Patent Document

BACKGROUND 
       [0001]    The present invention relates to a method, system, and devices for use in validating transactions. 
         [0002]    The repeated use of a single identifying number creates the primary vulnerability of current credit card processing systems to fraud. Currently, merchants must use this number to authorize a transaction. Most merchants also retain a copy of the number for at least a short time, to protect themselves against lost revenue due to charge-backs. Because the information needed to validate a current transaction is the same information needed to falsify future transactions, any person with access to the number may successfully initiate fraudulent transactions. Thus, credit fraud is easily facilitated by skimming a lost or stolen credit card, accessing business records, or phishing account numbers online. Billions of dollars per year are fraudulently charged by simple methods such as these. Accordingly, a solution is needed to reduce fraud carried out by these and similar methods. 
         [0003]    Strong authentication and encryption systems, based on advanced cryptography, digital signatures, and a public key infrastructure (“PKI”), have been developed and implemented. These systems are well-known and provide very good protection from fraudulent transactions. Digital signatures allow the recipient of a message to verify the identity of the author. These systems are based on keys that, using current technology, typically would take decades to reconstruct even using supercomputers and if the digital signatures were intercepted thousands of times. 
         [0004]    PKI-based authentication systems generally use asymmetric encryption algorithms using a combination of a public key, which is shared, and private key, which is not shared. The output of encryption using the private key is known as cipher text. A person wanting to verify that a cipher text was encrypted using a particular private key must decrypt the entire cipher text. Using asymmetric encryption, if the cipher text is altered in any way, it is not presently feasible to decrypt the cipher text or verify the identity of the user based on his private key. 
         [0005]    Communication of conventionally asymmetrically encrypted digital signatures comprising the entire cipher text typically requires at least a moderate amount of bandwidth. Although not excessive from a superficial perspective, the required bandwidth still exceeds that available in many existing authentication systems (e.g., standard credit card and identity card readers). 
         [0006]    In contrast to asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption, as referred to herein, uses shared keys rather than public and private keys, and allows for a cipher text to be truncated yet remain verifiable. Thus, it is desirable to use symmetric encryption, specifically systems wherein each of the parties has access to an identical private key (even if the process otherwise might be considered asymmetric), when a cipher text must be truncated before being communicated between a user requesting authentication and a receiver wanting to verify the user or when it is desirable to reduce the bandwidth of such transmissions. 
         [0007]    PKI-based systems typically are complex to implement. Typically, they require many participants and systems to verify the digital signature of a user making a transaction. Thus, though the cryptography on which PKI systems are based can provide a high-level of confidence in a transaction, these systems have had limited commercial application. 
         [0008]    Businesses also have not generally moved to implement devices using methods such as external and internal timing mechanisms to generate dynamic numbers. These proposed but unpopular devices typically share such disadvantages as timing errors and continuous generation of numbers, which increase the likelihood of a repeated number. Further, both the user and remote authenticator must synchronize their communications based on a third party timing signal. These devices, like unmodified PKI-based systems, are also complex to implement fully and accurately because of their dependence on third parties and have had limited commercial application. 
         [0009]    The disadvantages of PKI and other complex systems are especially inconvenient for credit and other high-volume authorization transactions where bandwidth and the computing power of embedded devices are very limited. Therefore, it is desirable to implement less complex methods and devices that retain the fraud prevention advantages of digital signatures, but utilize technology in a way that requires little computing power, bandwidth, or third-party interaction. 
         [0010]    It already is known how to replace a traditional credit card with a device that can create a more fully secure transaction by eliminating the repeated use of one number. For example, “smart card” credit cards from several processing companies perform this function. However, these and similar devices ordinarily require that merchants replace existing card authorization equipment. Businesses are hesitant to take on such an expense. For this reason, it would be desirable to find a means for preventing fraud while retaining the existing equipment for authorization systems. 
         [0011]    In many current authorization card readers, a magnetic strip is used which contains the user&#39;s name, identity number, and other authorization information. For example, in a credit card the standard format requires the user&#39;s name, credit card number, and expiration date. Consumers are accustomed to swiping their cards in order to allow the magnetic strip to be read, and authentication systems presently exist that comprise reading and transmitting digital data obtained from magnetic strips. Thus, it is desirable in credit card transactions to use a magnetic strip compatible with currently installed equipment. However, most magnetic strips contain static data and hence are vulnerable to fraudulent data capture and misuse. To improve security, it would be desirable to reduce dependence on such static data while utilizing media capable of being read by existing magnetic strip readers. 
       SUMMARY 
       [0012]    A method of using modified digital signatures generates a non-repeating dynamic number for authenticating credit and other transactions. Thus, small, but secure, digital signatures may be created, which may be transmitted over existing low-bandwidth connections and may be confidently authenticated. 
         [0013]    One example of the inventive method for facilitating a secure transaction requires each of a user (the party requesting or whose transaction requires authentication) and a receiver (for example, a system comprising a processor and memory for data storage) to have access to a private digital key. 
         [0014]    In this example, at the user end of the transaction, a digital user message is created. The digital message comprises user-identifying data and data relating to the user&#39;s transaction. For example, in a standard credit card transaction, the user-identifying data may be an account number, and the data relating to the user&#39;s transaction may be the time and date of the transaction. Alternatively, data such as an account holder&#39;s name, a personal identification number (“PIN”), an expiration date, or other data might identify the user, and the amount to be charged, merchant name, or other data might relate to the transaction. Then, at least a part of the data comprising the digital message is encrypted using the private key and an encryption program to create a first encrypted digital digest, which for convenience may be thought of as a digital signature or as a Temporary Account Number (“TAN”). The authorization request comprising the digital user message and TAN may be sent to an authorization processing center, which can use the TAN and the other data elements to verify the authenticity of the transaction. 
         [0015]    In one example, the receiver system receives the authorization request and locates and processes the user-identifying information contained in the digital user message to identify the private key relevant to the transmission. The receiver system then retrieves the private key from the data storage location and begins the analysis process. 
         [0016]    In this example, however, and in contrast to conventional technology, the receiver does not need to decrypt the user&#39;s transmission to verify its authenticity. Instead, an encryption process may be utilized. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that a compressed cipher text cannot be decrypted because some information will have been lost. However its authenticity can still be verified by repeating the encryption procedure. 
         [0017]    To utilize the encryption comparison method of this example, the receiver generates a second encrypted digital digest in the same manner in which the user created the first encrypted digital digest—that is, the receiver encrypts at least a part of the data comprising the digital message (the same part that was encrypted by the user) using the private key and an encryption program. Then, to determine the authenticity of the user transmission, the receiver compares the second encrypted digital digest that was created by the receiver, with the first encrypted digital digest (the TAN) that came from the user. If the two match, the transaction is authentic. 
         [0018]    The digital signature comprising the TAN may be generated by combining several authorization data elements. Preferably the data elements are selected so that the ultimately-resulting TAN will be generated in part by a dynamic element relating to the transaction—for example, transaction date and time, which of course will change from transaction to transaction. Including such dynamic elements in the user message itself, whether or not selected as a basis for the TAN, reduces the timeframe during which fraudulent attempts may be made by replaying a previously skimmed TAN. 
         [0019]    The private key utilized by the user and the receiver may be stored in a single location accessible to each of them, or may exist in duplicates that are separately stored. 
         [0020]    The elements that comprise the TAN may be hashed, typically prior to encryption. In such cases, the hashed digest may be encrypted using the shared encryption key to produce the digital signature comprising the TAN. The encryption process may utilize any symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithm. 
         [0021]    The digital signature comprising the TAN may be further shortened to a desired number of digits using a compression algorithm. Alternatively, the digest may be compressed using appropriately chosen modular arithmetic. As another example, another hash function may be used to map the first hashed digest to a number of desired length. 
         [0022]    Thus, in an exemplary embodiment, the user may transmit a first TAN and the data elements from which it has been derived to a receiver. The receiver may use some or all of the data elements, for example the account name, to retrieve the hash function, shared key, and compression function used by the sender to derive the first TAN. The receiver may then apply the hash function, encryption algorithm using the shared key, and the compression function in the same way as the user to compute a second shortened digital signature comprising a second TAN. The receiver may compare the second TAN to the received first TAN. If the first TAN and second TAN match, the receiver may authorize the transaction; if the first TAN and second TAN do not match, the receiver may decline the transaction. 
         [0023]    In certain embodiments of devices utilizing the method, the digital signatures may be provided on a magnetic strip of a credit card, the magnetic strip being dynamically programmable and adapted to be programmed by a cryptographic processor. Preferably, the programming of the digital signature and other data encoded on the magnetic strip maps such data to positions that emulate those expected by existing merchant reader equipment. In alternative embodiments, signatures may be transmitted to a receiver or to an intermediate processing device such as an RFID credit card reader by radio frequency rather than a magnetic strip. Transmission may also be accomplished through near field communication, a wireless Internet connection, Bluetooth technology, or any other communication protocol. In still other embodiments, a smart-card or smart-phone with a magnetic strip accessory may be used to produce a digital signature. Other embodiments may feature a combination of software and a USB interfacing device containing a processor, other circuitry, and means for providing the dynamic number directly to a user&#39;s internet browser for completing secure online transactions. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0024]      FIG. 1  is a process flow chart depicting an embodiment of the inventive method. 
           [0025]      FIG. 2  is a process flow chart reflecting an embodiment of a device using the inventive method in sending information in a credit transaction. 
           [0026]      FIG. 3  is a process flow chart reflecting an example use of the inventive method in receiving information in a credit transaction. 
           [0027]      FIG. 4  is a process flow chart reflecting an embodiment of a smart phone using the inventive method through utilizing a smart phone application and device to complete the sender portion of the inventive method. 
           [0028]      FIGS. 5A and 5B  depict the front and back of an exemplary smart phone and accessory configured to use the inventive method. 
           [0029]      FIG. 6  depicts a laptop and accessory configured to use the inventive method. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       [0030]    In the following detailed description of embodiments of the invention, reference is made to the accompanying drawings which form a part hereof, and in which are shown by way of illustration specific embodiments in which the invention may be practiced. It is to be understood that other embodiments may be utilized and structural changes may be made, all without departing from the scope of the present invention. 
         [0031]      FIG. 1  is a flowchart depicting an embodiment of the inventive method, comprising a sender  10 , a receiver  20 , and a transmitter  30 . It is assumed in the description to follow that the sender  10  is an authorized user of the information manipulated by the inventive method. 
         [0032]    The sender  10  has a message  100 , which may comprise various data elements. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that the data elements may comprise any information. The data may be comprised of random numbers or may instead be comprised of an account number, time and date of the transaction, an account holder&#39;s name, a personal identification number (“PIN”), an expiration date, an amount to be charged, other data, or some combination thereof. 
         [0033]    First, a hash function  201  may be performed on the message  100 . The hash function, as the term is used herein, may be any well-defined procedure or mathematical function that converts a large, possibly variably-sized amount of data into a small datum. Through this process, the message  100  is transformed into digest  104 , a new string of data. 
         [0034]    Next, the digest  104  undergoes encryption  108 . The encryption  108  will make use of a shared private key  106 . In preferred embodiments, shared private key  106  will be known by, and only by, the sender  10  and the receiver  20 . Shared private key  106  should be any data of suitable length for use in encryption process  108 . For example, in credit card applications, shared private key  106  may be any data which compromises enough characters to ensure security and to encrypt the name, date, and time up to the minute, as well as any additional information (PIN, expiration date, service code, and other data). Shared private key  106  may be 256 bits long. 
         [0035]    The encryption  108  may be of any type. In an exemplary embodiment, the encryption  108  is symmetric, such as, for example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (“AES”) with a 256 bit key. In another embodiment, the encryption  108  may be an RSA scheme, which is an algorithm for public-key cryptography. The encryption  108  of the digest  104  results in an encrypted digest  110 , a new set of data. 
         [0036]    Through compression  112 , the encrypted digest  110  may be truncated to a suitable length, forming a shorted encrypted digest  114 . Compression  112  may use any mathematical function, such as a modular arithmetic or hashing function, which creates a datum of smaller length. In embodiments for credit transactions, shorted encrypted digest  114  may be, for example, up to 19 characters long. 
         [0037]    The sender  10  may then utilize the transmitter  30  to transmit message  100  and shorted encrypted digest  114  to the receiver  20 . The transmitter  30  may use any suitable medium, network, or protocol for communication of digital data. For example, the transmitter  30  may comprise a card reader to read the message  100  and digest  114  from a card and transmit that information using a network. More specifically, the transmitter  30  may use the Internet network as a medium and the TCP/IP protocol. 
         [0038]    The receiver  20  will accept delivery of the message  100  and shorted encrypted digest  114  from the transmitter  30 . The receiver  20  will perform the exact same process on the message  100  that the sender  10  did before transmitting the message  100  and shorted encrypted digest  114 . The message  100  will be transformed to a new digest  116  through the hash function  102 ′. Then, using the shared private key  106 ′, the digest  116  will be processed by encryption  108 ′, which creates a new encrypted digest  118 . The new encrypted digest  118  undergoes compression  112 ′ to be transformed into a new shorted encrypted digest  120 . 
         [0039]    The receiver  20  may then perform a comparison  122  of shorted encrypted digest  114  against new shorted encrypted digest  120 . If digest  114  and digest  120  are identical, the receiver  20  may authorize the transaction assuming there are no other reasons to decline the transaction. If digest  114  and digest  120  are not identical, the receiver  20  may decline the transaction. Then the receiver  20  may transmit notice to the sender  10  via the transmitter  30  that the transaction has been authorized or declined. A person skilled in the art will appreciate that processes  102 ,  108 , and  112  must be operatively identical to processes  102 ′,  108 ′, and  112 ′, respectively, in order for the verification to properly function. 
         [0040]    The receiver  20  may execute further processes based on finding that the transaction is authorized or declined. For example, the receiver  20  may record that the transaction was authorized and an amount in a database, the receiver  20  may notify a third-party that the transaction was authorized or declined and an amount authorized, and/or the receiver  20  may freeze the account of the sender  10  if the transaction is declined. 
         [0041]    The inventive method may be utilized in various types of transactions, such as identity or credit card transactions.  FIGS. 2 and 3  reflect an exemplary embodiment of the inventive method as it might be used for a credit card transaction, with  FIG. 2  demonstrating the process from the point of view of a sender and  FIG. 3  demonstrating the process from the point of view of a receiver. 
         [0042]    In this particular exemplary embodiment, it is contemplated that software instructions executing in the processor or other circuitry disposed in a credit card belonging to the sender may perform the functions comprising the steps in  FIG. 2 . For example, the process may be performed by software instructions and integrated devices disposed in a “smart chip” or “smart card.” A smart card may comprise an interface configured to connect to a physical layer of an integrated circuit card terminal, a communication interface configured to communicate with a communication device, and an integrated circuit chip. The integrated circuit chip, or smart chip, may comprise control circuitry for managing the operations of the chip, a digital storage location, a communication interface connected to the control circuitry, a symmetric cryptographic processor to perform encryption steps, and an interface for transmitting to a receiver. The communication interface may be configured to communicate with a communication device and to receive data concerning the transaction from at least one of the user, a processor processing the transaction, and a user accessible digital storage location The credit card may further provide an input device, such as a button, which causes instructions to be executed in the processor disposed in the card to begin executing the exemplary process of  FIG. 2 . 
         [0043]    At the start  200 , the first step  202  is to read information from the credit card of sender  10 , such as the cardholder name, bank code, personal account number (“PAN”), and the date and time (including hours, minutes and seconds). The PAN may be a four-digit secret numeric password or personal identification number (“PIN”). The PIN may be input using a keypad disposed on the credit card or an external keypad that communicates with card or with the card reader. Alternatively, the PAN may be an account number representing a static credit card account number. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that a PAN comprising a static credit card number may be used with credit card processors that do not support non-repeating account numbers or a temporary account number (“TAN”) as described in more detail below. Other information, such as a card issuer number, may also be obtained from the credit card. The credit card will provide this information from memory located on the card or from another digital storage location, for example a remote location accessible through an input device disposed on or in the credit card. For example, the credit card may comprise a processor, secure memory, and a power source, such as a battery. 
         [0044]    The second step  204  is to compose a message from the data elements read in step  202  to produce sender message  206 . For example, the message text may be the string concatenation of the data elements in any order. 
         [0045]    In the exemplary embodiment, the third step  208  is to hash sender message  206 . This hashing may use the WHIRLPOOL hashing function or any other suitable hashing function. A PIN  205  and/or other optional data  207  may also be used in hashing. The result of step  208  is message digest  210 . 
         [0046]    The fourth step  214  is to encrypt the message digest  210  using an encryption algorithm based on secret key  212 . Any type of encryption, symmetric or asymmetric, may be used. An example symmetric encryption algorithm is the AES  256  encryption algorithm; an example asymmetric algorithm is RSA encryption. The result of this step is encrypted digest  216 . Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that secret key  212  must be available to both sending and receiving parties in an authorization transaction who wish to use a digital signature to verify a transaction. This can be accomplished by providing each party with access to the same copy of the key, or each party may have its own identical copy of the key. 
         [0047]    The exemplary embodiment further includes step  218  in which encrypted digest  216  is truncated to produce a shortened encrypted digest to be used as a non-repeating temporary account number (“TAN”)  220 . Step  218  may use any compression function suitable to produce the TAN  220  based on shortening the length of encrypted digest  216  to one which can be used in a credit card transaction. For example, the TAN  220  produced may be up to 19 characters long for credit card transactions that accommodate such lengths. In some embodiments, the TAN  220  may be 10 characters long to match the length of current static credit card numbers. Alternatively, TAN  220  may be longer than 19 characters long. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that shorter digital signatures require less bandwidth to transmit, but also may be less secure, and appropriate tradeoffs may be made to accommodate those considerations as well as expectations of existing readers with which the process will be used. 
         [0048]    The exemplary process may include step  222  during which the sender message  206  and the TAN  220  may be assigned to data elements traditionally representing credit card authorization data. For example, where existing credit card authorization apparatus expects a 21-digit sequence comprising a 16-digit credit card number, followed by a 4-digit expiration date (MMYY), followed by a 3-digit credit card verification (“CCV”) number, the sender message and the TAN  220  may be mapped to positions that are equivalent to these expectations using a process such as the following, it being recognized that any or all of the specific data elements herein mentioned could be changed to other variables: The least significant digit of the hour number representing the time of the transaction may be concatenated to the three-digit card issuer number, which may in turn be concatenated with a two-digit number representing the seconds at the time of the transaction. This number may in turn be concatenated to the ten-digit TAN to produce a sixteen-digit number. The sixteen-digit number may then be mapped to the location where the existing authorization apparatus would expect to read the card number data element. The two-digit month and two-digit year representing the time of the transaction may be mapped to the location where digits of similar length representing the expiration month and year respectively would appear. The two-digit date number representing the day of the transaction may be concatenated with the most significant digit of the hour representing the time of the transaction to produce a three-digit number, which may be mapped to the credit card verification (“CCV”) data element. Persons skilled in the art will appreciate that the mapping of the data representing issuer number, transaction time, and TAN onto the credit card standard card number, expiration date, and CCV may be done in a number of ways. 
         [0049]    Finally, the sender message  206  and TAN  220  are joined in a step  222  to produce authorization data, which is saved in the card&#39;s memory. The smart chip may then read the authorization data and output  224  it to a programmable device emulating a static magnetic strip. The data output to the magnetic strip may be structured to be compatible with traditional credit card readers and transmission systems. The credit card may also have a magnetic strip bearing a static credit card number for use in places where there is no smart card reader present. The credit card data elements, including the authorization data, may also, or alternatively, be disclosed through a display disposed in the card so that the numbers may be read over the phone or input online. 
         [0050]    Although the exemplary embodiment of the inventive method as shown in  FIG. 2  utilizes a magnetic strip  224  to output the message  206  and the TAN  220 , persons skilled in the art will, of course, recognize various other means for outputting this information for transmittal. For example, the cards could instead, or additionally, be equipped with radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) transmitters, allowing the card to simply be waved at a credit card reader instead of swiped through the reader. Transmission may also be accomplished through near field communication, a wireless Internet connection, Bluetooth technology, or any other communication protocol. 
         [0051]    As noted above,  FIG. 3  reflects the inventive method as it might be used for a credit card transaction from the point of view of the receiver  20 . The exemplary process as shown in  FIG. 3  includes a first step  302  wherein authorization data is read. The authorization data is the information sent by the sender  10  via the transmitter  30  as described with regard to  FIGS. 1 and 2 . The authorization data may be read by any method capable of transmitting digital data. For example, a computer network may be used, wherein the computer on the receiving end may utilize software instructions to read data from the network into the memory of the computer. In the exemplary embodiment, software instructions executing in a processor or other hardware may perform the functions comprising the steps in  FIG. 3 . 
         [0052]    The second step  304  of the  FIG. 3  embodiment is to split the authorization data into the sender message  206  and the TAN  220  received from the sender  10 . The sender message  206  may comprise data elements such as cardholder name and/or the date and time of the transaction. Persons skilled in the art will recognize that the sender message  206  may include other data elements related to authorization of a transaction. 
         [0053]    The third step  310  of the exemplary process is to hash the sender message  206  and produce a message digest  312 . A PIN  306  and/or other optional data  308  may also be used in hashing. Persons skilled in the art will recognize that incorporating authorization data elements not received from the transmitter  30  may be desirable in the verification process; sending said data elements across a public transmission medium may pose an increased risk of fraud on future transactions. This third step  310  must use the same hash function  208  as the sender  10  who originally hashed the sender message  206 . 
         [0054]    The fourth step  314  is to encrypt the message digest  312 , resulting in an encrypted digest  316 . The method for encryption should be the same encryption method  214  used by the sender  10  to produce the authorization data  222 . Additionally, the encryption should use the same secret key  212  as used by the sender  10 . For added security, it is preferable that the secret key  212  itself not be transmitted to the receiver  20 , but instead be stored in the files of the receiver  20 . It is important to note that the process of  FIG. 3  encrypts the sender message  206  rather than decrypting it. As previously discussed, persons skilled in the art will appreciate that a compressed cipher text cannot be decrypted because some information will have been lost. However its authenticity can still be verified by repeating the encryption procedure. 
         [0055]    The process of  FIG. 3  further includes the step  318  in which the encrypted digest  316  is compressed to produce a calculated TAN  320 . This step  318  should use the same compression algorithm as used by the sender  10 . 
         [0056]    Upon producing the calculated TAN  320 , the device executing the exemplary process then performs a comparison  322  to see whether the calculated TAN  320  matches the TAN  220  from the sender  10 . If the two TANS  220 ,  320  match, then the final step is to approve the transaction  324 . If there is no match, then the final step is to decline the transaction  326 . 
         [0057]    The inventive method may also be utilized through smart phones. Various smart phones, including the iPhone, Palm Treo, and Sprint Moto to name a few, already offer the ability to purchase credit card processing applications that allow the phones to take credit card payments and transmit them securely without add-on magnetic strip readers or other technology. Applications may be developed to allow the inventive method to be utilized on these phones in connection with credit or other secure transactions. 
         [0058]    In the alternative, as shown in  FIGS. 4 ,  5 A, and  5 B, an exemplary accessory  510  for an exemplary smart phone  500  may also be used to perform the inventive method and provide information to be output for use by standard card readers. In embodiments utilizing such an accessory  510  for credit transactions, the user will first utilize the smart phone interface  520  to start an application  400  to select a credit card for use. The application may require the input of user data  402 , which may be one or more authentication means such as a PIN, other password, or even biometric information like a fingerprint, using the interface  520 . This next step  404  would be to transmit the user data to the accessory  510 , which comprises memory  530 , a chip  540 , and a programmable magnetic strip  550 . The memory  530  preferably holds encryption keys for each of the user&#39;s credit cards. The chip  540  performs the next step  406  of data processing, which comprises performing the hashing, encryption, and compression process as previously described with respect to the inventive method, to produce a TAN  408 . The accessory  510  then writes, at step  410 , the TAN  408  as well as the other required user data onto the programmable magnetic strip  550 , which may then be processed like any other credit card. 
         [0059]    In some embodiments such as is shown in  FIGS. 5A and 5B , a magnetic strip  550  may be disposed on a removable temporary credit card  560 . The temporary credit card  560  could then be handed to a server in a restaurant without the user having to turn over his phone. In some embodiments, the application may provide a means for placing a limit on the temporary credit card  560  so that a child or employee may use the card. 
         [0060]    There are several benefits to utilizing an accessory to perform the method instead of solely using an application. First, the accessory allows for reading of the necessary authorization information by standard card readers. Use of the accessory may also provide an additional security measure. For example, the accessory could be stored separately from the phone providing a physical barrier. Additionally, should a virus or malicious software compromise the security of the smart phone, the user&#39;s credit card information would not be reached. 
         [0061]    Of course, other embodiments may utilize smart phones comprising one or more of a built-in protected memory, dedicated encryption chips, or magnetic strip emulators. 
         [0062]    As depicted in  FIG. 6 , the inventive method may also be utilized for online transactions through the use of a plug-in  600  for a web browser  610  and a peripheral computer device  630 , such as, for example as shown in  FIG. 6 , a universal serial bus (“USB”) key. When the exemplary plug-in  600  is activated, it gathers information from the web page  620  to identify the data sought to complete the transaction. The plug-in  600  then sends a request to the USB key  630 , which contains both a chip  632  and protected memory  634 . The chip  632  performs the hashing, encryption, and compression process as previously described with respect to the inventive method to produce a TAN, and the memory  634  stores the user&#39;s data, the encryption keys, and the algorithms necessary to complete the process. Once the TAN has been produced, the TAN and any other information sought by the web page  620  is sent back to the plug-in  600 , which automatically fills in the field for the transaction. As with the smart phone accessory, the use of a USB key or other device  630  to store the user&#39;s data, encryption keys, and algorithms separately from a computer provides increased portability as well as increased security. 
         [0063]    As mentioned above, the inventive method may be used in variety of ways not limited to credit transactions. For example, the method may be implemented in any security or identity card or device, from building access cards and to social security cards and drivers licenses. The method may also be used in place of an RSA SecurID token for even more secure authentication. Moreover, certain steps may be omitted in appropriate instances as will be recognized by those skilled in the art, without departing from the scope of the invention. 
         [0064]    The foregoing details are exemplary only. Other modifications that might be contemplated by those of skill in the art are within the scope of this invention, and are not limited by the examples illustrated herein.

Technology Category: 5