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47f59bf5c3762865a1fa6bfe5b1ce39809ece69523cf01bb9595bcf1eeb64c35

Russia won’t compromise AND military progress will make Ukraine overconfident, escalating to demands that Russia can’t concede

Chris Brown 3/15, foreign correspondent based in the CBC’s London bureau, “Many Ukrainians now believe they can defeat Russia's army, complicating diplomatic negotiations,” CBC, 3/15/2022, https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.6384782

saying peace could be within days are disingenuous and an effort to deflect failure onto Ukraine Putin cannot acknowledge Ukraine being sovereign is obsessed with delusions demand unconditional surrender it's difficult to picture giving back territory it seized yet, for Zelensky , allowing Russia to keep the land would be toxic Ukraine risk overestimating its position and holding out If you see your adversary suffering that encourages you to escalate your own aims Ukrainians talk openly about Crimea I don't think Russia is going to concede

the Russian news agency TASS over the weekend saying peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have made "considerable progress" and that " documents could be signed" within days In response , Ukrainian negotiators said they sensed a shift in the unfounded Russian position also that their own demands were finally being listened to But in interviews with CBC Ukrainian leaders and one former diplomat are putting little faith in talks to stop the war Instead Russian statements that negotiations are progressing are disingenuous — and are more likely an effort to deflect failure to secure a ceasefire onto Ukraine Putin cannot acknowledge any chance for Ukraine being sovereign is obsessed with delusions and hallucinations it's a waste of time trying to figure out what exactly he wants the public position taken by Russian negotiators has been to demand Ukraine's unconditional surrender , along with the removal of Zelensky In any peace negotiation it's difficult to picture Russia giving back the Ukrainian territory it has seized — and yet, for Zelensky , allowing Russia to keep the land would be toxic to a population that's furious with Russia for launching this war the price is so tremendous we are not ready to give up our territory Ukraine runs the risk of overestimating its bargaining position and holding out for a more favourable offer " If you see your adversary suffering and moderating their war aims accordingly, then that in turn encourages you to escalate your own aims and take the fight further Ukrainians now talk openly about having their army not just push Russian troops back to where they were when their invasion began but to recapture Crimea But that anger could obfuscate what could be done reasonably ; I don't think Russia is going to concede Crimea ."

TASS saying peace talks "considerable progress" documents within days response shift unfounded Russian position own demands listened to CBC Ukrainian leaders diplomat little faith in talks to stop the war progressing disingenuous deflect failure Ukraine Putin cannot acknowledge any chance being sovereign obsessed delusions hallucinations waste of time unconditional surrender removal of Zelensky difficult giving back territory it seized Zelensky keep toxic furious with Russia for launching this war price so tremendous not ready give up our territory Ukraine overestimating its bargaining position holding out more favourable offer suffering encourages escalate your own aims further openly just invasion recapture Crimea anger obfuscate reasonably don't think Russia is going to concede Crimea ."

['The announcement from the Russian news agency TASS over the weekend might have sounded too good to be true for Ukrainians, and for those distraught by the devastation inflicted by Russian bombs and missiles on Ukrainian cities and civilians.', 'It quoted prominent Russian Duma deputy Leonid Slutsky as saying peace talks between Ukraine and Russia have made "considerable progress" and that "documents could be signed" within days.', 'In response, Ukrainian negotiators said they sensed a shift in the utterly unfounded Russian position of its "denazification" and "demilitarization" of Ukraine. They also said they sensed that their own demands were finally being listened to by the Russian officials on the other side of the table.', 'But in interviews with CBC News, Ukrainian leaders and one former Ukrainian diplomat are putting little faith in this current round of talks to stop the war.', 'Instead, they believe Russian statements that negotiations are progressing are, at best, disingenuous — and are more likely an effort to deflect failure to secure a ceasefire onto Ukraine. ', "'Everyone in Ukraine wants peace'", 'They also fear it will take another lengthy period of intense warfare, with a high number of civilian casualties, before the Kremlin is ready to make a deal that Ukraine could accept.', '"Listen, I think Putin was very clear when he explained that he just does not accept the idea of Ukraine," said Andriy Shevchenko, a former Ukrainian MP who served as Ukraine\'s ambassador in Ottawa for six years, until 2021.', "He told CBC News that most Ukrainians see Russian President Vladimir Putin's war of aggression against their nation as an effort to destroy the Ukrainian identity. ", '"I think he cannot acknowledge any chance for Ukraine being a sovereign nation, deciding for itself what kind of future it wants to have," Shevchenko said. "Everyone in Ukraine again badly wants peace, but I think our expectations for these negotiations are very low at the moment." ', 'Shevchenko spoke to CBC News in the western Ukrainian city of Lviv, where he is organizing an international media centre to help share Ukrainian perspectives about the war with the rest of the world. ', "Despite the danger, he continues to travel back and forth to the capital, Kyiv, where his wife is a TV presenter and reports on Ukraine's defence.", '"We are dealing with a man [Putin] who is absolutely obsessed with historical delusions and hallucinations, and I think it\'s just a waste of time trying to figure out what exactly he wants," Shevchenko said. ', "Until now, the public position taken by Russian negotiators has been to demand Ukraine's unconditional surrender, along with the removal of Volodymyr Zelensky as president. ", 'They have also indicated that any future Ukrainian government would have to change its constitution to prohibit it from joining organizations like the European Union or military alliances such as NATO.', 'Russia expected a swift military strike: U.S.', "Few people outside of the Kremlin, however, know exactly what Putin's next steps might be. The country's decision to criminalize publishing information contradictory to the Russian government's position on the war has made it extraordinarily difficult for media to access to it. ", "American intelligence officials, however, believe Russia's original plan was to stage a lightning military strike on the capital Kyiv, capture or kill the Ukrainian president and replace him with a Russian-friendly leader.", "Almost three weeks after the invasion, however, Russia's main military thrust on the capital appears to have stalled. ", 'Beyond Kyiv, its troops have failed to capture most of their key objectives, although the loss of civilian lives and the destruction inflicted on its cities has been horrendous.', 'Much of Kharkiv — a city formerly of 1.3 million people — is in ruins.', 'Mykolaiv and Mariupol to the south have badly damaged by bombing, although Ukrainian soldiers and civilians remaining inside those cities continue to prevent Russian troops from taking over.', 'Ukraine claims it has killed 12,000 Russian soldiers, destroyed almost 400 tanks and shot down 160 aircraft and helicopters, although the Pentagon has estimated its casualties as between 2,000 and 4,000. ', 'While none of those claims have been independently verified, even if the actual Russian losses are a third of what Ukraine says they are they would still represent a humiliating setback for a military that was once touted as one of the strongest in the world.', "Still, for all of the efforts of Ukraine's army, Russian forces have managed to push deep into Ukraine's southern areas, capturing territory around the Sea of Azov and linking up to form what's known as a land bridge with separatist enclaves of Donbas and Luhansk. ", "In any peace negotiation, experts told CBC News that it's difficult to picture Russia giving back the Ukrainian territory it has seized — and yet, for Ukraine's Zelensky, allowing Russia to keep the land would be toxic to a population that's furious with Russia for launching this war.", '"I think the price that we have been paying is so tremendous, is so huge, and we are not ready to give up our territory and our people," Shevchenko said.', "Alexander Lanoszka, an assistant professor of international relations at the University of Waterloo, says Russia's behaviour over the past few days indicates the Kremlin leadership may no longer believe its military can accomplish a takeover of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian side may be correct at sensing some weakness.", 'Why Ukraine might hold out on a deal', 'Russia "is taking battlefield losses; it\'s making unusual requests to China [for military help] as well as asking for Syrian mercenaries and Belarussian military participation, all of which suggests that there\'s a major lack of confidence on the Russian side that they can pull this thing off," Lanoszka said.', 'But he says Ukraine also runs the risk of overestimating its bargaining position and holding out for a more favourable offer — rather than the first that might end the war.', '"If you see your adversary suffering and moderating their war aims accordingly, then that in turn encourages you to escalate your own war aims and to take the fight even further," Lanoszka said.', 'In the aftermath of the 2014 popular revolution in Ukraine that dumped a Russian-leaning government for one that was more pro-European, Russia seized the Ukraine-controlled Crimean Peninsula. The Kremlin also triggered and subsequently fuelled an eight-year war between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government in the Donetsk region. ', 'Many Ukrainians now talk openly about having their army not just push Russian troops back to where they were when their invasion began on Feb. 24, but to recapture the other Russian-controlled regions too, especially Crimea.', '"They\'re angry and they have every right to be," Lanoszka said. "But that anger could obfuscate what could be done reasonably; I don\'t think Russia is going to concede Crimea."']

[(6, 11), (12, 16)]

91f255066f7fd02c6f14b38b63f076774691a14460a12abbe5f55ca1144e2f17

Zero chance regime change ends with pro-Western leadership

Csaba Barnabas Horvath 3/13, assistant researcher at the Silk Road Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, “Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along?,” Geopolitical Monitor, 3/13/2022,

if regime change occurs , it is not sure whether it will be elite change as well the second line of leadership simply removes Putin himself however United Russia continue to govern if change is not a inside job Russian opposition parties were not pro-Western but far-right and Communists takeover would end in prolonged civil war

if regime change occurs , it is not at all sure whether it will be an elite change as well . It could easily happen in a way where the second line of Putin’s leadership simply removes Putin himself , putting the blame for their own responsibility in the war on him however , they , and United Russia continue to govern the country if the regime change is not a mere inside r job , but brings down the party and its elite even then , throughout elections during the last decade, the two strongest Russian opposition parties were not pro-Western but Zhirinovsky’s far-right and the Communists . Thus even if the United Russia party falls from power, then most likely it would be either Zhirinovsky , or the Communists , or an alliance that would take over the country, and not some pro-Western government any takeover attempt would likely end up in prolonged turmoil or even civil war

regime change occurs not at all sure elite change well easily second line of Putin’s leadership removes Putin himself own him they United Russia continue to govern the country not mere inside job party elite even then opposition not pro-Western Zhirinovsky’s far-right Communists Zhirinovsky Communists alliance not pro-Western government takeover attempt prolonged turmoil civil war

['The only major danger for China in case of a Russian defeat is the possibility of a pro-Western regime change. As more time passes with no particular advance of the Russian war effort in Ukraine, more and more discussion raises on the possibility of a possible coup against Vladimir Putin in case the war ends up in an obvious and undeniable fiasco for Russia, as in this case, all the sacrifice Russia had to suffer for the war would be proven to have been in vain. However, there are several factors to be taken into consideration here: First, in case of a Russian fiasco, a regime change is a mere possibility that may or may not happen, while in case of a Russian victory, the virtual reestablishment of the Soviet Empire would be a certainty, therefore, the latter one is a certain evil for China, while in case of a former one, the bad outcome is only a mere possibility for China. Vladimir Putin could very well stay in power, and in that case, a weakened Russia would be the most isolated from the West, thus the most dependent on an alliance with China. Second, even if a regime change occurs, it is not at all sure whether it will be an elite change as well. It could easily happen in a way where the second line of Putin’s leadership simply removes Putin himself, putting the blame for their own responsibility in the war on him as well; however, they, and the United Russia party continue to govern the country. Third, if the regime change is not a mere insider job, but brings down the United Russia party and its elite itself, even then, throughout elections during the last decade, the two strongest Russian opposition parties were not pro-Western parties, but Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s far-right party and the Communists. Thus even if the United Russia party falls from power, then most likely it would be either Zhirinovsky, or the Communists, or an alliance of both that would take over the country, and not some pro-Western government. Fourth, even if somehow some pro-Western group attempts to take control, given the immense support of not only the United Russia party but of the Party of Zhirinovsky and the Communists, public support for anti-Western Russian nationalism seems to be so strong, that any pro-Western takeover attempt would likely end up in prolonged turmoil or even a civil war. This, however, as we will see, would be something that China could take advantage of.']

[(15, 27)]

6bb4a775c6e96aaf7a5655c4e9f89b3954d93374100fa146e0f8654d2cb2fadf

It'd be a full collapse OR military dictatorship

Liana Fix & Michael Kimmage 3/4, Liana Fix is a Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, in Washington, D.C.; Michael Kimmage is Professor of History at the Catholic University of America and a Visiting Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russia/Ukraine portfolio, “What If Russia Loses?,” Foreign Affairs, 3/4/2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-04/what-if-russia-loses

a weakened humiliated Russia , harboring revanchist impulses akin to Germany after World War I . If Putin maintains power , Russia will become a pariah with a nuclear arsenal difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging Even if Putin loses his grip the country is unlikely to emerge a democracy . It could split Or become a nuclear military dictatorship

The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present fundamental challenges Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw a weak Russian control could mean a fractured, destabilized area of continuous fighting The humanitarian catastrophe would be unlike anything in decades No less worrisome is the prospect of a weakened humiliated Russia , harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I . If Putin maintains his grip on power , Russia will become a pariah a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but its nuclear arsenal intact it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war. Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia, the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy . It could split apart Or become a nuclear -armed military dictatorship it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center

loss fundamental challenges withdraw weak Russian control fractured, destabilized area continuous fighting humanitarian catastrophe unlike anything decades less weakened humiliated Russia revanchist impulses Germany after World War I maintains power pariah rogue superpower chastened conventional military nuclear arsenal intact very difficult liberal loses grip unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy split apart nuclear -armed military dictatorship immensely difficult stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center

['The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges. Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day, rebuilding Ukraine, with the political goal of welcoming it into the EU and NATO, will be a task of Herculean proportions. And the West must not fail Ukraine again. Alternatively, a weak form of Russian control over Ukraine could mean a fractured, destabilized area of continuous fighting with limited or no governance structures just east of NATO’s border. The humanitarian catastrophe would be unlike anything Europe has seen in decades.', 'No less worrisome is the prospect of a weakened and humiliated Russia, harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. If Putin maintains his grip on power, Russia will become a pariah state, a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact. The guilt and stain of the Ukraine war will stay with Russian politics for decades; rare is the country that profits from a lost war. The futility of the costs spent on a lost war, the human toll, and the geopolitical decline will define the course of Russia and Russian foreign policy for many years to come, and it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war.', 'Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia, the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart, especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a nuclear-armed military dictatorship. Policymakers would not be wrong to hope for a better Russia and for the time when a post-Putin Russia could be genuinely integrated into Europe; they should do what they can to enable this eventuality, even as they resist Putin’s war. They would be foolish, however, not to prepare for darker possibilities.', 'History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist, humiliated power near its center, especially one of the size and weight of Russia. To do so, the West would have to adopt an approach of continuous isolation and containment. Keeping Russia down and the United States in would become the priority for Europe in such a scenario, as Europe will have to bear the main burden of managing an isolated Russia after a lost war in Ukraine; Washington, for its part, would want to finally focus on China. China, in turn, could try to strengthen its influence over a weakened Russia—leading to exactly the kind of bloc-building and Chinese dominance the West wanted to prevent at the beginning of the 2020s.']

[(6, 11), (20, 27), (28, 31)]

2ea29fd02dcdb74342c1f8d139a11fdde79be28c9df2a3b46f3a1070a75ed7d4

If not, it’ll result in a durable military totalitarianism---causes future wars that are worse

David Ignatius 3/17, writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column for The Washington Post, “Watching Russia’s Military Failures Is Exhilarating. But A Cornered Putin Is Dangerous.,” Washington Post, 3/17/2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/17/cornered-putin-dangerous-ukraine-david-ignatius/

Russia will be in disarray after this war But As bad as Putin has been, there are future versions of Russian despotism that could be more destabilizing punitive peace after World War I spawned Nazi Germany Russia is in radical decline the dangers as Russia crumbles may be more ruinous conflict to come

Biden and his allies should begin planning for the endgame Putin doesn’t have a plan but neither does the West Russia will be in disarray after this war , politically and economically. It will be tempting to let that mess fester But beware As bad as Putin has been, there are future versions of Russian despotism that could be even more destabilizing A punitive peace after the horrors of World War I spawned the nightmare of Nazi Germany Russia is in radical decline ; we are watching the second fall of the Soviet Union the dangers as Russia crumbles may be a more ruinous conflict to come

planning for the endgame doesn’t have a plan neither does the West disarray fester beware As bad as Putin has been, there are future versions of Russian despotism that could be even more destabilizing punitive peace World War I spawned the nightmare of Nazi Germany radical decline second fall of the Soviet Union dangers Russia crumbles more ruinous conflict to come

['— President Biden and his allies should begin planning for the endgame of this war. Putin doesn’t have a plan, but neither does the West. What’s needed is an architecture of security so that neither Russia nor Ukraine feels threatened. Putin kept telling us for 15 years that there was trouble ahead; he meant it. The genius of the leaders of 1945 was that they built a structure for peace: the United Nations; the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund. The world will be rebuilt after this war; this reconstruction needs Russian and Chinese input or it will fail.', '— Russia will be in disarray after this war, politically and economically. It will be tempting to let that mess fester, especially if Russia continues to occupy parts of Ukraine. But beware: As bad as Putin has been, there are future versions of Russian despotism that could be even more destabilizing for Europe. A punitive peace after the horrors of World War I spawned the nightmare of Nazi Germany. Russia is in radical decline; we are watching, in effect, the second fall of the Soviet Union. Beware the dangers as Russia crumbles.', '— The Ukraine war may be just a rehearsal for a more ruinous conflict to come. That was the case with the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905; the world assumed that Russia would sweep to a quick victory, but its poor performance prefigured the fall of the czarist monarchy and was in many ways a prelude to World War I. Many of the most hideous features of 1914 had a trial run in 1905.']

[(6, 14), (15, 19)]

ac64a95be2fa255695035442f00082ed85200c43cd32ccd41cea2c75a69d84c5

No meltdown risk

Stephen Stapczynski & Shoko Oda 3/4, staff writer at Bloomberg, “What We Know About Ukraine’s Shelled Nuclear Plant,” Bloomberg, 3/4/2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-04/what-we-know-about-ukraine-s-shelled-nuclear-plant-quicktake

Unlike Chernobyl reactors are pressurized have containment structures Chernobyl did not Unlike Fukushima have separate water circuits also emergency cooling systems and multiple injection systems prevent a core melt shells designed to withstand an aircraft crash not likely will break emergency response should shut the reactors Even if damaged would be contained backup generators won’t spiral

News of attack by Russia on a nuclear power plant sent shudders around the world. But fire was contained and damage was unlikely to result in devastation seen in Chernobyl Unlike Chernobyl , the reactors are pressurized They have containment structures Chernobyl did not Unlike Fukushima VVER reactors have separate water circuits to cool the reactor and to produce steam They also have emergency core cooling systems and multiple injection systems to prevent a core melt The reactors are protected with thick metal and cement shells designed to withstand an aircraft crash it is not likely they will break the buildings emergency response systems should shut the reactors once they sense the vibrations from the attack Even if those were damaged meltdown would be contained as long as there is power -- and backup generators it won’t spiral into a meltdown

fire contained damage unlikely to result in devastation Chernobyl Unlike pressurized containment structures Chernobyl not Fukushima separate water circuits emergency core cooling systems injection systems core melt shells designed aircraft crash not likely break the buildings response systems shut the reactors damaged contained power backup generators won’t spiral

['News of what Ukrainian officials said was an unprecedented attack by Russia on a nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, sent shudders around the world. But a fire that broke out at the Zaporizhzhia site in the early hours of March 4 was eventually contained and the damage was unlikely to result in the kind of devastation seen in the last nuclear disaster on Ukrainian soil, the 1986 meltdown at Chernobyl. ', '1. How did the episode start?', 'Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba wrote on Twitter early Friday that a fire had broken out at the plant in southeastern Ukraine after Russian shelling overnight. One shell hit the plant’s first production unit, which was under maintenance, according to the head of Ukraine’s Energoatom nuclear power utility, Petro Kotin. The facility, near the city of Enerhodar, has six reactors and a total capacity of 5.7 gigawatts, enough to power more than 4 million homes.', '2. What was the result?', 'Kuleba had initially warned that an explosion would be 10 times larger than Chernobyl. Emergency services said later they had extinguished the blaze and there were no casualties. No radiation escaped and the integrity of the reactors wasn’t compromised, said Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world’s nuclear watchdog. The plant’s second and third units were put into safe “cold mode” and the fourth remained in operation as it was the most distant from the shelling zone, said Kotin. The reactors are “being protected by robust containment structures,” U.S. Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm said in a statement. ', '3. What was the response? ', 'Grossi said he was gravely concerned by the situation in Ukraine and had offered to meet Russian and Ukrainian representatives to try to reduce nuclear safety risks. The incident drew condemnation from NATO foreign ministers. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said it was “a crime, nuclear terrorism,” and called for further European Union sanctions against Moscow. Russia’s Defense Ministry said its forces have held the nuclear plant since Feb. 28 and accused Ukraine of a “provocation.”', '4. How does the plant compare to Chernobyl?', 'Unlike Chernobyl, the six reactors at Zaporizhzhia are pressurized water reactors (950 MW VVER-320), built in the early 1980s. They have containment structures around the reactor to stop any release of radiation. “Chernobyl did not have a containment,” said Dale Klein, a former chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Unlike the damaged Fukushima plant in Japan, these VVER reactors have separate water circuits to cool the reactor and to produce steam, according to Tony Irwin, a nuclear power expert and honorary associate professor at Australian National University. They also have emergency core cooling systems and multiple injection systems to prevent a core melt, he said.', '5. How strong are the containment structures?', 'The reactors are protected with thick metal and cement shells -- the head of Ukraine’s nuclear operator has said they are designed to withstand an aircraft crash. “Depending on what type of artillery shells they are firing, it is not likely they will break out the containment buildings,” Klein said. Nuclear plants are equipped with emergency response systems that should shut the reactors once they sense the vibrations from the attack, according to Mark Nelson, managing director of Radiant Energy Fund, which advises non-profits and industry about nuclear energy. Even if those systems were damaged, the meltdown would likely be contained within the facility.', '6. What about a meltdown?', 'If a nuclear fuel rod isn’t properly cooled and is exposed to air, then it can quickly heat up, begin to melt and release radioactive gases, which is the phenomenon known as a meltdown. But as long as there is power -- and backup diesel generators -- to keep the fuel rods cool, then it won’t spiral into a meltdown like the one that occurred in 2011 at Fukushima, which didn’t have electricity for a prolonged period of time following an earthquake and tsunami. “Multiple backup cooling systems are available and operators have been trained to be able to withstand plausible situations that could occur under any abnormal situation,” said Lake Barrett, a former official at the U.S. NRC who was involved with the cleanup after a partial meltdown at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in the U.S. in 1979. “If there is no significant military damage to their multiple redundant safety systems, the reactors should remain in a safe stable state.”']

[(8, 21), (28, 35)]

5cdcd309635674efe97eea842e81d57c717d9265a5e17b76fbd7b2237e21a5fa

A cornered Putin would use cyber AND chemical weapons

Keith Alexander & Donald R. Dixon 3/15, IronNet Co-CEO General (Ret.) Keith Alexander and Forgepoint Capital Co-Founder and Managing Director Donald R. Dixon, “The Russia-Ukraine War: Is cyber the next battleground?,” IronNet, 3/15/22, https://www.ironnet.com/blog/the-russia-ukraine-war-is-cyber-the-next-battleground

if Putin says this isn’t working , where does he go from here? losing would be total humiliation requires a quick win , but stubborn resilience means he must resort to unconventional tactics Acts of desperation give us war beyond the physical which include chemical as well as cyber capabilities are there so far has been minimal Nevertheless could target global entities a new form of warfare can paralyze a country a “ cyber Pearl Harbor

Russia still has overwhelming combat power as Putin’s war continues to go badly for Russia if Putin says this isn’t working , where does he go from here? From Putin’s perspective, losing this war would be total humiliation . He requires a quick win , but stubborn resilience means he must resort to unconventional tactics Putin is scrambling to get anybody he can to help Acts of desperation give us pause about forms of war fare beyond the physical which include chemical as well as cyber capabilities for destructive attacks are there , but will Putin use them? so far has been the cyber impact continues to be minimal and isolated to Ukrainian entities Nevertheless Putin’s cyber to carry out destructive attacks that could target global entities is a new form of warfare Without question can be used to paralyze a nother country ,” a “ cyber Pearl Harbor .”

Russia overwhelming combat power badly for Russia isn’t working where does he go from here? losing total humiliation quick win stubborn resilience unconventional tactics scrambling anybody he can to help desperation pause forms of war fare beyond the physical chemical cyber capabilities are there so far minimal Ukrainian cyber could global new form of warfare question paralyze a country cyber Pearl Harbor

['As we enter the third week of the Russia-Ukraine war, the resilience of the Ukrainian people and President Zelensky is worthy of the world’s admiration. Unfortunately, Russia still has overwhelming combat power. Many have speculated that Putin’s health may be severely compromised, in turn accelerating “his mission to restore what he considers lost Russian land.”', 'Putin simply doesn’t have the ground force capability to go much further than he already has, especially with his unrehearsed playbook and ill-trained and possibly disengaged troops. Not to mention the impact of swift, global sanctions and the fact that once-supportive Russian oligarchs are doing an about-face. Nevertheless, we suspect this week will continue to be another devastating one for Ukraine as the battle wages on.', "If we were to go back to 22-23 February and take a deep look at Russia’s and Putin’s objectives, it’s fair to say that the world thought Russia had more than sufficient forces to accomplish their early invasion of Ukraine with a fierce eye on overtaking Kyiv. That is, that they were trained and ready. What unfolded, however, was a spectacle on the global stage that demonstrated that Russia clearly was not ready to take over Kyiv (fortunately). They did not train. They didn't have the logistics. The fact that they had made very little progress toward Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro, moreover, over the last 10 days highlights the fact that lack of preparedness is turning out to be a big problem for Putin. We think the Russians would say it's an embarrassment.", 'Certainly, we are beginning to see signs of fracture within the Russian leadership as Putin’s war continues to go badly for Russia:', 'The battle for Kviv, which many thought would end in three days, could now take more than three weeks with significant cost to Russian forces', 'Limited supply chains and weather are hampering Russian progress', 'Most important, President Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have proven to be willing and more than able to fight for their freedom', 'Two top FSB (Russian internal service) leaders were arrested, allegedly for not providing accurate information on Ukraine prior to the invasion', 'Journalists have been threatened with 15 years in prison for disseminating “false information” as determined by the Russian government', 'When is enough enough in the Russia-Ukraine War? ', "The Ukrainians have proven to be like a buzz-saw to the Russian army, and the Russian military could be taking greater losses presumably than what's in the press. The impact of global sanctions (e.g., a fast-growing list of multi-national companies pulling out of Russia) as well as responsive efforts among the U.S., NATO, and EU to work together have placed increased pressure on Putin, who may also be very sick (physically) as some have asserted. The war is getting to a point where if Putin says this isn’t working, where does he go from here?", "The UK’s Chairman of the Commons Defence Select Committee Tobias Ellwood recently wrote, “From Putin’s perspective, losing this war would be total humiliation. He requires a quick win, but Ukraine’s stubborn resilience means he must resort to unconventional tactics to secure victory.” Right now, Putin is scrambling to get anybody he can to help because he recognizes he doesn't have the force structure he needs to not only take Ukraine but to also hold onto it.", 'The potential for cyberwarfare', 'Acts of desperation give us all pause about forms of warfare beyond the physical domain, which could include chemical as well as cyber. If we go back to recent history, to 2015, we know that Russia, in fact, did cross the cyber-physical barrier. In that case, two electrical distribution companies were shut down, as Russian-backed adversaries did a distributed denial of service attack on the phone system, which prevented people from calling up to find out why their power was out. The capabilities for destructive attacks are there, but will Putin use them?', 'With ongoing attention on possible spillover to the cyber realm, many are asking why the cyber theater so far has been quiet. Overall, the cyber impact continues to be minimal and primarily isolated to Ukrainian entities. Perhaps Putin’s cyber forces are completely engaged in the Ukraine, helping with intelligence and ongoing Russian tactical operations. Nevertheless, all are on guard for Putin’s potential use of cyber to carry out destructive attacks that could target global entities, especially across the financial and energy sectors. Indeed, cyber is a new form of warfare. Former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta suggests the same, “The reality is that cyber is today a weapon of war. Without question, it can be used to paralyze another country,” who added that we could be facing a “cyber Pearl Harbor.”']

[(6, 17), (28, 38)]

6f8838cc8fb878096d161b8c51aa33c08d20dc7fc328c80e7ef9a64f1b9ce33d

It fits their broader strategy of escalate-to-deescalate---consensus of experts

Anthony Faiola 3/15, foreign affiars columnist at the Washington Post, citing Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Why Putin’s nuclear threat could be more than bluster,” Washington Post, 3/15/22,

if boxed in Putin could use one in Ukraine the highest risk if the resistance in Ukraine shifts toward triumph , and Moscow is seen to be losing I find it hard to imagine Putin accepting defeat without nuclear weapons would fit escalate to de-escalate bringing a crisis to climax could nuke a ship a airplane The risk is higher than the West think might see deployment as unimaginable But don’t think it’s unimaginable for Putin there’s a cultural difference Russians finish military exercises with nuclear strikes there is comfort with nuc s as big artillery

The world might reel in horror at nuclear deployment of any size if boxed in some argue Putin could use one in Ukraine without triggering World War III this might not be a question of sanity , but perspective Putin dwells in a “ moral sphere the rest of us would find impossible to conceive he finds the highest risk of Putin deploying a nuclear device if the against-the-odds resistance in Ukraine shifts toward triumph , and Moscow is seen to be decisively losing “ I find it hard to imagine Putin accepting military defeat without trying to use nuclear weapons he sees nuclear use as more attractive than accepting defeat if Putin went nuclear, he would almost certainly deploy a low-yield weapon with a narrow target. That would fit a Russian military strategy of escalate to de-escalate bringing a crisis to dramatic climax to force a settlement “They could nuke a ship nuke a Ukrainian airplane could nuke tanks on the ground But the message would be ‘Oh my God, he’s just used a nuclear weapon Putin would be hoping we’d say, ‘this has gone too far. We’ve got to sue for peace The risk is higher than the West think experts say . In the mind-set of Putin’s government , a nuclear option may not seem taboo The West might see nuclear deployment as unimaginable ; that such weapons exist only for deterrent. But don’t think it’s so unimaginable for Putin and for the Russians there’s a big cultural difference The Russians often finish their military exercises ,” which serve as war simulations , “ with nuclear strikes there is just a comfort with nuc lear weapon s as big artillery shells , whereas we see them as categorically different

reel in horror nuclear deployment of any size boxed in some argue use one in Ukraine without World War III sanity perspective moral sphere rest of us impossible to conceive highest risk nuclear device against-the-odds resistance in Ukraine triumph decisively losing hard to imagine Putin accepting military defeat without trying to use nuclear weapons nuclear use more attractive than accepting defeat fit escalate to de-escalate dramatic climax force a settlement nuke ship Ukrainian airplane tanks on the ground message ‘Oh my God, he’s just used a nuclear weapon hoping peace higher than the West think experts say Putin’s government taboo West unimaginable don’t think Putin Russians cultural difference finish their military exercises simulations with nuclear strikes comfort nuc s big artillery shells we categorically different

['The Russians are thought to have roughly 2,000 such weapons — some so small as to be attached to torpedoes, depth charges, or even artillery shells and land mines. The world might reel in horror at nuclear deployment of any size. But, if boxed into the right kind of corner, some argue, Putin could use one in Ukraine without necessarily triggering World War III.', 'Putin has already raised the alert level of Moscow’s nuclear forces. Washington has downplayed the prospect of Russian nuclear deployment, suggesting it’s just Kremlin bluster. But on Monday, United Nations Secretary General António Guterres articulated a dangerous truth: “The prospect of nuclear conflict, once unthinkable, is now back within the realm of possibility,” he told reporters.', 'Plenty of observers believe Putin would not risk even a low-grade nuclear attack. Doing so could trigger deeper sanctions than the ones already crippling the Russian economy, increase war opposition at home, negatively impact his all-important alliance with the Chinese and change perceptions in nations still hedging their bets with Russia, including India, Brazil and South Africa.', 'Still, this might not be a question of sanity, but perspective. As Michael Gove, a senior British official, reasoned this week, Putin dwells in a “moral sphere the rest of us would find almost impossible to conceive of.”', 'Talk to Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and it only adds to the jitters of simulating nuclear strikes on the Nukemap site. He told me this week that he finds the highest risk of Putin deploying a low-yield nuclear device if the against-the-odds resistance in Ukraine shifts toward triumph, and Moscow is seen to be decisively losing the war.', '“I find it hard to imagine Putin accepting a complete military defeat without him trying to use nuclear weapons first,” Kroenig said. “I think he sees limited nuclear use as more attractive than accepting defeat.”', 'He suggested if Putin went nuclear, he would almost certainly deploy a low-yield weapon with a narrow target. That would fit with what some experts view as a Russian military strategy of escalate to de-escalate — or bringing a crisis to dramatic climax to force a settlement with the West that leans toward Russian terms.', '“They could nuke a ship in the Black Sea, they could nuke a Ukrainian airplane, they could nuke tanks on the ground,” he continued. “They could nuke a small city, although that is probably less likely, and it’s less escalatory to go after a military target than a civilian one.”', '“But the message in the West would be, ‘Oh my God, he’s just used a nuclear weapon.’ I mean, at least that’s what Putin would be hoping for. That we’d say, ‘this has gone too far. We’ve got to sue for peace,’ ” he said.', 'The risk is higher than the West might think, some experts say. In the mind-set of Putin’s government, a nuclear option may not seem as taboo as it does to Western observers. During his 2018 state of the nation address, Putin, to loud applause, aired a concept video showing a storm of hypersonic, unlimited range nuclear missiles raining down on Florida.', 'The West might see nuclear deployment as unimaginable; that such weapons exist only for deterrent. But “I don’t think it’s so unimaginable for Putin and for the Russians,” Kroenig said. “I do think that there’s a big cultural difference here. The Russians often finish their major military exercises,” which serve as war simulations, “with nuclear strikes. … I think there is just, you know, a comfort with nuclear weapons as kind of big artillery shells, whereas we see them as categorically different weapons.”']

[(8, 19)]

2ea9840be628542ad7c44da0f13cab9e615acf57aaa2ed74a645924eb7b14520

That triggers escalating Western response---war games, former Russian diplomats, AND official posture agree that goes nuclear

Harry J. Kazianis 2/27, senior director at the Center for the National Interest, “Yes, Russia could use nuclear weapons,” Spectator World, 2/27/2022, https://spectatorworld.com/topic/russia-use-nuclear-weapons-nato-ukraine/

a Russian diplomat told Russia believe in escalating to deescalate wargame s for years assume Russia use t n w s But NATO is not itching to attack territory my Russian colleague explained if anything threatens ability to exist we use nuc s Putin is close to his redlines like a caged animal will strike back if we apply too much pressure using nuc s sanctions were the triggers to flex nuclear muscles may decide scorched earth at any cost is better than taking months The carnage akin to World War II The world would be horrified weapons would flow on a grand scale More sanctions follow Russia’s ability to exist , would be threatened Putin would escalate to deescalate horrible for all

RUSSIA COULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS Nuclear war is part of our strategic culture . Yes, we would start one if our homeland was threatened a Russian diplomat told me Russia for several years has believe d in the concept of escalating nuclear tensions to deescalate tensions , or what defense scholars call “escalate to deescalate.” The thinking goes that if Moscow’s under threat by overwhelming conventional force Russia reserved the right to respond with t n w s , or more , as Moscow has no way to win a conventional war in wargame simulation s for years we always assume Russia would use t n w s if a war ever did break out. But such thinking leaves a lot of ground uncovered . NATO is not itching for a fight with Moscow or to attack its territory my Russian colleague in what other situations Russia would use nuclear weapons, if any . He explained that “ if anything threatens our ability to exist as a nation and prosper we would use nuc lear weapon s I didn’t believe him then, but I do now. Putin is trying to tell us in no uncertain terms that we are coming close to his geopolitical redlines and , like a caged animal , he will strike back if we apply too much pressure . That could even mean using nuc lear weapon s sanctions that have targeted Russian banks and their access to SWIFT were surely the triggers for Putin to flex his nuclear muscles Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv, determining that a scorched earth policy and winning at any cost is better than taking months to take the country in full . The level of carnage we would see would be akin to World War II The world would be horrified weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale More sanctions follow Russia’s way of life , its ability to exist , would be threatened . The Putin regime would be threatened would escalate to deescalate could mean something horrible for all of us

USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS part of our strategic culture would start one homeland threatened Russian diplomat years believe escalating nuclear deescalate tensions thinking under threat overwhelming conventional force reserved respond t n w s more no way to win a conventional war wargame s years assume would use t n w s lot of ground uncovered not itching for a fight with Moscow attack its territory other any if anything threatens our ability to exist as a nation and prosper would use nuc s I didn’t believe him then, but I do now. close to his geopolitical redlines and caged animal strike back too much pressure using nuc s sanctions Russian banks SWIFT surely the triggers flex his nuclear muscles truly go all in scorched earth policy winning at any cost better months full carnage World War II horrified weapons Ukraine grand scale sanctions way of life ability to exist threatened regime would be threatened escalate to deescalate horrible for all of us

['YES, RUSSIA COULD USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS', '“Nuclear war is part of our strategic culture. Yes, we would start one if our homeland, our way of life, was threatened, absolutely. Why wouldn’t we?” ', 'That’s what a retired Russian diplomat told me on the sidelines of a track-two dialogue between US, Russian and Chinese experts back in 2012. And to be honest, for several years, I didn’t believe him. I took his comments as bragging, atomic machismo, if you will. ', 'The context of the conversation was a response to a question to my Russian colleague on the subject of Moscow’s nuclear weapons doctrine and thinking. Russia for several years has believed in the concept of escalating nuclear tensions to deescalate tensions, or what defense scholars call “escalate to deescalate.” ', 'The thinking goes that if Moscow’s actual territory was under threat by overwhelming conventional force — think a NATO attack — then Russia reserved the right to respond with tactical nuclear weapons, or more, as Moscow has no way to win a long-term conventional war against NATO forces. ', 'In fact, in wargame simulations I have participated in for several years now, we always assume that Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons against NATO if a war ever did break out. ', 'But such thinking leaves a lot of ground uncovered. NATO is not exactly itching for a fight with Moscow or to attack its territory, even with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. ', 'Back in 2012, I pressed my Russian colleague, asking in what other situations Russia would use nuclear weapons, if any. He explained that “if anything threatens our ability to exist as a nation and prosper, it is my view that we would use nuclear weapons.” ', 'I didn’t believe him then, but I do now. ', 'With Russian President Vladimir Putin now putting his nation’s nuclear forces on alert status, Moscow is signaling to us that recent arms shipments, sanctions, lashings in the media, and pressure placed on the Putin government are rattling nerves.', 'Putin is trying to tell us in no uncertain terms that we are coming close to his geopolitical redlines and, like a caged animal, he will strike back if we apply too much pressure. That could even mean using nuclear weapons. ', 'Recent sanctions that have targeted Russian banks and their access to the SWIFT messaging network were surely the triggers for Putin to flex his nuclear muscles. With ten Russian banks now essentially locked out of global markets and Moscow’s Central Bank limited in how it can use its $600 billion dollars in foreign exchange reserves, Putin is now facing what could be a financial crisis on par with what Boris Yeltsin faced in 1998, when the Russian economy nearly collapsed. ', 'The good news, if there is any, is that peace talks seem to be underway whereby both sides could come to some sort of agreement to end hostilities. Ukraine, for example, could make a formal pledge not to join NATO in name only, but so tightly knit itself to the alliance and the EU that Russia would think twice about a second invasion. Russia may accept that, knowing its forces would need at this point to rely on heavy weapons, large-scale bombing, hundreds more missile strikes, and much more overall force to truly take over Ukraine. ', 'But here is where things could go from bad to worse. If both sides can’t come to a deal, Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv, determining that a scorched earth policy and winning at any cost is better than taking weeks or months to take the country in full. The level of carnage we would see would be something akin to images from World War II: bombed-out cities, bodies on the streets, and total carnage everywhere. ', 'The world would be horrified — and would demand action against Russia. What would the West do? It’s likely that more weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale, putting more pressure on Putin to respond. More sanctions would then follow, including disconnecting all of Russia’s banks and financial institutions from SWIFT, including entities tied to Russian energy, the lifeblood of Moscow’s economy. ', 'At that point, Russia’s way of life, its ability to exist, would be threatened. The Putin regime would be threatened. What, oh, what would Moscow do then? Think “escalate to deescalate” — and that could mean something horrible for all of us.']

[(9, 17), (18, 22)]

5efdd83e47252380108cbcfddd8248bdd2e2874c05e2f1350cdb08cdac2d022b

Crisis comms are defunct---there are no checks on escalation

Miles A. Pomper 3/10, Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury, “Would Putin use nuclear weapons? An arms control expert explains what has and hasn't changed since the invasion of Ukraine,” Conversation, 3/10/2022, https://theconversation.com/would-putin-use-nuclear-weapons-an-arms-control-expert-explains-what-has-and-hasnt-changed-since-the-invasion-of-ukraine-178509

Arms control has been declining Russia embarked on ambitious modernization some fall outside New START cyber a sat s loom A i and hypersonic tech could shorten warning times Russia deploying missiles that carry both conventional and nuclear sowing confusion worries missile defense prevent nuclear response Strategic Stability Dialogue has been suspended have shaken the rickety strategic security architecture

Arms control has been declining Russia embarked on an ambitious nuclear weapons modernization program, and some of its exotic new strategic weapon systems fall outside of New START ’s restrictions . cyber attacks and a nti- sat ellite weapon s loom A i and hypersonic tech could shorten warning times Russia has been deploying missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, sowing confusion . And Russia worries that U.S. missile defense systems prevent an effective Russian nuclear response Before the Ukraine war, Biden and Putin had launched a Strategic Stability Dialogue to tackle these issues But the dialogue has been suspended with the outbreak of hostilities Putin’s recent moves have further shaken the rickety strategic security architecture . With the war underway, Putin announced an “enhanced combat alert” of the country’s nuclear forces

declining Russia modernization outside of New START cyber a sat s loom A i hypersonic tech shorten warning times deploying missiles both and confusion missile defense prevent effective Russian nuclear response Strategic Stability Dialogue tackle these issues suspended hostilities further shaken the rickety strategic security architecture . nuclear forces

['New challenges for an aging system', 'Inspections under the INF treaty ended in 2001 after the last banned missiles were removed from deployment. Under the Obama and Trump administrations, the U.S. accused Russia of violating the treaty by developing, testing and deploying cruise missiles that exceeded its 500-kilometer limit, an accusation Russia rejected. Backed by NATO allies, the Trump administration withdrew from the treaty in 2019. This left long-range strategic weapons as the only nuclear weapons subject to arms control agreements.', 'Shorter-range non-strategic nuclear weapons – those with a range of less than 500 kilometers, or roughly 310 miles – have never been covered by any agreement, a sore point with Washington and NATO allies because Moscow possesses far more of them than NATO does.', 'Arms control has been declining in other ways as well. Russia has embarked on an ambitious nuclear weapons modernization program, and some of its exotic new strategic weapon systems fall outside of New START’s restrictions. Meanwhile, cyberattacks and anti-satellite weapons loom as new threats to arms control monitoring and nuclear command and control systems.', 'Artificial intelligence and hypersonic missile technology could shorten the warning times for a nuclear attack. Russia has been deploying missiles that can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads, sowing confusion. And Russia worries that U.S. missile defense systems, especially in Europe, threaten strategic stability by permitting the U.S. to carry out a nuclear first strike and then prevent an effective Russian nuclear response.', 'Before the Ukraine war, Biden and Putin had launched a Strategic Stability Dialogue to tackle these issues and lay the groundwork for negotiations on a replacement for New START before it expires in 2026. But the dialogue has been suspended with the outbreak of hostilities, and it is difficult to foresee when it might resume.', 'Putin turns up the heat – but not to a boil', 'Putin’s recent moves have further shaken the rickety strategic security architecture. On the eve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, he said that “anyone who tries to interfere with us … must know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will lead you to such consequences as you have never before experienced in your history” and that Russia possesses “certain advantages in a number of the latest types of weapons.”', 'With the war underway, Putin announced an “enhanced combat alert” of the country’s nuclear forces, which is not a regular alert level in Russia’s system comparable to the U.S.‘s DEFCON status. In practice, the enhanced combat alert consisted largely of adding staff to shifts at relevant nuclear weapon sites. The announcement was designed to discourage NATO from intervening and to intimidate Ukraine.']

[(9, 20)]

f1a75c13a8696615c04f63478e633c5b85b69480d5d3761316f98d8a9969a3f8

Growth is unsustainable and innovation can’t solve---degrowth spurred by crisis is the only chance to avoid extinction

Thomas Wiedmann et al. 20, Thomas Wiedmann, Sustainability Assessment Program, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, UNSW Sydney; Manfred Lenzen, ISA, School of Physics, The University of Sydney; Lorenz T. Keyßer, Institute for Environmental Decisions, Department of Environmental Systems Science; Julia K. Steinberger, Sustainability Research Institute (SRI), School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, “Scientists’ Warning on Affluence,” Nature Communications, vol. 11, no. 1, 1, Nature Publishing Group, 06/19/2020, p. 3107

growth increased resource use and emissions more rapidly than reduced through tech cultures inhibit necessary change scientists’ warn of degradation to life-sustaining functions failed solutions pose existential threats Holistic studies involve life-cycle assessment not only count direct but also indirect impacts along global supply chains because outsourcing undermine abatement on CO2 materials pollution , biod nitrogen water or energy Many studies yield clear ev that consumption is the strongest determinant dwarfing other s Absolute decoupling, let alone Kuznets does not occur growth have outrun tech for the world as well as individual countries The overwhelming ev is tech face an uphill battle To avoid irreversible damage will need global rapid decoupling highly unlikely rapid enough at scale renewable energy carbon-captur and services require metals , concrete and land extraction tech limit s and rebound s aggravate the problem need to be addressed by reducing consumption, not just greening necessary for wider change movements can bring social tipping points through reinforcing feedbacks and create windows of opportunity from crises the digital rev While driving transformation remained coupled sustaining intensive patterns needed are solutions at the systems level A debate in society

worldwide growth in affluence has increased resource use and emissions far more rapidly than reduced through tech affluent citizens are responsible for most environmental impacts Any transition towards sustainability can only be effective if far-reaching lifestyle changes complement technological advancements existing societies, economies and cultures incite expansion and the structural imperative for growth inhibit s necessary societal change scientists’ warn ings confirm alarming trends of environmental degradation leading to profound changes in essential life-sustaining functions humanity has failed to find lasting solutions to these changes that pose existential threats consumption of affluent households worldwide is by far the strongest determinant and strongest accelerator of increases of global environmental and social impacts Holistic studies of the environmental or social consequences of consumption usually involve the use of life-cycle assessment or input-output analysis that do not only ac count for direct on-site, within-territory but importantly also include indirect impacts occurring along global and complete supply chains 8 use of such methods is important, because failing to detect the outsourcing of indirect impacts has the potential to seriously undermine global environmental abatement efforts The implications of consumption on scarce energy resources was confirmed by many consumption -based analyses on indicators as varied as CO2 raw materials pollution , biod iversity, nitrogen scarce water use or energy Many of these studies employed multiple regression yield ing clear ev idence that consumption is by far the strongest determinant of global impacts, dwarfing other socio-economic–demographic factor s such as age, household size, qualification or dwelling structure Whilst the strength of the proportionality between consumption and impact decreases slightly towards higher incomes (measured by so-called elasticities), consumption was found to be a consistently positive driver the impact in tensity of consumption decreases, but absolute impacts increase towards higher consumption . Absolute decoupling, let alone an inverted-U-type Kuznets relationship , does not occur For some social indicators, causal associations between consumption and impact are weak or non-existent. For example, withdrawing consumption from countries with unequal wages, child labour, corruption or severe occupational hazards may not influence those conditions, and might even exacerbate social problems. consumption growth have mostly outrun any beneficial effects of changes in tech nology over the past few decades results hold for the entire world as well as for numerous individual countries The overwhelming ev idence is that globally , burgeoning consumption has diminished or cancelled out gains Furthermore, low-income groups are rapidly occupying middle- and high-income brackets around the world. This can further exacerbate the impacts of mobility-related consumption, which has been shown to disproportionately increase with income the elasticity is larger than one This means that if consumption is not addressed tech nological solutions will face an uphill battle they not only have to bring about reductions of impact but will also need to counteract the effects of growing consumption and affluence To avoid further deterioration and irreversible damage there will need to be a global and rapid decoupling it is highly unlikely that such will occur rapid ly enough at global scale and for other environmental impacts because renewable energy , electrification carbon-captur ing technologies and even services all have resource require ments, mostly in the form of metals , concrete and land 31 Rising energy demand and costs of resource extraction tech nical limit ation s and rebound effect s aggravate the problem 28 policy makers have to acknowledge the fact that addressing environmental breakdown may require a downscaling of production and consumption Since the level of consumption determines total impacts, affluence need s to be addressed by reducing consumption, not just greening it prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence but have led to enormous increases in inequality , financial instability , resource consumption and environmental pressures in the affluent countries a persistent, deep and widespread reduction of consumption and production would reduce economic growth as measured by GDP In response drivers of affluence Degrowth defined as “an equitable downscaling of throughput with a concomitant securing of wellbeing aimed at a subsequent downscaled steady-state economic system that is socially just and in balance with ecological limits. does not aim for a reduction of GDP per se, but rather accepts it as a likely outcome of the necessary changes78 transition initiatives prefigur the transformation as well as cultural and value changes a necessary precondition for wider radical change It is important to recognise the pivotal role of movements in this process, which can bring forward social tipping points through complex reinforcing feedbacks and create windows of opportunity from crises Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor. Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se. the digital rev olution —and more broadly the Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) with converging, step-change innovations in digital technology, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, 3D- printing, biotechnology and nanotechnology—has been touted as an enabler of absolute decoupling While digitalisation is already a key driving force in societal transformation , it has so far led to more consumption and inequality and remained coupled with the indirect use of energy and materials, therefore sustaining resource- intensive and greenhouse-gas growth patterns While the digital revolution undoubtedly increases labour productivity it remains to be seen whether the same is true for resource productivity Even if the FIR were to achieve absolute decoupling, this would come at a potentially high risk for privacy, liberty, data sovereignty, civic rights, security, equality and democracy What is needed are convincing and viable solutions at the systems level A wide debate in society is necessary The necessary alternative futures need to be envisioned and shared

affluence increased resource use emissions far more rapidly reduced tech most environmental impacts only be effective far-reaching lifestyle changes expansion imperative for growth inhibit warn degradation life-sustaining functions failed existential threats affluent strongest determinant strongest accelerator Holistic life-cycle only count direct indirect global complete supply chains failing outsourcing undermine global environmental abatement efforts CO2 materials pollution biod nitrogen water energy Many studies yield clear ev strongest determinant dwarfing other s consistently positive driver absolute increase higher consumption Absolute alone inverted-U-type Kuznets relationship not occur exacerbate outrun any beneficial effects tech entire world individual countries overwhelming ev globally diminished cancelled out gains middle- and high-income brackets further exacerbate increase with income larger than one consumption tech face an uphill battle counteract further deterioration irreversible damage global and rapid decoupling highly unlikely rapid enough global scale renewable electrification carbon-captur services require metals concrete land energy demand extraction tech limit s rebound s aggravate downscaling of production and consumption consumption need reducing not just greening it inequality instability resource consumption environmental pressures reduce economic growth GDP drivers Degrowth steady-state economic system socially just balance transition initiatives prefigur transformation cultural value changes precondition movements social tipping points complex reinforcing feedbacks windows of opportunity crises not be achieved exploit nature growth not be achieved prevents necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation digital rev touted enabler of absolute decoupling transformation more consumption and inequality remained coupled sustaining resource- intensive and greenhouse-gas growth patterns labour resource needed convincing and viable solutions at the systems level debate in society alternative futures envisioned shared

['Abstract', 'For over half a century, worldwide growth in affluence has continuously increased resource use and pollutant emissions far more rapidly than these have been reduced through better technology. The affluent citizens of the world are responsible for most environmental impacts and are central to any future prospect of retreating to safer environmental conditions. We summarise the evidence and present possible solution approaches. Any transition towards sustainability can only be effective if far-reaching lifestyle changes complement technological advancements. However, existing societies, economies and cultures incite consumption expansion and the structural imperative for growth in competitive market economies inhibits necessary societal change.', 'Introduction', 'Recent scientists’ warnings confirm alarming trends of environmental degradation from human activity, leading to profound changes in essential life-sustaining functions of planet Earth1,2,3. The warnings surmise that humanity has failed to find lasting solutions to these changes that pose existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies and call for action by governments and individuals.', 'The warnings aptly describe the problems, identify population, economic growth and affluence as drivers of unsustainable trends and acknowledge that humanity needs to reassess the role of growth-oriented economies and the pursuit of affluence1,2. However, they fall short of clearly identifying the underlying forces of overconsumption and of spelling out the measures that are needed to tackle the overwhelming power of consumption and the economic growth paradigm4.', 'This perspective synthesises existing knowledge and recommendations from the scientific community. We provide evidence from the literature that consumption of affluent households worldwide is by far the strongest determinant and the strongest accelerator of increases of global environmental and social impacts. We describe the systemic drivers of affluent overconsumption and synthesise the literature that provides possible solutions by reforming or changing economic systems. These solution approaches range from reformist to radical ideas, including degrowth, eco-socialism and eco-anarchism. Based on these insights, we distil recommendations for further research in the final section.', 'Affluence as a driver of environmental and social impacts', 'The link between consumption and impacts', 'There exists a large body of literature in which the relationship between environmental, resource and social impacts on one hand, and possible explanatory variables on the other, is investigated. We review and summarise those studies that holistically assess the impact of human activities, in the sense that impacts are not restricted to the home, city, or territory of the individuals, but instead are counted irrespective of where they occur. Such an assessment perspective is usually referred to as consumption-based accounting, or footprinting5.', 'Allocating environmental impacts to consumers is consistent with the perspective that consumers are the ultimate drivers of production, with their purchasing decisions setting in motion a series of trade transactions and production activities, rippling along complex international supply-chain networks5. However, allocating impacts to consumers does not necessarily imply a systemic causal understanding of which actor should be held most responsible for these impacts. Responsibility may lie with the consumer or with an external actor, like the state, or in structural relations between actors. Scholars of sustainable consumption have shown that consumers often have little control over environmentally damaging decisions along supply chains6, however they often do have control over making a consumption decision in the first place. Whilst in Keynesian-type economics consumer demand drives production, Marxian political economics as well as environmental sociology views the economy as supply dominated7. In this paper, we highlight the measurement of environmental impacts of consumption, while noting that multiple actors bear responsibility.', 'Holistic studies of the environmental or social consequences of consumption usually involve the use of life-cycle assessment or input-output analysis that do not only account for direct (on-site, within-territory) but importantly also include indirect impacts occurring along global and complete supply chains8,9. The use of such methods is important, because failing to detect the outsourcing of indirect impacts (also called spill overs or leakage) has the potential to seriously undermine global environmental abatement efforts, e.g. on climate change10.', 'A significant proportionality between consumption and impact exists for a large range of environmental, resource and social indicators. The implications of consumption on scarce energy resources emerged already in the 1970s and was confirmed by many consumption-based analyses on indicators as varied as CO2 emissions, raw materials, air pollution, biodiversity, nitrogen emissions, scarce water use or energy5,11. Many of these studies employed multiple regression or similar techniques, yielding clear evidence for our first finding: that consumption is by far the strongest determinant of global impacts, dwarfing other socio-economic–demographic factors such as age, household size, qualification or dwelling structure12,13,14,15. Whilst the strength of the proportionality between consumption and impact decreases slightly towards higher incomes (measured by so-called elasticities), consumption was found to be a consistently positive driver. In other words, the impact intensity of consumption decreases, but absolute impacts increase towards higher consumption. Absolute decoupling, let alone an inverted-U-type Kuznets relationship, does not occur from a consumption-based accounting perspective11,16,17.', 'For some social indicators, causal associations between consumption and impact are weak or non-existent. For example, withdrawing consumption from countries with unequal wages, child labour, corruption or severe occupational hazards may not influence those conditions, and might even exacerbate social problems. Footprint studies on these indicators nevertheless characterise consumers of commodities from socially problematic origins as being implicated with detrimental impacts9,18,19,20.', 'Trends', 'Many indicators of global environmental and social impacts have been monitored over time, and time series data exist5. Numerous global studies decomposing time series of footprints of consumption into drivers of trends have been carried out over the past decades, for example on greenhouse-gas emissions, energy use, water use, materials or mercury emissions. These studies routinely decompose global impact trends into effects due to changes in a number of factors, such as technology, the input structure of production, the product mix in consumer demand, the level of per-capita consumption or population21.', 'The majority of studies agree that by far the major drivers of global impacts are technological change and per-capita consumption11. Whilst the former acts as a more or less strong retardant, the latter is a strong accelerator of global environmental impact. Remarkably, consumption (and to a lesser extent population) growth have mostly outrun any beneficial effects of changes in technology over the past few decades. These results hold for the entire world22,23 as well as for numerous individual countries11,24,25,26. Figure 1 shows the example of changes in global-material footprint and greenhouse-gas emissions compared to GDP over time. The overwhelming evidence from decomposition studies is that globally, burgeoning consumption has diminished or cancelled out any gains brought about by technological change aimed at reducing environmental impact11.', '', '', 'Shown is how the global material footprint (MF, equal to global raw material extraction) and global CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO2 FFI) changed compared with global GDP (constant 2010 USD). Indexed to 1 in 1990. Data sources: https://www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database, http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org and https://data.worldbank.org.', 'Furthermore, low-income groups are rapidly occupying middle- and high-income brackets around the world. This can potentially further exacerbate the impacts of mobility-related consumption, which has been shown to disproportionately increase with income (i.e. the elasticity is larger than one27). This means that if consumption is not addressed in future efforts for mitigating environmental impact, technological solutions will face an uphill battle, in that they not only have to bring about reductions of impact but will also need to counteract the effects of growing consumption and affluence28,29.', 'To avoid further deterioration and irreversible damage to natural and societal systems, there will need to be a global and rapid decoupling of detrimental impacts from economic activity. Whilst a number of countries in the global North have recently managed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions while still growing their economies30, it is highly unlikely that such decoupling will occur more widely in the near future, rapidly enough at global scale and for other environmental impacts11,17. This is because renewable energy, electrification, carbon-capturing technologies and even services all have resource requirements, mostly in the form of metals, concrete and land31. Rising energy demand and costs of resource extraction, technical limitations and rebound effects aggravate the problem28,32,33. It has therefore been argued that “policy makers have to acknowledge the fact that addressing environmental breakdown may require a direct downscaling of economic production and consumption in the wealthiest countries”17,p.5. We will address this argument in the section on systemic drivers and possible solutions.', 'International disparities', 'In what follows, we will explain why we characterise consumption as affluence. Inequality is commonly described by the Gini index, with 0 characterising total equality (all individuals equal) and 100 representing total inequality (one individual owning everything). World countries’ Gini indices of income inequality range between 25 (Scandinavia) and 63 (Southern Africa)34. The world’s Gini index of income inequality is around 75, higher than the corresponding index of any national population. Simply put, the world as a whole is more unequal than any individual country.', 'Since income is strongly linked with consumption, and consumption is in turn linked with impact (see previous section), we can expect existing income inequalities to translate into equally significant impact inequalities. Indeed, environmental, resource and social impacts are exerted unequally across the world population. Teixido-Figueras et al.35 report that international Gini coefficients for CO2 emissions, material consumption and net primary productivity (both measured from a production and consumption perspective) range between 35 and 60. These values mean that the world’s top 10% of income earners are responsible for between 25 and 43% of environmental impact. In contrast, the world’s bottom 10% income earners exert only around 3–5% of environmental impact35. These findings mean that environmental impact is to a large extent caused and driven by the world’s rich citizens36. Considering that the lifestyles of wealthy citizens are characterised by an abundance of choice, convenience and comfort, we argue that the determinant and driver we have referred to in previous sections as consumption, is more aptly labelled as affluence.', 'Teixido-Figueras et al.35 also find that carbon emissions and material use are globally more unequally distributed when accounted for as footprints. In contrast to territorial allocations, footprints attribute environmental burdens to the final consumer, no matter where the initial environmental pressure has occurred. Here, international trade is responsible for shifting burdens from mostly low-income developing-world producers to high-income developed-world consumers37. This phenomenon of outsourcing appears to exacerbate global disparities, at least in carbon emissions and material use contexts.', 'Systemic drivers and possible solutions', 'As the previous section shows, there is a positive relationship between biophysical resource use and affluence, as defined by income. Adding to this, the most affluent groups have higher incomes than expenditure, and their saving and investing leads to substantial additional environmental impact38. Therefore, and due to significant inter- and intra-national wealth and income inequality36,39, we differentiate between globally affluent groups, such as the European Union, and the most wealthy and affluent groups within countries, e.g. the <1–10% richest income segments36. As quantitative research36,40,41 shows, highly affluent consumers drive biophysical resource use (a) directly through high consumption, (b) as members of powerful factions of the capitalist class and (c) through driving consumption norms across the population. The next sections focus on affluent groups globally and on the intra-nationally most wealthy and affluent segments (hereafter called super-affluent).', 'Reducing overconsumption', 'Since the level of consumption determines total impacts, affluence needs to be addressed by reducing consumption, not just greening it17,28,29. It is clear that prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support systems42. A suitable concept to address the ecological dimension is the widely established avoid-shift-improve framework outlined by Creutzig et al.43. Its focus on the end-use service, such as mobility, nutrition or shelter, allows for a multi-dimensional analysis of potential impact reductions beyond sole technological change. This analysis can be directed at human need satisfaction or decent living standards—an alternative perspective put forward for curbing environmental crises44,45. Crucially, this perspective allows us to consider different provisioning systems (e.g. states, markets, communities and households) and to differentiate between superfluous consumption, which is consumption that does not contribute to needs satisfaction, and necessary consumption which can be related to satisfying human needs. It remains important to acknowledge the complexities surrounding this distinction, as touched upon in the sections on growth imperatives below. Still, empirically, human needs satisfaction shows rapidly diminishing returns with overall consumption45,46.', 'As implied by the previous section on affluence as a driver, the strongest pillar of the necessary transformation is to avoid or to reduce consumption until the remaining consumption level falls within planetary boundaries, while fulfilling human needs17,28,46. Avoiding consumption means not consuming certain goods and services, from living space (overly large homes, secondary residences of the wealthy) to oversized vehicles, environmentally damaging and wasteful food, leisure patterns and work patterns involving driving and flying47. This implies reducing expenditure and wealth along ‘sustainable consumption corridors’, i.e. minimum and maximum consumption standards48,49 (Fig. 2). On the technological side, reducing the need for consumption can be facilitated by changes such as increasing lifespans of goods, telecommunication instead of physical travel, sharing and repairing instead of buying new, and house retrofitting43.', '[[FIGURE OMITTED]]', 'Sustainable lifestyles are situated between an upper limit of permissible use (“Environmental ceiling”) and a lower limit of necessary use of environmental resources (“Social foundation”) (figures from ref. 49 and ref. 84 combined and adapted).', 'However, the other two pillars of shift and improve are still vital to achieve the socio-ecological transformation46. Consumption patterns still need to be shifted away from resource and carbon-intensive goods and services, e.g. mobility from cars and airplanes to public buses and trains, biking or walking, heating from oil heating to heat pumps, nutrition—where possible—from animal to seasonal plant-based products43,46. In some cases this includes a shift from high- to low-tech (with many low-tech alternatives being less energy intense than high-tech equivalents, e.g. clothes line vs. dryer) and from global to local47. In parallel, also the resource and carbon intensity of consumption needs to be decreased, e.g. by expanding renewable energy, electrifying cars and public transport and increasing energy and material efficiency43,46.', 'The avoid-shift-improve framework, coherently applied with a dominant avoid and strong shift, implies the adoption of less affluent, simpler and sufficiency-oriented lifestyles to address overconsumption—consuming better but less46,47,49,50. This also includes addressing socially unsustainable underconsumption in impoverished communities in both less affluent and affluent countries, where enough and better is needed to achieve a more equal distribution of wealth and guarantee a minimum level of prosperity to overcome poverty48,49. Thus, establishing a floor-and-ceiling strategy of sustainable consumption corridors is necessary48,49 (Fig. 2).', 'It is well established that at least in the affluent countries a persistent, deep and widespread reduction of consumption and production would reduce economic growth as measured by gross domestic product (GDP)51,52. Estimates of the needed reduction of resource and energy use in affluent countries, resulting in a concomitant decrease in GDP of similar magnitude, range from 40 to 90%53,54. Bottom-up studies, such as from Rao et al.55 show that decent living standards could be maintained in India, Brazil and South Africa with around 90% less per-capita energy use than currently consumed in affluent countries. Trainer56, for Australia, and Lockyer57, for the USA, find similar possible reductions. In current capitalist economies such reduction pathways would imply widespread economic recession with a cascade of currently socially detrimental effects, such as a collapse of the stock market, unemployment, firm bankruptcies and lack of credit50,58. The question then becomes how such a reduction in consumption and production can be made socially sustainable, safeguarding human needs and social function50,59 However, to address this question, we first need to understand the various growth imperatives of capitalist social and economic systems and the role of the super-affluent segments of society60.', 'Super-affluent consumers and growth imperatives', 'Growth imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depreciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and economic instability in the absence of it7,52,60. Following a Marxian perspective as put forward by Pirgmaier and Steinberger61, growth imperatives can be attributed to capitalism as the currently dominant socio-economic system in affluent countries7,51,62, although this is debated by other scholars52. To structure this topic, we will discuss different affected actors separately, namely corporations, states and individuals, following Richters and Siemoneit60. Most importantly, we address the role of the super-affluent consumers within a society, which overlap with powerful fractions of the capitalist class. From a Marxian perspective, this social class is structurally defined by its position in the capitalist production process, as financially tied with the function of capital63. In capitalism, workers are separated from the means of production, implying that they must compete in labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to earn a living.', 'Even though some small- and medium-sized businesses manage to refrain from pursuing growth, e.g. due to a low competition intensity in niche markets, or lack of financial debt imperatives, this cannot be said for most firms64. In capitalism, firms need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy more7,61,62. As a result, the average energy intensity of labour is now twice as high as in 195060. As long as a firm has a competitive advantage, there is a strong incentive to sell as much as possible. Financial markets are crucial to enable this constant expansion by providing (interest-bearing) capital and channelling it where it is most profitable58,61,63. If a firm fails to stay competitive, it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth dynamics7,62,63,65.', 'However, two factors exist that further strengthen this growth dynamic60. Firstly, if labour productivity continuously rises, then aggregate economic growth becomes necessary to keep employment constant, otherwise technological unemployment results. This creates one of the imperatives for capitalist states to foster aggregate growth, since with worsening economic conditions and high unemployment, tax revenues shrink, e.g. from labour and value-added taxes, while social security expenditures rise60,62. Adding to this, states compete with other states geopolitically and in providing favourable conditions for capital, while capitalists have the resources to influence political decisions in their favour. If economic conditions are expected to deteriorate, e.g. due to unplanned recession or progressive political change, firms can threaten capital flight, financial markets react and investor as well as consumer confidence shrink51,58,60. Secondly, consumers usually increase their consumption in tune with increasing production60. This process can be at least in part explained by substantial advertising efforts by firms47,52,66. However, further mechanisms are at play as explained further below.', 'Following this analysis, it is not surprising that the growth paradigm is hegemonic, i.e. the perception that economic growth solves all kinds of societal problems, that it equals progress, power and welfare and that it can be made practically endless through some form of supposedly green or sustainable growth59. Taken together, the described dynamics create multiple dependencies of workers, firms and states on a well-functioning capital accumulation and thus wield more material, institutional and discursive power (e.g. for political lobbying) to capitalists who are usually the most affluent consumers61,67. Even if different fractions of the capitalist class have manifold and competing interests which need to be constantly renegotiated, there is a common interest in maintaining the capitalist system and favourable conditions for capital accumulation, e.g. through aggregate growth and high consumption51,62. How this political corruption by the super-affluent plays out in practice is well documented, e.g. for the meat industry in Denmark6.', 'Super-affluent consumers drive consumption norms', 'Growth imperatives and drivers (with the latter describing less coercive mechanisms to increase consumption) can also be active at the individual level. In this case, the level of consumption can serve as a proxy47,60,68. To start with, individual consumption decisions are not made in a vacuum, but are shaped by surrounding (physical and social) structures and provisioning systems47,61,69. Sanne66 and Alexander47 discuss several structural barriers to sufficiency-oriented lifestyles, locking in high consumption. These include lack of suitable housing, insufficient options for socialising, employment, transport and information, as well as high exposure to consumer temptations. Often, these conditions are deliberately fostered by states and also capitalists (the latter overlapping with super-affluent consumers and having disproportionate influence on states) to increase consumption61,66.', 'Further active mechanisms to spur growth include positional and efficiency consumption, which contribute to an increase in consumption overall52,60,68,70. After basic material needs are satisfied, an increasing proportion of consumption is directed at positional goods52,70. The defining feature of these goods is that they are expensive and signify social status. Access to them depends on the income relative to others. Status matters, since empirical studies show that currently relative income is one of the strongest determinants of individual happiness52. In the aggregate however, the pursuit of positional consumption, driven by super-affluent consumers and high inequalities, likely resembles a zero-sum game with respect to societal wellbeing70,71. With every actor striving to increase their position relative to their peers, the average consumption level rises and thus even more expensive positional goods become necessary, while the societal wellbeing level stagnates42,71. This is supported by a large body of empirical research, showing that an individual’s happiness correlates positively with their own income but negatively with the peer group’s income71 and that unequal access to positional goods fosters rising consumption52. This endless process is a core part of capitalism as it keeps social momentum and consumption high with affluent consumers driving aspirations and hopes of social ascent in low-affluence segments70,72. The positional consumption behaviour of the super-affluent thus drives consumption norms across the population, for instance through their excessive air travel, as documented by Gössling73.', 'Lastly, in capitalism, workers must compete against each other in the labour market in order to earn a living from capitalists7,63. Following Siemoneit68, this can lead to a similar imperative to net invest (increase the level of consumption/investment) as is observed with capitalists. In order to stay competitive, individuals are pushed to increase time and cost efficiency by investing in cars, kitchen appliances, computers and smartphones, by using social media and online trade etc. This efficiency consumption—effectively another facet of the rebound effect38,47,68—helps to manage high workloads, thus securing an income, while maintaining private life. This is often accompanied by trends of commodification61, understood as the marketisation of products and services which used to be provisioned through more time-intensive commons or reciprocal social arrangements, e.g. convenience food vs. cooking together. As in the food example74, this replacement of human labour with energy- and material-intensive industrial production typically increases environmental pressures47,75. Through these economic pressures, positive feedback loops and lock-ins are expected to emerge, since other consumers need to keep up with these investments or face disadvantages, e.g. when car or smartphone ownership become presupposed. Taken together with positional consumption, structural barriers to sufficiency and the substantial advertising efforts by capitalists, these mechanisms explain to a large extent why consumers seem so willing to increase their consumption in accordance with increasing production60.', 'Solution approaches', 'In response to the aforementioned drivers of affluence, diverse solution approaches and strategies are being discussed47,52,76. We differentiate these as belonging to a more reformist and a more radical group (Table 1). This is based on the categorisation by Alexander and Rutherford77. All these approaches differ from the established green growth (ecomodernism) approach28,78,79, in that they at least adopt an agnostic, if not negative, position on the question whether or not GDP can be sufficiently decoupled from environmental impacts28,52,78,80. Hence, these approaches also differ from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), since SDG 8 aims for continued global GDP growth of ~3% p.a., likely contradicting several other SDGs, e.g. SDG 12 and 1381,82,83. Further, the SDGs are not representing a theoretically coherent framework, since they are part of a deliberative process45, and sideline underlying power dynamics as well as interactions between injustices83. Nevertheless, approaches underpinned by multi-dimensional social wellbeing and environmental goals, such as Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics84, are strong alternatives to GDP-focused ones and may inspire transformative change in the context of the more reformist solution approaches outlined below. Importantly, the following discussion can only provide a rough overview of the respective approaches.', '[[TABLE OMITTED]]', 'The reformist group consists of heterogeneous approaches such as a-growth80, precautionary/pragmatic post-growth52, prosperity42 and managing85 without growth as well as steady-state economics86. These approaches have in common that they aim to achieve the required socio-ecological transformation through and within today’s dominant institutions, such as centralised democratic states and market economies52,77. From this position it often follows that current, socially vital institutions, such as the welfare state, labour markets, healthcare, pensions and others, need to be reformed to become independent from GDP growth52. Generally, bottom-up movements are seen as crucial, leading to value and cultural changes towards sufficiency42,47. Eventually, however, significant policy changes are proposed to achieve the necessary downshifting of consumption and production42,77,86 and/or the reduction of environmental impacts through decoupling52,80. These include, among others, stringent eco-taxes or cap-and trade systems, directed investments in green industries and public institutions, wealth redistribution through taxation and a maximum income, a guaranteed basic income and/or reduced working hours42,77. Although these policies already seem radical when compared to today’s policies, the proponents of reformist approaches are convinced that the transformation can be achieved in current capitalist economies and democratic states42,77,86.', 'The second, more radical, group disagrees and argues that the needed socio-ecological transformation will necessarily entail a shift beyond capitalism and/or current centralised states. Although comprising considerable heterogeneity77, it can be divided into eco-socialist approaches, viewing the democratic state as an important means to achieve the socio-ecological transformation51,65 and eco-anarchist approaches, aiming instead at participatory democracy without a state, thus minimising hierarchies54,87. Many degrowth approaches combine elements of the two, but often see a stronger role for state action than eco-anarchists50,51,88. Degrowth is defined here as “an equitable downscaling of throughput [that is the energy and resource flows through an economy, strongly coupled to GDP], with a concomitant securing of wellbeing“59,p7, aimed at a subsequent downscaled steady-state economic system that is socially just and in balance with ecological limits. Importantly, degrowth does not aim for a reduction of GDP per se, but rather accepts it as a likely outcome of the necessary changes78. Moreover, eco-feminist approaches highlight the role of patriarchal social relations and the parallels between the oppression of women and exploitation of nature89, while post-development approaches stress the manifold and heterogeneous visions of achieving such a socio-ecological transformation globally, especially in the global South90.', 'Degrowth advocates propose similar policy changes as the reformist group50,80. However, it is stressed that implementing these changes would most likely imply a shift beyond capitalism, e.g. preventing capital accumulation through dis-economies of scale and collective firm ownership, and thus require radical social change59,62,91. Eco-socialists usually focus more on rationing, planning of investments and employment, price controls and public ownership of at least the most central means of production to plan their downscaling in a socially sustainable way65,77.', 'Both groups agree on the crucial role of bottom-up movements to change culture and values, push for the implementation of these top-down changes and establish parts of the new economy within the old47,50. Finally, eco-anarchists do not view the state as a central means to achieve the socio-ecological transformation. Instead, they stress the role of bottom-up grassroots initiatives, such as transition initiatives and eco-villages, in prefiguring the transformation as well as cultural and value changes as a necessary precondition for wider radical change. With these initiatives scaling up, the state might get used to remove barriers and to support establishing a participatory-democratic and localised post-capitalist economy54,77.', 'In summary, there seems to be some strategic overlap between reformist and the more radical eco-anarchist and eco-socialist approaches, at least in the short term77. The question remains how these solution approaches help in overcoming the capitalist dynamics previously outlined, since here bottom-up and governmental action seem to be limited. It is important to recognise the pivotal role of social movements in this process, which can bring forward social tipping points through complex, unpredictable and reinforcing feedbacks92,93 and create windows of opportunity from crises77,94.', 'New research directions', 'The evidence is clear. Long-term and concurrent human and planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic systems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, international trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its impact to the global poor. Not only can a sufficient decoupling of environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utilisation per se.', 'In this context, the digital revolution—and more broadly the Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) with converging, step-change innovations in digital technology, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, 3D-printing, biotechnology and nanotechnology—has been touted as an enabler of absolute decoupling through sheer exponential efficiency gains95. While digitalisation is already a key driving force in societal transformation, it has so far led to more consumption and inequality and remained coupled with the indirect use of energy and materials, therefore sustaining resource-intensive and greenhouse-gas growth patterns at the macro-economic level17,96. While the digital revolution undoubtedly increases labour productivity—demonstrated by individual leading businesses showing a strong productivity paradox—it remains to be seen whether the same is true for resource productivity, and this will depend on governance and regulation. Even if the FIR were to achieve absolute decoupling, this would come at a potentially high risk for privacy, liberty, data sovereignty, civic rights, security, equality and democracy96,97.', 'What is needed are convincing and viable solutions at the systems level that can be followed. We call for the scientific community across all disciplines to identify and support solutions with multidisciplinary research, for the public to engage in broad discussions about solutions and for policy makers to implement and enable solutions in policy processes. Based on the literature reviewed above we identify the following areas in need of further research. This list is not exhaustive or even fully conclusive, but rather meant to be the start of a continuous debate to frame future agendas of research and actions that need to be discussed and criticised.', 'Research to advance basic academic understanding', 'Can inspiring visions for a sustainable life in prosperity, but within planetary limits and with less material affluence be formulated and demonstrated? How can fundamental changes in lifestyles of the affluent part of the human population be motivated and sustained?', 'The interface between materially downshifted lifestyles and the social environment (institutions, values, norms and governance) needs special attention. Which circumstances will allow for and support widespread shifts in lifestyles? What are the institutional, cultural and individual barriers to adopting lifestyle changes and how can they be overcome? What is the role of social groups, organisations and bottom-up movements? Can we learn from societies, e.g. indigenous and pre-industrial societies, which managed to live without economic growth?', 'So far, steady-state, degrowth or a-growth concepts have not practically been implemented on larger scales. Research on the environmental and social sustainability of these propositions is necessary (see e.g. ref. 78). Can a transition to reduced and changed consumption be achieved while at the same time keeping economic and social stability? What are the implications on work, employment and population growth? How can social security be maintained and equality be increased? What are the consequences for trade and for the global South in particular?', 'The scientific community should develop scenarios and possible pathways of strong sustainable consumption and production with upper and lower limits as suggested by the floor-and-ceiling framework, or sustainable consumption corridors48,49,91,98. These need to feature reduced physical throughput (possibly resulting in reduced GDP) and recomposing consumption99 with a simultaneous social reorientation of people, institutions and governments. Suitable indicators and scenarios based on interdisciplinary research need to be implemented to monitor progress100.', 'Research on societal changes for citizens and communities', 'One first and immediate action anyone can take is to talk about overconsumption, i.e. current levels of consumption by most people in the global North, and how it is unsustainable and unethical or unjust. A wide debate in society, research and policy is necessary. Many people do not see themselves being part of either the problem or the solution, but look for governments, technology and/or businesses to solve the problem. The necessary alternative futures need to be discussed, envisioned and shared. It is important to create a sense of collective responsibility and action. Social sciences research and approaches can help by creating, providing and sharing concepts, experiences and platforms where public debates and dialogues take place. People who have already downshifted should be enabled to share their motivations and experiences to break through stigma and isolation, as would activists building a larger popular movement on climate action.']

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