Patent Document

TECHNICAL FIELD  
         [0001]    The present invention relates generally to security and the control of access to equipment through a dial-up connection and, in particular, to methods and apparatus for controlling access to command controllable computerized equipment accessed through a transceiver connected to a dial-up line.  
         BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION  
         [0002]    Decentralization of service provision is a rapidly developing trend in the service industry. Two simple examples of services provided in a decentralized manner are: the remote maintenance of computerized equipment and access to dial-up services such as banking services. This trend is fuelled by the continuing miniaturization of computing equipment, the exponential increase in processing power of computing equipment and the convenience of providing services at a customer&#39;s premises. However, there is a cost associated with the convenience afforded by providing decentralized services. Access to computerized equipment is frequently accomplished using a dial-up connection to a transceiver, such as a modem. This arrangement enables maintenance of the computerized equipment without the expense of dispatching a maintenance person to the site. The enablement of such access, however, exposes the computerized equipment to attacks from unauthorized persons who accidentally or illegally obtain the dial-up address of the transceiver. Such vulnerability is of significant concern to service providers and has curtailed the development and deployment of decentralized service offerings. There therefore exists a need for a transceiver that enables control over access to computerized equipment that may be accessed through a dial-up connection.  
           [0003]    Another attempted solution to the problem is described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,724,426 to Rosenow et al., which issued on Mar. 3, 1998. Rosenow discloses means for controlling access to computer system resources which enable each new session to employ different encryption keys derived from multiple random numbers and multiple hidden algorithms without transmitting the keys across a communication line. Although this system also has merit, it does not provide an optimal solution for the need to enforce control over access to remote computerized equipment because it assumes a central access control system that employs a dedicated parallel control network, such as a LAN, to centrally manage access control tables of an access-controlled system of resources.  
           [0004]    There therefore exists a need for a method and apparatus enabling control over secure access to command controllable computerized equipment. The method and apparatus preferably provide user authentication, access control and optimal transaction records.  
         OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION  
         [0005]    It is an object of the invention to provide authenticated access to command controllable computerized equipment.  
           [0006]    It is another object of the invention to provide a secure access transceiver enabled to authenticate a caller.  
           [0007]    It is another object of the invention to provide a secure access transceiver connected to command controllable computerized equipment, the secure access transceiver being enabled to permit data to pass through upon establishing an authenticated connection and otherwise to prevent data from passing through.  
           [0008]    It is another object of the invention to provide enforcement of network-centric control of authenticated access to command controllable computerized equipment.  
           [0009]    It is another object of the invention to provide an authentication process in which a user connecting to a secure access transceiver is authenticated as part of a handshake sequence.  
           [0010]    It is another object of the invention to provide network-centric distribution of authentication information consisting of electronic access keys.  
           [0011]    It is another object of the invention to provide a secure service transceiver enabled to be associated on a one-to-one basis with a service console.  
           [0012]    It is another object of the invention to provide a secure service transceiver enabled to be associated with a pool of secure service transceivers; the pool of secure service transceivers being associated with a service center which serves as a service point for remote equipment.  
           [0013]    It is another object of the invention to provided a secure access controller enabled to authenticate a caller, the access controller being positioned between a modem and computerized equipment to be accessed through a dial-up connection.  
           [0014]    It is another object of the invention to provide a secure access controller connected to command controllable computerized equipment, the secure access controller being enabled to permit data to pass through the secure access controller upon establishing an authenticity of a service point and to prevent data from passing through the secure access controller otherwise.  
           [0015]    It is yet another object of the invention to provide an authentication process in which a user connecting to a secure access controller from a service point using an access transceiver is authenticated following a link establishing process.  
         SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION  
         [0016]    According to one aspect of the invention, a secure access transceiver is provided for enforcing authenticated access to command controllable computerized equipment. The secure access transceiver authenticates an entity seeking access to the computerized equipment from a remote service point upon detection of a carrier signal during an initial handshake sequence. A data port on the secure access transceiver used to deliver data to the command controllable computerized equipment is enabled only on authentication of the entity seeking access to the computerized equipment and the data port is kept disabled otherwise, preventing data transfer through the secure access transceiver unless an authenticated connection is established.  
           [0017]    According to another aspect of the invention, a method of providing authenticated access to command controllable equipment connected to a secure access transceiver in response to a service access request from an entity at a remote point is provided. An initial handshake sequence is performed. The handshake sequence is interrupted upon detection of a carrier signal to perform an authentication process. As part of the authentication process, authentication information is received from the entity at the remote point and is validated. Upon successful authentication, a data port is enabled for a duration of a service session permitting data to pass through to the computerized equipment, the data being otherwise prevented from passing through the secure access transceiver to the command controllable equipment.  
           [0018]    According to another aspect of the invention, a method of enforcing network-centric control over access to a group of command controllable computerized equipment units accessed through secure access transceivers requires a sequence of authentication steps. A service project is defined and stored along with project parameters at a service co-ordination center. A user is pre-authenticated to an authentication server maintained by the service co-ordination center. The project is assigned to at least one user by issuing an electronic access key to the user. A corresponding electronic access key is stored on the authentication server. The secure access transceiver associated with the command controllable computerized equipment to be serviced is provided with a corresponding electronic access key. The electronic access key is used to authenticate the user when the user requests access to the computerized equipment from a remote service point.  
           [0019]    According to another aspect of the invention, a secure access controller is provided for enforcing authenticated access to command controllable computerized equipment. The secure access controller authenticates an entity seeking access to the computerized equipment from a remote service point upon establishing a link. A data port on the secure access controller for delivering data to the command controllable computerized equipment is enabled only on authentication of the entity seeking access to the computerized equipment and the data port is disabled otherwise, preventing data transfer through the secure access controller.  
           [0020]    According to another aspect of the invention, a method of providing authenticated access to command controllable equipment connected to a secure access controller in response to a service access request is provided. An authentication process is performed upon establishing a link. As a part of the authentication process, authentication information is received from the remote point. Upon successful authentication, a data port is enabled for a duration of a service session permitting data to pass through the secure access controller to the computerized equipment, and the data is otherwise prevented from passing through the secure access controller to the command controllable equipment.  
           [0021]    According to yet another aspect of the invention, there is provided a method of enforcing network centric control over access to a group of command controllable computerized equipment units accessed through secure access controllers. A service project is defined and stored along with project parameters at a service co-ordination center. A user is pre-authenticated to an authentication server maintained by the service co-ordination center. The project is assigned to at least one user; as part of the assignment an electronic access key is issued to the user. A corresponding electronic access key is stored on the authentication server. The secure access controller associated with the command controllable computerized equipment is provided with a corresponding electronic access key in order to enforce secure access to the computerized equipment. 
       
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS  
       [0022]    The invention will now be described by way of example only, and with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:  
         [0023]    [0023]FIG. 1 is a connection diagram showing a secure access transceiver with an integrated secure access controller providing authentication checks and enabling access to an access port of a telecommunications switch;  
         [0024]    [0024]FIG. 2 is a connection diagram showing a transceiver connected to a secure access controller which provides authentication and access to a telecommunications switch;  
         [0025]    [0025]FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between a service point, equipped with a secure service transceiver, a service co-ordination center and secure access transceivers connected to command controllable computing equipment such as a telecommunications switch;  
         [0026]    [0026]FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between a stand alone user equipped with a secure service transceiver and an authentication server;  
         [0027]    [0027]FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between users associated with a service center which includes a pool of secure service transceivers, and an authentication server;  
         [0028]    [0028]FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between a service point equipped with a service transceiver, a co-ordination center, access transceivers and secure access controllers connected to command controllable computing equipment such as a telecommunications switch;  
         [0029]    [0029]FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between a stand-alone user equipped with a service transceiver and an authentication server;  
         [0030]    [0030]FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing the relationships between users associated with a service center having a pool of service transceivers, and an authentication server;  
         [0031]    [0031]FIG. 9 is a flow diagram showing the details of a handshake sequence ending in authentication of a remote service point as implemented on secure transceivers;  
         [0032]    [0032]FIG. 10 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a secure access transceiver validates a remote calling transceiver;  
         [0033]    [0033]FIG. 11 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a remote calling transceiver validates the secure access transceiver;  
         [0034]    [0034]FIG. 12 is a flow diagram showing the initiation of a service call from a workstation associated with a service center equipped with a pool of secure service transceivers;  
         [0035]    [0035]FIG. 13 is a flow diagram showing the details of a link establishing process in which a secure access controller authenticates a remote service point;  
         [0036]    [0036]FIG. 14 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a secure access controller validates a calling entity;  
         [0037]    [0037]FIG. 15 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a valid link is established between a remote point and secure access controller after the remote point validates the secure access controller;  
         [0038]    [0038]FIG. 16 is a flow diagram showing the details of the initiation of a service call from a workstation associated with a service center equipped with a pool of service transceivers in order to connect to a secure access controller through an access transceiver;  
         [0039]    [0039]FIG. 17 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a service access request is initiated;  
         [0040]    [0040]FIG. 18 is a flow diagram showing a process by which secure access equipment is updated with new access keys;  
         [0041]    [0041]FIG. 19 is a flow diagram showing a process for placing a service call to establish a service session with command controllable computerized equipment; and  
         [0042]    [0042]FIG. 20 is a flow diagram showing a process by which a control point and secure access equipment activate administration mode. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT  
       [0043]    In accordance with a first embodiment of the invention, there is provided a secure access transceiver for secure authenticated access to computerized equipment. The secure access transceiver performs all the functions of a standard modem if a remote user successfully authenticates as a trusted authorized user having access to the computerized equipment. Otherwise, a communications port of the transceiver connected to the computer equipment is disabled to ensure that access to the equipment is unconditionally denied. This preferred implementation is shown in FIG. 1 in which a telecommunications switch  100  having at least an access port  102  is connected to the secure access transceiver  104 . The secure access transceiver  104  has an integrated secure access controller. According to this implementation, the telecommunications switch  100  is accessed for systems maintenance from the public switched telephone network  106  through the secure access transceiver  104 .  
         [0044]    In accordance with a second embodiment of the invention, access to the computerized equipment is controlled by a secure access controller connected to a link between a transceiver and the computerized equipment. The access controller authenticates a remote user after the transceiver has established a link with the remote user. If the user is authenticated as trusted and authorized for access, the access controller passes data from the remote user to the computerized equipment, and vice versa. Otherwise, all communications between the remote user and the computerized equipment are disabled. This embodiment of the invention is shown in FIG. 2. A telecommunications switch  100  having at least an access port  102  is accessed through the secure access controller  108  for systems maintenance purposes. The secure access controller  108  is further connected to the transceiver  110 . The telecommunications switch  100  is serviced from the public switch telephone network  106  through the transceiver  110  and the secure access controller  108 .  
         [0045]    Each embodiment of the invention may operate as a stand-alone unit or be controlled by a central administration authority which administers access to the computerized equipment.  
         [0046]    [0046]FIG. 3 shows a schematic diagram representing a network configuration as it applies to maintenance of distributed telephone circuit switching equipment using access equipment according to a preferred embodiment of the invention. A command controllable computerized equipment, for example, a telecommunications switch  100  can be maintained and serviced through access ports  102 . At least one secure access transceiver  104 , from a secure access transceiver pool  112 , is connected to one of the access ports  102  in order to provide secure and authenticated access to the telecommunications switch  100  for maintenance purposes. The secure access transceiver  104  has a data port (not shown) through which it connects to one of the access ports  102  of the telecommunications switch  100 . The telecommunications switch  100  is serviced from a service point  114  located remotely with respect to the telecommunications switch  100 .  
         [0047]    In this example, a stand-alone user  116  using a portable computer  118  seeks access to the telecommunications switch  100 . The stand-alone user  116  uses a secure service transceiver  120  to access the telecommunications switch  100 . The secure service transceiver  120  has a data port (not shown) used to connect the secure service transceiver  120  to the portable computer  118 . Associated with the user  116  is a smart card  122  which contains authentication information.  
         [0048]    The access to the telecommunications switch  100  is managed by a service co-ordination center  124 . To enforce control over secure access to the telecommunications switch  100 , the service co-ordination center  124  has associated with it an authentication server  126 . The authentication server controls access to selected equipment by permitting only authorized personnel to access the equipment, as will be described below with reference to FIG. 17. The stand-alone user  116  uses the secure service transceiver  120  to connect to the authentication server  126  of the service co-ordination center  124 , shown as link A, through telecommunications switch  128 , the public switched telephone network (PSTN)  106  and telecommunications switch  130 . If the stand-alone user is successfully validated as an authorized person, the service co-ordination center  124  connects to the secure access transceiver  104 , shown as link B, through telecommunications switch  130  and the PSTN  106  to update equipment memory to permit the stand-alone user to access the equipment as will be explained below in detail. In order for the user  116  to service the telecommunications switch  100 , shown as link C, the user  116  uses the secure service transceiver  120  to connect through telecommunications switch  128 , the PSTN  106 , the telecommunications switch  100 , the secure access transceiver  104  and the access ports  102  of the telecommunications switch  100 . During the process of establishing a service link with the telecommunications switch  100 , the stand-alone user  116  is validated as an authorized person in a process described below with reference to FIGS.  9  to  12 .  
         [0049]    [0049]FIGS. 4 and 5 are schematic diagrams showing the relationship between service points  114 ,  140 , as explained above, the stand-alone user  116  is equipped with the portable computer  118  and the secure service transceiver  120 . The stand-alone user  116  accesses the co-ordination center  124  in order to request access to service command controllable computerized equipment through the public switched telecommunications network  106 . FIG. 5 shows another service point from which users  132  work from service center workstations using secure service transceivers  134  which are components of a secure service transceiver pool  136 .  
         [0050]    [0050]FIG. 6 is a connection diagram showing a network configured similarly to the network shown in FIG. 3 except that access to the telecommunications switch  100  is accomplished using standard transceivers and access is controlled by secure access controllers in accordance with the invention. The telecommunications switch  100  is serviced through access ports  102 . At least one secure access controller  108 , connected on a one-to-one basis with an access transceiver  110 , provides secure authenticated access to the telecommunications switch  100  for purposes of maintaining and servicing the telecommunications switch  100 . Access transceiver  110  may be a part of a pool of access transceivers  142 . The access transceiver  110  has a data port (not shown) with which it connects to one of the secure access controllers  108 . The secure access controller  108  has two data ports (not shown) through which it connects on one side to the access transceiver  110  and on the other side to an access port  102  of the telecommunications switch  100 . The telecommunications switch  100  is serviced from a service point  114  located remotely with respect to the telecommunications switch  100 .  
         [0051]    Using the access equipment shown in FIG. 6, a stand-alone user  116 , using a portable computer  118  services the telecommunications switch  100 . In order for the stand-alone user  116  to access the telecommunications switch  100 , a service transceiver  144  is employed. Preferably, the user  116 , is issued a smart card  122  which contains authentication information, although other authentication schemes may be used for the same purpose. Network-centric control over access to the telecommunications switches to be serviced is provided by the service co-ordination center  124 .  
         [0052]    [0052]FIGS. 7 and 8 show two types of service points, one consisting of a stand-alone user with a portable computer and the other consisting of a user at a service center. The user equipment is distinguished from the user equipment described in FIGS. 4 and 5 because standard transceivers  144 ,  146  are used at the remote service points.  
         [0053]    [0053]FIG. 9 shows a link-establishing sequence performed by the secure access transceivers in accordance with the invention as an attempt is made to access computerized equipment connected to the secure access transceiver.  
         [0054]    Upon power-up, the secure access transceiver  104  (FIG. 3) performs a start-up sequence (step  200 ) during part of which the communications port of the secure access transceiver  104  connected to the command controllable computerized equipment is disabled (step  202 ). The start-up sequence terminates, leaving the secure access transceiver in a state in which the secure access transceiver  104  is waiting for a ring signal, step  204 .  
         [0055]    When a call is initiated in step  210 , from a remote point, a dialing sequence is performed (step  212 ). The dialing sequence triggers a link establishing process  211 . The detection of the ring signal, at the secure access transceiver  104 , in step  214 , initiates a corresponding link establishing process  213 . Upon detection of the ring signal, the secure access transceiver  104  and the transceiver at the remote point begin a handshake sequence, steps  216  and  218 . A successful handshake commencement of the sequence terminates in both ends detecting a carrier signal, steps  220  and  222 , thereby terminating link establishing processes  211  and  213 . After the carrier signal is established, the transceiver at the remote point sends authentication information to the secure access transceiver  104  (step  224 ). The secure access transceiver  104  validates the authentication information in step  226 . Failure to detect the carrier signal in step  222  and/or failure to authenticate the remote user at the remote point, in step  226 , causes the secure access transceiver  104  to hang up (step  228 ), and return to a state of waiting for a ring signal, step  204 . If authentication of the information received by the secure access transceiver  104  is successful, step  226 , the secure access transceiver  104  initiates a cross validation process which commences with a validation of the remote user, in step  230 .  
         [0056]    [0056]FIG. 10 is a flow diagram illustrating an exemplary process by which the secure access transceiver  104  validates the user. The user validation sequence starts when the secure access transceiver generates a random number in step  232 . The random number is sent, in a message, to the remote point (step  234 ). Upon receipt of the message at the remote point, the number is encrypted using an electronic encryption key in step  238 . The encrypted number is signed at the remote point with an electronic signature and the encrypted and signed number is sent back to the secure access transceiver  104  in another message (step  240 ). Upon receipt of this message, the secure access transceiver  104  validates the signature in step  242 . If the signature belongs to an authorized user, the message is decrypted using a matching electronic decryption key, step  244 . If the number sent by the secure access transceiver  104  matches the number received and decrypted by the secure access transceiver  104  (step  246 ), an acknowledgement is sent to the remote point (step  248 ). If the secure access transceiver  104  does not successfully validate the signature of the received message (step  242 ), or the decrypted number does not match the one sent, the secure access transceiver  104  hangs up (step  250 ) and returns to the state of waiting for a ring signal (step  204 ). Acknowledgement of the validation of the user (step  252 ), may optionally initiate a secure access transceiver validation sequence (step  254 ) for enhanced security. The remote point allows for a reasonable length of time to pass for the receipt of the message in step  236  and for the receipt of the acknowledgement in step  252 . After a sufficient amount of time has elapsed for either of the two events, the remote point hangs up in step  253  and terminates in step  255 .  
         [0057]    [0057]FIG. 11 shows the secure access transceiver validation process used for enhanced security. In order to validate the secure access transceiver  104 , a random number is generated at the remote point in step  256 . The random number is sent to the secure access transceiver  104  in a message, in step  258 . An encryption of the number using another electronic encryption key is performed in step  262 . The encrypted number is signed by the secure access transceiver  104  using another electronic signature and the encrypted and signed number is sent to the remote point in a message in step  264 . The remote point allows for a reasonable length of time to pass for the receipt of the encrypted and signed message in step  266 . After a sufficient amount of time has elapsed the remote point hangs up in step  271 , and terminates in step  273 . Validation of the secure access transceiver signature is performed in step  266 . Upon successful validation of the secure access transceiver&#39;s signature key, the message is decrypted using another electronic decryption key in step  268 . A comparison is performed between the generated random number and the received number in step  270 . Upon successful comparison of the two numbers, an acknowledgement message is sent to the secure access transceiver in step  272 . The remote point also hangs up, in step  271 , if the comparison of the two numbers is unsuccessful. If the secure access transceiver fails to receive a message from the remote point, in step  260 , or if the remote point does not send an acknowledgement message, in step  274 , the secure access transceiver  104  hangs up, in step  280 , and returns to a state in which it is waiting for a ring signal, step  204 . Successful cross-validation leads to establishing a valid link (steps  278  and  276 ). Upon validating the link, the secure access transceiver  104  enables the communication port connected to the command controllable computerized equipment, in step  282 . At the same time, the remote point may also enable its communication port, if it had been previously disabled.  
         [0058]    Shown in FIG. 12 are the details of the initiation of a service call by a user  132  from a workstation associated with a pool  136  of secure service transceivers  146 . The procedure is similar to the one shown in FIG. 9 except for a few preliminary steps. On placing the service call from the workstation, the first step is to update, in step  300 , a secure service transceiver  134 , assigned by a service center access server  138  to the workstation from the pool  136 , with electronic keys necessary for the authentication and validation steps. The secure service transceiver  134  in the pool  136  records the necessary electronic keys in step  302 . A call request is placed at the service workstation, in step  304 , in response to which the secure service transceiver  134  in the pool  136  may disable its communications port, step  306 , and proceeds with the call and authentication process as previously described in relation to FIG. 9.  
         [0059]    The above described implementation is suitable for deployment of new services to be offered. For the case in which the command controllable computerized equipment with the associated access transceiver are already deployed, replacement of existing access transceivers with secure access transceivers would not be a financially viable solution. This is the reason behind the second embodiment in which in which secure access controllers are installed between the access transceivers and the command controllable computerized equipment are already deployed.  
         [0060]    Accordingly, a method of authenticating an entity seeking access from a remote point to command controllable computerized equipment through an access transceiver and a secure access controller is shown in FIG. 13. Upon power-up, the access transceiver goes through a start-up sequence, step  200 . The start-up sequence terminates, leaving the access transceiver in a state in which the access transceiver is waiting for a ring signal, step  204 .  
         [0061]    On placing a call to the access transceiver, step  210  from a remote point, the remote point and the access transceiver go through a process of establishing a communications link, steps  211  and  213 , respectively. Upon establishing a communications link, the access transceiver informs the secure access controller of the established communication link by asserting a Data Terminal Ready signal (DTR), step  221 .  
         [0062]    Upon power-up of the secure access controller  108  (step  201 ), the secure access controller  108  disables its communication port connected to the computerized equipment (step  202 ). The start-up sequence of the secure access controller  108  terminates leaving the secure access controller  108  in a state in which it is waiting for a Data Set Ready (DSR) signal (step  203 ). Upon detection of the DSR signal, by the secure access controller, in step  203 , which is equivalent to detecting the assertion of the DTR set by the access transceiver, the secure access controller  108  asserts its DTR signal in step  225 , establishing a link between the access transceiver  110  and the secure access controller  108 . Upon establishing the communications link, in step  211 , the remote point sends an access certificate, in step  224 , to the secure access controller  108 . In step  226 , the secure access controller  108  validates the access certificate and, upon validation of the access certificate, the secure access controller  108  initiates a cross validation sequence starting by validating the caller (step  231 ). Failing to validate the access certificate in step  226 , the secure access controller  108  drops its DTR signal in step  227 . The access transceiver  110  monitors its DSR input and, if the secure access controller  108  drops its DTR signal, the access transceiver  110 , in step  228 , hangs up and returns to a state in which it is waiting for a ring (step  204 ). At the same time, the secure access controller returns to a state in which it is waiting for a DSR signal.  
         [0063]    [0063]FIGS. 14 and 15 show the details of the cross validation sequence between the remote point in the secure access controller  108 . The steps of the cross-validation sequence are similar to the sequence presented above in relation to the preferred embodiment with the distinction that authentication is handled by the remote point and the secure access controller, and the details of establishing the connection are handled by the transceiver at the remote point and the access transceiver, respectively.  
         [0064]    [0064]FIG. 16 shows the extra details related to placing a service call from a service center workstation. A transceiver  146  from the transceiver pool  136  is selected and remains associated with the service call for the duration of the service session.  
         [0065]    All other details are similar to the previous implementation in all respects. In fact, the two implementations presented can co-exist and inter-operate with each other.  
         [0066]    Having described the implementation details according to two examples; the secure access transceiver and the secure access controller will be henceforth referred to as secure access equipment.  
         [0067]    A preferred implementation of a method for enforcing network-centric control over access to command controllable computerized equipment is shown in FIGS. 17, 18,  19  and  20 . FIG. 17 in particular shows the details of a process by which a service access request is initiated. A user who is a member of an authorized community to access telecommunications switches is assigned a project. The user proceeds from a service access request, step  500 . The user  116  signs on at a console, such as a portable computer  118  for example, in step  502 . Upon successful sign-on, the user requests access to the authentication server  126  by entering relevant information about the user, step  506 . The authentication server  126  checks as to whether the user is still a trusted user, step  508 . If the user is still a trusted user, the authentication server  126  sends an acknowledgement message to the service point, step  510 . On receiving the acknowledgement message, in step  512 , the user enters project variables, in step  514 . The authentication server  126  checks as to whether the project is a valid project and whether the user is expected to service the telecommunications switch  100  specified by the project, as previously defined in a database at the authentication server, step  516 . If the project is valid, the authentication server sends an acknowledge message, in step  518 , to the service point. Failing to recognize the user as a trusted user in step  508  or failing to find a previously defined valid project in the database associated with the user in step  516 , the authentication server  126  denies access to the user in step  517 . On receiving acknowledgement in step  520 , the user requests an electronic access key set, in step  522 . The authentication server  126  generates an electronic key set, step  524 , and sends the key set to the user, in step  526 . The user stores the electronic access key set which is valid for a duration of the service to be performed, or a limited time period thereof.  
         [0068]    Following this initiation process, the authentication server  126  proceeds to update the secure access transceiver  104  connected to the telecommunications switch  100  specified by the project, in step  530 . Having the electronic access key set, the user proceeds to place a service call to the secure access transceiver  104  and service the telecommunications switch  100  as specified by the project, step  544 .  
         [0069]    The update process of the secure access transceiver  104  is shown in FIG. 18. The necessary steps involved are: calling,  210 , the secure access transceiver  104 , step  210 ; establishing a link, step  211 ; performing cross validation, step  280 , activating administration mode, step  536 ; cross validating at the administration level, step  280 ; updating the secure access transceiver, step  540  and ending, step  543 , by hanging up, step  542 .  
         [0070]    The process followed in the course of a service session is shown in FIG. 19. In servicing the telecommunications switch  100  connected to a secure access transceiver  104  specified by the project, a user follows the following steps: a call is placed to the secure access transceiver  104 , step  210 ; a link is established, step  211 ; cross validation is performed, step  280 , a service session follows in which the telecommunications switch  100  is serviced, step  550 , and on completion, the session is terminated,  553 , by a hang-up in step  552 .  
         [0071]    The process by which a control transceiver and secure access equipment activate the administration mode is shown in FIG. 20. On activating administration mode  536 , the control transceiver associated with the authentication server  126  sends an administration mode request in step  560 . The control transceiver also activates its electronic administration keys and may disable its communication port (steps  564  and  568 , respectively). On receiving an administration mode request in step  562 , the secure access equipment disables the communication port, activates its electronic administration keys and proceeds to validate the caller as part of the cross validation process (steps  566 ,  570  and  230 , respectively). If the request received in step  562  is not an administration mode request, the secure access equipment checks as to whether the request is a valid request in step  580 . If the request is valid, then the secure access equipment proceeds to process the request. If the request is not valid then the secure access equipment hangs up in step  584  terminating the session, step  586 .  
         [0072]    In order to implement network-centric control over access to deployed command controllable computerized equipment accessed through secure access equipment, functionality is provided on the secure access equipment to enable it to act independently of the co-ordination center. The secure access equipment is provided with electronic memory storage, embedded processing capabilities, absolute time clock, etc. The electronic memory storage is used to store, in a retrievable fashion, authentication information, transaction records and certificate revocation lists.  
         [0073]    Active certificates corresponding to ongoing service projects are stored in the authentication information portion of the memory storage. The access certificates include the electronic access keys, as mentioned in the above descriptions. These access certificates have a time period of validity which is enforced using the real time clock. Records regarding access to the command controllable computerized equipment through the secure access equipment are kept in the transaction records portion of the memory storage. Invalid certificates are stored in the certificate revocation list portion of the memory storage.  
         [0074]    Upon updating the secure access equipment from a control point: new access certificates are stored in the authentication information portion of the memory storage, the transaction records are downloaded and the revocation lists updated. Alternatively the secure access equipment can call the control point to download its transaction records and update its revocation lists either on a specific time cycle or on critical conditions triggered by lengthy transaction records and stale revocation lists. Other situations related to enforcing secure access to command controllable computerized equipment in which the secure access equipment can call the control point would include numerous repetitive failed access attempts from the same remote point.  
         [0075]    Having the elements mentioned above different methods known in the art providing different degrees of secure access can be implemented in an actual realisation but still falling within the scope of the invention. For example, as an added level of security, once the service session is established, an encryption key can be generated and used for encrypting the exchanged data over the communications link for the duration of the service session. This encryption key would only be known to the secure access equipment and the service point. Another implementation would have the electronic memory storage, the real time clock and the embedded processor on a smart card associated with the secure access equipment.  
         [0076]    Although the invention has been explained with reference to telephone network equipment, it should be understood by those skilled in the art that the invention is in no way limited to such applications. The apparatus and methods in accordance with the invention may be used to control access to any computerized equipment accessed by a transceiver. For example, the invention may be used to control access to a personal computer, local or wide area network, any other computing machine or computerized equipment having an access port that may be accessed through a transceiver.  
         [0077]    The scope of the invention is therefore intended to be limited solely by the scope of the appended claims.

Technology Category: h