Patent Document

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/036,799, filed on 13 Jan. 2005, now U.S. Pat. No. 7,721,321 entitled “Method and Apparatus for Reducing Communication System Downtime when Configuring a Cryptographic System of the Communication System”, which names Allen D. Risley as inventor, which claims benefit under 35 U.S.C. §119(e) of U.S. Provisional Application entitled “A Method to Reduce Network Downtime When Changing Cryptographic Settings or When Commissioning a Cryptographic System”, filed on Dec. 3, 2004, naming Allen D. Risley as inventor, the complete disclosure thereof being incorporated by reference. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention generally relates to cryptographic systems, and more specifically, to a method and apparatus for reducing communication system downtime when configuring a cryptographic system of the communication system. 
     Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used in virtually every industry, but especially in utility industries such as gas delivery, electric power, sewage treatment, water supply, transportation, etc. A SCADA system is one type of communication system and includes, among other things, a control center having an operator display/control panel and a SCADA master operatively coupled to the operator display/control panel. A typical SCADA system is configured to measure key operating aspects of a process or system, and then to transmit via a SCADA communication network, the associated measurement data to a central control center. Operators, either human or machine at the control center, make decisions based on the measurement data. The SCADA system is also configured to transmit commands from the operators to the process or system via the SCADA communication network. 
     As is known, the SCADA communication network may include one of any number of suitable communication network links, depending on the process or system monitored by the SCADA system. For example, the SCADA communication network may include radio, analog and/or digital microwave links, fiber optic links, analog or digital modems on utility owned or leased telephone circuit links, or even the public switched telephone network. 
     In the electric utility industry a SCADA system may be configured to measure the voltages associated with a power system substation bus (i.e., bus voltages), to measure the current coming into the bus from a power transmission line (i.e., a line current), and to measure the status or position of numerous switches in the substation. The status measurements may include indications of circuit breaker positions and electrical power routing switch positions (e.g., open position, closed position). The SCADA system may also be configured to transmit the current, voltage and switch position measurements to a central control center (CC) via a SCADA communication network for review by an operator. The operator can then make decisions such as closing a circuit breaker to enable additional electric power to a particular load. In that case, a command from the operator delivered via the SCADA communication network results in closure of the circuit breaker. 
     “Intelligent” devices of the SCADA system that measure the current, voltage and switch positions, and that cause actions to be taken based on commands from the operator are often referred to as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). The IEDs may include an electric power meter, a programmable controller, a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), a communications processor, a protective relay, or any number of other suitable intelligent devices configured to take measurements, transmit those measurements over the SCADA communication network to the SCADA master and the operator display/control panel, and respond to commands sent via the operator display/control panel over the SCADA communication network. 
     As previously mentioned, the SCADA communication network may include any one of a number of suitable communication network links. A typical SCADA communication network may also span long distances of many miles. Unfortunately, due to their sheer expanse, SCADA communication networks are vulnerable to electronic intrusions thereby putting associated IEDs and other SCADA system components at risk for compromise by an eavesdropper (e.g., adversary, attacker, interceptor, interloper, intruder, opponent, enemy). For example, if an eavesdropper gains access to a telephone, circuit used to transmit switch position measurements from a power system substation to a CC and used to transmit circuit breaker control commands from the CC to the substation, the eavesdropper could launch numerous attacks on the power system. Such an attack may include altering settings on a protective relay thereby rendering the relay useless in the event of a short circuit, IED damage, operator confusion causing unnecessary power system blackouts, etc. Further, for systems other than power systems, the eavesdropper may cause havoc to any SCADA-monitored critical infrastructure including natural gas delivery systems, transportation or communications systems, waste water treatment and fresh water delivery, etc. The US government has recognized this growing threat. In a report created by the U.S. Department of Energy titled “21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA communication networks” published jointly by the President&#39;s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board, and the Office of Energy Assurance, the authors concluded:
         “Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) networks contain computers and applications that perform key functions in providing essential services and commodities (e.g., electricity, natural gas, gasoline, water, waste treatment, transportation) to all Americans. As such, they are part of the nation&#39;s critical infrastructure and require protection from a variety of threats that exists in cyber space today. By allowing the collection and analysis of data and control of equipment, such as pumps and valves from remote locations, SCADA communication networks provide great efficiency and are widely used. However, they also present a security risk: SCADA communication networks were initially designed to maximize functionality, with little attention paid to security. As a result, performance, reliability, flexibility and safety of distributed control/SCADA systems are robust, while the security of these systems is often weak. This makes some SCADA communication networks potentially vulnerable to disruption of service, process redirection or manipulation of operational data that could result in public safety concerns and/or serious disruptions to the nation&#39;s critical infrastructure. Action is required by all organizations, government or commercial, to secure their SCADA communication networks as part of the effort to adequately protect the nation&#39;s critical infrastructure”.       

     To address the SCADA communication network security issue, numerous types of cryptographic devices are used to encrypt, decrypt and authenticate the data transmitted by a SCADA communication network. Unfortunately, current cryptographic devices require manual installation, manual cryptographic setting changes and manual commissioning; a time consuming effort for a typical SCADA communication network spanning many miles. As a result, IEDs in need of cryptographic protection remain unprotected for unacceptable time periods until all of the cryptographic devices associated with the individual IEDs and the SCADA master have been installed, commissioned or had settings changed. As each cryptographic device is installed, the SCADA master loses communication with the IED&#39;s connected to the SCADA communication network segment associated with that cryptographic device. As installation of new cryptographic devices progress, the SCADA master loses communication with more of the IEDs until all cryptographic devices have been installed, including the cryptographic device for the SCADA master. Such a lack of complete SCADA communications may continue for days or even weeks, depending on how long it takes an operator(s) to visit all of the sites of the SCADA system  10  requiring cryptographic device installation. 
     Moreover, if the cryptographic device is installed on the SCADA master first, then the SCADA master will lose communications with all equipment on the SCADA communication network until cryptographic devices are installed at the various IEDs. The best a cryptographic device installer can do is to install cryptographic devices at about half of the IEDs, and then install the cryptographic device at the SCADA master. The SCADA master will lose communications with the half of the equipment not connected to cryptographic devices until the installer completes installing cryptographic devices at all of the intended sites. 
     When installed, each of the cryptographic devices may be manually placed in a “pass-through mode”, making the cryptographic device transparent to the SCADA communication network. Unlike encryption/decryption operation or “secure mode operation”, a cryptographic device in the pass-though mode performs no encryption, decryption, or authentication functions for data transmitted via the SCADA communication network. Unfortunately, cryptographic devices are placed in and removed from pass-through mode via either a hardware switch or button, or via an electronic command received via a maintenance interface of the cryptographic device. As a result, an installer has to travel from cryptographic device location to cryptographic device location to place the cryptographic devices in, or remove them from, pass-through mode. During that time, the SCADA system remains unprotected from eavesdropper activity. 
     Similarly, as each installed cryptographic device is undergoing a parameter value change (e.g., an encryption key change, an initialization vector size change, a synchronization mode change, a network architecture parameter change, a max allowable frame length parameter change), the SCADA master loses communication with the SCADA communication with the IEDs connected to the network segment associated with that cryptographic device. As each of the installed cryptographic devices are visited by an operator to change parameter values, the SCADA master loses communication with more of the IEDs until all cryptographic devices have undergone parameter value changes. Again, the lack of complete SCADA communications may continue for days or even weeks, depending on how long it takes an operator(s) to visit all of the sites of the SCADA system  10  requiring parameter value updates or changes. Moreover, if the parameter value(s) of the cryptographic device associated with the SCADA master are updated first, then the SCADA master will lose communications with all equipment on the SCADA communication network until all of the parameters values of the remaining cryptographic devices are similarly updated. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     According to an aspect of the invention, provided is a method and apparatus for reducing communication system downtime when enabling cryptographic operation of a cryptographic system of the communication system. The cryptographic system includes a first cryptographic device operatively coupled to a plurality of second cryptographic devices via a communication network of the communication system. The method includes causing a first mode, or pass-through mode of the first and second cryptographic devices to be suspended. The pass-through mode renders the second cryptographic devices transparent to the communication network. The method also includes sequentially determining a state of each of the second cryptographic devices, causing the second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device to substantially simultaneously operate in a second mode, or secure mode if each of the second cryptographic devices is determined to have a first state. The secure mode enables cryptographic operation on data transmitted via the communication network. The method further includes causing the second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device to operate in the pass-through mode if at least one of the plurality of second cryptographic devices is determined to have a second, or a non-readiness, state. In an embodiment, the communication system is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, and the communication network is a SCADA communication network. 
     According to another aspect of the invention, provided is a method for reducing communication system downtime when changing at least one parameter value of a cryptographic system of the communication system. The cryptographic system includes a first cryptographic device operatively coupled to a plurality of second cryptographic devices via a communication network of the communication system. Each of the first cryptographic device and the plurality of second cryptographic devices operate in a second mode, or secure mode using a first set of parameter values. The method includes detecting receipt of a first command to synchronously enable second mode operation using a second set of parameter values of the plurality of second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device, sequentially determining a state of each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices, and causing the plurality of second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device to substantially simultaneously operate in the second mode using the second set of parameter values if each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices is determined to have a first state. At least one of the second set of parameter values is different from the first set of parameter values. In an embodiment, the communication system is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and the communication network is a SCADA communication network. 
     According to yet another aspect of the invention, provided is an apparatus for reducing communication system downtime when enabling cryptographic operation of a cryptographic system of the communication system where the communication system includes a communication network. The apparatus includes a first cryptographic device having a first microcontroller, and a plurality of second cryptographic devices operatively coupled to the first cryptographic device via the communication network. Each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices includes a second microcontroller. The first microcontroller is adapted to cause a first mode of the plurality of second cryptographic devices to be suspended. The first mode renders the plurality of second cryptographic devices transparent to the communication network. The first microcontroller is further adapted to sequentially determine a state of each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices, and to cause the plurality of second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device to substantially simultaneously operate in a second mode if each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices is determined to have a first state. The second mode enables cryptographic operation on data transmitted via the communication network. In an embodiment, the communication system is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, and the communication network is a SCADA communication network. 
     According to a further aspect of the invention, provided is an apparatus for reducing communication system downtime when changing at least one parameter value of a cryptographic system of the communication system where the communication system includes a communication network. The apparatus includes a first cryptographic device having a first microcontroller, and a plurality of second cryptographic devices operatively coupled to the first cryptographic device via the communication network where each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices has a second microcontroller. Each of the first cryptographic device and the plurality of second cryptographic devices operate in a second mode, or secure mode, using a first set of parameter values. The first microcontroller is adapted to detect receipt of a first command to synchronously enable second mode operation using a second set of parameter values for the plurality of second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device. The microcontroller is further adapted to sequentially determine a state of each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices, and cause the plurality of second cryptographic devices and the first cryptographic device to substantially simultaneously operate in the second mode using the second set of parameter values if each of the plurality of second cryptographic devices is determined to have a first state where at least one of the second set of parameter values is different from the first set of parameter values. In an embodiment, the communication system is a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and the communication network is a SCADA communication network. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a SCADA system. 
         FIG. 2  is a block diagram of a SCADA system according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG. 3  is a more detailed diagram of a cryptographic device according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG. 4  is a flowchart of a synchronized commissioning process according to the present invention. 
         FIG. 5  is a ladder diagram of an exemplary communication flow between the master cryptographic device and the slave cryptographic devices during the synchronized commissioning process of  FIG. 4 . 
         FIG. 6  is a flowchart of a synchronized parameter values change process according to the present invention. 
         FIG. 7  is a ladder diagram of an exemplary communication flow between the master cryptographic device and the slave cryptographic devices during the synchronized parameter values change process of  FIG. 6 . 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
       FIG. 1  is a block diagram of an exemplary SCADA system  10 . The SCADA system  10  includes a control center (CC)  20  operatively coupled to a first substation  14  and a second substation  16  of a power system via a SCADA communication network  18 . The control center  12  includes an operator display/control panel  21  operatively coupled to a SCADA master  22 . The first substation  14  is monitored by a first IED  24 , and the second substation  16  is monitored by second and third IEDs  26  and  28 . As illustrated in  FIG. 1 , each of the IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  are configured to measure line current, bus voltage and switch positions, and cause actions to be taken based on commands from an operator via the operator display/control panel  21 . 
     During operation, the SCADA master  22  controls acquisition of information/data from each of the IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  and displays the information/data on the operator display/control panel  21 . Decisions are then made by an operator based on the information/data and the results of those decisions are forwarded to the appropriate IED(s) via the SCADA master  22 . 
     Also during operation, the IEDs measure line current, bus voltage and switch positions, transmit those measurements over the SCADA communication network  18  to the SCADA master  22 , and respond to commands sent via the operator display/control panel  20  over the SCADA communication network  18  to perform selected tasks such as enabling additional electric power to be supplied to a particular load of the associated power system. 
     As previously mentioned, SCADA communication networks are vulnerable to electronic intrusions by an eavesdropper.  FIG. 2  is a block diagram of a SCADA system  50  including a number of cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66 . The cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are capable of synchronized commissioning without individual manual intervention and capable of synchronized parameter values change without long SCADA system outages according to an embodiment of the invention. When in secure mode operation, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  provide encryption/decryption and authentication for data transmitted via the SCADA system  50 . 
     Referring to  FIG. 2 , the SCADA system  50  includes the control center  52  operatively coupled to a first substation  54  and a second substation  56  of a power system via the SCADA communication network  18 . The control center  52  includes the operator display/control panel  21  operatively coupled to the SCADA master  22 . The first substation  54  is monitored by the first IED  24 , and the second substation  56  is monitored by the second IED  26  and the third IED  28 . As illustrated in  FIG. 2 , each of the IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  are configured to measure line current, bus voltage and switch positions, and cause actions to be taken based on commands from an operator via the operator display/control panel  20 . Although adapted for an electrical power system, it is contemplated that the SCADA system  50  may be adapted for use in any number of systems such as natural gas delivery systems, transportation or communications systems, waste water treatment and fresh water delivery, etc. Further, although configured with three IEDs, it is contemplated that the SCADA system  50  may include many IEDs capable of many different configurations. 
     Each of the IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  and the SCADA master  22  is operatively coupled to respective cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66 . As illustrated, the first cryptographic device  60  is operatively coupled to the first IED  24 , the second cryptographic device  62  is operatively coupled to the second IED  26 , the third cryptographic device  64  is operatively coupled to the third IED  28 , and the fourth cryptographic device  66  is operatively coupled to the SCADA master  22 . For ease of discussion the fourth cryptographic device is referred to hereinafter as the master cryptographic device  66 . 
     During operation, data originating from IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  is encrypted before being transmitted via the SCADA communication network  18 . Transmitted data received by the control center  52  it is then decrypted and authenticated by the master cryptographic device  66  before it is passed to the SCADA master  22 . Likewise, control commands from the SCADA master  22  or elsewhere in the control center  52  are encrypted by the master cryptographic device  66  before they are delivered to the SCADA communication network  18 . The receiving cryptographic device (e.g., the cryptographic device  60 ) then decrypts and authenticates the control commands before they are passed to the associated IED (e.g., the IED  24 ) whereupon an IED function is performed. 
     Cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  operate to conceal transmitted data via one of any number of well-known encryption protocols (e.g., Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Data Encryption Standard (DES), triple DES, DESX, CRYPT(3), DES with Key-Dependent S-Boxes). When in a secure operating mode, each of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  installed in a data path between respective IEDs  24 ,  26 ,  28  and the SCADA master  22 , prevent an unauthorized eavesdropper  70  from accessing the data or control command/message content transmitted via the SCADA communication network  18 . 
       FIG. 3  is a more detailed diagram of the master cryptographic device  66  according to an embodiment of the invention. Although not separately discussed in detail, it should be understood that each of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  are similarly configured and operable. 
     Referring to  FIG. 3 , the master cryptographic device  66  includes a first interface, or trusted interface  80 , configured to be connected to an IED or SCADA master, and a second interface, or un-trusted interface  82 , configured to be connected to the SCADA communication network  18 . A third interface or maintenance interface  84  may also be included for maintenance purposes such as configuring, controlling, or temporarily monitoring the cryptographic device  66 . In some instances the maintenance interface  84  is included on the same physical interface as the trusted interface  80  or the un-trusted interface  82 . Further, for cryptographic device versatility, the trusted interface  80  may be configurable as an un-trusted interface  82 , and the un-trusted interface  82  may be configurable as the trusted interface  80 . In other words, the interfaces  80  and  82  may be configured as either trusted or un-trusted interfaces 
     As previously mentioned, during operation, the master cryptographic device  66  encrypts data received from the SCADA master  22  via the trusted interface  80  before transmitting it via the un-trusted interface  82 . Conversely, the master cryptographic device  66  decrypts data received via the un-trusted interface  82  before transmitting it via the trusted interface  80 . 
     The master cryptographic device  66  also includes a microcontroller  85  having a microprocessor  86  and a memory  88  operatively coupled to the microprocessor  86 . The memory  88  is configured to store cryptographic device parameters such as data rates, and cryptographic device data such as the encryption key and programs or routines that enable synchronized commissioning and a synchronized parameter values change. First and second data ports  90 ,  92  couple the microcontroller  85  to the trusted interface  80  and the un-trusted interface  82 , respectively. Similarly, a maintenance data port  94  couples the microcontroller  85  to the maintenance interface  84 . 
     During operation, the microprocessor  86 , executing a program stored in a program storage block  87  of the memory  88  performs inter alia, encryption, decryption and authentication. Resulting intermediate and temporary data is stored in a data storage block  89  of the memory  88 . During operation, the microprocessor  86  also performs inter alia, retrieval and optional modification of parameters that define various attributes of cryptographic device operation (e.g., data rates, which of Port  1  and Port  2  are the trusted and un-trusted ports, encryption keys, etc.). The parameters are stored in a parameter storage block  91  of the memory  88 . 
     As previously mentioned, cryptographic devices may be manually placed in a pass-through mode, making the cryptographic devices in the pass-through mode transparent to the SCADA communication network. Such transparency may be desired when a number of cryptographic devices are being installed or reconfigured with parameter updates, etc. Unfortunately, an installer has to travel from prior art cryptographic device to prior art cryptographic device to manually place them in and or remove them from pass-through mode. During that time period, communication between the SCADA master and the IEDs is compromised as described above. 
     Unlike prior art installed cryptographic devices that require individual manual intervention to transition from the pass-through mode operation to secure mode operation, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are configured to enable synchronized commissioning. That is, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are configured to transition from a first mode, or the pass-through mode, to a second mode operation, or secure mode operation, in response to a command received from another cryptographic device or another device connected to the SCADA communication network  18 . As a result, SCADA system downtime is reduced. 
     Further, unlike prior art installed cryptographic devices, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are configured to enable a synchronized parameter values change. That is, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are configured to transition from secure mode operation based on a first set of stored configuration parameters, to secure mode operation based on a second set of stored configuration parameters, in response to a command received from another cryptographic device or another device connected to the SCADA communication network  18 . As a result, SCADA system downtime is reduced. 
       FIG. 4  is a flowchart of a synchronized commissioning process  400  according to the present invention. Performance of the synchronized commissioning process  400  reduces SCADA system down-time when installing cryptographic devices on an existing SCADA communication network  18  and when transitioning the installed cryptographic devices from a pass-through mode to secure mode operation. For ease of discussion, the microcontroller  85  of the master cryptographic device  66  acts as a “master” controlling the synchronized commissioning process  400 . The microcontrollers of the remaining cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  respond as “slaves” to messages from the microcontroller  85 . It should be understood however, that the microcontrollers of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  may act as the master or the slave, or that another suitably configured SCADA system device may act as the master. 
       FIG. 5  is a ladder diagram  500  of an exemplary communication flow between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  during the synchronized commissioning process  400 . Although the ladder diagram  500  illustrates one communication flow that occurs during the synchronized commissioning process  400 , it is contemplated that other communication flows may be implemented to enable the synchronized commissioning process  400 . 
     Referring to  FIGS. 4 and 5 , the synchronized commissioning process  400  begins when the microcontroller  85  detects receipt of a BEGIN SYNC COMMISSIONING command  502  (step  402 ). The BEGIN SYNC COMMISSIONING command  502  may be initiated in one of any number of ways using one of any number of methods. For example, the BEGIN SYNC COMMISSIONING command  502  may result from an operator input received via the maintenance interface  84 . The BEGIN SYNC COMMISSIONING command  502  may also result from actuation of a switch, button, etc. on the master cryptographic device  66 . 
     Prior to installation, each of the plurality of cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  is pre-configured with a first set of parameter values that include an encryption key, a cryptographic device configuration, a data rate, a maximum data frame length, a maximum dead time, a number of data bits, a number of stop bits and a parity bit configuration, etc. Each of the plurality of cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  is also pre-configured to be in a pass-through mode when first installed and pre-configured to participate in the synchronization commissioning process upon receipt of a suitable commissioning command from the master cryptographic device  66 . 
     During installation of cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 , respective IED operation and communication to the SCADA master  22  is interrupted only during the time the data path is interrupted. That is, operation of and communication from the IED to the SCADA master  22  is interrupted from the time an installer disconnects a data communications cable from its respective IED to install the cryptographic device, to the time the cryptographic device is operational in the pass-through mode. Thus, the time the data path is interrupted is measured in minutes, rather than in the days and weeks required for installation of prior art cryptographic devices using prior art installation methods. Similarly, during installation of the cryptographic device  66  between the SCADA master  22  and the SCADA communication network  18 , communication to all IEDs is interrupted only during the time the data path is interrupted, a time again measured in minutes. When first installed and in pass-through mode, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  are transparent to the SCADA system  50  and therefore the SCADA system  50  operates much like the SCADA system  10  of  FIG. 1 . 
     Referring again to  FIGS. 4 and 5 , upon receipt of the BEGIN SYNC COMMISSIONING command  502 , the microcontroller  85  of the master cryptographic devices  66  begins the process of transitioning each of the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  from pass-through mode to secure mode operation to secure the SCADA communication network  18  against electronic intrusion by an eavesdropper. The previously stored parameter values stored in the memories of respective cryptographic devices are also placed into operation. 
     The transition to secure mode operation begins when the master cryptographic device  66  broadcasts a predetermined number of ESCAPE SEQUENCE commands  504  to cause the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  to temporarily suspend the pass-through mode upon receipt of one ESCAPE SEQUENCE messages  504  (step  404 ). The ESCAPE SEQUENCE messages  504  is preferably a string of characters unlikely to be generated by the underlying protocol, followed by a predetermined idle time period during which no data is transmitted by the master cryptographic device  66 . It should be understood however, that the ESCAPE SEQUENCE command  504  may be any suitably configured command that operates to temporarily suspend the pass-through mode. 
     After broadcasting a series of ESCAPE SEQUENCE commands  504 , the master cryptographic device  66  begins exchanging a series of commands/messages in a sequential or polling fashion, with each of the slave cryptographic device  60 ,  62 ,  64  to ensure that each is properly configured for synchronized commissioning. 
     The master cryptographic device  66  may begin the sequential polling by transmitting a STATUS REQUEST command  506  to a first slave cryptographic device, or the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  406 ). The slave cryptographic device  60  may respond in one of two ways. If it is not properly configured for synchronized commissioning, it will respond with a negative acknowledgement (NACK) message to the master cryptographic device  66 . In other words, the NACK message indicates a non-readiness to participate in the synchronized commissioning, or a non-readiness state. If the slave cryptographic device  60  is properly configured for synchronized commissioning, it will respond with a ready acknowledgement (RDY) message and a “challenge value”  508  to the master cryptographic device  66 . The challenge value is used for encrypting/decrypting and authentication purposes. 
     Upon receiving a NACK message from the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized commissioning process  400  to be aborted. After a predetermined time period, all of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  revert back to pass-through mode (step  407 ). Similarly, if no response is received from the slave cryptographic device  60  within a predetermined time period, the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized commissioning process  400  to be aborted and all of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  to revert back to pass-through mode (step  407 ). 
     Conversely, upon receiving the RDY message and challenge value  508  from the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  proceeds with the synchronized commissioning process  400  (step  408 ). The microcontroller  85  first encrypts the challenge value with its master encryption key to form an encrypted challenge value (step  410 ), and then causes a PREPARE FOR SYNC COMMISSIONING command  510  to be transmitted to the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  412 ). The PREPARE FOR SYNC COMMISSIONING command  510  includes the encrypted challenge value calculated by the microcontroller  85 . 
     When received, the encrypted challenge value is decrypted by the microcontroller of the slave cryptographic device  60  to form a decrypted challenge value, and then compares the decrypted challenge value to the original challenge value generated by the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the decrypted challenge value does not match the original challenge value, the slave cryptographic device  60  responds with a NACK message to the master cryptographic device  66 . 
     Upon receipt of the NACK message, the master cryptographic device  66  determines whether a predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  506  have been previously sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  506  have not been previously sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  again causes the STATUS REQUEST message  506  to be transmitted to the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  406 ). The message exchange between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic device  60  repeats until the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  506  to the slave cryptographic device  60  have been reached or until receipt of an ARMED message  512  from the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  506  have been sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized commissioning process  400  to be aborted and the master cryptographic device  66  reverts back to pass-though mode operation. After a predetermined time period, all of the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  to revert back to pass-through mode operation (step  407 ). Thus when not ARMED and EXECUTED within a time limit, the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  revert back to pass-through mode 
     If the decrypted challenge value matches the original challenge value, the slave cryptographic device  60  responds to the master cryptographic device  66  with the ARMED message  512  to indicate a ready condition for synchronized commissioning. In other words, the ARMED message  512  indicates a readiness to participate in the synchronized commissioning. Upon receipt of the ARMED message  512  from the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  causes the STATUS REQUEST command  506  to be transmitted to the second slave cryptographic device  62 . The process is repeated for each slave cryptographic device of the SCADA system  50 . If any of the slave cryptographic devices of the SCADA system  50  respond with a NACK message, the master cryptographic device  66  causes the synchronized commissioning process  400  to be aborted. 
     When all of the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  have been poled and have responded with the ARMED message  512  indicating a ready condition for synchronized commissioning, the microcontroller  85  causes a pre-determined number of EXECUTE commands  514  to be simultaneously broadcast to the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  to place them in secure mode operation (step  416 ). 
     The master cryptographic device  66  begins secure mode operation (encrypting and encrypting according to the previously programmed secret encryption key and other operational parameters) after the last EXECUTE command  514  is broadcast. The slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  begin secure mode operation upon receipt of the EXECUTE command  514 , provided the slave cryptographic device(s)  60 ,  62 ,  64  have previously successfully transmitted the ARMED message  512 . 
     Performance of the synchronized commissioning process  400  via the serial polling scheme described above yields a total time elapsed between the first ESCAPE SEQUENCE command  504  and the last EXECUTE command  514 , of less than one second. During that very brief time period, SCADA communications between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  are temporarily non-operational. 
     As may be apparent from the above discussion, the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  authenticate commands and requests transmitted from the master encryption device  66  using an encrypted challenge/response scheme. It should be understood however, that other well known authentications schemes may be used. 
     As described in connection with  FIG. 3 , during operation of the master cryptographic device  66 , the microprocessor  86  performs inter alia, retrieval and optional modification of the first set of parameters that define various attributes of cryptographic device operation (e.g., data rates, which of Port  1  and Port  2  are the trusted and un-trusted ports, encryption keys, etc.). The first set of parameters values is stored in the parameter storage block  91  of the memory  88 . In some cases it may be necessary to change or update one or more of the parameter values of the first set of parameter values to form a second set of parameter values. For example, it may be necessary to change the encryption keys used by the master cryptographic device  66  and all of the slave cryptographic devices of the SCADA system  50 . 
     Using prior art methods, as each installed cryptographic device is undergoing a parameter value change (e.g., an encryption key change), communication is lost between the SCADA master loses and the SCADA communication network segment associated with that IED. As each installed cryptographic devices is visited by an installer to change parameter values, the SCADA master loses communication that IED until all cryptographic devices, one-by-one, have undergone parameter value changes. The lack of power system monitoring due to lack of communication between the IEDs that have undergone the parameter value change and the SCADA master may continue for days or even weeks, depending on how long it takes an installer(s) to visit all of the sites of the SCADA system. Moreover, if the parameter value(s) of the cryptographic device associated with the SCADA master are updated first, then the SCADA master will lose communications with all equipment on the SCADA communication network until all of the parameters values of the remaining cryptographic devices are similarly updated. 
       FIG. 6  is a flowchart of a synchronized parameter values change process  600  according to the present invention. Performance of the synchronized parameter values change process  600  reduces SCADA system down-time when parameter values are changed or updated in installed cryptographic devices of the SCADA system  50 . For ease of discussion, the microcontroller  85  of the master cryptographic device  66  acts as a master controlling the synchronized parameter values change process  600 . The microcontrollers of the remaining cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  respond as slaves to commands from the master cryptographic device  66 . It should be understood however, that the microcontrollers of the cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64 ,  66  may act as the master or the slave, or that another suitably configured SCADA system device may act as the master. 
       FIG. 7  is a ladder diagram  700  of an exemplary communication flow between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  during the synchronized parameter values change process  600 . Although the ladder diagram  700  illustrates one communication flow that occurs during the synchronized parameter values change  700 , it is contemplated that other communication flows may be implemented to enable the synchronized parameter values change  700 . 
     A second set of parameter values, previously installed in the memories of respective cryptographic devices by an installer traveling from cryptographic device to cryptographic device, remain inactive until activated by the microcontroller  85 . As a result, operation of the cryptographic devices using the first set of parameter values remains unaffected during and after installation of the second set of parameter values until the second set of parameter values are activated by the microcontroller  85 . 
     Referring to  FIGS. 6 and 7 , the synchronized parameter values change process  600  begins when, upon receipt of a BEGIN SYNC PARAMETER CHANGE command  702 , the microcontroller  85  of the master cryptographic device  66  begins the process of transitioning each of the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  from a first set of parameter values to a second set of parameter values. 
     After receiving the BEGIN SYNC PARAMETER CHANGE command  702 , the master cryptographic device  66  begins exchanging a series of commands/messages in a sequential, or polling fashion, with each of the slave cryptographic device  60 ,  62 ,  64 . The microcontroller  85  may begin the sequential polling by transmitting a STATUS REQUEST command  704  to a first slave cryptographic device, or the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  604 ). The slave cryptographic device  60  may respond in one of two ways. If it is not properly configured to allow the synchronized parameter values change, it will respond with a negative acknowledgement (NACK) message to the master cryptographic device  66 , and if it is properly configured to allow the synchronized parameter values change, it will respond with a ready acknowledgement (RDY) message and a “challenge value”  706  to the master cryptographic device  66 . The challenge value is used for encrypting/decrypting and authentication purposes. 
     Upon receiving a NACK message from the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized parameter values change process  600  to be aborted. Similarly, if no response is received from the slave cryptographic device  60  within a predetermined time period, the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized parameter values change process  600  to be aborted (step  605 ). 
     Conversely, upon receiving the RDY message and challenge value  508  from the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  proceeds with the synchronized parameter values change process  600  (step  606 ). The microcontroller  85  first encrypts the challenge value with its master encryption key to form an encrypted challenge value (step  608 ), and then causes a PREPARE FOR SYNC PARAMETER VALUES CHANGE command  708  to be transmitted to the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  610 ). The PREPARE FOR SYNC PARAMETER VALUES CHANGE command  708  includes the encrypted challenge value calculated by the microcontroller  85 . 
     When received, the encrypted challenge value is decrypted by the microcontroller of the slave cryptographic device  60  to form a decrypted challenge value, and compared to the original challenge value generated by the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the decrypted challenge value does not match the original challenge value, the slave cryptographic device  60  responds with a NACK message to the master cryptographic device  66 . 
     Upon receipt of the NACK message, the microcontroller  85  determines whether a predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  704  have been previously sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  704  have not been previously sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  86  again cause the STATUS REQUEST command  704  to be transmitted to the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  604 ). The message exchange between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic device  60  repeats until the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST commands  704  to the slave cryptographic device  60  have been reached or until receipt of an ARMED message  710  from the slave cryptographic device  60 . If the predetermined number of STATUS REQUEST messages  702  has been sent to the slave cryptographic device  60 , the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized parameter values change process  600  to be aborted (step  605 ). 
     If the decrypted challenge value matches the original challenge value, the slave cryptographic device  60  responds to the master cryptographic device  66  with the ARMED message  710  to indicate a ready condition for synchronized parameter values change. Upon receipt of the ARMED message  710  from the slave cryptographic device  60  (step  612 ), the microcontroller  85  causes the STATUS REQUEST command  704  to be transmitted to the second slave cryptographic device  62 . The process is repeated for each slave cryptographic device of the SCADA system  50 . If any of the slave cryptographic devices of the SCADA system  50  respond with a NACK message, the microcontroller  85  causes the synchronized parameter values change process  600  to be aborted. 
     When all of the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  have been poled and have responded with the ARMED message  710  indicating a ready condition for synchronized parameter values change, the microcontroller  85  causes a pre-determined number of EXECUTE commands  712  to be simultaneously broadcasted to the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  to cause them to begin operating using the second set of parameter values (step  614 ). 
     The master cryptographic device  66  begins secure mode operation using the second set of parameter values after the last EXECUTE command  712  is broadcast. The slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  begin secure mode operation using the second set of parameter values upon receipt of the EXECUTE command  712 , provided the slave cryptographic device(s)  60 ,  62 ,  64  have previously successfully transmitted the ARMED message  710 . 
     Performance of the synchronized parameter values change process  600  via the serial polling scheme described above yields a total time elapsed between transmission of the first EXECUTE command  712  and the last EXECUTE command  712 , of less than one-tenth of one second. During that very brief time, SCADA communications between the master cryptographic device  66  and the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  are temporarily non-operational. 
     As may be apparent from the above discussion, the slave cryptographic devices  60 ,  62 ,  64  authenticate commands and requests transmitted from the master encryption device  66  using an encrypted challenge/response scheme. It should be understood however, that other well known authentications schemes may be used. 
     As may also be apparent from the above discussion, the method and apparatus disclosed herein greatly reduces network downtime during installation and commissioning of cryptographic devices in a SCADA communication network, without compromising network security. The method and apparatus disclosed herein also greatly reduces network downtime during a parameter values change to the cryptographic devices of the SCADA communication network without compromising network security. 
     Although a preferred embodiment of the invention has been described for purposes of illustration, it should be understood that various changes, modifications and substitutions may be incorporated in the embodiment without departing from the spirit of the invention which is defined in the claims which follow.

Technology Category: h