Patent Document

This Application is a Continuation-in-Part of application Ser. No. 08/744,363 filed Nov. 7, 1996, now U.S. Pat. No. 5,844,497. 
    
    
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     1. Field of the Invention 
     The present invention relates to information security devices, and more particularly to a method and apparatus of providing a secure authentication system utilizing a protected personal identification number (PIN) path. The present invention further relates to a method and apparatus of providing a secure authentication system using a protected personal identification data path. 
     2. Description of the Related Art 
     With the widespread use of computers, there is an increased need for controlling access to the computers and to the sensitive information stored within the computers. To provide additional security, cryptographic tokens, such as credit-card sized devices with built-in microprocessors and non-volatile memory are utilized in controlling access to computer systems. They are typically issued to a user with personalized information and private keying material and a personal access code, commonly known as a Personal Identification Number (“PIN”). The user must present a correct PIN to the card or to a device which reads the card, so as to unlock the card for operation. To compromise a card, a malicious user must be in physical possession of the card and also know the private PIN code. Since the PIN is typically entered directly into the computer, the security of such systems may still be compromised since the PIN may be captured by software specifically designed for the purpose. 
     One current approach to this problem is the use of an electro-mechanical device, or card reader, into which the user inserts the token. The device is, in turn, coupled to a computer. The user must enter his PIN directly into the card reader through a keypad mounted on the card reader. The card reader then verifies the PIN with the cryptographic key on the token. If the PIN is valid, a signal is sent to the computer, which authorizes access to the card&#39;s cryptographic information. 
     This approach however, present several disadvantages. First, the reader must provide the keypad, the keypad interface to the card reader&#39;s processor and the software for interpreting the user&#39;s entry. This feature adds to the complexity of the device and its cost. Secondly, a separate keyboard has to be used for accepting user input or commands to the computer. As a result, the user has to relocate from the keyboard to the keypad or vice versa. If repeated attempts at entering the PIN are required, such movement may prove distracting. The use of such a device is thus both awkward and expensive. 
     A second approach, as described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,406,624 (the “&#39;624 patent”), involves the use of a security unit that is connected between a computer and keyboard. The security unit includes a processor which stores a number of security programs for operating the security unit, controlling attached peripherals and executing cryptographic algorithms. The security unit operates in one of two fundamental modes: a Transparent Mode in which data inputted from the keyboard to the security unit is transmitted to the computer, and a Special Handling Mode in which data entered from the keyboard is isolated from the computer so that the security unit assumes complete control of data provided via the keyboard. The Special Handling Mode in effect causes the security unit to replace the computer, executing security-related algorithms and in general, duplicating the operations of the computer in controlling the input, processing and displaying of information. The control means for selecting one of these modes involves downloading cryptographically signed software from the host computer and executing it within the security unit, or the use of a switch box connected between the security unit and the computer, which enables manual selection of the modes. In the &#39;624 patent, security key operations are performed in the security unit. These security key operations include the verification of a program&#39;s signature, ciphering and deciphering of passwords and other like operations. 
     This second approach also presents several disadvantages. First, since the security and peripheral control programs executed by the security unit are of significant computational complexity, it requires a powerful processor and large amounts of memory to be effective. This processing requirement, and the control electronics for a variety of peripheral devices adds significant cost to the unit, placing it out of reach for a large number of potential users. Secondly, if the control means is implemented using down-loadable software, an additional security risk is incurred since this software comes from an external source, which could be intercepted and compromised. The &#39;624 device attempts to guard against this risk by requiring such software to be accompanied by a signature. However, this in turn limits the usefulness of the device for those applications which do not have the proper signature, and which do not have the knowledge (or code) required to interface with the security unit&#39;s processing system. If the control means is implemented using a manual switch, the operator has to be constantly interrupted to attend to the selection of the two modes, and may often find himself committing errors which hinder the effectiveness and the security of the unit. 
     Accordingly, there is a need in the technology for a simple, elegant and cost-effective consumer-level method and apparatus of authenticating a password or personal identification number (PIN) independently from the computer, so that access control to one or more application programs running on the computer may be enforced, while minimizing the risk of capture of the password by unauthorized users and also minimizing the complexity of user operation. 
     As discussed above, cryptographic tokens are typically issued to a user with personalized information, private keying material and a personal access code, commonly known as a Personal Identification Number (“PIN”). The correct PIN must be presented to the card or to a device which reads the card, so as to unlock the card for operation. The personal access code must be committed to memory and entered correctly before access control to one or more application programs running on a computer is available. 
     Accordingly, there is also a need for providing access control to one or more application programs running on the computer, while reducing the need for reliance on human memory in retrieving the personal access code, and also reducing human error in entering the personal access code to the authentication system. 
     BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention is a method and apparatus for controlling access to at least one program on a computer by verifying data entered through a scanner with data stored on a token such as a card, while isolating the entered data from the computer. The apparatus comprises a scanner, a memory, and a processor coupled to the scanner and memory. When activated, the scanner scans a field which the processor compares with a field stored in the memory. The processor is operable in a first mode wherein access to the computer via a keyboard is inhibited when the scanned field does not match the stored field. The processor is operable in a second mode, wherein the keyboard is coupled to the computer so that the at least one program on the computer is accessible via the keyboard when the scanned field matches the stored field. Various embodiments are disclosed. 
     The implementation of the present invention provides a simple, cost-effective and compact system that enforces access control for application programs running on a computer, while requiring minimal user relocation. 
    
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
     The features and advantages of the present invention will become more readily apparent to those ordinarily skilled in the art after reviewing the following detailed description and accompanying drawings, wherein: 
     FIG. 1 is a perspective view of one embodiment of the authenticating system of the present invention. 
     FIG. 2 is a block diagram of one embodiment of the authenticating system of FIG.  1 . 
     FIG. 3A illustrates one logical state of the processor in the verification unit, representative of one mode of operation in one embodiment of the verification unit. 
     FIG. 3B illustrates a second logical state of the processor in the verification unit, representative of a second mode of operation in one embodiment of the verification unit. 
     FIG. 3C illustrates a third logical state of the processor in the verification unit, representative of a third mode of operation in one embodiment of the verification unit. 
     FIG. 4 is a flow chart of one embodiment of the access authorization process  100  of the present invention. 
     FIGS. 5A and 5B illustrate a flow chart of one embodiment of the process S 200  of the present invention for creating a new user record for an uninitialized card. 
     FIGS. 6A and 6B illustrate a flow chart of one embodiment of the user alteration process  250  of the present invention. 
     FIGS. 6C and 6D illustrate a flow chart of one embodiment of the password alteration process  300  of the present invention. 
     FIG. 7 is a flow chart of one embodiment of the key translation process  400  of the present invention. 
     FIG. 8 is a perspective view of a second embodiment of the authenticating system of the present invention. 
     FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of the scanner  25  of FIG.  8 . 
     FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of the verification unit of FIG.  8 . 
     FIG. 11 is a perspective view of a third embodiment of the authenticating system of the present invention. 
     FIG. 12A illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of the verification unit of FIG.  11 . 
     FIG. 12B illustrates a block diagram of an alternate embodiment of the verification unit of FIG.  11 . 
     FIGS. 13A and 13B illustrate a flow chart of an alternate embodiment of the access authorization process of the present invention. 
     FIGS. 14A and 14B illustrate a flow chart of a third embodiment of the access authorization process of the present invention. 
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     FIG. 1 is a perspective view of the authenticating system  10  of the present invention. The authenticating system  10  comprises a computer  12 , a monitor  14 , a keyboard  16 , a connector or an adapter  18  and a verification unit  20 . The computer  12  may be a general purpose computer, a personal computer or a workstation. The computer  12  may also be connected to a network (not shown). The keyboard  16  is coupled to a first port  26  of the adapter  18  via a first cable  22 . The verification unit  20  is coupled to a second port  28  of the adapter  18  via a second cable  24 . The adapter  18  is in turn coupled to the computer  12  via a third port  30 . The computer  12  supplies current and voltage to the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20 . However, the keyboard  16  only communicates with the computer  12  through the verification unit  20 . The verification unit  20  has a slot  32  which receives a card  34 , such as a smartcard, a PCMCIA card or some other personal security token. The verification unit  20  also has a light emitting diode (LED)  38  which is turned on to indicate that the verification unit  20  is ready to accept information from the keyboard  16  and that any information thus communicated will not be provided to the computer  12 . 
     The authenticating system  10  functions under the control of one or more process access control software programs (PACS) residing in the computer  12  to enable the verification unit  20  to intercept and positively verify data such as a security identification number, a password, or a Personal Identification Number (PIN) of the operator requesting control of the application software. For discussion purposes, such data will be referred to as a password. This password is entered via the keyboard  16  and provided via the verification unit  20  to the card  34 , which compares the entered password to a password previously stored on the card  34 . Upon comparison of the passwords, the card  34  issues a “pass” or a “fail” signal via the verification unit  20  to the computer  12 , which either grants or denies execution control of application software to the operator. 
     Once execution control of the application software has been granted to the user, the user may gain access to the software and/or alter the software accessed. In one embodiment, such application software includes one or more applications software programs residing in the computer  12 . Examples of such applications software programs include: E-mail, Database Management Systems (DBMS), Web Browsers and Servers, Electronic Document Interchange/Electronic Fund Transfer (EDI/EFT) and local security programs. In one embodiment, different passwords may be used for obtaining access to different software programs in the computer  12 . In another embodiment, a single password may be used for obtaining access to a plurality of software programs. In a further embodiment, a single password may be used to issue or generate additional unique passwords for obtaining access to a plurality of network applications. 
     FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the authenticating system  10  of FIG.  1 . As shown, the computer  12  comprises a processor such as a CPU  40  and a memory module  42 . The CPU  40  and memory module  42  are coupled to a system bus  44 . The computer  12  also includes an input/output (I/O) interface  46  which is coupled the system bus  44 . A power supply  48  supplies current and voltage to the computer  12 . Alternatively, the computer  12  may obtain its current and voltage supply externally, for example, from a wall unit. 
     The present invention is also described in reference to an operating system installed on the computer  12 . The operating system supports process access control software (PACS) which enables application programs running on the CPU  40  to perform processes such as data base management, net browsing, electronic mail e-mail), firewalls, etc. The PACS also enables application programs running on the CPU  40  to control dispatch of commands to the verification unit  20 . 
     As discussed earlier, the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20  are coupled to the computer  12  through adapter  18 . The keyboard  16  is coupled to a first port  26  of the adapter  18  via a first cable  22 . The cable  22  comprises three lines, power line  22   a , power line  22   b  and data line  22   c . Power line  22   a  is coupled via adapter  18  to a power supply located in the computer  12 , while power line  22   b  is coupled to ground. The third line  22   c  is a data line that is coupled through the adapter  18  to the verification unit  20 , as discussed below. 
     The cable  24  comprises four lines, power lines  24   a  and  24   b , and data lines  24   c  and  24   d . Power line  24   a  is coupled to a power supply  48  (located in computer  12 ) via adapter  18 , while power line  24   b  is coupled to ground. Data line  24   c  is coupled via adapter  18  to I/O interface  46  located in computer  12 . Data line  24   d  is coupled to data line  22   c  (in cable  22 ) to keyboard  16 . Thus, the computer  12  supplies current and voltage to the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20 . However, the keyboard  16  only communicates with the computer  12  through the verification unit  20 , as described in detail in the following sections. 
     With reference to FIG. 2, the verification unit  20  comprises a processor  60  and a memory module  62  which includes both read only memory (ROM)  64  and random access memory (RAM)  66 . The verification unit  20  further comprises a card reader/writer  68  which receives the card  34  through a slot  32  (see FIG.  1 ). A clock module  70  provides timing signals for the operation of the processor  60  and the card  34 . In one embodiment, the clock module  70  comprises a single clock which provides timing signals for both the processor  60  and the operation of the card reader/writer  68 . In another embodiment, the clock module  70  comprises two clocks, one for driving the processor  60  and the other for driving the operation of the card  34 . The card  34  reads and/or writes data to or from the card  34 . It also provides timing signals, ground and power to the card  34 . 
     ROM  64  includes firmware which the processor  60  executes for monitoring the line  24   c  from the computer  12 , lines  24   d  and  22   c  from the keyboard. This firmware performs read/write operations to/from the card  34  and the read/write operations to/from RAM  66 , where RAM  66  is used as a temporary buffer for data inputs and outputs. The verification unit  20  further comprises a light emitting diode (LED)  38 , which operates under control of the processor  60  to indicate that the access authorization procedure has been initiated, and that the communication path between the verification unit  20  (and thus the keyboard  16 ) and the computer  12  has been temporarily suspended. The LED  38  provides visual indication to the keyboard operator that they may securely enter their password via the keyboard  16 . This prevents the password from being inadvertently provided to the computer  12 . 
     Data entered via the keyboard  16  is transmitted to the verification unit  20  as scan codes, as is known in the technology. The verification unit  20  interprets the entered scan codes to identify the key the operator has pressed. As the scan codes are resolved, the characters are written to RAM  66 . Once the user terminates the entry process, typically through depressing the ENTER key, software running on the processor  60  of the verification unit will encrypt the characters (password) written to RAM  66 , read the encrypted password from the card  34  and compare the encrypted passwords. If the encrypted passwords match, the verification unit  20  has “authenticated” the user. It then returns a code indicating success or failure to the computer  12 . Alternatively, the authentication process is performed by the card  34 . In this case, upon receipt of the password, the verification unit  20  constructs the command code specified by the card  34  manufacturer for a “COMPARE PIN” command, append the password, and write this data to the card  34 . The card  34  will then compare the password with the one stored in its non-volatile memory. If the passwords match, the card  34  has “authenticated” the user. It then returns a code indicating success or failure to the verification unit  20 . In both cases, the number of consecutive failed attempts is recorded and the card  34  is disabled if a predetermined number (for example, 3 to 7) is reached. 
     The processor  60  further controls the communications between: (1) the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20 ; (2) the keyboard  16  and the computer  12 ; and (3) the verification unit  20  and the computer  12 . This is accomplished by porting data from: (1) the keyboard  16  to the verification unit  20  (or vice-versa); (2) the keyboard  16  to the computer  12  (or vice-versa); or (3) from the verification unit  20  to the computer  12  (or vice-versa), in response to commands issued by the CPU  40  in the computer  12 . The porting of data from one unit (i.e., the keyboard  16 , verification unit  20  or computer  12 ) to another unit as discussed above may be described with reference to a “logical switch”  65  as shown in FIGS. 3A-3C. 
     The logical switch  65  is used to illustrate the three states in which the processor  60  may operate in response to commands issued by the CPU  40 . For purposes of discussion, the switch  65  has two switches, S 1  and S 2 . In the first state, S 1  is closed while S 2  is open, so that there is only communication between the keyboard operator and the verification unit  20 . When the processor  60  is in the first state, the LED  38  is turned on, indicating that it is safe for the operator to enter his password via the keyboard  16 . In the second state, S 1  is open, while S 2  is closed. In this second state, there is communication only between the verification unit  20  and the computer  12 . In the third state, S 1  and S 2  are both closed, so that an operator at the keyboard  12  may communicate with the computer  12  in a normal manner. 
     Thus, under the command of the CPU  40  in the computer  12 , the verification unit  20  may intercept the password or Personal Identification Number (PIN) of the operator requesting control of the application software running on computer  12  and verify the password or PIN. This password is entered via the keyboard  16  and provided to the verification unit  20  when the processor  60  is operating in state  1 . Upon receipt of the password from the keyboard  16 , the verification unit  20  encrypts and temporarily stores the password in RAM  66 . It then proceeds to read the encrypted password stored in the card  34  through card reader  68 , and compares the encrypted password received from the card  34  with the encrypted password stored in RAM  66 . 
     Upon comparison of the passwords, the verification unit  20  generates a status signal representing the result of the comparison and forwards it to the computer  12 . The signal is issued when the processor  60  is operating under state  2 . If the status signal indicates that the authentication was successful, i.e., the encrypted password from the keyboard  16  matches the encrypted password from the card  34 , the computer  12  grants execution control of the application software to the operator. This is accomplished by issuing a command to the processor  60 , which advances to state  3 , where communications between the operator at the keyboard  12  and the computer  12  is established. The operator may then access and/or alter the application program(s) unlocked through the use of the password. If the encrypted password from the keyboard  16  did not match the encrypted password from the card  34 , access to the computer  12  is denied. The processor  60  thus returns to state  1 . 
     In an alternate embodiment, the password entered via the keyboard  16  is forwarded to the card  34 , which compares the password to its internally stored password (state  1 ). Upon comparison of the passwords, card  34  generates a status signal representing the result of the comparison. The verification unit  20  receives the status signal and forwards it to the computer  12 . The signal is issued when the processor  60  is operating under state  2 . If the computer  12  grants execution control of the application software to the operator, the processor  60  advances to state  3 , where communications between the operator at the keyboard  12  and the computer  12  is established. Otherwise, access to the computer  12  (or its application programs) is denied and the processor  60  returns to state  1 . 
     FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the access authorization process  100  of the present invention. To gain access to a software application enabled with the PAC security application program interface, access authorization from the verification unit must first be obtained. This authorization is obtained as follows. Beginning from a start state, the process  100  proceeds to process block  102 , where the PACS running on CPU  40  issues a command to the verification unit  20  for initiating access authorization. The card  34  may be inserted in the verification unit  20  at this time. 
     The verification unit  20  then proceeds to state  1 , as shown in process block  104 . In this state, S 1  is closed while S 2  is open, i.e., data is ported from the keyboard to the verification unit  20  and the communication path between the verification unit  20  and the computer  12  is suspended, which in turn suspends communication between the keyboard  16  and the computer  20 . The verification unit  20  then turns on the LED  38 , indicating that the path for entering the password is secure. The process  100  then advances to process block  106 , where the CPU  40  directs the monitor  14  to display the message “Please enter password”. The keyboard operator then enters his or her password via keyboard  16 , which is provided to the verification unit  20  via line  22   c , the adapter  18 , and line  24   d . The password is encrypted and temporarily stored in RAM  66 . 
     The process  100  then advances to process block  108 , where the verification unit  20  reads the encrypted password stored on the card  34  through the card reader  68 . The encrypted password from the card  34  is temporarily stored in RAM  66 . The process  100  then proceeds to process block  110 , where the processor  60  in the verification unit  20  determines if the entered encrypted password is valid by comparing it to the encrypted password previously stored on the card  34 . The result of the validation process is sent to the computer  12 , as shown in process block  112 . The process  100  advances to decision block  114 , where the CPU  40  in computer  12  determines if result provided indicates that the entered password is valid. If the CPU  40  determines that the password is invalid, it issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit to remain in state  1 , as shown in process block  116 . The operator is thus denied access to the software on the computer  12 . In addition, the failed attempt is recorded by the card  34 . 
     The process  100  then proceeds to decision block  118 , where the verification unit  20  determines if a predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts have been recorded. If not, the process  100  returns to process block  106 , where the operator is allowed another attempt at entering the correct password. If, however, the verification unit  20  determines that the predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts has been reached, the process  100  proceeds to process block  120 , where the card  34  is locked and/or permanently disabled. The process  100  then terminates. This feature of the verification unit  20  ensures that consecutive tries at guessing the password can be detected. In addition, this feature of the verification unit  20  provides additional security by locking and/or permanently disabling the card  34  after a predetermined number of consecutive failed attempts has occurred. 
     If, at decision block  114 , the entered password is determined to be valid, the CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit  20  to direct the processor  60  to proceed to state  3 , where communications between the keyboard and computer may be established, as shown in process block  122 . The process  100  then terminates. Alternatively, the CPU  40  may prompt the keyboard operator to enter a second password, and process blocks  106 - 122  may be repeated to provide additional security. The application software program or programs accessed by the operator upon authentication of his entered password may be used to perform cryptographic operations, such as the decryption or encryption of messages. 
     As discussed earlier, in an alternate embodiment, the process  100  may, at process block  108 , forward the entered password to the card  34  for comparison. In that case, the password is temporarily stored in memory  36  of the card  34 . The processor  35  of the card then compares the entered password with its internally stored password. Upon comparison, the processor  35  issues a status signal to the verification unit  20 , that is representative of the result of the search. The verification unit  20  than issues another signal to the computer  12  indicative of this result. The process  100  then proceeds as described above. It is understood by one skilled in the technology that the status signal may be implemented as a status bit or a flag that is forwarded from the card  34  to the verification unit  20  or from the verification unit  20  to the computer  12 . 
     In one embodiment, the verification unit  20  can perform additional security functions for the protection of application programs running on the CPU  40  in computer  12 , which is in turn coupled to a computer network or system. These functions include the creation and alteration of users who are authorized to use the application programs. Examples of such functions are illustrated in FIGS. 5A-5B and  6 A- 6 D, and discussed in detail in the following sections. The additional security functions also involve the management of cipher keys that protect other keys and the generation of session keys that are sent to the PACS residing the CPU  40  for use in preparing classified documents and files. An example of key management provided by the verification unit  20  includes the translation of encrypted keys, as illustrated in FIG.  7  and as discussed in detail in the following sections. 
     FIGS. 5A and 5B illustrate a flow chart of one embodiment of the process  200  of the present invention for creating a new user record. Upon receiving one or more uninitialized cards, an operator in a managing position, such as a supervisor, may utilize the verification unit  20  for creating new user record and to store the record on each card, such as card  34 . The process  200  proceeds as follows. Beginning from a start state, the process  200  advances to process block  202 , where the supervisor inserts the uninitialized card into the verification unit  20  and enters a command, via keyboard  16 , for creating a new user record for the uninitialized card. The command thus entered may be entered by depressing a particular key on the keyboard  16 , which is provided as a scan code to the verification unit  20 . 
     Upon receiving the command, the verification unit  20  interprets the command or scancode to identify the key that the supervisor has entered. It then issues a signal to the computer  12  requesting the computer  12  to display a message prompting the supervisor to enter the supervisor password. The computer  12  responds by displaying this message (block  204 ). Communications between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  is then suspended, and the verification unit  20  turns on the LED  38 , indicating that the path for entering the password is secure (block  206 ). The supervisor then enters the supervisor password, which the verification unit  20  stores on the card (block  208 ). 
     Next, the supervisor enters a command for creating a subordinate user record (block  210 ). The supervisor first enters the subordinate user authentication number, followed by the corresponding unique subordinate user password and the corresponding number of password attempts allowed for gaining access to a particular program, or to the card  34  (block  212 ). When the supervisor has completed entering this information, he enters another command indicating such completion. The verification unit  20  then stores the subordinate user information on the card and then turns off the LED  38 . Communications between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  is then reestablished (block  214 ). 
     The process  200  then advances to decision block  216 , where it determines if there are more uninitialized cards for which new user records have to be created. If so, the process  200  proceeds to process block  218 , where the supervisor enters a command for creating another new user record for another uninitialized card. The process  200  then proceeds to process block  220 , where the supervisor inserts another uninitialized card. The process  200  then proceeds back to process block  202  to repeat the blocks for creating a new user record. 
     If, at decision block  216 , the process  200  determines that there are no other uninitialized cards for which new user records have to be created, the process  200  proceeds to process block  222 , where the supervisor enters a command indicating the completion of the process  200 . The process  200  then advances to process block  224 , where the verification unit  20  receives the command and turns off the LED  38 . Communications between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  is then reestablished (block  226 ) and the process  200  terminates. 
     The process  200  illustrated in FIGS. 5A-5B and discussed above may be performed in an unsecured location, since the new user information is not provided to the computer  12  and cannot be captured or tampered with. However, the verification unit  20  may be configured to receive and write information regarding the new user to the card, such as card  34  without the use of a secure path. In this embodiment, the computer  12  utilized may be isolated and located in a secure room, so that the communications path between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  need not be suspended during the entry and storage of the new user record. 
     After creating a new user record for a subordinate user, records may have to be updated, deleted or altered. This may be accomplished through the user alteration process  250  as shown in FIGS. 6A-6B. Beginning from a start state, the process  250  proceeds to process block  252 , where the supervisor inserts the card with the information to be altered and enters a command for changing the subordinate authentication number. The process  250  then proceeds to process block  254 , where the verification unit  20  receives the command and issues a signal to the computer  12 , which prompts the supervisor to enter the supervisor password. Communications between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  is then suspended, and the verification unit  20  turns on the LED  38 , indicating that the path for entering the password is secure, as shown in process block  256 . The supervisor then enters the supervisor password (block  258 ). 
     Upon receiving the supervisor password, the verification unit  20  compares the entered supervisor password with the supervisor password stored on the card  34 , as shown in process block  260 . The verification unit  20  then determines if the passwords match (decision block  262 ). If not, access to the subordinate user record and to the card, is denied. The process  250  then terminates. 
     If, at decision block  262 , it is determined that the passwords match, the process  250  proceeds to process block  268 , where verification unit  20  turns off the LED  38 . Communications between the computer  12  and the verification unit  20  is reestablished, as shown in process block  270 . The verification unit  20  then issues a signal to the computer  12  indicating that the passwords match and the computer  12  responds by prompting the supervisor to proceed with the desired change (block  272 ). The process  250  then advances to process block  274 , where the communication path between the computer  12  and the verification unit  20  is suspended. At this juncture, the verification unit  20  turns on the LED  38 , indicating that the path between the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20  is secure. 
     The process  250  then proceeds to process block  276 , where the supervisor enters the subordinate user&#39;s authentication number, and a command corresponding to the alteration or deletion of the user&#39;s authentication number. The process  250  then proceeds to process block  278 , where the verification unit  20  deletes or alters the corresponding information. The altered information, if any, is then stored on the card  34 . The process  250  then proceeds to process block  280 , where the verification unit  20  turns off the LED  38  and communications between the computer  12  and the keyboard  16  is then reestablished. The process  250  then terminates. 
     FIGS. 6C-6D illustrate a flow chart of the password alteration process  300  of the present invention. This process  300  may be used by a supervisor or a subordinate user to alter his password. Beginning from a start state, the process  300  proceeds to process block  302 , where the supervisor or the subordinate user inserts his or her card and enters a command for changing his or her password. The process  300  proceeds to process block  304 , where the verification unit  20  issues a signal to the computer  12  indicating receipt of the command. The computer  12  responds by prompting the supervisor or subordinate user to enter the current password. Communications between the keyboard  16  and the computer  12  is then suspended, and the verification unit  20  turns on the LED  38 , as shown in process block  306 . The supervisor or subordinate user then enters the current password, as shown in process block  308 . The verification unit  20  then compares the entered password with the password stored on the card  34 , as shown in process block  310 . 
     Next, the process  300  proceeds to decision block  312 , where the verification unit  20  determines if the passwords match. If not, the password alteration process is denied to the operator, as shown in process block  314 . The process  300  then terminates. If, at decision block  312 , the verification unit  20  determines that the passwords match, the process  300  proceeds to process block  316 , where communications between the verification unit and the computer  12  is reestablished, while communications between the verification unit  20  and the keyboard  16  remains inhibited. The process  300  then advances to process block  318 , where the verification unit  20  sends a signal indicative of successful authentication of the entered password to the computer  12 . The verification unit  20  then turns off the LED  38 . 
     Next, the process  300  proceeds to process block  320 , where the computer  12  prompts the operator to enter the new password. Communications between the verification unit  20  and the computer  12  is then suspended, while communications between the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20  is reestablished, as shown in process block  322 . The verification unit  20  then turns on the LED  38 . The process  300  then proceeds to process block  324 , where the operator enters the new password, which is temporarily stored in the RAM  66  of the verification unit  20 . Next, the verification unit  20  turns off the LED  38  and the computer  12  prompts the operator to enter the new password again, as shown in process block  326 . Communications between the verification unit  20  and the computer  12  is suspended, and the LED  38  is turned on again, as shown in process block  328 . The operator then enters his new password again, as shown in process block  330 . Control is then passed to decision block  332 . 
     At decision block  332 , the verification unit  20  determines if the two entries match. If not, the process  300  proceeds to process block  334 , where the verification unit  20  turns off the LED  38  and communications between the computer  12  and the verification unit  20  is reestablished. The process  300  then returns to process block  320 . If, at decision block  332 , the verification unit  20  determines that the two entries match, the process  300  proceeds to process block  336 , where the verification unit  20  replaces the password read from the card  34  with the new password. The verification unit  20  then turns off the LED  38  and communications between the computer  12  and the verification unit  20  is reestablished, as shown in process block  338 . The process  300  then terminates. 
     FIG. 7 is a flow chart of the key translation process  400  of the present invention. Beginning from a start state, the process  400  proceeds to process block  402 , where an operator A located at the computer  12  receives an encrypted message from an operator B at another computer (not shown). The operator A also receives a key K for encrypting the message from B, which was encrypted with B&#39;s private key and forwarded with B&#39;s user identification (ID). To encrypt the message, operator A forwards B&#39;s user identification and the encrypted key K to the verification unit  20  (block  404 ). The verification unit  20  then compares the encrypted key K with keys that are stored in the ROM  64  of the verification unit  20  (block  406 ). Each key on the list has a corresponding translation key which may be used in translating the encrypted key K. If the key K does not match any of the keys on the list, the process  400  proceeds to process block  408 , where the verification unit  20  sends a signal to computer  12  indicating that there is no match. The computer  12  then displays a message indicating that the key K cannot be translated. The process  400  then terminates. If, at decision block  406 , the verification unit  20  determines that the key K matches one of the keys on the list, the process  400  proceeds to process block  410 , where the verification unit  20  decrypts the encrypted key K with the translation key associated with the matched key on the list, and re-encrypts the decrypted key using A&#39;s private key. The process  400  then proceeds to process block  412 , where the re-encrypted key is forwarded back to A, and used to decrypt the message from B. The process  400  then terminates. 
     Other functions of the verification unit  20  include the management of cipher keys that protect other keys and the generation of session keys that are sent to the PACS residing the CPU  40  for use in preparing classified documents and files. Examples of such functions include the generation of a random number and the enciphering or deciphering of data, which are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
     Upon request by the operator or by an application program running on the computer  12 , the verification unit  20  may generate a random number, which is provided to the computer  12 . The random number may be used to encrypt messages or other keys. Since the program which generates random numbers on the computer  12  may easily be captured or emulated, this aspect of the present invention permits provides a secure means of providing session keys. The random number thus generated may also be stored on the card  34  and subsequently used to encrypt other keys. 
     The verification unit  20  may also encipher data provided from the computer  12 , upon request from the operator or by an application program running on the computer  12 . For example, a command representative of such a request is first entered by the keyboard operator. The data to be enciphered is forwarded from the computer  12  to the verification unit  20 . Upon receipt of this data, the verification unit  20  enciphers it using one of a plurality of keys stored in its memory  62 . The enciphered data is then returned to the computer  12 . 
     Likewise, the verification unit  20  may decipher data provided from the computer  12 , upon request from the operator. In this case, the operator must first be authenticated, using process  100  as described above. When authenticated, the operator issues a command to the verification unit, requesting the deciphering of a block of data. The data to be deciphered, along with a key identification number which identifies the key to be used for deciphering (located in the verification unit  20 ), are then provided to the verification unit  20 . Upon receipt of this information, the verification unit  20  deciphers the data and then sends the deciphered data back to the computer  12 . 
     The implementation of the present invention provides a simple, cost-effective and compact system that enforces access control to one or more application programs running on a computer, while requiring minimal user relocation. The implementation of the present invention authenticates passwords for accessing such application programs while ensuring that the passwords will not be tampered with by software running on the computer. The present invention also facilitates the creation and alteration of users who are authorized to use the application programs. In addition, the present invention provides a number of security functions for the protection of application programs running on the computer. These functions involve the management of cipher keys that protect other keys and the generation of session keys that are sent to the computer for use in preparing classified documents and files. 
     Thus, the present invention provides a simple, elegant and cost-effective consumer-level method and apparatus of authenticating a password or personal identification number (PIN) independently from the computer, so that access control to one or more application programs running on the computer may be enforced, while minimizing the risk of capture of the password by unauthorized users and also minimizing the complexity of user operation. Due to the cost-effective and compact features of the present invention, the verification unit  20  may readily be utilized in consumer-level applications such as home-banking. 
     The authentication system described above may also be configured to authenticate personal identification data, such as biometric features of a user. The term “biometric” as used herein refers to a substantially stable physical characteristic of a person, which can be automatically measured and characterized for comparison. Such biometrics include fingerprints, palm prints, retinal prints, and facial characteristics. Biometrics may also include behavioral characteristics, such as the manner in which a person writs his or her signature. The term “metric” as used herein refers to a set of data which can be automatically compared to the scanned biometric. A metric may be a recorded digital image of the biometric which is compared to the scanned biometric by cross-correlation. More typically a metric is a recorded set of characteristics or measurements which can be repeated on the scanned biometric and compared with the recorded set. Automatic comparison of human biometrics is known by one of skill in the art and is discussed in “Vital Signs of Identity”, IEEE Spectrum, pages 22-30, February 94, and is incorporated herein by reference. 
     FIG. 8 is a perspective view of a second embodiment of the authenticating system of the present invention. The authentication system  10   a  of FIG. 8 is identical to the authentication system  10  of FIG. 1, with the exception that the verification unit  20   a  further comprises a scanner  25 . In an alternate embodiment, the verification unit  20   a  further comprises a scanner  25  and a scanner interface circuit  27  (see FIG.  10 ). In one embodiment, the scanner  25  is a biometric scanner. The scanner  25  scans a field in which scannable indicia or a biometric, such as a fingerprint, may be presented. In one embodiment, the scanner interface circuit  27  is a data processing circuit that is further coupled to other input/output devices such as a printer, a transmitter and/or an auxiliary data input. 
     In one alternate embodiment, the scanner  25  is located external to the verification device  20   a . In this case, biometric data is forwarded to the verification device  20   a  for comparison with a metric that is stored either in RAM  84   b  on the verification device  20   a  or in memory  36  of the card  34 . 
     FIG. 9 illustrates one embodiment of the scanner  25  of FIG.  8 . The scanner  25  comprises conventional optics  510  which focus the field  450  onto a charge coupled device (CCD)  520 . The CCD  520  generates a digital signal representative of the field  450  in a manner that is known by one of skill in the art. The scanner  25  may also include light emitting diodes (LEDs)  500  or other sources of illumination generally known to one of ordinary skill in the art, to illuminate the field  450 , if necessary. 
     FIG. 10 illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of the verification unit  20   a  of FIG.  8 . The verification unit  20   a  is substantially identical to the verification unit  20  as shown in FIG. 2, with the exception that it further comprises a scanner  25 . In an alternate embodiment, the verification unit  20   a  comprises a scanner  25  and a scanner interface circuit  27 . Upon scanning a field (such as field  450  as shown in FIG.  9 ), the scanner  25  generates a signal representative of the field scanned. The signal is provided to the processor  60 , which compares the scanned indicia or biometric with a metric stored in RAM  66 . If there is a match, the processor  60  issues a validation signal that is provided either to the verification unit  20  or to the computer  12 . Otherwise, a error signal is generated. 
     Techniques for validating various biometric characteristics are well known. For example, the article “Vital signs of Identity” describes numerous commercially available systems for recognizing fingerprints, hand geometry and signatures. Accordingly, a person of ordinary skill in the art can readily implement such recognition techniques. 
     The signal generated by the scanner  25  is also provided to the scanner interface circuit  27 . The scanner interface circuit  27  is coupled to memory  62  and processor  60 . In one embodiment, the scanner interface circuit  27  is also coupled to a printer (not shown), which may be configured to print a hard copy record of a transaction. In an alternate embodiment, the scanner interface circuit  27  is connected to an auxiliary data input (not shown) for inputting data. 
     FIG. 11 is a perspective view of a third embodiment of the authenticating system of the present invention. The authentication system  10   b  of FIG. 11 is substantially identical to the authentication system  10  of FIG. 1, with the exception that the keyboard  16   a  further comprises a scanner  25   a . In one embodiment, the scanner  25   a  is identical to the scanner  25  of FIG.  9 . In an alternate embodiment, the keyboard  16   a  further comprises the scanner  25  and a scanner interface circuit  27  (see FIG.  12 A). 
     FIG. 12A illustrates a block diagram of one embodiment of the keyboard  16   a  of FIG.  11 . The keyboard  16   a  comprises a processor  80  and a memory module  82  which includes both read only memory (ROM)  84   a  and random access memory (RAM)  84   b . The keyboard  16   a  also comprises a keypad  86  that is coupled to the processor  80 . In addition, the keyboard  16   a  comprises the scanner  25   a . In one embodiment, the keyboard  16   a  further comprises the scanner  25   a  and a scanner interface circuit  27   a.    
     ROM  84   a  includes firmware which the processor  80  executes for monitoring the line  22  from the keyboard  16   a . This firmware performs read/write operations to/from RAM  84   b , where RAM  84   b  is used as a temporary buffer for data inputs and outputs. 
     In the embodiment of FIG. 12A, the scanned indicia or biometric is converted into a signal representative of the indicia or biometric scanned. The signal is provided to the processor  80 , which compares the scanned indicia or biometric with a metric stored in RAM  84   b . If there is a match, the processor  80  issues a validation signal that is provided either to the verification unit  20  or to the computer  12 . Otherwise, a error signal is generated. 
     FIG. 12B illustrates a block diagram of an alternate embodiment of the keyboard  16   b  of FIG.  11 . The keyboard  16   b  is substantially identical to the keyboard  16   a  of FIG. 12A, with the exception that it further comprises a card reader/writer  90  which receives a card such as card  34  through a slot (not shown). The card reader/writer  90  reads and/or writes data to or from the card  34 . A clock module  88  provides timing signals for the operation of the processor  80  and the card  34 . In one embodiment, the clock module  88  comprises a single clock which provides timing signals for both the processor  80  and the operation of the card reader/writer  90 . In another embodiment, the clock module  88  comprises two clocks, one for driving the processor  80  and the other for driving the operation of the card  34 . The keyboard  16   b  also provides ground and power to the card  34 . 
     In the embodiment of FIG. 12B, the scanned indicia or biometric is converted into a signal representative of the indicia or biometric scanned. The signal is provided to the processor  80 , which compares the scanned indicia or biometric with a metric stored in RAM  84   b  or with a metric stored in the memory e.g., memory  36  of a card, such as card  34 . In the first case (i.e., where the metric is stored in RAM  84   b ), the processor  80  issues a validation signal if there is a match. Otherwise, a error signal is generated. In the second case (i.e., where the metric is stored in the memory of the card), the processor e.g., processor  35  located on the card  34  issues a validation signal, which is forwarded to the processor  80 , which subsequently generates a validation signal that is provided either to the verification unit  20  or to the computer  12 . 
     In a further embodiment, the scanner  25  may be located external to the keyboard  16   a  or  16   b , and is coupled to the keyboard  16   a  or  16   b  via a signal line. In this case, the scanner  25  performs the same function as the scanner of FIG.  12 A. In another embodiment, the keyboard  16   a  or  16   b  does not include the processor  80  or memory module  82 , so that signals provided from the scanner  25   a  (which may be located internal or external to the keyboard  16   a  or  16   b ) are forwarded to the verification device  20  (FIG. 1) via the keyboard  16 . In this case, the scanner  25  forwards the biometric data to any one of: (1) the card inserted in the card reader  90  of keyboard  90  (FIG.  12 B), (2) the verification device  20  (FIG.  1 ), or (3) the card  34  inserted in the verification device  20  (FIG.  1 ), for verification. 
     FIGS. 13A and 13B illustrate a flow chart of an alternate embodiment of the access authorization process of the present invention. For a two-factor verification process, in which the scanned biometric is compared with a stored metric, the process  500  may be implemented using any one of: the verification unit  20   a  (FIG.  10 ); the keyboard  16   a  (FIG. 12A) in conjunction with the verification unit  20  (FIG.  2 ); the verification unit  20  in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the verification unit  20 ; or with the keyboard  16  (FIG. 2) in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the verification unit  20 . For a three-factor verification process, in which the scanned biometric is compared with a stored metric, and an entered password is compared to a stored password, the process  500  may be implemented using any one of: the keyboard  16  (FIG. 2) in conjunction with the verification unit  20   a  (FIG.  10 ); the keyboard  16   a  (FIG. 12A) in conjunction with the verification unit  20  (FIG.  2 ); the keyboard  16  and the verification unit  20  in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the verification unit  20 ; or with the keyboard  16  (FIG. 2) in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the verification unit  20 , and the verification unit  20 . In alternate embodiments, various combinations of the keyboard  16 ,  16   a  and  16   b , the verification unit  20 ,  20   a  and the scanner  25  may be implemented to perform the process  500  in accordance with the principles of the present invention. For present discussion purposes, the verification unit  20   a  and the keyboard  16  will be referred to in the following sections. In addition, although a biometric is referred to in the process  500 , it is understood that other scannable indicia may also be used in implementing the access authorization process. 
     To gain access to a software application enabled with the PAC security application program interface, access authorization from the verification unit  20   a  must first be obtained. This authorization is obtained as follows. Beginning from a start state, the process  500  proceeds to process block  502 , where the PACS running on CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the verification unit  20   a  for initiating access authorization. The card  34  may be inserted in the verification unit  20   a  at this time. 
     The verification unit  20   a  then proceeds to state  1 , as shown in process block  504 . In this state, S 1  is closed while S 2  is open, i.e., data is ported from the keyboard to the verification unit  20   a  and the communication path between the verification unit  20   a  and the computer  12  is suspended, which in turn suspends communication between the keyboard  16  and the computer  20 . The verification unit  20   a  then turns on the LED  38 , indicating that the path for entering the biometric is secure. The process  500  then advances to process block  506 , where the CPU  40  directs the monitor  14  to display the message “Please present biometric”. The operator then presents his or her biometric for scanning by scanner  25 . The scanner  25  scans the biometric and temporarily stores the scanned biometric in RAM  66 . 
     The process  500  then advances to process block  508 , where the verification unit  20  reads the metric stored on the card  34  through the card reader  68 . The metric from the card  34  is temporarily stored in RAM  66 . The process  500  then proceeds to process block  510 , where the processor  60  in the verification unit  20  determines if the scanned biometric is valid by comparing it to the metric previously stored on the card  34 . The result of the validation process is sent to the computer  12 , as shown in process block  512 . The process  500  advances to decision block  514 , where the CPU  40  in computer  12  determines if result provided indicates that the scanned biometric is valid. If the CPU  40  determines that the password is invalid, it issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit  20   a  to remain in state  1 , as shown in process block  516 . The operator is thus denied access to the software on the computer  12 . In addition, the failed attempt is recorded by the card  34 . 
     The process  500  then proceeds to decision block  518 , where the verification unit  20   a  determines if a predetermined number M of consecutive failed attempts have been recorded. If not, the process  500  returns to process block  506 , where the operator is allowed another attempt at entering the correct password. If, however, the verification unit  20   a  determines that the predetermined number M of consecutive failed attempts has been reached, the process  500  proceeds to process block  520 , where the card  34  is locked and/or permanently disabled. The process  500  then terminates. This feature of the verification unit  20   a  ensures that consecutive tries at guessing the password can be detected. In addition, this feature of the verification unit  20   a  provides additional security by locking and/or permanently disabling the card  34  after a predetermined number of consecutive failed attempts has occurred. 
     If, at decision block  514 , the scanned biometric is determined to be valid, the process  500  determines if further verification is required, as shown in decision block  522 . If not, the CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit  20   a  to direct the processor  60  to proceed to state  3 , where communications between the keyboard  16  and computer  12  may be established, as shown in process block  524 . The process  500  then terminates. 
     If further verification is required, the process  500  proceeds to process block  526 , where the CPU  40  directs the monitor  14  to display the message “Please enter password”. The keyboard operator then enters his or her password via keyboard  16 , which is provided to the verification unit  20   a  via line  22   c , the adapter  18 , and line  24   d  (see FIG.  2  and FIG.  10 ). The password is encrypted and temporarily stored in RAM  66 . 
     The process  500  then advances to process block  528 , where the verification unit  20   a  reads the encrypted password stored on the card  34  through the card reader  68 . The encrypted password from the card  34  is temporarily stored in RAM  66 . The process  500  then proceeds to process block  528 , where the processor  60  in the verification unit  20   a  determines if the entered encrypted password is valid by comparing it to the encrypted password previously stored on the card  34 . The result of the validation process is sent to the computer  12 , as shown in process block  530 . The process  500  advances to decision block  530 , where the CPU  40  in computer  12  determines if result provided indicates that the entered password is valid. If the CPU  40  determines that the password is invalid, it issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit  20   a  to remain in state  1 , as shown in process block  534 . The operator is thus denied access to the software on the computer  12 . In addition, the failed attempt is recorded by the card  34 . 
     The process  500  then proceeds to decision block  536 , where the verification unit  20   a  determines if a predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts have been recorded. If not, the process  500  returns to process block  526 , where the operator is allowed another attempt at entering the correct password. If, however, the verification unit  20   a  determines that the predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts has been reached, the process  500  proceeds to process block  538 , where the card  34  is locked and/or permanently disabled. The process  500  then terminates. This feature of the verification unit  20   a  ensures that consecutive tries at guessing the password can be detected. In addition, this feature of the verification unit  20   a  provides additional security by locking and/or permanently disabling the card  34  after a predetermined number of consecutive failed attempts has occurred. 
     If, at decision block  532 , the entered password is determined to be valid, the CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the processor  60  in the verification unit  20   a  to direct the processor  60  to proceed to state  3 , where communications between the keyboard and computer may be established, as shown in process block  540 . The process  500  then terminates. Alternatively, the CPU  40  may prompt the keyboard operator to enter a second password, and process blocks  526 - 540  may be repeated to provide additional security. The application software program or programs accessed by the operator upon authentication of his entered password may be used to perform cryptographic operations, such as the decryption or encryption of messages. 
     As discussed earlier, in an alternate embodiment, the process  500  may, at process blocks  510  and  528 , respectively forward the scanned biometric and the entered password to the card  34  for comparison. In that case, the respective scanned biometric or password are temporarily stored in memory  36  of the card  34 . The processor  35  of the card then compares the scanned biometric (in process block  510 ) with its internally stored metric and/or compares the entered password (process block  528 ) with its internally stored password. Upon comparison, the processor  35  issues a status signal to the verification unit  20   a , that is representative of the result of the search. The verification unit  20   a  than issues another signal to the computer  12  indicative of this result. The process  500  then proceeds as described above. It is understood by one skilled in the technology that the status signal may be implemented as a status bit or a flag that is forwarded from the card  34  to the verification unit  20   a  or from the verification unit  20   a  to the computer  12 . 
     In alternate embodiments, the verification unit  20   a  can perform additional security functions for the protection of application programs running on the CPU  40  in computer  12 , which is in turn coupled to a computer network or system. These functions include the creation and alteration of users who are authorized to use the application programs, and are described in earlier sections. 
     FIGS. 14A and 14B illustrate a flow chart of a third embodiment of the access authorization process of the present invention. For a two-factor verification process, in which the scanned biometric is compared with a stored metric, the process  600  may be implemented using any one of: the keyboard  16   a  (FIG. 12A) in conjunction with the verification unit  20  (FIG.  2 ); the keyboard  16  (FIG. 2) in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the keyboard  16 , and the verification unit  20 ; or the keyboard  16   b . For a three-factor verification process, in which the scanned biometric is compared with a stored metric, and an entered password is compared to a stored password, the process  600  may be implemented using any one of: the keyboard  16   b ; the keyboard  16  (FIG. 2) in conjunction with the verification unit  20   a  (FIG.  10 ); the keyboard  16   a  (FIG. 12A) in conjunction with the verification unit  20  (FIG.  2 ); the keyboard  16  in conjunction with an external scanner that is coupled to the keyboard unit  16 , and the verification unit  20 . In alternate embodiments, various combinations of the keyboard  16 ,  16   a  and  16   b , the verification unit  20 ,  20   a  and the scanner  25  may be implemented to perform the process  600  in accordance with the principles of the present invention. For present discussion purposes, the keyboard  16   b  will be referred to in the following sections. In addition, although a biometric is referred to in the process  600 , it is understood that other scannable indicia may also be used in implementing the access authorization process. 
     To gain access to a software application enabled with the PAC security application program interface, access authorization from the keyboard  16   b  must first be obtained. This authorization is obtained as follows. Beginning from a start state, the process  600  proceeds to process block  602 , where the PACS running on CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the keyboard  16   b  for initiating access authorization. The card  34  may be inserted in the card reader  90  of the keyboard  16   b  at this time. 
     The communications path between the keyboard  16 B and the computer  12  is then suspended, as shown in process block  604 . The keyboard  16   b  then turns on the LED  92 , indicating that the path for entering the biometric is secure. The process  600  then advances to process block  606 , where the CPU  40  directs the monitor  14  to display the message “Please present biometric”. The operator then presents his or her biometric for scanning by scanner  25   a . The scanner  25   a  scans the biometric and temporarily stores the scanned biometric in RAM  84   b.    
     The process  600  then advances to process block  608 , where the keyboard  16   b  reads the metric stored on the card  34  through the card reader  90 . The metric from the card  34  is temporarily stored in RAM  84   b . The process  600  then proceeds to process block  610 , where the processor  80  in the keyboard  16   b  determines if the scanned biometric is valid by comparing it to the metric previously stored on the card  34 . The result of the validation process is sent to the computer  12 , as shown in process block  612 . The process  600  advances to decision block  614 , where the CPU  40  in computer  12  determines if result provided indicates that the scanned biometric is valid. If the CPU  40  determines that the scanned biometric is invalid, it issues a command to the processor  80  in the keyboard  16   b  remain in a state in which the communications path between the keyboard and the computer remains suspended. The operator is thus denied access to the software on the computer  12 , as shown in process block  616 . In addition, the failed attempt is recorded by the card  34 . 
     The process  600  then proceeds to decision block  618 , where the keyboard  16  determines if a predetermined number M of consecutive failed attempts have been recorded. If not, the process  600  returns to process block  606 , where the operator is allowed another attempt at entering the biometric. If, however, the keyboard  16  determines that the predetermined number M of consecutive failed attempts has been reached, the process  600  proceeds to process block  620 , where the card  34  is locked and/or permanently disabled. The process  600  then terminates. This feature of the keyboard  16  ensures that consecutive tries at presenting the biometric can be detected. In addition, this feature of the keyboard  16   b  provides additional security by locking and/or permanently disabling the card  34  after a predetermined number of consecutive failed attempts has occurred. 
     If, at decision block  614 , the scanned biometric is determined to be valid, the process  600  determines if further verification is required, as shown in decision block  622 . If not, the CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the processor  80  in the keyboard  16   b  to direct the processor  80  to proceed to a state in which communications between the keyboard  16   b  and computer  12  may be established, as shown in process block  624 . The process  600  then terminates. 
     If further verification is required, the process  600  proceeds to process block  626 , where the CPU  40  directs the monitor  14  to display the message “Please enter password”. The keyboard operator then enters his or her password via keyboard  16 . The password is encrypted and temporarily stored in RAM  84   b.    
     The process  600  then advances to process block  628 , where the keyboard  16   b  reads the encrypted password stored on the card  34  through the card reader  68 . The encrypted password from the card  34  is temporarily stored in RAM  84   b . The process  600  then proceeds to process block  628 , where the processor  60  in the keyboard  16   b  determines if the entered encrypted password is valid by comparing it to the encrypted password previously stored on the card  34 . The result of the validation process is sent to the computer  12 , as shown in process block  630 . The process  600  advances to decision block  632 , where the CPU  40  in computer  12  determines if result provided indicates that the entered password is valid. If the CPU  40  determines that the password is invalid, it issues a command to the processor  80  in the keyboard  16   b  to remain in a state in which communications between the keyboard  16   b  and the computer  12  remains suspended. The operator is thus denied access to the software on the computer  12 , as shown in process block  634 . In addition, the failed attempt is recorded by the card  34 . 
     The process  600  then proceeds to decision block  636 , where the keyboard  16   b  determines if a predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts have been recorded. If not, the process  600  returns to process block  626 , where the operator is allowed another attempt at entering the correct password. If, however, the keyboard  16   b  determines that the predetermined number N of consecutive failed attempts has been reached, the process  600  proceeds to process block  638 , where the card  34  is locked and/or permanently disabled. The process  600  then terminates. This feature of the keyboard  16   b  ensures that consecutive tries at guessing the password can be detected. In addition, this feature of the keyboard  16   b  provides additional security by locking and/or permanently disabling the card  34  after a predetermined number of consecutive failed attempts has occurred. 
     If, at decision block  632 , the entered password is determined to be valid, the CPU  40  in computer  12  issues a command to the processor  80  in the keyboard  16   b  to direct the processor  80  to proceed to a state in which communications between the keyboard  16   b  and computer  12  may be established, as shown in process block  640 . The process  600  then terminates. Alternatively, the CPU  40  may prompt the keyboard operator to enter a second password, and process blocks  626 - 640  may be repeated to provide additional security. The application software program or programs accessed by the operator upon authentication of his scanned biometric and/or entered password may be used to perform cryptographic operations, such as the decryption or encryption of messages. 
     As discussed earlier, in an alternate embodiment, the process  600  may, at process blocks  610  and  628 , respectively forward the scanned biometric and the entered password to the card  34  for comparison. In that case, the respective scanned biometric or password are temporarily stored in memory  36  of the card  34 . The processor  35  of the card then compares the scanned biometric (in process block  610 ) with its internally stored metric or compares the entered password (process block  628 ) with its internally stored password. Upon comparison, the processor  35  issues a status signal to the keyboard  16   b , that is representative of the result of the search. The keyboard  16   b  then issues another signal to the computer  12  indicative of this result. The process  600  then proceeds as described above. It is understood by one skilled in the technology that the status signal may be implemented as a status bit or a flag that is forwarded from the card  34  to the keyboard  16   b  or from the keyboard  16   b  to the computer  12 . 
     In one embodiment, the keyboard  16   b  can perform additional security functions for the protection of application programs running on the CPU  40  in computer  12 , which is in turn coupled to a computer network or system. These functions include the creation and alteration of users who are authorized to use the application programs, as described in earlier sections. 
     The present invention thus provides access control to one or more application programs running on the computer, while reducing the need for reliance on human memory in retrieving the personal access code, and also reducing human error in entering the personal access code to the authentication system. The present invention also provides enhanced security by providing a two or three-factor authentication system and method. 
     The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from its spirit or essential characteristics. The described embodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore, indicated by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description. All changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are to be embraced within their scope.

Technology Category: 3