonville city ordinance that prohibited the showing of films containing nudity if the film was visible from a public area. Richard Erznoznik, the theater's manager, was charged with a Class C offense under the ordinance. He challenged the ordinance in Duval County Circuit Court, which upheld the statute. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, affirmed the decision. The Supreme Court of Florida denied certiorari.</p> | True | 51257 | 638 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-1942 | Richard Erznoznik | Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville | First Amendment | 3 | City of Jacksonville | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1942 |
109 | affirmed | <p>Catherine Jackson had received electricity from Metropolitan Edison at her home. Her service was terminated in September 1970 due to a lack of payment. Jackson opened another account under the name of another resident, James Dodson. Metropolitan Edison investigated her residence on October 6, 1971 and service was again terminated without notice on October 11. Jackson sued in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. She sought damages for the termination and an injunction to continue her service. The court dismissed her suit. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal.</p> | False | 51258 | 631 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-5845 | Catherine Jackson | Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company | Due Process | 3 | Metropolitan Edison Company | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5845 |
110 | vacated/remanded | <p>Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain were sophomores at Mena Public High School in Mena, Arkansas. They heard about a school meeting where both parents and students would be present and decided to spike the punch with alcohol. Ten days later, Mrs. Curtis Powell, a teacher at the high school, learned of the prank and confronted the girls. The girls confessed based on the understanding that she would handle their punishment. The next day, the teacher informed the girls that the principal, P. T. Waller, heard about the incident and she would not be able to help them unless they confessed to the principal. The girls did so, and Mr. Waller suspended them for two weeks pending a decision by the school board. The school board voted to suspend the girls for the rest of the semester. The girls, their parents, and their counsel were present at a subsequent meeting to ask the board to reconsider the suspensions. The board denied the request.</p>
<p>Strickland and Crain sued the members of the school board, administrators, and the school district of Mena, Arkansas for damages resulting from their suspension, which they claimed violated their right to due process. The jury could not reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. The district court directed a verdict for the school board because there was no evidence of malice toward the girls. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial. </p> | True | 51259 | 1450 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-1285 | John P. Wood, et al. | Wood v. Strickland | Civil Rights | 4 | Peggy Strickland, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1285 |
111 | affirmed | <p>Stephen Wiesenfeld and Paula Polatschek were married in 1970. Polatschek had worked as a teacher for the five years prior to their marriage and continued teaching after they were married. Her salary was the principle source of the couple’s income, and social security contributions were regularly deducted from her salary. In 1972, Polatschek died in childbirth, which left Wiesenfeld with the care of their newborn son. Wiesenfeld applied for social security benefits for himself and his son, and was told that his son could receive them but that he could not. Social Security Act provides benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband and father that are available to both the children and the widow. The benefits for a deceased wife and mother, however, are only available to the children.</p>
<p>In 1973, Wiesenfeld sued on behalf of himself and similarly situated widowers. He claimed that the relevant section of the Social Security Act unfairly discriminated on the basis of sex and sought summary judgment. A three-judge panel of the district court granted Wiesenfeld’s motion for summary judgment</p> | False | 51266 | 1120 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1892 | Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare | Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld | Civil Rights | 0 | Stephen Charles Wiesenfeld, etc. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1892 |
112 | affirmed | <p> The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) set fixed commission rates for stock transactions less than $500,000. Richard A. Gordon, on behalf of a class of independent investors, sued the New York Stock Exchange and member firms claiming fixed commission rates and exorbitant membership fees violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the New York Stock Exchange, holding that the authority of the SEC provided immunity from antitrust claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Affirmed.</p> | False | 51269 | 563 | 9 | majority opinion | 74-304 | Richard A. Gordon, members of the Independent Investor Protection League | Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc. | Economic Activity | 0 | New York Stock Exchange, Inc., et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-304 |
113 | vacated/remanded | <p>The respondents represent a class of current and past employees of the Albemarle Paper Co. paper mill in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, who claimed to have suffered from racially discriminatory hiring and promoting practices. In 1966, after filing a race discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the respondents sued Albemarle Paper Co. and the plant’s labor union, Halifax Local 425, and sought permanent injunctive relief against any plant “policy, practice, custom, or usage” that violates Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1970, the plaintiffs moved to add a class demand for backpay.
<p>At trial, the court found that the plant’s seniority system was racially segregated and ordered the plant to implement a new system. The court did not award backpay because the company did not act in bad faith and respondents added the demand four years after the action was initiated. The court also did not enjoin Albemarle’s use of pre-employment tests. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the district court should have awarded backpay and enjoined the use of the pre-employment tests. </p> | True | 51270 | 1188 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-389 | Albemarle Paper Company, et al. | Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody | Civil Rights | 1 | Joseph P. Moody, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-389 |
114 | reversed/remanded | <p>On May 6, 1968, Roger Corpus was shot and killed in his apartment. The police obtained the name of Richard Brown, who was identified as an acquaintance of the victim, though not a suspect. On May 13, 1968, detectives arrested Brown and searched his apartment without probable cause and without a warrant. The detectives read Brown his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him. During the questioning, Brown confessed to assisting in Corpus’ murder. Later, Brown was questioned again after being read his Miranda rights a second time. He substantially repeated his account of the murder. </p>
<p>Prior to his trial, Brown moved to suppress the two statements based on the fact that his arrest was illegal and the statements were taken in violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found Brown guilty. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the judgment but did not accept the State’s argument that the arrest was legal.</p> | True | 51279 | 1003 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-6650 | Richard Brown | Brown v. Illinois | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Illinois | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-6650 |
115 | reversed | <p>On August 21, 1971, Ralph Feola, along with Enriquito Alsondo, Henry Rosa, and Michael Farr, planned to sell a kilo of powdered sugar in place of heroin to customers who, unbeknownst to them, were undercover cops. If the sale did not go well, the four planned to attack the buyers and take the money. Agent Hall and Agent Lightcap posed as customers and the deal was in progress when they found themselves under attack. They countered the attack, and Feola, Alsondo, Rosa, and Farr were arrested for conspiracy to assault and assaulting federal agents in the commission of their duties.</p>
<p>At trial in the district court, the jury instructions specified that knowledge of the agents’ true identities was not a necessary element to prove the conspiracy charge. When the respondents appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction on the assault charges, but reversed the conviction on the conspiracy charges.</p> | True | 51278 | 963 | 7 | majority opinion | 73-1123 | United States | United States v. Feola | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Ralph Feola | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1123 |
116 | affirmed | <p>Schick, a master sergeant in the Army, was convicted of murder in a military court and sentenced to death in 1954. President Eisenhower intervened and commuted his sentence in 1960, reducing it to life imprisonment without parole.</p> | False | 51286 | 238 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-5677 | Schick | Schick v. Reed | Civil Rights | 3 | Reed | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5677 |
117 | reversed/remanded | <p>In December 1967, the Silver Bridge at Point Pleasant, West Virginia, collapsed and killed 43 people, including Melvin Cantrell. Joseph Eszterhas, a reporter for the local newspaper the Plain Dealer, was assigned to cover the story. He decided to focus on the Melvin Cantrell’s funeral and the impact of his death on his family. Five months later, he returned to do a follow-up piece and spoke to the Cantrell children when their mother, Margaret Cantrell, was not present. The article appeared on August 4, 1968 and contained a number of admitted inaccuracies concerning the family and the status of their home.</p>
<p>Margaret Cantrell and her children sued under the “false light” theory of invasion of privacy. After the jury heard plaintiff’s case, the judge removed the demand for punitive damages because Cantrell had failed to present evidence that the falsehoods stemmed from actual malice. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the judge denied. The jury found the defendants guilty and awarded compensatory damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the district judge should have granted the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.</p> | True | 51292 | 1204 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-5520 | Margaret Mae Cantrell, et al. | Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Company | First Amendment | 1 | Forest City Publishing Company, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-5520 |
118 | reversed | <p>The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order under their emergency powers limiting the time railroad cars could stay at a holding location. The order was issued without notice or a hearing. If a railroad shipper held a car for longer than that time, they would lose the privilege to reconsign the contents of the car and were subject to a tariff from the point of origin to the holding point and from the holding point to the ultimate destination. A three-judge district court held the ICC did not have the power to issue the order because it was not suspending any rule or regulation. This case was heard on direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51296 | 673 | 9 | majority opinion | 73-1210 | Interstate Commerce Commission | ICC v. Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc. | Economic Activity | 0 | Oregon Pacific Industries, Inc., et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1210 |
119 | reversed/remanded | <p>The State of Iowa denied Linda Alcala and several other pregnant women welfare benefits for their unborn children. The Department of Social Services stated that although those children would be eligible for benefits once born, while unborn they do not fit the Social Security Act’s definition of “dependent children” as required by the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The pregnant women sued, arguing that the denial of benefits conflicted with federal Social Security standards and violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that unborn children were “dependent children”, but did not reach the 14th Amendment arguments. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51300 | 780 | 7 | majority opinion | 73-1708 | Kevin J. Burns, Commissioner, Dept of Social Services of Iowa, et al. | Burns v. Alcala | Civil Rights | 1 | Linda Alcala, Jane Doe, Joan Roe, et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1708 |
120 | reversed/remanded | <p>Quality Manufacturing Company fired an employee after she refused to meet with the company president without a union representative. The shop chairlady and assistant chairlady were also fired for trying to represent the employee at the meeting and for filing a grievance. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) found that these discharges constituted unfair labor practices because the employee reasonably believed that disciplinary action would occur at the meeting. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ruling was an impermissible departure from prior NLRB precedent.</p> | True | 51299 | 622 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-765 | International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union | International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Quality Manufacturing Company | Unions | 3 | Quality Manufacturing Company, National Labor Relations Board | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-765 |
121 | vacated/remanded | <p>On January 3, 1957, Kenneth Donaldson was committed on the petition of his father, following a brief hearing before a county judge. Twelve days later, he was admitted to Florida State Hospital and soon thereafter diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic. The committing judge told Donaldson that he was being sent to the hospital for “a few weeks”. Instead, he was confined for almost fifteen years.</p>
<p>When Donaldson was admitted in 1957, J.B. O’Connor was Assistant Clinical Director of the hospital; O’Connor was also Donaldson’s attending physician until he transferred wards on April 18, 1967. John Gumanis was a staff physician for Donaldson’s ward. Donaldson was denied grounds privileges by Gumanis and confined to a locked building with sixty closely-quartered beds. As a Christian Scientist, Donaldson refused to take any medication or to submit to electroshock treatments. According to Donaldson, he received cognitive therapy from O’Connor no more than six times. In essence, the hospital provided Donaldson with subsistence-level custodial care, and a minimal amount of psychiatric treatment. Donaldson challenged his continued commitment several times, but each challenge was denied with little explanation.</p>
<p>In February 1971, Donaldson charged O’Connor and other members of the hospital’s staff under § 1983 with intentionally and maliciously depriving him of his constitutional right to liberty. Evidence at trial showed that the staff had the power to release a mentally ill, committed patient if he was not dangerous to himself or others, but that the staff did not exercise this power. The jury trial found in favor of Donaldson, assessing both compensatory and punitive damages against O’Connor and Gumanis. O’Connor appealed his case separately, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court rejected O’Connor’s argument that the trial court improperly barred the jury from finding that O’Connor acted in good faith. The jury instruction was valid because it explicitly stated that the defendants’ reasonable belief that Donaldson’s confinement was proper would preclude damages. Any reliance on state law would fall under this consideration of O'Connor's good faith intentions.</p> | True | 51303 | 2269 | 9 | majority opinion | 74-8 | J.B. O'Connor, M.D. | O'Connor v. Donaldson | Due Process | 0 | Kenneth Donaldson | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-8 |
122 | reversed | <p>In 1960, the government of the Republic of Cuba confiscated the businesses of several Cuban cigar manufacturers. The Republic named “interventors” to take over and run the businesses. The interventors continued to ship cigars to foreign purchasers, including in the U.S., and some purchasers mistakenly paid money owed to the original owners for cigars shipped before the takeover. The interventors refused to return the money. The original owners fled to New York and sued the purchasers for trademark infringement and compensation for money paid to the interventors for past shipments. The district court held that the 1960 intervention was an “act of state” so U.S. courts had no power in the matter. Under the act of state doctrine, the courts of a sovereign cannot question the acts of another sovereign within its own borders. The court did, however, have power over the amounts mistakenly paid for pre-intervention shipments. The purchasers were entitled to set off their mistaken payments against amounts due for post intervention shipments. One purchaser, who was entitled to more than it owed, received an affirmative judgment.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the 1960 act was an “act of state”, but also held that the interventor's refusal to pay back the mistaken payments was also an act of state. The purchasers could still set off the amount they were entitled to against the amount they owed, but the court reversed the ruling for the one purchaser who received an affirmative judgment.</p> | True | 51310 | 1604 | 5 | majority opinion | 73-1288 | Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc. | Alfred Dunhill Of London, Inc. v. Cuba | Judicial Power | 4 | Republic of Cuba, et. al | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1288 |
123 | affirmed | <p>Gurley Oil Co. owned five gas stations in Mississippi and purchased gas tax-free out of state. Gurley added both federal and state excise taxes on to the retail price of the gasoline. Mississippi imposed an additional 5% tax on the “gross proceeds” of all gas sales. Mississippi did not permit Gurley to deduct the state and federal excise taxes from the “gross proceeds” before calculating the 5% tax. Gurley paid the tax under protest, but sued for a refund. They alleged that not allowing a pretax deduction of the excise taxes was an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Gurley argued that the company was just a collector of taxes paid by the consumer, so those taxes were not actually part of his gross receipts. The chancery court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed.</p> | False | 51308 | 832 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1734 | W. M. Gurley dba Gurley Oil Co. | Gurley v. Rhoden | Economic Activity | 0 | Arny Rhoden, Chairman, Tax Commission of Mississippi | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1734 |
124 | vacated/remanded | <p>It was long the rule in admiralty cases arising from collision or stranding that, when both parties were negligent, the sum of the damages to both should be split evenly between them. The Supreme Court endorsed this "rule of divided damages" in <em>The Schooner Catharine v. Dickenson,</em> 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).</p>
<p>On a clear night, in 8-10 foot seas and 45 knots of wind off Rockaway Point, the Mary A. Whalen, a coastal tanker carrying fuel oil to New York from New Jersey, went astray. Unable to locate the breakwater light, her master attempted a U-turn, stranding her upon a sand bar. The light had failed. Its maintenance was the U.S. Coast Guard's responsibility. The tanker's owner sued in federal district court, which found negligence on the parts of both the vessel (75%) and the Coast Guard (25 %). Even though only the ship owner suffered damages, the district court applied the rule of divided damages, assessing both parties equal shares. They cross-appealed, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed <em>per curiam.</em></p>
<p>Abstract prepared by Professor J.P. Jones</p> | True | 51318 | 1127 | 9 | majority opinion | 74-363 | United States | United States v. Reliable Transfer Company, Inc. | Economic Activity | 0 | Reliable Transfer Company, Inc. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/74-363 |
125 | affirmed | <p>Earl Foster began working for Dravo Corp. in 1965. In 1967, he worked the first nine weeks of the year before being called for military service. He served for 18 months before returning to Dravo to work the last 13 weeks of 1968. Under his collective bargaining agreement, employees earn full vacation benefits if they work at least 25 weeks per year. Under the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), veterans returning to civilian jobs are entitled to their job at the same level of seniority, status and pay as when they left. Foster did not receive vacation benefits for 1967 and 1968, so he sued in district court, arguing that he would have received those benefits had he worked for Dravo while he was in the military.</p>
<p>The district court ruled in favor of Dravo, holding that the vacation benefits did not accrue automatically with continued employment and so were not tied to seniority. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case to determine whether Foster should receive partial vacation benefits for the time he worked in 1967-68.</p> | False | 51325 | 1097 | 8 | majority opinion | 73-1773 | Earl R. Foster | Foster v. Dravo Corporation | Civil Rights | 0 | Dravo Corporation | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1773 |
126 | reversed | <p>Southeastern Promotions was a theatrical production company that requested to use the Tivoli Theater in Chattanooga, Tennessee to present the musical "Hair." "Hair" was a controversial musical that contained obscenities and nudity. The Tivoli was privately owned, but was leased to the city of Chattanooga. The city rejected Southeastern's request based on the controversial content in the production. Southeastern challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that Chattanooga's denial of its request violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The District Court ruled for Chattanooga and found that the musical contained obscene content that was not constitutionally protected. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that decision.</p> | True | 51327 | 851 | 6 | majority opinion | 73-1004 | Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. | Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad | First Amendment | 3 | Steve Conrad et al. | 1974 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-1004 |
127 | reversed | <p>Using marked money, police officers made an undercover heroin buy from a third party who, upon taking money from the officers, entered "Mom Santana's" house and emerged with heroin. Officers then arrested the third party and returned to Santana's house where they identified themselves as police officers, entered the house after Santana fled into it from the porch, and, after ordering her to empty her pockets, discovered some of the marked money. The search was done without a warrant.</p> | True | 51332 | 496 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-19 | United States | United States v. Santana | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Santana | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-19 |
128 | reversed | <p>A flyer identifying "active shoplifters" was distributed to merchants in the Louisville, Kentucky area. The flyer included a photograph of Edward C. Davis III, who had been arrestedon a shoplifting charge. When the charge was dismissed, Davis brought an action against Edgar Paul, the Louisville chief of police. Davis alleged that the distribution of the flyer had stigmatized him and deprived him of his constitutional rights.</p> | True | 51336 | 436 | 5 | majority opinion | 74-891 | Paul | Paul v. Davis | Civil Rights | 3 | Davis | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-891 |
129 | reversed | <p>A Nebraska state trial judge, presiding over a widely publicized murder trial, entered an order restraining members of the press from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions made by the accused to the police. The judge felt that this measure was necessary to guarantee a fair trial to the accused.</p> | True | 51333 | 316 | 9 | majority opinion | 75-817 | Nebraska Press Association et al. | Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart | First Amendment | 0 | Hugh Stuart, Judge, District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-817 |
130 | reversed/remanded | <p>Following his conviction for first-degree murder, and subsequent imposition of a death sentence, Roberts challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana's death penalty scheme. This scheme mandated the death penalty's imposition, regardless of any mercy recommendation, whenever the jury found that the defendant demonstrated a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm while in the commission of at least one of five different narrowly defined types of homicide. The sentencing scheme also required juries, in all first-degree murder cases, to be instructed on the lesser charges of manslaughter and second degree murder even if no evidence existed to support such verdicts.</p>
<p>This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.</p> | True | 51350 | 1031 | 5 | plurality opinion | 75-5844 | Roberts | Roberts v. Louisiana | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Louisiana | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5844 |
131 | affirmed | <p>A 1971 statute enacted in Maryland authorized the payment of state funds to any private higher education institute that met a set of minimum criteria and refrained from awarding “only seminarian or theological degrees.” The grants were noncategorical, but they could not be used for sectarian purposes, as per a 1972 provision. At the end of every fiscal year, the institution that received the aid must report all financial transactions and identify the nonsectarian expenditures within those transactions.</p>
<p>Four Maryland taxpayers sued to challenge the constitutionality of the statute and argued that the statute benefited certain church-affiliated institutions that are constitutionally ineligible for this form of aid under the First Amendment. The district court applied the three-part test from <em>Lemon v. Kurtzman </em>― which asks whether the state aid has a secular purpose, a primary effect other than the advancement of religion, and doesn’t excessively entangle the state in church affairs ― and determined that the statute was constitutional.</p> | False | 51349 | 1072 | 5 | plurality opinion | 74-730 | John C. Roemer, III, et al. | Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland | First Amendment | 4 | Board of Public Works of Maryland et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-730 |
132 | affirmed | <p>The Michelin Tire Corporation (MTC) operated a warehouse in Gwinnett County, Georgia, in which products imported from France and Nova Scotia were stored for later distribution. The County levied a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on the goods (a percent of the property's value). MTC claimed that the contents of the warehouse were constitutionally free from state taxation because they were in their original containers. The county declared that the products were subject to the tax because they had been sorted and arranged for sale.</p> | False | 51351 | 552 | 8 | majority opinion | 74-1396 | Michelin Tire Corporation | Michelin Tire Corporation v. Wages | Economic Activity | 0 | Wages | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1396 |
133 | reversed | <p>On August 17, 1972, a postal inspector received information from an informant that the respondent, Henry Ogle Watson, was in possession of stolen credit cards. The informant had provided the inspector with reliable information in the past, and, later that day, provided the inspector with a stolen card. The inspector asked the informant to arrange another meeting with Watson to deliver more stolen cards. At the meeting on August 23, when the informant gave the signal, officers revealed themselves and arrested Watson. The officers read Watson his Miranda warning and searched him but did not find the cards on his person. They asked to search his car, and Watson gave them permission. In the car, officers found two stolen cards. Watson was then charged with four counts of possessing stolen mail. Prior to the trial, Watson moved to suppress the cards by claiming his arrest was illegal because there was no warrant, and that the search of his car was involuntary because he was not informed that he could withhold consent. The motion was denied and Watson was convicted.</p>
<p> The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the arrest was unconstitutional because the postal inspector had sufficient time to obtain a warrant but failed to do so. The Court of Appeals also held that the subsequent search was coerced and hence unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.</p> | True | 51355 | 1410 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-538 | United States | United States v. Watson | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Henry Ogle Watson | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-538 |
134 | reversed/remanded | <p>Mitch Miller was charged of carrying alcohol distilling equipment and whiskey on which liquor tax had not been paid. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks, The Citizens & Southern National Bank of Warner Robins and the Bank of Byron requesting records of Miller's accounts. The banks complied with the subpoenas, and the evidence was used during Miller's trial in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Miller was convicted and appealed his conviction alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in his favor.</p> | True | 51363 | 682 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-1179 | United States | United States v. Miller | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Mitch Miller | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1179 |
135 | vacated/remanded | <p>Mary Alice Firestone filed for divorce from her husband, an heir to the Firestone Tires fortune. He counterclaimed alleging “extreme cruelty and adultery”. The court granted the divorce with an ambiguous decree that did not specify the grounds. Time Magazine printed an article reporting that Firestone’s extreme cruelty and adultery caused the divorce. Firestone requested a retraction, but Time refused. Firestone sued Time, Inc. for libel in Florida state court. The circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Firestone for $100,000. The Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.</p> | True | 51365 | 634 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-944 | Time, Inc. | Time, Inc. v. Firestone | First Amendment | 2 | Mary Alice Firestone | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-944 |
136 | reversed | <p>George Eldridge, who had originally been deemed disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain, was informed by letter that his disability status was ending and that his benefits would be terminated. Social Security Administration procedures provided for ample notification and an evidentiary hearing before a final determination was made, but Eldridge's benefits were cut off until that hearing could take place. Eldridge challenged the termination of his benefits without such a hearing.</p> | True | 51368 | 498 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-204 | Mathews | Mathews v. Eldridge | Civil Rights | 2 | Eldridge | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-204 |
137 | affirmed | <p>Acting on behalf of prescription drug consumers, the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council challenged a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for licensed pharmacists to advertise their prescription drug prices. On appeal from an adverse ruling by a three-judge District Court panel, the Supreme Court granted the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy review.</p> | False | 51377 | 378 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-895 | Virginia State Board of Pharmacy | Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. | First Amendment | 1 | Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-895 |
138 | reversed in-part | <p>In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute.</p> | True | 51373 | 424 | 7 | per curiam | 75-436 | Buckley | Buckley v. Valeo | First Amendment | 1 | Valeo | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-436 |
139 | vacated/remanded | <p>Massachusetts enacted a law specifying consent requirements for unmarried minors seeking abortions. William Baird, on behalf of an abortion counseling organization, Parents Aid Society, filed a class action under the Fourteenth Amendment challenging the statute against state Attorney General Frances Bellotti and all district attorneys within the state. Baird argued that the statute created a parental veto. Parental vetoes were ruled unconstitutional in <em>Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth</em>. The federal District Court struck down the law. Bellotti appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, contending that the District Court should have abstained until a decision on the statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.</p> | True | 51383 | 768 | 9 | majority opinion | 75-73 | Frances Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts et al. | Bellotti v. Baird | Judicial Power | 0 | William Baird et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-73 |
140 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1968, Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. (Brada Miller) agreed to lease a tractor and trailer operated by its employee-driver, H. L. Hardrick, to fellow licensed motor carrier Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. (Transamerican) for a shipment from Detroit, Michigan, to Kansas City, Missouri. The agreement stated that Transamerican assumed control and responsibility for the operation of the equipment during the lease and that Brada Miller agreed to indemnify Transamerican from any and all claims related to any negligence on the part of Brada Miller or its employees. On the way to Kansas City, the truck collided with another car in Illinois. The injured driver sued both Brada Miller and Transamerican in federal district court and alleged that the accident was caused by Hardrick’s negligence.</p>
<p>Transamerican settled with the driver for $80,000 and then sued Brada Miller seeking indemnification for the settlement amount and costs of litigation. The district court held that the indemnity clause was unenforceable because it was contrary to public policy and granted summary judgment in favor of Brada Miller. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed and held that the indemnification clause was an attempt to circumvent regulations promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) that required carriers to exert actual control and responsibility over leased equipment and borrowed drivers.</p> | True | 51384 | 1450 | 9 | majority opinion | 74-54 | Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. | Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. | Economic Activity | 0 | Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-54 |
141 | reversed | <p>After the applications of two blacks were rejected by the District of Columbia Police Department, the two men filed suit against Mayor Walter E. Washington. The men alleged that the Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, discriminated against racial minorities. They claimed that the test was unrelated to job performance and excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.</p> | True | 51395 | 422 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-1492 | Washington | Washington v. Davis | Civil Rights | 2 | Davis | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1492 |
142 | affirmed | <p>Following his Florida conviction for first-degree murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Proffitt challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and Florida's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging is was arbitrary and capricious insofar as it permitted judges rather than juries to act as sole sentencing authorities.</p>
<p>This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.</p> | False | 51397 | 739 | 7 | plurality opinion | 75-5706 | Proffitt | Proffitt v. Florida | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Florida | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5706 |
143 | vacated/remanded | <p>Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (TGPL) proposed a plan for gas allocation among its customers to deal with a gas shortage. Under the plan, customers who used over the system-wide average would have to pay extra, and those who used less would receive a rebate. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) rejected the plan, stating it violated the Natural Gas Act, which prohibits discrimination among customers. The TGPL sought review of the FPC decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court directed the FPC to conduct a review of TGPL’s records to determine the extent of the gas shortage. The FPC refused, arguing that the court overstepped its bounds by interfering with an independent administrative agency. The FPC also argued that the extent of the gas shortage was not material to the issues in the litigation.</p> | True | 51400 | 866 | 7 | per curiam | 75-584 | Federal Power Commission | Federal Power Commission v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation | Judicial Power | 0 | Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-584 |
144 | reversed | <p>American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. A federal district court ruled in favor of the city, a decision that was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The appeals court concluded that the ordinances posed a prior restraint based on content and that the ordinances ran afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.</p> | True | 51416 | 809 | 5 | majority opinion | 75-312 | Coleman Young | Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. | First Amendment | 4 | American Mini Theatres, Inc. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-312 |
145 | affirmed | <p>Michael McCrary and Colin Gonzales were black children who were denied admission to Bobbe's School. Gonzales was also denied admission to Fairfax- Brewster School. McCrary and Gonzales's parents filed a class action against the schools, suspecting the denials were due to their children's race. A federal district court ruled for McCrary and Gonzales, finding that the school's admission policies were racially discriminatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.</p> | False | 51412 | 515 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-62 | Russell L. Runyon et al. | Runyon v. McCrary | Civil Rights | 2 | Michael McCrary et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-62 |
146 | affirmed | <p>Jules Hutton was a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) informant that made the acquaintance of Charles Hampton. According to the government, Hampton told Hutton that he could acquire heroin and was willing to sell it. Hutton replied that he would find a buyer and orchestrate a sale. Hampton and Hutton arranged two appointments with DEA agents posing as buyers. At the second appointment, Hampton was arrested. According to Hampton, he was unaware that he was selling heroin. He claimed that Hutton provided him with the drugs and that Hutton had told him they were counterfeit. Since the government, through Hutton, had provided him with the drugs, he had been entrapped and was therefore not guilty. Hampton was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. He appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, alleging entrapment and a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction.</p> | False | 51419 | 1023 | 5 | plurality opinion | 74-5822 | Charles Hampton | Hampton v. United States | Criminal Procedure | 3 | United States | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-5822 |
147 | reversed/remanded | <p>The respondent, Donald Opperman, left his car unattended in a prohibited parking space in violation of local ordinances in Vermillion, South Dakota. He received two parking tickets from local police officers, and as a result, his vehicle was subsequently inspected and impounded. At the impound lot, a police officer observed personal items in the dashboard of the car and unlocked the door to inventory the items using standard procedures. In the unlocked glove compartment, the officer found marijuana in a plastic bag. Opperman was arrested later that day and charged with possession of marijuana. He was convicted but the Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed on appeal and concluded the search was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.</p> | True | 51426 | 749 | 5 | majority opinion | 75-76 | South Dakota | South Dakota v. Opperman | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Opperman | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-76 |
148 | reversed/remanded | <p>Martinez-Fuerte and others were charged with transporting illegal Mexican aliens. They were stopped at a routine fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of the vehicle's occupants on a major highway not far from the Mexican border.</p> | True | 51429 | 238 | 7 | majority opinion | 74-1560 | United States | United States v. Martinez-Fuerte | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Martinez-Fuerte | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1560 |
149 | reversed | <p>Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. This case was decided together with Wolf v. Rice.</p> | True | 51445 | 346 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-1055 | Stone | Stone v. Powell | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Powell | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1055 |
150 | reversed/remanded | <p>The state of North Carolina enacted legislation that made the death penalty mandatory for all convicted first-degree murderers. Consequently, when James Woodson was found guilty of such an offense, he was automatically sentenced to death. Woodson challenged the law, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of North Carolina.</p>
<p>This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>.</p> | True | 51448 | 665 | 5 | plurality opinion | 75-5491 | Woodson | Woodson v. North Carolina | Criminal Procedure | 4 | North Carolina | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5491 |
151 | affirmed | <p>After his conviction by a Texas trial court for murder and the imposition of the death penalty, Jurek challenged the constitutionality of both his death sentence, alleging it was a "cruel and unusual" punishment, and the state's capital-sentencing procedure, alleging it would result in arbitrary and "freakish" imposition of the death penalty.</p>
<p>This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/74_6257/">Gregg v. Georgia</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.</p> | False | 51449 | 697 | 7 | plurality opinion | 75-5394 | Jurek | Jurek v. Texas | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Texas | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/75-5394 |
152 | affirmed | <p>In 1961, Morris Hasson, a Los Angeles grocery store manager, was shot and killed during a robbery attempt. Paul Imbler was convicted of the murder after three eyewitnesses identified him as the gunman. After the trial, the prosecutor, Deputy District Attorney Richard Pachtman, wrote to the Governor of California and described newly discovered evidence that undermined the testimony of one of the eyewitnesses. In light of the letter, Imbler challenged his incarceration in state court, where his petition was denied, and later in federal court. The federal district court found that Pachtman had knowingly used false testimony during the trial and suppressed evidence favorable to Imbler, so the district court ordered Imbler released from prison. Imbler then filed an action against Pachtman in federal court under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which allows a party to recover damages from any person who acts “under color of state law” to deprive another of a constitutional right. The district court held that Pachtman was immune for civil liability for acts done in his capacity as prosecutor and dismissed the complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on appeal.</p> | False | 51461 | 1233 | 8 | majority opinion | 74-5435 | Paul Imbler | Imbler v. Pachtman | Civil Rights | 0 | Richard Pachtman | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-5435 |
153 | reversed | <p>Robert Murgia, although he was in excellent physical and mental health, was forced to retire at age fifty according to state law. Murgia had been a uniformed officer in the state police force. Murgia successfully challenged the mandatory retirement law in district court.</p> | True | 51472 | 279 | 7 | per curiam | 74-1044 | Massachusetts Board of Retirement | Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia | Civil Rights | 1 | Murgia | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1044 |
154 | reversed/remanded | <p>Teachers at the Hortonville Joint School District went on strike when negotiations over employment contracts broke down. Wisconsin law prohibited strikes by public employees. The School District invited the teachers to return to work several times, and a few teachers accepted the offer. After about two weeks of striking, the school board set disciplinary hearings for the teachers who continued to strike. An attorney for the teachers indicated that the teachers wished to be treated as a group and argued that the school board was not sufficiently impartial to be able to exercise discipline over the teachers. The attorney argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required an independent, unbiased decision maker. The school board still voted to terminate the teachers, but invited them to reapply for their jobs. One teacher did so and returned to work. The remaining teachers were replaced.</p>
<p>The fired teachers sued the school district in Wisconsin state court alleging that their termination violated their due process. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, holding that due process was not violated because the teachers admitted to being on strike in violation of state law after receiving adequate notice and a hearing. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Due Process Clause required the teachers' conduct and the school board’s decision to be evaluated by an impartial decision maker.</p> | True | 51471 | 1485 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-1606 | Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 et al. | Hortonville Independent School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association | Due Process | 3 | Hortonville Education Association et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1606 |
155 | vacated/remanded | <p>On April 8, 1971, Richard Mosley was arrested in Detroit in connection with robberies that had occurred at two local restaurants. Mosley was taken to police headquarters, where he was informed of his Miranda rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. After Mosley signed the police department’s constitutional rights notification certificate, Detective James Cowie began to question Mosley, but he immediately stopped when Mosley said that he did not wish to speak about the robberies. A few hours later, Detective Hill brought Mosley out from his cell to question him about the recent murder of a man named Leroy Williams, and Mosley was again informed of his Miranda rights. At first Mosley denied any involvement, but after being informed that another man had named him as the shooter, he made statements implicating himself in the murder. During the second interrogation, he never asked for a lawyer or refused to answer questions. Mosley was subsequently charged with first-degree murder. Mosley moved to suppress his incriminating statement and argued that Detective Hill’s interrogation and eventual use of his incriminating comment violated his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion, and he was found guilty and given the mandatory sentence of life in prison. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and held that the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s statement was a per se violation of Mosley’s Miranda rights. The Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.</p> | True | 51473 | 1512 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-653 | State of Michigan | Michigan v. Moseley | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Richard Bert Mosley | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-653 |
156 | reversed | <p>General Electric Co. offered its employees a disability plan for non-occupational sicknesses and accidents, but the plan did not cover disabilities from pregnancy. The respondents, a class of female employees of General Electric Company, sued their employer for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that the plan violated the Act, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51491 | 461 | 6 | majority opinion | 74-1589 | General Electric Company | General Electric Company v. Gilbert | Civil Rights | 3 | Martha V. Gilbert, et al. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1589 |
157 | affirmed | <p>Seven prisoners in the custody of the California Department of Corrections sued the United States District Court for the Northern District Court of California and alleged the manner in which the California Adult Authority determined the length and conditions of punishment for convicted criminal offenders violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants argued that two sets of documents, the Adult Authority files and the Prisoners’ files, which contained personal information, were irrelevant, confidential, and privileged information that should not be admissible into evidence. The district court ordered the production of the documents; however, the court limited the number of people associated with the prisoners who could examine those documents and only allowed access to the counsel and no more than two investigators designated by the counsel. The defendants filed a writ of mandamus requesting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacate the decision to compel discovery, but the appellate court denied the petition because the prisoners had no absolute privilege that would allow them to avoid production of the documents at issue. However, the petitioners were allowed to have their request for in camera review, or private review, considered.</p> | False | 51495 | 1316 | 8 | majority opinion | 74-1023 | Henry W. Kerr | Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. | Criminal Procedure | 0 | United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1023 |
158 | affirmed | <p>A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>
<p>This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5394/">Jurek v. Texas</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5844/">Roberts v. Louisiana</a> </em>, <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5706/">Proffitt v. Florida</a> </em>, and <em> <a href="/cases/1975/75_5491/">Woodson v. North Carolina</a> </em>.</p> | False | 51498 | 735 | 7 | plurality opinion | 74-6257 | Gregg | Gregg v. Georgia | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Georgia | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-6257 |
159 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>About a year after the Supreme Court decided <em>Roe v. Wade</em>, the State of Missouri passed a law regulating abortions in the state. Planned Parenthood of Missouri and two doctors who supervised abortions at Planned Parenthood sued to prevent enforcement of certain parts of the law. The challenged parts of the law: (1) define “viability” as the “stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life support systems”; (2) require a women submitting to an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy to sign a consent form certifying that she was not coerced; (3) require written consent from the woman’s spouse during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion will save the mother’s life; (4)require parental consent if the woman is younger than 18; (5) require physicians to exercise professional care in preserving a fetus life or risk being charged with manslaughter; (6) declare an infant who survives an abortion attempt as a ward of the state, depriving mother and father of parental rights; (7) prohibit saline amniocenteses after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy; and (8) require reporting and record keeping for facilities and physicians that perform abortions.</p>
<p>The district court upheld all of the provisions except 4, holding that it was overbroad because it did not exclude the stage of pregnancy before the fetus is viable. The Supreme Court head this case on direct appeal.</p>
<p> </p> | True | 51496 | 1515 | 5 | majority opinion | 74-1151 | Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri, David Hall. M.D., and Michael Freiman, M.D. | Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth | Privacy | 4 | John C. Danforth, Attorney General of New Jersey; and J. Brendan Ryan, Circuit Attorney of the City of St. Louis, Missouri | 1975 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1975/74-1151 |
160 | affirmed | <p>A New Hampshire law required all noncommercial vehicles to bear license plates containing the state motto "Live Free or Die." George Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness, found the motto to be contrary to his religious and political beliefs and cut the words "or Die" off his plate. Maynard was convicted of violating the state law and was subsequently fined and given a jail sentence.</p> | False | 51512 | 385 | 6 | majority opinion | 75-1453 | Wooley | Wooley v. Maynard | First Amendment | 3 | Maynard | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1453 |
161 | affirmed | <p>In _Milliken v. Bradley (1973) _, the Court ruled that an inter-district desegregation plan in the city of Detroit was impermissible and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The District Court ordered remedial education programs be instituted within the Detroit school district, and that the State of Michigan would bear half the costs of the remedial programs. The state of Michigan challenged the District Court order, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit.</p> | False | 51514 | 562 | 9 | majority opinion | 76-447 | William G. Milliken, Governor of Michigan et al. | Milliken v. Bradley | Civil Rights | 0 | Ronald Bradley et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-447 |
162 | affirmed | <p>Richard M. Nixon resigned as President of the United States on August 9, 1974, leaving in government custody approximately 42 million pages of documents, 880 reels of tape recordings of conversations, and other materials. Soon after, Nixon executed a depository agreement with the Administrator of General Services Administration providing for the storage of these materials near Nixon’s California home; this agreement also specified that certain of the materials would be destroyed at Nixon’s discretion.</p>
<p>Shortly after this agreement was publicized, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act became law. The act directed the Administrator to take custody of Nixon’s presidential materials, assign government archivists to screen materials for items that were personal or private in nature, preserve materials with historical value, and make materials available for use in judicial proceedings. The act also directed the Administrator to promulgate regulations allowing eventual public access to the materials.</p>
<p>The day after President Ford signed the act into law, Nixon challenged its constitutionality in district court, claiming that it violated 1) the principle of separation of powers, 2) Nixon’s presidential privilege, 3) Nixon’s privacy interests, 4) Nixon’s First Amendment associational rights, and 5) the bill of attainder clause. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the act. The district court dismissed Nixon’s compliant, holding that his constitutional challenges were without merit.</p> | False | 51521 | 1572 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-1605 | Richard M. Nixon | Nixon v. Administrator of General Services | First Amendment | 2 | Administrator of General Services | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1605 |
163 | reversed | <p>East Cleveland's housing ordinance limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Part of the ordinance was a strict definition of "family" which excluded Mrs. Inez Moore who lived with her son and two grandsons.</p> | True | 51524 | 241 | 5 | plurality opinion | 75-6289 | Moore | Moore v. City of East Cleveland | Economic Activity | 4 | City of East Cleveland | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-6289 |
164 | reversed/remanded | <p>On February 18, 1974, three enrolled Couer d’Alene Indians—William Davison, Gabriel Francis Antelope, and Leonard Davison—broke into the home of 81-year-old Emma Johnson, robbed her, and killed her. Because the crimes were committed on an Indian reservation, the three were subject to federal prosecution under the Major Crimes Act. They were indicted by a grand jury and tried for burglary, robbery, and murder. Leonard Davison and Antelope were found guilty on all three charges, and William Davison was found guilty of second-degree murder.</p>
<p>The defendants appealed and argued that their convictions under federal law were the result of unlawful racial discrimination. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions and held that the defendants were placed at a “racially based disadvantage.”</p> | True | 51528 | 835 | 9 | majority opinion | 75-661 | United States | United States v. Antelope | Civil Rights | 0 | Gabriel Francis Antelope, et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-661 |
165 | affirmed | <p>The North Carolina Department of Correction (“DoC”) had custody of approximately 10,000 prisoners housed in 80 prison units in 67 different counties. The only unit having a writ room and some semblance of a legal library was the Central Prison in Raleigh. Robert Smith, Donald W. Morgan, and John Harrington were all inmates in the DoC’s custody. In consolidated cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the state of North Carolina failed to provide its prisoners with proper legal facilities. They argued that this violated their right of access to the courts guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>
<p>The district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, ordering the responsible state officials to submit a proposed plan to provide library facilities for the use of indigent prisoners seeking to file pro se habeas or civil rights actions, or to provide some acceptable substitute. The court suggested that the state could fulfill its obligations by making legal counsel or assistance available, but did not mandate this approach. In response, the state proposed to construct seven new law libraries within the prison system, to expand the facilities at Central Prison, and to provide all inmates with access to these libraries upon request.</p>
<p>The plaintiffs protested that the plan was inadequate, but the court rejected their objections. It held that North Carolina was not constitutionally required to provide legal assistance as well as libraries. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed, but held that the plan failed to provide female prisoners with the same access as male prisoners.</p> | False | 51534 | 1665 | 6 | majority opinion | 75-915 | Vernon Lee Bounds; Commission, State Department of Corrections; Stanley Blackledge, Warden, Cetral State Prison; R. L. Turner, Superintendent of Odom Correctional Institution et al. | Bounds v. Smith | Due Process | 3 | Robert (Bobby) Smith, Donald W. Morgan, John Harrington et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-915 |
166 | reversed/remanded | <p>An Oregon state police officer suspected Carl Mathiason of burglary and asked him to come to the police station for questioning. Mathiason came freely, spoke with the officer, and was not arrested at the time. He was arrested later and a trial court used evidence obtained during the questioning to convict him. Mathiason moved to suppress the evidence since he was not read his Miranda rights before the questioning. The court admitted the evidence since Mathiason was not in custody during the questioning. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Oregon reversed since it found that Matianson was in a "coercive environment" when questioned and therefore deserved to hear his Miranda rights.</p> | True | 51538 | 720 | 6 | per curiam | 76-201 | Oregon | Oregon v. Mathiason | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Carl Mathiason | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-201 |
167 | reversed in-part/remanded | <p>Dianne Rawlinson applied to be a prison guard with the Alabama Department of Corrections. The Department had a minimum height and weight requirement of 120 pounds and 5 feet 2 inches. Rawlinson did not meet the minimum weight requirement, so the Department refused to hire her. Rawlinson sued on behalf of herself and all similarly-situated women under Title VII, alleging sex discrimination. While this suit was pending, the Alabama Board of Corrections adopted a rule banning women from working in “contact positions” that require close physical proximity to inmates. Rawlinson amended her complaint to challenge the new rule as well. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of Rawlinson. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p> | True | 51546 | 796 | 7 | majority opinion | 76-422 | E.C. Dothard, Director, Dept. of Public Safety of Alabama | Dothard v. Rawlinson | Civil Rights | 2 | Dianne Rawlinson et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-422 |
168 | reversed/remanded | <p>A St. Louis policy prohibited non-therapeutic abortions in the city's two publicly run hospitals.</p> | True | 51551 | 105 | 6 | per curiam | 75-442 | Poelker | Poelker v. Doe | Privacy | 3 | Doe | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-442 |
169 | vacated/remanded | <p>A New Jersey statute prohibited the importation of solid or liquid waste into the state, except for garbage for swine feed. The City of Philadelphia challenged the statute, alleging it was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause of Article I and pre-empted by the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute. Congress then passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.</p> | True | 51555 | 430 | 5 | per curiam | 75-1150 | City of Philadelphia et al. | City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey | Economic Activity | 4 | New Jersey et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1150 |
170 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1974, Erlich Anthony Coker, serving a number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and assault, escaped from prison. He broke into a Georgia couple's home, raped the woman and stole the family's car. The woman was released shortly thereafter, without further injuries. The Georgia courts sentenced Coker to death on the rape charge.</p> | True | 51556 | 348 | 7 | plurality opinion | 75-5444 | Coker | Coker v. Georgia | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Georgia | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-5444 |
171 | reversed in-part | <p>In regulating the Arizona Bar, the Supreme Court of Arizona restricted advertising by attorneys. Bates was a partner in a law firm which sought to provide low-cost legal services to people of moderate income who did not qualify for public legal aid. Bates and his firm would only accept routine legal matters (many of which did not involve litigation) and depended on a large number of patrons given the low financial return from each client. In assessing their concept of legal services, Bates's firm decided that it would be necessary to advertise its availability and low fees.</p> | True | 51564 | 588 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-316 | Bates | Bates v. State Bar of Arizona | Attorneys | 4 | State Bar of Arizona | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-316 |
172 | reversed/remanded | <p>In the wake of the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, abortion opponents turned to state and local legislators in an effort to curb the practice of abortion. This case involved a Pennsylvania law which restricted Medicaid-funded abortions only to indigent women in situations in which a doctor determined the procedure was medically necessary.</p> | True | 51565 | 349 | 6 | majority opinion | 75-554 | Beal | Beal v. Doe | Privacy | 3 | Doe | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-554 |
173 | affirmed | <p>In 1972, the North Carolina Board of Agriculture adopted a regulation that required all apples shipped into the state in closed containers to display the USDA grade or nothing at all. Washington State growers (whose standards are higher than the USDA) challenged the regulation as an unreasonable burden to interstate commerce. North Carolina stated it was a valid exercise of its police powers to create "uniformity" to protect its citizenry from "fraud and deception."</p> | False | 51569 | 478 | 8 | majority opinion | 76-63 | Hunt | Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission | Economic Activity | 0 | Washington State Apple Advertising Commission | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-63 |
174 | vacated/remanded | <p>The U.S. Attorney General sued Hazelwood School District, alleging a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against African Americans in hiring teachers. This violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government provided statistical evidence of the number of African American teachers hired. The district court entered summary judgment for Hazelwood, finding that the government’s evidence did not establish a pattern or practice of discrimination. The court compared the number of African American teachers hired to the number of African American students in the school district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the proper statistical comparison is between the number of African American teachers on staff and the number of qualified African American individuals in the relevant labor market. The relevant labor market included St. Louis and the county where Hazelwood was located. </p> | True | 51584 | 946 | 8 | majority opinion | 76-255 | Hazelwood School District; C. O. McDonald, Superintendent; Robert Bischof, Robert Coleman, Dorothy Smith, Charles Sweeney, Donald Mattox and Milton Strauss, Members of the Board of Education of the Hazelwood School District | Hazelwood School District v. United States | Civil Rights | 1 | United States | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-255 |
175 | affirmed | <p>In 1962, GTE Sylvania Incorporated (Sylvania) enacted a plan that limited the number of franchises in any given geographical area to which they would sell televisions. Three years later, Sylvania franchised a San Francisco area company, Young Brothers, which was located only one mile from one of their existing franchises, Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental). Continental protested that the Young Brothers franchise violated Sylvania’s new location restrictions. When Sylvania ignored their protests, Continental tried to acquire more Sylvania televisions to sell in a new retail location in Sacramento. Sylvania already had retailers near Continental’s new Sacramento location and declined to supply them with more televisions, so Continental withheld payments they owed Sylvania under an existing franchise agreement.</p>
<p>Continental sued in district court and alleged that Sylvania’s franchise agreements, which placed location-based restrictions on the sale of their products, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Sherman Act). A jury found that Sylvania’s location restrictions violated the per se rule established in <em>United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co.</em> that prohibited manufacturers from “restrict[ing] and confin[ing] areas or persons with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.” Sylvania appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which declined to apply the per se rule. Instead, the appellate court distinguished this case from <em>Schwinn</em>, applied a reasonableness rule, and held that Sylvania’s restrictions “had less potential for competitive harm than” other invalidated restrictions.</p> | False | 51587 | 1699 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-15 | Continental T. V., Inc., et al. | Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. | Economic Activity | 2 | GTE Sylvania Inc. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-15 |
176 | reversed | <p>Hugo Zacchini performed a "human cannonball" act, in which he was shot from a cannon into a net 200 feet away. A free-lance reporter for Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. recorded the performance in its entirety without consent and it aired on the nightly news. Subsequently, Zacchini sued Scripps-Howard, alleging the unlawful appropriation of his professional property. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scripps-Howard. While recognizing that Zacchini had a cause of action for the infringement of his state-law right to publicity, the court found that Scripps-Howard was constitutionally privileged to include in its newscasts matters of public interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose.</p> | True | 51599 | 819 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-577 | Zacchini | Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company | First Amendment | 4 | Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-577 |
177 | affirmed | <p>Robert Williams escaped from a mental hospital and lived at the Des Moines YMCA. Soon thereafter, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA while at her brother’s wrestling match. A boy in the parking lot saw Williams carrying a large bundle to his car with two “skinny and white” legs in it. The next day, police found Williams’ abandoned car about 160 miles east of Des Moines. Williams soon turned himself in to police in Davenport, Iowa. Williams said he would tell police the whole story once he saw his lawyer in Des Moines. Williams spoke with a local attorney and reiterated his intention to confess when he saw his attorney in Des Moines. Davenport police promised not to question Williams during the drive to Des Moines. During the drive, however, the detective, knowing that Williams was deeply religious, told Williams that the girl’s family wanted to give her a “Christian burial” and suggested that they stop to locate the body. As a result of the officer's pointed statements, Williams made incriminating statements and ultimately led police to the girl’s body. He was indicted for first-degree murder.</p>
<p>At trial, Williams moved to suppress all evidence relating to the car ride conversation, arguing that the questioning violated Williams’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The judge denied the motion, and a jury found Williams guilty. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Williams petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The court granted the writ, finding that speaking to Williams during the drive violated his right to counsel, and the evidence in question was wrongly admitted at trial. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p> | False | 51597 | 1768 | 5 | majority opinion | 74-1263 | Lou V. Brewer, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary | Brewer v. Williams | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Robert Anthony Williams aka Anthony Erthel Williams | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/74-1263 |
178 | reversed/remanded | <p>In the wake of Roe v. Wade, the Connecticut Welfare Department issued regulations limiting state Medicaid benefits for first-trimester abortions to those that were "medically necessary." An indigent woman ("Susan Roe") challenged the regulations and sued Edward Maher, the Commissioner of Social Services in Connecticut.</p> | True | 51602 | 328 | 6 | majority opinion | 75-1440 | Maher | Maher v. Roe | Privacy | 3 | Roe | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1440 |
179 | reversed | <p>On March 6, 1975, federal prosecutors indicted Eugene Lovasco for the possession of stolen firearms and for dealing in firearms without a license. The indictment alleged that Lovasco committed the offenses between July 25 and August 31, 1973—more than 18 months before the prosecutors filed the indictment. Lovasco moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the delay was unnecessary and prejudicial to his defense, as two of his witnesses had died in the interim. The district court found that the government had collected all of the necessary information to indict Lovasco within a month of the alleged commission of crimes and granted the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p> | True | 51606 | 736 | 8 | majority opinion | 75-1844 | United States | United States v. Lovasco | Criminal Procedure | 1 | Eugene Lovasco | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1844 |
180 | reversed | <p>In 1972, the state legislature enacted the New York State Controlled Substances Act. The Act required doctors to fill out forms for potentially harmful prescription drugs. The prescribing doctor kept one copy, while another copy was sent to the dispensing pharmacy and a third copy was sent to the state department of health. The forms included personal information such as the patient's name, address, and age.</p> | True | 51609 | 419 | 9 | majority opinion | 75-839 | Whalen | Whalen v. Roe | Privacy | 0 | Roe | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-839 |
181 | affirmed | <p>Complete Auto Transit was a Michigan corporation doing business in Mississippi. Complete shipped cars into the state where they were distributed for sale. Mississippi imposed a tax on transportation companies for the "privilege of doing business" in the state. The tax was applied equally to businesses involved in intra-and interstate commerce.</p> | False | 51612 | 353 | 9 | majority opinion | 76-29 | Complete Auto Transit Inc. | Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady | Economic Activity | 0 | Brady | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-29 |
182 | reversed/remanded | <p>The village of Skokie, Illinois had a population of approximately 70,000 persons, of whom approximately 40,500 were Jewish. Included within this population were thousands who survived detention in Nazi concentration camps. On March 20, 1977, Frank Collin, the leader of the National Socialist ("Nazi") Party of America, informed Skokie's police chief that the National Socialists intended to march on the village's sidewalk on May 1. As a result of media attention and a number of phone calls allegedly made by Nazi Party members to residents with "Jewish names", this planned demonstration became common knowledge among Skokie's Jewish community.</p>
<p>Collin wrote a letter to Skokie officials stating that the purpose of the demonstration was to protest the Skokie Park District's ordinance requiring a bond of $350,000 to be posted prior to the issuance of a park permit. He also stated that the demonstration would consist of 30-50 demonstrators marching in single file in front of the Skokie Village Hall. The demonstrators intended to wear uniforms similar to those traditionally worn by Nazis, including swastika armbands. Collin also said that the demonstrators would not make derogatory public statements and would cooperate with reasonable police instructions.</p>
<p>The district court of Cook County conducted a hearing on a motion by the Village of Skokie for a preliminary injunction. The court considered Collin's letter as an affidavit and took the testimony of a number of Skokie residents. One resident testified that a number of Jewish organizations planned a counterdemonstration for the same day with an expected attendance of 12,000 to 15,000 persons, and that the appearance of Nazi demonstrators could well lead to violence. The mayor of Skokie also testified that the demonstration could lead to uncontrollable violence. The court entered an order enjoining defendants from marching, walking, or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off their person on May 1, 1977. The Nazi Party applied to the Illinois appellate court for a stay of the district court's injunction; the appellate court denied their application. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court also denied the petition for a stay. The Nazi Party then filed an application for a stay with Justice John Paul Stevens, who referred the matter to the Court.</p> | True | 51616 | 2360 | 5 | per curiam | 76-1786 | National Socialist Party of America | National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie | First Amendment | 4 | Village of Skokie | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-1786 |
183 | affirmed | <p>In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Act), which gave the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the power to enact regulations to limit the amount of pollution that manufacturing plants could discharge. In exercising that power, the Administrator of the EPA created groups made up of similar plants and prescribed a specific pollution limitation to each of the different groups. These regulations granted existing plants some leeway for complying with the prescribed pollution limit. Petitioners, eight inorganic chemical manufacturing plants, sued the EPA in district court and alleged that it had overstepped its statutory authority by promulgating regulations organized by categories, instead of issuing specific pollution limits for each plant. Petitioners also argued that the EPA regulations for plants that had not yet been built violated the provisions of the Act because they did not allow for any variance from the prescribed limit. The district court found that the Act gave appellate courts jurisdiction to review pollution regulations and removed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court rejected petitioners’ arguments regarding the categorical limits but held that the EPA must provide new plants the same variance allowances with which the existing plants were provided.</p> | False | 51623 | 1364 | 8 | majority opinion | 75-978 | E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company et al. | E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company v. Train | Economic Activity | 0 | Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, et al. | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-978 |
184 | affirmed | <p>On October 1, 1970, Assistant Principal Solomon Barnes applied corporal punishment to Roosevelt Andrews and fifteen other boys in a restroom at Charles R. Drew Junior High School. A teacher had accused Andrews of tardiness, but Andrews claimed he still had two minutes to get to class when he was seized. When Andrews resisted paddling, Barnes struck him on the arm, back, and across the neck.</p>
<p>On October 6, 1970, Principal Willie J. Wright removed James Ingraham and several other disruptive students to his office, where he paddled eight to ten of them. When Ingraham refused to assume a paddling position, Wright called on Barnes and Assistant Principal Lemmie Deliford to hold Ingraham in a prone position while Wright administered twenty blows. Ingraham’s mother later took him to a hospital for treatment, where he was prescribed cold compresses, laxatives and pain-killing pills for a hematoma.</p>
<p>Ingraham and Andrews filed a complaint against Wright, Deliford, Barnes and Edwart L. Whigham, the superintendant of the Dade County School System; the complaint alleged the deprivation of constitutional rights and damages from the administration of corporal punishment. They also filed a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all students in the Dade County schools. At the close of Ingraham and Andrews’ case, the defendants successfully moved to dismiss the third count because the plaintiffs showed no right to relief. The court also ruled that the evidence for the first two counts was insufficient to go to a jury. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed. The Fifth Circuit held that the punishment of Ingraham and Andrews was so severe that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments and that the school’s corporal punishment policy failed to satisfy due process. Upon rehearing, the en banc court rejected this conclusion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It held that due process did not require that students receive notice or an opportunity to be heard and that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid corporal punishment in schools.</p> | False | 51627 | 2143 | 5 | majority opinion | 75-6527 | James Ingraham, Roosevelt Andrews | Ingraham v. Wright | Criminal Procedure | 4 | Willie J. Wright, Lemmie Deliford, Solomon Barnes, Edward L. Whigham | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-6527 |
185 | affirmed | <p>Leon Goldfarb was a widower who applied for survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act. Even though his wife Hannah had paid Social Security taxes for 25 years, his application was denied. To be eligible for benefits under 42 U.S.C. Section 402, he must have been receiving half his support from his wife at her time of death. Section 402 did not impose this requirement on widows whose husbands had recently passed away. Goldfarb challenged this statute under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The District Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Government appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | False | 51629 | 705 | 5 | plurality opinion | 75-699 | Joseph Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare | Califano v. Goldfarb | Civil Rights | 4 | Leon Goldfarb | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-699 |
186 | reversed/remanded | <p>Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, while allowing legitimate children to inherit by intestate succession from either their mothers or fathers, allowed illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers. Consequently, Deta Trimble, the illegitimate daughter of Sherman Gordon, was unable to inherit her father's estate when he died intestate. After losing her challenge to Section 12 in the Illinois Supreme Court, Trimble appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> | True | 51648 | 495 | 5 | majority opinion | 75-5952 | Trimble | Trimble v. Gordon | Civil Rights | 4 | Gordon | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-5952 |
187 | reversed/remanded | <p>The Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (MHDC) contracted with the Village of Arlington Heights ("Arlington") to build racially integrated low-and moderate-income housing. When MHDC applied for the necessary zoning permits, authorizing a switch from a single-to a multiple-family classification, Arlington's planning commission denied the request. Acting on behalf of itself and several minority members, MHDC challenged Arlington's denial as racially discriminatory. On appeal from an adverse district court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and the Supreme Court granted Arlington certiorari.</p> | True | 51656 | 611 | 5 | majority opinion | 75-616 | Village of Arlington Heights | Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation | Civil Rights | 3 | Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-616 |
188 | affirmed | <p>Congress provided in Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that reapportionment plans of several states were to be submitted to the U.S. attorney general or the District Court of the District of Columbia for approval. Several districts in New York were restructured to create districts with a minimum nonwhite majority of 65 percent. A Hasidic Jewish community was split in two by the reapportionment. The community claimed that the plan violated their constitutional rights because the districts had been assigned solely on a racial basis.</p> | False | 51673 | 545 | 7 | plurality opinion | 75-104 | United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. | United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey | Civil Rights | 1 | Carey | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-104 |
189 | reversed | <p>New York and New Jersey had established a Port Authority to enhance water-bound business between the two states. In 1974, the states repealed a 1962 bond agreement which limited the Authority to administer commercial and passenger railroad subsidies.</p> | True | 51677 | 258 | 4 | majority opinion | 75-1687 | United States Trust Company of New York | United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey | Economic Activity | 3 | New Jersey | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1687 |
190 | affirmed | <p>In 1971, Wesley Ward was charged with selling two sadomasochistic publications at his store in violation of the Illinois obscenity statute. The statute defined material as obscene if its predominant appeal was “a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion” and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters. Ward waived his right to a jury trial, and was found guilty based on the two publications and the testimony of the police officer who purchased them at the store. Ward was sentenced to one day in jail and a $200 fine. While Ward’s appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided <em>Miller v. California</em>, which confirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, but acknowledging that official regulation should only cover “works which depict or describe sexual conduct” and such conduct must be specifically defined in the applicable law. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed Ward’s conviction. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that the publications were obscene and the Illinois statute was not unconstitutional.</p> | False | 51675 | 1151 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-415 | Wesley Ward | Ward v. Illinois | First Amendment | 4 | Illinois | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-415 |
191 | affirmed | <p>In the spring of 1972, Ernest Dobbert’s son was found wandering outside a Holiday Inn in Jacksonville, Florida, with apparent signs of a beating. He told a circuit court judge that his injuries were the result of beatings from his father, that his brother and one of his sisters had been killed by his father, and that his other sister was kept locked in a closet at home. The judge issued a warrant for Dobbert’s arrest, and Dobbert fled Jacksonville. In October 1973, Dobbert was arrested in Texas and extradited to Florida for trial. The Florida death penalty law in place when the children were killed, which gave the jury ultimate authority in deciding to impose the penalty, was found unconstitutional before Dobbert’s trial. It was replaced by a new law where the jury gave an advisory recommendation, but the judge made the ultimate decision.</p>
<p>Before his trial, Dobbert applied to the Supreme Court of Florida for a constitutional stay of trial, arguing that applying the new death penalty law violated the ex post facto and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. His application was denied. Dobbert also moved for a change of venue from Duval County based on the publicity his trial was receiving. The trial judge took the motion under advisement and later denied it. Dobbert was convicted of the first-degree murder of his daughter, second-degree murder of his son, and the torture and abuse of his two other children. At his sentencing hearing, the jury recommended life imprisonment, but the trial judge, acting under the authority granted to him by the Florida statute governing the death penalty, overruled the jury and sentenced Dobbert to death. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed.</p> | False | 51676 | 1723 | 6 | majority opinion | 76-5306 | Ernest John Dobbert, Jr. | Dobbert v. Florida | Criminal Procedure | 3 | Florida | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/76-5306 |
192 | reversed/remanded | <p>J. W. Gamble was a prisoner in the Huntington Unit of the Texas prison system, also known as the “Walls Unit.” On November 9, 1973, a 600-pound bale of cotton fell on Gamble while he was working in a textile mill during a work assignment in Huntsville, Texas. He continued to work for several hours, but later became stiff and requested a pass to the unit hospital. The hospital gave Gamble a checkup for a hernia and sent him back to his cell, but later his pain became so intense that he was forced to return to the hospital. A nurse gave Gamble two pain pills, and a hospital doctor later examined him but gave him no further treatment. On November 10th, a different doctor examined Gamble, prescribed him painkillers and placed Gamble on a cell-pass cell-feed routine that mostly confined him to his cell.</p>
<p>That same doctor later took Gamble off the cell-pass cell-feed routine, concluding that he was able to engage in light work. The prison administrative office soon placed Gamble in “administrative segregation” -- essentially solitary confinement -- for refusing to work. Gamble remained in solitary confinement through January of the next year, although he complained that his back pain was as intense as on the first day he was injured. On December 6, a different doctor examined Gamble and diagnosed him with high blood pressure; the previous doctor never detected this condition. Gamble refused to work several more times over the next few months, and was repeatedly disciplined for doing so. When Gamble began experiencing pain in his chest on a regular basis, he was hospitalized and treated, but the prison denied him later requests for treatment. In all, medical personnel treated Gamble seventeen times.</p>
<p>On February 11, 1974, Gamble signed a <i>pro se</i> complaint alleging that the prison subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth. The district court dismissed Gamble’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed, noting that the prison failed to diagnose Gamble’s back injury by giving him an X-ray, that the prison provided no real treatment for Gamble’s back injury, and that Gamble was essentially placed in solitary confinement due to substandard medical care.</p> | True | 51682 | 2353 | 8 | majority opinion | 75-929 | W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Ralph Gray, Medical Director of the Texas Department of Corrections, H. H. Husbands, Warden of the Walls Unit. | Estelle v. Gamble | Criminal Procedure | 1 | J. W. Gamble | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-929 |
193 | reversed | <p>An undercover police officer bought drugs from a narcotics vendor. The officer saw the vendor up close for several minutes. The officer described the vendor to another officer who obtained a photograph of Nowell A. Brathwaite and gave it to the first officer. The officer identified the Brathwaite as the narcotics vendor. At trial, the photograph was admitted as evidence and the officer again identified Brathwaite as the vendor. A jury convicted Brathwaite of possession and sale of heroin. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed. Brathwaite then filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus in district court. The district court dismissed the petition, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the officer’s identification was unreliable and the method of identification from a single photograph was unnecessarily suggestive.</p> | True | 51689 | 880 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-871 | John R. Manson, Commissioner of Correction of the State of Connecticut | Manson v. Brathwaite | Criminal Procedure | 2 | Nowell A. Brathwaite | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-871 |
194 | reversed | <p>An Oklahoma law prohibited the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2 percent beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. Curtis Craig, a male then between the ages of 18 and 21, and Carolyn Whitener, a licensed vendor challenged the law as discriminatory.</p> | True | 51690 | 281 | 7 | majority opinion | 75-628 | Curtis Craig and Carolyn Whitener | Craig v. Boren | Civil Rights | 2 | David Boren, Governor of Oklahoma | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-628 |
195 | vacated/remanded | <p>Fred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elected president of the Teachers’ Association during a period of tension between the board and the Teacher’s Association. Doyle was also involved with a series of incidents beginning in 1970 where he allegedly behaved inappropriately toward students and other staff members; in one incident, Doyle made obscene gestures to two students. Finally, in February 1971, Doyle conveyed the substance of an internal memorandum regarding a proposed staff dress code to a disc jockey at WSAI, a Cincinnati radio station. The disc jockey promptly announced the dress code as a news item.</p>
<p>One month later, the superintendent of the school district recommended that the board not renew Doyle’s contract, along with the contracts of nine other teachers. The board adopted the superintendent’s recommendations. In response to Doyle’s request for an explanation, the board stated that Doyle displayed a “lack of tact in handling professional matters,” and cited both the call to the disc jockey and the obscene gestures Doyle made toward students. Doyle brought a § 1331 federal question action against the board for reinstatement with damages, claiming that the board’s refusal to rehire him violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>
<p>While the district court found that all of the incidents occurred, it held that Doyle was still entitled to reinstatement with backpay. The court concluded that Doyle’s call to the radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the call played a substantial part in the board’s decision not to rehire Doyle, a violation of Doyle’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit affirmed in a short per curiam opinion.</p> | True | 51703 | 1890 | 9 | majority opinion | 75-1278 | Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education | Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle | First Amendment | 0 | Fred Doyle | 1976 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-1278 |
196 | reversed/remanded | <p>In 1971 Ora Spitler McFarlin presented a petition for sterilization of her mildly mentally disabled daughter, Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman, to Judge Harold D. Stump. Judge Stump concluded sterilization was in Sparkman’s best interests due to her mental capabilities and approved the petition. The operation was performed, although Sparkman was unaware of the true nature of the surgery. Two years later, after Sparkman married, she discovered that the sterilization explained her inability to become pregnant. Sparkman sued Judge Stump for violating her right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that although the approval of the petition by Judge Stump was erroneous, he had jurisdiction to consider the petition and was entitled to judicial immunity. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment and concluded that Judge Stump did not have jurisdiction to approve the petition and that he did not have judicial immunity.</p> | True | 51713 | 997 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1750 | Judge Harold D. Stump | Stump v. Sparkman | Civil Rights | 3 | Linda Kay Spitler Sparkman | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1750 |
197 | reversed | <p>The National Bank of Boston, along with two other national banks and three corporations, wished to spend money to publicize their opposition to a ballot initiative that would permit Massachusetts to implement a graduated income tax. The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed the organizations that he intended to enforce a state statute that prohibited such organizations from making contributions to influence the outcome of a vote that does not materially affect their assets and holdings. The organizations sued and argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute.</p> | True | 51715 | 683 | 5 | majority opinion | 76-1172 | First National Bank of Boston, et al. | First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti | First Amendment | 4 | Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/76-1172 |
198 | reversed | <p>Edna Smith Primus was a practicing attorney who worked for a private law firm and was also affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), a non-profit organization. She received no compensation for her work with ACLU. In her capacity as a lawyer at the private firm, Primus discovered women were being sterilized. Primus spoke to a group of the sterilized women to advise them of their legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit. One of these women, Mary Etta Williams, decided she wanted to sue her doctor over her sterilization. Primus then informed Williams through a letter of the ACLU’s offer of free legal representation. Shortly after, Williams visited the doctor who sterilized her, signed a release of liability, and notified Primus she no longer intended to sue.</p>
<p>A few months later, the Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of South Carolina (Board) filed a complaint that charged Primus with solicitation in violation of the Canons of Ethics, a code of professional conduct for lawyers. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in accordance with the Board’s panel recommendation, found Primus in violation of regulations regarding solicitation. Primus appealed and argued that the disciplinary action violated the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech.</p> | True | 51717 | 1365 | 7 | majority opinion | 77-56 | Edna Smith Primus | In re Primus | Attorneys | 1 | United States | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-56 |
199 | reversed/remanded | <p>On October 28, 1974, Officer Barry Headricks of the Tucson Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Rufus Mincey. Later, Officer Headricks knocked on the door of Mincey's apartment, accompanied by nine other plainclothes officers. Mincey’s acquaintance, John Hodgman, opened the door. Officer Headricks slipped inside and quickly went to the bedroom. As the other officers entered the apartment -- despite Hodgman’s attempts to stop them -- the sound of gunfire came from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged from the bedroom and collapsed on the floor; he died a few hours later.</p>
<p>The other officers found Mincey lying on the floor of his bedroom, wounded and semiconscious, then quickly searched the apartment for other injured persons. Mincey suffered damage to his sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg; a doctor described him as depressed almost to the point of being comatose. A detective interrogated him for several hours at the hospital, ignoring Mincey’s repeated requests for counsel. In addition, soon after the shooting, two homicide detectives arrived at the apartment and took charge of the investigation. Their search lasted for four days, during which officers searched, photographed and diagrammed the entire apartment. They did not, however, obtain a warrant.</p>
<p>The state charged Mincey with murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. Much of the prosecution’s evidence was the product of the extensive search of Mincey’s apartment. Mincey contended at trial that this evidence was unconstitutionally taken without a warrant and that his statements were inadmissible because they were not made voluntarily. In a preliminary hearing, the court found that Mincey made the statements voluntarily. Mincey’s motion to suppress evidence taken from his apartment was also denied, and he was convicted on all charges. The Supreme Court of Arizona held that the warrantless search of Mincey’s apartment was constitutional because it was a search of a murder scene, and that Mincey’s statements were admissible for impeachment purposes, reversing the murder and assault charges on other grounds.</p> | True | 51718 | 2204 | 9 | majority opinion | 77-5353 | Rufus Junior Mincey | Mincey v. Arizona | Criminal Procedure | 0 | Arizona | 1977 | https://api.oyez.org/cases/1977/77-5353 |