Patent Document

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
       [0001]    This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No. 10/991,743, filed Nov. 18, 2004. 
     
    
     BACKGROUND 
       [0002]    The present invention relates generally to operating systems and architecture and more particularly to an operating system and run-time architecture for safety critical systems. 
         [0003]    Aircraft systems are subject to functionality restrictions and the verification requirements specified in the RTCA/DO-178B (DO-178B) Standard, “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification.” The Federal Aviation Authority in conjunction with its world wide counterparts recognizes and enforces adherence to this standard. In the RTCA/DO-178B standard, there are three concepts of interest defined, the first being “Levels of software criticality,” the second concept being protection, and the third, which is closely related to the second is the concept of partitioning. 
         [0004]    Software levels of criticality, as defined in the DO-178B standard, are defined as five differing levels (e.g. Levels A, B, C, D, E), where Level A represents software of the highest criticality and Level E the lowest in terms of the software&#39;s function in controlling safety critical function on the aircraft. Thus the standard provides a method to classify high criticality functions and tasks from lower level criticality functions and tasks. Safety critical standards from other industries may define this concept similarly. 
         [0005]    The DO-178B standard defines partitioning as the separation of software levels of criticality in both time and space running on a single CPU. Thus a partitioned design provides both Time Partitioning and Space Partitioning. Time Partitioning is the ability to separate the execution of one task from another task, such that a failure in one task will not impede the execution of the other. Space Partitioning is defined as the separation of execution space for two partitions, such that one partition cannot corrupt the other partition&#39;s memory (space), or access a critical resource. The DO-178B standard defines protection as the protection of one partition from another partition, such that a violation of either time or space in a partition has no effect on any other partition in the system. 
         [0006]    Many existing task analysis and scheduling techniques exist in real-time preemptive operating systems today. One method of interest is Deadline Monotonic Analysis (DMA) and Scheduling (DMS) (reference Embedded Systems Programming see “Deadline Monotonic Analysis,” by Ken Tindell, June 2000, pp. 20-38). Deadline Monotonic Analysis (DMA) is a method of predicting system schedule-ability where the system is a CPU with multiple tasks that are to be executed concurrently. DMA requires that the analyst have the following basic information for every task to be scheduled in the system: 1) Task period, the task cycle or rate of execution. 2) Task Deadline, the time that the task must complete execution by as measured from the start of a task period. 3) The task&#39;s worst case execution time (WCET), the worst-case execution path of the task in terms of instructions converted to time. Armed with this basic information the analyst can use the DMA mathematics or formulas to predict if the system can be scheduled, i.e. whether all tasks will be able to meet their deadlines in every period under worst case execution scenarios. If the system can be scheduled then the system can be executed using a runtime dynamic compliant Deadline Monotonic Scheduler (DMS). 
         [0007]    Existing Deadline Monotonic Schedulers use a dynamic method for determining individual task execution at runtime. At each timing interval, an evaluation is made at run-time to determine whether the currently executing task is to be preempted by a higher priority task, or whether a new task is due to be started on an idle system. This dynamic method achieves the goals of schedule-ability, but does introduce an element of variability, since the individual preemption instances and task initiation times may vary over successive passes through the schedule. For example, in an existing Deadline Monotonic Scheduler, individual task execution may be “slid” to an earlier execution time if the preceding task finishes early or aborts. Also, the number and placement of preemptions that take place are similarly affected, and so individual tasks may vary anywhere within the bounds defined by their DMS parameters. 
         [0008]    Even though the amount of variability in existing Deadline Monotonic Schedulers is limited to the schedule parameters, it is nevertheless undesirable for certain applications where a higher degree of predictability and repeatability is desired, for example, DO-178B (avionics) and other safety critical applications. 
         [0009]    In a partitioned design, tasks inside of one partition communicate data via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) or APplication/EXecutive (or APEX) as they are called in ARINC 653 compliant designs. The RTCA/DO-178B standard concept of protection requires that partitions be protected from each other such that a violation of either time or space in partition has no effect on any other partition in the system. This concept of protection applies to the APIs or APEX interfaces as well. 
         [0010]    In ARINC 653 compliant designs, partitions are given access to the APEX interface during the partition&#39;s window of execution. During this window, a partition can request or send data to any resource available in the system via calls to the appropriate APEX interface. 
         [0011]    In the case of the ARINC 653 compliant designs, all partitions have access to all of the APEX interfaces to request or send information. Thus, the standard has no concept for restricted use or protected services or restricted interfaces. Thus, it is possible for one partition to overload or corrupt any APEX interface or associated service such that the service is not available during the next partitions window of execution. This limitation does not support the protection criteria required by DO-178B in partitioned designs. 
         [0012]    Many safety critical industries like aviation provide regulatory guidelines for the development of embedded safety critical software. Adherence to safety critical software design standards involves creation of design and verification artifacts that must support and prove the pedigree of the software code in its particular application and assessed software criticality level. 
         [0013]    Adherence to these safety critical standards typically means that designers will spend less than 20% of their time producing the actual code, and greater than 80% producing the required supporting artifacts, and in some cases the time spent producing the code can enter the single digits. 
         [0014]    While adherence to these standards is meant to produce error-free embedded software products, the cost associated with the production of these products is high. As a result, the producers seek as much reuse as possible. Due to the critical nature of these products in the industries that they serve, the safety critical standards also provide guidance for reuse. 
         [0015]    The reuse guides typically state that a software configuration item can be reused without additional effort if it has not changed, implying that its artifacts have not changed in addition to the code. 
         [0016]    Today, only one standard exists for a partitioned software design in the safety critical world of avionics. That standard is the ARINC 653 standard. The ARINC 653 standard supports application partitions that could be reused across multiple applications. Since the standard provides a common APEX or user interface to the Operating System functions, it is possible to write an application that utilizes the specified APEX interface. If an application can be written using the standards specified for APEX interface calls only, then if properly developed, the applications artifacts and code would not change from product to product. 
         [0017]    One of the flaws with the ARINC 653 approach is that the underlying system hardware, like on aircraft avionics communications protocols and/or other product or system hardware devices, can and will change from program to program (or aircraft to aircraft). In addition, most aircraft OEM&#39;s change aircraft specifications from aircraft to aircraft which puts application software reuse at risk. 
         [0018]    In summary, existing safety critical operating systems contain many noticeable drawbacks, among these are the following: 
         [0019]    1) They do not ensure that the individual tasks grouped within a partition will be individually time partitioned. 
         [0020]    2) They do not provide the flexibility to space partition multiple tasks of the same criticality either individually or in subgroups. 
         [0021]    3) The architecture requires the operating system to provide all Application Programming Interfaces (API&#39;s) or APEX&#39;s in the case of ARINC 653, to all partitions. 
         [0022]    4) Access to system hardware or CPU resources is provided by the operating system via the API (or APEX in the case of ARINC 653), thus the interface for these resources is controlled by the operating system, and could change from platform to platform, limiting the ability to reuse software without change. 
         [0023]    5) The architecture and API or APEX interfaces provide no mechanism for exclusive use of critical resources by a partition, the concept of protected resources. 
         [0024]    6) The architecture and API or APEX interfaces are open to use by any caller and as such does not provide protection for each partition. 
         [0025]    7) Runtime dynamic compliant Deadline Monotonic Schedulers do not limit task execution variability. 
       SUMMARY 
       [0026]    An operating system for an aircraft according to an exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes an application layer and a core services layer that is time and space-partitioned from the application layer. A hardware interface layer, being time and space-partitioned from both the application layer and the core services layer, is operable to control communications with hardware in a computer. 
         [0027]    An operating system for an aircraft according to another exemplary aspect of the present disclosure includes a plurality of core services and a plurality of application specific services that are time and space-partitioned from the core services. The core services are common across multiple platforms. The application specific services are specific to one of the multiple platforms, such that the application specific services can be modified without altering the core services. A hardware interface layer is time and space-partitioned from both the core services and the application specific services. The hardware interface layer is operable to control communications with hardware in a computer. 
     
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         [0028]    Other advantages of the present invention can be understood by reference to the following detailed description when considered in connection with the accompanying drawings wherein: 
           [0029]      FIG. 1  is a high level schematic of a control system, shown controlling systems of an aircraft. 
           [0030]      FIG. 2  is a schematic of the architecture of the control system. 
           [0031]      FIG. 3  illustrates the operation of the message queues in  FIG. 2  generally. 
           [0032]      FIG. 4  illustrates a first step in the operation of the message queues of  FIG. 3 . 
           [0033]      FIG. 5  illustrates a first step in the operation of the message queues of  FIG. 3 . 
           [0034]      FIG. 6  illustrates a first step in the operation of the device drivers of  FIG. 2 . 
           [0035]      FIG. 7  illustrates a second step in the operation of the device drivers of  FIG. 6 . 
           [0036]      FIG. 8  illustrates a third step in the operation of the device drivers of  FIG. 6 . 
           [0037]      FIG. 9  illustrates a fourth step in the operation of the device drivers of  FIG. 6 . 
           [0038]      FIG. 10  conceptually illustrates the space partitioning of the control system. 
           [0039]      FIG. 11  illustrates the method of scheduling used in the control system. 
           [0040]      FIG. 12  illustrates the operation of the schedule for use in the control system. 
       
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       [0041]      FIG. 1  schematically illustrates a control system  20  installed and in use in an aircraft  22 . The control system  20  includes a CPU  24  having a processor  26  and memory  28  storing an operating system  30  and other software for controlling the functions of the aircraft  22 , including the engine  34   1 , brakes  34   2 , navigation  34   3 , climate control  34   4 , exterior lighting  34   5 , interior lighting  34   6  and other functions (up to function  34   N ). The memory  28  could be RAM, ROM and may be supplemented by a hard drive or any other electronic, magnetic, optical or any other computer readable media. 
         [0042]      FIG. 2  schematically illustrates the architecture of the control system of  FIG. 1 . The operating system  30  is within its own partition  40  and communicates with board support package (BSP) interfaces  44 , which communicates with BSP services  46 , for interfacing with hardware  48 . Core support services  50  (one shown), each in its own partition, also communicate with the BSP interfaces  44 . The operating system  30  and core support services  50  communicate with one another and the application specific service  70  via core programming interfaces  54 ,  56 . The operating system  30  and core support services  50  communicate with the core reusable application programming interface (API)  60  for interfacing with a plurality of application partitions  62   1  to  62   N , each containing a plurality of tasks  64   1  to  64   N . The application specific service  70  also communicates with the partitions  62  via an application specific programming interface  72 . 
         [0043]    The application tasks  64   1 - 64   N  in each partition  62  run in user mode and are certified to the level of criticality required by function hazard assessment and system safety assessment. The application tasks  64  can have their own partitions  62  or can share a partition  62  with one or more tasks  64  of the same criticality level, as shown. The application tasks  64  interface with the application specific support services  70 , core support services  50  and the operating system  30  through the APIs  60 ,  72 . It should be noted that the application tasks  64  do not interface with the hardware  48  directly. The core support service  50  and application specific support service  70  run in user mode, while the operating system  30  runs in supervisor mode. 
         [0044]    The tasks within the core support service  50  can each have their own unique partitions or can share a partition with one or more core support services of the same criticality level. The tasks within the core support services  50  interface with the application tasks  64 , other application specific support services  70 , operating system  30  and the BSP services  46  through APIs  60 ,  72 ,  44 . 
         [0045]    The application specific support services  70  module contains tasks that run in user mode. The services  70  are reserved for services that change from aircraft to aircraft. The application specific support services  70  tasks are certified to a level of criticality required by functional hazard assessment and system safety assessment. Application specific support service  70  tasks can have their own unique partitions or can share a partition with one or more tasks of the same criticality level. The tasks in each application specific support service  70  interface with the applications  64 , core support services  50 , operating system  30 , and the BSP services  46  through APIs  60 ,  72  and  44 . The tasks in the BSP services  46  run in user mode. The interfaces will be particular to the product&#39;s hardware interfaces. The hardware interfaces can either be tasks or device drivers. Tasks can have their own unique partitions or can share a partition of one or more tasks of the same criticality level (hardware access and partition needs must be considered). Device drivers can be called by any task in any partition to read data without delay. Device drivers can handle writing to hardware I/O, if an exclusive device driver (one per task). The BSP services  46  interface with the core support services  50  application specific support services  70  and operating system  30  through BSP interfaces  46 . 
         [0046]    The APIs comprise two types: message queues and device drivers. Referring to  FIG. 3 , the message queues  60   a - b  (only two shown for purposes of illustration) can have fixed length messages or variable length messages and provide communication across partitions. The message queues  60   a - b  pass multiple messages between an application task  64  in one partition  62   1  and an application task  64  in another partition  62   2 . Message queues are controlled by the RTOS  30  (in terms of size, shape, access, etc) and are implemented using system calls. Each message queue  60   a - b  is dedicated to sending messages from one specific task  64  to another specific task  64  in a single direction. Each queue  60   a - b  has one task  64  as the sender and the other task  64  as the receiver. If the two tasks  64  require handshaking, then two queues must be created, such as in the example shown. Message queue  60   a  sends messages from task  64   1  to task  64   2  while message queue  60   b  sends messages from task  64   2  to task  64   1 . Each task  64  has a queue  60  for each of the tasks  64  to which it has to send data and a queue  60  for each of the tasks  64  from which it has to receive data. 
         [0047]    Referring to  FIG. 4 , in use, a sending task  64   1  (such as the “galley light switch task”) copies its message to the queue  60   a  (“galley light to communications” queue), which resides in the RTOS  30  during its task slot. Referring to  FIG. 5 , I/O communications services  50   a  is one of the services  50  shown generically in  FIG. 2 . During its task slot, the receiving task, I/O communications services  50   a  (in this example), copies the message from the queue  60   a.  In this example, the I/O communications services  50   a  would then map the output data to the hardware  48  (via BSP Interfaces  44  of  FIG. 2 , not shown in  FIG. 5 ). 
         [0048]    Referring to  FIG. 6 , device drivers (one device driver  60   c  is shown) can also be used to read information between task partitions  62 . Device drivers  60   c  have a single entry point and are re-entrant and pre-emptive. The device drivers  60   c  are implemented using system calls and there is no data delay. The device drivers  60   c  are operated in supervisor mode by the RTOS and can traverse space partitions. The I/O communications services  50   a  retrieves inputs from hardware  48  during its period of execution and places an image of the data into a memory map  73 . As shown in  FIG. 7 , a task  64   1  (in this example again, the “galley light switch task”) requests the communication I/O device driver  60   c.  The request is handled in the RTOS  30  executing in supervisor mode. RTOS  30  adds code and data partition to the MMU for the device driver  60   c.  Execution is then placed in user mode and the device driver  60   c  is invoked. Referring to  FIG. 8 , the communication I/O device driver  60   c  executes with memory that is partitioned for both the galley light switch task  64   1  and the I/O communications services  50   a.  The device driver  60   c  copies the requested inputs into the galley light switch data partition. Referring to  FIG. 9 , when the device driver  60   c  is finished, execution returns to the RTOS  30  in supervisor mode. The RTOS  30  removes the code and data partition from the MMU for the device driver  60   c.  Execution is then returned to the requesting task  64   1  and the total execution time required to run the device driver  60   c  is charged to the requesting task  64   1 . 
         [0049]    The space partitioning is illustrated conceptually in  FIG. 10 . A mask  69  is defined by Block Address Translation (BAT) registers  71 ,  76 ,  80 , and is used for space partitioning. For example, a task  64  is assigned data BAT entry  71 , which defines a partition  74  in RAM  28   a  of memory  28 , for example. Transition lookaside buffer (TLB)  76  defines a partition  78  in RAM  28   a  for task  64 . Further, instruction BAT entry register  80  defines partition  82  in ROM of memory  28   b  of memory  28 . 
         [0050]    Tasks  64  are assigned to a partition  74 ,  78  and  82 . Every task  64  switch loads in the predefined registers  71 ,  80  of the partition that task  64  belongs to. No searches are required if a BAT miss is encountered. The miss is a space partitioning fault. The transition lookaside buffer  76  on chip page table registers are used for stack protection. No searches are required if a TLB miss occurs. The miss is a space partitioning fault. The BAT registers  71 ,  80  are defined at compile time. All registers can be used for designer to allocate. The last register is multiplexed with a device driver. For communication, all tasks  64  can write to the last register. 
         [0051]    For the instruction BATs  80 , the first register is assigned to the operating system API instruction area (function call). The second to the last registers can be used for a designer to allocate. The last register is multiplexed with a device driver. Switching tasks requires first a check that a Single Event Upset (SEU) did not occur in the BAT registers. Then the BAT registers  71 ,  80  are updated with the new tasks  64  partition BAT values. The system then checks that the SEU did not occur for the TLB registers for the stacked protection. The current TLB registers are invalidated for the current task  64  and the TLB registers  76  are updated with the new tasks  64  values. 
         [0052]      FIG. 11  illustrates an example of the method of scheduling used in the control system. The example consists of Tasks A, B and C. In the example, Task A has a 3-unit WCET, a deadline of 3 units and a period of 10 units. Task B has a 2-unit WCET, a deadline of 5 units and a period of 10 units. Task C has a 7-unit WCET, a deadline of 18 units and a period of 20 units. Using the deadline monotonic algorithm, the repeating schedule  88  is created as shown. The three Task A execution blocks  90  are scheduled before the Task A deadline  92  (of 3 units) during every Task A period  94  (of 10 units). The two Task B execution blocks  100  are scheduled before the Task B deadline  102  (of 5 units) during every Task B period  104  (of 10 units). The seven Task C execution blocks  110  are scheduled before the Task C deadline  112  (of 18 units) during every Task C period  114  (of 20 units). The seven Task C execution blocks  102  are distributed such that five of the execution blocks  102  are during what corresponds to the one period  94 ,  104  of Tasks B and C, and two are during what corresponds to another period  94 ,  104  of Tasks B and C. This leaves three unused execution blocks  120 , which may then be used for the task monitoring function. 
         [0053]    Referring to  FIG. 12 , the schedule  88  does not change during operation. For example, the first three execution blocks  90  are always for Task A, even if A should terminate or fail. A status register  130  has a plurality of registers  132  that each correspond to the time blocks in the schedule  88 . The status register  130  indicates the expected operation of the task associated with that particular status register  130 . For example, the “1” may mark the beginning of a task for restarting the task. The “0” may signify that the Task may continue executing. The “2” indicates that the Task should end. An index  134  of the deadline monotonic scheduler  136  is incremented at each timer interrupt  138 . The index  134  indicates which execution block in the schedule  88  is currently being performed. 
         [0054]    The DM scheduler  136  ensures that no task can starve or block another task, because the DM scheduler  136  will only give each task the exact execution blocks that are allotted it in the schedule  88 . Therefore, if Task A, for example, fails to complete before the third execution block, where the status register  132  of “2” indicates that the Task A should end, Task A is terminated, put to sleep or restarted. In the fourth execution block, Task C begins on schedule. If necessary, the entire control system  20  may be restarted. 
         [0055]    A new schedule can be inserted when the index  134  reaches the end of the current schedule  88 . The index  134  is then set to the beginning of the new schedule. For example, the system  20  may utilize a first, startup schedule for startup and another normal schedule for normal operation. The startup schedule may permit some of the various tasks more time to start up, with different WCETs, periods and deadlines. Once the system  20  is in full operation, the normal schedule may be seamlessly switched into operation. 
         [0056]    In accordance with the provisions of the patent statutes and jurisprudence, exemplary configurations described above are considered to represent a preferred embodiment of the invention. However, it should be noted that the invention can be practiced otherwise than as specifically illustrated and described without departing from its spirit or scope.

Technology Category: g