Patent Document

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
   This application claims priority from provisional application 60/286,457, filed on Apr. 26, 2001. 

   BACKGROUND 
   Computer login traditionally consists of a user typing in an account name and a password. 
   Historically, access validation, such as authenticating a password for an account, has been through reading data from a single password file comprising account name and encrypted password. Once a single account and a typed password is known, system security can be compromised. Once encryption for a single password is broken, all other passwords are potentially comprised, as all passwords and account names are conveniently located in the single password file and use the same encryption. 
   U.S. Pat. No. 6,442,692 [Zilberman] disclosed a special microcontroller embedded within a keyboard. The microcontroller was employed “to measure certain characteristics of the user&#39;s keystroke dynamics” independent of the typed text, including the timing, intervals, and durations of key presses and pauses. These measured characteristics were then used as integral information for authenticating a user&#39;s identity. 
   U.S. Pat. No. 6,766,456 [McKeeth] disclosed user input from one or a combination of input devices as a basis for user authentication. McKeeth used matching of “implicit input” as part of the authentication, where the implicit input is related to the timing and/or duration of explicit inputs. 
   Zilberman and McKeeth used surreptitious surveillance of user input, where the user could not choose or control data vital to authentication. McKeeth disclosed the possible usage of multiple input devices, used singularly or in combination, but only disclosed that “the computer system may be configured,” never anticipating that a user may choose the input device configuration. 
   SUMMARY 
   Computer login may comprise any user-determined submission, including a plurality of transmissions for which submission may be passively terminated. Preferably a user determines the signal types as well as content of signals. This makes submission theft more difficult and less likely. 
   Account identification may be inferred by signature rather than explicitly stated. Overt account identification provides an entry point for hacking; with inferred account identification, this entry point is eliminated. 
   A plurality of discontiguous data blocks (keys) in a one or more files may be employed for validation. This ameliorates having a single authentication key that, once accessed, may be deciphered and security compromised. 
   Multiple trajectories to keys, hence multiple paths to authorization as well as ersatz trajectories and paths when submission will not garner authorized access, obfuscate validation protocol to spy software and devices. 
   These aspects are independent: one does not rely upon the other. Any one or all may be employed to enhance computer login security. 
   Access privileges for accounts are not germane. Determining or setting account access privileges are separate operations that occur after submission validation and authorization. 

   
     DRAWINGS 
       FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a computer suitable for practicing the invention. 
       FIG. 2  depicts the access authentication process. 
       FIG. 3  depicts an embodiment of identification and signature comprising submission. 
       FIG. 4  depicts an embodiment of signature solely comprising submission. 
       FIG. 5  depicts classifying signals by their transmission and signal types. 
       FIG. 6  depicts simple and composite signals. 
       FIG. 7  depicts active submission termination. 
       FIG. 8  depicts passive submission termination. 
       FIGS. 9 &amp; 10  depict example submission screens. 
       FIG. 11  depicts account creation. 
       FIG. 12  depicts a key. 
       FIG. 13  depicts a key unit. 
       FIG. 14  depicts an example of key indexing. 
       FIG. 15  depicts validation after submission termination. 
       FIG. 16  depicts incremental validation. 
       FIG. 17  depicts the validation process. 
       FIG. 18  depicts an example of validation key trajectory resulting in access. 
       FIG. 19  depicts an example of validation key trajectory resulting in authorization failure. 
   

   DESCRIPTION 
     FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a desktop computer  100  which comprises a CPU  102 ; storage  103 , which comprises memory  104  and optionally one or more devices with retention medium(s)  105  such as hard disks, diskettes, compact disks, or tape; an optional display device  101 ; and one or more input devices  106 , examples of which include but are not exclusive to: a keyboard  108 ; one or more pointing devices  107 , such as a mouse; or a biometric device  109 , such as a fingerprint reader. The mouse is the most popular pointing device  107  for desktop computers  100 . In the description below, mention of a mouse is meant to include pointing devices  107  of any type, including, for example, a pen or stylus used in computing devices where a user may “write” upon a screen. The described software may be employed on such a computer  100 . As well, the software described may find application in other computer-like devices requiring secured access, including hand-held or embedded devices. 
   In the following description, software-determined protocol includes exemplary methods or techniques such as algorithms; or non-algorithmic methods or techniques, including, for example, fuzzy logic or neural network pattern matching; or, random or pseudo-random determinations. A random or pseudo-random technique that results in seemingly arbitrary selection, the equivalent of software rolling dice, is referred to as non-deterministic. 
   In the following description, protocols, algorithm types, data types, and types of data, such as transmission  11 , signal  21 , packaging  13 , sequencing  15 , or encryption  14  types or protocols, are identifiable using binary identification codes (type identifiers), by data length, or other data signature, such as a uniquely identifiable bit pattern, or by convention, such as known location (offset) within a data structure. 
     FIG. 2  depicts the access authentication process  97 , comprising submission  9 , validation  18 , and authorization  27 . Naturally, an account must be created  10  before any access authentication process  97  may occur. 
   Submission  9  comprises one or more transmissions  1  intended for authenticating access to a computer  100  or network of computers  100 . As depicted in  FIG. 3 , in one embodiment, a submission  9  comprises identification  3  and signature  4 . Historically, an account name would be an identification  3 , and a password a signature  4 . If surety of uniqueness may be assured, in an alternate embodiment, a submission  9  comprises a single signature  4   s , as depicted in  FIG. 4 , supplanting separate identification  3  &amp; signature  4   a  while providing for the dual components of identification  3  and signature  4 . With submission  9  solely comprising signature  4   s , an account may be identified by the signature  4   s  data itself, or by having an account identifier  110  embedded within a key  6  that has been accessed during validation  18  of the signature  4   s.    
   A transmission  1  is user input into the computer  100  via one or more input devices  106 , whereupon termination of transmission  1  is recognizable, and resulting in at least one signal  2 . There may be different types  11  of transmissions  1 , examples of which include mouse  107  movements or clicks, keyboard  108  entry, or combinations thereof. Other types  11  of transmissions  1  are possible with different input devices  106 , such as, for example, voice transmission  1  if the computer  100  is equipped with a microphone and speakers. 
   Multiple-device  106  transmission  1   m  is conceivable. An example of a multiple-device  106  transmission  1  is a combination of mouse  107  movement while one or more keys  108  are pressed, as depicted in  FIG. 6 . 
   A signal  2  is a set of related software-recognizable data from a single transmission  1 . A plurality of signals  2  of different types  21  may emanate from a single transmission  1 . For example, typing a word may yield the signals  2  of entered keys  210  and the timing between keystrokes  211 . Another example: mouse  107  movement of the cursor may yield signals  2  of locations  214 , velocities, duration; and shape pattern(s) (such as script signatures, drawn characters, and so on)  215 . 
   A transmission  1  of composite signals  2   c  comprising a plurality of simple signals  2   s  is conceivable. For example, a multiple-device  106  transmission  1   m  produces a composite signal  2   c  if matching to signals  2  of both devices  106  is required, as does requiring signal match  5  of multiple signal types  21  from a single-device transmission  1 . 
   Signal data  22  may be categorized by its transmission type  11  and/or signal type  21 , as depicted in  FIG. 5 . For easy identification, each possible transmission type  11  or signal type  21  may be assigned a unique ordinal. Hypothetically, if a multiple-device  106  transmission  1  is identified as a unique transmission type  11 , the range of transmission types  11  may extend to the factorial of all possible input devices  106 , depending upon the embodiment employed. To avoid unnecessary complication, consider signal type  21  as potentially additive (rather than combinatorial): for example, a key-mouse transmission  1  could be considered as comprising key  108  plus mouse  107  signals  2 , rather than some uniquely identifiable key-mouse signal type  21 . 
   Identification  3  is at least one transmission  1  of an account identifier. Historically, identification  3  has been a keyed-in account name. Employing the invention, identification  3  comprises at least one signal  2  from at least one transmission  1 . A translation table, algorithmic method, or other software-determined protocol, with or without encryption  14 , may be employed if identification  3  or signature  4   s  does not represent the actual account identifier. 
   A signature  4  is at least one transmission  1  intended as a security precaution to preclude unauthorized access  39 . Historically, a single signal  2  of a single transmission  1  has typically been used for a signature  4 , namely a password, which is a signature  4  of a single word of text. A pass-phrase is a signature  4  of a plurality of words of text. 
   A plurality of transmissions  1  or signals  2  may be used for identification  3  or signature  4 . In some embodiments, a user may determine the transmission(s)  1 , signal(s)  2 , transmission type(s)  11 , or signal type(s)  21  that comprise a submission  9 . Alternately, transmission  1  or signal  2  determination accords with a software-determined protocol. 
   Historically, validation  18  has required an absolute signal match  5  to input  22 : for example, no deviance from a character-based password has been permitted. With mouse  107  movements, or other difficult-to-exactly-replicate signals  2 , however, some tolerance may be permitted. Signal  22  tolerance should be allowed when appropriate, and may be set by software-determined protocol or user selection. For example, deviance up to 10% from recorded signal match  5  for keystroke timing  211  may be acceptable. Similarly, as another example, mouse click location may vary within a radius of 10 pixels and still be tolerated. As multiple signals  2  may comprise a submission  9 , the need for exactness for any single signal  2  to properly authenticate access  97  is lessened. 
   Termination of submission  9  may be active or passive.  FIGS. 7 &amp; 8  illustrate. Inputting a password or pass-phrase, for example, is typically terminated by pressing the ‘Enter’ key or clicking an equivalent acknowledge button  43  using the mouse  107 . As another example, inputting mouse  107  movement may be actively terminated by a mouse  107  click. With active termination  78 , a user terminates submission  9  through a prescribed indication  25 . With passive termination  77 , software terminates submission  9  without overt user action, but instead when a predetermined condition is met  26 . Examples of passive termination  77  include: recording mouse  107  movement or sound for a limited time, or until a certain elapsed time absent further input; until sufficient signal  2  has been input to allow a signal match  5 ; or until a succeeding transmission  1  of another transmission type  11  or signal type  21  commences, the change of type  11  itself indicative of previous transmission  1  termination. For example, changing from cursor/mouse movement to mouse button clicking may be considered a change in signal type  21 , and hence a possible basis for passive termination. Biometric transmission  1  is typically passively terminated  77 : software terminates submission  9  when sufficient biometric signals  2  have been recorded. 
   Termination  23  of identification  3  or signature  4  may occur using any number of protocols: passively  77  by a predetermined or user-selected number of transmissions  1 ; final transmission  1  by a particular type of action; active termination  78  by a final gesture, such a key or button press; passive termination  77  by time out of a predetermined duration or sufficiency of data collection. Another example: incremental validation  181  permits passive termination  77  via absence of next key trajectory  7 , or, alternately, completed signal matching  5  of all relevant keys  6 . 
     FIGS. 9 &amp; 10  depict an example account input  99  or post-account creation submission  9  screen  40 , employed to input at least a signature  4 . (In one embodiment, account identifiers  3  may be assigned.) Text transmission(s)  1  can be input in the text input dialog  41  comprising a text input control  42  and acknowledge button  43 . Signature  4  transmission(s)  1  can be input, and input signals  2  recorded.  FIG. 9  depicts dragging the text input dialog  41  down the screen  40  as a transmission  1  (by pressing the proper mouse  107  button when the cursor is over an appropriate section of dialog  41 , thus selecting the dialog  41 , then moving the mouse  107  while keeping the button pressed). The dragging action in this example is terminated by a mouse-up (releasing the mouse  107  button). 
   In one embodiment, a user may determine as part of account creation  10  which signal types  21  are to be considered for validation  18  of subsequent submissions  9 . This is an editing process that may be construed as part of account input  99 . For example, after submission termination  23 , having recorded signals  2  for account input  99 , as depicted in the example of  FIG. 10 , the user may select, via checkbox controls as shown, which signal types  21  of the transmission  1  depicted in  FIG. 9  are to be considered for the transmission  1  being recorded. The checkboxes are specific to types of signals  21  appropriate to the type of transmission  11  employed. In the described example, the checkboxes (for signal type  21  selection) appear only for account input  99 , not when a user is making an submission  9  after an account has been created, as the prerequisite signals  2  for signature  4  or identification  3  have already been stored. 
     FIG. 9  depicts a button  25  for submission termination  78 . A termination button  25  or its equivalent is necessary only with active termination  78 . Initial input for account creation  10  may use active termination  78  which is later edited out during a subsequent signal  2  and transmission  1  selection process, resulting in passive termination  77 . 
   There is an embodiment whereby a user may determine some or all of the transmissions  1  or transmission types  11  comprising account input  99 . There is an embodiment whereby a user may determine which signal types  21  of select transmissions  1  comprise account input  99 . Otherwise, software-determined protocol may determine all or some transmissions  1  or signals  2  comprising account input  99 . 
   In one embodiment, account input  99  captures all transmission  1  signals  2  until actively terminated  78 . In an alternate embodiment, account input  99  may be passively terminated  77 . In one embodiment, transmissions  1  and signals  2  from account input  99  may be edited, the user selecting signals  2  and termination, such that only select, edited signals  2  and termination types are employed as account submission  9 . In alternate embodiments, as aspects of account input  99 , signals  2  may not be edited or user-selected, or termination  23  type user-determined. 
     FIG. 11  depicts account creation  10 , in the beginning of which account input  99  provides one or more signals  2  from one or more transmissions  1  for packaging into one or more keys  6 . Each user account has at least one key  6  for access authentication  97 . 
   There are two aspects to account creation  10 : packaging  13 , and key  6  creation or employment  16 . 
   Packaging  13  tells how to interpret keys  6 , including stored match signals  5 . Overt packaging  13  is optional, and may vary by embodiment. Packaging  13  may be implicit by software-determined protocol, obviating the need for overt, data-based packaging  13 . There may be two optional aspects to packaging  13 : encryption  14  and signal sequencing  15 . 
   Encryption  14  refers to encrypting or decrypting all or part of key  6  data. Encryption  14  is optional, but recommended. Encryption  14  employment may vary by embodiment. In one embodiment, the same encryption  14  protocol or algorithm is used throughout (thus, predetermined). In alternative embodiments, encryption  14  may vary by software-determined protocol or by user selection on a per-user or per-signal  2  basis. If a plurality of protocols are used for encryption  14 , the protocol  14  employed must be identifiable. 
   As a suggestion for encryption  14 , initial input signals  2  in the first transmission  1  may comprise a parametric seed for encrypting one or more keys  6 . Caution is advised if non-exact signal matching  5  is tolerated, as close may not good be enough for decryption using such a seed technique, but it is possible to incorporate tolerance into an encryption  14  algorithm, so that an acceptable margin of error for signal matching  5  may also suffice for decryption as well. Mathematical rounding is a suggested technique allowing such tolerance; as well employing a subset of possible signals  2 , such as a high and low, or using one or more algorithmically-derived values, such as median or mean. 
   Signal sequencing  15  is codification of the order of signals  2 . Signal sequencing  15  may be predetermined (software-determined), such as, for example, input order, or, alternately, a predetermined prioritization. In alternative embodiments, signal sequencing  15  may vary by software-determined protocol or by user selection. If a plurality of protocols are used for signal sequencing  15 , the protocol employed must be identifiable. 
   Sequencing  15  and encryption  14  may be combined, offering further opportunity for obscuring decipherment of packaging  13  protocols. 
   During account creation  10 , each selected signal  2  is optionally encrypted  14 , encoded for subsequent signal matching  5 , and stored in keys  6 , which are stored in key files  8 , for subsequent access authentications  97 . 
   As in the prior art, each account must be unique. For accounts where submission  9  comprises identification  3  and signature  4   a , identification  3  must be unique. For accounts where submission  9  comprises signature  4   s , the signature  4   s  itself must be unique. During account creation  10 , this can be verified by attempting to validate  18  the appropriate component of a submission  9  for a new account prior to establishing the account  10 . 
   A key  6  may contain account identification  3 . 
   As depicted in  FIG. 11 , a key unit  16  is a virtual or actual collection of signal matches  5 . As in one embodiment a single key  6  may have a plurality of signal matches  5 , and thereby function as a plurality of keys  5  in alternate embodiments, a key  6  may comprise a key unit  16 . A key file  8  as an actual or potential collection of keys  6  a key unit  8 . An established account may be considered a virtual aggregation of the keys  6  used to validate  18  submission  9  for that account, hence also represents a key unit  16 . 
   A key file  8  comprises at least one key  6 . A key file  8  may comprise a plurality of keys  6 , or what deceptively may be keys  6 : a key file  8  may have pseudo-keys as key file  8  filler. In one embodiment, key files  8  may be a uniform number of bytes, regardless of the number of keys  6  stored in a key file  8 . Keys  6  may be in files  8  not exclusively comprising keys  6  (or pseudo-keys); in other words, a key file  8  may as well be employed for other purposes, including files  8  comprising unrelated data or even executable code. 
   As depicted in  FIG. 12 , a key  6  may comprise packaging  13 , at least one signal match  5  facility, and at least one next key trajectory  7 . In alternate embodiments, key  6  composition varies; the minimum requirement is that a key  6  comprises at least one signal match  5 . Packaging  13  and next key trajectory  7  inherency may vary. 
   A signal match  5  is a signal  2  stored in a key  6  during account creation  10 , used for validation  18  of a subsequent submission  9  signal  2 . A key  6  may comprise a plurality of signal matches  5 . 
   A next key trajectory  7  vectors validation  18  to the next key  6 , or, if the terminal key  6   t , results in forwarding match results  33  for authorization  27 , by absence of next key trajectory  7  in one embodiment. Next key trajectories  7  are a sequential organizational facility for keys  6 . 
   Next key trajectories  7  may be obviated by having a single key  6  with sufficient contiguous signal matches  5  for validation  18 , whereupon the signal matches  5  within the key  6  are sequenced, organized, indexed, or otherwise knowable by software-determined protocol in relation to packaging  13 . 
   As the correspondence of signal match  5  to key  6  varies by embodiment, so too where a next key trajectory  7  leads. Depending upon restrictions that may be imposed in an embodiment, a next key trajectory  7  may lead to a key  6  in the same key file  8  as the last key  6 , a key  6  in another key file  8 , or the same key  6  if the key  6  holds a plurality of signal matches  5 . 
   Next key trajectory  7  provides all or part of a reference to the next key  6  used in validation  18 , if there is a next key  6 . A next key trajectory  7  may be encrypted  14 . 
   A next key trajectory  7  may be combined with other data that may have been or need to be mathematically transposed to determine the next key  6 . For example, all or a portion of an account identifier  3 , part of a signal match  5 , or some portion of packaging  13  may be combined with the next key trajectory  7  as a next key  6  identifier. Next key trajectory  7  may comprise or reference an offset in a key file  8 . A next key trajectory  7  may reference a key index entry  62 . 
   A key  6  may include a plurality of next key trajectories  7 , in which case a different next key trajectory  7  may be selected based upon signal match  5  results—one or more next key trajectories  7  for a correct signal match  5 , likewise for an wrong signal match  5 . With a plurality of next key trajectories  7 , a next key trajectory  7  may be selected based upon signal match  5  results, or by software-determined protocol, or a combination thereof. 
   Packaging  15  may be encoded as part of the next key trajectory  7 . For example, a next key trajectory  7  may include the signal sequencing  15  that identifies next signal match  5  type  21 . In this instance, if the next input signal  2  cannot be of the same type  21  as the next signal match  5 , authorization  27  may fail  86 . Knowing that at that point, a wrong trajectory protocol  7   w  may be invoked to avoid identifying a proper key unit  16 . 
   A submission  9  comprising identification  3  followed by signature  4   a  is easier to validate  18  than a submission  9  solely comprising signature  4   s : knowing an account identifier  3  provides the means to know what the signature  4   a  should be. 
   Historically, identification  3  has not been relied upon for security. Signature  4  has played gate-keeper to unauthorized access  39 , not account identification  3 . 
   An initial key  61  that may ultimately lead to authorized  27  access  39  must associate to an account, either directly or by reference. There may be keys  6  for which authorization  27  cannot succeed  86  that may not associate to an account for which access  39  may be obtained. A key unit  16  for which authorized  27  access  39  is unobtainable is referred to as a fake key  6   w.    
   Organize key units  16  as an optmization. Various conventions of organizing or indexing accounts, keys  6 , and key files  8  may be employed. In alternate embodiments, the same organizing principles may be applied at the level of key  6 , key file  8 , or account. 
   Optimally, keys  6  are organized to facilitate rapid search for signal matches  5 , particularly for finding initial signals  21  when submission  9  solely comprises signature  4   s . Keys  6  may be sorted. For example, keys  6  for initial signals  21  may be arranged in binary sorted order by signal type  21  and signal  2 . 
   Key files  8  may be organized by account, or by transmission type  11 . Key files  8  may be organized by signal type  21 , with keys  6  within files  8  organized by input ordinal. Alternately, an initial key file  81  may comprise all possible initial keys  61  (of first signal matches  5 ), possibly organized or indexed by signal type  21 . One or more key files  8  may contain one or more indexes  61  to keys  6  within their respective files  8 . 
   A key file  8  may include an index  61 , or key files  8  themselves be indexed. The next key trajectory  7  may provide next key  6  lookup via an index  61 . A key file  8  may include an index  611  to initial signal keys  61 . The index  61  may comprise key trajectories  7 , including key trajectories  7  to possible first keys  61 , which may be organized by transmission type  11  and/or signal type  21 . 
     FIG. 14  depicts an example of key  6  indexing. Key  6  indexing  61  or organization is recommended when submission solely comprises signature  4   s  where a user may input signals  2  in any user-determined manner. Depicted in  FIG. 14  is a key file  801  with a key index  61 , specifically an initial key index  611 . The depicted initial key index  611  contains references to keys  61  that contain at least initial signals  2 . 
   In the  FIG. 14  example, only initial keys  61  are indexed. In this example, checking possible initial keys  61  constitutes initial key trajectory  71 . One or more next key trajectories  7  in an initial key  61  may indicate keys  8  for succeeding signal matching  5 , like links in a chain, so only an index of initial keys  61  is required. Alternately, a single key  6  may contain all necessary signal matches  5  for validation  18 . 
   A key index  61  may reference keys  6  in different files  8 . As depicted in the  FIG. 14  example, initial key index  611  entries  62  reference keys  6  of the same input signal type  21 . Initial key code keys  210 , for example, reference keys  6210  in the same file  801  as the index  611 , while keystroke timing keys  6211  referenced by the keystroke timing index entry  211  reside in another key file  802 . Key indexing  61  is an optimization. 
   A key code &amp; mouse click key index entry  217  is depicted in  FIG. 14  as an example of a composite signal  2 . The key code &amp; mouse click key index entry  217  may reference keys  6  comprising multiple signal matches  5 , one for each simple signal  2  (key code  210  and mouse click  212 ), or, alternately, reference multiple keys  6 , each with simple signal matches  5  that altogether comprise the composite signal  2 . 
   Without key file  8  organization or key indexing  61 , more keys  6  may need to be considered than just those keys  61  for initial signal matches  5 . With next key trajectories  7  referring to subsequent keys  6 , optimally, only potential initial keys  61  need be searched to commence validation  18 . 
     FIG. 15  depicts post-submission validation  180 : input signals  2  are accumulated  47  and submission  9  completed  46  before validation  18  commences.  FIG. 16  depicts incremental validation  181 : validation  18  is concurrent with submission  9  transmission  1 . In other words, with incremental validation  181 , validation  18  may progress with each signal  2  or transmission  1 . 
   Submission termination  23  must be known using post-submission validation  180 . This is a potential drawback: unless software-determined protocol determines submission termination  23 , passive termination  77  cannot be accomplished using post-submission validation  180 ; active termination  78  must be used. For full user-determined submission  9 , employ incremental validation  181 , which has the concomitant advantage of immediate knowledge of authorization failure  86 , allowing wrong key trajectory  7   w  protocol interposing. 
     FIG. 17  depicts the validation  18  process, which is similar regardless whether post-submission validation  180  or incremental validation  181  is employed. 
   Incremental validation  181  may commence once the first transmission  1  completes, or, in a more sophisticated embodiment, ongoing  88  with signal input  2 . In a concurrent validation  181  embodiment, initial signal keys may be accumulated  50  and subsequent unmatched keys discarded  51  concurrent with transmission  1 , on a signal-by-signal  2  basis. 
   Validation  18  commences by accumulating possible keys  55  based upon signal match  54  between signals  2  of the first transmission  1  and possible initial signal keys  52 . For subsequent transmissions  1 , accumulated keys are discarded  59  by failure to match signals  57 . Match results  33  are passed to authorization  27  when there are no keys remaining  73  or no next key trajectories  7  for remaining keys  75 . As long as there are remaining keys  34  with next key trajectories  74 , the process of discarding keys that don&#39;t match  51  continues  818 . 
     FIGS. 18 &amp; 19  depict examples of the access authentication  97  process.  FIGS. 18 &amp; 19  illustrate an example of one-to-one correspondence between signal match  5  and key  6 . Through access to one or more keys  6  which may reside in one or more key files  8 , validation  18  produces signal match results  33 , upon which authorization  27  permits access  29 , allows retry  28  of submission  9 , or denies access  37 . 
   Full submission  9  comprises a set of signals  2  upon which access  39  may be granted  72 . Incomplete submission  9  comprises a set of signals  2  to which additional user input is ongoing  88 , and for which by themselves  2  authorization  27  would not succeed  86 . 
   In an example depicted by  FIG. 18 , the first trajectory  71  is to a key  61  in a key file  81  determined by signal type  21 . Keep in mind that this process may be repeated for all possible initial keys  61 . For example, consider key  108  transmission  1  input  2 , with two possible corresponding signals  2 : key (character) codes  210 , and timing of key strokes (rhythm)  211 . As an example, a key unit  16  of key code signal type  21  might be accessed to search keys  6  for signal matches  5  of key code  210  signals  2 . It may be, for example, that user-selected signal selection was employed, with initial key code  210  signals  2  for the first input to be ignored, and key rhythm  211  used. A key code  210  match  5  may be found, but it would be wrong in this example, though with incremental signal matching  5 , this would not be known at first. A key unit  8  of key rhythm  211  signal types  21  would also find a match  5  after the second key code (as rhythm is the timing between successive keystrokes), this time (in this example) for the correct user. In this example, the key  6  with rhythm  211  signal match  5  may have sequence packaging  15  indicating that key code  210  is ignored for this transmission  1 . So, in this example of incremental validation  181 , initial signal input  2  has multiple signal matches  5 , narrowing possibilities in the initial transmission  1  to two possible accounts meriting validation  18  consideration. In this example, subsequent input signals  2  narrow validation  18  to a single account by a sequential process of elimination. 
   So, with incremental validation  181  there may need to be a plurality of input signals  2  before signal match  5  may effectively commence. In the example above, where key rhythm  211  is the first signal  2  to be matched  5 , two key code  210  signals  2  must be input before key rhythm  211  may even be considered. 
   In the example of  FIG. 18 , validation  18  accesses three key files  8  through successive key trajectories  7 , bundling match results  33  for authorization  27 . In the depicted example, input signals  2  are validated  18  in input order interactively with input  2 . In other words, validation  18  is incrementally contemporaneous  88  with submission  9 . In an alternate embodiment with alternate sequencing  15 , input signal  2  validation  18  may not commence until submission  9  is completed  46 . The described example facilitates rapid authorization  27  by incremental validation  18 . Actually, while access  39  may marginally be accelerated by incremental validation  18 , only lack is authorization  86  is notably rapidly facilitated, as continued input  2  of a submission  9  that cannot possibly be validated  18  may be interrupted so that a user may retry  63 . 
     FIG. 19  depicts an example of an embodiment employing a wrong trajectory protocol  7   w . Wrong trajectory protocol  7   w  is employed as a means of obfuscation targeted at computer monitoring devices. In the depicted example, keys  6  are constructed with multiple key trajectories  7 , with at least one trajectory to a succeeding key  6  whereupon authorization  27  may succeed  72 , and at least one trajectory  7   w  whereupon access  39  is hopeless (fake keys  6   w ). In the example, signal match  77  in the initial key  77  in the initial key file  81  mismatches. In this case, key trajectory  7   w  leads to a fake key  6   w  that cannot result in successful authorization  86 : whatever key  6  or key file  8  pinball is used, authorization fails  86 . 
   Trajectories  7  may be selected non-deterministically. This suggestion is most effective when there are multiple possible trajectories  7 , including wrong key trajectories  7   w , that augur either for authorization success  72  or failure  86 . 
   For example, a key  6  may contain six next key trajectories  7 , three of which are wrong key trajectories  7   w . Depending upon signal match  5  results, one of the three right or wrong trajectories  7  are non-deterministically chosen. This example presupposes sequences of keys  6  strung together by next key trajectories  7  that play out to authorization  27 . It is possible for different next key trajectories  7  to diverge to different (possibly duplicate) keys  6  that later converge back to the same key  6 . 
   As described, validation protocols  18  may vary, and different protocols may be combined. Multiple non-deterministic trajectory  7  paths, including wrong trajectory  7   w , is one example. In some embodiments, validation protocol  18  authorizing  27  access  39  may use different trajectories  7 . Duplicate signal matches  5  in different keys  6  in the same or different key files  8  may be employed to have various paths to authorization  27 . As another suggestion, different signal sequencing  15  may be employed to differ trajectories  7 .

Technology Category: 5